EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-
006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the
13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-
President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-
President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84
called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the
regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected
in that election.
[1]
Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the
13
th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.
[2]

On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but
one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12)
Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13
th
) Senator shall serve the
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President.
[3]
Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked
12
th
and 13
th
, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and
taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent.
Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator
receiving the 13
th
highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-
year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so
far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645);
[4]
(2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special
or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
[5]
and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646).
[6]
Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001
elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.
[7]

Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support
their claim, petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of
13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and
Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the
Senate.
[8]
Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast
for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the
candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners
in each of those elections.
[9]

Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their
petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued
Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an
amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners
accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their
original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the
seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further
raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate.
Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is
actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For
his part, Recto, as the 12
th
ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because
the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13
th
placer in the 14 May 2001
senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in
the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-
founded.
[10]
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what
petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan
was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration that no special election
was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from
declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and
01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special
election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain
requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not
seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the
annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners
cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its
subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant
petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist
from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[11]
Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin
acts already done.
[12]
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
[13]
Thus, in Alunan III v.
Mirasol,
[14]
we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was
filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the
validity of the order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the
question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no
bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the
validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to
comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such
election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters
because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do
petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-
005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental
act.
[15]
The requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of
issues,
[16]
relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies.
[17]
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
[18]

Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In
questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001,
petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is
shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in
that election.
[19]
Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court
should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax
money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that
public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose.
[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion
to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage.
[21]
Also, in the recent case
ofIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[22]
we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition
filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the validity of a
Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an
interest. We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few
cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence
occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face
again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.
[23]
(Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since
they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this
petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called
to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in
pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the
Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for
such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication,stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however,
That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall
occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the
term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty
(60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of
such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the
date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90)
after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall
be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the
voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May
2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections
reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial,
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its
resolutions
[24]
or even in its press releases
[25]
did COMELEC state that it would hold a special
election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14
May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13
th
highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with
the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the
winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is
invalid for lack of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the
manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below,
the Court answers in the negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the elections validity.
[26]
In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the
election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
[27]

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special
election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the
time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of
calling the election failed to do so.
[28]
This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate
from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority
[29]
and the law thus
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
[30]

Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent,
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
[31]

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held
at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14
May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a
vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is
subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before the
expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to
the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The
COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill
the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district
involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the
COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice
of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number
of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a
vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void.
[32]

The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that
COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13
th
highest number of
votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to
give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no
special election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February
2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence
of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice
of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC
would determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such as media
reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign.
[33]

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan,
in the absence of proof that COMELECs omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of
suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul
elections and will only do so when it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what
are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have
been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise.
[34]

Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the results of the
election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections.
[35]
This is
but to acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which
is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who
shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all
of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When
that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should
not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of
their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no
way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public duty
of greater importance than the duty itself.
[36]
(Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that
COMELEC fix the date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to
be voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of
certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns
and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general
and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a
jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May
2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the
original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad)
made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be
filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to
amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering
the thirteenth (13
th
) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and
the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No.
934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the
Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION
TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE
SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998
for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated
Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the
members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on
February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective
Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials
shall be held on the second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy
through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader,
Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a
vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was
then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had
to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or
rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24
candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-
year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the
13
th
largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be
an election for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the
Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate
obtaining the 13
th
largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of
Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an
election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising
here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can No, this is
not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is
needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special
election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our colleague,
Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill
up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in
such a manner.
x x x x
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in
the simultaneous elections, the 13
th
placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this
purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It
is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special
election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13
th
placer of the forthcoming elections that will
be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe
that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13
th
candidate will be running
with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other
amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
x x x x
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
[37]

Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the
special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal,
as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed
COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal
or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
[38]
COMELECs decision to abandon the means it
employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method
embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court
will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to
the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC
adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of
discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its
choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this
court should not interfere.
[39]

A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of
necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right
of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude
that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election
held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC
to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular
elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., joins the dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Punos dissent.
Tinga, J., joins Justice Punos dissent.



[1]
As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as amended.
[2]
Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a
term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated
Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been conferred by a majority vote of all the
members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on
February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective
Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and
municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday of May and every three years
thereafter. Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved to certify as
it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13
th
) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
[3]
Resolution No. 01-005 reads:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as the National Board of Canvassers for
the election of Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open and public
proceedings the certificates of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the national
and local elections conducted on May 14, 2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-
nine (79) Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards of Canvassers of cities
comprising one (1) or more legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of Canvassers of
Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee Voting, and the remaining uncanvassed certificate of
canvass which will not anymore affect the results, the Commission on Elections sitting En
Banc as the National Board of Canvassers finds that the following candidates for senators in
said elections obtained as of June 04, 2001 the following number of votes as indicated
opposite their names:
Name Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 2001)
NOLI DE CASTRO 16,157,811
JUAN M. FLAVIER 11,676,129
SERGIO R. OSMEA, III 11,531,427
FRANKLIN M. DRILON 11,223,020
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR. 11,187,447
JOKER P. ARROYO 11,163,801
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. 11,084,884
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 10,877,989
EDGARDO J. ANGARA 10,746,843
PANFILO M. LACSON 10,481,755
LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA 10,456,674
RALPH G. RECTO 10,387,108
GREGORIO G. HONASAN 10,364,272
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the
National Board of Canvassers hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13)
candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001
elections. Based on the certificates of canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12)
Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13
th
) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was
appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the
Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act
No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)
[4]
This provision states: The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the
date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to
be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is
scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general
election.
[5]
This provision reads: Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files
his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
[6]
This provision reads: Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of Candidates. x x x The names
of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also
be printed in the election returns and tally sheets.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
[8]
Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13 November 1951 while Senator
Felisberto Verano was elected in the special election of 8 November 1955.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 8-12.
[10]
Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
[11]
Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[12]
Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).
[13]
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil.
184 (1997); Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[14]
342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[15]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993,
225 SCRA 568.
[16]
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
[17]
CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
[18]
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[19]
See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
[20]
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392 (internal citations
omitted).
[21]
De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 420; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129
Phil. 7 (1967). See also Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil.
153 (1998).
[22]
G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[23]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[24]
E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing for the calendar of activities and
periods of prohibited acts in connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as amended by
Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306, dated 7
November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December 2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001);
Resolution No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of candidacy of
nuisance senatorial candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing
for the general instructions to the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting
of votes).
[25]
E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14, 2001
Elections.
[26]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[27]
Ibid; ibid.
[28]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).
[31]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[32]
See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).
[33]
Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the 14 May 2001 elections and
that the senator elected to the 13
th
place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona
was published in news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 6 and Daily
Tribune, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14
February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9 February 2001,
pp. 3, 8). Furthermore, the fact that the administration and opposition coalitions each
fielded 13 senatorial candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive coverage
by news publications (see Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13
February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001,
pp. 1, 4; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 12 February 2001, pp.
1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya, 13
February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1,
6; Manila Times, 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp.
1, 4).
[34]
Florendo, Sr. vs. Buyser, 129 Phil. 353 (1967); Capalla v. Tabiana, 63 Phil.
95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755 (1930); Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924).
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on failure of elections
(resulting to the annulment of elections), provides: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election
in any polling place had not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by an interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on
a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[35]
Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984); Villareal v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756
(1949); Lucero v. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852 (1924).
[36]
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
[37]
Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February 2001, pp. 49-54.
(Emphasis supplied)
[38]
E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).
[39]
Pugutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil.
237 (1941).












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO
ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and
19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his
duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military
Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision
of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is
not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been
empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port
who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the
29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An
importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military
command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary
measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have
violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to
create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of
waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long
as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military
occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association
Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the
two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full
sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of
trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this
connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then
Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been
shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military
commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law
in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals
that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even
possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty.
It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against
her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the
trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our
government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment
of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in
said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United
State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which
petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our
Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said
petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military
commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for
Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of
the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds.
Petitioner has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as
prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It
appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as
with such appearance they would be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved
in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several
constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole
context of said order which is reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office
charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of
war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision
and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available
sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement of
hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the
prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said
Office information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war
criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
(a) General. person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be
convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority
at the time of the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all offenses including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to
murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of
public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed
against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or
religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or
not in violation of the local laws.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Appointment. The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be
appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and
in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the
place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial
has begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all proceeding had
evidence taken in that case shall be made known to the said new member or alternate. This
facts shall be announced by the president of the commission in open court.
(b) Number of Members. Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3)
members.
(c) Qualifications. The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons
whom he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified
by personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case
in which he personally investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One
specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an
objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of
not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission
present shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct
the prosecution before each commission.
(b) Duties. The duties of the prosecutor are:
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all
cases referred for trial.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION
(a) Conduct of the Trial. A Commission shall:
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or
interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate
punishment therefor.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by
the convening authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. The accused shall be entitled:
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so
as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening
authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in
support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears
before the commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any
documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths
or affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and
duties set forth in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in
proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have
probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of
evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious
procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general
rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to
have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed
forces of any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the
International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any
investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as
possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.
(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the
commission to contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is
not immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military
or other agencies of any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer
of proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such
evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be
considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the
accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so
requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence
without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or
statement was procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a
character that may have caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may
strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as
follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at
this or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit
to the commission and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At
the close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a
finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may
defer action on any such motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case
and produce any further available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding
member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes
to submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of
such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the
commission may rule as being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and
sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
( f ) Record of Proceedings. Each commission shall make a separate record of its
proceeding in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the
prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel.
The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the presiding
member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as
soon as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by
hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other
punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into
effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life
imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the
Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to
be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty with or
assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have authority to
approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter
the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the case for rehearing
before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the severity of
the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a
commission shall final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
Supplementary Rule and Forms. Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern
its procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as
may be prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in
the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in
accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the
President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other
property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States
Army to the Philippines Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the
Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War
Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
congressional enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question,
is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly
vested in Congress by the Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative
power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would
dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised
exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of the President of the
Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines under martial law,
and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in
the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by
Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of
America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of
government legislative, executive, judicial to distinct and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in
the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may
exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue
express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish
government office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions.
Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers
upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to
define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively
vested by the Constitution in Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office
established by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative
power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme
Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive
Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest
that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power
granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and
Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT
TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national
emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the
tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to
the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing
means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population the establishment of an air
protective service and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other
measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy
the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force
and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall have the
force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First
Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of
Philippines. Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress
espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when
not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or
(b) to perform such services as may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over
farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take
over industrial establishment in order to insure adequate production, controlling wages and
profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the
unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in the interest of national
security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees
in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even distribution of
labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of
transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued
transportation facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for
use or operation by the Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or
commodities of prime necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and
(11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious
speculations, and private control affecting the supply, distribution and movement of foods,
clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material, implements, machinery, and equipment
required in agriculture and industry, with power to requisition these commodities subject
to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the
President may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department,
bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this
Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the
authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten
years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is
committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with
the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible
therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the
date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under
the authority herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such
amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five
Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to
be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President
is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to
create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of
government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or
suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to imposed
new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds
through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds
thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection
of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem
necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations.
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines
shall otherwise provide.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said
Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest,
when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct
part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as
chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are,
therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly
for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke
out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary
measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative power were
delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the
Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section
26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of
the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could
still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did
not intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the
surrender of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the
surrender of Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the
hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the
Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of
our Independence, two district, separate and independence legislative organs, Congress and the
President of the Philippines would have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to
enact laws of every nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in
the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be
pregnant with dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to
Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long
recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of
Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit
the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and
by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable
doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief
of the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General
Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision
promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and
dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are
perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of
evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to
declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in
his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON:
BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado
D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction
1
providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu,
Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L.
Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza.
2
Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear
that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction
on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on
December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor
vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the
said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;
[Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all
streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all
owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one
(1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and
yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is
stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including
expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning
device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor
vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause
Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to
registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not
more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate
and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then
instruction.
3
Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in
this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The
Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any
and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d
bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner
shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'"
4
There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations
on December 10, 1976.
5
They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered
a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-
registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned.
6
Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter
of Instruction
7
the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter
of Instruction No. 229 as amended.
8
It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated
June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the
following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever
source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except
motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be
indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees
of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are
hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately.
9
It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and
Communications.
10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in
Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"
11
alleged that said
Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police
power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."
12
He contended
that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;"
13
are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set."
14
are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWD's."
15
He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo
C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto
within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further
Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by this Court.
16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they
lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen
Beetle Car,
17
they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its
subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by
Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are
likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal
the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged
in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."
18
Unlike petitioner who contented himself
with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a
valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not
susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the
portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be
the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v.
Williams,
19
Morfe v. Mutuc,
20
and Edu v. Ericta.
21
Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines
was a signatory and which was duly ratified.
22
Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in
detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of
petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot
survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal
protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing.
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty"
23
was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugosoreiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative
power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as
Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the
past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would
be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law,
25
an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute,
the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and
streets designated as national roads * * *.
26
As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,
27
with petitioner failing in
his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila.
28
The rationale was clearly set forth in an
excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing
the statute.
29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such
factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices
'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or
1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end
collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record.
As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's
statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent
another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths
that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?"
30
It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful
study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause
is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a
pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.
5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction
was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with
1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal
among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of
the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any
of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately
get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty
in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer
of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to
purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning
device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this
early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as
petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device
requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an
unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in
an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral
where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order
disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it.
32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished,
if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of
legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of
Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according
to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle
of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the
last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on
the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained.
33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is
equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds
light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as
in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given
expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into
force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with
the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in
character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."
34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * "
35
It cannot be disputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * *
* adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * *
*."
36
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept
of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even
elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far
Eastern Broadcasting Co.,
37
namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless
the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued."
38
"Equal protection" is not a
talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that
success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.


Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances
grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation
Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not
reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by
Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society,"
because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged
administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been
made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in
1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S
and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative
road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum
lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways;
and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their
offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of
the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and
irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that
can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for
his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all
pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and
property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.


# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances
grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation
Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not
reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by
Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society,"
because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged
administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been
made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in
1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the purchase and
installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S
and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative
road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum
lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways;
and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their
offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of
the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof
system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and
irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that
can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for
his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all
pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and
property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.














Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa
are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of
twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between
the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities
to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with
law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the
filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in
the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight
years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced,
is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave
the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.1vvphl.nt
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military
service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to
organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary
interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the
army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United
States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due
process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of
war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies
compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to
make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying
with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So
ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND
TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television
which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program
entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday.
The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing
on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law."
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992,
it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in
its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the
respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-
14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City.
1
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their
Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner
submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September
9, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:
2

REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for
this program to show series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects
and using it in their discussion about the bible. There are remarks which are direct
criticism which affect other religions.
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its
September 11, 1992 subsequent action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:
3

REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of
the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs
and avoid attacks on other faith.
(3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9,
1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows:
4

REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our
(Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is
found in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October
20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 121 as follows:
5

REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on,
specifically, the Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and
the rest are wrong, which they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its November
20, 1992 action on petitioner's Series No. 128 as follows:
6

REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation dated September 1, 1992.
7

(7) Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation.
8

(8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary
Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of
the respondent Board which x-rated the showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The
letter reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III, section 4
of the 1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well
as studied the passages found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we
find no indication that the episode poses any clear and present
danger sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee.
(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr.,
addressed to President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board
x-rating petitioner's Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated
December 18, 1992 allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to
the Christian Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series
No. 119, please be informed that the Board was constrained to deny
your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an
attack against another religion which is expressly prohibited by
law. Please be guided in the submission of future shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on petitioner's bond o P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs.
9
The pre-
trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of
the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as the
parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show that after
submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment,
10
on December 15, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review
for Moving Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the
necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and
attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
11
praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring
petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the
motion.
12
On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. It
ordered:
13

xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the
Court's Order dated December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from
offending and attacking other existing religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited from
requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious
program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was
denied.
14

On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals
15
reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the
respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and
(2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials
constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA
NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN
THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS
PROGRAMS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO," A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS
INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to
review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power,
whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious
program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other
religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its section
3 pertinently provides:
Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television
programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-
theatrical distribution for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or
produced in the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation,
exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as
but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic
and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence or pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and
reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-
judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are subjudice in nature
(emphasis ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs."
By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or
prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The
law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to
determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like
its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an
uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good."
16
We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and
worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:
1
7
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the
hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he
chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of
God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality
of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to
the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to
prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all,
is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right
to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he
believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as
this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is
error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power
can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely
for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious
freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma,
not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the
object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally
interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not
allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A
person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his
religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist
cannot express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the
faithful. The police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of
the suttee, born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate
herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind
but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile
area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest
wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe
from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the
fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the
near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and
misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of
weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule
rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any
act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave
its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the
State should not stand still.
It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed
the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The
records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other
religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its
reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for ". . . criticizing different religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's ". . .
own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was
x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our
Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the
bible that we should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated
". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell,
dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong
. . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it ". . .
outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On second review, it was x-rated because of its
"unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the bible."
18
In sum, the respondent Board x-rated
petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's controversial
biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs. The respondent appellate
court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows.
19
It is the burden of the respondent Board
to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking"
either religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits
"A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of
freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, so viz.:
20

xxx xxx xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise.
In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To
persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts
to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent in church or
state or even to false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part
of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to
preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia
ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference
between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad
theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it
is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time
permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it
is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating
the religious program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it
is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television
program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board
in its Rules.
21
This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules
and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any religion" as a ground
allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of
the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion."
We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify
the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justifyprior
censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included
"attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over
by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the
Executive Department espouses this view.
Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now President of the
Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:
xxx xxx xxx
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor
the subject television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision
of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same as the
provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards of censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or
with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a wrong"
as determined by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard." As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television
program to "previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious
program makes mention of beliefs and practices of other religion." On the face of the
law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by the
Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to he within
the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law. (Emphasis supplied).
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
22
this Court held: "The constitutional
guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other
restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union,
23
we further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate
court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of
the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at
bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone
permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US,
24
as follows: ". . .
the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine the
latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties, when
its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech.
25
Thus, for instance, the test
was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing.
26
The use of the test took a downswing in the
1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist
conspiracy.
2
7 In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge
Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." The imminence requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the
protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,
28
when the High Court restored in the test the imminence requirement, and
even added an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only
speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished.
29
Presently in the United States, the clear
and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech,
commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech:
speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of
court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial.
30
Hence, even following the
drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the
case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile
audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb tenribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention
overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their
speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its
sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that ". . . the determination of the question as to
whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the
boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an
administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint
may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. "The same
submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its
seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual
Enterprise v. Day
31
By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland
32
was ready to hold
that "the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding
ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression only a procedure requiring a judicial
determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint."
33

While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for
Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs
and enforce its decisionsubject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up
in Sotto vs. Ruiz,
34
viz.:
The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be
regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons posses no absolute right to put into
the mail anything they please, regardless of its character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the
mails, in the exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate in nature and can
only be justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to the supposed
objectionable publication. In excluding any publication for the mails, the object
should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other
fundamental right of the people. This is the more true with reference to articles
supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is
or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due
process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the
courts in case he had abused his discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex
parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727;
Public Cleaning House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing
Co. vs. Murray [1916]. 23 - Fed., 773)
As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication
contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and
involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in
favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases
coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States
Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the
Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co. vs.
Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub.
Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909,
announcing a somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-
General).
To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or
not courts aloneare competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally
protected.
35
The issue involves highly arguable policy considerations and can be better
addressed by our legislators.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is
affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the
action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs in the result.



Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:
I think the basic issues in this case are:
A. What is the statutory extent and the constitutional limitation of the powers of the Movies and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)? More specifically, does the MTRCB have the
power to prohibit/ censor television shows?
B. In banning the television showing of the Iglesia ni Cristo videotape series, did the respondent
Board exercise its powers correctly and properly?
The first question deals with the general legal concepts and principles underlying the functions and
prerogatives of the MTRCB while the second calls for a juridical evaluation of the specific act of the
Board in classifying as "X" (or not for public viewing) specific pre-taped or canned programs,
identified as Series 115, 119, 121 and 128, for the reason that they allegedly constituted an "attack
against another religion." The first involves doctrine; the second, application.
A. EXTENT AND LIMIT OF
MTRCB'S POWERS
The statutory powers of the MTRCB are set forth in Sec. 3 of P.D.
1986.
1

In implementing P.D. 1986. the MTRCB issued its own Rules and Regulations. At issue in this case is
Section 4
2
of such Rules.
On the other hand, these statutory powers and internally generated regulations are limited by the
Bill of Rights. Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the rights to free speech and religion.
Mr. Justice Mendoza connects the above constitutional rights with the present controversy by
saying that "expression . . . by means of television broadcast is included in the free speech and free
press guarantee of the Constitution" and by Mr. Justice Kapunan by writing that this "case uniquely
interphases questions of religious expression and censorship laws in the context of the
constitution's guarantees of freedom of religion and of speech and expression."
Here before us therefore is a classic constitutional law case wherein the inherent power of the state
to safeguard the peace, well-being and general welfare of the people collide and clash with the
constitutional rights of individuals and religious institutions to evangelize, preach, promote, teach,
and even proselytize.
Religious Freedom -- A Cherished Right
FIRST, I agree with the ponencia that "(f)reedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present." Religious freedom is absolute when it is
confined within the realm of thought to a private, personal relationship between a man's
conscience and his God, but it is subject to regulation when religious belief is transformed into
external acts that affect or afflict others. The mere invocation of religious freedom will not
stalemate the State and ipso facto render it incompetent in preserving the rights of others and in
protecting the general welfare.
MTRCB's Power to Review and to Censor is Valid
SECOND, I believe that as an agency of the State created to promote the general welfare, the MTRCB
under P.D. 1986 has the basic initiatory authority and power to -
"approve or disapprove,
delete objectionable portion from
and/or prohibit
the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast" of pre-taped or canned (as contra-distinguished from "live")
video-audio/film/television programs and publicity materials. I regret I cannot go along
with Mr. Justice Mendoza's avante garde thesis that Section 3-c of P.D. 1986, from where the
above-quoted words were taken, is "upon its face and as applied, unconstitutional." I note
the extensive materials, particularly from American cases, buttressing his cogent stand, but,
after reflection, prayer and discernment. I am thoroughly convinced that the situation in our
country, particularly the totality of our cultural and religious milieu is far different from that
in America.
Petitioner INC contends that the MTRCB's authority extends only to non-religious video materials
but not to religious programs, particularly those of INC, which it claims are neither "immoral" nor
"indecent". This position presents more problems than solutions. For who will determine whether a
given canned material is religious or not, and therefore whether it can be publicly exhibited or not
without its passing through the Board? I would prefer that the State, which is constitutionally
mandated to be neutral, continue to exercise the power to make such determination, rather than
leave it up to the producer, maker or exhibitor of such material, who/which, because of vested
interests would, in the normal course, be understandably biased in his/its own favor. I feel less
discomfort with the idea of maintaining the censors' quasi-judicial authority to review such film
materials, subject to appeal to the proper courts by aggrieved parties, than with the prospect and
consequences of doing away with such power altogether. I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug in finding "it
more prudent to have a deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived (by the Board) to be
contrary to decency, morality, good custom or the law until, at least, the courts are given an
opportunity to pass upon the matter . . ." A contrary ruling would most regrettably remove
meaningful and necessary safeguards against a veritable floodtide of prurient, violence-prone and
values-eroding television shows and programs.
In Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak
4
and Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans, Jr.,
5
this Court
early on acknowledged the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast and electronic media in the
lives of everyone, and the easy accessibility of television and radio to just about anyone, especially
children. Everyone is susceptible to their influence, even "the indifferent or unwilling who happen
to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set."
6
And these audiences have less opportunity
to cogitate, analyze and reject the utterances, compared to readers of printed material.
7
It is
precisely because the State as parens patriae is "called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young"
8
that I vote for the retention of the State's power of review and prohibition
via the MTRCB. High-minded idealism in the staunch defense of the much-vaunted freedoms cannot
but be admired. Yet, no matter how devoutly we may wish it, not all the people share the same
mindset and views nor, needless to say, the same viewpoint, i.e., the ivory tower window. Hence, we
must prudently anticipate that abuses against the public weal are likely to be committed where
absolute permissiveness is the norm. Would that, with the total absence of censorship or review,
there occur a significant increase in religious, spiritual or morally uplifting prime-time
programming! But realistically and pragmatically speaking, we see mostly the prospect of more
explicit sex-oriented advertising, unadulterated violence and outright pandering to phone-sex
addicts and the simply curious. The fact that even the Net is not free of pornographic slime is no
excuse to let down all reasonable barriers against broadcast media offerings of muck, moral
depravity and mayhem. And definitely, there is no good and sensible reason for the State to
abdicate its vital role as parens patriae, in the guise of copying American constitutional precedents,
which I respectfully submit, are inapplicable in our factual context and time.
MTRCB Must Use Constitutional Standard
THIRD. In exercising its prerogatives, the MTRCB cannot act absolutely or whimsically. It must
act prudently. And it can do so ONLY if it exercizes its powers of review and prohibition according to
a standard and/or a limit.
I believe that the phrase "with a dangerous tendency" in Sec. 3-c of P.D. 1986 should be struck
down as an unconstitutional standard. This is martial law vintage and should be replaced with the
more libertarian "clear and present danger rule" which is eloquently esplained by JJ. Kapunan, Puno
and Mendoza (and which explanation I shall not repeat here).
Having said that, may I respectfully point out however that there is an even more appropriate
standard in thePhilippine context proffered by the law itself, and that is "contemporary Philippine
cultural values." This standard under the law, should be used in determining whether a film or
video program is "(a) immoral, (b) indecent, (c) contrary to law and/or good custom, and (d)
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people." On the other hand, when
the question is whether the material being reviewed "encourages the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime" per the enumeration contained in Sec. 3-c, the "clear and present danger" principle
should be applied as the standard in place of the "dangerous tendency" rule.
Just a word edgewise about cultural values. Our cultural ideals and core values of galang,
pagbabahala, pananagutan, balikatan, malasakit, asal, halaga, diwa, damdamin, dangal, kapwa,
pakikitungo, hiya, delikadesa, awa, tiwala, maka-Diyos, maka-tao, maka-buhay and so forth, define us
as a people, as Filipinos. We are who and what we are because of these values and ideals. They
delimit the areas of individual and social behavior and conduct deemed acceptable or tolerable, and
ultimately they determine the way we as individuals uniquely conduct our relationships and
express ourselves. According to Mr. Justice Kapunan, applying contemporary Filipino values to
religious thought and expression will permit an "overarching" into a constitutionally protected
area, and provides the MTRCB with a veiled excuse for clamping down against unorthodox religious
thought and expression. But such fear is highly speculative and totally unsupported by empirical
evidence. I would like to add that where a mode of religious expression runs counter to such core
values, serious questions have to be raised about the ultimate redeeming worth of such expression.
An example is in order. Not too long ago, the so-called "Children of God" blew into town, and, under
the guise of proselytizing, practised "flirty-fishing" (free sex). I wonder how many of us will simply
sit on our hands if these "Children" were to telecast their religious programs for OUR children to
watch, or conduct seminars over the airwaves on the hows of free sex . . . Another example: satanic
cults involve blood sacrifices . . . In brief, I am in agreement with the ponencia that the practice of
religion cannot be totally abandoned to the market place and governed by the policy of laissez faire.
Validity of MTRCB's Internal Rule
FOURTH. Anent the validity of Sec. 4 of the Board's Rules and Regulation authorizing MTRCB to
prohibit the showing of materials "which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed or
religion . . .", I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug that the phrase "contrary to law" in Sec. 3-c "should be
read together with other existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 201, which prohibit the exhibition of shows that 'offend another race or
religion.'" Indeed, where it can be shown that there is a clear and present danger that a religious
program could agitate or spark a religious strife of such extent and magnitude as to be injurious to
the general welfare, the Board may "X-rate" it or delete such portions as may reasonably be
necessary. The debilitating armed conflicts in Bosnia, Northern Ireland and in some Middle East
countries due to exacerbated religious antagonisms should be enough lesson for all of us. Religious
wars can be more ravaging and damaging than ordinary crimes. If it is legal and in fact
praiseworthy to prevent the commission of, say, the felony of murder in the name of public welfare
why should the prevention of a crime punishable by Art. 201 of the Penal Code be any less legal and
less praiseworthy.
I note, in this connection, the caveat raised by the ponencia that the MTRCB Rule bans shows which
"attack" a religion, whereas Art. 201 merely penalize; those who exhibit programs which "offend"
such religion. Subject to changing the word "attack" with the more accurate "offend". I believe
Section 4 of the Rules can stand.
In sum, I respectfully submit (1) that P.D. 1986 is constitutional, subject to the substitution (or
interpretation) of the words "dangerous tendency" with the phrase (or as meaning) "clear and
present danger" in Sec. 3-c: and (2) that Sec. 4 of the Board's Rules would be likewise valid,
providcd the words "constitute an attack" are changed with "offend"
B. WAS THE BANNING OF THE IGLESIA
PROGRAMS PROPER?
We now come to the immediate question: Did the respondent Board correctly apply Section 3 of
P.D. 1986 in prohibiting the public telecasting of the Iglesia program. In short, did the INC series
"offend" a religion? Juridically stated, did the respondent MTRCB use "contemporary Filipino
cultural values" in determining that said series offended another religion such as to constitute a
clear and present danger of a religions strife which is injurious to public welfare? [Note: I advisedly
used both the "values" and "clear and present" standards in framing the question because the INC
program was apparently "x-rated" for being both "contrary to law" and violative of Art. 201, a
"crime".]
Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question directly because the tape in question was never
submitted to the Court for viewing. Neither was there a detailed description of its objectionable
contents in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. Nor is there extant
a detailed justification prepared by respondent Board on why it banned the program - other than
its bare conclusion that the material constituted an attack against the Catholic and Protestant
religions.
In no wise can the "remarks" in the voting slips presented before the trial court be considered
sufficient justification for banning the showing of any material.
In the face of such inadequacy of evidence and basis, I see no way that this Court could authorize a
suppression of a species of the freedom of speech on the say-so of anyone - not even of the MRTCB.
Paraphrasing People v.Fernando,
9
the disputable presumption (which is of statutory origin) that
official duties have been regularly performed must yield to the constitutionally enshrined freedoms
of expression and of religion. If courts are required to state the factual and legal bases of their
conclusions and judicial dispositions, with more reason must quasi-judicial officers such as censors,
especially when they curtail a fundamental right which is "entitled to the highest priority and
amplest protection."
FOR THIS REASON AND THIS REASON ALONE, i.e., that the respondent Board failed to justify its
conclusion thru the use of the proper standards that the tapes in question offended another
religion, I vote to GRANT the petition insofar as it prays for the showing of said programs. However,
I vote to DENY the petition insofar as allowing the INC to show its pretaped programs without first
submitting them forreview by the MTRCB.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it removes the ban against the showing of petitioner's
TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119 and 121. However, I disagree with that part of the majority
opinion which upholds the power of respondent Board to subject to prior restraint petitioner's
religious television programs.
It should by now be undisputably recognized and firmly rooted in this country that there can be no
prior restraints on the exercise of free speech expression or religion unless such exercise poses a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right and even the duty to prevent.
The ban against such prior restraints will result, as it has resulted in the past, in occasional abuses
of free speech and expression but it is immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional
abuses of speech and expression than to arm a governmental administrative agency with the
authority to censor speech and expression in accordance with legislativev standards which albeit
apparently laudable in their nature, can very well be bent or stretched by such agency to
convenient latitudes as to frustrate and eviscerate the precious freedoms of speech and expression.
Besides, any person who may feel aggrieved by the exercise of free speech, expression and religion,
is afforded, under our system, the remedy of redress in the courts of law, justice and equity.
In short, it is far better for the individual to live in a climate of free speech and free expression,
devoid of prior restraints, even at the risk of occasional excesses of such freedoms than to exist in
an ambiance of censorship which is always a step closer to autocracy and dictatorship.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision to allow the showing of certain video tapes of petitioner's program, "Ang
Iglesia Ni Cristo," and for this purpose to reverse the contrary ruling of the Court of Appeals. I am
constrained to file this separate opinion, however, because, while the majority opinion invokes
general principles of free speech and religion to which I subscribe, it regrettably fails to apply these
principles to the law (P.D. No. 1986 and its implementing rules) under which the Board has acted.
My position will be spelled out presently but, in brief, it is this: Censorship may be allowed only in
anarrow class of cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and danger to national security.
Even in these cases, only courts can prohibit the showing of a film or the broadcast of a program. In
all other cases, the only remedy against speech which creates a clear and present danger to public
interests is through subsequent punishment. Considering the potentiality for harm which motion
pictures and TV programs may have especially on the young, all materials may validly be required
to be submitted for review before they may be shown or broadcast. However, the final
determination of the character of the materials cannot be left to an administrative agency. That
judicial review of administrative action is available does not obviate the constitutional objection to
censorship. For these reasons, I would hold 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which gives to the Board limited
time for review, to be valid, while finding 3(c), under which the Board acted in this case in
censoring petitioner's materials, to be, on its face and as applied, unconstitutional.
I. "At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be . . . no
previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings, unless there be a clear
and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent."
1
"Because of the
preferred character of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and expression, a weighty
presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms."
2

