MERCURY

E-paper No.1
January 2011

Conceptualising Multilateralism
Can We All Just Get Along?
MERCURY is fnancially supported by the EUs 7th Framework Programme
www.mercury-fp7.net
Caroline Bouchard and John Peterson
Series editors:
John Peterson, University of Edinburgh (john@peterberg.org)
Gunilla Herolf, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (herolf@sipri.org)
Nadia Klein, University of Cologne (nadia.klein@uni-koeln.de)
Wolfgang Wessels, University of Cologne (wessels@uni-koeln.de)
Conceptualising Multilateralism:
Can We All Just Get Along?
1

Abstract
2

Multilateralism is a poor, ugly duckling among concepts used to study international relations.
Yet, new, interesting and primordial questions have arisen about its role in modern IR. We
argue that three analytical tasks must be undertaken to conceptualise multilateralism. First,
a conceptual ramework or understanding it must be developed. !econd, a modern deinition
o multilateralism is needed that can guide urther research. "hird, a set o research
questions must be mapped that a research programme on multilateralism should tackle. We
ocus on the our main actors that condition multilateralism# $% dierent conte&ts, '% dierent
goals, (% dierent orms, and )% dierent meanings. We ind that multilateralism in practice
has outpaced our understanding o its role in '$
st
century IR. We go beyond the ambitions o
a *review article+ to propose a systematic research programme on multilateralism.
,aroline -ouchard .ohn /eterson
0mail c.bouchard1ed.ac.uk 0mail 2ohn1peterberg.org
http#33www.mercury4p5.net3
I!!6 '75848''9
1
"his is a revised and updated version o M0R,:RY 04paper 6o. $, February '7$7
2
0arlier drats were presented at the 84$7 .uly '778 M0R,:RY ;*Multilateralism and the 0uropean :nion in the
,ontemporary <lobal =rder+% workshop in >?ln, the $@ February '7$7 panel on *Multilateralism# Revisiting
/ra&is, Rethinking "heory+ at the International !tudies Association conerence in 6ew =rleans, the (4) March
'7$7 plenary M0R,:RY conerence in -russels, the $9 March '7$7 meeting o the :niversity o 0dinburgh+s
International Relations !ociety, and the (7 March '7$7 meeting o the /olitical !tudies Association in 0dinburgh.
We grateully acknowledge inancial support or M0R,:RY through the 0:+s Framework BII programme. .ohn
/eterson is grateul to the Institute o <overnmental !tudies at the :niversity o ,aliornia, -erkeley, or hosting
him in summer '7$7 when inal revisions were made. !pecial thanks to 0liCabeth -omberg, ,hristina -oswell,
Iain Dardie, ,hristopher Dill, Eominic .ohnson, 6adia >lein, Andrew 6eal, "at2ana /etrovic, "homas Riess,
Wolgang Wessels, and especially .ean4Michel -aer o the 0uropean ,ommission and Mark Aspinwall, or their
thoughtul comments.
Table of contents
Introduction F....................................................................................................... (
Eeining Multilateralism F..............................F................................................... G
Eierent ,onte&ts F........................................................................................... $$
"he -irth o Multilateralism ..................................................................... $'
Wilsonianism and the Heague o 6ations ............................................... $'
/ostwar Multilateralism F....................................................................... $(
Multilateralism, :nipolarity and <lobalisation ......................................... $9
Multilateralism through "ime and !pace ................................................. $G
Eierent <oals F................................................................................................ $5
Eierent Forms ................................................................................................... '7
"ougher Rules, 6ew MultilateralismI ...................................................... ''
Eierent Meanings F.......................................................................................... '9
,onclusion F...................................................................................................... '8
Reerences F..................................................................................................... ('
Conceptualising Multilateralism:
Can We All Just Get Along?
Introduction
Multilateralism is a poor, ugly duckling among concepts used to study international relations
;IR%. Arguably, multilateralism is not a core concept in the same league with anarchy,
sovereignty, or interdependence. I so, such a result is ironic. Ater the ,old War ended,
renewed optimism about the potential o international institutions such as the :nited 6ations
;:6% or 0uropean :nion ;0:% led to burgeoning interest in multilateralism on the part o both
academics and practitioners. At the time, ,aporaso ;$88'% complained that multilateralism
was being used to describe a variety o dierent orms o international cooperation, but still
was not adequately conceptualised. Dis response was to resort to a cocktail o *sociology,
e&perimental psychology, organisation theory, and game theory+ to try to plug the gap
;,aporaso $88'# G7)%. "he e&ercise was both creative and interesting. -ut it ailed insoar
as multilateralism continued ;and continues% to be used in a variety o ways to reer to
dierent modes and orms o cooperation.
(

/erhaps one reason why is that, despite claims to the contrary ;,raword and .arvis '77$%,
IR remains an American4dominated discipline ;Domann $855%. In IR, as in other disciplines,
theory tends to ollow practice. <addis ;'77)% argues that only Franklin Roosevelt amongst
all /residents ever successully *sold+ multilateralism to the :nited !tates ;:!% public.
Multilateralism might be poorly conceptualised because, in practice, America *does not do+
multilateralism.
)
A dierent, but compatible *reason or the paucity o theory concerning multilateralism is that
there may be so little multilateralism in practice+ ;,aporaso $88'# G77%. -y one calculation,
no ma2or new multilateral agreement has been agreed since the mid4$887s ;6aJm '778b%.
"he World "rade =rganisation ;W"=% is now a teenager. "he same is true o the last ma2or
multilateral security agreement# the e&tension o the 6uclear 6on4/rolieration "reaty. 0ven
it has not deterred India, /akistan and 6orth >orea K soon 2oined by IranI K rom becoming
nuclear powers.
3
"o illustrate the point, one recent work concludes that multilateralism is merely an *e&tended policy+ o
cooperation ;"ouval and Lartman '7$7# ''5%.
4
= course, :! oreign policy debates eature a rich and diverse mosaic o opinion about multilateralism, with
leading practitioners ;"albott '77@% and academics ;Ikenberry '77G% stressing its virtues, especially in wake o the
<eorge W. -ush presidency ;Heler and Hegro '77@%.
3
A like4minded view would consider multilateralism to be an arteact o the ,old War. Interest
in multilateralism irst developed when it came to be seen as a solution to the problem o
nuclear prolieration. It also became a battle cry or the non4aligned movement, led by
6ehru+s India. "he ,old War is now history. Attempts at multilateral arms control have been,
on balance, ineective.
"he view that multilateralism is an anachronism is companionable with one that considers it a
*weapon o the weak+ ;>agan '77'# )%. -y this view, states that seek multilateral agreements
are those that lack power to impose solutions to international problems. Most 0uropean
states could be categorised as such. >agan ;'77@# )'% considers post4war India+s wish to be
*the harbinger o a new set o principles o peaceul coe&istence and multilateralism...a
0uropean4style worldview beore 0uropeans themselves had adopted it+.
0ven the most hard4boiled multilateralism sceptic must concede some basics. <lobalisation,
broadly deined, creates powerul incentives or states to cooperate. Ater the ;allegedly%
relentless unilateralism o the <eorge W. -ush administration, the :! elected an *untested
multilateralist in oreign aairs+ ;Eelbanco '77@%. -arack =bama+s inaugural address and
later speeches in ,airo, =slo and at the :nited 6ations ;:6% *made clear his liberal4
internationalist preerence or multilateralismFMinN dealing with other countries, whether
*riends+ or adversaries+ ;Biotti '7$7# '$7%. "he claim that 0urope+s own e&perience o
multilateralism can never be replicated is requent. -ut it is challenged by evidence that other
regions o the world, including Asia, increasingly look to the 0: or lessons that can be
learned about how cooperation can solve transnational problems, albeit with little interest in
0uropean4style institutionalisation ;see >atCenstein '779, >ang '775O ,alder and Fukuyama
'77@O Frost '77@O <reen and <ill '778%. "he 0: now seeks partnerships with emerging
powers with the e&plicit goal o building multilateralism ;<revi and de Basconcelos '77@%.
= course, global demand or multilateralism may be increasing, but ma2or powers may lack
either the will or capability to supply it. ,ynics might argue that =bama+s America K because
o domestic political constraints 4 is no more engaged in building multilateralism than was
-ush+s. Meanwhile, 0uropean integration has stalled. 0merging powers K -raCil, Russia,
India and ,hina ;collectively known as -RI,% K act more unilaterally as they gain political
conidence.
:ltimately, whether or not demand or multilateralism remains unmet is an empirical question.
0ven the question o how we can *measure+ demand is contentious. "he devil may be in the
detail, with wide variance between issue4areas. /ressure or multilateral cooperation has no
4
doubt intensiied in the cases o inancial governance and climate change. ,an we say the
same about trade or arms controlI
In short, there may be good reasons or multilateralism to remain under4conceptualised.
