Leo Donofrio - Quo Warranto Expanded

Leo Donofrio – Quo Warranto
Misconceptions About Quo Warranto

Posted in Uncategorized on November 26, 2009 by naturalborncitizen
http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/
There is quite a bit of confusion regarding the federal quo warranto statute
(http://tinyurl.com/yg7humv). Since the statute will most likely be invoked by private citizens
in the near future, I will discuss some of the confusion floating about. Recently, Mario Apuzzo
Esq. added to the confusion with a blog post (http://tinyurl.com/yl5anlb) that contains multiple
misconceptions regarding the federal quo warranto statute and applicable case law.
I know Mr. Apuzzo is an honorable attorney and an intelligent man. I do not want my readers
to get the impression that I am advocating otherwise. Regardless, it is necessary for me to
strongly counter the impression his recent report has given the public.
I will ask that readers please bone up on the exhaustive work I published back in March which
Mr. Apuzzo failed to acknowledge in his post. My previous three part series can be found at
the following links:
Quo Warranto Legal Brief – Part 1 (below, page 10)
I will draw from these previous publications to correct Apuzzo’s recent mistakes.
Mr. Apuzzo stated on November 9th, 2009:
Before we begin, we must understand that a quo warranto action is a direct

attack on an office holder, questioning his qualifications to hold an office and
therefore his warrant and authority to occupy that office. It does not challenge
any action taken by that person while having been in office. This type of action
is to be distinguished from one where the plaintiff brings an indirect attack
(collateral attack) against that office holder, arguing that some action taken by
him or her is invalid because he or she is not qualified to hold the office from
which the action is taken… Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C.Cir.1984). As
we shall see below, this distinction is important, for it can be argued that direct
attacks must satisfy the requirements of a quo warranto action while indirect
attacks must satisfy the requirements of the de facto officer doctrine. Mr.
Donofrio does not explain which one of these approaches he proposes to take
against Obama.
I have discussed the difference between collateral attacks and direct attacks in quo warranto
on multiple occasions going all the way back to March 2009 when I introduced my readers to
the important DC Court of Appeals case – Andrade v. Lauer:
Page 1 of 35
- Under the holding in ANDRADE v. LAUER, 729 F.2d 1475, 234 U.S.App.D.C.
384 (1984), (http://tinyurl.com/y9d5saq) the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has held that the defacto officer’s doctrine does not prohibit “collateral
attacks” of official actions based upon a public officer’s lack of eligibility. These
are not quo warranto suits to remove the official, they are civil suits to
challenge a specific action of that official.
In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who lost their
jobs to “reduction in force” ordinances which cut whole departments from the
Government budget. The plaintiffs sued alleging those who did the cutting were
not Constitutionally qualified to make such decisions in that their appointments
violated the appointments clause of the US Constitution.
The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other than to
bring a “direct attack” in quo warranto to remove the alleged usurper. But the
DC Court of Appeals reversed and said the plaintiffs, who had suffered real
injuries, could bring such an action on a case by case basis if they could prove
their injury in fact (being fired) was caused by a Government official who was
not eligible to serve.
The false implication from Mr. Apuzzo’s recent article is that I haven’t considered the
difference between direct and collateral attacks. I certainly have, as my prior reports predate
his by eight months. Apuzzo goes on to say:
Since Mr. Donofrio is proposing a quo warranto action, he must be planning a

direct attack against Obama. Mr. Donofrio fails to recognize the many
problems that exist with the quo warranto procedure that he advocates.
I have been on the record numerous times to explain the difficulties in proving one is an
“interested person” under the statute. The difficulty is covered in great detail in my previous
three part series. Apuzzo fails to acknowledge this work and then berates me as if the work
does not exist.
But the most serious deficiency in Mr. Apuzzo’s work concerns his failure to properly quote
the US Supreme Court wherein he states:
Under the standard for being an “interested person” as pronounced by Newman

v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915), in a case involving a public
office one would have to have “an interest in the office itself peculiar to
himself…” and be filing an action against another who allegedly usurped that
office. Indeed, Newman requires that the plaintiff be “actually and personally
interested” in the office and that there be another person against whom the
action is brought who has unlawfully occupied the office in question. In other
words, the plaintiff must himself make a claim to the office in order to qualify to
bring the action.
Mr. Apuzzo has ignored the most important part of the holding in the controlling US Supreme
Court case which has construed the quo warranto statute – Newman v. United States ex rel.
Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915) (http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm). His reporting here is blatantly
Page 2 of 35
mistaken. In the Newman case, the SCOTUS discussed the issue concerning who may be an
“interested person” under the statute and they left a huge barn door open on this point. Please
refresh your memories on this most important SCOTUS precedent:
For in neither case is there any intent to permit the public office to be the subject
matter of private litigation at the instance of one who has no interest therein
which differs from that of every other member of the public. The claim that this
construction makes the statute nugatory cannot be sustained, for the statute, as
already pointed out, gives a person who has been unlawfully ousted before his
term expired a right, on proof of interest, to the issuance of the writ, and there
might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would
have an interest and therefore a right to be heard.
It is that final line issued by the SCOTUS which provides the best possible access to the quo
warranto statute and the DC District Court for review of Obama’s eligibility. As readers of this
blog are fully aware, I have said over and again that somebody like former Inspector General
Walpin (http://tinyurl.com/lxedzg) – fired from his civil service position by Obama – would
have a fair chance at qualifying as an “interested person” to make a direct attack via quo
warranto upon Obama’s eligibility in the DC District Court.
Back in March I stated in Quo Warranto part 3 below:
SCOTUS held that interested persons would include persons ousted from the
office they are challenging. But they left the door open with that last line, “…and
there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would
have an interest and therefore a right to be heard.”
Mr. Apuzzo fails to mention this part of the holding in Newman, and he fails to mention my
previous discussion thereof. Furthermore, he goes on to say:
Are there any available plaintiffs at this time who fill this bill or will there be
any in the future who will do so? I know that Mr. Donofrio is now looking for a
plaintiff to retain him to bring a quo warranto action in the DC District Court.
But has he advised the public that any would-be plaintiff has to have an interest
in the office itself peculiar to himself and that he be actually and personally
interested in the office?
The record is quite clear. I have advised the public regarding the Newman case and the quo
warranto statute since March. And I have done so comprehensively whereas Mr. Apuzzo has
not. There is no excuse for Apuzzo’s ignorance of this important aspect of the Newman
holding. It greatly expands the definition of “interested person”.
Furthermore, I am not looking for plaintiffs. But plaintiffs have certainly come looking for
me. I have not directly solicited anyone. I simply stated on my blog that I was open to
speaking to persons who might fit into the statute’s requirements as defined by SCOTUS.
I have turned most who contacted me down because they did not meet the requirements
discussed by the SCOTUS in Newman. I’ve had long conversations with active military
persons. I counseled them not to bring quo warranto actions in the DC District Court since
Page 3 of 35
the holding in Newman provides no wiggle room for military plaintiffs. Our brave soldiers are
certainly interested in their Commander being eligible, but the holding in Newman is rather
strict. The court only listed two possible groups of eligible candidates for 3503 access to a
direct attack via quo warranto – those who seek the office and others who might have claims
under “the civil service laws”. Since SCOTUS went out of their way to limit this holding to
these two possible sets of persons, the chances of military persons gaining access under the
statute is remote. Not impossible but certainly remote.
Until the statute is tried by persons effected by the civil service laws, I do not
believe the military should be on the front line for this issue. And I explained
this back in March as well, stating:
I don’t believe the military are party to the civil service laws, so I don’t see them
as being the plaintiffs with the best possible standing.
Apuzzo then goes on to argue that the quo warranto statute can’t remove a sitting President,
stating:
Second, if the DC statute were to be read as Mr. Donofrio does so as to be used