Authoritative interpretations of the free speech clause consider as invalid two types of prior
restraints, namely, those which are imposed prior to the dissemination of any matter and those
imposed prior to an adequate determination that the expression is not constitutionally protected.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put the matter, "[A] prohibited "prior restraint" is not limited to
the suppression of a thing before it is released to the public. Rather, an invalid prior restraint is an
infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate matters that are ordinarily protected by
the first amendment without there first being a judicial determination that the material does not
qualify for first amendment protection."
3

Our own cases furnish illustrations of these types of prior restraints. In Ayer Productions
Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong,
4
we held that an injunction stopping the production of a documentary film was
an invalid prior restraint on freedom of speech and of expression. In Mutuc v. COMELEC,
5
we struck
down, also as an invalid prior restraint, a COMELEC rule prohibiting the use in political campaigns
of taped jingles blared through loudspeakers which were mounted on mobile units. "[T]he
constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances."
6

On the other hand, the fact that the material may have seen print or been taped, as in the case of the
TV series in question, cannot justify restriction on its circulation in the absence of a judicial
determination that the material does not constitute protected expression. In Sotto v. Ruiz, we
denied finality to the authority of the Director of Posts to exclude newspapers and other
publications from the mails "since whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal
question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be
subject to revision by the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded authority."
8

II. P.D. No . 1986, 3(b) requires motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials to be
submitted to the Board for review, while 7 makes it unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or
cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theater or public place or by television any motion
picture, television program or publicity material unless it has been approved by the Board. Anyone
who violates the prohibition is liable to prosecution and, in case of conviction, to punishment by
imprisonment ranging from 3 months and 1 day to 1 year, plus a fine of not less than P50,000.00
but not more than P100,000.00. In addition, the moviehouse, theater or television station violating
the provision faces a revocation of its license.
9

In Burstyn v. Wilson,
10
it was held that expression by means of motion pictures -- and, it may be
added, by means of television broadcasts - is included in the free speech and free press guarantee of
the Constitution. This ruling is now part our constitutional law, which has assimilated into the
constitutional guarantee not only motion pictures but also radio and television shows because of
the importance of movie, radio and television both as a vehicle of communication and as a medium
of expression.
11

Does 3(b) impermissibly impose a prior restraint because of its requirement that films and TV
programs must be submitted to the Board for review before they can be shown or broadcast? In my
view it does not. The Burstyncase, in declaring motion pictures to be protected under the free
expression clause, was careful to add: "It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places . . . Nor does it
follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other
particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems."
12
With
reference to television, this Court is on record that "a less liberal approach calls for observance.
This is so because unlike motion pictures where patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a [TV]
set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of programs therein shown. . . . [T]he State
as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young."
13

While newspapers may not be required to submit manuscripts for review as a condition for their
publication, except during wartime, such a requirement is justified when applied to motion pictures
or television programs (other than newsreels and commentaries) because of unique considerations
involved in their operation. "First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence
in the livesof all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available
to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or
viewer is constantly tuning in and out."
14
The State may thus constitutionally require the advance
submission of all films and TV programs as a means
of enabling it effectively to bar the showing of unprotected films and TV programs.
15

For these reasons, I hold 3(b) to be a valid exercise of the State's power to protect legitimate
public interests. The purpose of this restraint - temporary in character -- is to allow the Board time
to screen materials and to seek an injunction from the courts against those which it believes to be
harmful.
III. I reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to 3(c). This provision authorizes the
Board to prohibit, among other things, the exhibition or broadcast of motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials which, in its opinion, are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
[which have] a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime," such as the following:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against
the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government and/or the duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or
pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any
person, whether living or dead; and
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal,
or pertain to matters which are sub judice in nature.
Under this authority, the Board can determine what can be shown or broadcast and what cannot. It
is not true, as the Board claims, that under P.D. No. 1986 its power is limited to the classification of
motion pictures and TV programs. The power to classify includes the power to censor. The Board
can x-rate films and TV programs and thus ban their public exhibition or broadcast. And once it
declares that a motion picture or television program is, for example, indecent or contrary to law, as
in the case of the INC program in question, its declaration becomes the law. Unless the producer or
exhibitor is willing to go to court, shouldering not only the burden of showing that his movie or
television program is constitutionally protected but also the cost of litigation, the ban stays.
16
This
is censorship in its baldest form. This is contrary to the fundamental tenet of our law that until and
unless speech is found by the courts to be unprotected its expression must be allowed.
In an effort to save this provision from constitutional attack, it is alleged that the TV program in
question was disallowed pursuant to the rules of the Board which prohibit the showing of motion
pictures or TV programs containing "malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or religion." It is
contended that this rule impermissibly broadens the prohibition in 3(c), because this ground
("malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or religion") is not among those provided therein.
However, 3(c) gives the Board authority to stop the showing of motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials which are "contrary to law," and Art. 201(2) (b) (3) of the Revised
Penal Code makes it a crime for anyone to exhibit "shows which offend any race or religion." It is
true that Art. 201 (2) (b) (3) refers to subsequent punishment, whereas we are dealing here with
prior restraint. However, by authorizing the censorship of materials which in the opinion of the
Board are "contrary to law," 3(c) makes what is only a ground for subsequent punishment also a
ground for prior restraint on expression. It is 3(c) of P.D. No. 1986, and not only the rules
implementing it, which is unconstitutional.
1
7
While I think the Board may be granted the power to preview materials, it is only for the purpose of
enabling the Board to decide whether to seek their prohibition by the court in the interest of
safeguarding morality, good order and public safety, considering the pervasive influence of
broadcast media compared to that of the print media. But concern with possible deleterious effects
of movies and television shows cannot and should not be allowed to overshadow the equally
important concern for freedom of expression and blind us to the danger of leaving the ultimate
determination of what expression is protected and what is not to a board of censors. The protection
of the youth should be in the first place the concern of parents, schools and other institutions. I do
not think that society is so morally impoverished that we have to draw on a group of censors for
ultimate moral lesson and leading.
If we have to call on the assistance of any agency at all, it must be the courts.
18
There are many
reasons why a system of prior restraint (in those cases where it may validly be imposed) may only
be administered by judges. First is that the censor's bias is to censor. Second is that "only a
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression."
19
As has been observed, "Central to the first amendment due process is the notion that
a judicial rather than an administrative determination of the character of the speech is necessary. . .
. [C]ourts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected."
20
Third, the
members of the Board do not have the security of tenure and of fiscal autonomy necessary to secure
their independence.
Indeed, I cannot understand why, after ruling that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies,
21
this Court
should be willing to leave the valuation of that priceless commodity - expression, whether by means
of motion picture or television - to administrative agencies with only occasional review by the
courts. The trend may be toward greater delegation of judicial authority to administrative agencies
in matters requiring technical knowledge and as a means of relieving courts of cases which such
agencies can very well attend to.
22
There is no justification, however, for such delegation in the
area of our essential freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, where "only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding [can] ensure the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression."
23

We have witnessed such distinct possibility in the past to need any more lesson in the future to
make us realize the danger of leaving freedom of expression and religion - the essential freedom of
the mind - in the care of an administrative agency.
To the extent therefore that P.D. No. 1986, 3(c) vests in the Board the final authority to determine
whether expression by motion picture or television is constitutionally protected, I find it
unconstitutional.
IV. The majority limit themselves to a determination of the correctness of the Board's finding that
the video tapes in question contain attacks on the Catholic religion, I find it difficult to pass upon
this question because the contents of the tapes are not in the record of this case.
24
The trial court
ruled that the tapes contain no attack against any religion but only a discussion of the doctrines
which the Iglesia Ni Cristo believes embody "superior and self evident truth." On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court, found that the tapes "offend by verbal abuse other
religions" and are for that reason "indecent and contrary to good customs" within the meaning of
P.D. No, 1986, 3(c). Neither court, however, had any evidence to support its conclusions, because
this case was submitted by the parties solely on the basis of memoranda. What the majority of this
Court call facts (pp. 16-17) are simply the opinions of members of the Board that the video tapes
contain attacks on the Catholic religion.
There are no facts on which to base judgment on this question. Even if there are, the clear and
present danger test is inapplicable. To be sure, in Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak this Court said:
[W]here the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned -- included as they are in freedom of
expression - censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable
only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
25

The clear and present danger test has been devised for use in criminal prosecutions for violations of
laws punishing certain types of utterances.
26
While the test has been applied to the regulation of
the use of streets and
parks
2
7 -- surely a form of prior restraint - its use in such context can be justified on the ground
that the content of the speech is not the issue. But when the regulation concerns not the time, place
or manner of speech but its content (i.e., it is content-based) the clear and present danger test
simply cannot be applied. This is because a determination whether an utterance has created a clear
and present danger to public interests requires a factual record.
The test itself states that the question in every case is "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent."
28
However it may have been
reformulated in later cases, the test essentially requires that the causal connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended be evident.
29
But how can this be shown unless the speech is first
allowed? It is not enough that the tapes have been made and only their broadcast banned. What
about the audience reaction to the tapes? Even if we know what the tapes in this case contain, we
cannot determine whether their public broadcast would create a clear and present danger to public
interests. The censorship board, trying to determine whether to issue a permit, must necessarily
speculate on impact which the words will have since the context in which they will be uttered - the
audience, the occasion, and the place - is totally lacking in the record. It is then forced to apply a
lesser standard of proof in deciding whether to impose a restraint on speech.
The majority claim that there is no need for a factual record in order to find that the Board in this
case exceeded its powers in disallowing the TV series in question. They argue that "acts of prior
restraint are hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brews.
It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
heavy burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. . . . In the case at bar, respondent board did
nothing to rebut the presumption." (p. 17)
That, however, is precisely the problem with the censorship law. It in effect places on the producer
or exhibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that his film or program is constitutionally
protected. To paraphrase Sotto v. Ruiz, which the majority cite as authority for sustaining the
validity of 3(c), "Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of [the agency's]
action."
30
The Board would have this burden of justification if, as I believe it should, is made to go to
court instead and justify the banning of a film or TV program. That is why 3(c) should be
invalidated. One cannot defend the validity of the law and at the same time contend that in any
court proceeding for the review of the Board's decision the burden of justifying the ban should be
on the Board.
The teaching of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak simply comes down to this: that the standard for
judging the validity of prior restraint on political expression is stricter than that for adjudging
restraints on materials alleged to be obscene, but not that the test of clear and present danger is
applicable in determining whether or not a permit may be granted.
In Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak
31
this Court echoed Justice Douglas's plea that "every writer, actor, or
producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." For
indeed the full flowering of local artistic talents and the development of the national intelligence
can take place only in a climate of free expression. A film producer, faced with the prospect of losing
on his investment as a result of the banning of his movie production, may well find himself
compelled to submit to the wishes of the Board or practice self-censorship. The expression of
unpopular opinions, whether religious, political or otherwise is imperilled under such a system.
We have long ago done away with controls on the print media, it is time we did the same with the
control on broadcast media, which for so long operated under restraints,
32
leaving the punishment
for violations of laws to be dealt with by subsequent prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare 3(2) of P.D. No. 1986 unconstitutional and to reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals, except in so far as it sustains the grant of power to the Board to
preview materials for showing or broadcast, consistent with my view that 3(b) is valid.

