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New York Ciry, Selected Neighborhoods
4 6
CHA P T E R T HRE E
these three domai ns, creati ng new pressures on the New York Ci ty pol i ti -
cal system.
Interacti ons between State, soci ety, and economy have not unfol ded i n
a stabl e envi ronment. Between 1.970 and 1990, the cul mi nati on of the
posti ndustri al revol uti on subi ected al l three to rapi d and thoroughgoi ng
.hnng.. Some anal ysts rej ect the term "posti ndustri al " because manufac-
turi ng retai ns a l arge share of the nati onal output and conti nues to be a
key determi nant of economi c competi ti veness, even though i ts share of
empl oyment has fal l en steadi l y.a whi l e these facrs cannot be deni ed, the
"posti ndustri al " concept neverthel ess captures cruci al aspects of the cur-
rent transformati on that other terms mi ss.
Narrowl y construed, the concept hi ghl i ghts the massi ve and i rreversi -
bl e shi ft of empl oyment away from the manufacture and di stri buti on of
goods toward servi ces and the associ ated shi ft from bl ue-col l ar to whi te-
i ol l ar work serti ngs. In thi s sense, New York and other l arge central ei ti es
have become hi ghl y posri ndusrri al . (l n 1982, 14.7 percent of the resi dents
of Los Angel es were empl oyed as manufacturi ng producti on workers; i n
New York, the fi gure was onl y 10.5 percent' s)
The posti ndustri al transformati on i s far ri cher and more compl ex than
a si mpi e shi ft i n economi c secrors and occupati ons, however. Li ke i ts
predei esso., the i ndustri al revol uti on, the posti ndustri al revol uti on has
t een dr i ven by basi c changes i n gl obal capi t al i sm: r api d t echnol ogi cal
change, the gl obal i zati on of economi c competi ti on, the i ncreasi ng i mpor-
tance of fi nance rel ati ve to producti on, the gl obal i zati on and central i za-
ti on of fi nanci al markets, and the formati on of a new i nternati onal di vi -
si on of l abor, wi th renewed mi grati on from thi rd worl d i ndustri al i zi ng
nati ons to the core ci ti es of the 6rst worl d.o
Thi s i ncreasi ng gl obal i ntegrati on has been centered i n and fostered by
a smal l number of worl d-ci ty nodes. None has bcen more central i n prop-
agating change nor has felt its impact more strongly than New York'7
Bi t*ei n the l ow poi nr of the busi ness cycl e i n 1975 and i ts peak i n 1989,
the forces of change were parti ctl l arl y rapi d. New York Ci ty' s sustai ned
economi c boom caused empl oyment i n the advanced corporate servi ces,
soci al servi ces, and dte publ i c sector to mushroom and i ncreased the ci ty' s
gross product and medi an househol d earni ngs. At the same ti me, manu-
facturi ng conti nued to decl i ne.
The composi ti on of the ci ty' s popul ati on al so changed rapi dl y. The ol d
pattern i n whi ch bl acks and Puerto Ri cans repl aced whi tes was steadi l y
i cl i psed by a new pattern i n whi ch bl ack, Lati no, and Asi an "new i mmi -
gr"ntt" di spl aced the nati ve born of al l races.
' l ' he
rnt>vemcnt of womcn
i nto the l abor force and the ri se of nontradi ti onal househol ds reshaped
the ci ty' s soci al base. These demographi c changes i ntertwi ned wi th the
restructuring of the city's economy to forge a new racial/ethnic/gender
di vi si on of l abor as wel l as new forms of i nequal i ty.E
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
4 7
Thi s transformati on erased many of the soci al and spati al features that
di sri ngui shed the precedi ng era. whi l e al ways i mportant as a headquar-
ters ci ty' New York' s si ngl e l argest soci al strarum i n the mi d-1950s was
bl ue-col l ar whi te ethni cs. Turn-of-the-cenrury
i mmi grants and the chi l -
dren tl rey bore before worl d
rwar
II consti tuted an i ndustri al worki ng
cl ass of consi derabl e proporti ons. Today, few whi te bl ue-col l ar workers
remai n; many once categori zed thi s way are now el derl y.e New groups
have repl aced them, rangi ng from whi te professi onal , und -unug.., ,o
mi nori ty and femal e cl eri cal workers, to i mmi grant servi ce workers. of-
fice workers in corporate, social service, and
iovernment settings vastly
outnumber producti on workers.
ri /hi l e
many women and bl acks benefi ted from the departure of whi te
mal es-from the ci ty' s Iabor force, many were arso.*.l ud.d from i ts
growth. The overal l poverty rare and i ncome i nequal i ty both i ncreased
noti ceabl y duri ng the 1980s.
poverty
rose from 15 percent i n1975 (about
20 percent over rhe nati onal average) to 23 percen t i n r9g7 (al most
twi ce
the.nati onal average).t0 Low l abor-force parti ci pati on rates for bl acks,
Lati nos, and women,. thc growth of femai e_head' ed househol ds, and the
decl i ne of the real val ue of rransfer payments contri buted to the growth
of poverty.' r Ar the otl rer end of the i ncome di stri buti on, *. ' ' or, i api dry
growi ng and remune.rati ve occupati ons i n the advanced corporate serv-
i ces l argel y excl uded bl acks and Lati nos.r2 These trends ,."nrfo.rn.d N.*
York from a rel ati vel y- wel l off, wl ri te, bl ue-coi l ar ci ty i nto
"
n,or. ..o-
nomi cal l y di vi ded, mul t i r aci al , whi t e- col l ar ci t y. r
j
The contradictory forces of investment and abandonment in New
york,s
posti ndustri al
revol uti on-al so reshaped i ts bui l t envi ronment. co.por"t.
office towers and zones of luxury ..rid.n.. and consumption
"ros.
a.ldrt
a decayi ng publ i c i nfrasrructure and decl i ni ng nei ghborhoods,
maki ng
New Yor k a " phoeni x i n t he ashes. " t o, l onr y af l r t gl s: di cr t he. i f u. gi i
to experi ence ner gai ns i n the si ze and qual i ty of i ts housi ng ,ro.(.; ur.,
and pl aces associ ared wi th the i ndustri ai ci ty and rhe poor i ..ti *a i ,.ou-
i l y, whi l e i nvesrment surged i nto offi ce construcri o;, the i nsti tuti onal
expansi o' of hospi tal s and uni versi ti es, the conversi on of former l oft-
manufacturi ng areas' the gentri fi cati on
of Iate-ni neteenth-century
upper-
cl ass nei ghborhoods, and rhe growth of new i mmi grant nei ghborhoods.
Growth of $/est Indi an, Lati n, and Asi an i mmi g-ron, .o-"-uni ti es l i ke
Crown Hei ghts,
Jackson Hei ghts, and El mhursr,"togerher
*i th ,p*rrd
mobi l i ty for some nati ve-born bl acks, drove the bol undari es of ti re ol d
ghettos ourward i nto former whi te worki ng-cl ass resi denti al n.i ghbor-
hoods. Prornptcd by thi s mi nori ty i nvasi onl whi te edrni cs ,.t.ea' ted to
ethni c encl aves on the ci ty' s peri prery.' 5
The growi ng number of poor
bl acks and Lati nos rei nforced the i oi l apse of th-e ol d gi .,to cores of the
south Bronx, Harl em,.the Lower Easr Si de, and cent"rar Brookryn. The i
ci ry thus presented i tsel f as a paradoxi cal mi x of sprendor and decay.
\
j
1
!
4 8
CHA P T E R T HRE E
These radi cal economi c' soci al , and spati al changes had potenti al l y
I"rg.' ptfi i i .al
i mpl i cati onr. Fi t", they al tered the economi c' demo-
,r""Ofrl .,
and gouei nmenral i nterests wi th whi ch l ocal pol i ti cal entrepre-
neurs i nteract. Economi c restructunng strengthened
one set of.eco.nomi c
i ""..ri , *ni l e severel y undermi ni ng
bthers. Commerci al banks, i nvest-
-.nrb"nt r, the di versi fi ed fi nanci af Frms' corPorate l aw.fi rms' and real
estate devel opers accrued vastl y i ncreased.revenues
and assets' Publ i c
sector producer i nterests-parti cul arl y.
publ i c empl oyees and nonprofi t
"rg-i J*t"s
that rel y on publ i c funds-al so i ncreased i n si ze and re-
;;;;.;r. Dei ndustri al i zati on,
on the other hand, undermi ned manufactur-
;;i l ;;s
and the uni ons thar represented thei r workers. Fi rms and
;;pl "t;.t i n the ri si ng servi ct
"ttot'
di spl aced manufacturi ng
i n the
.ornpeti ti on
for space, capi tal ,-l abor,
and pol i ti cal support'
--
Oi, ifr. demogiaphic
frfnt, ih. postinduitrial revolution altered constit-
";;;t
;;;" *lii.h .l..toral alignments h.ad rested'
Jewish
garment work-
. . r o. f t " f i " " r t . u. do. . r di sapp" ear ed, whi l et hemanager i al andpr of es-
si onal strata of th. gro*i ng
"t' o"
became more
Jewi sh
a.nd. Ital i an' The
e.;;i h' "?
