REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No.

103047, September 2, 1994236 SCRA

257FACTS
:Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
without the knowledge of the formers parents. All the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage which includes procurement of marriage license, was
attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for
four (4) months after which they parted ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer
for a possible annulment of her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the
States to follow her daughter who was adopted by her brother with the consent of
Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castro and
Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an
alleged marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970
but such cannot be located since it does not appear in their records. It was then
that she found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of her marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court
denied her petition. It ruled that inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification
from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license. The respondent appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court
declaring that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract. However, the
Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of
Castro are not sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity
of a marriage.
ISSUE
:Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to
the celebration of marriage.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability
to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.3196182
to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not aground to deny her petition.
The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to
the peculiar circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage
license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. It was held that under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.

MORENO vs. BERNABE (256 SCRA 120)
FACTS:Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the
respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but only to find out that she
could not get the marriage contract because Office of LCR failed to issue a
marriage license . The complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the
judge to have her and her husband to be married by him, in defense of the judge he
was in good faith as he was only moved by the plea of the complainant. The
complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is
valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge will be held liable for solemnizing the
marriage without the issuance of a valid marriage license.
HELD: YES, Supreme Court provides that:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that
the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme
Court insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a
member of the judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge
displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his position and is
therefore
fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act should be punished severely.



People Vs Borromeo
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias
Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming
because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo
Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas
hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias
mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant,
Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be
liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no
marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his
testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a
chapel by a priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being
married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the
common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on
the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal
capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not
invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not
one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is
AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000.
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the
existence of such marriage, Persons living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence to the case, to be
in fact married. The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest
known in law. The law presumes morality and not immorality, marriage and not
concubinage, legitimacy and not bastardy.



ABDON SEGUISABAL, complainant,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. CABRERA, City Judge of Toledo City, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In his verified Complaint filed on 18 June 1979, Abdon Seguisabal has charged City
Judge Jose R. Cabrera of Toledo City with gross misconduct in office and gross
ignorance of the law for having solemnized, on 14 April 1978, the marriage of Jaime
Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without the requisite marriage license pursuant to
Article 53 of the Civil Code, and for having failed to transmit a copy of the marriage
contract, signed by him and the parties, to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization as mandatorily
required by Article 68 of the same Code.
That respondent actually solemnized said marriage without the requisite license, is
shown by the marriage contract issued to the contracting parties (Annexes "C", "C-
1"). The f failure to transmit a copy of the marriage contract to the Local Civil
Registrar is substantiated by the Certifications, both issued on 5 June 1979, by the
Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City (Annex "A" and "B"),
Required to comment, respondent Judge explained:
On April 14, 1978 at around 12:00 o'clock noon, Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy
accompanied by the mother of Jaime Sayson the father of Marlyn Jagonoy and
several others appeared before my Office bringing with them a Marriage Contract to
be solemnized in marriage. I asked them for their Marriage License but they told me
that the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City cannot issue the same because the one
in-charge was not in his Office, it being already 12:00 o'clock noon. The bride-to-be
was three months pregnant.
Presuming that the papers were in order inasmuch as the parents were present, I
solemnized the marriage but told the parties to come back in the afternoon
together with the Marriage License. The parties did not come in the afternoon and
the papers left in my office were lost in the mass of paper works attendant in the
Office of the City Judge, in fact, I have virtually forgotten about it myself.
Sometime in May 1979, about a year after, a crying girl bringing with her a child
appeared before me in my office and I Identified her as Marlyn Jagonoy. She
informed me that her husband, Jaime Sayson, who was a draftee in the Philippine
Army died in an encounter with the Muslim rebels in Maguindanao and
subsequently died. The army authorities will give her the benefits if and when she
can prove that she was actually married to the said Jaime Sayson. In sympathy and
fairness to Marlyn Jagonoy whose marriage I actually solemnized, I searched for the
papers and found them. I told the father of Marlyn to go to the Local Civil Registrar's
Office in order that Marriage License be issued to her which he did but came back
and told me that the Local Civil Registrar will not receive the papers and will not
issue the Marriage License for the reason that the parties have not attended the
Family Planning Seminar required by law before Marriage License may be issued.
Believing that Family Planning was no longer necessary inasmuch as Jaime Sayson
was already dead, I issued to them the Marriage Contract in order that they can
enjoy the benefits accruing Jaime Sayson who died a hero's death in the service of
the flag of the Republic. In issuing the Marriage Contract, I had done it in good faith
and in sympathy and in fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy, whom I believe is
entitled to the benefits she could enjoy it simply because of the technicality of the
law. The issuance of the Marriage Contract made everybody happy, The parents of
the boy and the parents of the girl were satisfied and are not even a party to this
Complaint (Rollo, pp. 9-10).
Respondent Judge further averred that the complainant herein was obviously ill-
motivated and resorted to this administrative action out of spite because he had, on
24 November 1978, dismissed Criminal Case No. A-1712 for Alarm and Scandal filed
by complainant against a certain Marcelo Rizal, and that complainant is the accused
in Criminal Case No. A-1907 for Qualified Theft pending before respondent's Court.
Considering the admissions made by respondent, and as observed in the
Memorandum Report dated 22 October 1980 submitted by Deputy Court
Administrator, Leo D. Medialdea, concurred in by Court Administrator, Justice
Lorenzo Relova, there was no more need for a formal investigation to determine the
administrative liability of respondent Judge. Respondent must be held guilty of the
charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on
14 April 1978 without requiring the essential pre-requisite of a marriage license,
respondent had undoubtedly transgressed Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in the
absence of any showing that the subject marriage falls under marriages of an
exceptional character wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent
was likewise remiss in his duty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the
Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of
solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the marriage contract duly
signed by him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a judicial
officer, he is expected to know the law on the solemnization of marriages. His
feeling of sympathy and fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy" cannot serve as a
license for him to deliberately transgress or dispense with legal requisites.
In view, however, of respondent's twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of
service in the Judiciary, and considering that he has applied for retirement under
Republic Act No. 5095 due to schemic heart ailment, we have mitigated the
corresponding administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall
pay a fine equivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to be deducted from his
gratuity upon his retirement from the service.
A copy of this Decision should be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED,