MELO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The enjoyment of the freedom of religion is always coupled with the freedom of expression. For the
profession of faith inevitably carries with it as a necessary appendage, the prerogative of
propagation. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship thus denotes the right to disseminate religious information (American Bible Society vs.
City of Manila 101 Phil. 386 [1957]). Any prior restriction upon a religious expression would be a
restriction on the right of religion. We recognize the role and the deep influence that religion plays
in our community. No less than the fundamental law of the land acknowledges the elevating
influence of religion by imploring the aid of almighty God to build a just and humane society. Any
restriction that is to be placed upon this right must be applied with greatest caution.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that the Iglesia ni Cristo as an established religious
organization has been well with us for almost a century, with several millions of following quite a
number of imposing and elegantly constructed cathedrals and hundreds of chapels spread in many
parts of the country, injecting profound influence not only in the social and political aspect of the
community but upon its moral values as well. Respect must be afforded a well-established church,
especially on matters concerning morality and decency lest no concept of morality could ever be
accepted with deference. Such preeminence in the community deserves no less than the confident
expectation that it will act in accordance with its avowed mission of promoting religious guidance
and enlightenment. Its religious programs must be accorded the presumption that the same will
instill moral values that would be beneficial to its adherents and followers, and perhaps to the
community in general. The contrary must not be presumed. Its television programs, therefore,
should not be equated with ordinary movies and television shows which MTRCB is bound by the
law to monitor for possible abuse. One must recognize the power of State to protect its citizenry
from the danger of immorality and indecency motivated by the selfish desire of media
entrepreneurs to accumulate more wealth, or of bogus religious groups, for that matter, to mislead
and beguile the unlettered and uninformed. But considering all these circumstances, I see no cogent
reason for the application of such power to the present case.
Freedom of religion and expression is the rule and its restriction, the exception. Any prior
restriction on the exercise of the freedom to profess religious faith and the propagation thereof will
unduly diminish that religion's authority to spread what it believes to be the sacred truth. The State
can exercise no power to restrict such right until the exercise thereof traverses the point that will
endanger the order of civil society. Thus we have ruled in the case of Ebralinag vs. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (219 SCRA 270 [1993]):
The sole justification for a given restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the state has the right and duty to prevent.
Correspondingly, the MTRCB has no authority to use as standard, the dangerous tendency rule,
which we have long abandoned and for which reason, the dangerous tendency standard under
Subparagraph C, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1986 has no place in our statute books.
I therefore, vote to grant the petition.

VITUG, J., dissenting:
I agree with those who support the view that religious freedom occupies an exalted position in our
hierarchy of rights and that the freedom to disseminate religious information is a constitutionally-
sanctioned prerogative that allows any legitimate religious denomination a free choice of media in
the propagation of its credo. Like any other right, however, the exercise of religious belief is not
without inherent and statutory limitations.
The Board disapproved the exhibition of a series of television programs of petitioner on the ground
that they tend to "offend and constitute an attack against other religions." An opinion has been
expressed that the non-inclusion in Section 3 of P.D. 1986 of an "attack against any religion," as a
standard for classification, and so the deletion of the phrase "offensive to other religions" found in
the old censorship law (Executive Order No. 876), should be clear enough to manifest a legislative
intent "to do away with the standard." A reading of Section 3 of P.D. 1986 shows that the Board is
empowered to "screen, review and examine all . . . television programs" and to "approve or
disprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the . . . television broadcast of . . .
television programs . . . which, in the judgment of the BOARD (so) applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or
good customs . . . ." I believe that the phrase "contrary to law" should be read together with other
existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article
201, which prohibits the exhibition of shows that "offend another race or religion." I see in this
provision a good and sound standard. Recent events indicate recurrent violent incidents between
and among communities with diverse religious beliefs and dogma. The danger is past mere
apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and now prevalent in some parts of the world.
In order not to infringe constitutional principles, any restriction by the Board must, of course, be for
legitimate and valid reasons. I certainly do not think that prior censorship should altogether be
rejected just because sanctions can later be imposed. Regulating the exercise of a right is not
necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard and secure that right.
When I particularly ponder on the magnitude of the power of a television set, I find it more prudent
to have a deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived to be contrary to decency, morality,
good customs or the law until, at least, the courts are given an opportunity to pass upon the matter
than rely merely on the availability of retribution for actual injury sustained. A delay is not too high
a price to pay for a possible damage to society that may well tum out to be incalculable and lasting.
In this instance, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I concur in the result of the majority's decision reversing that of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it set aside the action of respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115,
119 and 121, with due respect, I cannot agree with its opinion that respondent Board of Review for
Motion pictures and Television (now MTRCB) has the power to review petitioner's TV program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." The religious TV program enjoys the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of
religion,
1
and of speech and
expression.,
2
and cannot be subject to prior restraint by the Board by virtue of its powers and
functions under Section 3 of P.D. 1986 which provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television
programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-
theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or
produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export.
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
Injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime, such as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic
and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence and pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and
reputation of any person, whether living or dead; and,
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-
judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are subjudice in nature.
Under the aforequoted provisions, the MTRCB, while nominally a classification board, is granted the
power not only to classify, but also to approve or disapprove/prohibit exhibition of film or
television broadcasts of motion pictures and TV programs.
The freedom to disseminate religious information is a right protected by the free exercise clause of
the Constitution. It encompasses a wide range of ideas and takes many forms. In the process of
enlightening the adherents or convincing non-believers of the truth of its beliefs, a religious sect or
denomination is allowed the free choice of utilizing various media, including pulpit or podium,
print, television film, and the electronic mail.
The broad latitude of freedom afforded by the free exercise clause is an historic outgrowth of our
country's twin colonial experiences: our forefathers' aversion against the Spanish colonial
government's interference with religious belief and practice and the transplantation of American
Constitutional thinking into the mainstream of our political life, which brought with it the ideas of
Protestant dissent and humanistic rationalism dominant in the debates of the American
Constitutional Convention. These two poles conjoined to place the individual conscience beyond the
coercive power of government. Involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator, respect
for the inviolability of conscience lay at the core of the free exercise clauses in our Constitutions
from 1935 to 1987.
3

It is, therefore, settled that religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to the highest priority
and amplest protection among human rights. Because of its exalted position in our hierarchy of civil
rights, the realm of religious belief is generally insulated from state action, and state interference
with such belief is allowed only in extreme cases.
Free exercise encompasses all shades of expression of religious belief. It includes the right to
preach, proselyte and to perform other similar functions.
4
As oftentimes these aspects of the free
exercise clause fall within areas affected by government regulation, the importance of religious
freedom is such that the state must make special provisions to relieve religious liberty from
restrictions imposed by generally legitimate government regulations
5
Commenting on religious
freedom and other freedoms of conscience, this Court held in Reyes v. Bagatsing
6
that:
[O]n the judiciary -- even more so than on the other departments -- rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course dispense with what
has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales
of justice on the side of such rights.
7

Even before film and television achieved the power and influence it has gained in the last few
decades, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Burtsyn v. Wilson,
8
conceded that movies were a
significant medium for the dissemination of ideas, affecting "public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from the direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes artistic expression."
9
The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that the significance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not diluted by the fact that
films are "designed to entertain as well as to inform,"
10
thus, recognizing that motion pictures fell
within the sphere of constitutionally protected speech and expression. Responding to the question
of censorship in the context of film as protected expression, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of
Freedman v. Maryland
11
held that:
The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar
dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a
censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor.
Because the censor's business is to censor, there is an inherent danger that he may
be less responsive than a court part of an independent branch of government -- to
constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
12

In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
13
this Court held that any restraint on the right to
disseminate religious information "can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent."
14
Affirming the use of this "clear and present danger" standard in
cases involving religious freedom and worship, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee warned
that "[t]he sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent."
15

Religious freedom is not of course an absolute right. However, given its exalted position in our
hierarchy of civil rights, the essence of all that has been said and written about the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance claims to
free exercise of religion.
16
In a highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest situation
endangering paramount govemmental interests give occasion for permissible limitation. And even
in such rare cases, government may justify an inroad into religious liberty only by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling state interest. A facially neutral regulation
apparently evenhandedly applied to all religious sects and denominations would be constitutionally
suspect when it imposes an undue burden on the exercise of religious freedom. "Rules are rules" is
not by itself a sufficient justification for infringing religious liberty.
1
7
It is my submission that the government, under the guise of its regulatory powers in the censorship
law (P.D. 1986 and its corresponding implementing rules and regulations), does not have the power
to interfere with the exercise of religious expression in film or television by requiring the
submission of the video tapes of petitioner's religious program before their public viewing, absent a
showing of a compelling state interest that overrides the constitutional protection of the freedom of
expression and worship. Even if government can demonstrate a compelling state interest, it would
only burden such fundamental right like the free exercise of religion by the least intrusive means
possible.
18
There is no demonstration here of any sufficient state interest to justify the
infringement.
In any case, petitioner's religious programs, which in their very essence and characterization are
the exercise of religious freedom, cannot possibly come under the category of the objectionable
matters enumerated in Section 3(c) of P.D. 1986 or analogous thereto. It is not likely that
propagation of religion which has been spoken of as "a profession of faith that binds and elevates
man to his Creator"
19
will involve pornography excessive violence or danger to national security.
Significantly, the enumeration in Section 3(c) does not include the standard "attack against any
religion" as among those considered objectionable and subject to censorship. Respondents justify
this omission by stating that any form of expression "contrary to law" could be subject to regulation
because the enumeration is in any case not exclusive, and that the phrase "contrary to law" should,
in the Solicitor General's words in behalf of respondents, be construed "in relation to Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code which proscribes the exhibition of shows that "offend any race or
religion."
20
Respondents moreover argue that the Rules and Regulations of the MTRCB issued
pursuant to P.D. 1986 in any case explicitly furnish the standard left out in the enumeration when it
provides:
Sec. 4. GOVERNING STANDARD. -- a) The BOARD shall judge the motion pictures
and television programs and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as
standard contemporary Filipino cultural values to abate what are legally
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philipines or its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime
such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vii) Those which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed, or religion as
distinguished from individual members thereof; . . .
There are several reasons why I cannot agree with respondent Board's contention that it may add
the standard "attack against any religion" among those enumerated by P.D. 1986. While the law's
enumeration is concededly not exclusive, inclusion of other standards should be made in the strict
context of the words "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs." Specific standards
following a general enumeration cannot go beyond the scope of the latter.
In the first place, the word "indecent" in censorship law has a narrow meaning, confined to
obscenity regulation.
12
It cannot be conveniently employed as a catch-all term embracing all forms
of expression considered noxious by the Board. On the other hand, "contrary to law," had particular
significance in the old censorship laws because those laws explicitly included anything "offensive to
other religions" among their enumerated standards. In the light of what the Solicitor General
describes as the "transitional" nature of P.D. 1986, the better view would be that the omission of
"attack against any religion" among the enumerated standards was intentional and part of the
evolving process of fashioning a system of strict classification of films and television programs as
opposed to censorship. As this phrase was ubiquitous in the old censorship laws (particularly E.O.
868 and E.O. 876), its elimination in P.D. 1986 expresses the manifest intention of the law-making
authority to do away with the standard. This view is supported by the Executive Branch itself,
through the Opinion of then Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales who stated, when the case came up
before his office for review, that:
[T]he question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the
subject television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of
Section 3, paragraph (c) of P.D. 1986, which is substantially the same as the
provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards for censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or a wrong" as
determined by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard". As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television
program to "previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious
program" makes mention of beliefs and practices of other religion". On the face of
the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by the
Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within
the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law.
22