,t. n"ti i r_born"bl ack
and
puerto
Ri can popul ati ons sl owed,
i rhi l . th. new i mmi granrs became the dri vi ng force i n the ci ty' s popul a-
,i on. si n.. the ol d
"-nd
n.* mi nori ty groups col oni zed di sti nct l ocati ons
i n i i rr.uofui ng di vi si on of l abor and experi enced di fferent economi c tra-
i ..i ori .r, they" devel oped di fferent and someti mes confl i cti ng i nterests'
rrr.l ""|i r"*;;-.l tt; fosi ti on,l ack
of Engl i sh' and nonci ti zen status of
i fr. i i "-l g."nt, t.nd"d' to excl ude them from the pol i ti cal arena. Il road
J.l tgt"fti c
trends *n.thtl t" si gni fi cantl y al teri d the composi ti on of
the el ectorate compared to the 195ds. l n short, the post-i ndustri al revol u-
ti on al tered rhe raw i ngredi ents from whi ch pol i ti cal entrepreneurs
mi ght
;;;k;; ;tg"ni ze a dori i nant pol i ti cal coal i ti on i n New York Ci tv'
--
i .cond,"these
changes al so exacerbated tensi ons al ong the characteri s-
ti col l ffi ti ndustri al
f"aul t l i nes of race, nati vi ty, ethni ci ty' gender, house-
;";i J' f;;, and i ndustry sector' The pri mary tensi on operates,between
nurn.ri ."ti y decl i ni ng but sti l l pol i ti i al l y and economi cal l y
domi nant
whi tes and the nume.i cal l y i ncreasi ng but economi cal l y
and pol i ti cal l y
subordi nate mai ori ty of bi acks, Lati nos, and Asi ans' The di versi ty and
competi don among these l atter groups' however' generates secondary
i .nri on, wi thi n thi emergi ng no"n*hi te mai ori ty'
(For exampl e., bl ack
Drotesters have conducted boycotts agai nst Korean greengrocers' )
t' i l ;;;,",i ;;
hl chl t cycl i cal , burt_ond_boom
narure of the economy from
thc 1g60s to tl re l ggtrs rp.d th. pace of c6angc, accerruated thc l evel of
. o" ni . . ' anddest abi l i zedl ocal gover nment ' Sr evenuebasc. AsShef t er l r as
;"*], i i i t ttor.. l oose ol d
i ""ttn'
of
-pol i ti cal
accommodati on
and
op".n.i the way to-new on.' ' ft Frorn 195b i nto the t970s' l ocal publ i c
expendi tures
rose faster than revenues. Unti l the earl y 1' 97)s,ci ty gov-
. , nnl . n, f i nancedt hi sgapwi t hsubst ant i al i ncr easesi nf eder al ai dand
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON 4 9
borrowi ng. Economi c contracti on, dwi ndl i ng l ocal revenues and i nter-
governmental transfers, and the cl osure of the capi tal market l ed to the
mi d-1970s fi scal cri si s.
Thi s cri si s eroded the autonomy of ci ty governmenr, threw el ected offi -
ci al s and publ i c empl oyees on the defensi ve, and made publ i c support for
pri vate i nvestment pol i ti cal l y attracti ve. These outcomes fostered a re-
newed economi c boom and, as ci ty revenues and governmental authori ty
recovered, a renewed struggl e over the "stakes and pri zes" of l ocal
power. The city budget doubled between 1977 and 1.987, financed largely
from i ncreased l ocal revenues. It once more became a powerful pri ze for
those who bui l t the new conservati ve domi nant coal i ti on and for those
who sought t o chal l enge i t .
The posti ndustri al revol uti on thus exerted strong but contradi ctory i n-
fl uences on the l ocal pol i ti cal order. It transformed the economi c and the
soci al contexts i n whi ch New York Ci ty government operates. It erased
some cl ai mants for power whi l e creati ng a vari ety of others; i t al tered the
rel ati ve i nfl uence of these i nterests, what they wanted from government,
and thei r strategi es for getti ng power. The economi c and fi scal col l apse of
the mi d-1970s sped the pace of change and broke down ol d patterns of
pol i ti cal accommodati on; renewed economi c growth after 1977 i n-
creased the potenti al rewards of power.
Restructuring the Economy
The forces that dri ve economi c growth i n New York Ci ty spri ng from i ts
hi stori c rol e as the l eadi ng port ci ty and as the conti nent' s premi er corpo-
rate headquarters compl ex.' 7 They generated a l egacy of market, bank-
i ng, and corporate servi ce functi ons that sustai n the ci ty' s posi ti on as one
of the gl obe' s three l eadi ng centers of busi ness deci si on-maki ng. The
depth and breadth of the ci ty' s advanced corporate servi ces have become
its primary competitive advantage. These activities are concentrated in the
Manhattan central
.business
district, where Nvo million people work in 500
mi l l i on square feet of of6ce space, surrounded by a 30-county regi on that
contai ns another ei ght mi l l i on j obs. In 1985, they produced a gross ci ty
product of $150 bi l l i on and a gross regi onal product of $425 bi l l i on.rs
Internationalizntion and the Corporate Headquarters Complex
The i ndustri al growth that was synonymous wi th urbani zati on between
1850 and 1950 may t ur n out t o be an hi st or i cal except i on, whi l e t he
comparati ve advantages enj oyed by port ci ti es i n the earl y ni neteenth cen-
tury have returned to dri ve urban growth i n the second hal f of the rwenti -
t i .
I
I
I
I
I
I
l
J
I
5 0
CHAPTER. THREE
eth century. New York has organi zed much of U.S. forei gn trade si nce
1g00. The' Port of New York and New
Jersey
remai ns the l argest gateway
for U.S. merchandi se i mports, accounti ng for 20 percent of the ocean
cargo and 40 percent of the i nternati onal ai r cargo.re As i nternati onal
trai e rose from !2 percent to 20 percent of GNP si nce 1970, and the
trade bal ance worsened, New York prospered' 2o Though ocean cargo
now moves through New
Jersey,
the brokers, l awyers, and fi nanci ng re-
mai ns i n New
yoi k,
whi l e
John
F. Kennedy' s Ai rport ai r cargo faci l i ti es
have become massi ve. Imports and exports of goods and servi ces (excl u-
si ve of factor payments) account for a thi rd of the regi on' s product and
probabl y more of the ci tY' s' I.
Si nce the foundi ng of combi nes l i ke U.S. Steel at the turn of the cen-
tury, New York has
"al so
been the l eadi ng center for corporate h_eadquar-
,..i i n the Uni ted States. Drennan i ncl udes i n thi s groupi ng the "chi ef
admi ni strati ve offi ce and al l i ed" empl oyment of i ndustri al corporati ons'
corporate servi ces such as management consul ti ng, and anci l l ary se_rvl ces
,u.i , u, hotel s and restauranrs. *i thi n thi s compl ex, ho' ever, the fate of
i ndustri al corporati ons has di verged from headquarters acti vi ti es i n other
sectors. The number and empl oyment of i ndustri al corporati ons head-
quarrered i n New York have decl i ned si gni fi cantl y i n the l ast
-two
dec-
ud.r; the number of Fortune J00 i ndustri al fi rms headquartered i n Man-
hattan fel l from 128 to 50 si nce 1955. The number of headquarters of the
l argest banks, l i fe i nsurance fi rms, and di versi fi ed fi nanci al fi rms grew
over the same peri od.22
In the mi d-i 960s, New York contai ned over a ql rarter of the Fortune
500 i ndustri al headquarters. Al though they departed, they l eft behi nd an
unparal l el ed array of advanced corporate servi ces 6rms that serve cl i ents
on' u ,.gi on"l , nati onal , and gl obal scal e. The i ncreasi ng cconomi c rol e of
i
i nuestni ent banki ng and the capi tal markets had a powerfLrl effect on Nerv
york
ci ty. wi th London and Tokyo, Ncw York bcgan to form a si ngl e
i
gl obal capi tal market, to whi ch New York fi rms contri buted a steadT
i rr.u,,, oi n.* fi nanci al "produ6s." The rapi d growth of empl oyment
and earni ngs i n i nvestment banki ng had a strong mul ti pl i er effect on
other sector"s, sucl t as l egal servi ces.23 The i ntcrnati onal operati ons of U' S'
fi rms, and the U.S. heaJqua.ters of forei gn fi rms remai n concentrated i n
New York. Drennan has shown that 24 of the 100 l argest U.S. mul ti na-
r i onal f i r ms ar e l ocat ed i n t he ci t y and anot hcr l 5 i n t he st r bur bs. Hal f t he
New York ci ty fi rms' revenues were from forei gn,operati ons, compared
to a thi rd nari onal l y. vhi l e these New York ci ty fi rms were then a quar
ter of the nati onal i otal , they accounted for over a thi rd of total forei gn
revenues.to
commerci al banki ng al so pl ayed a mai or rol c. wi th dcregul ati on, Nerv
york
banks sought to di u.rri fy thei r fi nanci al servi ces and bui l d nati onal
ancl i nt er nat i onal br anch ner wor ks. Lar ge f or ei gn banks, especi al l y
Japa-
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
5 1
nese banks, now have far l arger deposi ts than do the l arge u.s. banks, but
New York' s share of forei gn deposi ts i n u.S. banks2i *a u.s. offi ces of
forei gn banks25 i ncreased. Meanwhi l e, i ts share of u.S. banki ng assets
hel d steady at one-thi rd duri ng the 19g0s.27 Returns to these
"rr.,,
*.r.
consi derabl y hi gher than for the l arger
Japanese
banks. Moreover, New
York ci ty 6rms hel d a quarter of the assets of the worl d' s 130 l argest
i nsti tuti onal i nvestors.l 8
New York' s domi nant posi ti on i n advanced servi ces reaches far be-
vond fi nanci al servi ces. whi l e a quarrer of al l securi ti es fi rms wi th more
than fi fty empl oyees were l ocated i n New
york,
more than a thi rd of al l
l arge l arv fi rms and more rhan hal f of those wi th forei gn offi ces were.2t
Nerv York coul d al so cl ai m fi ve of the "bi g si x" accoi rnti ng fi rms and
ni neteen of the worl d' s thi rty l argest adverti i i ng agenci es.r0 D"rennan has
found that New York accounrs for 20 percent oJ n' ati onal empl oyment i n
"i nformati on i ntensi ve i ndustri es," wi th a hi gher concentrati on i hun
"ny
9r!:r
gi l y except Washi ngton and Boston. By .ont."rr, New
york
l ags
behi nd cook.county (chi cago) and Los Angel es county i n absorute nu--
bers of peopl e empl oyed i n the centrar offi ces of busi ness corporari ons,
and the concenrrari on of i ts workers i n thi s acti vi ty does not rank i n the
top ten ci ti es.rl
The Tbleconununicntions
ond Computer Reuolution
The revol uti on i n computers and tel ecommuni cati ons
technol ogy has re-
i nforced New York' s rol e as a gl obal busi ness servl ces center. Gl obal
banks^such as ci ti corp, the securi ti es fi rms operati ng on wal l Street, and
l arge fi nanci al i nsti tuti ons such as Ameri can t*pr.rJh"u. provi ded a p.-
mary i mpetus for techni cal i nnovari on. As Kenneth
phi l l i ps,
a ci ti ctrp
vi ce presi dent and chai rrnnn of the l egi srati ve affai rs commi rree of the
Nerv York Corporate Tel ecommuni cati on
Users has observed,
A l i teral revol uti on has taken pl ace renderi ng the bi ts and bytes enteri ng New
York vi a a l arge satel l i te di sh, or fl owi ng under the streets of Manhatran at the
speed of l i ght, i n a fi ber opti c cabl e, whi ch are parr of a mul ti -mi l l i on dol l ar
el ectroni cs funds transfer. . . . Thi s comparati vel y smal l area of l and had over
nvi ce the tel ecommuni cati ons swi tchi ng capaci ty of the average f.rei gn coun-
try' morc computcrs than a country the si ze of Brazi l , and more word proces-
sor s t han al l r he count r i es of Eur ope combi ned. capi r al i nvesr ment by busi ness
users i n pri vate tel ecommuni cati ons systems, communi cati ng work processi ng
st at i ons, comput er mai nf r r mes, mi ni s, and mi cr os i s cur r ent l y i n t he bi l l i ons of
dol l ars and i s growi ng annual l v.I
The stock exchanges and the i nterbank funds transfer networks accounr
f or a l ar ge vol ume of i nr er ci t v l nd t r anshor der dnr r f l o*, s l r , , r r hn , , . . . i . . ,
5 2 CHA P T E R T HRE E
fi nanci al i nsti tuti ons al so generate i mmense traffi c. l n 1983, an Ameri can
Express offi ci al noted that the fi rm processed 250,000 authori zati ons
per day wi th an average response ti me of fi ve seconds and "respond[ed]
vi rtual l y i nstantaneousl y to 500,000 dai l y messages di recti ng hi gh-speed
trade in securities commodities, bonds, treasury bills, and a host of other
I t ems.