Te v. Choa (Te v. CA)
Facts:
1. Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14).
They did not live together after marriage although they would meet each
other regularly.
2. 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.
3. 1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with
Liliana was subsisting.
4. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative
case (revocation of engineering license for grossly immoral act) against
Arthur and Julieta Santella (2
nd
wife of Arthur)
5. Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.
6. RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first
marriage was pending.
Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and
administrative case be rendered judgment?
Held: NO.
1. P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is ab initio) was overturned.
2. Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
3. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

RD: Absence of Impediment.
FC. Art. 5: any male or female of the age of 18yrs or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned under art. 37 & 38, may contract marriage.
Case: Since it was deemed that the marriage of Arthur and Liliana was valid,
bigamous marriage between Arthur and Julieta is void. (see. NCC Art. 80)

MARTINEZ V. TAN 12 PHIL. 237
Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace,
even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not
constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant Angel
Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidencesupporting
this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and
plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori
and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori
appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony of
Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court
that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all present
during the ceremony.

Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace

Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that
they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the
contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.
Amortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the
officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the
peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary
is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the
document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually
agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document
which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was
proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so
hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
Madridejo (plaintiff and appellee) v De Leon (defendants and appellants)
Doctrines : Articles 121, 131,135 of the Civil Code
Issue:
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son by compulsion?
Whether the subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated him.
Facts:
In a case earlier filed and the court decided that the marriage between Pedro and
Flaviana was valid, and that their marriage legitimated Melecio Madridejo as their
son. An appeal was filed for the errors committed by the lower court.
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, had one child Domingo De Leon
Eulogio de Leon died 1915.

Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo and begot Melecio Madridejo

The Parish Priest of Siniloan, Laguna failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary when Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez married.

HELD:
Melecio Madridejo has not been voluntarily acknowledged by his
father and his mother either before or after their marriage,
although the birth certificate, though it lacks the requisites of the
Law of Civil Registry and it has neither been executed or signed
by P.M.

The mother supplied the data of birth in the baptismal certificate
but constitutes the proof of baptism and not the kinship or
parentage of the person baptized.

Melecio has not impleaded his parents to acknowledge him in
order that the court might have the correct pronouncement on
his being a natural child and the right to the estate of his brother
Domingo De Leon.

Thus, the judgment is reversed, defendants absolved, with cost against the
appellee and their marriage did not legitimate him.
Trinidad v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together
with Felix and Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their
deceased father. He presented the following evidence.

a. Testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. Testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he
got married.

Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios
claims:
a. Testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. Her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that
Arturio was simply a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures
Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio,
together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are
sufficient?

Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof
of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth
certificate of the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For
filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.


Presumption of Marriage
1.) Presumption in favor of a valid marriage (Art 220 CC)
2.) The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage is
satisfactory if uncontradicted. (Sec. 3 (aa), Rule 131, ROC)
3.) In marriages of exceptional character, the existence of the marriage is
presumed, even in the TOTAL ABSENCE of a marriage license. (Vda. De
Jacob v CA, 1999)
4.) If a marriage certificate is missing, and all means HAVE NOT YET
BEENEXHAUSTED to find it, then the marriage is presumed to exist
(Sevilla v Cardenas,2006)
5.) Absence of a marriage certificate is not proof of absence of marriage.
To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: (1) the testimony of witnesses to matrimony; (2)
the couples public cohabitation; and (3) birth and baptismal
certificates of children born during the union. (Trinidad v CA, 1998)
VDA DE JACOB VS. CA
Facts
Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructedMarriage Contract between herself and the
deceased. Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be
the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr.
Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a
marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.. Appellant claims that the marriage
between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original
copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when
Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on
the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the
legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed trial
courts ruling.