Additionally, the phrase "contrary to law" cannot and should not be understood to refer to Article
201
23
of the Revised Penal Code, as respondents mistakenly suggest. Article 201 deals with the
subject of subsequent punishment; P.D. 1986 clearly treats with an altogether different matter --
prior restraint and censorship. The two laws stand at opposite poles in the continuum of regulation
and punishment.
Thus, the censor's cut poses a peculiar danger because it altogether skirts time-honored judicial
tests and standards utilized in determining those forms of expression that fall within the area of
protected speech or expression, and because, as between prior restraints and the subsequent
sanctions meted after proof of violation of specific penal statutes, the former prevents the speech or
expression from entering the marketplace of ideas.
24
That is exactly the effect of the orders assailed
by petitioner in the instant case. More significantly, under the specific facts and circumstances of
the case confronting us, what is sought to be kept out of the marketplace of ideas is not only
ordinary speech or expression, two constitutional values which already enjoy primacy among our
civil rights, but also religious speech or expression utilizing the medium of television.
It is claimed that the provisions of P.D. 1986 in any case provide for a neutral standard applicable to
all religious sects and denominations. I cannot agree. The "neutrality" standard has been raised in
numerous free exercise cases before the courts, the most recent having been the Flag Salute
cases.
25
However, a regulation neutral on its face poses free exercise problems when it creates or
has the potential of imposing undue burdens on religion. "Democratic government acts to reinforce
the generally accepted values of a given society and not merely the fundamental ones which relate
to its political structure."
26
Facially neutral standards are a facet of prevailing concensus. The old
flag salute cases are testaments to the natural preference for the prevailing political and social
morality over the religious liberty of minorities. The prevalent view tends to impose its idea of what
is religious and what is not over and above the protests of the other religions, sects and
denominations.
2
7 Applying "contemporary Filipino standards" and values (the general test in P.D.
1986) to religious thought and expression allows an "overarching" into a constitutionally protected
area and potentially would simply provide the Board with a veiled excuse for clamping down
against unorthodox religious thought and expression. Measured in terms of the historic purpose of
the guarantee, the free exercise provision in our Constitution not only insulates religion against
governmental power, but when taken together with the Establishment clause, affords protection to
religious minorities by preventing the use of that power in imposing the majority's will.
We are faced with a case of censorship and restraint which, I stated earlier, touches upon one of the
most private and sensitive of domains: the realm of religious freedom, thought and expression. In
this domain, sharp differences may arise such that the tenets of one individual may seem the
"rankest error" to his neighbor.
28
In the process of persuading others about the validity of his point
of view, the preacher sometimes resorts to exaggeration and vilification. However, the
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication
falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of censors.
29
Even if the
exercise of the liberties protected by the speech, expression and religion clauses of our Constitution
are regarded as neither absolute nor unlimited, there are appropriate laws which deal with such
excesses. The least restrictive alternative would be to impose subsequent sanctions for proven
violations of laws, rather than inflict prior restraints on religious expression.
Our penal law punishes libel, or acts or speeches offensive to other religions, and awards damages
whenever warranted. In our legal scheme, courts essentially remain the arbiters of the
controversies affecting the civil and political rights of persons. It is our courts which determine
whether or not certain forms of speech and expression have exceeded the bounds of correctness,
propriety or decency as to fall outside the area of protected speech. In the meantime, the liberties
protected by the speech and expression and free exercise clauses are so essential to our society that
they should be allowed to flourish unobstructed and unmolested.
30

The majority opinion professes fealty to freedom of religion which it openly admits, has been
accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, and affirms that "(D)eeply
ensconced in our fundamental
law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech."
31
The majority
then adds pointedly that "acts of prior restraint are hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brews. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this heavy burden, its acts of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar."
32

And yet, the majority at the same time would grant MTRCB the power to review the TV religious
programs because "with its expertise," it "can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law."
33
The majority thus would uphold the power of the Board as an
administrative body with quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs, citing with
favor the 1921 decision of this Court in Sotto vs. Ruiz
34
wherein it was held that:
As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication
contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and
involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is
in favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases
coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States
Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the
Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong.
I share with Justice Mendoza's view that the majority's pronouncement would in effect place on the
producer or exhibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that his film or program is
constitutionally protected. This throws overboard the fundamental tenet that any act that restrains
speech is presumed invalid and it is the burden of the censor to overthrow this presumption. In the
context of the present case, if the Board disapproves a TV religious program or deletes a portion
thereof, it is the exhibitor or producer who will go to court to prove that the Board is wrong and the
court will not interfere with the Board's decision unless it can be clearly shown that it is wrong,
following the ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz.
The majority's ruling, I am afraid, constitutes a threat to constitutionally protected speech and
expression and supplants a judicjal standard for determining constitutionally protected speech and
expression with the censor's standard. The heavy burden on the imposition of prior restraints is
shifted away from the state by imposing upon the exhibitor the obligation of proving that the
religious programs fall within the realm of protected expression. This leaves the exhibitor with only
two unwanted options: either 1) he himself deletes the portions which he anticipates the Board
might possibly object to prior to submission to that body and thereby obtains the censor's nod, or
2) submits the Video tapes in their entirety and risks disapproval or deletion, in which case he may
go to court and show that the Video tapes contain constitutionally protected speech and expression.
In the first situation, the message loses its essence and substance. The second scenario may entail
tremendous amount of money, time and effort in a prolonged litigation. Either case constitutes
grievous assault on the freedom of speech and religion.
The ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz cannot be invoked as authority to allow MTRCB to review petitioner's TV
programs. In that case, the Court held that the Acting Director of the Bureau of Posts is vested with
authority to determine what mail matter is obscene, lewd, filthy or libelous, pursuant to Section
1954 of the old Administrative Code which provides, among others, that no lewd, lascivious, filthy,
indecent or libelous character shall be deposited in, or carried by, the mails of the Philippine Island,
or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts. Petitioner's
programs which are televised in the exercise of freedom of worship cannot be placed in the
category of the printed matter proscribed in the old Administrative Code. Freedom of worship is
such a precious commodity in our hierarchy of civil liberties that it cannot be derogated
peremptorily by an administrative body or officer who determines, without judicial safeguards,
whether or not to allow the exercise of such freedom.
The rights of free expression and free exercise of religion occupy a unique and special place in our
constellation of civil rights. The primacy our society accords these freedoms determines the mode it
chooses to regulate their expression. But the idea that an ordinary statute or decree could, by its
effects, nullify both the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression puts an ominous gloss on
these liberties. Censorship law as a means of regulation and as a form of prior restraint is anathema
to a society which places high significance to these values.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I vote to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:
I think the basic issues in this case are:
A. What is the statutory extent and the constitutional limitation of the powers of the Movies and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)? More specifically, does the MTRCB have the
power to prohibit/ censor television shows?
B. In banning the television showing of the Iglesia ni Cristo videotape series, did the respondent
Board exercise its powers correctly and properly?
The first question deals with the general legal concepts and principles underlying the functions and
prerogatives of the MTRCB while the second calls for a juridical evaluation of the specific act of the
Board in classifying as "X" (or not for public viewing) specific pre-taped or canned programs,
identified as Series 115, 119, 121 and 128, for the reason that they allegedly constituted an "attack
against another religion." The first involves doctrine; the second, application.
A. EXTENT AND LIMIT OF
MTRCB'S POWERS
The statutory powers of the MTRCB are set forth in Sec. 3 of P.D.
1986.
1

In implementing P.D. 1986. the MTRCB issued its own Rules and Regulations. At issue in this case is
Section 4
2
of such Rules.
On the other hand, these statutory powers and internally generated regulations are limited by the
Bill of Rights. Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the rights to free speech and religion.
Mr. Justice Mendoza connects the above constitutional rights with the present controversy by
saying that "expression . . . by means of television broadcast is included in the free speech and free
press guarantee of the Constitution" and by Mr. Justice Kapunan by writing that this "case uniquely
interphases questions of religious expression and censorship laws in the context of the
constitution's guarantees of freedom of religion and of speech and expression."
Here before us therefore is a classic constitutional law case wherein the inherent power of the state
to safeguard the peace, well-being and general welfare of the people collide and clash with the
constitutional rights of individuals and religious institutions to evangelize, preach, promote, teach,
and even proselytize.
Religious Freedom -- A Cherished Right
FIRST, I agree with the ponencia that "(f)reedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present." Religious freedom is absolute when it is
confined within the realm of thought to a private, personal relationship between a man's
conscience and his God, but it is subject to regulation when religious belief is transformed into
external acts that affect or afflict others. The mere invocation of religious freedom will not
stalemate the State and ipso facto render it incompetent in preserving the rights of others and in
protecting the general welfare.
MTRCB's Power to Review and to Censor is Valid
SECOND, I believe that as an agency of the State created to promote the general welfare, the MTRCB
under P.D. 1986 has the basic initiatory authority and power to -
"approve or disapprove,
delete objectionable portion from
and/or prohibit
the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast" of pre-taped or canned (as contra-distinguished from "live")
video-audio/film/television programs and publicity materials. I regret I cannot go along
with Mr. Justice Mendoza's avante garde thesis that Section 3-c of P.D. 1986, from where the
above-quoted words were taken, is "upon its face and as applied, unconstitutional." I note
the extensive materials, particularly from American cases, buttressing his cogent stand, but,
after reflection, prayer and discernment. I am thoroughly convinced that the situation in our
country, particularly the totality of our cultural and religious milieu is far different from that
in America.
Petitioner INC contends that the MTRCB's authority extends only to non-religious video materials
but not to religious programs, particularly those of INC, which it claims are neither "immoral" nor
"indecent". This position presents more problems than solutions. For who will determine whether a
given canned material is religious or not, and therefore whether it can be publicly exhibited or not
without its passing through the Board? I would prefer that the State, which is constitutionally
mandated to be neutral, continue to exercise the power to make such determination, rather than
leave it up to the producer, maker or exhibitor of such material, who/which, because of vested
interests would, in the normal course, be understandably biased in his/its own favor. I feel less
discomfort with the idea of maintaining the censors' quasi-judicial authority to review such film
materials, subject to appeal to the proper courts by aggrieved parties, than with the prospect and
consequences of doing away with such power altogether. I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug in finding "it
more prudent to have a deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived (by the Board) to be
contrary to decency, morality, good custom or the law until, at least, the courts are given an
opportunity to pass upon the matter . . ." A contrary ruling would most regrettably remove
meaningful and necessary safeguards against a veritable floodtide of prurient, violence-prone and
values-eroding television shows and programs.
In Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak
4
and Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans, Jr.,
5
this Court
early on acknowledged the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast and electronic media in the
lives of everyone, and the easy accessibility of television and radio to just about anyone, especially
children. Everyone is susceptible to their influence, even "the indifferent or unwilling who happen
to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set."
6
And these audiences have less opportunity
to cogitate, analyze and reject the utterances, compared to readers of printed material.
7
It is
precisely because the State as parens patriae is "called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young"
8
that I vote for the retention of the State's power of review and prohibition
via the MTRCB. High-minded idealism in the staunch defense of the much-vaunted freedoms cannot
but be admired. Yet, no matter how devoutly we may wish it, not all the people share the same
mindset and views nor, needless to say, the same viewpoint, i.e., the ivory tower window. Hence, we
must prudently anticipate that abuses against the public weal are likely to be committed where
absolute permissiveness is the norm. Would that, with the total absence of censorship or review,
there occur a significant increase in religious, spiritual or morally uplifting prime-time
programming! But realistically and pragmatically speaking, we see mostly the prospect of more
explicit sex-oriented advertising, unadulterated violence and outright pandering to phone-sex
addicts and the simply curious. The fact that even the Net is not free of pornographic slime is no
excuse to let down all reasonable barriers against broadcast media offerings of muck, moral
depravity and mayhem. And definitely, there is no good and sensible reason for the State to
abdicate its vital role as parens patriae, in the guise of copying American constitutional precedents,
which I respectfully submit, are inapplicable in our factual context and time.
MTRCB Must Use Constitutional Standard
THIRD. In exercising its prerogatives, the MTRCB cannot act absolutely or whimsically. It must
act prudently. And it can do so ONLY if it exercizes its powers of review and prohibition according to
a standard and/or a limit.
I believe that the phrase "with a dangerous tendency" in Sec. 3-c of P.D. 1986 should be struck
down as an unconstitutional standard. This is martial law vintage and should be replaced with the
more libertarian "clear and present danger rule" which is eloquently esplained by JJ. Kapunan, Puno
and Mendoza (and which explanation I shall not repeat here).
Having said that, may I respectfully point out however that there is an even more appropriate
standard in thePhilippine context proffered by the law itself, and that is "contemporary Philippine
cultural values." This standard under the law, should be used in determining whether a film or
video program is "(a) immoral, (b) indecent, (c) contrary to law and/or good custom, and (d)
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people." On the other hand, when
the question is whether the material being reviewed "encourages the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime" per the enumeration contained in Sec. 3-c, the "clear and present danger" principle
should be applied as the standard in place of the "dangerous tendency" rule.
Just a word edgewise about cultural values. Our cultural ideals and core values of galang,
pagbabahala, pananagutan, balikatan, malasakit, asal, halaga, diwa, damdamin, dangal, kapwa,
pakikitungo, hiya, delikadesa, awa, tiwala, maka-Diyos, maka-tao, maka-buhay and so forth, define us
as a people, as Filipinos. We are who and what we are because of these values and ideals. They
delimit the areas of individual and social behavior and conduct deemed acceptable or tolerable, and
ultimately they determine the way we as individuals uniquely conduct our relationships and
express ourselves. According to Mr. Justice Kapunan, applying contemporary Filipino values to
religious thought and expression will permit an "overarching" into a constitutionally protected
area, and provides the MTRCB with a veiled excuse for clamping down against unorthodox religious
thought and expression. But such fear is highly speculative and totally unsupported by empirical
evidence. I would like to add that where a mode of religious expression runs counter to such core
values, serious questions have to be raised about the ultimate redeeming worth of such expression.
An example is in order. Not too long ago, the so-called "Children of God" blew into town, and, under
the guise of proselytizing, practised "flirty-fishing" (free sex). I wonder how many of us will simply
sit on our hands if these "Children" were to telecast their religious programs for OUR children to
watch, or conduct seminars over the airwaves on the hows of free sex . . . Another example: satanic
cults involve blood sacrifices . . . In brief, I am in agreement with the ponencia that the practice of
religion cannot be totally abandoned to the market place and governed by the policy of laissez faire.
Validity of MTRCB's Internal Rule
FOURTH. Anent the validity of Sec. 4 of the Board's Rules and Regulation authorizing MTRCB to
prohibit the showing of materials "which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed or
religion . . .", I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug that the phrase "contrary to law" in Sec. 3-c "should be
read together with other existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 201, which prohibit the exhibition of shows that 'offend another race or
religion.'" Indeed, where it can be shown that there is a clear and present danger that a religious
program could agitate or spark a religious strife of such extent and magnitude as to be injurious to
the general welfare, the Board may "X-rate" it or delete such portions as may reasonably be
necessary. The debilitating armed conflicts in Bosnia, Northern Ireland and in some Middle East
countries due to exacerbated religious antagonisms should be enough lesson for all of us. Religious
wars can be more ravaging and damaging than ordinary crimes. If it is legal and in fact
praiseworthy to prevent the commission of, say, the felony of murder in the name of public welfare
why should the prevention of a crime punishable by Art. 201 of the Penal Code be any less legal and
less praiseworthy.
I note, in this connection, the caveat raised by the ponencia that the MTRCB Rule bans shows which
"attack" a religion, whereas Art. 201 merely penalize; those who exhibit programs which "offend"
such religion. Subject to changing the word "attack" with the more accurate "offend". I believe
Section 4 of the Rules can stand.
In sum, I respectfully submit (1) that P.D. 1986 is constitutional, subject to the substitution (or
interpretation) of the words "dangerous tendency" with the phrase (or as meaning) "clear and
present danger" in Sec. 3-c: and (2) that Sec. 4 of the Board's Rules would be likewise valid,
providcd the words "constitute an attack" are changed with "offend"
B. WAS THE BANNING OF THE IGLESIA
PROGRAMS PROPER?
We now come to the immediate question: Did the respondent Board correctly apply Section 3 of
P.D. 1986 in prohibiting the public telecasting of the Iglesia program. In short, did the INC series
"offend" a religion? Juridically stated, did the respondent MTRCB use "contemporary Filipino
cultural values" in determining that said series offended another religion such as to constitute a
clear and present danger of a religions strife which is injurious to public welfare? [Note: I advisedly
used both the "values" and "clear and present" standards in framing the question because the INC
program was apparently "x-rated" for being both "contrary to law" and violative of Art. 201, a
"crime".]
Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question directly because the tape in question was never
submitted to the Court for viewing. Neither was there a detailed description of its objectionable
contents in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. Nor is there extant
a detailed justification prepared by respondent Board on why it banned the program - other than
its bare conclusion that the material constituted an attack against the Catholic and Protestant
religions.
In no wise can the "remarks" in the voting slips presented before the trial court be considered
sufficient justification for banning the showing of any material.
In the face of such inadequacy of evidence and basis, I see no way that this Court could authorize a
suppression of a species of the freedom of speech on the say-so of anyone - not even of the MRTCB.
Paraphrasing People v.Fernando,
9
the disputable presumption (which is of statutory origin) that
official duties have been regularly performed must yield to the constitutionally enshrined freedoms
of expression and of religion. If courts are required to state the factual and legal bases of their
conclusions and judicial dispositions, with more reason must quasi-judicial officers such as censors,
especially when they curtail a fundamental right which is "entitled to the highest priority and
amplest protection."
FOR THIS REASON AND THIS REASON ALONE, i.e., that the respondent Board failed to justify its
conclusion thru the use of the proper standards that the tapes in question offended another
religion, I vote to GRANT the petition insofar as it prays for the showing of said programs. However,
I vote to DENY the petition insofar as allowing the INC to show its pretaped programs without first
submitting them forreview by the MTRCB.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it removes the ban against the showing of petitioner's
TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119 and 121. However, I disagree with that part of the majority
opinion which upholds the power of respondent Board to subject to prior restraint petitioner's
religious television programs.
It should by now be undisputably recognized and firmly rooted in this country that there can be no
prior restraints on the exercise of free speech expression or religion unless such exercise poses a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right and even the duty to prevent.
The ban against such prior restraints will result, as it has resulted in the past, in occasional abuses
of free speech and expression but it is immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional
abuses of speech and expression than to arm a governmental administrative agency with the
authority to censor speech and expression in accordance with legislativev standards which albeit
apparently laudable in their nature, can very well be bent or stretched by such agency to
convenient latitudes as to frustrate and eviscerate the precious freedoms of speech and expression.
Besides, any person who may feel aggrieved by the exercise of free speech, expression and religion,
is afforded, under our system, the remedy of redress in the courts of law, justice and equity.
In short, it is far better for the individual to live in a climate of free speech and free expression,
devoid of prior restraints, even at the risk of occasional excesses of such freedoms than to exist in
an ambiance of censorship which is always a step closer to autocracy and dictatorship.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision to allow the showing of certain video tapes of petitioner's program, "Ang
Iglesia Ni Cristo," and for this purpose to reverse the contrary ruling of the Court of Appeals. I am
constrained to file this separate opinion, however, because, while the majority opinion invokes
general principles of free speech and religion to which I subscribe, it regrettably fails to apply these
principles to the law (P.D. No. 1986 and its implementing rules) under which the Board has acted.
My position will be spelled out presently but, in brief, it is this: Censorship may be allowed only in
anarrow class of cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and danger to national security.
Even in these cases, only courts can prohibit the showing of a film or the broadcast of a program. In
all other cases, the only remedy against speech which creates a clear and present danger to public
interests is through subsequent punishment. Considering the potentiality for harm which motion
pictures and TV programs may have especially on the young, all materials may validly be required
to be submitted for review before they may be shown or broadcast. However, the final
determination of the character of the materials cannot be left to an administrative agency. That
judicial review of administrative action is available does not obviate the constitutional objection to
censorship. For these reasons, I would hold 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which gives to the Board limited
time for review, to be valid, while finding 3(c), under which the Board acted in this case in
censoring petitioner's materials, to be, on its face and as applied, unconstitutional.
I. "At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be . . . no
previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings, unless there be a clear
and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent."
1
"Because of the
preferred character of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and expression, a weighty
presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms."
2