" - -
Processi ng thi s vol ume natLrral l y requi res i ncreasi ngl y sophi sti cated
computer hardware and software. The "turrets" i n Wal l Street fi rms may
tap up to 150 i nformati on-vendor servi ces, provi de access to a worl dwi de
voi ce network, and cost $50,000 to i nstal l . They are wi red i nto redundant
fi ber opti c and satel l i te di gi tal communi cati ons systems, on whi ch the
twenty l argest New York brokerage fi rms spent $2.2 bi l l i on i n 1.987.34
Noyel l e has observed, "New York i s usual l y regarded as the l eadi ng de-
vel oper of new computeri zed technol ogy i n the fi nanci al servi ces. . . . Fi -
nanci al i nnovati on i s i ncreasi ngl y based i n part on the devel opment of
new computer-dri ven products and processes."r5
These communi cati ons nodes depend heavi l y on l ocal network capac-
i ty, whi ch i s greater i n New York than anywhere el se. New York Tel e-
phone has i nstal l ed three fi ber opti c networks i n and around Manhattan,
whi l e the ci ty government, wi th Merri l l Lynch,' Western Uni on, and the
Port Authori ty, has i nstal l ed another ri ng connecti ng the four other bor-
oughs to the ci ty' s "tel eport" on Staten Isl and. New York i s served by fi ve
i nterci ty fi ber opti c networks and si x satel l i te common carri ers, al ong
wi th pri vate earth stati ons run by the tel evi si on networks and other l arge
fi rms. l n 198 1, New York accounted for al most one-fourth of the nati on' s
overseas busi ness cal l s and 15 percent of the resi denti al cal l s, twi ce as
many message uni ts as ori gi nated i n Los Angel es, the second l eadi ng
ori gi n.36
As massi ve as the growth of fi nanci al and corporate servi ces has been,
they consti tute onl y one l eg of the tri ad of servi ce sectors. Government
i tsel f i s the second sector. What some have cal l ed "the thi rd sector" or
"the i ndependent sector" al so made maj or contri buti ons to the growth of
t he New Yor k Ci t y economy dur i ng t he 1980s. Nonpr of i t and publ i c
servi ces hel pcd make possi bl e ar.rd enhanced thc ci ty' s domi nant posi ti on
i n t he advenced cor por at e ser vi ces.
Even though some of these i nsti tnti ons, such as foundati ons or muse-
ums, do not empl oy l arge numbers, thei r presti ge and resources can sti l l
be extremel y si gni fi cant. A Regi onal Pl an Associ ati on study showed that
New York Ci ty foundati ons made 29 perccnt of the total dol l ar val ue of
U. S. f oundat i on gr ant s i n 1975, whi ch i n t ur n hel ped t o suppor t a br oad
array of ci ty-based nonprofi ts.rT El i te cul tural i nsti tuti ons have hel ped
New York keep i ts competi ti ve edge as a gl obal ci ty; as geography be-
comes l ess determi nant for economi c l ocati on. cul tural ameni ti es become
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L
T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
stronger.3s
The ri chness of the ci ty' s popul ar cul ture and i ts ethni c di ver-
si ty rJi nforce thi s attracti on' 3e
Office Construction
Boonr
Unti l the recessi on that began i n 1990, the growth of these servi ce sectors
;;;;;J;
h.rg. d.rn"nd"fot
"t*
of6ce space in New York City' Con-
structi on-cont.".t
"*",ds
i n New York Ci ty rose (i n constant dol l ars)
from $2.4 bi l l i on i n 1979 to $4' 8 bi l l i on i n 1' 987; cornmerci al contract
"*"ri ,
^1."e grew from $1 bi l l i on i ntg7g to $2.5
bi l l i on i n 1987.401n
;;;i ;80;, nrt]-ri * bui l di ngs added 24' 2 mi l l i on square f9.et
9f
space i n
mi dt own( wi t hanest i mat e" cl 28mi l l i onmor ecomi ngavai l abl ebet ween
1988 and 1.994). Si mi l ar patterns hel d for downtown Manhattan' radi -
."ffy .ft"tgi ng ,h. .i ry;, i ttyti "e' ar The ownershi p and devel opment
of
,fr.J. U"ifai"g", *", fttgftfy tintt''t'"ttd.:
according to Salomon Brothers'
thi rtv-si x "real estate"f"rni l i t' "
owned 50 percent
9l ' i :
pri me offi ce
i l :
; i l ni u,rut.tt
Constructi on
empl oyment
doubl ed between 1' 977
and 1989, maki ng i t vi rtual l y the onl y bl ue-col l ar'
goods-rel ated acti vi ty
that expanded wi thi n the New York Ci ty economy'
Industrial Decline
Asur f ei t of f or ceshasdi mi ni shedgoocl spr oduct i onanddi st r i but i oni n
New York. Son1.
"r. "g. neri c'
l i keTorei gn compet i t i on. wi t h
U' S' i ndus-
tri es concentrated
i n New York, such as the garment tndrtstry' utners are
rp..ri . tt n.* York' such as ri si ng space' energy' and l abor costs' the
reti ri ng of rhe turn_oi _th.-..nt,rry
i mmi grant generati on that domi nated
smal l busi ness i n New i nrk, th. i ecl i ne i f th. pott, the de.vastati ng effect
of r . . . r r i oni nt hel gTOsandt heear l yl gg0s' andt hef ai l ur et ocapt ur e
growi ng hi gh-technol ogy
i ndr"rstri tt:
.. . .
Empl oymen,
,t p.i n?ttg and publ i shi ng' whi ch i s cl osel y ti ed to the
advanced scrvrces' *"t tti Uf" tl ui i ng thc 1980s' thottgl r i t too was hi t by
the 1990 recessi on. Broadl y speaki ng, however' New York i s no l onger an
i "i ""tl "L.i ry.
Tabl e 3' 1 si rows that manufacturi ng
empl oyment was cut
byt wo- t hi r dssi ncel g50t o| esst hanl 0per cent of . t heci t y' sempl oy.
ment.4r Trucki ng,
*"*i ou' i "g,
and whoi esal e trade experi enced the
samef at e' on. , t udy. , hn* , , " h, , t ot al goods- r el at edempl oyment f el l
from 35.4 percent oi i h. tot"l i n 1' 959 to 2t' 8 percent i n 19.85' aa
The 4ecl i ne of ,n.,"ti truri ness paral l el s the departrrre.of
.i ndustri al
head-
ouarrers. New
york
hi ri ori . "l l u , peci al i zed
i n smal l or l i ght -wei ght
goods
:#i l i ;;;;;;;
i n rel ati on to thei r transporr costs, such as apparel ,
54 c HApr ER THREE
furs, j ewel ry, as wel l as books, magazi nes, and newspapers.ot The parts of
these i ndustri es that produce hi gh-fashi on i tems wi th smal l runs or that
requi re qui ck resuppl y and cl ose supervi si on of producti on have been
sl owest to l eave the ci ty. Other parts can rel y on l ow-wage i mmi grant
l abor.a6 Forei gn competi ti on, the reti rement of a generati on of i mmi granr
Jewi sh
tai l ors, di amond cutters, and factory owners, and busi ness-cycl e
downturns destroyed much of the rest, however.
These l ong-term shi fts i n the New York Ci ty economy rvere accel erared
by the rapi d fl uctuati ons i n the ci ty' s busi ness cycl e. The 1970s contrac-
ti on devastated manufacturi ng whi l e onl y sl owi ng the growth of the serv-
i ces; the boom of the 1980s spurred the servi ce sectors, wi thout much
sl owi ng the fal l of manufacturi ng. Tabl e 3.1 shows that the whi p of
the busi ness cycl e reduced manufacturi ng from al most a thi rd of ci ty em-
pl oyment to l ess than one-tenth i n four decades.aT Conversel y, fi nance
and pri vate servi ces al most doubl ed from a quarter to nearl y hal f of ci ty
empl oyment .
The economi c boom of the 1980s expanded al l three components of
the servi ce economy. Fi nance and other advanced corporate servi ces
emerged as the most powerful motors dri vi ng economi c acti vi ty i n New
TABLE 3.1
Industry 1950 Percent 1970 1977 1980 1989 Per cent
Construction 123
Manufacturi ng 7,040
Nondur abl e ( 810)
Apparel (341)
Pr i nt i ng ( 119)
Dur abl e ( 230)
Transport 232
Communi ca-
ti ons 55
Uti l i ti es 34
Whol esal e 322
Retail 433
Fi nance,
insurance, and
real estate
Servi ces
Government
Total
3. 5 1 10
30. 0 756
(23.3) (525)
(e.8) (204)
( 3. 4) ( r 21. )
(6.6) (241)
6.7 203
1. 9 95
1. 0 26
9.3 302
12.5 434
9. 7 460
' t 4. 6
785
10. 8 5 63
100. 0 3, 745
64 77 121
539 496 360
( 376) ( 351) ( 26s)
( 153) ( 140) ( 100)
( e0) ( e4) ( 88)
( 1. 53) ( 145) ( e5)
157 150 134
76 82 s9
26 25 23
248 245 228
372 358 402
414 448 530
783 894 1, 147
508 516 502
3, 188 3, 302 3, 607
3. 4
10. 0
7. 3
2. 8
2. 4
L . O
3. 7
1. 6
0. 6
6. 3
11. 1
14.7
3r . 8
16. 7
100. 0
336
507
374
3, 459
so,zce: New York State Department of Labor. 1950 Transportati on, communi cati ons,
Ut i l i t i es and whol esal e and r et ai l empl oyment f i gur es est i mat ed. 1999 Communi cat i ons
f i gur e depr essed by l abor di sput e. Col umns may not add t o t ot al due t o r oundi ng.