6evertheless, new, interesting, and even primordial questions have arisen about its role in
modern IR. Is multilateralism 2ust a *subset+ o cooperation or a speciic construct in IRI I
demand or multilateralism continues to outpace supply, why does this shortall e&istI Is
multilateralism merely a weapon o the weakI =r do strong states pursue it selectively when
it serves their interestsI Are we moving to a undamentally more multilateralised
international orderI
We review '$
st
century multilateralism in theory and practice, and ind that it does constitute
a distinctive ordering device in IR. We also uncover evidence o growing interest, even
amongst ma2or powers, in multilateral solutions to transnational problems that are
e&ternalities o globalisation. For e&ample, the '77@4$7 inancial crisis suddenly made the
<roup o '7 ;<'7% most *systemically important industrialiCed and developing economies+
9
K
a previously obscure and young ;less than $7 years old% coniguration K the main orum or
debates about how shared policy commitments might restore global economic growth. ,hina
and Russia both seek multilateral cooperation within multiple institutions, notably the
!hanghai ,ooperation =rganisation ;>lein et al '7$7%. "he 0: is unding multiple, large
research programmes into multilateralism as part o its doctrinal commitment to *eective
multilateralism+.
G
Academic interest is by no means conined to 0urope# Robert >eohane et
al ;'778# '@% have urged that scholars make multilateralism a ma2or ocus o IR research that
is *deeply empirical+ and based on *comparative institutional analysis+.
We seek to lay the groundwork or such a research programme. =ur+s is an e&ercise in pre4
theoriCing, which takes the prior step o developing a conceptual ramework that can guide
investigation#
,onceptual rameworks or perspectives provide a broad language and a
orm o reerence in which reality can be e&amined. "hey go urther than a
model in providing interpretations o relationships between variables.
,onceptual rameworks achieve a greater depth and breadth in their
attempts to e&plain reality ;!toker $888# $@%.
5
"his orm o words is used by the <'7 to describe itsel. !ee http#33www.g'7.org3aboutPwhatPisPg'7.asp&
;accessed 12 January 2011%.
6
"he 0:+s '77( 0uropean !ecurity !trategy commits the :nion to *an international order based on eective
multilateralism+ and *a rule4based international order+ ;0uropean :nion '77(# $)4$9O see also HaCarou et al '7$7%.
:nder its Framework research programme 5, the 0: is unding three large pro2ects on multilateralism. "he
present authors are participants in M0R,:RY ;see http#33www.mercury4p5.net%, which ocuses on the 0:+s own
contribution to eective multilateralism. "he two additional programmes are 0:4<RA!/ ;see www.eugrasp.eu%,
on *,hanging Multilateralism# "he 0: as a <lobal4Regional Actor in !ecurity and /eace+, and 0:)!0A! ;see
www.eu)seas.eu%, which will study *"he 0: and !ub4regional Multilateralism in 0urope+s !ea -asins#
6eighbourhood, 0nlargement and Multilateral ,ooperation+.
5
"he need or conceptual depth and breadth leads us to ask ar more questions than we
answer. -ut many questions about multilateralism remain unanswered. We cull the research
literature on multilateralism, but go beyond the ambitions o most review articles. =ur+s is an
e&ercise in mapping, systematically, a set o questions or a research programme on
multilateralism. We identiy dependent variables that need to be e&plained so that scholars
can identiy what independent variables could be incorporated into testable hypotheses.
Above all, we argue that research needs to ocus on one elemental dependent variable# the
;recent% widening and deepening o multilateralism.
We begin by e&amining contending deinitions o multilateralism. "his e&ercise moves over
well4travelled ground, but we cover it in order to propose a modern, '$
st
century deinition.
We then ocus on the our main actors that condition multilateralism# $% dierent conte&ts, '%
dierent goals, (% dierent orms, and )% dierent meanings.
Defining Multilateralism
As the ,old War ended, >eohane ;$887% argued that multilateralism had developed a
momentum o its own. It had increasingly become both an ob2ective and ordering device in
IR. Yet, multilateralism at this point still *served as a label more than as a concept deining a
research program+ ;>eohane $887# 5($%.
For >eohane ;$887# 5($%, multilateralism is *the practice o coordinating national policies in
groups o three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means o institutions+. It
thus involves ;e&clusively% states and oten ;not e&clusively% institutions, deined as
*persistent and connected sets o rules, ormal and inormal, that prescribe behavioural roles,
constrain activity, and shape e&pectations+ ;>eohane $887# 5((O see also >eohane and 6ye
'777aO '777b%.
5


Multilateralism becomes institutionalised when enduring rules emerge.
Institutions thus *can be distinguished rom other orms o multilateralism, such as ad hoc
meetings and short4term arrangements to solve particular problems+ ;>eohane $887# 5((%.
Multilateral institutions, by implication, take the orm o international regimes or bureaucratic
organisations.
@
7
An implied assumption in >eohane+s work appears to be that purely ad hoc multilateralism is likely to lead to
institutionalised multilateralism, as states ind themselves unable to enorce the terms o agreements they make
with each other ;see >eohane $88@O >eohane and 6ye '777b%.
8
>eohane ;$887# 5((% deines regimes *as institutions with e&plicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that
pertain to a particular set o issues in international relations+. -ureaucratic organisations usually accompany
regimes# they *assign speciic role to their employees+ and monitor and manage *a set o rules governing states in
a particular issue4area+.
6
>eohane+s deinition o multilateralism was dismissed as *nominal+ by .ohn <erard Ruggie
;$88'# 9G)% on the grounds that it neglected the *qualitative ;emphasis in original% dimension
o the phenomenon+. "o illustrate, the preamble o the :6 ,harter implies that multilateralism
means *establishMingN conditions under which 2ustice and respect or the obligations arising
rom treaties and other sources o international law can be maintained+. Multilateralism thus
involves 2ustice, obligation, and a sort o international rule o law. What makes it distinctive,
and matters more than the number o parties or degree o institutionalisation, is the type o
relations it spawns.
For Ruggie, multilateralism meant *coordinating relations among three or more states...in
accordance with certain principles+ that order relations between them. Multilateralism
represented a *generic institutional orm ;emphasis in original%+ and implied institutional
arrangements that *deine and stabiliCe property rights o states, manage coordination
problems and resolve collaboration problems+. -ut it oten took place in the absence o
international organisations, which are a *relatively recent arrival and still o only modest
importance+ ;Ruggie $88'# 9G549G@%.
,rucially, Ruggie argued, multilateralism is built on principles that distinguish it rom other
orms o IR such as bilateralism and imperialism#
generalised principles o conduct,
indivisibility, and
diuse reciprocity
First, three or more states
8
engage in multilateral cooperation when relations between them
are based on principles that identiy *appropriate conduct or a class o actions, without
regard to particularistic interests o the parties+ ;Ruggie $88'# 95$%. ,ooperation is governed
by *norms e&horting general i not universal modes o relations to other states, rather than
dierentiating relations case4by4case+ ;,aporaso $88'# G7'%.
!econd, multilateralism is based on a speciic social construction# indivisibility. It can take
various orms, but in all cases it constitutes *the scope ;both geographic and unctional% over
which costs and beneits are spread+ when actions are taken that aect the collectivity
;,aporaso $88'# G7'%. For instance, peace is usually deemed indivisible in a collective
security system.
9
Ruggie ;$88'# 9G@% notes that everyone agrees that multilateralism is not bilateralism. -ut, as ,aporaso ;$88'#
G7(% suggests, the term does not presuppose any speciic number o states in the way that unilateral, bilateral,
trilateral and universal do# *Multilateralism suggests *many+ actors, but is unspeciic as to what number constitutes
many. *Many+ could reer to anything rom a minimum o three actors to a ma&imum o all+.
7
"hird, members o a collectivity e&pect *a rough equivalence o beneits in the aggregate and
over time+ ;Ruggie $88'# 95$O see also >eohane $8@G%. Eiuse reciprocity underpins the
hypothesis that multilateralism helps solve problems o coordination on which transaction
costs are high and states are mostly indierent to outcomes ;such as on international
telephony or river transport%. When international problems demand coordination,
governments are happy to lose today as long as there is the prospect o winning tomorrow.
-ut only rarely can multilateralism be e&pected to solve collaboration problems, such as
those o collective security, when governments have grave ears about the consequences o
*losing today+. Eiuse reciprocity also helps e&plain why powerul states, while invariably
choosing institutions that serve their interests, may ind that multilateral arrangements
become more attractive to them as they value the uture more highly.
For Ruggie ;$88'%, international orders, regimes and organisations could be multilateral in
orm, but need not be. An international regime might not operate on the basis o indivisibility#
the :nited !tates or :nited >ingdom have *particularistic interests+ within the International
=rganiCation o !ecurities ,ommissions ;I=!,%, which promotes sound regulation o
securities markets. "hese interests make any collectivity that groups them together with
;say% Albania, !erbia, or "anCania in this issue4area a very unrestrictive one. /ut simply# or
an international organisation to qualiy as a case o multilateralism, it coordinates relations
among states on the basis o organiCing principles. In principle ;i not always in practice%, the
same rules apply to all.
Dere, modern multilateralism diers rom earlier versions# the same rules might apply to all
states, but states are not the only actors that partake in multilateralism ;see >eck and !ikkink
$88@O ,ooper '77' and Dampson '77(O >aldor '77(O >eane '77(O .ones and ,oleman
'779%. 6on4state actors K multinational corporations, non4governmental organisations, and
the secretariats o I=s K may push states to make multilateral commitments or even agree to
such commitments between themselves. =ne recent e&ample is agreement by airlines
within their trade association, the International Air "ransport Association, to cut net emissions
by 97 per cent rom '779 levels.