Authoritative interpretations of the free speech clause consider as invalid two types of prior
restraints, namely, those which are imposed prior to the dissemination of any matter and those
imposed prior to an adequate determination that the expression is not constitutionally protected.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put the matter, "[A] prohibited "prior restraint" is not limited to
the suppression of a thing before it is released to the public. Rather, an invalid prior restraint is an
infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate matters that are ordinarily protected by
the first amendment without there first being a judicial determination that the material does not
qualify for first amendment protection."
3

Our own cases furnish illustrations of these types of prior restraints. In Ayer Productions
Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong,
4
we held that an injunction stopping the production of a documentary film was
an invalid prior restraint on freedom of speech and of expression. In Mutuc v. COMELEC,
5
we struck
down, also as an invalid prior restraint, a COMELEC rule prohibiting the use in political campaigns
of taped jingles blared through loudspeakers which were mounted on mobile units. "[T]he
constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances."
6

On the other hand, the fact that the material may have seen print or been taped, as in the case of the
TV series in question, cannot justify restriction on its circulation in the absence of a judicial
determination that the material does not constitute protected expression. In Sotto v. Ruiz, we
denied finality to the authority of the Director of Posts to exclude newspapers and other
publications from the mails "since whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal
question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be
subject to revision by the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded authority."
8

II. P.D. No . 1986, 3(b) requires motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials to be
submitted to the Board for review, while 7 makes it unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or
cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theater or public place or by television any motion
picture, television program or publicity material unless it has been approved by the Board. Anyone
who violates the prohibition is liable to prosecution and, in case of conviction, to punishment by
imprisonment ranging from 3 months and 1 day to 1 year, plus a fine of not less than P50,000.00
but not more than P100,000.00. In addition, the moviehouse, theater or television station violating
the provision faces a revocation of its license.
9

In Burstyn v. Wilson,
10
it was held that expression by means of motion pictures -- and, it may be
added, by means of television broadcasts - is included in the free speech and free press guarantee of
the Constitution. This ruling is now part our constitutional law, which has assimilated into the
constitutional guarantee not only motion pictures but also radio and television shows because of
the importance of movie, radio and television both as a vehicle of communication and as a medium
of expression.
11

Does 3(b) impermissibly impose a prior restraint because of its requirement that films and TV
programs must be submitted to the Board for review before they can be shown or broadcast? In my
view it does not. The Burstyncase, in declaring motion pictures to be protected under the free
expression clause, was careful to add: "It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places . . . Nor does it
follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other
particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems."
12
With
reference to television, this Court is on record that "a less liberal approach calls for observance.
This is so because unlike motion pictures where patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a [TV]
set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of programs therein shown. . . . [T]he State
as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young."
13

While newspapers may not be required to submit manuscripts for review as a condition for their
publication, except during wartime, such a requirement is justified when applied to motion pictures
or television programs (other than newsreels and commentaries) because of unique considerations
involved in their operation. "First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence
in the livesof all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available
to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or
viewer is constantly tuning in and out."
14
The State may thus constitutionally require the advance
submission of all films and TV programs as a means
of enabling it effectively to bar the showing of unprotected films and TV programs.
15

For these reasons, I hold 3(b) to be a valid exercise of the State's power to protect legitimate
public interests. The purpose of this restraint - temporary in character -- is to allow the Board time
to screen materials and to seek an injunction from the courts against those which it believes to be
harmful.
III. I reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to 3(c). This provision authorizes the
Board to prohibit, among other things, the exhibition or broadcast of motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials which, in its opinion, are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
[which have] a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime," such as the following:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against
the State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government and/or the duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or
pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any
person, whether living or dead; and
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal,
or pertain to matters which are sub judice in nature.
Under this authority, the Board can determine what can be shown or broadcast and what cannot. It
is not true, as the Board claims, that under P.D. No. 1986 its power is limited to the classification of
motion pictures and TV programs. The power to classify includes the power to censor. The Board
can x-rate films and TV programs and thus ban their public exhibition or broadcast. And once it
declares that a motion picture or television program is, for example, indecent or contrary to law, as
in the case of the INC program in question, its declaration becomes the law. Unless the producer or
exhibitor is willing to go to court, shouldering not only the burden of showing that his movie or
television program is constitutionally protected but also the cost of litigation, the ban stays.
16
This
is censorship in its baldest form. This is contrary to the fundamental tenet of our law that until and
unless speech is found by the courts to be unprotected its expression must be allowed.
In an effort to save this provision from constitutional attack, it is alleged that the TV program in
question was disallowed pursuant to the rules of the Board which prohibit the showing of motion
pictures or TV programs containing "malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or religion." It is
contended that this rule impermissibly broadens the prohibition in 3(c), because this ground
("malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or religion") is not among those provided therein.
However, 3(c) gives the Board authority to stop the showing of motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials which are "contrary to law," and Art. 201(2) (b) (3) of the Revised
Penal Code makes it a crime for anyone to exhibit "shows which offend any race or religion." It is
true that Art. 201 (2) (b) (3) refers to subsequent punishment, whereas we are dealing here with
prior restraint. However, by authorizing the censorship of materials which in the opinion of the
Board are "contrary to law," 3(c) makes what is only a ground for subsequent punishment also a
ground for prior restraint on expression. It is 3(c) of P.D. No. 1986, and not only the rules
implementing it, which is unconstitutional.
1
7
While I think the Board may be granted the power to preview materials, it is only for the purpose of
enabling the Board to decide whether to seek their prohibition by the court in the interest of
safeguarding morality, good order and public safety, considering the pervasive influence of
broadcast media compared to that of the print media. But concern with possible deleterious effects
of movies and television shows cannot and should not be allowed to overshadow the equally
important concern for freedom of expression and blind us to the danger of leaving the ultimate
determination of what expression is protected and what is not to a board of censors. The protection
of the youth should be in the first place the concern of parents, schools and other institutions. I do
not think that society is so morally impoverished that we have to draw on a group of censors for
ultimate moral lesson and leading.
If we have to call on the assistance of any agency at all, it must be the courts.
18
There are many
reasons why a system of prior restraint (in those cases where it may validly be imposed) may only
be administered by judges. First is that the censor's bias is to censor. Second is that "only a
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression."
19
As has been observed, "Central to the first amendment due process is the notion that
a judicial rather than an administrative determination of the character of the speech is necessary. . .
. [C]ourts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected."
20
Third, the
members of the Board do not have the security of tenure and of fiscal autonomy necessary to secure
their independence.
Indeed, I cannot understand why, after ruling that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies,
21
this Court
should be willing to leave the valuation of that priceless commodity - expression, whether by means
of motion picture or television - to administrative agencies with only occasional review by the
courts. The trend may be toward greater delegation of judicial authority to administrative agencies
in matters requiring technical knowledge and as a means of relieving courts of cases which such
agencies can very well attend to.
22
There is no justification, however, for such delegation in the
area of our essential freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, where "only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding [can] ensure the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression."
23

We have witnessed such distinct possibility in the past to need any more lesson in the future to
make us realize the danger of leaving freedom of expression and religion - the essential freedom of
the mind - in the care of an administrative agency.
To the extent therefore that P.D. No. 1986, 3(c) vests in the Board the final authority to determine
whether expression by motion picture or television is constitutionally protected, I find it
unconstitutional.
IV. The majority limit themselves to a determination of the correctness of the Board's finding that
the video tapes in question contain attacks on the Catholic religion, I find it difficult to pass upon
this question because the contents of the tapes are not in the record of this case.
24
The trial court
ruled that the tapes contain no attack against any religion but only a discussion of the doctrines
which the Iglesia Ni Cristo believes embody "superior and self evident truth." On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court, found that the tapes "offend by verbal abuse other
religions" and are for that reason "indecent and contrary to good customs" within the meaning of
P.D. No, 1986, 3(c). Neither court, however, had any evidence to support its conclusions, because
this case was submitted by the parties solely on the basis of memoranda. What the majority of this
Court call facts (pp. 16-17) are simply the opinions of members of the Board that the video tapes
contain attacks on the Catholic religion.
There are no facts on which to base judgment on this question. Even if there are, the clear and
present danger test is inapplicable. To be sure, in Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak this Court said:
[W]here the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned -- included as they are in freedom of
expression - censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable
only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
25