Empl oyment i n Nonagri cul t ural Est abl i shmenrs, New York Ci ry Annual
Averages, 19 50-1989 (i n thousands)
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
J J
York Ci ty and i ndeed the surroundi ng regi on. Fi nanci al servi ces gener-
ated hi gh earni ngs and had a l arge mul ti pl i er effect on rel ated sectors, but
Tabl e 3.2 shows that i t accounts for onl y 1' 4.7 petcent of total empl oy-
TABTE 3.2
Employment Trends, Nonagricultural Establishments, Rising Sectors
in Nerv York Ciry, 1969, 1977,
'1989
(in thousands)
1969 1977 1989
Percent of
1977- 1989 1977- 1989
Annual gain in seruices
Goods product i on and di st ri but i on
Services
Financial services
Banki ng
Securities
Corporate services
Legal services
Management consul t i ng
Account i ng
Engi neeri ng and archi t ect ure
Bui l di ng servi ces
Personnel servi ces
Communi cat i ons, t ransport , and medi a
' Communi cat i ons
Advert i si ng
Publ i shi ng
Ent ert ai nment , cul t ure, and t ouri sm
Rest aurant s, bars
Hotels
Legitimate theater
Museums
Educat i on and research
El ement ary and secondary
Colleges
Heal t h and soci al servi ces
Hospi t al s
Ot her heal t h servi ces
Social services
Government (noneducat i onal )
Local
St at e
Federal
I Ot al
0. 31%
3. 49%
2.28%
3.82%
1. 1t %
3, 659 1. 10% n, a.
r, 961 1, , 307
1, 837 1, 881
466 474
97 118
99 70
183 228
28 39
35 22
23 21
2' 1. 16
35
27 54
249 21.2
85 76
39 32
70 52
185 762
123 106
34 24
10 14
4b5
158 248
151 151
77
198 240
104 119
47 66
47n 55
398 377
254 242
38 51
106 84
3, 798 3, 18 8
994
2,675
531
171
t J /
541
76
-) -)
J - t
21
47
-0.96%
3. 2s%
2. 36%
1L.44%
n. a,
100. 0
15. 9
42.6
220
56',
39
6l
230
131
J.t
30
8
315
184
113
350
1.39
100
121
427
299
56
/ o
1. 1
9.3
9. 3
15. 0
5. 8
Sol l rce: Nerv York State Department of Labor.
. Ref l ect s
r ecl assi f i cat i on due t o br eak- up of AT&T and adj ust ment f or a l abor di sput e i n 1989.
r' Esti mate.
5 6
CHA P T E R T T T RE E
ment and contri bured onl y 15.9 percent of tl re ci ty' s j ob
grorvth duri ng
rhe 1977-89 boom. Nerv York' s ' ni quel y broad' array oJ nonfi nanci al
corporate servi ces experi enced trul y expl osi ve growth, accounti ng for
42.6 percent of the j obs
gai ned.
Nonprofi t educati on, heal th, and soci al servi ces and the publ i c
secror
al so made si gni f i cant cont r i but i ons t o t he ci t y' s economi c f or t unes, as
Tabl e 3. 2 shows. Heal t h and educat i on al one const i r ur e 1g. 4 per cent
of
t he ci t y' s empl oyment base and pr oduced 24. 3 per cent of i t s empl oymenr
gai ns i n t he 1980s. Govcr nment ser vi ces excl udi ng educat i on i onst i t ut e
11' 8 percent of empl oyment and contri buted anorher 5.g percent
of the
gai n. The publ i c and nonprofi t secors rhus accounred for al most a thi rd
of the overal l expansi on.
Raci al Successi on, the Raci al Di vi si on of Labor,
and the New Inequality
Li ke t he ci t y' s economy, i t s p. pul r t i on has al so bcen " gr obal i zecl " and
"dei ndustri al i zed." Much of the whi te, ethni c rvorki ng- *a mi ddl e-cl ass
popul at i on moved away f r om t he ci t y dur i ng t he 1970s and 19g0s; t hose
who r e nr ai n ar e f ar r nor e l i kcl y t o be el der l y t han t he r est of t he popul a-
ti on. In recent decades, thc "new i mn' ri grati .' " hrrs beconre thc dri vi ng
force behi nd soci al change, rcdefi ni ng rhe nature of raci al successi on.rt Ai
the same time, women's roles, the nature of families and household forma-
ti on, and the array of subcul tures have been radi cal l y al tered. of al l these
forces, the i mpact of mi grati on on New
york
ci ty has been most di sti nct.
Waues of Migration
Four waves of mi grati on have washed over New
york
ci ty: the Iri sh and
Ger mans af t er J. 848, t he I t al i ans and mi ddl e Eur opeanJews f r om 1g90 t o
1920, Southern bl acks and Puerto Ri cans i n rhe 1940-70 peri od, and the
cur r ent " new i mmi gr at i on" f r om t he car i bbean, Lat i n Amer i ca. and
Asi a.a' These l vaves i ntersected wi th di fferent phases of the ci ty' s eco-
nomi c growdr, creari ng a di sti ncti ve raci al /ethnl c di vi si on of l abor. The
groups arri ved wi th di fferent resources and empl oyed vari ed strategi es
wi th respect to the economi c context they found. Each wave thus pro-
duced a char ect er i st i c pl t t cr n of ct l r ni c compct i t i or r .
The fi rst two i mmi grant waves bui l t upon each other and prodLrccd a
cumul ati ve l ayeri ng characteri zed by the abi l i ty of earl i er groupr to gai n
upward mobi l i ty by col oni zi ng good economi c ni ches and di feni i ng th..
agai nst newcomers. In thi s respect, New York resembl ed otl rer l arg-e, ol d,
i ndustri al ci ti es of rhe northeast and mi dwesr. Bur whi te fl i eht -d tht
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON J /
economi c decl i ne of the mi d-1970s compl i cated economi c progress for
the l atter part of the thi rd and the fourth waves.
The bl ack and Puerto Ri can i mmi grants after Worl d War II and the
post-1955 "new i mmi grants" confronted previ ousl y establ i shed i mmi -
grant generati ons and thei r assi mi l ated chi l dren who occupi ed a range of
i ndustry/occupati onal ni ches. Duri ng the fi rst part of thi s peri od, ethni c
successi on i n the l abor market took on a di sti nctl y raci al form. Bl acks and
Puerto Ri cans faced a sl owl y decl i ni ng but sti l l wel l entrenched and resi s-
tant whi te popul ati on. In the 1970s, rapi d whi te fl i ght changed thi s si tua-
ti on i n two ways. Vhi te fl i ght created openi ngs for mi nori ty entrants even
i n decl i ni ng goods-rel ated sectors because whi tes l eft faster than the i n-
dustri es decl i ned.sO Access to growi ng sectors wi th wel l -remunerated
j obs, whether i n commerci al constructi on or i nvestment banki ng, re-
mai ned effecti vel y cl osed to mi nori ti es.
The sr.rrge of i mmi grati on i n the wake of i mmi grati on-l aw reform i n
1965 al so redefi ned the nature of raci al successi on. Duri ng the 1980s
al one, the ci ty experi enced a net gai n of roughl y hal f a mi l l i on i mmi -
grants, reversi ng the ci ty' s previ ous decades of popul ati on l oss. Roughl y
one- t hi r d of t hi s i nf l ux camc f r om Car i bbean bl acks, one- quar t er f r om
Asi ans, and one-fi ftl .r from Lati nos.sr The nati ve-born bl ack ancl Puerto
Ri can popul ati ons began to decl i ne i n absol ute as wel l as rel ati ve terms i n
1980s, so that forei gn-born bl acks and Lati nos were di spl aci ng nati ve-
bor n bl acks end Puer t o Ri cans as wel l as whi t es. The 1980 census f ound
t hat 18 per cent of t hc adul t bl ack popul at i on was f or ci gn bor n; by 1988,
a CUNY survey found that the rate was over 30 percent. The Puerto
Ri can share of adul t Lati nos decl i ned from 51 percent i n 1980 to 54 per-
cent i n 1988.
Social Change in the 1.970s and 1980s
The "subtl e revol uti on" has al so had an enormous i mpact on New York
Ci ty.
rVomen
entered the l abor force i n massi ve numbers, the femal e
l abor force became al most as l arge as the mal e l abor force, nontradi ti onal
househol ds di spl aced the tradi ti onal fami l y as the domi nant househol d
form, and bi rth rates fel l bel ow the repl acement rate.s2 Though bl ack,
Puerto Ri can, and some i mmi grant women have hi gher ferti l i ty rates than
nati ve whi tes, they are fal l i ng over ti me. And whi l e l abor-force parti ci pa-
ti on for nati ve-born bl ack and Puerto Ri can women has been l ower than
for nati ve-born whi te women, i mmi grant bl ack, Lati n, and Asi an women
are l i kel y as nati ve whi te women to work or more so.
The basi c changes i n popul ati on, race, fami l y patterns, and l abor-force
par t i ci pat i on dur i ng t he 1970s and 1980s ar e hi ghl i ght ed i n Tabl e 3. 3. I n
both decades, New York became l ess whi te and more forei gn born, i ts
58 CHA P T E R T HRE E
TABLE 3.3
Changes in the New York City Population, 1970-90
1970 t 980 1990
1980-90
Percent
Change
Tot al popul at i on
Non-Hi spani c whi t e popul at i on
(percent age)
Non-Hi spani c bl ack popul at i on
Native born
Foreign born
Hi spani c popul at i on
Puert o Ri can
Non-Puert o Ri can
Non-Hi spani c Asi an popul at i on
Forei gn-born popul at i on
Tot al househol ds
Fami l y househol ds
Marri ed coupl e f ami l i es
\ Wi t h
chi l dr en. 18
Femal e-headed househol ds
Wi t h chi l dr en. 18
Nonf ami l y househol ds
Average persons per househol d
Mal es i n l abor f orce
(percent age mal es , 15)
Femal es i n l abor f orce
(percent age f emal es , 15)
7, 322, 564 3. 55
3,' ,t63,125
-13.79
( 43. 2)
1,847,049 9.03
1.,270,000'
-2.31'
577,000" 54.50.