$7
It is also notable that the <'7 actually consists o $8
states# the 0: is its '7
th
member.
Alternatively, non4state actors may act as roadblocks to new multilateral agreements, such as
on climate change, or even seek to scupper e&isting cooperation as, or e&ample, on
10
!ee IA"A ;'778% *A global approach to reducing airline emissions+, available rom
http#33www.iata.org36R3rdonlyres3EAE-5-8A40(G(4),E'4-@-84
0GE0EA'AG8G)373-rochureP<lobalPApproachPtoPReducingPAviationP0missionsP'@7878.pd ;accessed $9
6ovember '778%.
8
whaling. In any event, non4state actors *have become progressively more assertive in
demanding a voice at the top decision4making tables+ ;"hakur '77'# '57%. '$
st
century
multilateralism is not an e&clusively intergovernmental phenomenon.
Whatever actors are involved, the question o what makes multilateralism effective inevitably
arises. Martin ;$88'% observes that multilateral organisations vary both in the degree to
which they are eective and institutionalised# *one may be strong, the other weak+ ;,aposaro
$88'# G7'%. Multilateral organisations may also be orums where actors become socialised
to the principles o multilateralism# the admission o ,hina to the W"= might be a case in
point. Multilateralism can be a means, a tool or a strategy to achieve other goals, such as
good governance, migration control, or economic liberalisation.
-ut multilateralism is not a panacea. !mith ;'7$7% demonstrates how it can have odious
eects# adherence to the *same rules or all+ within the :D Duman Rights ,ouncil K with
0uropean support 4 led to the toleration o human rights abuses, to the discredit o both the
:6 and 0:. "here is empirical evidence to suggest that dictatorships that practice torture
are more likely to accede to the multilateral :6 ,onvention Against "orture than dictatorships
that do not ;Breeland '77@%. Martin ;$88'% concedes that multilateralism may not always be
the most eicient means to promote international cooperation. "hinking retrospectively,
>ahler ;$88'# 575% insists that multilateralism can be a chimera#
"he collective action problems posed by multilateral governance were
addressed or much o the postwar era by minilateral great power
collaboration disguised by multilateral institutions and by derogations rom
multilateral principles in the orm o persistent bilateralism and regionalism.
6aJm+s ;'778b% more contemporary ;and positive% view is that *minilateralism+, which seeks to
develop cooperation only between the states that really matter in an issue4area, is oten
more eective than inclusive multilateralism involving all or most states. I the goal is to
promote development in Arica, the states vital to the task and their number might be dierent
than, say, those required to strike a multilateral agreement on nuclear prolieration. "o give a
concrete illustration o where minilateralism makes sense, it might be argued that it is
ludicrous to give land4locked Hu&embourg or the ,Cech Republic a say on 0: isheries policy
that is equal to that o maritime states such as France, !weden, and the :nited >ingdom.
In summary, numerous attempts have been made to deine the essence o multilateralism
while still allowing or its nuances and limitations. Meanwhile multilateralism has lourished in
practice. In the roughly (7 years ater $857, the number o international treaties more than
tripled, leading to a signiicant increase ;by about two4thirds% in international institutions
9
;Ikenberry '77(# 9(G%. "he subsequent decade brought the birth o the <'7,
multilateralisation o the !hanghai ,ooperation =rganisation, and radical enlargement o the
0:. Yet, there still e&ists no single, accepted deinition o multilateralism, let alone a
coherent, conceptually4driven research programme to investigate it.
In act, multilateralism may be most clearly understood when we consider what it is not. It is
not unilateralism, bilateralism or ;arguably, see below% inter4regionalism. It contrasts with
imperialism, or cooperation based on coercion, as in the case o the Warsaw /act.
Multilateral cooperation is voluntary. It is not entirely ad hoc# it is based on rules that are
durable and ;at least potentially% aect the behaviour o actors that agree to multilateral
cooperation. :ltimately, all interpretations stress three main dimensions#
$. the importance o rulesO
'. inclusiveness in terms o the parties involved or aectedO and
(. voluntary cooperation that is at least minimally institutionalised.
As such, multilateralism in its modern, '$
st
century guise may be deined as#
Three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalised international
cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to
all states.
All competing deinitions agree that multilateralism, at minimum, involves a minimum o three
actors ;usually states%. ,ritics might argue that this is to set the bar too low. -ut there are
imaginable cases o multilateralism that could have ma2or impacts on IR involving only a ew
actors, which need not all be states. Ma2or international agreements K on emissions
reductions, regulatory cooperation, and rights or workers K might involve, even necessarily,
non4state actors. ,onsider what might be accomplished in terms o industry retrenchment
and the embrace o green technologies by cooperation between 2ust ( actors ;only $ o which
is a state%# the :!, the 0:, and the automobile industry.
$$

=ur deinition speciies that participation in multilateral cooperation must be voluntary.
Eependency theorists could pose hard questions about whether it is innately coercive or the
same rules to apply to all, powerul as well as weak states, even leaving aside the
concessions requently made to <reat /owers. 6onetheless, our deinition assumes that
most, i not all, international actors have real choices when they decide whether or not to
partake in multilateral cooperation.
11
In act, the *automobile industry+ is not a single industry, despite considerable cross4investment by both American
and 0uropean manuacturers. Any agreement on regulatory cooperation would logically require the consent o '
automobile associations# the ;American% Alliance o Automobile Association and the 0uropean Automobile
Manuacturers+ Association ;known as A,0A%.
10
=n institutionalisation, we must hedge our bets. -y deinition, all multilateral cooperation is
essentially institutionalised.
$'
"hat is, it may or may not spawn tangible international
organisations, with headquarters, stas, and delegated powers. "he <'7, as one e&ample,
employs no permanent sta. -ut there is no question that policy cooperation within it has
become institutionalised in that it is governed by norms and principles.
We argue that the same rules must apply, by and large, equally to all# generally and or the
most part, all states must play by the same rules. When the :6 agrees a resolution, it
applies equally to all states. -ut only ive states en2oy permanent membership and veto
power on the :6 !ecurity ,ouncil. Moreover, participants in multilateral cooperation may not
be states. 6on4state actors do not possess sovereignty under international law, the ability to
sign treaties, or a monopoly on the use o orce. "hus, by deinition, the same rules that
apply to states in multilateral cooperation cannot apply to them.
/lenty o cases o modern multilateralism apply rules dierently to dierent states. As we
demonstrate, claims that today+s multilateralism is more binding, rules4based, and
demanding than past versions have genuine substance. -ut the *old+ multilateralism K with
its opt4outs, derogations, and special privileges or <reat /owers 4 lives on in the :6, the
International Monetary Fund ;IMF%, and elsewhere. =ur deinition thereore relects caution
about claims o a *new+, stronger, '$
st
century multilateralism.
Different Contexts
In the broadest sense, research on multilateralism must investigate time and space. "hat is,
a research programme must include e&amination o both the historical evolution o the
international order and the dimensions o that order K determined by the distribution o power
and patterns o interdependence K at any given time. It may also have to depart rom the
strictures o most IR theory and investigate sub4systemic political space# politics at the
domestic level o individual states Q especially <reat /owers Q that have eased or stymied
multilateralism in dierent historical eras. As Ruggie ;$88'# 98'% argues, *a pronounced shit
toward multilateralism in economic and security aairs requires a combination o airly strong
international orces and compatible domestic environments+. Dere, we can oer only the most
truncated raw material or an investigation o the conditions that have encouraged states
12
-y *essentially+, we mean undamentally, inherently, intrinsically and necessarily institutionalised# rules must
e&ist that are durable and ;potentially% aect the behaviour o actors even i parties to an agreement only meet
once and no administration e&ists to ensure enorcement.
11
;and, recently, non4states% to embrace or re2ect multilateralism. -ut we show that research on
multilateralism cannot be ahistorical or neglect political space at multiple levels.

The Birth of Multilateralism
Multilateral agreements have sprung up through history mainly to manage relations between
states in areas where interdependence is inescapable. As early as the $5
th
century,
multilateral arrangements were proposed to manage property issues, such as the
governance o oceans. Multilateral cooperation, however, was relatively rare until the $8
th
century, which witnessed a surge o new treaties on ;inter alia% trade, river transport and
public health. "he International "elegraph :nion, the :niversal /ostal :nion and the
International =ice o /ublic Dygiene all had their origins in the $@77s.
$8
th
century multilateralism was spurred by the political, social and economic transormations
generated by the Industrial Revolution. Rising volumes o international transactions not only
increased the scope or disputes between states. "hey also prompted states to protect their
sovereignty, even as they agreed to common rules to acilitate economic e&change.
Most multilateral agreements in the $8
th
century did not generate ormal organisations. "he
most important, the ,oncert o 0urope, was an almost purely inormal ramework in which
our 0uropean powers Q Austria, <reat -ritain, /russia, Russia ;later 2oined by France% Q
agreed to consult and negotiate on matters o 0uropean peace and security. "he result was
peace in 0urope or nearly orty years. Dowever, the ,oncert was imposed by statesmen on
docile publics. Its legitimacy was gravely damaged by the revolutions o $@)@ and the surge
in nationalism they generated. "he ,oncert never became a truly multilateral organisation.