as a tool to oust from office a sitting putative President, then I doubt such an
application of that statute would be constitutional. It is highly doubtful that
Congress, a co-equal branch of government to the Executive, has the
constitutional power to pass a statute which would allow a federal district court
to alone directly remove a sitting President.
I have addressed the constitutional issues in great detail in my prior reports. But this is
exactly the argument recently made by the Department of Justice before Judge Carter in
Barnett v. Obama. The DOJ argued that the quo warranto statute could not be used to remove
a sitting President. But Judge Carter did not adopt the DOJ argument in his holding in
Barnett v. Obama (http://tinyurl.com/ykfljd3). Instead, Judge Carter stated on page 25 of
that decision:
The writ of quo warranto must be brought within the District of Columbia
because President Obama holds office within that district. The quo warranto
provision codified in the District of Columbia Code provides, “A quo warranto
may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of
Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise
conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or
military.” D.C. Code §§ 16-3501 – 16-3503.
It’s very encouraging that faced with the chance to affirm the DOJ position, Judge Carter
refrained form doing so. Instead, he quotes the clear language of the statute which applies to
all United States offices. As Mr. Apuzzo is well aware, when the language of a statute is clear,
the courts have consistently refused to construe the statute otherwise. Accordingly, Judge
Carter was careful to state that “The writ of quo warranto must be brought within the District
of Columbia because President Obama holds office within that district.”
Page 4 of 35
Another mistake made by Apuzzo is his reliance upon Wilder v. Brace where he states that “a
federal court with diversity jurisdiction can hear quo warranto action“. Unfortunately,
Apuzzo fails to acknowledge that the holding in Wilder only extends to a state quo warranto
action, not a federal action. This was discussed in Tuscon v. US West
(http://tinyurl.com/ygxtufy) as follows:
Wilder v. Brace, 218 F. Supp. 863-65 (D. Me. 1963) (holding that a federal court
with diversity jurisdiction can hear a state quo warranto action).
A state quo warranto action is a very different beast than a quo warranto to remove a US
national office holder. Most of the States have their own quo warranto statutes effecting state
officers. The holding in Wilder simply clarifies that a federal court with diversity jurisdiction
applying state law may apply state quo warranto law. This is a completely different situation
than a federal quo warranto action to remove a US national office holder.
As I have pointed out in my previous reports (please review links form above), the federal
courts have consistently refused to entertain federal quo warranto actions against US national
office holders due to the very specific wording of the quo warranto statute. As stated above,
Judge Carter recently reaffirmed this to be the law.
In conclusion, I must reiterate that Mr. Apuzzo fails to quote the highest court in the land
properly and in doing so he misses the forest for the trees. Once again, SCOTUS stated in the
Newman holding:
“…there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would
have an interest and therefore a right to be heard.”
This one line is the single most important precedent concerning the issue of who may be an
“interested person” under 16-3503 of the quo warranto statute. Why Mr. Apuzzo fails to
mention it is a mystery to me. I have been educating the public thereto since March ‘09. I am
proud of my work and I stand by it.
Leo C. Donofrio
http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/
The "exchange" found Puzo writing a lengthy comment and Donofrio writing rejoinders (in brackets
after the abbreviation "Ed.") so that points (Puzo's) and counterpoints (Donofrio's) were embedded
throughout. The original had different colors which helped, insofar as LD didn't always insert an END
bracket.
puzo1 Says:
November 27, 2009 at 3:04 AM
Leo,
I am surprised that you state that I missed the Newman statement: “there might be cases under
the civil service law in which the relator would have an interest and therefore a right to be
Page 5 of 35
heard.” I did not miss this point.
[Ed. You failed to include the Newman "civil service law" quote in your long essay. You failed to
analyze it or mention it at all. You also failed to mention where the DC Court of Appeals in Andrade
also discussed the "civil service law" statement by the SCOTUS in Newman. You completely avoided
it.]
First, I will remind you that during our 5-hour, March 3, 2009 meeting in my office, I was the one
who pointed that language out to you and suggested that it may be a means by which a plaintiff
could gain standing otherwise than by being interested in the Office of President. When I raised
that point with you, you even complimented me on my theory.
[ed. I take strong issue with this assertion. That is not my recollection at all, sir. I went to your office
and explained to you that you had brought your action for quo warranto in the wrong venue. I told you
that you needed to file your request for use of the name of the United States with the AG or US
Attorney as well. I stated quite clearly to you that your case would be dismissed and it was.
Back on February 27, 2009, I made reference in my blog to the coming legal brief on Quo Warranto.
This was a full week before I met you. Even the image to my blog post of Feb. 27, 2009 is a reference
to quo warranto.]
Second, you are under the mistaken impression that a case involving the civil rights laws would
be a quo warranto action. On the contrary, any case involving the civil rights laws would not be a
quo warranto action, for the plaintiff would be challenging Obama’s action related to some
employment situation and indirectly attacking his title to office. Such an attack would be an
indirect attack (a collateral attack), not a quo warranto action which is a direct attack against the
title to office.
[ed. That's not what the SCOTUS said. They were analyzing who would be an "interested person"
under 3503 when they stated:
"The claim that this construction makes the statute nugatory cannot be sustained, for the
statute, as already pointed out, gives a person who has been unlawfully ousted before his
term expired a right, on proof of interest, to the issuance of the writ, and there might be
cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an interest and
therefore a right to be heard."
The statute being discussed is the same throughout the case and the passage. When the SCOTUS says
that there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an "interest" and a
right to be heard, they are obviously discussing standing as an "interested person" under the statute
previously mentioned in the very same sentence. To suggest otherwise is bizarre.
One is only considered a "relator" if one brings a direct attack action in the name of the United States
"ex relator" followed the name of the injured party whereas a collateral attack is brought directly in the
name of the injured party. A collateral attack is NOT brought ex relator. For example:
- the official name of the Newman case is -
Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell

Newman was a direct attack for removal of a usurper.
- the official name of the Andrade case is -
Page 6 of 35
Sharon ANDRADE et al., Appellants,

v.
Charles A. LAUER, Acting Administrator, Office of Juvenile
Justice, et al.
Andrade was a collateral attack intended to reverse a Government employee having been fired.
The "civil service law" statement made by SCOTUS in Newman refers to the "relator" having a right to
be heard under the civil service law. It is a direct attack if the suit is brought "ex relator". It is an
indirect attack if brought in ones own name and not in the name of the United States. You should
correct yourself on this important point. There is no rational argument otherwise.
The Newman quote bears repeated review. Considering the use of the term "relator" in this passage, my
analysis is completely confirmed by SCOTUS in that they did leave the barn door open to a direct
attack via quo warranto on the President's eligibility when they stated:
"...there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an
interest and therefore a right to be heard."
Clearly and unambiguously, the SCOTUS was considering a direct attack on eligibility under the quo
warranto statute by persons interested due to injuries under the civil service laws. ]
With such an indirect attack, the plaintiff would have to overcome the de facto officer doctrine
among the many other issues that would be involved in the case. Hence, the Newman statement
only has relevancy if one were planning to bring an indirect attack involving an employment
matter which is not a quo warranto action. You fail to recognize that the employment case is not
a quo warranto action. Rather, you advocate dressing a civil service employment case with quo
warranto clothing when Andrade clearly states that such an employment case does not belong in
the quo warranto matrix but rather is a collateral attack to a person’s right to hold a particular
office. Hence, you are mistaken in stating that I missed the most important part of the Newman
holding.
[Ed, You didn't just miss the most important part of Newman in your post, you also missed the most
important part of Andrade v. Lauer where the DC Court of Appeals cites the Newman holding on civil
service law applicability to direct attacks. Here, let me show you. The last line is the kicker:
In feudal times, when the writ of quo warranto originated, public offices were similar to a form of
property right, and a quo warranto action was like an action of ejectment, in which the only party who
could bring a lawsuit was a claimant who sued to regain possession from one who was unlawfully in
possession. Some courts have continued to insist that only a claimant to the defendant's office is
sufficiently "interested" to bring a quo warranto action. See Columbian Cat Fanciers, Inc. v. Koehne,
supra, 96 F.2d at 532; Application of James, supra, 241 F.Supp. at 859; cf. Newman v. United States ex
rel. Frizzell, supra, 238 U.S. at 544, 35 S.Ct. at 882 (quo warranto "came to be used as a means of
determining which of two claimants was entitled to an office"). But cf. id. at 551, 35 S.Ct. at 885
(recognizing that "there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an
interest and therefore a right to be heard")
In the last line of the above passage the court in Andrade cites to "id. at 551" which is a citation back to
the Newman case where the Andrade holding mentions the Newman civil service statement with the
Page 7 of 35
citation "cf.". "cf." means -
Cf. is used when the cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but
sufficiently analogous to lend support. The citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if
it is explained in a parenthetical.
Therefore, the DC Court of Appeals in Andrade made it clear that while the main focus of the Newman
holding was that only a person who sought the office would be an interested person, the SCOTUS in
Newman also made a contrary statement as to those effected by the civil service laws. Hence, the court
in Andrade properly made reference to the ancillary "civil service law" proposition which is different
from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support.
What's most important on this issue is that your post neither mentions the civil service law statement by
the SCOTUS in Newman nor does your report mention the civil service law statement as to Andrade
where it was quoted as well.]
I remind you that in my article I did mention that an indirect attack challenging Obama’s action
would have a better chance of getting standing than would a quo warranto direct attack under
the DC Code in the DC District Court.
[ed. You never once discussed the "civil service law" statement in Newman. You never once discussed
the "civil service law" statement from Andrade. Both Newman and Andrade quote the civil service law
caveat to the main proposition, but you never quoted it or discussed it.]
As I explained in my article, the latter presents procedural and constitutional roadblocks which
most probably cannot be overcome. In my article, I explain how the quo warranto DC Code
cannot for constitutional reasons be used to remove a putative sitting President. In your three-
part series brief you state that the DC Code used in the DC District Court is the only way to
remove such a person. This is the biggest difference between us. I would have thought that you
would have addressed this point in your response to my article rather than the other tangential
issues.
[ed. The point is addressed in my three part legal brief and the link was provided as I explained.
Readers of this blog know that I have addressed the issue you raise in numerous comments and I have
done so comprehensively. You are coming rather late to my blog with your arguments. I have seen it all
before and I do not find it persuasive at all. Furthermore, you failed to cite to my previous work dating
back to March and you provided no link thereto.]
I will also inform you that the reason for my writing my quo warranto article is that you attacked
me and the Kerchner case, publicly stating that we will fail in the courts, and criticized me for
filing an “exotic” case rather than a quo warranto case under the DC code in the DC District
Court. I do not know what could possibly be your motivation for attacking my work. I do not
understand why you would attempt to undermine the efforts of others who are earnestly working
to bring the Obama eligibility issue to justice.
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
[ed. My motivation as a legal blogger is to tell the legal truth, not to undermine your case. But if your
case is undermined by the truth that is not my problem. As to your criticism of my work, I am more
than confident the record supports that you are mistaken in your approach.
Page 8 of 35
Now, I've given you the chance to respond and I have printed your response in full. Please do not
bother responding again unless you are willing to correct yourself on the obvious mistake you've made
in interpreting the Newman and Andrade holdings. The stakes are much too high to grant any respect at
all to your obviously mistaken analysis.]
Page 9 of 35
QUO WARRANTO LEGAL BRIEF: part 1