1, 783, 511 25. 85
895,753 4.21
885,748 62.57
489, 851 53. 05
2,082,931 24.71
2, 81. 9, 401, 1. 11
' t,734,908
-1.29
1, 098, 418
- 9. 72
510, 813 4. 62
507,459 9.52
t ) s ) g g \ 1 " )
1, 084, 493 5. 1g
2. 54 2. 00
1, 891, 21, 1 9. 18
( 71. r )
7, 695, 217 l
g. 0g
( 53. 7)
7,894,862
4 97) SOq
( 53. 0)
1, 525, 745
1, 279, 630
846,731
476, 913
1 15, 830
1. , 437, 059
2,835,872
2,043,765
1,603,397
774,496
l S l K g )
209,006
793,107
2.74
1,988,774
( 7 4. 1)
I , 355, 554
(42.2)
7,071,639
3, 668, 945
( 51. e)
7, 694, 127
1,300,1,44
393,983
1,,406,024
850, 552
545,472
300,406
1, 670, 1. 99
2, 788, 530
1.,7 57,554
1,203,387
535, 581
452, 933
307,709
1, 030, 966
. 2. 49
1, 732, ' . 165
( 6e. 5)
1, 435, 533
( 47. r )
Sorrrce: U. S. Census, 1970, 1980 Publ i c Use Mi crodrre Sampl c Fi l es: 1990 STFl and STF3.
"Est i mat ed on t he basi s of 1988 CUNY Survev.
Lat i no and Asi an popul ar i ons gr ew r api dl y, i r s houscl r ol ds wer c l ess
l i kel y to be fami l i es, and fami l i es were l ess l i kel y ro have rwo parents. But
whi l e the ci ty l ost popul ati on heavi l y i n the 1970s, rhe economi c boom
and i mmi grant surge of the 1980s i ncreased the popul ati on by 3.6 percent
(roughl y 251,000). Moreover, the growth of i mmi grant fami l i es hal ted
the fal l of mean househol d si ze and sl owed the growth of nonfami l y and
femal e-headed househol ds. The popr.rl ati on gai n reversed rhree previ ous
decades of decl i ne; more remarkabl y, New York Ci ry gai ned popul ati on
rel ati ve to i ts surroundi ng metropol i tan, breaki ng the pattern of the pre-
vi ous si x decades. The whi te popul ati on decl i ne conri nued i n the 1980s
but f ar l ess r api dl y t han i n t he 1970s. Dur i ng t he 1980s, i mmi gr at i on
brought the number of Lati nos al most even wi th the number of bl acks,
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L
T I { A NS F ORMA T I ON
5 9
rvhi l e i mmi grants from chi na and el sewhere i n Asi a were the most rap-
i ai y gto*i { group, though sti l l smal l rel ati ve to the others'
TIrc New RaciallEthniclGender
Diaision of Labor
Economi canddemographi cchangesi nt ersect edwi t ht herapi dchangesi n
,f' t. ..""t-y and l ab]or^market to produce a new pattern of how groups
are di stri bui ed across the l atti ce of i ndustri es and occupati ons. The whi te,
.i i ni l , bl ue-col l ar worki ng cl ass shrank to the poi nt where i taccounts for
"l rfrro,
5 percent of the l i ty' s adul t popul ati on. As i t aged and di mi n-
i r-fri a,' i * ri ral e offspri ng e.,i e.ed manageri al and professi onal occupa-
ti ons. Mi nori ti es, parti ci l arl y Lati nos, ri pl aced retreati ng whi tes wi thi n
i i r. ,fr.i nf.i "g -a.,ufactu.i ng l abor force.-The femal e whi te-col l ar
work-
;;; ;i ;r; .rp"ond.d grearl y. i vhi r. women make up about hal f thi s group,
*fi i ;. btu.t ond other mi nori ty women hol d another quarter. (Men make
up th. rest.) Thi s new pattern i s associ ated wi th both growi ng poverty
and worseni ng i ncome i nequal i ty' Race, gender, nati vi ty' and ethni ci ty al l
pl ayed a .ol e i n sorti ng groups across economi c ni ches'
In broad rerms, *[i i ., di sproporti onatel y
hol d manageri al , profes-
si onal , and cl eri cal l obs
i n constructi on, transportati on,.
fi nance, ad-
vanced corporate servi ccs, educati on, and.government'
Bl acks tend to
hol d cl eri cal and servi ce
j obs i n heal th, soci al servi ces' and government.
Lati nos are concentrated i n servi ce and operati ve
j obs i n manufacturi ng,
,.ri ru.on,r, and heal th servi ces. In each of these groups' mal e wh-i te-col -
l ar workers are more l i kel y to be managers or professi onal s and.femal es
i o be .l ..i .al workers, whi l e mal e bl ue-i ol l ar workers are more l i kel y to
be craftsmen and women to be operati ves' s1
These broad
Patterns
do vary across speci fi c combi nati ons of race,
ethni ci ty or nati ;i ry' and gendei ' however' Among whi te mal es' for ex-
;;;l ;, i hore of
Jewi sh
ani estri es are strongl y represented i n the apparel
i nai ,rr.y, whol eJal e trade, the corporate servi ces, whi l e women of
Jewi sh
ancestri es are concentrated i n educati on.5o Mal es of l tal i an ancestry are
di rf.opo.ri nnatel y
i n constructi on, transportati on'
and whol esal e and
,.,l i f i t"a.; hi gh proporti ons of Iri sh mal es may be found worki ng i n
,rtntpo.r"ri oni banki ng,
the bar and restaurant busi ness' and publ i c
r.r"1... Among bl acks, nati ve-born men are more l i kel y to be i n trans-
portati on, .o--uni .ni i on,
and uti l i ti es and women i n educati on' soci al
i ."r"i *; ;J l rp..i "l l y gou.rn-.nr. Jamai can
mal es, on the other hand,
;r. ;;;. l i kel i to b. i l n -"n' f"ttuti ng
(cspeci al l y of
.durabl e
goods)'
l onst ruct i on'
and hospi t al s. Si mi l arl y, Domi ni can i mmi grant s are more
i i l .ty ,f,"n
puerro
Ri cans to work i n manufacturi ng
(especi al l y apparel )
o, ,.,,"u."nts and l ess l i kel y to work i n heal th servi ces, soci a| servi ces,
6 0
CHA P T E R T HRE E
or government. Some groups achi eved extremel y hi gh concentrati ons i n a
f ew i ndust r i es: f or exampl e, i n 1980, 44 per cent of al l Chi nese mal es
worked as wai rers and cooks i n restaurants, whi l e 40 percent of al l
Domi ni can women and 54 percent of al l Chi nese women worked be-
hi nd sewi ng machi nes i n the garment i ndustry. Even among whi tes,
21 percent of
Jewi sh
ancestry women worked i n educati on, whi l e 15 per-
cent of the Whi te Angl o-Saxon Protestant and Iri sh mal es worked i n
banki ng.55
Thi s pattern of ethni c speci al i zati on refl ects the i mpri nt l eft by the i ni -
ti al i mmi grant generati ons, though to be sure wi th upward and outward
mobi l i ty over ti me.56 One can see
Jews
i n the garment i ndustry, Ital i an
constructi on workers, and Iri sh fi remen, though they are now more l i kel y
to own or manage thei r enterpri ses, or to be craftspersons rather than
operati ves. By l ooki ng at where groups have spread from the i ni ti al con-
centrati ons, one can al so sense the traj ectori es that pri or i mmi grant
groups have fol l owed. The Iri sh, for exampl e, certai nl y di d not begi n wi th
concentrati ons i n i nvestment banki ng and corporate l aw but used pol i ti cs
as a spri ngboard to gai n access ro them. Ital i ans achi eved a si mi l ar but
l esser mobi l i ty i nto these sectors.
Jews
gai ned access to i nvestment bank-
i ng but evi dentl y not nearl y so much entree i nto commerci al banki ng.
Thei r speci al i zati on i n the publ i c school sysrem al so l ed to a compara-
ti vel y hi gh representari on i n hi gher edr.rcati on.
Bl acks and Lati nos have achi eved l ess mobi l i ty i nto the best remuner-
ated and most rapi dl y growi ng sectors of the economy, and there are
conti nued i ndi cati ons of di scri mi nati on agai nsr rhem.i T But bl acks and
Lati nos di verge consi derabl y i n thei r l abor-ntarket concentrati ons. Re-
fl ecti ng thei r hi gher degree of pol i ti cal mobi l i zati on, bl acks are much
more heavi l y represented i n heal th, soci al servi ces, and publ i c empl oy-
ment. Lati nos, on the other hand, remai n l odged i n the decl i ni ng manu-
facturi ng sectors and have experi enced downward mobi l i ty wi th them.
Vomen al so l ag behi nd men i n gai ni ng professi onal and manageri al posi -
ti ons, wi th whi te women posi ti oned bettcr than mi nori ty women, ancl
bl ack women better posi ti oned than Lati nas.5s
Thi s new raci al , ethni c, and gender di vi si on of l abor has created com-
pl i cated new patterns of i nfergroup tensi on tl ' rat cannot be summed up i n
a si mpl e di chot or ny l i ke " management vcr sus wor ker s" or " whi t es ver sus
bl acks. " Vhi t e mal es of Engl i sh, Ger man, I r i sh, andJewi sh ancest r i es st i l l
cl earl y domi nate upper posi ti ons i n the economy, but thei r representati on
i s decl i ni ng rel ati ve to the kal ei doscope of groups that are stri vi ng to take
thei r pl ace. These chal l engi ng groups are di fferenti ated by race, ethni ci ry,
and gender. No si ngl e i nteresr uni tes them agai nst the domi nant group; to
the contrary, myri ad di fferences fragment them.
l "
6l
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L
T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
The Nezu lnequalitY
Agai nst thi s hi ghl y compl ex
mosai c has been l ai d an i ncreasi ngl y
stark
;ffi; il;;;it;v:'
wr'ii' nlunv people. entered the labor market' the
srowrh of femal e-he"i .a
f"-i fi .t t .p, l arge proporti ol l
^of
bl acks and
ffi ;; ;;;;i i ;. D;rpi r. ,r' . overal l prosp.ri tv of the 1980s, l abor-force
parti ci padon
,"r., a.-.ti nti -*ong
both^mtn
and women and poverty
rose. These
' poo.
