Written in Polity, Vol. 20, No.

2 (winter, 1987), an article under the title of

Political Philosophy and History: The Links between Strauss and Heidegger. By
the American political science Professor James F. Ward
1
seeks a better
understanding for Leo Strausss teachings through exploring intellectual links
between Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss himself.
The main argument is the relation between political philosophy and the history of
political philosophy and since Leo Strausss teachings are considered as an attempt
to answer radical historicism which was perfected by Martin Heidegger, then the
issue of the relation between political philosophy and the history of political
philosophy may lead to shedding the light on aspects tackled by Leo Strauss in his
attempt to turn into history of political philosophy in order to recover the
possibility of political philosophy itself.
The author was guided through one of Strausss interpretive principles which
dictate that the thought of a thinker may be understood as an imitation of its
objects. Two closely related issues were in the mind of the author in his quest for
exploring connections between Strauss and Heidegger.
-The first issue is that there might be a problem inherent in Strausss turning to
historical studies to recover teachings which their authors presented as simply or
timelessly true. The central theme in Strausss thought was that political
philosophy begins with simple or fundamental experiences, this articulation of
experiences form opinions about nature of political things which lead to knowledge
of political things such as (best regime, natural right,..etc.). He argued that modern
natural science and historicism have obscured that natural understanding of
political things.
-The second issue arises from doubts. Some scholars claim that Strauss agreed with
radical historicism. The author argues that the attempt to recover political
philosophy confirms the truth of nihilism which must then be concealed in the
interests of a decent moral and political order.