INTRODUCTION:
Chapter 35§ 16-3501 Persons against whom issued; civil action.
A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of
Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the
United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be
deemed a civil action.
The federal statute for quo warranto was tailor made by the legislature to challenge any
person occupying any public office of the United States under questionable title thereto.
This legal brief considers all relevant issues pertaining to the proper legal use of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to determine Presidential eligibility. The brief will be sent
via regular and certified mail to Attorney General Eric Holder as well as to the US Attorney for
the District of Columbia, Mr. Jeffrey Taylor, along with an open letter requesting their direct
attention to the issues contained herein.
Please note from the start that only one of these officials need bring the action in quo
warranto. The applicable statute vests both officials with the same mutually exclusive
authority to do so. The statute requires either/or, not both. And the statute also provides a
separate mechanism by which their official consent is not necessary to an action in quo
warranto where the “third person” petitioning for the writ is also an “interested person”.
Regardless, I fear justice will never prevail on this issue. By Justice I mean that the relevant
issues will probably never be decided on the merits by any court. Yet, I believe every man
charged with the duty to uphold the law must be given his rightful chance to follow and be
guided by the rule of law. And until every effort is made to most effectively bring an action in
quo warranto, I personally can’t be satisfied I’ve done everything in my power to protect the
Constitution and the Republic. Thanks to my readers for pointing this out. (Also see my
apology to SCOTUS (http://tinyurl.com/9eomrw) for previous inflammatory comments along
with removal of noted image.)
Since an action in quo warranto is unquestionably the correct legal device to

challenge the eligibility of any public office holder and since quo warranto has
not been properly set in motion or explained to the public, this brief will attempt
to educate the public and the proper officials as to the need to resolve the Obama
POTUS eligibility issue in a single quo warranto hearing rather than subject the
nation to a floodgate of litigation from plaintiffs with proper standing to bring
collateral attacks challenging, on the basis of POTUS ineligibility, any number of
potential orders and actions to be issued by the Obama administration.
Additionally, having studied controlling quo warranto cases, I have come to the conclusion
that military plaintiffs probably do not have any special standing to institute an action for quo
Page 10 of 35
warranto which differs from the standing of the general public. Please consider that this
statement is not based on emotion but on the following;
1) the controlling statute
2) the seminal US Supreme Court decision
3) other relevant SCOTUS and federal cases
When these are examined together, it appears no special standing exists for military personnel
to institute actions in quo warranto under the statute.
However, there is a civilian subset of “third persons” who do have a viable claim to quo
warranto standing to challenge Presidential eligibility in a direct legal attack on Obama’s title
to office. And so long as this civilian subset exists, there’s no good reason to subject our
military to possible court martial by recklessly exposing them to UCMJ Article 88 violations
(http://tinyurl.com/297kut) as well as numerous other statutes which could potentially end
their careers or land them in jail.
That military personnel are being exposed to court martial via contemptuous language and
false headlines (ie, news report which erroneously stated an officer had defied a Presidential
order) is one of the strongest public policy reasons why Attorney General Holder and/or US
Attorney Taylor should be convinced to step in on their own motion, which is their
unquestionable right by statute, to request a straight forward quo warranto hearing on the
two basic core issues now in dispute.
1. Does Obama’s birth status having been governed by the British Nationality Act
of 1948, as was admitted by Obama, prevent him from satisfying the “natural
born citizen” requirement of the Constitution.
2. Should Obama be forced to present, to the District Court for the District of
Columbia, proper legal documentation to prove his place of birth by a form of
identification regularly accepted by the Government for legal purposes.
POINT I: WHETHER A WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO CAN BE ISSUED TO REMOVE A

SITTING PRESIDENT?
A. Applicability of Statute 16-3501.
§ 16-3501 applies against any person within the District of Columbia who “usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises… a public office of the United States.” Under the statute,
the writ of quo warranto is issued by the DC District Court in the name of the United States.
The seminal SCOTUS case which has interpreted this statute is Newman v. United States ex
Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915) (http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm). The opinion is truly one of
most rational and clearly written decisions in Supreme Court history and by itself serves as a
thorough education on the history of quo warranto as well as the proper statutory
interpretation. I suggest everyone read the entire case.
Page 11 of 35
According to SCOTUS, Newman at 552, the statute applies to any public office:
The Revised Statutes declare that the District of Columbia shall be the seat of
government, and “all offices attached to the seat of government shall be
exercised in the District of Columbia.” The Code …provides that the… court shall
have jurisdiction to grant quo warranto “against a person who unlawfully
holds or exercises within the District a . . . public office, civil or military.” It was
probably because of this fact that national officers might be involved that the
Attorney General of the United States was given power to institute such
proceedings…
…the District Code, in proper cases, instituted by proper officers or persons,

may be enforceable against national officers of the United States. The sections
are therefore to be treated as general laws of the United States, not as mere
local laws of the District. Being a law of general operation, it can be reviewed
on writ of error from this Court. American Co. v. Commissioners of the District,
224 U. S. 491; McGowan v. Parish, 228 U. S. 317.
Years later, any doubts as to the accuracy of this interpretation were completely nullified when
current federal statute16-3501 revised the predecessor code to include officers of “the United
States” and not just the District of Columbia.
Neither the statute nor any existing federal case provides an exception to the office of
President or any public office of the United States.
CONCLUSION: An action in Quo Warranto is the statutory legal device available

to challenge the eligibility of a sitting President.
B. Constitutionality of using the federal quo warranto statute to remove a sitting President.
There are two sections of the Constitution which allow for the removal of the President.
Article 2, Section 4 allows for impeachment (http://tinyurl.com/ydzwz55). This is the remedy
for removal of the President should he partake in high crimes or treason. A quo warranto
action as to POTUS eligibility does not appear to be covered by impeachment.
The second section of the Constitution which provides the removal of the President is Article
2, Section 1, Clause 6 (http://tinyurl.com/5kjpcj):
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,

Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.
Many have argued that only Congress can remove a sitting President and that the separation
of powers enumerated in the Constitution denies the courts any legal ability to remove a
sitting President. But with the federal quo warranto statute, Congress has delegated that
Page 12 of 35
authority to the District Court of the District of Columbia by providing for the removal of the
President (and other public officers) by quo warranto where the President is found to be a
usurper to the office even if he assumed the office with a good faith belief he was eligible.
Consider the following scenario: A quo warranto action is instituted by AG Holder or, in the
alternative, US Attorney Taylor on their own motion. In that case, there must be a hearing on
the merits (this will be explained in detail below). Further assume Obama then produces a
perfect long form birth certificate proving he was born in Hawaii, but then the District Court
of DC holds that since Obama was also a British subject at the time of his birth, he is not a
“natural born citizen” and is therefore not legally occupying the office of President. Further
assume that the DC District Court’s ruling is upheld by SCOTUS.
Under this fact pattern, Obama would not have broken any laws and so he couldn’t be
impeached, but he would be removed from office pertaining to the removal authority of
Congress enumerated in Article 2, Section 6, and so delegated by federal statute Chapter 35,
§16-3501.
CONCLUSION: Congress has provided for the removal of a sitting President

found to be ineligible by enacting the federal quo warranto statute .
POINT II: WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE AN ACTION IN QUO

WARRANTO TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELIGIBILITY OF A
SITTING PRESIDENT?
Page 13 of 35
QUO WARRANTO LEGAL BRIEF – Part 2: The

Federal Quo Warranto Statute Is The Only
Constitutional Means of Removing a Sitting President
Other Than Impeachment
[TYPO UPDATE: The first federal Quo Warranto statute was enacted in 1878 not 1787.]
[UPDATE 9:16 AM: 03.06.09: EXHIIBITS 7-9 were added below. And they are
heavyweights.]
[UPDATE: 12:30 AM: 03.06.09 EXHIBIT 6 was added below . ]
The issue of whether the President can be removed from office other than by
impeachment is the single most important question presented with regard to
challenging the eligibility of a sitting President. This section of the brief contains
important new information supporting the conclusions discussed in Part 1 of this
legal brief .
Please understand that if the Constitution limits Congressional power to remove the President
to only cases of impeachment then there is no Constitutional mechanism available to remove a
President who is proved to be a usurper. And if that’s true, then the federal quo warranto
statute doesn’t have the power to remove a sitting President… even if it was proved beyond
any doubt he was ineligible.
The best dream team of lawyers you can draft may bring all the law suits they like for the best
possible reasons in favor of the most perfectly possible plaintiffs with undeniable standing as
to injury in fact and causality, but the courts do not have the authority – under the
Constitution – to remove a sitting President. Those law suits will fail and they should fail.
In order to protect the Constitution, we must not subvert the separation of

powers.
If it can’t be done by quo warranto, then it can’t be done at all. Why?
Because Congress is the only branch authorized by the Constitution to remove the President
should he be found ineligible. And the only court Congress has delegated that power to is the
District Court of the District of Columbia, and such delegation of power is strictly limited to
actions governed by the federal quo warranto statute.
If we are going to challenge eligibility to protect the Constitution, then we certainly cannot do
an end around the separation of powers. I have recognized this from the outset and that’s why
I tried to have the eligibility issue litigated prior to election day and then again prior to the
electoral college meeting. After the electoral college met and cast its votes for Obama, he went
from being an ordinary candidate to being the President-elect.
That metamorphosis has important Constitutional consequences which cannot be ignored.