-ut it paved the way or '7
th
century multilateralism by establishing that issues o peace and
security could be addressed in international ora, and by recogniCing the special roles, rights
and obligations o <reat /owers.
Wilsonianism and the eague of !ations
In contrast to prior orms, multilateralism in the early '7
th
century yielded multiple ormal
organisations. Multilateralism thus was transormed. It came *to embody a procedural norm
in its own right Q though oten a hotly contested one Q in some instances carrying with it an
international legitimacy not en2oyed by other means+ ;Ruggie $88'# 9@)O emphasis in
original%.
"he advocacy o Woodrow Wilson was crucial in this transormation. "he only political
scientist ever to serve as :! /resident, Wilson+s Fourteen /oints, presented to the :!
12
,ongress in .anuary $8$@, urged the creation o *a general association o nations+.
Wilsonianism thus became a doctrine that prescribed the spread o democracy, ree trade
and strong international law to create an international order that *would replace older orms o
order based on the balance o power, military rivalry and alliances MFN power and security
competition would be decomposed and replaced by a community o nations+ ;Ikenberry '778#
$'O see also Mead '77'%. !peciically, Wilson championed an international body with
universal membership, binding rules and a dispute settlement mechanism. De studiously
avoided use o the term *collective security+. Dowever, intense negotiations, mainly between
the -ritish and Americans at Bersailles in $8$8, ocused on precisely this issue.
"he result was the Heague o 6ations. Its ,ovenant committed member states not only to
the renunciation o war, but also to accepting *the understandings o international law as the
actual rule o conduct among <overnments+. Article $7 o the ,ovenantRs preamble required
members *to respect and preserve as against e&ternal aggression the territorial integrity and
e&isting political independence o all Members o the Heague+. !tates were threatened by
political and economic sanctions i they resorted to war, with orce used only as a last resort.
In no sense did the Heague+s ,ovenant ind universal approval. Its collective security
provisions were the primary reason or the :! !enate+s re2ection o American membership.
Wilson himsel was pivotal in establishing the conditions or negotiations on a new
international system based on collective security with the Heague as a mechanism or
dispute resolution. -ut he ailed to coa& the domestic political conditions required or :!
entry ;see <eorge and <eorge $8G)O ,ooper '77'%.
"he Heague was disbanded in $8)G. It ailed, irst, because membership was not universal#
the :! never 2oined and ma2or players such as the !oviet :nion and <ermany withdrew.
!econd, the Heague aced multiple crises during an economic depression and became
deeply unpopular in a number o countries including <ermany. Finally, the Heague+s
,ovenant was plagued by loopholes, ambiguity, and over4ambition ;Armstrong et al '77)#
'8%. /recisely why the Heague ailed continues to be debated. -ut actors rooted in the
domestic, as well as the international, level o political space were central to its demise.
"ost#ar Multilateralism
Whatever its ailings, the Heague o 6ations was an essential precursor to international
institution4building ater $8)9. In less than a decade, multilateral accords creating the
-retton Wood agreements and the <eneral Agreement on "aris and "rade ;<A""%, the :6,
and 6A"= were agreed. Why such a *spike+ in multilateralismI ,entral to any e&planation is
13
the role o the emergent hegemonic power, the :!, and its leaders, particularly Franklin
Roosevelt. For the :!, *multilateralism in its generic sense served as a oundational principle
on the basis o which to reconstruct the post4war world+ ;Ruggie $88'# 9@G%. For weaker
states, multilateralism thus not only promised beneits but also constrained a hegemon
;Ikenberry '77(%.
When work began on the :6 ,harter, it was clear that it would be a collective security
organisation and thus ollow in the steps o the Heague. Dowever, past traumas coa&ed
consensus on the need to recognise the privileged role o <reat /owers. =ering the :!,
!oviet :nion, France, the :> and ,hina permanent membership on the :6 !ecurity ,ouncil,
and thus eectively a veto, not only marked a return to balance4o4power. It also
acknowledged the necessity o unanimity among ma2or powers as a prerequisite o
multilateral cooperation. Eecisions o the !ecurity ,ouncil K eectively, a directoire 4 were
equally binding on all :6 members. :nlike the Heague, the :6Rs role e&tended to economic
and social aairs and human rights.
"he :! also threw its weight behind the creation o a multilateral economic system. It
became clear during the !econd World War that only multilateral cooperation could act as an
antidote to the protectionism o the $8'7s and (7s. 6ew multilateral agreements were thus
struck on a stable e&change rate system, a reserve unit o account ;the gold standard%, and
the reduction o trade barriers,
,rucially, bipartisanship on oreign policy between the two ma2or :! political parties emerged
during the war and persisted ater it ended. It was nurtured assiduously by the White Douse#
Roosevelt took RepublicansR reservations about the :6 seriously enough to work to
incorporate them in the ,harter. "wo pillars o the oreign policy o his successor, Darry
"ruman, were that a stable and prosperous 0urope and a rules4based international economic
order were central to :! interests. In the end, the Marshall /lan and <A"" en2oyed broad
bipartisan support ;see Ikenberry '77(O >upchan and "rubowitC '775%. "he domestic politics
o multilateralism thus shited in the :!, albeit in response to international changes.
"he ,old War also ushered in a new and unprecedented international conte&t. =n one hand,
tensions between the :! and the !oviet :nion permeated the entire :6 system, making
unanimity between ma2or powers diicult, oten impossible, to achieve. =n the other, the
construction o the iron curtain convinced Washington to support the creation o 6A"= in
$8)8, with an attack on one member treated as an attack on all. -ut the American
commitment to multilateralism was not doctrinal. 6o multilateral security agreement ever
14
materialised between the :! and 0ast Asian states, with the :! preerring bilateral
agreements with .apan and !outh >orea.
It is not impossible to imagine a dierent post4war :! approach. As one o two dominant
powers, the :! could have shunned multilateral commitments and intimidated its Western
allies into submission. 0qually, as Martin ;$88'# 5@5% argues, weaker allies in a bipolar
system might have threatened to e&it their alliance to *create incentives or a dominant power
to accept smaller beneits in e&change or long4term growth and stability...MsinceN the
credibility o threats to e&it determines the long4term costs and beneits o multilateralism+.
Yet, there was never a credible threat that West 0uropean allies would e&it the alliance,
leaving aside the special case o France and 6A"=. -y the same token, within the
multilateral institutions it had championed, the :nited !tates was always *unlikely to give up
long4term gains or short4term gains at the e&pense o its allies+ ;Martin $88'# 5@5O see also
Weber $88'%.

Multilateralism$ %nipolarit& and Globalisation
When the ,old War ended, many predicted that the international system would shit towards
multipolarity, thus undermining multilateralism. Dowever, *MwNhat the $887s wrought is a
unipolar America...more powerul than any other great state in history+ ;Ikenberry '77(# 9(@%.
Many e&pected the :! to eschew multilateralism. Yet, Washington gave crucial political
backing to the development o new multilateral economic agreements including the W"= and
the Asia4/aciic 0conomic ,ooperation orum ;A/0,%. It also was instrumental in the *robust
multilateralism+ that was embraced, and the comple& division o labour between multiple
international organisations that emerged, in response to war in the -alkans ;"albott '77@# (%.
It was at least *permissive+ o a process o considerable strengthening o the :6+s systems
or peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid ;.ones and Forman '7$7%.
In other areas K including arms control, environmental aairs and some human right issues 4
:! support or new multilateral initiatives ranged rom patchy to none&istent. Ater the
Republican /arty captured control o ,ongress in $88), multilateralism became a *wedge+
issue used to seek partisan advantage, with Republicans insisting *that the MEemocraticN
,linton administrationRs penchant or multilateralism was compromising :! sovereignty+
;>upchan and "rubowitC '775# '9%. "he bipartisan consensus crucial to :! support or post4
war multilateralism crumbled quickly.
/artisanship became even more entrenched during the administration o <eorge W. -ush.
Many o its top oicials openly aired their mistrust o international institutions, and the :!
15
reneged on a range o multilateral commitments ;see Feith '77@%. !till, questions o
multilateralism dominated :! oreign policy debates. Future historians may concur with a
senior American diplomat# *the -ush administration+s ailing has not been its instinct or
unilateralism and its disdain or multilateralism. Its ailing too oten has been how poorly it
has practiced multilateralism+ ;Ross '77@# 9%.
In any event, the '777s witnessed rapid advances in interdependence spurred by
globalisation. "he internationaliCation o inancial regulation, diseases, and the threat o
catastrophic terrorism created resh demand or multilateral solutions. As generic comments
on multilateralism go, Ikenberry+s ;'77(# 9)7% comes as close as any to unchallenged
veracity# *as global interdependence grows, so does the need or multilateral coordination o
policies+.