The clear and present danger test has been devised for use in criminal prosecutions for violations of
laws punishing certain types of utterances.
26
While the test has been applied to the regulation of
the use of streets and
parks
2
7 -- surely a form of prior restraint - its use in such context can be justified on the ground
that the content of the speech is not the issue. But when the regulation concerns not the time, place
or manner of speech but its content (i.e., it is content-based) the clear and present danger test
simply cannot be applied. This is because a determination whether an utterance has created a clear
and present danger to public interests requires a factual record.
The test itself states that the question in every case is "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent."
28
However it may have been
reformulated in later cases, the test essentially requires that the causal connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended be evident.
29
But how can this be shown unless the speech is first
allowed? It is not enough that the tapes have been made and only their broadcast banned. What
about the audience reaction to the tapes? Even if we know what the tapes in this case contain, we
cannot determine whether their public broadcast would create a clear and present danger to public
interests. The censorship board, trying to determine whether to issue a permit, must necessarily
speculate on impact which the words will have since the context in which they will be uttered - the
audience, the occasion, and the place - is totally lacking in the record. It is then forced to apply a
lesser standard of proof in deciding whether to impose a restraint on speech.
The majority claim that there is no need for a factual record in order to find that the Board in this
case exceeded its powers in disallowing the TV series in question. They argue that "acts of prior
restraint are hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brews.
It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this
heavy burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. . . . In the case at bar, respondent board did
nothing to rebut the presumption." (p. 17)
That, however, is precisely the problem with the censorship law. It in effect places on the producer
or exhibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that his film or program is constitutionally
protected. To paraphrase Sotto v. Ruiz, which the majority cite as authority for sustaining the
validity of 3(c), "Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of [the agency's]
action."
30
The Board would have this burden of justification if, as I believe it should, is made to go to
court instead and justify the banning of a film or TV program. That is why 3(c) should be
invalidated. One cannot defend the validity of the law and at the same time contend that in any
court proceeding for the review of the Board's decision the burden of justifying the ban should be
on the Board.
The teaching of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak simply comes down to this: that the standard for
judging the validity of prior restraint on political expression is stricter than that for adjudging
restraints on materials alleged to be obscene, but not that the test of clear and present danger is
applicable in determining whether or not a permit may be granted.
In Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak
31
this Court echoed Justice Douglas's plea that "every writer, actor, or
producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." For
indeed the full flowering of local artistic talents and the development of the national intelligence
can take place only in a climate of free expression. A film producer, faced with the prospect of losing
on his investment as a result of the banning of his movie production, may well find himself
compelled to submit to the wishes of the Board or practice self-censorship. The expression of
unpopular opinions, whether religious, political or otherwise is imperilled under such a system.
We have long ago done away with controls on the print media, it is time we did the same with the
control on broadcast media, which for so long operated under restraints,
32
leaving the punishment
for violations of laws to be dealt with by subsequent prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare 3(2) of P.D. No. 1986 unconstitutional and to reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals, except in so far as it sustains the grant of power to the Board to
preview materials for showing or broadcast, consistent with my view that 3(b) is valid.

MELO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The enjoyment of the freedom of religion is always coupled with the freedom of expression. For the
profession of faith inevitably carries with it as a necessary appendage, the prerogative of
propagation. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship thus denotes the right to disseminate religious information (American Bible Society vs.
City of Manila 101 Phil. 386 [1957]). Any prior restriction upon a religious expression would be a
restriction on the right of religion. We recognize the role and the deep influence that religion plays
in our community. No less than the fundamental law of the land acknowledges the elevating
influence of religion by imploring the aid of almighty God to build a just and humane society. Any
restriction that is to be placed upon this right must be applied with greatest caution.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that the Iglesia ni Cristo as an established religious
organization has been well with us for almost a century, with several millions of following quite a
number of imposing and elegantly constructed cathedrals and hundreds of chapels spread in many
parts of the country, injecting profound influence not only in the social and political aspect of the
community but upon its moral values as well. Respect must be afforded a well-established church,
especially on matters concerning morality and decency lest no concept of morality could ever be
accepted with deference. Such preeminence in the community deserves no less than the confident
expectation that it will act in accordance with its avowed mission of promoting religious guidance
and enlightenment. Its religious programs must be accorded the presumption that the same will
instill moral values that would be beneficial to its adherents and followers, and perhaps to the
community in general. The contrary must not be presumed. Its television programs, therefore,
should not be equated with ordinary movies and television shows which MTRCB is bound by the
law to monitor for possible abuse. One must recognize the power of State to protect its citizenry
from the danger of immorality and indecency motivated by the selfish desire of media
entrepreneurs to accumulate more wealth, or of bogus religious groups, for that matter, to mislead
and beguile the unlettered and uninformed. But considering all these circumstances, I see no cogent
reason for the application of such power to the present case.
Freedom of religion and expression is the rule and its restriction, the exception. Any prior
restriction on the exercise of the freedom to profess religious faith and the propagation thereof will
unduly diminish that religion's authority to spread what it believes to be the sacred truth. The State
can exercise no power to restrict such right until the exercise thereof traverses the point that will
endanger the order of civil society. Thus we have ruled in the case of Ebralinag vs. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (219 SCRA 270 [1993]):
The sole justification for a given restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the state has the right and duty to prevent.
Correspondingly, the MTRCB has no authority to use as standard, the dangerous tendency rule,
which we have long abandoned and for which reason, the dangerous tendency standard under
Subparagraph C, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1986 has no place in our statute books.
I therefore, vote to grant the petition.

VITUG, J., dissenting:
I agree with those who support the view that religious freedom occupies an exalted position in our
hierarchy of rights and that the freedom to disseminate religious information is a constitutionally-
sanctioned prerogative that allows any legitimate religious denomination a free choice of media in
the propagation of its credo. Like any other right, however, the exercise of religious belief is not
without inherent and statutory limitations.
The Board disapproved the exhibition of a series of television programs of petitioner on the ground
that they tend to "offend and constitute an attack against other religions." An opinion has been
expressed that the non-inclusion in Section 3 of P.D. 1986 of an "attack against any religion," as a
standard for classification, and so the deletion of the phrase "offensive to other religions" found in
the old censorship law (Executive Order No. 876), should be clear enough to manifest a legislative
intent "to do away with the standard." A reading of Section 3 of P.D. 1986 shows that the Board is
empowered to "screen, review and examine all . . . television programs" and to "approve or
disprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the . . . television broadcast of . . .
television programs . . . which, in the judgment of the BOARD (so) applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or
good customs . . . ." I believe that the phrase "contrary to law" should be read together with other
existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article
201, which prohibits the exhibition of shows that "offend another race or religion." I see in this
provision a good and sound standard. Recent events indicate recurrent violent incidents between
and among communities with diverse religious beliefs and dogma. The danger is past mere
apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and now prevalent in some parts of the world.
In order not to infringe constitutional principles, any restriction by the Board must, of course, be for
legitimate and valid reasons. I certainly do not think that prior censorship should altogether be
rejected just because sanctions can later be imposed. Regulating the exercise of a right is not
necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard and secure that right.
When I particularly ponder on the magnitude of the power of a television set, I find it more prudent
to have a deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived to be contrary to decency, morality,
good customs or the law until, at least, the courts are given an opportunity to pass upon the matter
than rely merely on the availability of retribution for actual injury sustained. A delay is not too high
a price to pay for a possible damage to society that may well tum out to be incalculable and lasting.
In this instance, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I concur in the result of the majority's decision reversing that of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it set aside the action of respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115,
119 and 121, with due respect, I cannot agree with its opinion that respondent Board of Review for
Motion pictures and Television (now MTRCB) has the power to review petitioner's TV program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." The religious TV program enjoys the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of
religion,
1
and of speech and
expression.,
2
and cannot be subject to prior restraint by the Board by virtue of its powers and
functions under Section 3 of P.D. 1986 which provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television
programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-
theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or
produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export.
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
Injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime, such as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
sedition against the State, or otherwise threaten the economic
and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people, their government and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence and pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and
reputation of any person, whether living or dead; and,
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-
judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are subjudice in nature.
Under the aforequoted provisions, the MTRCB, while nominally a classification board, is granted the
power not only to classify, but also to approve or disapprove/prohibit exhibition of film or
television broadcasts of motion pictures and TV programs.
The freedom to disseminate religious information is a right protected by the free exercise clause of
the Constitution. It encompasses a wide range of ideas and takes many forms. In the process of
enlightening the adherents or convincing non-believers of the truth of its beliefs, a religious sect or
denomination is allowed the free choice of utilizing various media, including pulpit or podium,
print, television film, and the electronic mail.
The broad latitude of freedom afforded by the free exercise clause is an historic outgrowth of our
country's twin colonial experiences: our forefathers' aversion against the Spanish colonial
government's interference with religious belief and practice and the transplantation of American
Constitutional thinking into the mainstream of our political life, which brought with it the ideas of
Protestant dissent and humanistic rationalism dominant in the debates of the American
Constitutional Convention. These two poles conjoined to place the individual conscience beyond the
coercive power of government. Involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator, respect
for the inviolability of conscience lay at the core of the free exercise clauses in our Constitutions
from 1935 to 1987.
3

It is, therefore, settled that religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to the highest priority
and amplest protection among human rights. Because of its exalted position in our hierarchy of civil
rights, the realm of religious belief is generally insulated from state action, and state interference
with such belief is allowed only in extreme cases.
Free exercise encompasses all shades of expression of religious belief. It includes the right to
preach, proselyte and to perform other similar functions.
4
As oftentimes these aspects of the free
exercise clause fall within areas affected by government regulation, the importance of religious
freedom is such that the state must make special provisions to relieve religious liberty from
restrictions imposed by generally legitimate government regulations
5
Commenting on religious
freedom and other freedoms of conscience, this Court held in Reyes v. Bagatsing
6
that:
[O]n the judiciary -- even more so than on the other departments -- rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course dispense with what
has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales
of justice on the side of such rights.
7

Even before film and television achieved the power and influence it has gained in the last few
decades, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Burtsyn v. Wilson,
8
conceded that movies were a
significant medium for the dissemination of ideas, affecting "public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from the direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes artistic expression."
9
The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that the significance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not diluted by the fact that
films are "designed to entertain as well as to inform,"
10
thus, recognizing that motion pictures fell
within the sphere of constitutionally protected speech and expression. Responding to the question
of censorship in the context of film as protected expression, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of
Freedman v. Maryland
11
held that:
The administration of a censorship system for motion pictures presents peculiar
dangers to constitutionally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a
censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor.
Because the censor's business is to censor, there is an inherent danger that he may
be less responsive than a court part of an independent branch of government -- to
constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
12

In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
13
this Court held that any restraint on the right to
disseminate religious information "can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent."
14
Affirming the use of this "clear and present danger" standard in
cases involving religious freedom and worship, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee warned
that "[t]he sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent."
15

Religious freedom is not of course an absolute right. However, given its exalted position in our
hierarchy of civil rights, the essence of all that has been said and written about the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance claims to
free exercise of religion.
16
In a highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest situation
endangering paramount govemmental interests give occasion for permissible limitation. And even
in such rare cases, government may justify an inroad into religious liberty only by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling state interest. A facially neutral regulation
apparently evenhandedly applied to all religious sects and denominations would be constitutionally
suspect when it imposes an undue burden on the exercise of religious freedom. "Rules are rules" is
not by itself a sufficient justification for infringing religious liberty.
1
7
It is my submission that the government, under the guise of its regulatory powers in the censorship
law (P.D. 1986 and its corresponding implementing rules and regulations), does not have the power
to interfere with the exercise of religious expression in film or television by requiring the
submission of the video tapes of petitioner's religious program before their public viewing, absent a
showing of a compelling state interest that overrides the constitutional protection of the freedom of
expression and worship. Even if government can demonstrate a compelling state interest, it would
only burden such fundamental right like the free exercise of religion by the least intrusive means
possible.
18
There is no demonstration here of any sufficient state interest to justify the
infringement.
In any case, petitioner's religious programs, which in their very essence and characterization are
the exercise of religious freedom, cannot possibly come under the category of the objectionable
matters enumerated in Section 3(c) of P.D. 1986 or analogous thereto. It is not likely that
propagation of religion which has been spoken of as "a profession of faith that binds and elevates
man to his Creator"
19
will involve pornography excessive violence or danger to national security.
Significantly, the enumeration in Section 3(c) does not include the standard "attack against any
religion" as among those considered objectionable and subject to censorship. Respondents justify
this omission by stating that any form of expression "contrary to law" could be subject to regulation
because the enumeration is in any case not exclusive, and that the phrase "contrary to law" should,
in the Solicitor General's words in behalf of respondents, be construed "in relation to Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code which proscribes the exhibition of shows that "offend any race or
religion."
20
Respondents moreover argue that the Rules and Regulations of the MTRCB issued
pursuant to P.D. 1986 in any case explicitly furnish the standard left out in the enumeration when it
provides:
Sec. 4. GOVERNING STANDARD. -- a) The BOARD shall judge the motion pictures
and television programs and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as
standard contemporary Filipino cultural values to abate what are legally
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philipines or its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime
such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vii) Those which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed, or religion as
distinguished from individual members thereof; . . .
There are several reasons why I cannot agree with respondent Board's contention that it may add
the standard "attack against any religion" among those enumerated by P.D. 1986. While the law's
enumeration is concededly not exclusive, inclusion of other standards should be made in the strict
context of the words "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs." Specific standards
following a general enumeration cannot go beyond the scope of the latter.
In the first place, the word "indecent" in censorship law has a narrow meaning, confined to
obscenity regulation.
12
It cannot be conveniently employed as a catch-all term embracing all forms
of expression considered noxious by the Board. On the other hand, "contrary to law," had particular
significance in the old censorship laws because those laws explicitly included anything "offensive to
other religions" among their enumerated standards. In the light of what the Solicitor General
describes as the "transitional" nature of P.D. 1986, the better view would be that the omission of
"attack against any religion" among the enumerated standards was intentional and part of the
evolving process of fashioning a system of strict classification of films and television programs as
opposed to censorship. As this phrase was ubiquitous in the old censorship laws (particularly E.O.
868 and E.O. 876), its elimination in P.D. 1986 expresses the manifest intention of the law-making
authority to do away with the standard. This view is supported by the Executive Branch itself,
through the Opinion of then Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales who stated, when the case came up
before his office for review, that:
[T]he question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the
subject television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of
Section 3, paragraph (c) of P.D. 1986, which is substantially the same as the
provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards for censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or a wrong" as
determined by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard". As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television
program to "previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious
program" makes mention of beliefs and practices of other religion". On the face of
the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by the
Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within
the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law.
22