,o-i l i es tend Ji sproporti onatel y
to- be nati ve-born
bl acks, Puerto ni ."n' , unJOo-i ni tont
' i ht' th"n i mmi grant
West Indi -
ans or Lati n e-.rl .on' '
i he peopl e sorted i nto decl i ni ng
i ndustri es or out
of the l abor ro... .*p.ri .n..i
,.ol i ncome l osses. si nce wel fare payments
for, *r.""a
to i n{l oti on' the poorest househol ds
experi enced-the
greatest
ffi.";;il;;;;;;t;i
i-n. i.,.o*. distribution,
the surge of e.arnings in
manageri al '
p.ofessi oJal ;' ";;
;"t" cl eri cal occupati o.ns'
especi al l y
when
associ ated
wi th Wal l ;;;;; .;"r.d medi an real hbusehol d i ncomes to ri se
;;;;;;;
i q8or. d; ;h;" of total i ncome recei ved bv the l owest 20
Dercent
of househol ds
decl i ned from 15' 4 to 11' 6 percent between 1975
ffii;;;,
*iil. irtt, of the top 10 percent rose from 43'8 to 49'Tpercenr'
r"Uti "",i "ffy
worse than the U' S' trend' 5'
Rapi dl y .i si ng ..nt, accentuated
thi s probl em' Even though the ci ty' s
househol ds i n. r. "r. dl f
re O, Ooo bet ween 1980 and 1988' t he net decl i ne
i nt l r eci t y, shousi ngst ockdi dnot st opunt i l af t er l g83' andst t bsequent
net expansi on di a noi ' *tth tht househol d
growth' Si nce more house-
hol dswi t hmorei ncomewerechasi nganessen"t i al l yf i xedhousi ngsuppl y,
i t was certai n that rents woul d ri se, i ent/i ncome
rati os worsen' and dou-
;l i ;;";-;;J
l ]otn.l .rrncss
i ncrease.50
Those at the bottom were at an
i ncreasi ng competi trJe
di ' "au"n"gt
wi th al l those above them' The resul t
was the di sproporti o;;;;;";;h
i n Nt* York of what some have cal l ed
"t he undercl ass. "5'
The Fiscal Context
Li ke the rest of the New York Ci ty economy' the.publ i c sector experi -
;;;;i ;"' ;;
"nd
ofttn ttnsettl i ng tl "' ""gt' duri ng the 1970s and 1980s'
Four broad peri ods:;;i l ;l ;;t";ui shei
for pubi i c.f
i l t' .
i n New York
Ci ty.62 Between
1' 961 and 1959' the
ci ty' s budget doubl ed i n real terms
f rom $8. 5 bi l l i on , n-SJe' Z Ui f l i on
(i n 1982 dol l ars)' 63 Thi s growt h was
fi nanced
pri mari l y i tttougtt l ocal .revenues
and i ntergovernmental
trans-
fers drawn f.om tl ' ,e *a' ]i nduttd
economi c
boom of the peri od and i n-
creased federal ui a i ro,n' ,t. K.nn.dy and
Johnson
admi ni strati ons.
The
CHA P T E R T HRE E
share of Iocal revenues fel l from 57.8 percent to 49.0 percenr, however.
The share borrowed rose from 11.5 percent to 13.g p....nt i n the fi rst
years of the 1950s but then fel l to 9.1 percenr. Inrergovernmental ai d,
parti cul arl y federal ai d, thus rose fasrer than the budgei as a whol e or any
of i ts other fundi ng sources.
Between 1969 and 197 5, the budget continued ro grow at half the rate
of the 1950s, but the previ ous sources of fi nanci ng di d not fol l ow sui t. In
1982 constant dol l ars, the budget peaked at $2L.7 bi l l i on i n 197 s. Local
revenues shrank agai n from 49.0 to 42.2 percent of the total as back-to-
back recessi ons reduced l ocal tax ,.u.nu.r. Intergovernmental ai d al so
decl i ned from 42 percenr to 40.4 percent i n 1973, rccoveri ng to 44 per-
cent i n 1.975 as the ci ry' s fi scal strai ts worsened. (Thi s refl ei rs a maj or
fal l off i n federal ai d under the Ni xon admi ni strati on, parti al l y countered
by i ncreases i n st at e ai d. ) The Li ndsay and Beame admi ni st i at i ons bor-
rowed ro cl ose the gap, i ncreasi ng thei r share from 9.1 percent
i n 1969 to
13. 5 percent i n 1975. (Borrowi ng peaked at 15. 1 percenr i n r974. ) The
ci t y rol l ed up i ncreasi ngl y l arge debrs, i rnrount i ng i o more rhan $13 bi l _
l i on i n currenr dol l ars 1975 (i ncl udi ng
$7 bi l l i ori i n sl . rorr-rerm debt at a
ti me when the total budget was onl y $ 12.4 bi i l i on). Its i nabi l i ty to pay thi s
short-term debt l ed the banks ro cur off credi t, preci pi tati ng
the fi scal
cri si s peri od from 1975 to 1983.
_ ^l n
th.i s-peri od, ci ty spendi ng decreased from $21.1 bi l l i on i n consrant
1982 dol l ars to $15.5 bi l l i on, a decl i ne of 22.2 percenr. Borrowi ng
droppe-d rapi dl y to7.6 percent of the total i n 19g3. Local revenues i n-
creased. from 42.2 pefcent to 51.5 percent of the total , .efl ecti ng ,.newed
expansi on that took hol d i n the ci ty' s economy after 1977. rnt"ergoue.n-
mental ai d rose i n the i mmedi are wake of the hscal ..i ri s, ..".i i 3g a7.l
percent i n 1978, but t hen decri ned t o 40. 9 percent i n 19g3, berow t he
l evel of l ate 1950s. Most of rhi s representcd si ate efforts ,o
"rri *
rhe crry;
despi te hel p from the carter admi ni strati on i n 1977 and 797g, federal
ai d decl i ned f rom $2. 5 bi l l i on i n l 97g t o $2. 2 bi l l i on i n 19g3 i n . ur. . nt
dol l ars. 6a
The post-1977 economi c expansi on set the stage for the renewed
growth of the ci ty budget between 19g3 to t9g9. i he growth of rocar
revenres was so strong duri ng thi s peri od tl rat the ci ty budget rose i n
const ant 1982 dol l ars f rom $16. 5 bi l l i on i n 19g3 t o $20. 7 bi l l i on i n 19g9,
or 27,3 percent.65 Borrowi ng arso i ncreased from 7.G percent to !0.7 per-
cent,.refl ecti ng rhe ci ry' s return to the capi tar marker end i ts cresi re to
rebui l d i rs capi t al budger. Remarkabry, i nrergovernmenrar
ai d decri ned
even further, from 40.9 percent to 29.i percent of the rotal .
The stock market crash of october r9g7 effecti v.ty -"rk.d the end of
the boom era i n New
york
ci ty, and i ndeed i n the nati on, and rhe onser
of a new recessi on i n 1990. Berween the month of the crash and the begi n-
P OS T I NDUS T RI A L T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
6 3
ni ng of 1990, total New York Ci ty empl oyment rose by onl y 56,000
i obs'
pub-l i c
ernpl oyment grew by 25,000 duri ng thi s peri od, whi l e the fi nanci al
servi ces decl i ned by 5,000
j obs. Between the mi ddl e of 1989 and the end
of 1991., total empl oyment decl i ned by 190,000, whi l e publ i c empl oy-
ment hel d steady. Thi s di spari ty between the pri vate economy and publ i c
personnel expendi tures l ed to renewed and i ncreasi ngl y severe fi scal prob-
l ems i n 1990 and 1991.
Pol i ti cal Impl i cati ons of the Posti ndustri al Revol uti on
These profound changes i n the ci ty' s economy, soci ety, and publ i c sector
had thi ee ma
j or consequences for the i nterests wi th whi ch pol i ti cal entre-
preneurs must i nteract as they seek to construct a vi ctori ous pol i ti cal coa-
i i ti on. They al tered the si ze, di sposi ti on, and potenti al i nfl uence of the
i nterests i n the economi c and soci al envi ronments i n whi ch pol i ti cs oper-
ates. Tl rey al so created di sti ncfl y posti ndustri al tensi ons and confl i cts
among these consti ruenci es. Fi nal l y, the sharpl y cycl i cal nature of the
busi ness cycl e destabi l i zed ol d patterns of accommodati on among i nter-
ests and opened the way for attempts at defi ni ng a new domi nant coal i -
ti on that woul d hel p determi ne who woul d benefi t from the economi c
boom of t he 1980s.
Ch nnging C on st itu en ci e s
The posti ndustri al revol uti on has al tered the constel l ati on of i nterests i n
1{.'
the two operati ng envi ronments of pol i ti cs, the market and the ci ti zenry,
,]'
as wel l as wi thi n the publ i c sector i tsel f. In the marketpl ace, the 1970s
i
and 1980s sharpened the di sti ncti on between the ri si ng sectors-fi nance,
the other advanced corporate servi ces, pri vate, nonprofi t soci al servi ces,
and government-and i he decl i ni ng se6ors-manufacturi ng, whol esal -
i ng, i nd frei ght transporr. l t propel l ed the former upward and outward,
*hi l . di r ni ni shi ng and di spl aci ng t he l at t er .
The ri si ng economi c consti tuenci es had a cl ear, i f l atent or parti al l y
expressed, agenda for ci ty pol i ti cs. The ci ty' s corporate l eaders wanted
ci ty government to reduce i ts tax burden on the pri vate economy, shri nk
i ts' fri ncti ons and empl oymenr base, reduce seemi ngl y unchecked cl ai ms
for soci al servi ces, and i ncrease servi ces rel evant to the pri vate sector and
the mi ddl e cl ass. Real estate devel opers and thei r i nvestment bankers and
corporate l awyers wanted ci ty government to promote pri vate i nve stment
-oi . oggr.rsi vel y through a capi tal program that woul d restore econom-
i cal l y rl i -evant i nfrastructure and through regul atory and tax i ncenti ves
CHA P T E R
T H
;1ru::'*i;';'i",Yff',t:::'-':^:':'
In generar,
the rising
se*ors
or
iJ';ilffi
HTJ,: :.::1,
a m o re p o, i ti u."