Multilateralism through Time and 'pace
=ur review o the evolution o multilateralism over time and space has analogies to WaltC+s
;$888% claim about neorealism# it tells us a ew, important things without pretence to
anything more. "he irst is that consistent patterns in the development o multilateralism are
elusive, leaving aside how rising interdependence K as during the Industrial Revolution or
modern era o globalisation K increases demand or multilateralism. 0ven here, there are
caveats# advances in multilateralism have been reversed ;as seen by the demise o the
,oncert o 0urope% and variable between issue4areas. !econd, in deiance o most IR
theory, multilateralism clearly thrives or dies as a consequence o alignments at multiple
dimensions o political space. Multilateralism was transormed into a orm o cooperation
with more legitimacy than other orms in the '7
th
century because o systemic changes# it
was embraced both because it was inclusive K in the case o the :6 4 and e&clusive K in the
case o 6A"=. Yet, multilateralism has been spurred or stymied through history by changes
at the sub4systemic level o domestic politics, such as the revolutions o $@)@ or postwar
bipartisanship in :! politics. "hird and inally, economic crisis appears to advance
multilateralism# or e&ample, the -retton Woods agreements could be viewed as a delayed
response to the Eepression and the demonstrable ailure o economic nationalism. Yet, the
W"= was created in absence o any deep economic slump. Whether the inancial crisis o
'77@ and beyond yields a strengthening o multilateral institutions such as the <'7 remains
an open question. It is one among many hypotheses about multilateralism that cry out or
empirical testing.
16
Different Goals
I much about the evolution o multilateralism remains ambiguous, it is clear that the dierent
goals that lead states to embrace it condition what orm it takes. Dere, we encounter
elephant in the room4type questions. Dave universally accepted norms and principles o
multilateralism ever e&istedI Eo they e&ist nowI I so, what they areI ,an multilateralism
be eective even i states have dierent goals or cooperationI What e&plains variation
between dierent issue4areasI
A irst step in answering such questions is to consider how dierent IR theories view
multilateralism ;see table $%. Realists o all stripes contend that states inevitably pursue
dierent ob2ectives when they agree to multilateral cooperation because they are driven by
incompatible interests. International institutions are either weak or act to obscure hegemonic
control, as in the cases o the IMF or 6on4/rolieration "reaty. Interdependence is increasing
but remains a weak motivator o state behaviour ;WaltC $888%. Any notion o a *global
consensus+ on multilateralism is a myth.
For their part, institutionalists assume that the goal o multilateralism is to solve shared
problems. <lobalisation generates wealth and ;sometimes% inter4cultural understanding. -ut
it also creates problems that states cannot solve by themselves. "hus, they create
international institutions that act as ocal points or bargaining and help ensure that they keep
their commitments to one another ;>eohane $887%.
/erhaps ironically, many constructivists would agree with realists that since multilateralism is
an Kism, it is *an ideology SdesignedT to promote multilateral activity+ ;,aporaso $88'# G7$%.
Where they dier is on how much IR can be transormed by multilateralism, with
constructivists viewing it as truly transormative ;see Wendt $888%. 6eounctionalists would
go even urther in viewing multilateralism as inherently normative. .ust as 0uropean
integration has seen one act o new cooperation become a springboard or the ne&t,
multilateralism begets more multilateralism# that is its goal ;see Rosamond '779%.
Table 1( Theoretical Models of Multilateralism
Theoretical
Perspective
neorealist liberal
institutionalist
constructivist neo-
functionalist
radical/critical
/3
rd
world
Model of
Multilateralism
weak
(hegemony)
cooperative /
functional
normative integrative dependent
,ritical or dependency theorists re2ect any suggestion that multilateralism promotes
international harmony# its purpose is to e&ploit the weak. Most multilateral organisations
17
have had their rules written by a sub4group ;oten hegemonic% o the eventual latent
membership. Eierences in rules ;IMF% or equivalence in rules ;W"=% e&pose the rhetoric o
multilateralism as concealing dependency ;<ill $885%. In short, dierent theoretical positions
yield very dierent views about the basic ob2ectives o multilateralism.
A second step is to consider whether universality is precluded by dierent unctional
ob2ectives in dierent issue areas. "he question is central to multiple debates about
multilateralism. =ne is about whether we can resort to economistic models to describe,
e&plain and predict why and when multilateralism emerges# should we e&pect the *supply+ o
multilateralism to be responsive to demand or itI !urely, it depends on the issue4area.
Regulatory cooperation illustrates the point. A lurry o activity in the early $887s between the
:! and 0: led to speculation that these two economic giants could create a *transatlantic
economic space+. Within it, economic e&change would no longer be hampered by dierent
regulatory regimes. 0ventually, regulatory policy cooperation would be multilateralised, with a
progressively larger number o states embracing it ;see /ollack '77$%. =ne eect would be
to sustain claims that *bilateralism is not the opposite o multilateralism, but an eicient
component+ in building it through *dyadic diplomacy+, especially between <reat /owers
;Berdier# )(8%.
In practice, the results o transatlantic regulatory policy cooperation have been modest ;see
/eterson and !teenson '778O /ollack and !haer '778%.
$(
A ma2or reason why is that both
the 0: and the :! have powerul, autonomous, and strong4willed regulatory agencies. Most
consider international cooperation to be a ar lower priority than providing *high quality+
domestic regulation. "hus, even in areas where there is powerul demand or cooperation Q
particularly rom large multinationals that do business in both markets Q it has not
materialised. ,aporaso ;$88'# G$'% presages this result# *A great deal o intragovernmental
coordination and power would be required to tailor regulatory policy to the speciications o
oreign trade...I am sceptical about generaliCing the conditions o economic e&change to
multilateral settings+.
As a third step, debates about the trade4o between inclusiveness and eectiveness must be
conronted. Is regionalism Q oten viewed as on the march globally ;Fawcett $88GO "elo
'77$O Acharya and .ohnston '775% Q compatible with a more multilateral worldI Is it
hypocritical or states, such as those o the 0:, to seek *an ever closer union+ between
13
As a partial caveat, Young ;'778# G@'% concludes that *rather being characterised by conlict or co4operationF
the transatlantic regulatory relationship is really one o tolerance, in which the vast ma2ority o regulatory
dierences are not resolved, either amicably or through litigation+.
18
themselves while also seeking to promote multilateralism globallyI More generally, how can
the ideal number o parties to any multilateral agreement be determinedI Is minilateralism
more eective than universal multilateralismI
"heoretical work on solving cooperation problems suggests potential answers via the k
group solution ;=rbell et al $88$%. ,ooperative solutions are requently behaviourally
dependent on a consensus within a large *n+ group. -ut *n+ oten e&ceeds the number o
states needed to produce an optimum result, which could be agreed ar more easily within a
sub4set *k+ group. "o return to an earlier e&ample, a solution to the over4ishing o 0uropean
waters requires agreement by land4locked 0: states even though they have no resources
;coastal waters and ishing leets% to contribute to the common good o conserving ish stocks
;besides convincing their citiCens to eat pollack instead o cod%.
6aJm ;'778b% posits that relatively small k groups could solve problems o nuclear
prolieration or poverty in Arica. Mattoo and !ubrahmanian ;'778% argue that the large *n+
Eoha round o the W"= would do almost nothing, even i it succeeded, to solve the real
problems o trade in the '$
st
century# luctuating commodity prices, inancial instability, the
insecurity o middle class workers, and environmental insecurity. "hey propose a -retton
Woods II, based on institutionalised cooperation by k groups in speciic issue4areas and a
sharing o tasks between international organisations, to tackle the new multilateral trade
agenda.
"he mini4 v. multilateral dilemma plagues the 0: itsel. A :nion o '5 states illustrates
,aporaso+s ;$88'# G75% in2unction that *the smaller the k group, the easier it is to cooperate
but the less multilateral the arrangement would be. "he larger the k group, the more
multilateral the cooperative arrangement might be but the more diicult it is to pull o
cooperation+. Arguably, the 0:+s present *n+ o '5 is larger than the k group needed to solve
most 0uropean cooperation problems. "he same dilemma is illustrated by the <'7. "he
inancial crisis o '77@4$7 muted concerns about its inclusiveness. "he urgent need or
economic policy cooperation made determining the k group ;the <'7+s members represent
@7 per cent o the world economy% a relatively simple matter. -ut should the <'7 become a
ma2or institution or economic policy cooperation, cries o directoire are certain to be heard
rom e&cluded states.
Ruggie ;$88'# 95)% argues that *the multilateral orm should not be equated with universal
geographical scope# the attributes o multilateralism characterise relations within speciic
collectivities that may and oten do all short o the whole universe o nations+. -ut he oers
19
little guidance about how to ind the k group or whether regionalism Q especially deep
regionalism o the 0uropean kind Q is compatible with multilateralism. "he 0: itsel is
committed, at least rhetorically, to e&porting its own habits o peaceul, deep cooperation to
other regions and seeking to agree inter4regional cooperative agreements between itsel and
its *clones+. =ne hopeul scenario is that *the new regionalism, with 0: support, could
represent an open Spost4modernT model o a Srenewed international system+++;!mith '77@#
$7@%. "he pro2ect o *renewing+ the international system points us back to the need to study
how goals determine orm in the design o multilateralism. And, surely, inter4regionalism, and
what determines its success or ailure, must eature in any research programme on
multilateralism.