The Constitution provides that once we have a President-elect, the eligibility of that person
Page 14 of 35
can be challenged by Congress. The political question doctrine kicks in at that point and the
ability of any other branch to challenge for POTUS eligibility is probably nullified. And once
the President-elect is sworn in and assumes office, the Constitutional separation of powers
certainly controls the issue.
Recall, Congress didn’t challenge Obama’s eligibility before he was sworn in, so those
provisions are now moot. And once a person is sworn in as President, the Constitution then
provides specific means for removing the President from office, none of which grant such
power to the Judicial Branch. Now please consider the following two points:
1. Nowhere in the Constitution does it give the Judicial Branch the power to
remove a sitting President.
Those who are currently petitioning the Judicial branch to challenge Presidential eligibility are
seeking to subvert the Constitution.
They will argue Obama isn’t legally President and so therefore the Constitutional separation of
powers can be ignored. Should a court ever accept that theory, you will have the recipe for
civil war, and you will be doing more damage to the nation than you can even imagine. Protest
all you like, but the US Government recognizes his authority.
Furthermore, United States Courts all the way up to SCOTUS have refused to get involved, and
this was the case before Obama was sworn in when the Judicial Branch actually did have the
power to adjudicate the eligibility issue. They punted. Fact.
Now that Obama has taken the office of President and is officially recognized as President, no
court is going to suddenly take a leap around the separation of powers by agreeing the
Constitution doesn’t apply to Obama as President. That will never happen.
Let that sink in because it’s true.
2. Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that impeachment is the sole means of
removing the President.
Some who support Obama’s eligibility will seek to subvert the Constitution by arguing that the
Constitution states that the sole remedy for removing the President is impeachment. Nowhere
in the Document does it say that. Those who believe it must “imply” or “assume” that is the
case. But the Constitution does not state that impeachment is the sole means of removing the
President.
The Constitution (http://tinyurl.com/ynolyc) does say that Congress has the sole authority to
impeach and the Senate to convict, and that the President “shall” be removed upon conviction,
but it does not say that impeachment is the sole means of removal. You will hear people say
that it does say that in the days ahead. It is a lie.
I have uncovered a plethora of evidence – within and without the Constitution – which I
strongly believe proves that the framers provided Congress with the power to remove a
President who is found to be ineligible. This makes sense because not every person who is
found to be ineligible is guilty of a crime.
Page 15 of 35
HYPOTHETICAL:
Two double agents born in the evil nation of “KILLAMERICASTAN” sneak a

child into America over the Canadian border and later obtain false documents
indicating they are US citizens and that their child was born in the United States.
The child is raised like a Manchurian Candidate and believes his parents are US
citizens and that he was born in the US. The child grows up a gifted politician
and eventually becomes President. After being sworn in, the truth is discovered
by US Intelligence and proved beyond any doubt. The President then refuses to
leave office since he didn’t do anything wrong and had no knowledge of the plot.
What happens?
Well, the President has done nothing to be impeached. He’s not guilty of any high crimes or
misdemeanors, bribery or treason. Did the framers leave us naked in such a situation? I don’t
believe so. We will return to this shortly.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
My respect for the separation of powers in our Constitution is the core reason I was so willing
to drop the eligibility fight once the Electoral College met. I understand and respect the
Constitution. And I would never further damage it by aiding a new Constitutional crisis which
might help to bring our Republic down.
We must respect the separation of powers or we will lose the Constitution and
the Republic for which it stands.
The separation of powers argument will be the proper undoing of every single POTUS
eligibility law suit running through the courts at this moment in time. They will all fail. And
they should, because for any of them to prevail, the separation of powers would be violated.
Even in law suits where federal courts have been petitioned to request Congress investigate -
by way of mandamus – Obama’s eligibility (as opposed to seeking removal), the courts will
dismiss on the basis of separation of powers limitations and/or subject matter jurisdiction,
even if the plaintiffs were found to have passed the difficult standing tests (and that’s not
going to happen either).
While I respect the litigants and the efforts they have made, I take issue with some of the
tactics employed and I’m also not that impressed with many of the pleadings. I hope that, by
publishing this brief, I will correct some of the previous errors and provide the public at large
with the best possible education so that proper pressure can be applied to authorized
Government officials. Knowledge is power. I seek to empower you.
Should those officials not respond, I also hope the following will act as a template for any
attorneys who may wish to pursue a quo warranto petition. This should save time and
resources.
I have reached out to some of the attorneys who impressed me, but none have brought a law
suit which can succeed in light of the separation of powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Page 16 of 35
IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION?
It appears there is a Constitutionally viable method available for the eligibility issue to be
litigated which does not violate the separation of powers enumerated in the Constitution. I
strongly believe the federal quo warranto statute provides the only Constitutionally viable
means by which a sitting President can be removed from office if found to be a usurper,
whether such usurpation is intentional or unintentional. Full details and analysis below, but
first let’s discuss the following:
REVIEW OF CURRENT QUO WARRANTO ACTIVITY
As far as I can tell, only one attorney has filed for an actual quo warranto claim at this point in
time. Unfortunately, that attempt will fail as it was brought on behalf of private plaintiffs. As
you will see below, any action in quo warranto must be brought on behalf of the United States.
The attorney needed to first petition the Attorney General or US Attorney in DC to institute an
action in quo warranto. Additionally, that same action was brought in the wrong venue.
According to the statute, a quo warranto action to challenge the eligibility of a United States
officer – whether elected or appointed – can only be brought in the District Court of the
District of Columbia.
Another attorney has sent a “pre-litigation” letter to Attorney General Holder. But the statute
requires a “verified petition” be forwarded to the Attorney General and/or the US Attorney
requesting consent plaintiffs be allowed to institute a quo warranto action in the name of the
United States. No such petition has been filed.
This “letter” sent to AG Holder insists he recuse himself due to an alleged conflict of interest
since the Attorney General’s office is the designated defender of the President. But that is only
true as to the President’s official actions. A Quo warranto dispute is not related to official
activity of the President’s office. It relates to whether the President is eligible to hold the
office and that is not an “official action” undertaken by the President. The statute defines quo
warranto as a civil action. I believe the President would have to hire private counsel to defend
him.
So, there’s probably no legal conflict of interest requiring Eric Holder to recuse himself. Any
conflict of interest which exists is probably limited to the personal gratitude AG Holder may
have for Obama since he appointed him. But that’s not the type of conflict which requires
recusal. For example, a Supreme Court Justice does not have to recuse himself in a dispute
involving the President who appointed him.
It’s not fair to suggest AG holder won’t do his job because he owes personal allegiance to
Obama. I believe in fighting a fair fight even if others fight unfairly against me. It’s only fair
that the man be given the chance to do the right thing. Furthermore, no verified petition has
even been forwarded to the Attorney General’s office.
The federal quo warranto statute provides that the “United States attorney” may institute an
action in quo warranto on his own motion. The US Attorney for the District of Columbia is
Jeffrey Taylor (sic) (http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/). He was appointed to that position in
2006 by the Bush administration and certainly has no conflict of interest. I am not aware of
Page 17 of 35
anybody who has contacted US Attorney Taylor in this regard. It will only take one of those
officials to bring the action, not both.
WHY EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE PUBLIC TO PRESSURE AG