"
n J
loo*,,
"f
,,ff :TTl
H
These ri si n s .."",., -, llllllij.
lr,r!..,o.iori
ty wi th .t"*.J
.iil.rir.
.
These ri s i n g econ o,.n i. .on'r rj*
";?l;:,l^","'
ty wl th elected
offi ci a ls.
wi th the ci ry' i pol i ti c"r
L.a..r,'
i i ;;' ,:
"""
many i m porta
n t connecti orr
the city's r.u.nu.r,
;;j;;;"":::'-'."^:iI
payments
provided
the bulk
of
deveropm
en t,
",,,'i.,lljl'-Tvr:slmen
t capi ta I ;; ;;il;;
ii"t lin g p, uri.
provi ded
,l r. bul l :l l es
to frui ti on;
tl rei r ttnj ot
t*..,;;;;;.
parrners
menropporr,,"i,i:,i:,'XT;;,lf,
:roffi
:'i:,;:,1,i::,"T",;;;*I j.;ltr
tensive
influence
over instituti""i
rrr"r rir.p.d
,;r;;;i.i,l#,lur,.
"o,r-
i on. Thc expl osi ve
growt '
, f , 1, , ; ; ; ' ; ; l l l . ,
"nd-: arni ngs
duri ng
t he
#': i:fi::J?,ff
li[;:,*:'inlin
ll'n n u. n.. No, on r-y *.,. .o,po.
reru se ro accom
mod a
"
ii.i.
il;#; ;[il':ffiH.T:,
|u.."
u.,",,
foi id
r"ffiH;i ;;:3^T'''"";;;;;;';;'
"'t,o
.ougr,,,,,;,,"n*-irom
ciry
experiencedo*,"J,i"1'.Tr",,:";[:T,i?!ll$:",:1.:;ffi
il::il*{
more ri ke the ri si ng,serto"'
1Ft. .*"-fr.,
apparer
fi rms emphasi zed
de-
srgn, markeri ng,
and fi nance,..";";;;;;u*i on
el sewhere.)
As the l abor
torce i n these i ndustrr.r.d*rni i .;
;"#;....c
poorer,
so di d the trade yni gn: rhat represent.a.
*"r rn
j H;d.d
thei r i ncrustri es.
some crecri n_
ii:li,ffi
T::;,Hi:::',:';:?:;1,',':,i,l"rw:",*r,irr.,i"g,-n-gh,oguin,,
lll;.?iil;il:i:.:T1'5;;;;;,,;[::tlfi
rl;:ilf
::ru:i;:ll
i"a"".,"r,
ir?;;;;' ::l:-to
make,svmbolic.gestures
in defense
of these
*r r,. u n i n,,,
;;.".i:::
;ilT
:iil ;* l;m
ji:Tf:t
*, :I lli;
poti ti cat
i ncenti ves
ron i n th.' op;;;;:i l :..,,"".
Thi s si tuari on
i s nearry.r#;J' ;kr",r.on-,.,
to how the pori ti cal system
rerares
to ri si ng
"ra
a..ri n' rt
;;;;r.,
of rhe resi denr
popurati on
.,r',r1,ll:Ti
i:l ;jmf
;|.f,:'ftt
H ;;
|
.n'
"'e,
i n .e.e,it
t.." d.,,
votes. Though
in nr-..,cal
decline,
,rr.r. illt^l,lles
cast the majority
oi
atcly occupie' d
,tr" ,t
"n",",J,,i:;,;' ::..:i:*
constttttencics
disproportion-
nom ic ...1o,,
il; i;:il:;:
1;
q
j.T:
r;,HHffi
::lx
lll!
j;x,.;
.fid !{?'..HT
:: #:
"'H
ll'
gff
:Tf
s'
J ?.' #,r'."
i; ; l;J,o,rr
e
X]."^ l?ror' J.rq:[ Irr-ugrr
rhe rcgular
o"rrt' t
party'
Thev succcedecl
by
f-v e
.b
o ro u g rr'' vi' i r.
i'
*i, n a r r. r'a n,''
#i il
;tTH i il : ?:"r ii ; :
y,
: cratrc organi zati ons
to accept
and advan.e-rt.n.,
oy th.eateni ng
tn d.f..t
to other parti cs
or to p..i ,,i ;...ru."]
.."i ' i .,.,r,
rhc rcgrrrrrr
De.rrr' crrrri c organ rza ri ons u I ti r' a tcl y used these l o;;;;;,
As we wittsee
in grearei
a"tuitrn
it . i.#;""r,*
[.t:t:H:*,::H;
T T T . DUS T RI A L
T RA NS F ORMA T I ON
means excl uded bl acks and Lati nos
' contrary,
whi te Democrati c regul ars
6s
duri ng t he 1970s and 1980s. To
promotecl mi nori ty l eaders al l i ed
them so as to shape mi nori ty el ectoralmobi l i zati on. But they had l i ttl e
to make them equal partners.
,.
Jerrs
and whi te cathol i cs had represented di sti nct and competi ng ten-
d-.|.r i n tfi e Democrati c party el ectorate.
Jews
were more l i beral ; they
orovi ded the bul k of the vote on the Ameri crrn Labor Party bal l ot l i ne i n
rhe 1930s and 1940s and on the Li beral Party l i ne after the 1950s and
s.ere porenti al l y avai l abl e to reform i nsurgents. (Jewi sh voters hel ped
cl ea both LaGuardi a and Li ndsay.) whi te cathol i cs, especi al l y l tal i ans,
were more conservati ve; many voted for Republ i can presi denti al candi -
dates and provi ded votes on the Conservati ve and Ri ght to Li fe bal l ot
:.
fn.r. As
Jews
competed wi th whi te Cathol i cs for top posi ti ons i n the
l
Democrati c
party, they often sought mi nori ty support, forgi ng a pattern
of
Jewi sh-bl i ck
cooperati on that was the basi s for New York' s brand of
urban l i beral i sm.
The decl i ne i n the numbers of
Jews
and whi te cathol i cs rel ati ve to
bl acks and Lati nos duri ng the 1950s and 1970s, the i ncreasi ng raci al di vi -
si ons between whi tes and bl acks, and overt confl i cts such as the Ocean
Hi l l -Brownsvi l l e
school decentral i zati on di spute and the teachers stri ke
of t968 drove a wedge between
Jews
and thei r former al l i es and l ed them
i n the l atter 1970s to make common cause wi th the whi te Cathol i cs. Ci ty-
rvi de races between Democrati c candi dates of Ital i an and
Jewi sh
descent
coul d di vi de thi s new al l i ance, but otherwi se i t hel d strong'
However much New York' s el ectoral arena was domi nated by decl i n-
i ng consti tuenci es, i t coul d not i gnore the ri si ng but underrepresented
co"nsti tuenci es. The county Democrati c party organi zati ons i n Brookl yn,
rhe Bronx, and
Queens
supported the ri se of nati ve-born bl ack and Puerto
Ri can al l i es who coul d control the mobi l i zati on of these popul ati ons, and
they encouraged competi ti on between these groups based on the obi ecti ve
,pui i nl and eJonomi Cdi fferences between them. Havi ng come earl i er and
i n l arger numbers, and havi ng undertaken more extensi ve i ndependent
pol i ti cal mobi l i zati on, bl acks achi eved more upward mobi l i ty i n the
bemocrati c party and i n tl re l abor market than di d Puerto Ri cans. In thi s
way, the Democrati c.regul ars i ncorporated and subordi nated these con-
st i t uenci es.
Duri ng the l atter 1970s and rhe 1980s, thi s raci al /ethni c fragmentati on
took a ni w turn as the nati ve-born bl ack and Puerto Ri can popul ati ons
wenr i nto numeri cal decl i ne rel ati ve to forei gn-born bl acks and Lati nos.
The rapi d growth of west Indi an, Domi ni can, chi nese, and other i mmi -
g."nt popul "ti ons rnade the strategy of di vi de and conquer cven easi er'
i tri r potl i i ."l weakness was rei nforced by these new consti tuenci es hol d-
i ng
j obs l argel y outsi de the advanced corporate servi ces. Some i mmi grant
66 CHA P T E R T HRE E
groups, for exampl e, West Indi ans, *' orked i n such ri si ng sectors as hospi -
tal s and l ocal government. But even among Wesr l ndi ans, the l argest
number of i mmi grants worked i n the decl i ni ng manufacturi ng sectors,
where the numeri cal decl i ne of whi te workers was even more rapi d than
thei r l oss of
j obs,
creati ng openi ngs for i mmi granr rvorkers. Thei r weak
posi ti on i n the l abor market rei nforced thei r weak pol i ti cal posi ti on.
Out of thi s contradi ctory pattern of decl i ni ng popul ati on groups domi -
nati ng the better j obs
i n the ri si ng economi c sectors and the ri si ng gr<-rups
col oni zi ng the decl i ni ng economrc secrors, two devi ant groups stand out:
the l argel y whi te stratum of professi onal s of the baby boom generari on
and the more typi cal l y mi nori ty Iabor force i n government and nonprofi t
soci al servi ces. Here, growi ng groups hel d j obs i n growi ng secors.