Different Forms
I multilateralism is to be conceptualised, a irst step is to classiy its dierent orms. IR
scholarship oten resorts to obuscatory classiications that ail to capture what is distinctive
about multilateralism. For e&ample, a scheme that classiies dierent modes o international
governance as *sot+ ;the :6 <eneral Assembly%, *medium+ ;the W"= or IMF% or *hard+ ends
up concluding that a *hard+ <reat /ower coalition is most eective because it has
*unparalleled legitimacy+ ;Rosecrance '77@# $75%. =n the contrary, multilateralism involves
rules, norms, principles, and reciprocity that bestow on it more legitimacy than other orms Q
especially hegemonic Q o international cooperation.
$)
An alternative view presents institutionalised, crystallised, and aspirant multilateralism as
distinct ideal types ;see "able '%. Rules4based organisations such as the W"= relect
institutionalised multilateralism. 6ew international norms, rules and organisations 4 such as
the International ,riminal ,ourt ;I,,%, more active international 2udicial intervention, or eorts
to tackle climate change K are e&amples o crystallising multilateralism# they are *becoming+
as opposed to *being+, and are still not ully established. "he emergence o international
norms on child labour or oreign investment relects aspirant multilateralism# *norms inorm
oreign policy behaviour in the absence o codiied rules or even the prospect o establishing
them+ ;/eterson et al '77@# @48%.
14
As Lartman and "ouval ;'7$7# @% sum, *MtNhe philosophy o multilateral cooperationFconers legitimacy as one
o its beneits, more so than unilateralism or bilateralism, although it does so at the e&pense o eiciency and
possibly even o eectiveness+.
20
Table 2( )orms of Multilateralism
Institutionalised Crystallising Aspirant
Characteristics rules-based
international
organisations are
established
new international rules
and organisations are
in the process of being
established
norms inform foreign
policy behaviour in
the absence of any
formally-codified
rules
Examples WTO udicial intervention
and the !""
climate change post-
#yoto
child labour
foreign investment
ource! "eterson et al #$$%! &
In e&ploring dierent orms o multilateralism, a central concern must be compliance or non4
compliance ;that is, violation o rules%. As such, we inevitably are drawn to scholarship on
international law. It helps us conront debates about whether '$
st
century multilateralism is
more binding and demanding than earlier orms, thus creating stronger incentives or states
Q especially <reat /owers Q to resist it.
Most debates about international law distil to a single question# does it actually inluence the
conduct o states, including their compliance behaviourI "he traditional view is that
international law ;both treaty and customary law% directly aects the behaviour o states#
*state conduct that is consistent with international law must necessarily have been caused by
international law+ ;<lennon '779# 8G), see also Dathaway and Havinbuk '77G%. !tates
recognise a 2uridical obligation to ollow agreed international rules or law. "hey thus conorm
to the norm# *MtNhe rule and the rule alone+ aects the behaviour o states ;<lennon '779#
8G9%.

Rationalist legal scholars are more circumspect. <oldsmith and /osner ;$888, '779%
question whether international law is an independent orce aecting states+ behaviour, or
whether it emerges rom states acting rationally to ma&imise their interests. In other words,
*the rule does not cause states+ behaviour, it relects their behaviour+ ;<oldsmith and /osner
'779# (%.
For their part, constructivists insist that multiple actors determine state behaviour and that
the evolution o social norms shapes both the development o international law and the
conduct o states ;see Finnemore $88GO Reus4!mith '77)O <lennon '779O Dathaway and
Havinbuk '77G%. International law is thus a social structure o IR that is deeply inluenced by
non4legal ;or sub4legal% norms# *MNor a variety o reasons, policy4makers in a given state may
21
well determine that in certain circumstances it is in the state+s interests to honour a given
norm even though that norm is not considered binding+ ;<lennon '779# 8G$%.
Wherever else they dier, scholars working at the interace o IR and international law
broadly agree that compliance is a pivotal eature o multilateralism ;see >oh $885O -yers
$888O Dathaway '77'O <lennon '779%. Its evolution is shaped, in particular, by violations o
agreements. 0&cessive violation o a rule, whether embodied in norms or a treaty, occurs
when a suicient number o states decide that the beneits produced by the violation o a rule
oset potential costs ;<lennon '779# 8)7%. I enough states adopt the negating behaviour,
the behaviour ceases to be a violation. In eect, the rule is replaced by no rule. <uantanamo
-ay, abuses at Abu <hraib, and e&traordinary rendition o terrorist suspects are recent
e&amples. Russia, .apan and Italy have also resisted complying with international
agreements, most notably in the domain o environmental relations ;see ,hayes '77@%. "he
question is whether multilateral agreements and their rules are changed by such violations.
Dave these violations been e&cessive to the point where rules and norms have lost their
obligatory characterI
"hese e&amples relect the undamental ambiguity or *desuetude+ o multilateralism, drawn
rom the Hatin term desuescere, meaning *to become disaccustomed to+ ;see <lennon '779#
8)'%. Ambiguity inevitably arises when states give conlicting signals as to whether they
remain bound by a rule. !uch ambiguity cannot be dismissed even by those who claim that
a *new+ multilateralism has emerged in the '$
st
century, which is more binding,
institutionalised, and demanding or states. What is really new may be thornier, and possibly
unprecedented problems o compliance.
Tougher *ules$ !e# Multilateralism?
=ver time, a rich variety o scholars have claimed to have uncovered a *new multilateralism+
;,amps and Eiebold $8@(O McRae and Dubert '77$O Ikenberry '77(%. /rominent among
them is Robert ,o& ;$885%, whose ive4year pro2ect on *Multilateralism and the :6 !ystem+
criticised state4centric approaches to multilateralism and the priveleges oered to <reat
/owers. "he pro2ect yielded an unapologetically normative typology that assigned causal
signiicance to an emergent global civil society ;,o& $885O see also >rause and >night
$889%.
More recently, Ikenberry ;'77(O '77GO '778% has argued that there is something truly new
about '$
st
century multilateralism# it is more demanding and necessitates more concessions
on the part o states. /revious orms were more accommodating to <reat /owers, oering
22
more reservations, e&emptions, veto powers or weighted voting mechanisms. !uch
provisions were widely4accepted means or increasing the number o signatories to
multilateral treaties and agreements. "he old multilateralism oered relatively unthreatening
cooperation.
In particular, vehement criticism o the :nited !tates ;:!% or its insistence on
accommodation mechanisms may be viewed as indicative o a new multilateralism ;see
/atrick and Forman '77'O Ignatie '779O .ones and Forman '7$7O Muldoon et al '7$$%. For
,hayes ;'77@# 9$%, the *reedom to impose Mreservations and e&emptionsN has become a
sine qua non or American treaty ratiication+. Washington has been by no means alone in
seeking to qualiy its commitments. -ut the type and scope o provisions it has sought,
repetitively and almost systematically, sets it apart ;>oh '77(O Moravcsik '779O ,hayes
'77@%.
"he International ,riminal ,ourt ;I,,% is a case in point. In negotiations on the I,,+s Rome
!tatute, the :! delegation sought permanent e&emptions and reservations or American
soldiers. It ocused on Article $', which sets out the ,ourt+s 2urisdiction,
$9
claiming that it did
not recognise the special role that the :! plays as a military power that shoulders risks and
responsibilities providing global public goods, such as peace and stability ;!cheer '77$O
Mayereld '77(%. =ther parties argued that granting e&emptions to the :! would sacriice
the ,ourt+s underlying premise o non4selective enorcement o 2ustice# the sine qua non o
multilateralism. Where would the line be drawn i one e&emption were grantedI
Eespite dissatisaction with the !tatute, /resident -ill ,linton ;'777% inally signed it on the
last possible day or signature, stating that the :! would *remain engaged in making the I,,
an instrument o impartial and eective 2ustice in the years to come+. -ut he also made clear
that more work had to be done on the !tatute beore :! ratiication could be considered. In
May '77', 2ust two months beore its entry into orce, the -ush administration oicially
*unsigned+ the treaty and declared that the :! did not intend to become party to it.
"he I,, has been described as a *newer style o multilateralism in which the scope o the
agreement is universal and the binding character is law4based and anchored in international
2udicial authority+ ;Ikenberry '77(# 9)'%. !tates, including ma2or powers, are asked to
embrace the principle o non4selective enorcement o 2ustice with ewer qualiications than in
the past. Dowever, the Rome !tatute does contain e&ceptions, including the possibility o a
seven year e&emption or the prosecution o war crimes. Although only two states ;France
15
"he ull te&t o the Rome !tatute may be ound at# http!''untreaty.un.org'cod'icc'inde(.html;accessed $) March
'7$7%.
23
and ,olombia% requested the e&emption, its mere e&istence suggests that some o the old
multilateralism lives on. Moreover, the I,,+s limited 2urisdiction K dealing with dramatic
violations o human rights such as genocide and crimes against humanity K make it diicult to
consider it illustrative o any wider pattern o multilateral cooperation.
International trade oers another testing ground or claims o a new multilateralism.
Distorically, the :! has championed trade agreements, including the <A"" and the W"=.