HOLDER AND US ATTORNEY TAYLOR TO INSTITUTE – ON THEIR OWN
MOTION – AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED
STATES WITHOUT EX RELATOR PLAINTIFFS
While arguments about whether the military make the best plaintiffs have been raging, the
simple truth is that a quo warranto case with the best chance of success ought to be initiated
with no private plaintiffs at all. The federal quo warranto statute shows a preference for cases
brought on behalf of the United States by the Attorney General or the US Attorney. And until
respectful pressure is applied to those officials, the nation is deprived of the most perfect
avenue to justice. Until this course of action is exhausted, I pray that all private attorneys
briefly delay requesting consent from these officials while an effort is made to persuade them
that it’s in the best interests of the nation for them to proceed on their own motion.
This is not a private issue. The controversy is raging. Nobody can deny that. AG
Holder and US Attorney Taylor need to consider that the citizens, the military,
the Government – as well as Obama himself – will all be better off once clear
title to the office is established.
§ 16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may
institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the
relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third
person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition
duly verified setting forth the grounds of the application…
In Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915)
(http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm), the Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US
attorney as follows:
The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be
corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits
those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States
and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position,
they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can
institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many
reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with
litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a
private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws
obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there
might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be
instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not
only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the
government in quo warranto proceedings.
Page 18 of 35
The modern federal statute is virtually identical except the US attorney has been included with
the Attorney General as the two officials who may “at their discretion and acting under the
sense of official responsibility… institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper.”
Such an action is so proper that despite which side of this argument you fall on, it should be
obvious the nation would be better served by having this issue settled once and for all in open
court… but not in the name of private plaintiffs who can be so easily painted as partisan.
If either official bring an action in quo warranto upon their own motion, such an
action is brought on behalf of the United States and no leave of the court is
necessary.
Comparatively, if a private attorney petitions these officials to allow them to bring suit in the
name of the US “ex relator” then even if one of the two officials gives their consent, leave of the
court must be requested and if denied, that’s it. The matter is done. One could then appeal to
SCOTUS, but SCOTUS is the last resort, not the first. There’s no need to disrespect the statute
and the resources of the court by going straight to SCOTUS. That’s just sensational, not wise.
Another interesting point to consider is that while the predecessor statute only named the
District Attorney for the District of Columbia – the modern statute which controls quo
warranto as to national officers mentions both the Attorney General and the “United States
attorney”. As written, it’s possible any US attorney might be eligible to institute such a quo
warranto action. Notice that in the statute – “attorney” isn’t capitalized in either 16-3502 or
16-3503 when the “United States attorney” is mentioned. Of course, US Attorney Taylor is
certainly authorized, but this needs further research.
Assuming AG Holder or US Attorney Taylor were to institute an action in quo warranto, the
District Court might attempt to avoid a hearing on the merits (which every court of the nation
seems hell bent upon avoiding) by claiming that the federal quo warranto statute – if applied
to the President – would violate the Constitutional separation of powers and that they are of
the opinion that the Constitution only allows removal of the President for impeachment.
If that argument can be overcome then, due to the obvious public policy benefits inherent in
establishing that the President has a clear title to the office of President, there should be no
obstacle preventing at least one of the two officials charged with the authority to act in the
name of the United States to bring this issue to the court for the benefit of the nation.
THE CONSTITUTION HAS PROVIDED CONGRESS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO

REMOVE THE PRESIDENT FROM OFFICE IN CASES OTHER THAN
IMPEACHMENT.
Evidence of this power is directly written into the Constitution. The most obvious section is
Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 which states in full:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
Page 19 of 35
shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be

elected.
Unlike in Wikipedia (http://tinyurl.com/yfpf4ez), the actual text (http://tinyurl.com/ynolyc)

of the Constitution does not apply the heading “Vacancy and Disability”. The heading is
misleading. A comprehensive investigation appears to reveal that the framers intended Article
2, Section 1, Clause 6 – as it applied to the POTUS – for two distinct purposes.
- the first purpose is the commonly accepted purpose: to provide for a vacancy in the office of
President
- the second purpose was to provide Congress a means to remove the President should it
become clear that he is not entitled to hold the office, for example – a classic quo warranto
situation or if the President becomes disabled.
I realize this is an entirely new theory of Constitutional law and that the common accepted
interpretation is that the President can only be removed by impeachment. As stated above,
the Constitution does not state anywhere in its text that impeachment is the only means by
which the President can be removed. And since the concept of demanding public officials
prove their legal warrant to hold office via the extraordinary writ of quo warranto goes back to
feudal times, nobody can deny the framers were aware that usurpation was a sad fact of life.
How likely is it that the Framers failed to provide for usurpation of public office in the
Constitution? Knowing their collective wisdom, not very likely. So please suspend judgment
until the full weight of the evidence is revealed.
EVIDENCE THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR REMOVAL OF THE

PRESIDENT BY QUO WARRANTO – SUCH POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS
If my theory is correct, then we should be looking for evidence that the Framers considered –
in their deliberations upon Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 – that impeachment was not the sole
means of ousting a sitting President. The following are my list of exhibits.
EXHIBIT 1: A perfect on point reference from James Madison’s

personal notes are included in the Records Of the Federal Convention
(http://tinyurl.com/y9mnak7):
In Case of his Impeachment, (Dismission) Removal, Death, Resignation or

Disability to discharge the Powers and Duties of his (Department) Office; the
President of the Senate shall exercise those Powers and Duties, until another
President of the United States be chosen, or until the President impeached or
disabled be acquitted, or his Disability be removed.
[2:186; Madison, 6 Aug.]
James Madison’s notes here pertain directly to Clause 6 and they list - separated by commas
– all the various possibilities whereby the President’s office might be vacated. Clearly, they
considered that the Presidency might be vacated by a “Case of Impeachment” as well as
“(Dismission) Removal, Death, Resignation, or Disability“.
Page 20 of 35
Impeachment and Dismission are listed as mutually exclusive devices to remove

the President.
EXHIBIT 2: Clause 6 directly follows the infamous Article 2, Section 1,

Clause 5 wherein the exact qualifications for the office of President are
listed.
Qualifications for office are directly followed by a clause empowering removal from office.
EXHIBIT 3: The text of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 would be

redundant unless the dual purposes listed above were intended.
Examine the first part of Clause 6 alone:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President,…
If the sole intention of the framers was that Clause 6 only applied – as to the POTUS – with
regard to replacing a vacancy then there was no need to say anymore about it – as to the
President. The first line indicates that the powers devolve upon the Vice President when a
vacancy occurs. So what’s the need for the next line?
…and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,…
In this line we see that the Framers, who in the first line already provided directly for
succession as to the President, have given Congress – in the 2nd line – the authority to “by
Law provide for the Case of Removal… ” of the President and Vice President.
Now, let’s examine the third line:
…declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Without the bias of pre-conceived notions, a balanced reading of Clause 6 indicates that the
Framers intended to give Congress the authority to remove the President as long as the
manner in which they do that is provided for “by law” in line 2. Then in line 3, the Framers
charged Congress to provide for a line of succession should the Presidency be vacated… as well
as the Vice Presidency, and so on.
If there was only one purpose, why mention the vacancy of the Presidency twice?
EXHIBIT 4: The 25th Amendment. (http://tinyurl.com/2tzhlp)
One of the arguments against my theory is the misconception that the 25th Amendment
superseded every purpose of Clause 6. I don’t believe that’s correct. The 25th amendment
was born directly due to the clunky ambiguities contained in Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6. And
the 25th Amendment response to that wording directly attests that the Congressional power
Page 21 of 35
vested by Clause 6 was not just concerned with providing for a vacancy since the 25th
Amendment also provides specific means by which Congress can force the President to leave
office, temporarily and/or permanently:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
If Clause 6 only grants Congress the power of providing for a vacancy, then why does the 25th
Amendment provide Congress the ability to “by law provide” (the same language as used in
Clause 6 as to “removal”) some “other body” the right to declare the President unable to
discharge his duties?
Clearly, if the 25th Amendment was simply a clarification of Clause 6, then Clause 6 must have
vested Congress with more power than just the power to provide for succession since the 25th
Amendment allows Congress to replace the President with the Vice President.
Whether the President was found undeniably ineligible to be President – due to his not being a
natural born citizen – would make him unable to discharge his duties is certainly debatable,
but I don’t think the 25th Amendment pertains to that fact pattern since Clause 6 and
Madison’s notes both list “Removal” and “inability to discharge the Power and Duties” as
mutually exclusive. It would be disingenuous to argue that the 25th Amendment directly
pertains to a quo warranto situation.
However, it’s obvious that if the 25th Amendment is a response to the ambiguity of Clause 6,
then Clause 6 wasn’t just intended to fulfill vacancies. If Congress was given power in Clause 6
(as codified by the 25th Amendment) to actually replace the President upon his inability to
discharge duties – then Congress also had the power to remove the President for being found
ineligible.
The 25th Amendment is quite an amazing grant of power when you consider the President can
be forced to step down if Congress believes he’s lost his mind. That’s certainly a much greater
power than just being authorized to decide how to fill the vacancy if he loses his mind.
More evidence to support my theory is found in what the 25th Amendment doesn’t discuss.
The 25th Amendment doesn’t discuss death or resignation.
Why?
Because there is nothing to discuss. When the President dies or resigns has nothing to do with
Congress. But when it came to deciding whether the President is able to discharge his duties,
Congress is authorized to exercise removal power by the 25th Amendment – and such power
must be derived directly from Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6.
Page 22 of 35
QUESTION: If Congress has the power to remove a President should it become

known he was a usurper, then why doesn’t the 25th Amendment address that?
ANSWER: Because by 1967 – when the 25th Amendment was ratified – Congress
had already exercised their authority on this issue by enacting the federal quo
warranto statute which allows for the removal of any United States officer found
to be a usurper.
EXHIBIT 5: Article 2 Section 4:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other High crimes and misdemeanors.
If one argues that the federal quo warranto statute does not apply to the President because the
only way to remove a President is by impeachment, then it stands to reason that the statute
also can not apply to “civil officers of the United States”. If you’re going to argue that Article 2
section 4 is the sole means of removing the President, then you must also argue that it’s the
sole means of removing “civil officers of the United States”.
If that’s your argument, then 16-3501 of the federal quo warranto statute makes absolutely no
sense. Take a look:
A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who
within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the
United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
(Emphasis added.)
If Congress didn’t believe they had the authority to remove a usurper from any public office of
the United States, they why did they enact the statute to to read as if it covers every public
office of the United States? Why didn’t they write relevant exceptions in the statute for the
office of President, Vice President and civil officers?
The 25th Amendment clarified “Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6″ only in so far as the clause
needed clarification. It didn’t need clarification as to death or resignation of the President as
those are obvious, and it didn’t need clarification as to issues of quo warranto and usurpers
because they had enacted a thorough federal statute.
EXHIBIT 6: Article 1 Section 8 Clause 17 – aka “The Hook Clause”

(http://tinyurl.com/db58tj)
Article 1 Section 8 Clause17 states:
The Congress shall have power…To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by
cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
the government of the United States,…
Page 23 of 35
Compare the wording of Clause 17 with §16-3501 of the federal quo warranto statute:
A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within
the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a
franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States,
civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
When you read the two back to back, it appears Constitutional that the office of President –
being in the District of Columbia – should be governed by the federal quo warranto statute.
EXHIBIT 7: Analogous Congressional precedent – the voiding of “Mr.