Issues:
a.) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.

Held
The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the
claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.

With regard to the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the lack of
a marriage license, it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional
in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. With regard to the loss of the marriage certificate, the execution of a
document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. In the present
case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage..
REPUBLIC, SANTOS v. BEDIA-SANTOS
FACTS
Leouel Santos, then a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, got married with Julia
Bedia on Sept. 20, 1986. They lived with Julias parents in La Paz, Iloilo. Their son,
Leouel Santos, Jr. was born on July 18, 1987. They started to have problems: (1)
frequent interference of
Julias parents (2) when & where theyd start living independently (3) Leouels
spending a few days with his parents. Julia left for the US to work as a nurse on May
18, 1988. She only called up Leouel seven months after she left with promise to
return after her contract expires on July 1989. She didnt come back. Leouel had a
training in the US and he looked for Julia but he never found her. He filed a case for
voiding their marriage under article 36 of the FC (marriage contracted by either
party who at the time of the marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity shall be manifest after the solemnization). Leouel claims that Julias
failure to communicate with him & inform him of her whereabouts are proof that
shes psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Julia denied her husbands allegations saying it was her husband who was
irresponsible & incompetent. She filed a manifestation stating that she would
neither appear nor submit evidence. Trial court & CA dismissed the complaint.



ISSUE
WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated?

HELD
NO. Dismissed. Affirmed.

RATIO
For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real inability to commit
oneself to the essential obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations which could be overcome by normal effort does not constitute
incapacity. Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3 characteristics
of psychological incapacity: (1) gravity that would really render one incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties in marriage (2) juridical antecedence means it
should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage (3) incurability including
cure that is beyond the partys means. Circumstances of the case at bar do not
amount to psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs
of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend
more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for
aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In
1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in
1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he
abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and
duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she
and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the
problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid
set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying
with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to
act on behalf of the state.
Choa vs. Choa
FACTS:
Respondent Alfonso Choa filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage
to petitioner Leni Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
filed a demurer of evidence (an objection or exception by one of the parties in
an action at law to the effect that the evidence which the adversary produced
is insufficient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). The
demurrer of evidence was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that
the claims of Alfonso Choa that hers wife had filed several lawsuits against
him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature,
carefree and had no intentions of procreative sexuality- as sufficient evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfonso Choa presented quantum evidence for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. The testimony of the expert doctor and the
respondent only showed that the two couldnt get along with each other. The
spouses had an incompatibility or defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy.
Tsoi vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at
the ManilaCathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the
newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night,
second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and
on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent,
a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3
inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever
made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she
always removed his hands.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a
psychological incapacity ?[i]
HELD:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage
is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos
FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married
twice and had five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent
left the military service in 1987. Consequently, due to the respondents failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the respondent
would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were already living
separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos failure to find work to support
his family and his violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their
children constituted psychological incapacity.
HELD: The court ruled the negative.
RATIONALE: The totality of the respondents acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
POLICY: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Ngo Te vs Yu Te
rticle 36: Psychological Incapacity
Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have
interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness
due to the fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still
in college, Rowena proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on
the ground that he is young and jobless but due to Rowenas persistence Kenneth
complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they
found themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently,
Rowenas uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be married. After
marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncles house where Kenneth was
treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he
will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was
hidden from Rowenas family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live
with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live together separately or just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it
is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed for
an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The City
Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is
collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The
opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between
Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties unreadiness to commitment
and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court
ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG
appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the
psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the
Molina case to be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in
lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.
HELD: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed
a set of rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after
Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not
much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals. The SC however is not abandoning the Molina
guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to
both parties psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert
psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others.
He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital
obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

Set of [Strict] Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the FC Established in the Molina
Case (RP vs Molina)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff .
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/orsymptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each
othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

DANILO A. AURELIO, PETITIONER, VS. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO,
RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo
Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
[4]
In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying
with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent
alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and
even during the time of the marriage ceremony.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
[6]
the petition.
Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of
action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
W/N the court violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the
facts in Molina Doctrine are sufficient to grant the Petition for nullification of
marriage.
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED and the decision was REAFFIRMED. Petitioner contends that
the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that
such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition. Each case involving the application of
Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.