"he <A"" worked on the basis o consensus, which implied no special treatment or ma2or
powers. In act, it allowed *weak states to block positive4sum outcomes that they deemed to
have an inequitable distribution o beneits+ ;!teinberg '77'# ()9%. "he preerence or
consensus relected the dynamics o the ,old War, the accession o a large bloc o
developing countries in the $897s, and the widely4held view that *it would be impossible to
reach agreement on a weighted voting ormula and e&pand the <A"" into a broad4based
organisation that could attract and retain developing countries+ ;!teinberg '77'# ()9O see
also ,urCon and ,urCon $85(O /orges $889%.
"he W"= thus appeared to mark a step4level change when it was created as the <A""+s
successor in $889 ;see Wilkinson '777%. According to its Eisputes !ettlement :nderstanding
;E!:%, states became legally obliged to deliver on the terms o sanctions that were assessed
against them. "he W"= thus became a poster child or the new multilateralism.
In act, non4compliance with W"= rules has been a requent practice o ma2or players,
including the :! and the 0:. :ndeterred, advocates o a new multilateralism argue that
non4compliance in the international trade area is undamentally dierent than, or e&ample,
gross violations o human rights. As "rachtman ;'775# $'5% observes, the rules o the W"=
are *not like the international law proscription o genocide or aggressive war# Mthey doN not
normatively demand compliance at all costs+.
6evertheless, violation o W"= rules by some members can have severe impacts on others.
In a sense, the E!: was designed to accommodate states aected by non4compliance. It
operates on the *consensus minus $+ principle, so that a state ound to be violating W"=
rules can be sanctioned and legally obliged to oer remedies to aggrieved states. It thus
demands compliance rom states with agreed international rules with more orce than did the
<A"". -ut the W"= is a less clear4cut case o the new multilateralism than is sometimes
claimed.
!imilarly, arms control agreements have displayed eatures o both the old and new
24
multilateralism. "he ,hemical Weapons ,onvention ;,W,% was ratiied by the :! !enate in
$885 only ater it added '@ conditions to the treaty+s resolution o ratiication. "heir inclusion
in a treaty that was originally designed to prohibit any e&ceptions prompted other states
including India, ,hina and .apan also to add reservations ;,hayes '77@# 9)%.
In contrast, the =ttawa ,onvention on landmines is an unusually pure case o the new
multilateralism. Again, the :! demanded changes and e&ceptions, including a geographical
e&ception or the use o landmines in >orea and a deinition o landmines that would allow
the use o mi&ed4system anti4tank mines. "he :! delegation also asked or a deerral period
or compliance, as well as the right to withdraw during periods o armed conlict ;Wareham
$88@# '()4'(9%. 6early all the :! proposals were dismissed ater most signatories insisted
that the treaty should have no e&ceptions. In Eecember $885, $'' states signed a
convention categorically prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transer o anti4
personnel mines.
=ther recent arms control cases relect a similar aversion to e&ceptions and reservations.
"hey include a convention on cluster munitions and negotiations on the creation o a global
Arms "rade "reaty ;A""% covering international transers o conventional arms. =n balance,
modern arms control appears to conirm the shit towards a new multilateralism.
"he debate about whether multilateralism is advancing in a secular ashion is ultimately
about whether we are witnessing a process o convergence towards an essentially single,
binding and more demanding orm. =n one side, sceptics argue that orm ollows unction#
the new multilateralism is considerably more visible on arms control than it is on trade, even
leaving aside human rights. =n the other, the emergence o more institutionalised and rules4
based agreements sustains the argument that we are moving towards a new, more
undamentally multilateralised international order.
Different Meanings

,laims that the international order is becoming progressively more multilateral are
challenged by dierent cultural visions o multilateralism. ,onsider *sovereignty4based+
multilateralism, which is requently cited by ,hinese policy4makers as a normative ob2ective
;Uinbo '778# G@%. "he $8854@ Asian inancial crisis opened eyes in -ei2ing to how ar
economic interdependence had progressed in the region. !ubsequently, ,hina both took
active, speciic steps to help stabilise the region+s economies and shited more generally
towards *enthusiastic embrace o multilateral diplomacy+ ;<ill and <reen '778# '7%. "his
25
stance has shapes ,hinese oreign policy choices in a regional conte&t in which *0ast Asian
governmental regionalism has grown dramatically in the past ew decades+ ;>ang '775# 5'%.
=ther ma2or powers now seiCe on ,hina+s wish to be seen to embracing multilateralism, as
illustrated in comments by "imothy <eithner, the :! "reasury !ecretary, on a new early
warning mechanism agreed by the <'7 to warn o e&cessive trade deicits# *It+s a very
pragmatic approach, a very multilateral approachFit allows ,hina to point to a set o
multilateral commitments.+
$G

0qually, however, ,hinese enthusiasm or multilateralism is irmly based on the
understanding that domestic matters, such as human rights in ,hina, are nobody else+s
business. A lourishing o new Asian initiatives K the region now hosts about $77 multilateral
groupings K owes much to ,hinese support. Yet, the main ocus o most scholars o Asia
remains e&plaining why the region e&hibits an *Torganisation gapT K a paucity o multilateral
organisation+ compared to other regions in the world ;,alder and Fukuyama '77@# $%. Asia is
still home to intense nationalism, raw territorial disputes, and ar more ethnic, linguistic and
cultural diversity than K say K 0urope. ,hina+s political and economic rise might well
maniest itsel in multilateral leadership in the region, but *both Dobbes and >ant are alive
and well in Asia+s multilateral process, and neither can claim dominance over the region+s
uture+ ;<ill and <reen '778# $(%.
Multilateralism ,hinese4style contrasts with what is oten considered to be gospel in
Washington# *any multilateral order is a shamQ the strong do what they like while the weak
talk and establish institutions+.
$5
American realists, such as >agan ;'77'%, claim that there
e&ists a distinct, American4style multilateralism that is merely *a cost4beneit analysis, not a
principled commitment to multilateral action as the cornerstone o world order+. In act,
multilateralism is viewed dierently by dierent American political tribes, and even within
them. =ne outlook Q by no means e&clusive to Eemocrats or Republicans Q sees
multilateralism as a route to democracy promotion and the emergence o a *liberal peace+
;Eoyle $8@GO ,o& et al '777%. In a sense, this view underpinned the <eorge W. -ush
administration+s commitment to *transormational diplomacy+ ;see .ervis '77GO Rice '775O
Ikenberry et al '778%. /erhaps ironically, the question o whether -ush was, in practice, *the
heir o Woodrow Wilson+, became a debating point by the end o his administration ;Ikenberry
'778# $%. 0qually, the commitment o -ush+s successor, -arack =bama to a *new spirit o
multilateralism+ was severely compromised when moves to 2oin the :6 Duman Rights
,ouncil and increase the :! inancial contribution to the IMF were met with widespread
domestic political opposition ;see Morris '778O =+,onner '778%. What these cases may
16
Vuoted in )inancial Times ;:> edition%, 8 6ovember '7$7, p.G.
17
.ohn Ban =udenaren ;'775% *,ontaining 0urope+, R!!# American Future, available at#
http#33americanuture.net3IpagePidW$)' ;accessed $' .uly '775%.
26
illustrate is that political salesmanship o multilateralism involves nuance and ambiguity about
its likely results, and Washington politics is ;mostly% *intolerant o nuance and ambiguity+
;Freedman '77@# 97G%.
0ven when Washington politics allows a :! administration to commit itsel to multilateralism,
structural actors may constrain American behaviour. As an ;allegedly% hegemonic power, the
:! aces the challenge o rendering its commitment to multilateralism credible ;>arns '77@%.
Is the :! attitude towards multilateralism based on assumptions about the desire o other
states to shackle American powerI Realists would contend that such assumptions outlast
any administration.
= course, the :! has provided leadership in the creation o the :6 and the W"=, plus the
!ummit o the Americas, the Free "rade Area o the Americas ;F"AA%, and the enlargement
o 6A"=. 6evertheless, the :! !enate+s two4thirds ma2ority hurdle or treaty ratiication
remains a powerul obstacle to the new multilateralism ;,owhey $88(O >arns and Mingst
'77'O Hyman '77'%. /erceptions o threat and vulnerability post48.$$ have prompted
aggressive American behaviour in negotiations on arms control, container security, and the
handling o data on airline passengers ;/rice '779%. Yet, one ;surprising% result was
*substantive cooperation+ on counterterrorism within A/0, ;<ill and <reen '778# 5%. Again,
multilateral cooperation varies considerably between dierent issue areas. <enerally,
however, American e&ceptionalism must be a ocus or any research programme on
multilateralism.
!o must the question o whether multilateral cooperation encourages non4democratic states
to adopt democratic habits. ,ooperation o any kind may not be possible with ,hina on
6orth >orea, Iran, or Asian security i the :! or 0: puts democratisation at the centre o its
policy. Multilateral cooperation between non4democracies is always unlikely to promote
democracy. >eohane ;et al '778% claim to have uncovered the empirical conditions under
which multilateralism leads to net gains in democracy. -ut they also insist on the need or ar
*more comprehensive analysis o the eects o multilateralism on democracy+ ;>eohane et al
'778# '@%. !uch analysis also must be comparatively cultural.