1

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234783
The article then is divided into four points regarding this relation between
Heidegger and Strauss in order to know how far the claims rose in the previous two
issues are true.
The first point is focusing on the influence drawn on Strauss by Heidegger.
Heideggers was seen by Strauss as offering a history of philosophy that shows the
historicity of being rather than a succession of more or less adequate attempts to
know the nature of the whole. Uprooting this tradition made possible a genuine
return to classical philosophy.
In the second point, the author argues that both Heidegger and Strauss share
reverence for the rank of the greatest of the philosophers they study. Strauss says
that we must understand a philosopher as he understood himself. Strauss meant
that the interpreter must bring a philosophic intention to his task. Heidegger argued
before that it is impossible to understand a philosopher as he understood himself.
The author then moves on to another concept which is Heideggers concept of
language, that the language of the thinker brings to us what is unthought in his
thinking.
Another very important concept in this article and in Heideggers thought as well is
of being since he wrote his famous book Being and Time. For him, the
homogenous differentiating activity of the being is prior to the heterogeneity of the
beings or things that emerge and are given their determinate properties by man.
This leads us to the point that a thinker can never say what is most of all of its own
because what is sayable receives its determination from what is unsayable.
Heidegger criticizes the idea that the early thinkers, being first in point of time are
first and foremost in every respect which is contradictory to Strausss call to return
to classical political philosophy in order to have much clearer vision.
There is a basic agreement between both Heidegger and Strauss as each of them
turns to history in search of the fundamental experiences which lie at the base of
philosophy.
The third point introduces a double vision of the connection between experience
and philosophy. The author focuses first on contexts or Horizons of Heidegger
and Strauss.
The author offers somehow a definition of the notion of horizon: that it may be
understood as the transcendental premise that it is only within a context that
anything can show itself or be intelligible.
Heidegger had a specific understanding of being that consists of two elements, the
first one is that man is the only point of access to being and the second one is any
possibility that nature furnishes access to being. For Heidegger, there can be no
natural order as a standard for human things, there is no permanent horizon for
Heidegger but historical possibility characterizes the horizon.
Unlike Heidegger, Strauss understands horizon in several ways, in thesis of radical
historicism, all knowledge however limited or scientific presupposes a horizon, a
comprehensive view within which knowledge takes place. In the classical thesis
however, knowledge is possible rather than taking place. He claims that the
horizon for radical historicism cannot be validated by reasoning since it is the basis
of all reasoning which means that the choice of horizon is made with no guidance.
The horizon of classical thesis is characterized by a fundamental awareness of the
whole. The very fact that the visions of societies contradict one another forces man
to recognize that these visions are all opinions about the whole. Strauss says that
radical historicism fails to recognize that any horizon is a limited or partial vision
of the whole and he criticizes the philosophy that claims to take its bearings solely
from experience.
While Strauss compared the horizon of the radical historicism thesis to that of the
classical thesis, he used a second different sense of horizon. Strauss claims that the
horizon of a thinker is the limit of what he sees or is able to see or chooses to see.
For him, it is possible to assess rationally the adequacy of the horizon within which
a thinker has chosen to think. The measure is reference to human experience. The
articulations of experiences points out toward nature as the permanent horizon for
the assessment of political teaching.
Strauss criticizes Heidegger for choosing to abstract from the natural articulation of
experiences. The conflict between political philosophy and history appears when
history is understood as historicism: that history is a dimension of reality or a
world and not as a succession of events, a kind of knowledge or a form of inquiry.
Strauss claims that not only a conflict between historicism and political philosophy
but between historicism and philosophy as historicism denies that philosophy as
traditionally understood is possible.
Strauss claims that now philosophy must begin from an artificial of non-
philosophic opinion and not with the articulation of the natural understanding
directly. He also claims that however it is, historicism has limits and that it tends to
blur or distort or ignore but cannot extinguish the evidence of those experiences
regarding right or wrong which shows that there is a natural right.
The author believes that the power of radical historicism is exaggerated; he argues
that Strauss can hardly assert that a certain class of experiences has been blurred or
distorted unless he regards as intelligible that these experiments can be seen
clearly. Moreover, Strauss shows that his own experiences and reflections are not
simply historically conditioned.
Heidegger and Strauss agree that we do not live in the natural or pre-scientific
world but rather in a world that is product of science or profoundly affected by
modern science, Strausss criticism of logical positivism and modern science lead
to his claim that an adequate account of natural science can be produced only on
the basis of the decisive account of the natural understanding, and for him the
ancients provide such an account.
In the Fourth and the last point, the author states two aims among Strausss aims
which are arriving at non-historicist account of historicism and a non-historicist
account of classical philosophy. He argues that philosophy depends upon the
existence of civilization, he agrees with Hegels argument that modern philosophy
cannot begin with natural experiences but must proceed conceptually and
historically. The author asserts that Strausss understanding of interpretation which
compels the interpreter to engage in philosophic activity would mean that those
philosophers would possess essentially the property of requiring the philosophic
activity of the interpreter. Strauss recognized the limits of philosophy or the
distance between the quest and achieving wisdom. For Strauss, the knowledge of
the whole surpasses the knowledge of the part, a synthesis of these two sorts of
knowledge would be wisdom. The author concluded at the end of the article that
historicism. In any case, the truth of historicism and thus what is rightly its due
cannot be disclosed by historical study. Strauss has shown that the foundations of
historicism have nothing to do with history or historical study and everything to do
with the political intentions of the founders of modernity and that after we have
descended the ladder of historical study, we may discard it.
The author moved in the article through different concepts in a sequence that
revolves around the main argument which is the relation between history and
political philosophy, which one depends on the other? On what basis do they
stand? The comparison between Martin Heidegger and Leo Strauss searching for
similarities and differences between their thought in order to have a clearer vision
regarding the main argument. Leo Strauss was the one who called for turning back
to classical political philosophy and Heidegger is regarded by the author himself
that he perfected historicism. Although Strauss was influenced by Heidegger, he
had a contradictory view regarding that of history and nature. Despite the authors
own views which was represented at his conclusion, the issue is very important and
crucial that requires debates as it defines the shape of further political course, and
the aim and possibility of not political philosophy but philosophy itself.













Political Science Department
Third Year



Political Theory
Article Review


Political Philosophy and History: The Links between
Strauss and Heidegger by James F. Ward



By: Hazem Ehab Massoud