Shields” and “Mr. Galatin’s” US Senate elections after they were found
to be usurpers who did not meet the qualifications for office
enumerated in the Constitution.
While the Constitution doesn’t provide for impeachment of Senators or Representatives, it

does provide for their “expulsion” by a vote of two thirds of all members of each body
respectively. Article 1 Section 5 (http://tinyurl.com/yfe94d4) states:
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.
Like impeachment for a President, expulsion is sometimes erroneously assumed to be the only
Constitutional process by which a Senator can be removed from office. But that’s not
accurate. The Senate can remove a sitting Senator should he be found to be a usurper, just as
they can remove a President found to be a usurper… and they have done so at least twice that I
am aware of.
At Senate.gov (http://tinyurl.com/yc3e2w), all fifteen of the Senators who have been removed
by the Constitutionally enumerated process of expulsion are listed. Please notice that the list
doesn’t include Senator Shields who was removed by Congress in 1849
(http://tinyurl.com/ycu4fka).
Senator Shields was removed by the Senate after it was discovered that he was an alien by
birth, and that when he was elected in January 1849 – from the State of Illinois, to serve as a
US Senator – he had not been a US citizen for the requisite nine years. However, he was not
removed pursuant to the Article 1 section 5 expulsion power.
Instead, the Senate held that his election was entirely “void”. Senator Shields even offered his
resignation to the Senate, but his resignation was not accepted by the Senate who held that
since Shields was never qualified, he was never a Senator even though he had been sworn in
and had been serving as a Senator until March 1849 when his election was completely made
void and the seat declared vacant.
Since Shields it was discovered – after Shields had occupied the Senate seat –
that he didn’t meet the Constitutional qualifications for the office of Senate, the
Senate held that he was never an actual Senator and so his removal is not
recorded as an expulsion.
Page 24 of 35
Nowhere in the Constitution does it explicitly state that the Senate may remove a Senator by
making a determination that his election was void and that he was a usurper. But that’s
exactly what happened. If the power to remove a usurper wasn’t Constitutionally allowed, the
Senate couldn’t have voided Mr. Shields election and vacated his Senate seat. But they did.
The Congressional Globe account of the Shields (http://tinyurl.com/ycu4fka) removal is

preceded by an account of a similar precedent regarding a Mr. Albert Galatin. Mr. Galatin was
elected to the US Senate from Pennsylvania in 1793 and it was later found that he had never
become naturalized. The Senate again voided his election stating that the election wasn’t just
“voidable”, but that since there was no way to cure the qualification defect… the election was
completely “void”… it didn’t happen.
It’s important to note that the first quo warranto statue enacted by Congress didn’t take effect
until 1787 [typo - that should read "1878"] so in 1793 and 1849 the Senate chose to void the
elections of the two usurpers.
So here we have precedent for Congressional authority to remove Senators other than by
expulsion. Usurpation of office resulted in elections being voided and the Senate record do
not even record usurpers as having been members of the Senate. If Congress can remove a
usurper to the Senate without expelling him, this provides evidence that Congress can remove
a usurper to the Presidency without impeaching him.
It appears there is no possible separation of powers issue to confront. If a person occupying

the Presidency is found to be a usurper, then his Presidency is a fiction to be voided in history
and his name removed from the record books. A usurper isn’t allowed to have been said to be
President. His occupation is a fiction.
In the Galatin case the Senate made clear that since there was no possible way the failure to
qualify could be cured, then the election was a total fiction and is void, not voidable, but void,
as if it never happened.
[Special thanks to reader Kamira, who discovered the Galatin information in the
Congressional Globe.]
EXHIBIT 8: USC CODE: TITLE 3 THE PRESIDENT Chapter 1. Presidential

Elections and Vacancies
Please review §19:
Vacancy in offices of both president and vice president; officers eligible to act
§ 19. (a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in
Congress, act as President.
Page 25 of 35
Please take notice that “failure to qualify” is listed as one of the means by which a vacancy in
the office of President may occur. And recall, as to Mr. Shields whose election to the Senate
was voided, the Senate declared his seat vacant.
EXHIBIT 9: COMMON SENSE
Out of all the exhibits listed above, I think it’s most important to keep in mind the most simple
evidence – common sense. Does anybody really believe our Constitution prevents the removal
of a person who is found to be a usurper to the office of President?
The answer must be no.
CONCLUSION: The federal quo warranto statute provides the only Constitutional
means by which a sitting President may be removed by the Judicial branch.
(I must thank a special reader for making me aware of the Clause 17 hook.)
Page 26 of 35
QUO WARRANTO LEGAL BRIEF: Part 3 STANDING-

TRIAL BY JURY- HISTORY OF STATUTE –
SEPARATION OF POWERS Cont.
[CORRECTIONS struck out below. 03.11.09]
——————————————————————————————–
The following points contain the most important issues as to federal quo warranto actions
brought under the District of Columbia Code.
1. SCOTUS IS THE WRONG VENUE TO INITIATE AN ACTION IN QUO

WARRANTO BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD DEPRIVE THE PUBLIC OF A JURY
TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OBAMA WAS BORN IN HAWAII.
The District of Columbia Code, Title 16, Chapter 35 (Quo Warranto) Subchapter III states:
§ 16-3544. Pleading; jury trial.
In a quo warranto proceeding, the defendant may demur, plead specially, or

plead “not guilty” as the general issue, and the United States or the District of
Columbia, as the case may be, may reply as in other actions of a civil character.
Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury if either party requests it.
Otherwise they shall be determined by the court. (Emphasis added.)
The quo warranto statute allows a jury trial on “issues of fact”. Whether Obama was born in
Hawaii is an issue of fact. Whoever institutes a proceeding pursuant to the statute may
request a jury trial and one must be granted. The judge could not refuse.
But if the case is brought to SCOTUS before it’s brought to the District Court of
the District of Columbia, and if SCOTUS were to accept the case, you’re never
going to have a jury trial.
Any quo warranto proceeding should go before the DC District Court as follows:
a. a determination would have to be made, as a matter of fact, as to whether Obama was born
in the US/Hawaii.
b. if the jury’s verdict is that he wasn’t born in Hawaii, then the legal question is easy: he’s not
a natural born citizen. please take note that the issue wouldn’t be whether the online COLB is
genuine, the issue is whether Obama was born in Hawaii and any COLB or other document
would only be considered as a piece of evidence for the jury to consider.
c. if the jury’s verdict is that Obama was born in Hawaii, then the next issue is a more complex
judicial question. The District Court would have to make a legal determination as to the
meaning of NATURAL BORN CITIZEN.
Page 27 of 35
Congress has absolutely no power to “interpret” clauses of the Constitution. That would be a
violation of the separation of powers. Only the judicial branch could make such a
determination. Congress properly assigned the issue to the District Court.
While Congress has the power to remove the President under the Constitution, they don’t have
the power to interpret the Constitution. The judicial branch must do that.
As to issues of fact, i.e.:
- how long a person is a citizen of the US
- how old a person is
- where a person is born
…these qualifications for office are matters of fact which Congress properly recognized were
best left to a trier of fact and therefore a trial by jury is statutorily allowed.
The issue of who is a “natural born citizen” under Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 is an issue of
legal interpretation outside the Constitutional authority of Congress.
Only the judicial branch can interpret the laws of this nation.
Congress didn’t delegate the authority to remove the President…they exercised that authority.
(My previous explanation was not correct. I said they delegated their authority but that was a
poor choice of words. Please forgive me.) Congress exercised their authority by allowing for
the removal of the President.
Under the statute, the DC District Court must follow the law enacted by
Congress. Congress has deemed that if an action is instituted properly, the court
then conducts a trial as to all relevant facts. After the facts are determined, the
court is empowered under the Constitution, to interpret the law in light of the
facts.
JURY TRIAL. Think about that.
SCOTUS is not a trier of fact and so quo warranto MUST be brought before the District Court
for the District of Columbia EXACTLY as the statute requires.
GOD FORBID SCOTUS WOULD EVER JUMP IN AND TRY TO WRANGLE THIS
CASE FROM A DISTRICT COURT JURY.
2. STANDING UNDER THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE TO INSTITUTE A