-ecause both multilateralism and democracy are understood dierently in dierent cultures,
0urope+s cultural commitment to multilateralism bears scrutiny. -y one view, it is deeply4
rooted in the e&perience o the :nion+s history and institutions. -ut it may well be the
opposite o universal. We may even ind dierent cultural understandings o multilateralism
in dierent 0: member states. "o illustrate, the <erman ,hancellor, Angela Merkel, argued
27
in '778 that the problem o climate change could be solved only i states were willing to *give
up powers to multilateral organisations, whatever the cost+.
$@
-ut it is an open question
whether her view was shared by her ;say% /olish or ,Cech counterparts. <ermany+s strong
support or multilateralism even contrasts with France+s commitment to a oreign policy that
seeks ;somehow% to combine *preeminent multilateralism, autonomous regional groupings,
and unapologetic nationalism+ ;-owen '779# 89O see also Moreau Eearges '77)%. Eierent
cultural understandings o multilateralism within the 0: may help e&plain why, in the words o
ormer 0: "rade ,ommissioner /eter Mandelson, *nothing divides us more than Russia+.
$8
Russia itsel may have developed a distinct cultural understanding o multilateralism as part
o a shit towards a ,Carist *sovereign democracy+. Moscow+s view could be seen as a
product o symbiosis between Bladimir /utin+s iron rule and the return o Russia to something
approaching <reat /ower status. As >agan ;'77@# 99% puts it, *strength and control at home
allow Russia to be strong abroad. !trength abroad 2ustiies strong rule at home. Russia+s
growing international clout also shields /utin+s autocracy rom oreign pressures+.
What room could there be in this equation or Russia embracing multilateralismI "he
!hanghai ,ooperation =rganisation ;!,=% reveals that there is room. Formally created in
'77$, the !,= brings Russia together with ,hina, >aCakhstan, >yrgyCstan, "a2ikistan, and
:Cbekistan. India, Iran, /akistan and Mongolia have observer status. "he .une '778 !,=
summit was hailed by the Russian /resident, Emitry Medvedev, as an opportunity or its
participants ;which included -raCil in trade discussions% to *build an increasingly multipolar
world order+. Multilateral economic policy cooperation within the !,= could be used,
according to Medvedev, to undermine an *artiicially unipolar system Mbased onN one big
centre o consumption, inanced by a growing deicit, and thus growing debts, one ormerly
strong reserve currency, and one dominant system o assessing assets and risks+ ;quoted in
Dudson '778# 8%.
"he =bama administration sought to attend the .une '778 summit as an observer, but was
rebued. "he summit deliberately sought to e&pand trade between ma2or economic players
in way that oered no role or the :! or its currency. "he importance o the goals in shaping
multilateralism is relected in a Russian worldview that insists *we have reached our limit in
subsidiCing the :! military encirclement o 0urasia while also allowing the :! to appropriate
18
Vuoted in *<ermany+s oreign policy# a new game o dominoes+, The *conomist ;:> edition%, $) 6ovember
'778# )8.
19
Mandelson made the comment to a meeting o the <eneral Aairs ,ouncil ;o 0: Foreign Ministers% in .uly
'77G. Interviews, Eirectorate4<eneral or "rade, 0uropean ,ommission, -russels, $74$$ !eptember '77G.
28
our e&ports, companies and real estate in e&change or paper money o questionable worth+
;Dudson '778# 8%.
"he !,=+s remit has e&panded rom a narrow ocus on border stabilisation between ,hina
and its Asian neighbours to cooperation on economic and energy issues, water rights and
;especially% action against the *three evils+ o separatism, e&tremism, and terrorism. A '779
!,= declaration calling or the :! and its allies ;although not naming them% to set a date or
the withdrawal o their military orces rom *the territories o !,= member states+, at a time
when several thousand American troops used bases in :Cbekistan and >yrgyCstan as
platorms or action in Aghanistan, caused alarm in Washington and other western capitals.
'7
Yet, ears that the !,= is developing into an anti4western alliance capable o genuine
collective action, as opposed to summit declarations, seem at least premature. "hus ar, it
has been mostly hamstrung by ,hinese4Russian rivalry ;,ooley '778%.
!till, the !,= surely merits urther study. It is a case in which multilateralism is certainly not a
*weapon o the weak+. It also suggests that we are some distance away rom any universal,
cross4cultural understanding o multilateralism.
Conclusion
=ur sub4title reprises the words o Rodney >ing, whose brutal beating by police oicers
triggered the $88' Hos Angeles riots. It points to a double entendre. First, can IR scholars
*get along+, accept a modern deinition o multilateralism, and pursue a research programme
that leads to its conceptualisationI !econd, is there suicient will and agreement on the
virtues o multilateralism amongst the world+s political elite to sustain a process o urther
multilateralisation o the global orderI
We have seen that multilateralism has been deined and understood in dierent ways. We
concur with Ruggie ;$88)# 99G% that *there is unavoidable ambiguity in deining this term+.
!cholarship on multilateralism still suers rom a lack o an agreed conceptual ramework, an
common language, and set o reerences with which to e&amine its development.
Yet, as we have argued, multilateralism is both distinctive and more than 2ust a sub4set o
cooperation. 0ven i claims o a new multilateralism cannot always be validated,
20
In act, :Cbek /resident Islam >arimov eventually set his own date or withdrawal o :! orces K likely with the
active encouragement o -ei2ing and Moscow 4 in response to the -ush administration+s criticism o :Cbekistan+s
dreadul human rights record.
29
multilateralism in practice has outpaced eorts to understand it. =ur analysis o the main
actors that condition multilateralism 4 dierent conte&ts, goals, orms, and meanings K has
raised ar more questions than it has answered because so many basic questions about
remain unanswered. "hey include#
When is multilateralism not a weapon o the weakI Distorically, under what
circumstances have <reat /owers embraced itI
What determines what type o multilateralism emerges in any speciic era or issue4
areaI Eoes the speciic type o multilateralism that emerges depend on what
ob2ectives are being soughtI
What determines how many states are parties to a multilateral agreementI ,an we
demonstrate empirically that minilateralism is advancing more quickly and is more
eective than inclusive multilateralismI
,an inter4regionalism be a means to the end o e&tending and deepening
multilateralismI I so, under what conditionsI =r does it inevitably undermine
multilateralismI
What is really new about '$
st
century multilateralismI Is the I,, a *rogue case+I Will
the post4'77@ inancial crisis yield more and stronger multilateralismI What is the role
o non4state actors in modern multilateralismI
Is Ikenberry ;'77(# 9)7% right that *demands or multilateral agreements Q even and
perhaps especially by the :nited !tates 4 will increase+I Is American e&ceptionalism
unassailable or surmountableI
Is there evidence o an emergent, cross4cultural understanding o multilateralism in
the '$
st
centuryI /recisely what accounts or dierent understandings in dierent
cultures, and what are the dierences ;as revealed, say, by discourse analysis o
government oreign policy documents and media portrayals%I
:nder what circumstances has multilateral cooperation encouraged non4democratic
states to adopt democratic habitsI Dow is the trade4o between inclusiveness and
democracy promotion best4managed in the design o new multilateral agreementsI
"o be clear, there is much in the e&isting literature on which such a research programme can
build, including the three essential eatures o multilateralism. "he irst is generalised
principles o conduct. ,onsider the case o Russia+s attempt to agree a declaration in the
!hanghai ,ooperation =rganisation condemning the :! role in the '77@ conlict in <eorgia.
It was quietly shelved when the ,hinese delegation made clear that, in their view, the
proposal was inconsistent with the basic teleology o the !,=. "hus, a generalised principle
was established# geopolitical disputes would not distract the !,= rom its core task o
conronting the *three evils+ o separatism, e&tremism, and terrorism.
30
Indivisibility Q in some orm Q is a second, minimum condition o multilateralism. "he
stalling o the Eoha Eevelopment Round illustrates. 0merging states blocked agreement on
the grounds, broadly speaking, that the costs and beneits were not spread equitably
between all parties in any settlement that had been proposed.
Eiuse reciprocity also continues to be a deining condition o multilateralism. /arties to any
multilateral agreement must be prepared to lose today, and remain a party that agreement,
on the grounds that they might win tomorrow. In other words, cooperation must be minimally
durable Q that is, institutionalised Q to be called multilateralism.
I we can agree what constitutes multilateralism, we can begin to answer the questions we
have posed, particularly one that trumps all others# is the international order becoming, in a
secular and durable way, more multilateralisedI Eebates about whether we are witnessing a
transition to a more multilateral international order persist, not least because o disagreement
about what constitutes compliance and whether international laws or norms have tangible
impact on the behaviour o states. "here are good reasons to be pessimistic about the uture
o multilateralism, but also evidence that multilateralism is e&panding and deepening in the
'$
st
century. We still do not seem to understand why with much precision. It is worth
investment o time and thought into considering whether, how and why one o the ugly
ducklings o IR might one day emerge as a useul, perhaps even beautiul, swan.
31
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3orld "olitics, ,ambridge and Malden MA# /olity.
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o Ma2or /owers# ,ompeting /atterns o International RelationsI "he ,ases o the :!,
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