In 1980, the fi rst group compri sed roughl y one-renth of the ci ty' s total
l abor force; the subsequent decade of economi c boom i ncreased i t sub-
stanti al l y.66 Perhaps two-thi rds of thi s group i s empl oyed i n pri vate cor-
porati ons and advocates the busi ness agenda, but the other thi rd i s based
i n nonprofi t sectors and has a more l i beral and reformi sr oudook. Steven
Bri nt has commented:
It seems l i kel y that i n reccnt years, many l i beral professi onal s have accommo-
dated to the prerogati ves of the domi nant busi ness sector, j usr as i n rhe 1950s
and 1970s many busi ness peopl e accommodated ro thc rhen-:rscendent rhetori c
of the "servi ce soci ety," the "knowl edge cl ass," soci al reform, and communi ty
control . Together wi th thesc acconrnrocl l ti ons, hr)rvever, :rrc rrl so pcrsi stent
tensi ons ari si ng from confl i ct between two sratus cul tures: the uti l i tari an and
profi t-centered concerns of peopl e cl ose to the fi nanci al and busi ness worl ds,
and the i ntel l ectual , expressi ve, anci cul tural l y cosnropol i t:rn col ' l cerns of peopl e
cl ose to the l i beral professi onal worl d of the uni versi ti es, the arrs, the nonprof-
i ts, and government soci al servi ces.tt
Shefter l ras argued that these groups, embodi cd i n the "reform van-
guard," have pl ayed an i mportant rol e i n pol i ti cs because rhei r resources
and i nfl uence far outstri p thei r numbers. As such, they mi ght consri tute a
pi votal consti tuency drawn i n certai n pcri ods towards a l i beral versi on of
the reform i deal and i n others toward a more conservati ve vi si on. As we
shal l see bel ow, the traj ectory of thi s group i s an i mportant factor i n de-
termi ni ng the fate of i nsurgent coal i ti ons i n New York Ci ty pol i ti cs.
Government empl oyment and dre al l i ed nonprofi t soci al servi ce secror
al so grew rapi dl y between 1977 and 1989, despi te the i mpressi on of rc-
trenchment conveyed by the postfi scal cri si s atmosphere of New York
Ci ty pol i ti cs.
\i l 7hi l e
the fi scal cri si s caused l ocal government to reduce i ts
empl oyment by a net of 5-5,000 j obs bctween 1970 and 7977, ci ty govern-
ment empl oyment grew rapi dl y after 1983. By the end of 1989, l ocal
government empl oyed substanti al l y more peopl e (469,000) than ei ther
manuf act ur i ng ( 353, 000) or banki ng and secur i t i es ( 305, 000) . 68
l r
t l
1 l
i i
i
P OS T I N DUS T RI A L T RA NS F OI T MA ' I ' I ON
o t
In contrast to the retrenchment i n government support for nonprofi ts
that took pl ace i n other ci ti es duri ng the earl y 1980s, l ocal government
contri buti ons to nonprofi t budgets grew i n New York.5e By l ate 1989, the
empl oyment i n these sectors (676,000) outstri pped government' as wel l
,, ."n.rfacturi ng and banki ng. Government and the nonprofi t soci al
servi ces had a much hi gher rate of empl oyment for bl acks and Lati nos
than grorvi ng parrs of i he pri vate, for-profi _t economy. Most bl ack and
Lati no managers and professi onal s may be found i n these sectors' as can
whi te women. Fo. gou.tnment and nonprofi t soci al Servi ce workers' race
and i ndustry often rei nforce l i beral soci al and pol i ti cal atti tudes.
' Whi l e
thei r i ncomes are far l ower than those i n the upper professi ons, thei r
numbers are far greater, amounti ng ro al most one-thi rd of the total em-
pl oyment. Li ke reform-ori ented professi onal s, they too represent a pi v-
otal consti tuency for i nsurgent coal i ti ons.
Nezu Fonns of Class
qnd
Race Conflict
These trends produced i ncreasi ngl y sharp new patterns of i nequal i ty
among New York Ci ty resi dents i n rerms of i ncome, housi ng, and pol i ti -
cal i n-fl uence. Growi ng i nequal i ty fostered homel essness, ri si ng cri me
rares, rhe breakdown of publ i c order and_ci vi l i ty, and deteri o_rati ng race
"nd
i nt..g.nup rel ati ons,whi ch worsened the qual i ty of l i fe for al l New
Yor kcr s, i nt
t ur t
t hc i mmcdi at e vi ct i ms. These ar e but t he most vi si bl e of
a network of characteri sti cal l y posti ndustri al tensi ons that permeate the
pol i t i cal ar ena.
These confl i cts cannot be boi l ed down i nto si mpl e di chotomi es' Vhi l e
the soci al , economi c, and pol i ti cal (i f not al ways physi cal ) di stance be-
tween whi te i nvestment bankers and Lati no wel fare mothers grew
enormousl y duri ng the 1977-89 economi c boom, cl ass cannot be reduced
to col or, .rh"i .i ty, or gender. At the extremes, cl ass does have a_ col or,
and raci al di scri mi nati on conti nues to occur even i n the l ower echel ons of
Ncw York soci ety. But not al l bl acks or Lati nos are poor. Despi te raci al
ancl cthni c i neqrral i ty, the cconomi c bool n crcated paths of
_trpward
mo-
bi l i ty for most bl ack;, Lati nos, and Asi ans. Nati ve-born bl acks' especi al l y
*on1.n, gai ned a consi derabl e foothol d not onl y i n cl eri cal work but i n
soci al ,er"ui ce professi ons and government. Forei gn-born bl acks benefi ted
frorn the expansi on of the heal th sector and
Sovernment.
Whi l e Puerto
Ri can, Domi ni can, and Chi nese women were sl ' runted i nto the decl i ni ng
garment i ndustry and men i nto the ri si ng restaurant i ndustry, many for-
l i gn- bor n Lat i nos and Asi ans have al so est abl i shed t hr i vi ng i mmi gr ant
eri terp.i ses. Even the top manageri al and professi onal
i obs
formerl y re-
,..u.i for whi te mal e Prbtestants have been opened to
Jewi sh
and Catho-
l i c mal es, as wel l as to token femal e and bl ack Stanford MBAs'
',/'
CT I A P T E R T HRE E
The central probl em of raci al i nequal i ty I.ras tl ' rus taken on a cl ual i ta-
ti vel y new and more compl i cated form. Fi rst, the basi c di chotomy be-
tween whi tes on one si de and nati ve-born bl acks and Puerto Ri cans on the
other has been fragmented by ethni ci ty/nati onal i ty and gcndcr.7O West
Indi an i mmi grants di ffer obj ecti vel y from nati ve-born bl acks i n economi c
and cul tural terms and compete agai nst them,
j ust
as Lati nos do agai nst
bl acks and Domi ni cans do agai nst Puerto Ri cans.
Si gni fi cant di fferences di vi de each group. Gender can be one such di f-
ference. Bl ack women, for exampl e, are better posi ti oned i n New York' s
cl eri cal l abor force and are begi nni ng to gai n better entry to manageri al
and professi onal j obs
than bl ack men. More i mportantl y, as the i ncome
i nequal i ty among bl ack househol ds has grown greater, the soci al and po-
l i ti cal di stance between the bl ack mi ddl e cl ass and the bl ack poor has
wi dened. As a resul t, the rel ati onshi p between the establ i shed bl ack l ead-
ershi p stratum and a si gni fi cant porti on of i ts consti tuency has become far
more probl emati c. Important as such di vi si ons are, however, whether l a-
tent or overt, they take on pol i ti cal i mportance onl y to the extent that
actors i n the pol i ti cal system mobi l i ze them.
P oliti cal D e st abilizsti on
Fi nal l y, the sharp fl uctuati on of the busi ness cycl e al so had a maj or i m-
pact on New York Ci ty pol i ti cs. As Marti n Shefter has argued, thi s cycl e
rocked the pol i ti cal systcm and ruptured ol d patterns of pol i ti cal accom-
modati on among i nterests. The downturn of the fi scal cri si s put severe
stress on publ i c sector producer i nterests, parti cul arl y the regul ar Demo-
cr at i c or gani zat i ons and t he publ i c empl oyee uni ons. Thi s di sar r ay
opened the way, i l ter 7977, for new forccs to organi ze a new domi nl nt
coal i t i on.
The post-1977 boom dramati cal l y i ncreased both the confl i cts faci ng
the pol i ti cal system and the si ze of the resources avai l abl e ro rhe i nreresrs
that succeeded i n organi zi ng the domi nant coal i ti on. The creati on of new
consti tuenci es, the decay of ol d ones, thc cl rangi ng powcr rcl ati ons
among them, and the cl ashes between them exert deep but someti mes
contradi ctory forces on New York Ci ty' s pol i ti cal systern. The pol i ti cal
responses, however, were deepl y shaped by the ways i n whi ch i nterac-
ti ons between the pol i ti cal system and i ts el ectoral , governmental , and
economi c envi ronments have been i nsti tuti onal i zed. It i s to these i nsti tu-
ti onal patterns and practi ces that we now turn.
Four
The Rules of the Game in New York city Politics
In extremel y oversi mpl i fi ed terms, there appear
to be at l east two "power el i tes" i n the Ci ty, a
party-centered one and a "status" centered one'
(Theodore Lowi, At the Plea*re of
the Mayor)'
The successful pol i ti ci an i n New York Ci ty has
to focus on two audi ences: pri me voters and
campai gn contri butors.
( Nor man Adl er , pol i t i cal consul t ant ) r
Anal ysts . . . must stop mi staki ng ethni ci ty for
pol i ti cs; whi l e ethni ci ty may be more
i mpor t ant t han cl ess t o vot i ng, economi cs i s
more i mportant to government pol i cy
than ethni ci tY.
fl i m
Chapi n, "Vho Rul es New York
Today?" ) l
pnsvl ousl -y
i t has been argued that pol i ti cal actors seek to construct and
-mai nti ri n a cl omi nant .orl -i ri on by usi ng ci ty government' s rel ati onshi ps
*i tl ., ..nnonl i c and pol i ti cal /el ectoral
i nterests to wi n el ecti ons and secure
-
the coopcrati on from publ i c and pri vate power-hol ders requi red to gov-
'
ern. over the l ast seu.ral decades, soci al change has al tered the nature of
^i t
.r. governmental , soci i rl , and economi c i nterests and created new
confl i ci s and tensi ons among them. These i nterests and confl i cts take
on pol i ti cal rnel ni ng, l ]n*cu"r, onl y wi thi n a speci fi c setti ng of pol i ti cal
i nsti tuti ons and practi ces. These i nsti tuti onal patterns strongl y.medi ate
the broacl er soci al changes descri bed above and shape pol i ti cal actors'
;1.,1.; towards i nterJsts i n the government, the el ectorate, and the
economY. '
The cri ti cal step toward bui l di ng a domi nant pol i ti cal coal i ti on i s to
wi n mayoral el ectl ons. Thi s means fashi oni ng el ectoral mai ori ti es out of
-i f,.
.o"rri ruent el ements of the ci ty' s el ectorate. But havi ng won offi ce,
, i . . " yn, and hi s or her al l i es must al so gover n' To do so' . t hey must
achi eve the acti ve cooperati on from those who occupy posi ti ons i nsi de