FEDERAL QUO WARRANTO ACTION
a. STANDING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Page 28 of 35
The DC code allows three different levels of standing to “institute” a quo warranto action. As
to private plaintiffs, SCOTUS noted – in Newman at 538 – that Congress “has placed
obstacles” in the way. But as to the “Attorney General” or the “United States attorney”, who
act in the name of the United States, the statute makes it very simple for an action to be
instituted. It says:
“The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may
institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion…”
SCOTUS in Newman at 546 has interpreted the statute to give wide discretion to these
officials:
“By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of
official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem
proper.”
“IN ANY CASE THEY DEEM PROPER.”
- There is no qualification that there be a certain amount of evidence one way or the other.
- There is no qualification that the officials must consider public opinion or political party
affiliation.
- There is no “standing” to prove. If your title is US Attorney General or United States

attorney, you have standing.
- There is no need to consult with Congress because, as SCOTUS noted in their opinion,
Congress has already acted on the issue by enacting the quo warranto statute.
All that is required is that the official deems a quo warranto statute proper. His discretion
is unassailable judicially.
WHY SHOULD THESE OFFICIALS DEEM QUO WARRANTO PROPER?
The short answer is that the action is proper to settle title to the office of
President for the good of the nation.
Even if both officials are convinced Obama is eligible, it’s still proper for them institute a quo
warranto proceeding because the evidence emerging now is that, by leaving the controversy as
is, a floodgate of litigation will ensue. And like the waters over New Orleans levees, this
floodgate has the ability to wreak havoc on our nation.
- Active military officers have openly stated that the so called Commander In Chief is an
“imposter” and a “usurper”. These men have consented to be plaintiffs in eligibility law suits.
Should this trend spread, it has the power to divide our forces and nation.
- Under the holding in ANDRADE v. LAUER, 729 F.2d 1475, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384 (1984), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that the defacto officer’s doctrine does
not prohibit “collateral attacks” of official actions based upon a public officer’s lack of
Page 29 of 35
eligibility. These are not quo warranto suits to remove the official, they are civil suits to
challenge a specific action of that official.
In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who lost their jobs to
“reduction in force” ordinances which cut whole departments from the Government budget.
The plaintiffs sued alleging those who did the cutting were not Constitutionally qualified to
make such decisions in that their appointments violated the appointments clause of the US
Constitution.
The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other than to bring a “direct
attack” in quo warranto to remove the alleged usurper. But the DC Court of Appeals reversed
and said the plaintiffs, who had suffered real injuries, could bring such an action on a case by
case basis if they could prove their injury in fact (being fired) was caused by a Government
official who was not eligible to serve.
They opened the door to a floodgate of litigation by an incredibly large field of possible
plaintiffs who might challenge every single official action of the Obama administration on the
basis that he isn’t eligible.
- Furthermore, there is a tenet of Government that requires there be a certainty to the official
actions taken in the name of the United States. No certainty is possible when millions of US
citizens, including active military, are concerned that Obama’s credentials were not verified in
the same way all citizens must verify their identity for the most simple things in life like
getting a drivers license or passport. It smacks of imperial coronation when a Government of,
by and for the people are not entitled to know that the commander in chief must submit to the
same levels of identity proof as the citizens.
Regardless of whether one believes Obama’s online COLB is real, no citizen can tell the
Government to check a web site for their birth certificate rather than bring it in to the DMV or
send it to the federal Government for a passport. You have to actually mail your BC in to them
if you don’t bring it in person.
I recognize that the Constitution does not require a birth certificate as a qualification, but
that’s not the issue anymore.
The issue is whether the Attorney General and/or a United States attorney
deems it proper for Obama to provide the same proof of identity as ordinary
citizens in order to avoid FORESEEABLE complications which are destined to
rot public faith.
We need to put aside whatever prejudices we have as to the eligibility and plead for now for
the issue to be resolved as opposed to pleading what we believe the outcome of any such action
should be.
I have stated over and again on numerous radio programs that I do not believe any private
plaintiff has standing to demand to see Obama’s records of birth or any other personal
records. These plaintiffs are appealing to emotions and not rational legal considerations.
Obama should not bend to the will of those who have no legal authority to command him. I
Page 30 of 35
said this over and over and over again. But I was grouped in with these other attorneys whose
theories I take great issue with.
We are governed by laws. And there is no law which allows a private person to demand to see
Obama’s birth certificate or college records. It may seem like a good idea, but last time I
checked the Constitution, neither are required to be President.
However, the United States attorney, the Attorney General and the District
Court for the District of Columbia do have authority to command Obama to
prove his credentials. And they ought to exercise that authority for the good of
the nation, especially our military.
I fail to see any difficulty in establishing non-partisan compliance with the SCOTUS holding in
Newman (http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm) that these officials may bring a quo warranto if they
simply “deem it proper” to do so.
That decision is not subject to review.
There is a public policy behind this which makes a lot of sense. Obama ought to encourage
these officials to institute an action in quo warranto for the good of the nation and for the good
of his own legacy.
IMPORTANT:
The best possible candidates I can think of who should request the US Attorney
and/or the Attorney General to bring an action in quo warranto on their own
motion are Retired Military officers who understand the absolute need for the
President’s title to office not to be encumbered by doubt. Retired military can
band together to request that these Government attorneys “deem it proper” to
protect the active military from all of the swirling dangers their involvement in
a political action as to POTUS eligibility would bring. Such a request shows no
disrespect, but rather recognizes the actual risk now being taken by soldiers
getting involved with various law suits. The retired military would not be
making a case for or against Obama’s eligibility, but rather they would simply
be asking that the issue be resolved one way or the other under the applicable
statute. Again, keep in mind that the statute doesn’t require anything more
than that the US attorney or the Attorney General “deem it proper.”
Please don’t confuse this with asking these retired military to be plaintiffs. That’s not what I’m
suggesting. I’m suggesting that retired military officers are the best possible group who might
be able to influence the US attorney or the Attorney General in making the decision to bring
an action in quo warranto on their own motion with no private plaintiffs.
Another interesting question is whether any of the 94 United States attorneys may institute
the proceeding in quo warranto… [Ed. I have reconsidered the discussion on this issue and as
of 03.011.2009 struck it from the brief. 16-3502 applies exclusively to the US Attorney
General and to the US Attorney for the District of Columbia. I believe that's the most accurate
intention of the statute.]
Page 31 of 35
b. Standing of “third persons” vs “interested persons”.
16-3502 states:
The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may
institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the
relation of a third person.
16-3503 states:
If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo

warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person
may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued.
The terms “third person” and “interested person” have been interpreted by
SCOTUS in the Newman (http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm) case as follows:
The Code provides that a “third person” — the equivalent of “any person” — may
institute the proceedings only after he had secured the consent of the law officers
and the court. It makes a distinction between a “third person” and an “interested
person,” and provides that, if the Attorney General refuses to give his consent to
the latter, such “interested person” may secure the right to use the name of the
government by satisfying the… Court of the District that his reasons for applying
therefore are sufficient in law…
Considering the ancient policy of the law and the restrictions imposed by the
language of the Code, it is evident that, in passing this statute, Congress used the
words “third person” in the sense of “any person,” and the phrase “person
interested” in the sense in which it so often occurs in the law…The interest which
will justify such a proceeding by a private individual must be more than that of
another taxpayer. It must be “an interest in the office itself, and must be peculiar
to the applicant”…The language of the Code, supported by the history and policy
of the law, sustains the proposition that one who has no interest except that
which is common to every other member of the public is not entitled to use the
name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.
For if the allegations in such a suit by a private citizen set out any cause of action
at all, it shows on its face that it was a cause of action belonging to the whole
body of the public, and which therefore should be prosecuted by the public
representative.
The rule is the same regardless whether the office is elective or appointive. For in
neither case is there any intent to permit the public office to be the subject matter
of private litigation at the instance of one who has no interest therein which
differs from that of every other member of the public. The claim that this
construction makes the statute nugatory cannot be sustained, for the statute, as
already pointed out, gives a person who has been unlawfully ousted before his
term expired a right, on proof of interest, to the issuance of the writ, and there
Page 32 of 35
might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an
interest and therefore a right to be heard.
In Newman (http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm), there was a jury trial and the jury held that the
public officer didn’t meet the requirements of office. The District Court ousted him based on
the jury’s verdict. The DC Court of Appeals affirmed. But SCOTUS reversed by stating the
jury verdict was nullified because the plaintiff wasn’t an “interested party” and so he didn’t
have standing. Since the official Government attorneys refused consent to bring the action,
the plaintiff couldn’t just be a “third person”, the plaintiff had to be an “interested person.”
SCOTUS held that interested persons would include persons ousted from the office they are
challenging. But they left the door open with that last line, “…and there might be cases under
the civil service law in which the relator would have an interest and therefore a right to
be heard.” (Emphasis added.)
THREE WAYS TO BRING QUO WARRANTO
1. The US attorney and/or the US Attorney General institute the case on their own motion –
which is the best way this could happen. No leave of the court need be requested. There will
be a hearing and a trial of facts.
2. If no authorized Government attorneys will bring the action on their own motion, then any
citizen may join a law suit as “third persons” and such law suit, by way of verified petition,
shall be brought to the US Attorney and/or the Attorney General to ask their consent to use
the name of the United States. If the Government gives consent, then you must request
permission from the court to bring the suit as well. And if the Court says yes, you will have a
hearing on the merits.
3. If the Government will not give consent, then “interested persons” may request leave of the
court to institute the action in quo warranto. But standing will be – according to SCOTUS in
Newman – restricted to anybody who was ousted from the office of POTUS (and nobody is
going to meet that requirement) or, in the alternative there might by cases under the civil
service laws which provide standing.
I don’t know exactly what SCOTUS meant by that vague reference to “civil service laws”, but I
would assume they are making reference to Government employees, and perhaps this could
also apply to recipients of civil service benefits. I don’t believe the military are party to the
civil service laws, so I don’t see them as being the plaintiffs with the best possible standing.
The holding in Newman is certainly ripe for a challenge, but care ought to be made to find the
best possible plaintiffs who might qualify as “interested persons”.
The best private plaintiffs who might have standing to institute an action in quo warranto as
“interested persons” would be those persons with an injury in fact caused by an official action
of POTUS as it relates to the civil service laws.
Active military may appear to have the best standing based on a purely emotional reading of
the term “interested persons”, but according to the controlling SCOTUS decision in Newman
(http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm), the military aren’t the best subset of “third person” plaintiffs.
Page 33 of 35
This is the best shot, not the military. They do enough for us to at least deserve
civilians with better standing exhaust every possible Constitutional means
available before subjecting them to any number of possible court martials.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 16 CHAPTER 35 (Quo Warranto) OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE.
Chapter 35 is entitled “QUO WARRANTO”. Subchapter I is entitled “Actions Against Officers