Additionally, the phrase "contrary to law" cannot and should not be understood to refer to Article
201
23
of the Revised Penal Code, as respondents mistakenly suggest. Article 201 deals with the
subject of subsequent punishment; P.D. 1986 clearly treats with an altogether different matter --
prior restraint and censorship. The two laws stand at opposite poles in the continuum of regulation
and punishment.
Thus, the censor's cut poses a peculiar danger because it altogether skirts time-honored judicial
tests and standards utilized in determining those forms of expression that fall within the area of
protected speech or expression, and because, as between prior restraints and the subsequent
sanctions meted after proof of violation of specific penal statutes, the former prevents the speech or
expression from entering the marketplace of ideas.
24
That is exactly the effect of the orders assailed
by petitioner in the instant case. More significantly, under the specific facts and circumstances of
the case confronting us, what is sought to be kept out of the marketplace of ideas is not only
ordinary speech or expression, two constitutional values which already enjoy primacy among our
civil rights, but also religious speech or expression utilizing the medium of television.
It is claimed that the provisions of P.D. 1986 in any case provide for a neutral standard applicable to
all religious sects and denominations. I cannot agree. The "neutrality" standard has been raised in
numerous free exercise cases before the courts, the most recent having been the Flag Salute
cases.
25
However, a regulation neutral on its face poses free exercise problems when it creates or
has the potential of imposing undue burdens on religion. "Democratic government acts to reinforce
the generally accepted values of a given society and not merely the fundamental ones which relate
to its political structure."
26
Facially neutral standards are a facet of prevailing concensus. The old
flag salute cases are testaments to the natural preference for the prevailing political and social
morality over the religious liberty of minorities. The prevalent view tends to impose its idea of what
is religious and what is not over and above the protests of the other religions, sects and
denominations.
2
7 Applying "contemporary Filipino standards" and values (the general test in P.D.
1986) to religious thought and expression allows an "overarching" into a constitutionally protected
area and potentially would simply provide the Board with a veiled excuse for clamping down
against unorthodox religious thought and expression. Measured in terms of the historic purpose of
the guarantee, the free exercise provision in our Constitution not only insulates religion against
governmental power, but when taken together with the Establishment clause, affords protection to
religious minorities by preventing the use of that power in imposing the majority's will.
We are faced with a case of censorship and restraint which, I stated earlier, touches upon one of the
most private and sensitive of domains: the realm of religious freedom, thought and expression. In
this domain, sharp differences may arise such that the tenets of one individual may seem the
"rankest error" to his neighbor.
28
In the process of persuading others about the validity of his point
of view, the preacher sometimes resorts to exaggeration and vilification. However, the
determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication
falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of censors.
29
Even if the
exercise of the liberties protected by the speech, expression and religion clauses of our Constitution
are regarded as neither absolute nor unlimited, there are appropriate laws which deal with such
excesses. The least restrictive alternative would be to impose subsequent sanctions for proven
violations of laws, rather than inflict prior restraints on religious expression.
Our penal law punishes libel, or acts or speeches offensive to other religions, and awards damages
whenever warranted. In our legal scheme, courts essentially remain the arbiters of the
controversies affecting the civil and political rights of persons. It is our courts which determine
whether or not certain forms of speech and expression have exceeded the bounds of correctness,
propriety or decency as to fall outside the area of protected speech. In the meantime, the liberties
protected by the speech and expression and free exercise clauses are so essential to our society that
they should be allowed to flourish unobstructed and unmolested.
30

The majority opinion professes fealty to freedom of religion which it openly admits, has been
accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, and affirms that "(D)eeply
ensconced in our fundamental
law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech."
31
The majority
then adds pointedly that "acts of prior restraint are hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brews. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this heavy burden, its acts of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar."
32

And yet, the majority at the same time would grant MTRCB the power to review the TV religious
programs because "with its expertise," it "can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law."
33
The majority thus would uphold the power of the Board as an
administrative body with quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs, citing with
favor the 1921 decision of this Court in Sotto vs. Ruiz
34
wherein it was held that:
As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication
contains printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and
involves the exercise of his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is
in favor of the correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases
coming from the United States Supreme Court and pertaining to the United States
Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the
Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong.
I share with Justice Mendoza's view that the majority's pronouncement would in effect place on the
producer or exhibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that his film or program is
constitutionally protected. This throws overboard the fundamental tenet that any act that restrains
speech is presumed invalid and it is the burden of the censor to overthrow this presumption. In the
context of the present case, if the Board disapproves a TV religious program or deletes a portion
thereof, it is the exhibitor or producer who will go to court to prove that the Board is wrong and the
court will not interfere with the Board's decision unless it can be clearly shown that it is wrong,
following the ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz.
The majority's ruling, I am afraid, constitutes a threat to constitutionally protected speech and
expression and supplants a judicjal standard for determining constitutionally protected speech and
expression with the censor's standard. The heavy burden on the imposition of prior restraints is
shifted away from the state by imposing upon the exhibitor the obligation of proving that the
religious programs fall within the realm of protected expression. This leaves the exhibitor with only
two unwanted options: either 1) he himself deletes the portions which he anticipates the Board
might possibly object to prior to submission to that body and thereby obtains the censor's nod, or
2) submits the Video tapes in their entirety and risks disapproval or deletion, in which case he may
go to court and show that the Video tapes contain constitutionally protected speech and expression.
In the first situation, the message loses its essence and substance. The second scenario may entail
tremendous amount of money, time and effort in a prolonged litigation. Either case constitutes
grievous assault on the freedom of speech and religion.
The ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz cannot be invoked as authority to allow MTRCB to review petitioner's TV
programs. In that case, the Court held that the Acting Director of the Bureau of Posts is vested with
authority to determine what mail matter is obscene, lewd, filthy or libelous, pursuant to Section
1954 of the old Administrative Code which provides, among others, that no lewd, lascivious, filthy,
indecent or libelous character shall be deposited in, or carried by, the mails of the Philippine Island,
or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts. Petitioner's
programs which are televised in the exercise of freedom of worship cannot be placed in the
category of the printed matter proscribed in the old Administrative Code. Freedom of worship is
such a precious commodity in our hierarchy of civil liberties that it cannot be derogated
peremptorily by an administrative body or officer who determines, without judicial safeguards,
whether or not to allow the exercise of such freedom.
The rights of free expression and free exercise of religion occupy a unique and special place in our
constellation of civil rights. The primacy our society accords these freedoms determines the mode it
chooses to regulate their expression. But the idea that an ordinary statute or decree could, by its
effects, nullify both the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression puts an ominous gloss on
these liberties. Censorship law as a means of regulation and as a form of prior restraint is anathema
to a society which places high significance to these values.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1 A petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, the case was raffled to Br. 104, then
presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Maximiano Asuncion.
2 Original Records, p. 24.
3 Original Records, p. 25.
4 Original Records, p. 27.
5 Original Records, p. 28.
6 Original Records, p. 29. The second review shows the following action of the respondent
Board:
REMARKS:
An unbalanced interpretation of some parts of the bible regarding Christmas. They (The
Iglesia ni Kristo) tackle/discuss only their own interpretations (and) while the sides of the
Protestants and the Catholics who they pick on in this episode are not heard of.
We feel that this topic of the Iglesia ni Kristo which is (?) of attacking other religious beliefs
does not merit public telecast.
(Original Records, p. 30)
7 Original Records, pp. 21-22.
8 Original Records, p. 23.
9 Original Records, pp. 121-120; pp. 144-149.
10 Original Records, pp. 219-220.
11 Original Records, pp. 223-230.
12 Original Records, pp. 233-242.
13 Original Records, pp. 245-250.
14 Original Records, pp. 379-381.
15 Tenth Division with Associate Justice Antonio P. Solano (ponente), Associate Justice
Alfredo Benipayo (chairman) and Associate Justice Ricardo Galvez (member).
16 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker Union, L-25246, September 12, 1974 per Mr. Justice
Calixto Zaldivar.
17 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., pp. 176-178.
18 Original Records, p. 30.
19 Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan ,372 US 58 (1963);
New York Times v. United States , 403 US 713 (1971).
20 310 US 296.
21 Sec. 4. Governing Standard. -- a) the Board shall judge the motion pictures and television
programs and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as standard
contemporary Filipino cultural values, to abate what are legally objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law, and good customs . . . such as but not limited:
xxx xxx xxx
vii. Those which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed, or religion as
distinguished from individual members thereof."
22 101 Phil. 386.
23 59 SCRA 54, 58.
24 249 US 47, 63 Led 470 (1919).
25 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252 262 where J. Black observed that the test "has afforded
a practical guidance in a variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional protections of
freedom of expression was an issue."
26 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940).
27 341 US 494 (1951).
28 Id., at p. 510.
29 Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, Some
Fragments of History, 27 Stan L. Rev. 719 (1975).
30 Hentoff, Speech, Harm and Self Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and
Present Danger Test, 91 Col. Law Rev. No. 6, p. 1453 (1991).
31 370 US 478 (1962).
32 380 US 51 (1965).
33 Id. at p.58.
34 41 Phil. 468 (1921) per Justice Malcolm.
35 See Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, A Reply to
Prof. Mayton, 67 Cornell L. Rev, 283 (1982) for the view that courts are no better than
administrative agencies in protecting First Amendment rights.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:
1 Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. - The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television
programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether
such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution,
for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines,
and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export.
c) To approve or disprove, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of
the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of
violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the
State, or otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government
and/or duly constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence and
pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether living or dead; and,
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or
pertain to matters which are sub judice in nature.
2 Section 4, GOVERNING STANDARD. - a) The BOARD shall judge the motion pictures and
television programs and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as standard
contemporary Filiping cultural values to abate what are legally objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of a wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vii) Those which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed, or religion as
distinguished from individual members thereof; . . .
3 Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression . . .
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. . . .
4 137 SCRA 717 (July 22, 1985).
5 137 SCRA 628 (July 19, 1985).
6 Eastern, supra, at p. 636.
7 Id.
8 Gonzales, supra, at p. 729.
9 SCRA 151, 159 (October 21, 1986).
MENDOZA, J., concurring:
1 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835, 856 (1969); accord, Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553 (1983); Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717 (1985).
2 Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, 873 (1988).
3 State v. I, a Woman - Part II, 53 Wis. 102, 191 N.W. 2d 897, 902-903 (1971); see
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1041-42 (1988).
4 160 SCRA 861 (1988).
5 36 SCRA 228 (1970).
6 Id., at 234.
7 41 Phil. 468 (1921).
8 Id. at 470.
9 11.
10 343 U.S. 495, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952).
11 See Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA at 869; Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,
137 SCRA at 723; Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628, 635 (1985).
12 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 502-503, 96 L. Ed. at 1106.
13 Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA at 729.
14 Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA at 635.
15 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 13 L.Ed. 2d 649 (1965).
16 PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 66 (1961).
17 Thanks to Rule 4(VII) of the Board, "shows which offendany race or religion," as a
ground for prosecution, is translated into "clearly . . malicious attack against a race, creed or
religion," as a ground for censorship, thus limiting the Board's discretion in censoring films
and TV programs. This does not of course make the grant of censorial powers to the Board
any less invalid. There was a time when I thought that the problem was with overboard
standards. I am now convinced that the problem is with censorship per se.
18 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak,
390 U.S. 139, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 428 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971).
19 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58, 13 L.Ed.2d at 654. For a discussion of the "vices" of
administrative censorship as opposed to judicial determination, see generally John Jeffries,
Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 421-426 (1983).
20 Henry Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1970).
21 EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987); Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987).
22 E.g., AntipolO Realty v. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987); Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, 152
SCRA 540 (1987).
23 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58, 13 L.Ed.2d at 654.
24 Compare the following: "Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding
should precede judging," Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520, 68 L.Ed. 813, 829
(1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), which Professor Freund says was central to the thought of
Justice Brandeis. ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 50 (1949).
25 137 SCRA at 725.
26 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919); Primicias v. Fugoso,
80 Phil. 71 (1948); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); Vera v. Arca, 28 SCRA 351
(1969).
27 E.g., Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983); Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731
(1970); see also the Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. Blg. 880), 6(a) of which makes it
mandatory for mayors to grant permits for the use of parks and streets unless there is "clear
and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health."
28 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52, 63 L.Ed at 473-74.
29 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 569 (1977).
30 41 Phil. at 470.
31 137 SCRA at 725, quoting Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Superior Films v.
Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589, 98 L.Ed. 330, 331 (1954).
32 The first film censorship law, Act No. 3582 of the Philippine Legislature, was enacted on
November 29, 1929.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 CONST., art. III, sec. 5.
2 CONST., art. III, sec. 4.
3 The 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
This provision retains the wording of both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution.
4 Mc Daniel v. Patty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1998); "Clearly, freedom of belief protected by the
free exercise clause embraces freedom to profess or practice that belief. Id., at 631
(Brennan, J., concurring).
5 Sherbert v. Vener, 374, U.S. 398 (1963).
6 125 SCRA 553 (1983).
7 Id., at 570.
8 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
9 Id., at 501.
10 Id.
11 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
12 Id., at 57.
13 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
14 Id., at 398.
15 Supra, note 11, at 534. (Dissenting).
16 The dichotomy between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act upon one's beliefs
was succinctly summed up by this Court in its flag ceremony decision, See Ebralinag v.
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 270 (1993).
17 Goldman v. Weinberger, 54 LW 4298 (1986).
18 Sherbert v. Vener, 374 U.S. 333 [1963].
19 Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
20 Rollo, p. 130.
21 See, Miller v. Califonia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
22 Rollo, p. 42. (Emphasis supplied).
Article 201 provides:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The
penalty ofprision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
24 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
25 Supra, note 15. See also Motion for Reconsideration, G.R. No. 95770, December 29, 1995.
26 Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part I The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 Harvard L.R. 1381 (1967).
27 In any society, the most acculturated religion is that which exists in full harmony with
society's values and institutions. Normally, the acculturated religion rarely comes at odds
with society's legal norms in as much as those norms themselves are directly or indirectly
influenced by the acculturated or dominant religion. The thorniest legal issues arise when a
particular religion or sect advocates ideas separate from mainstream culture, or urges a
radical deviation from dominant thought which clashes with orthodox norms or
expectations. Notwithstanding the "acceptable" variety of expression which falls under the
rubric of bona fidereligious dogma, cross cultural religious clashes are bound to be
mediated from the standpoint of the dominant religion. See, H. RICHARD NEIBHUR, CHRIST
AND CULTURE (1951).
28 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, at 310 (1939).
29 Whether or not administrative bodies might be more effective (and as suggested
"liberal" as opposed to the traditional "conservatism" of courts) in this regard or in terms of
protecting the constitutional rights of speech and expression, the process of assaying the
constitutional validity of the Board's acts with respect to these guarantees is a function
ultimately reposed by the constitution in the courts.
30 Id., at 310.
31 Majority opinion, pp. 13, 19.
32 Id. at 17.
33 Id., at 24.
34 41 Phi1. 468.