of the United States.” Subchapter II is entitled “Actions Against Officers or Corporations of
the District of Columbia.” Please note that the original DC quo warranto statute was first
enacted in 1901. While SCOTUS interpreted that statute as controlling national officers,
Congress modified the statute in 1963 to its current form which erases any possible doubt that
the statute applies to all Officers of the United States.
Furthermore, the District of Columbia Code is federal law. It’s enacted by Congress and the
actual United States Constitution is included in the District of Columbia code
(http://tinyurl.com/ykxdlt8). I have seen the most erroneous comments online wherein it has
been argued that a “local DC code is not federal law”. Besides the ultimate federal law – the
Constitution – being placed directly in the DC code, SCOTUS has stated – in the seminal quo
warranto DC code case, Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915)
(http://tinyurl.com/ygycrpm) – that the District Code applies to all…
“…actions in quo warranto instituted by authorized parties against national

officers of the United States, they are general laws of the United States, and not
merely local laws of the District of Columbia…”
I must reiterate that the code’s text does not provide any exceptions for any
public office, not even POTUS.
In UNITED STATES of America ex rel. STATE OF WISCONSIN v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 248 F.2d 804 (1957), the US court of Appeals, 7th Circuit,
provided an on point discussion of quo warranto in the district courts
(http://tinyurl.com/yadrvse):
There have been submitted to this court only two instances in which original quo
warranto jurisdiction has been specifically conferred upon federal district
courts. The revised statutes of 1878 vested jurisdiction in these courts of
proceedings brought by the United States Attorney for the removal of persons
holding office contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Rev. Stat., Sections
563(14), 626(14), (1786). This Act was repealed in the Judicial Code of 1911, 36
Stat. 1168. In 1901, Congress specifically authorized the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to issue quo warranto in the name of the
United States. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1419, Title 16, Section 1601 of the
D.C. Code (1940). However, this grant is strictly limited and is confined solely to
situations involving franchises and public offices held within the District of
Columbia. There is no other specific statutory provision vesting original
jurisdiction in the district courts in quo warranto actions.
Page 34 of 35
The first statute mentioned above dealt specifically with quo warranto actions which arose out
of 14th amendment issues where citizens were refused the right to vote. Under this statute, all
US district courts could hear quo warranto cases. But this statute was repealed in 1911 and so
the only remaining statute which controls quo warranto is the District of Columbia Code. And
all actions brought thereunder must be brought in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.
All discussion of quo warranto actions brought in other “district courts” of the US has been
rendered moot. Unfortunately, I have seen irrelevant analysis of that repealed statute applied
to the DC Code by various confused commentators online. In a quote taken from a legal
treatise called “Treatise on Federal Practice” (http://tinyurl.com/yhqvdt7) by Roger
Foster, written in 1921, he states:
“The better opinion is that the District Courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction to grant the writ of quo warranto only when specifically authorized
by statute; and that no writ of quo warranto can issue from them to try the title
to the office of President of the United States.”
At first glance it appears this “better opinion” might be a problem. I don’t know where he
derives this “better opinion” from, certainly not the federal courts or SCOTUS because no such
case law exists. It’s probably a reflection of a common erroneous assumption that the
Constitution only allows removal of a sitting President by impeachment in the House and
conviction in the Senate. We put that rumor to rest in part 2 of this brief – the Constitution
does not say that anywhere in the Document’s text.
When you continue with the Foster quote, it states:
The District Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of all suits to recover
possession of any office…authorized by law to be brought, wherein it appears
that the sole question touching the title to such office arises out of the denial of
the right to vote to any citizen…” (Emphasis added.)
This analysis is specifically directed to the repealed statute regarding quo warranto wherein
“the sole issue” is deprivation of 14th amendment voting rights. It has nothing to do with the
District of Columbia Code wherein quo warranto may be brought against any “public office of
the United States” with regard to anyone found to be a usurper for any legal breach.
The statute Foster refers to has been repealed. It didn’t deal with Constitutional qualifications
for office. Also notice that the comment says “District Courts”. This is obsolete. District
Courts – other than the DC district court – have been stripped of authority to hear any quo
warranto cases.
CONCLUSION: The District of Columbia Code is the only means by which a federal quo
warranto action can be instituted and its application is strictly limited to public offices of the
United States or local DC offices within the ten square miles of the District of Columbia. No
public office, i.e. POTUS, is exempt by the statute.
Page 35 of 35

Leo Donofrio - Quo Warranto Expanded

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Leo Donofrio - Quo Warranto Expanded

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Leo Donofrio – Quo Warranto

Misconceptions About Quo Warranto

Quo Warranto Legal Brief – Part 1 (below, page 10)

Quo Warranto Legal Brief – Part 2 (below, page 14)

Quo Warranto Legal Brief – Part 3 (below, page 27)

Mr. Apuzzo stated on November 9th, 2009:

Before we begin, we must understand that a quo warranto action is a direct

Since Mr. Donofrio is proposing a quo warranto action, he must be planning a

Under the standard for being an “interested person” as pronounced by Newman

Back in March I stated in Quo Warranto part 3 below:

Second, if the DC statute were to be read as Mr. Donofrio does so as to be used

heard.” I did not miss this point.

Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell

Sharon ANDRADE et al., Appellants,

citation "cf.". "cf." means -

QUO WARRANTO LEGAL BRIEF: part 1

Chapter 35§ 16-3501 Persons against whom issued; civil action.

Since an action in quo warranto is unquestionably the correct legal device to

1) the controlling statute

2) the seminal US Supreme Court decision

3) other relevant SCOTUS and federal cases

POINT I: WHETHER A WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO CAN BE ISSUED TO REMOVE A

A. Applicability of Statute 16-3501.

…the District Code, in proper cases, instituted by proper officers or persons,

CONCLUSION: An action in Quo Warranto is the statutory legal device available

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,

CONCLUSION: Congress has provided for the removal of a sitting President

POINT II: WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO INSTITUTE AN ACTION IN QUO

QUO WARRANTO LEGAL BRIEF – Part 2: The

[UPDATE: 12:30 AM: 03.06.09 EXHIBIT 6 was added below . ]

In order to protect the Constitution, we must not subvert the separation of

If it can’t be done by quo warranto, then it can’t be done at all. Why?

That metamorphosis has important Constitutional consequences which cannot be ignored.

Let that sink in because it’s true.

Two double agents born in the evil nation of “KILLAMERICASTAN” sneak a

IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION?

REVIEW OF CURRENT QUO WARRANTO ACTIVITY

WHY EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE PUBLIC TO PRESSURE AG

§ 16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.

THE CONSTITUTION HAS PROVIDED CONGRESS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO

shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be

Unlike in Wikipedia (http://tinyurl.com/yfpf4ez), the actual text (http://tinyurl.com/ynolyc)

EVIDENCE THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR REMOVAL OF THE

EXHIBIT 1: A perfect on point reference from James Madison’s

In Case of his Impeachment, (Dismission) Removal, Death, Resignation or

[2:186; Madison, 6 Aug.]

Impeachment and Dismission are listed as mutually exclusive devices to remove

EXHIBIT 2: Clause 6 directly follows the infamous Article 2, Section 1,

EXHIBIT 3: The text of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 would be

Examine the first part of Clause 6 alone:

Now, let’s examine the third line:

EXHIBIT 4: The 25th Amendment. (http://tinyurl.com/2tzhlp)

The 25th Amendment doesn’t discuss death or resignation.

QUESTION: If Congress has the power to remove a President should it become

EXHIBIT 5: Article 2 Section 4:

EXHIBIT 6: Article 1 Section 8 Clause 17 – aka “The Hook Clause”

Article 1 Section 8 Clause17 states:

EXHIBIT 7: Analogous Congressional precedent – the voiding of “Mr.

While the Constitution doesn’t provide for impeachment of Senators or Representatives, it

The Congressional Globe account of the Shields (http://tinyurl.com/ycu4fka) removal is

It appears there is no possible separation of powers issue to confront. If a person occupying

EXHIBIT 8: USC CODE: TITLE 3 THE PRESIDENT Chapter 1. Presidential

Please review §19: