1.

Preface
1.1 This Policy is prepared and issued by the Competition Commission (hereinafter the
Commission) as a guideline
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to clarify the Commissions policy approach on matters falling within
its urisdiction in terms of the Competition !ct" !ct #$ of 1$$# (hereinafter the !ct).
1.% This Policy is purely aimed at pro&iding guidance and is not binding on the Commission" the
Competition Tribunal
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(hereinafter the Tribunal) or the Competition !ppeal Court
'
(hereinafter
the !ppeal Court) in the e(ercise of their respecti&e discretions" or their interpretation of the !ct.
1.' )t must be noted that nothing in this Policy shall preclude the Commission from e(ercising its
discretion or powers granted to it in terms of the !ct on matters to which the adopted policy
approach may be applicable.
1.* This Policy becomes effecti&e on the date of publication in the +o&ernment +a,ette and may be
amended by the Commission as the need arises.
2. Introduction
%.1 The Commission was established in terms of the !ct to" inter alia" in&estigate" control and
e&aluate restricti&e practices and abuse of dominant position
*
. The o&erriding purpose of the !ct
is to promote and maintain competition in the economy" and to pre&ent any form of anti-
competiti&e conduct by a firm or a group of firms arising from agreements.
%.% The rele&ant section of the !ct for the purpose of this policy is section *(1)(b)" which reads as
follows.
*. /estricti&e hori,ontal practices prohibited
(1) !n agreement between" or concerted practice by" firms" or a decision by an
association of firms" is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship
and if-
(b) it in&ol&es any of the following restrictive horizontal practices.
1
Section 79 of the Act provides for the publishing of guidelines.
2
Established in terms of section 26 of the Act
3
Established in terms of section 36 of the Act
4
See sections 4 ! " and 9 of the Act.
1
Corporate Leniency Policy
(i) directly or indirectly fi(ing a purchase or selling price or any other
trading condition0
(ii) di&iding mar1ets by allocating customers" suppliers" territories" or
specific types of goods or services0 or
(iii) collusi&e tendering.
%.' The abo&e pro&ision of the !ct is particularly aimed at eradicating and pre&enting cartel acti&ity as
it harms the economy at large. Cartels are particularly a damaging form of anticompetiti&e
agreement often resulting in price increases that are harmful to consumers of goods or ser&ices
concerned. 2ot only does such acti&ity affect consumer welfare" but it also hinders de&elopment
and inno&ation in the industries within which this acti&ity occurs.
%.* Cartel operation is often collusi&e" decepti&e and secreti&e" and is conducted through a
conspiracy among a group of firms" with the result that it becomes difficult to detect or pro&e
without the assistance of a member who is part of it.

%.3 )n its endea&ours to detect" stop" and pre&ent cartel beha&iour" the Commission has" in line with
other international urisdictions" de&eloped this policy to facilitate the process through which firms
participating in a cartel are encouraged to disclose information on the cartel conduct in return for
immunity from prosecution.
%.4 The policy sets out the benefits" procedure and re5uirements for co-operation with the
Commission in e(change for immunity. The granting of immunity becomes an incenti&e for a firm
that participates in a cartel acti&ity to terminate its engagement" and inform the Commission
accordingly.
%.6 This policy shall be 1nown as the Corporate Leniency Policy (C7P).
3. What is the CLP?
'.1 The C7P outlines a process through which the Commission can grant a self-confessing cartel
member" who is first to approach the Commission" immunity or indemnity for its participation in
cartel acti&ity
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upon fulfilling specific re5uirements and conditions by such cartel member.
!
#he $ommission is empo%ered to inter alia investigate alleged contraventions of $hapter 2 &s.21&c'' refer matters to the $ompetition #ribunal &s. 21&g''
and appear before #ribunal as re(uired b) the Act. *) virtue of these provisions the $ommission has po%ers to prosecute cartel activities.
2
'.% )t is a compliance mechanism de&ised to encourage cartel participants to disclose to the
Commission a cartel acti&ity that the Commission is not aware of" to discourage or pre&ent the
formation of cartels and to eradicate this harmful conduct.
'.' )mmunity or indemnity in this conte(t means that the Commission would not subect the
successful applicant
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to adudication
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before the Tribunal for its in&ol&ement in the cartel acti&ity"
which is part of the application under consideration. 8urthermore" the Commission would not
impose any fine to that successful applicant.
'.* )t is a lenient process in that a cartel member that approaches the Commission of its own accord"
and pro&ides information that would result in the institution of proceedings against a cartel" will
not be subected to prosecution that it would ha&e otherwise been subected to had the
Commission unco&ered the cartel acti&ity on its own.
'.3 Thus" a firm in&ol&ed" implicated or suspecting that it is in&ol&ed in cartel acti&ity would be able to
come forward of its own accord and confess to the Commission in return for leniency. )n other
words" if a cartel member realises that such conduct is a contra&ention of the !ct" it could of its
own free will without waiting for the Commission to in&estigate them" report the cartel acti&ity and
re5uest the Commission to deal with it under C7P.
'.4 The C7P therefore ser&es as an aid for the efficient detection and in&estigation of cartels" as well
as effecti&e prosecution of firms in&ol&ed in cartel operations. )t en&isages not only a situation that
the applicant alerts the Commission of the e(istence of cartel acti&ity" but one that would o&er and
abo&e culminate to a successful referral of and adudication of such reported cartel acti&ity" with
the applicant co-operating as a witness against other members of the cartel where necessary.
'.6 The C7P is also adopted in recognition of the fact that not all firms engaging in anticompetiti&e
conduct are aware that such conduct is illegal. )n some sectors some conduct may be so
pre&alent that mar1et players assume it is legal. 9&en those firms that become aware of the
illegal nature of their conduct may fear disclosing the conduct for fear of se&ere conse5uences
flowing from the !ct.
'.# )n short" the C7P is designed in order to unco&er conspiracies that would otherwise go
undetected and to also ma1e the ensuing in&estigations more efficient. )t is for this reason that
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Successful applicant means a firm that meets all the conditions and re(uirements under the $+,.
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Ad-udication means a referral of a contravention of chapter 2 to the #ribunal b) the $ommission %ith a vie% of getting a prescribed fine imposed on the
%rongdoer. ,rosecution has a similar import to ad-udication herein.
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the benefits of leniency are spelt out from the outset to ser&e as an incenti&e for the applicant to
come forward.
'.$ +ranting of immunity under the C7P is not based on the fact that the applicant is &iewed as less of
a cartelist than the other cartel members" but on the fact that the applicant is the first to approach
the Commission and pro&ide information that helps the Commission to uproot the harmful conduct
that it would otherwise not ha&e been able to detect.
'.1: The e(istence of the C7P shall" howe&er" not preclude the Commission from deciding to e(ercise
its powers to in&estigate a cartel in terms of the !ct without considering the matter under the C7P"
if the Commission deems it appropriate to do so in certain instances.
4. How should the CLP be interpreted?
*.1 ;nless otherwise indicated in the C7P" the definitions and interpretation of words or phases used
in this entire document will be those gi&en in section 1 of the !ct.
*.% The terms leniency" immunity and indemnity are used interchangeably as bearing the same
meaning in the C7P.
*.' !ny reference to a number of days in the C7P refers to business days.
. Where is the CLP applicable?
3.1 The C7P is applicable only in respect of cartels. ! cartel refers to an association by agreement
among competing firms to engage in price fi(ing" di&ision or allocation of mar1ets" and<or
collusi&e tendering. This conduct constitutes a per se prohibitions in terms of section *(1)(b) of
the !ct.
3.% These cartel acti&ities need not ha&e been entered into in =outh !frica. 8or as long as a cartel
acti&ity has an effect in =outh !frica" the C7P would apply irrespecti&e of the fact that the acti&ity
ta1es place outside the shores of =outh !frica.
3.' )mmunity granted by another competition authority would not automatically 5ualify the applicant
for immunity by the Commission under the C7P. !s an independent authority" the Commission
must conduct its own in&estigation on alleged contra&entions of the !ct in an independent and
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impartial manner. 8urthermore" no cross-boarder agreements e(ist between the Commission and
other competition authorities on leniency matters.
3.* )mmunity would be granted in respect of separate and &arious cartel acti&ities pro&ided the
applicant meets the re5uirements on each contra&ention reported. Thus" there will be no blan1et
immunity. 8or instance" if an applicant is granted immunity in respect of one contra&ention out of
the three that were committed at a certain gi&en time" such does not automatically indemnify the
applicant in respect of the other two contra&entions. The only e(ception would be in respect of
contra&entions that cannot be se&ered" such may be considered as one.
3.3 The C7P is aimed at cartel acti&ity that is un1nown to the Commission. >owe&er" there is an
e(ception in respect of the following circumstances.
3.3.1 where the Commission is aware of the conduct but has insufficient information" and no
in&estigation has been initiated yet" the applicant that has sufficient information or
e&idence to enable the Commission to institute proceedings may be considered under the
C7P.
3.3.% in respect of pending in&estigations and in&estigations already initiated in the Commission
if the Commission" ha&ing assessed the matter" is of the &iew that it has insufficient
e&idence to prosecute and one of the firms under in&estigation could be used as a 1ey
witness in the prosecution of other firms in&ol&ed in cartel acti&ity.
3.4 ?nly a firm that is first to the door to confess and pro&ide information to the Commission in
respect of cartel acti&ity would 5ualify for immunity under the C7P. )f other members of the cartel
wish to come clean on their in&ol&ement in a cartel to which the applicant has already confessed"
the Commission may e(plore other processes outside the C7P" which may result in the reduction
of a fine" a settlement agreement or a consent order. )n the e&ent that the matter is referred for
adudication in the Tribunal" the Commission may consider as1ing the Tribunal for fa&ourable
treatment
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of the applicants who were not first to come.
.
3.6 The C7P applies to a firm" which includes a person" partnership or a trust. ! person refers to both
a natural and a uristic person. The C7P will apply to a natural person to an e(tent that such
person is in&ol&ed in an economic acti&ity" for instance" a sole trader or a partner in a business
"
.avourable treatment implies substantial or minimum reduced fine from the one prescribed %hich %ill be dictated b) the nature and circumstances of each
case as %ell as the level of cooperation given
!
partnership. 8urthermore" it is important that a person ma1ing the application be the person
authorised to act for a firm in 5uestion.
3.# /eporting of cartel acti&ity by indi&idual employees of a firm or by a person not authorised to act
for such firm will only amount to whistle blowing and not application for leniency under the C7P.
The Commission also encourages whistle blowing" as such would also assist the Commission in
detecting anticompetiti&e beha&iour.
3.$ )t must be noted that the !ct does not attach criminal sanctions to competition law &iolations"
therefore" the C7P would only indemnify the applicant from prosecution for contra&ening section
*(1)(b) of the !ct and the administrati&e fine that may be imposed by the Tribunal. )t would not
absol&e the applicant from criminal liability under any pro&ision of the !ct.
!. What is the nature of the CLP process?
4.1 The C7P is a compliance tool that ser&es as an aid in the in&estigation of cartels. )t is therefore
not in itself an administrati&e action that is subect to re&iew by or appeal at the Tribunal or any
other court of law
$
.
4.% )t is a process that is underta1en on a confidential basis. @isclosure of any information submitted
by the applicant prior to immunity being granted during this process would be made with the
consent of the applicant" pro&ided such consent will not be unreasonably withheld by the
applicant.
4.' )t is applied on a case-by-case basis. The Commission will e(ercise its discretion whether or not
to consider granting immunity but will endea&our to consistently apply the C7P in all deser&ing
cases.
4.* 8air and proper administration of the !ct underlies it" not prosecution of selfAconfessed cartel
members. )t is for this reason that honesty and cooperation are paramount for the effecti&e
implementation of the C7P.
4.3 2othing in the C7P shall limit the rights of any person who has been inured by cartel acti&ity in
respect of which the Commission has granted immunity. +ranting of immunity under the C7P
9
See /orvatis SA &,t)' +td 0 1thers vs #he $ompetition $ommission 0 1thers &222$32*24un512$#' and 6en7i Simelane 0 1thers vs Seven Eleven
$orporation &,t)' +td 0 1thers &4"5225512S$A'. Also see e8clusions provided in terms of section 1&i'&a'&ff' of the ,romotion of 4ustice Act 2555 &Act 3 of
2555'
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does not shield the applicant from any ci&il action
1:
that may arise from the cartel conduct in
respect of which the Commission has granted immunity.
". When would the CLP not apply?
6.1 There are &arious instances in which the C7P clearly would not be applicable" which include" but
not limited to" the following.
6.1.1 where the cartel conduct in respect of which immunity is sought falls outside the ambit of
the !ct0
6.1.% where the matter relates to an attempted unsuccessful cartel conduct0
6.1.' where another member within the cartel has already made an application for leniency
under the C7P0
6.1.* where there is lac1 of the re5uired cooperation from the applicant0 or
6.1.3 where the applicant fails to meet the re5uirements and conditions set out in the C7P.
6.% )t is the approach of the Commission that unsuccessful applicants" if they so wish" be
encouraged to cooperate with the Commission and attempt negotiations to settle the matter with
the Commission through a settlement agreement or a consent order" which may result in a
reduced fine.
6.' The Commission may" on its own initiation in deser&ing cases" e(plore other lenient approaches
outside the C7P in respect of unsuccessful applicants.
#. How to ascertain if the CLP will be applicable?

#.1 Bhere a firm is unsure whether or not the C7P would apply to a particular conduct" it may
approach the Commission on a hypothetical basis to get clarity. This may be done telephonically
or in writing. ! firm concerned may choose to remain anonymous if it wishes to.
#.% ! firm that chooses to disclose its identity or any rele&ant information at this stage does so at its
own ris1 because it would not be protected by the C7P at this stage. >owe&er" the Commission
will protect information submitted by applicants and treat it with utmost confidentiality.
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A right to bring a civil claim for damages arising from a prohibited practice comes into e8istence on the date that the #ribunal made a determination in
respect of a matter that affects that person or in case of an appeal on the date that the appeal process in respect of that matter is concluded &see s. 6!&9''. #hus
granting of immunit) per se does not give rise to such right.
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#.' !ny clarification issued in this regard will not ha&e a binding effect on the Commission" the
Tribunal or the !ppeal Court. )t is merely issued to guide the would-be applicant as to whether a
conduct would be considered for leniency under the C7P.
$. What for%s of leniency are applicable in the CLP?
$.1 !pplicants for leniency may e(pect the following result(s) to their applications.
$.1.1 Conditional i%%unity
$.1.1.1 This is normally gi&en to an applicant at the initial stage of the application so as to create
a good atmosphere and trust between the applicant and the Commission pending the
finalisation of the leniency process. This is done in writing between the applicant and the
Commission signalling that leniency has been pro&isionally granted.
$.1.1.% Conditional immunity would therefore precede total immunity or no immunity. ?nce the
Commission finalises all the preliminary in&estigations and is of the &iew that it has
sufficient e&idence to institute proceedings in respect of the reported cartel conduct" it will
gi&e the co-operating applicant total immunity.
$.1.1.' The Commission reser&es the right to re&o1e the conditional immunity if the applicant
does not co-operate.
$.1.2 &otal I%%unity
$.1.%.1 Total immunity is granted to a successful applicant who.
a. has fully met all the conditions and the re5uirements0
b. has not been found guilty of engaging in cartel acti&ity before in terms of the !ct0
and
c. in respect of the current application has not been the instigator or the leader of the
cartel.
$.1.%.% )n situations where the applicant has failed to meet any one of the abo&e conditions" and
the applicant is the only one that has come forward in respect of that particular cartel
acti&ity with the result that no successful adudication can be achie&ed without the
"
applicant being used as a witness against other cartel members" the Commission may
consider granting leniency.
$.1.%.' The situation described in $.1.%.% abo&e will not be applied lightly. 9(treme caution will be
e(ercised as this e(ception may be open to abuse.
$.1.3 'o i%%unity
$.1.'.1 This applies in those cases where the applicant fails to meet the conditions and
re5uirements. )t also applies to applicants who ha&e been found to be dishonest in their
applications with the result that the process does not achie&e the intended purpose.
$.1.'.% ?nce immunity is not granted" the Commission would be at liberty to deal with the
applicant as pro&ided for in the !ct. )n the same breath the Commission may consider a
settlement agreement or a consent order" or where a matter is referred" as1ing the
Tribunal for a reduction of fine in respect of the unsuccessful applicant.
$.1.'.' !n applicant that does not meet all the re5uirements but wishes to be considered for
some form of fa&ourable treatment may also approach the Commission for a possible
settlement of the matter.
1(. What are the re)uire%ents and conditions for leniency under the CLP?
1:.1 The applicant for immunity under the C7P will 5ualify for leniency pro&ided it meets the following
re5uirements.
(a) the applicant must honestly pro&ide the Commission with complete and truthful disclosure
of all e&idence" information and documents in its possession or under its control relating to
the cartel acti&ity0
(b) the applicant must thereafter offer full and e(peditious co-operation to the Commission
concerning the reported cartel acti&ity. =uch co-operation should be continuously offered
until the Commissions in&estigations are finalised and the subse5uent proceedings in the
Tribunal are completed0
(c) the applicant must immediately stop the cartel acti&ity or act as directed by the
Commission0
(d) the applicant must not ha&e been the instigator of" or coerced other firm(s) to be part of the
cartel acti&ity0 and
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(e) the applicant must not alert former cartel members that it has applied for leniency
1:.% The Commission will e(ercise its discretion on whether or not to consider an application for
leniency under the C7P whene&er the abo&e situations e(ist. The Commission will" howe&er"
endea&our to grant immunity to all deser&ing applicants.
1:.' )t is a standing condition in any application for leniency to the Commission that any applicant who
ma1es a misrepresentation concerning the material facts shall not get immunity. !lso if an
applicant is dishonest" the Commission reser&es the right to stop the leniency process and deal
with the party as pro&ided for by the !ct.
1:.* )f the applicant fails to meet the re5uirements and conditions through no fault of its own" the
Commission may in deser&ing appropriate cases still grant leniency. This could be the case where
for e(ample a firm applying for leniency is unable to pro&ide re5uired documentary e&idence
which is in possession of a third person and cannot ha&e access to it.
11. What is the procedure to be followed in the CLP?
11.1 The procedure outlined herein is aimed at ensuring efficient facilitation of the C7P" and the
Commission may e(ercise some fle(ibility where necessary to achie&e the desired outcome. 8or
instance" where the process refers to a meeting" the Commission may in certain circumstances
choose to use other forms of communicating with the applicant without ha&ing a meeting. The
procedure is as follows.
11.1.1 *irst Contact with the Co%%ission
11.1.1.1The applicant must ma1e an application for leniency in writing to the Commission by
facsimile or e-mail
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. The application must contain information substantial enough to
enable the Commission to identify the cartel conduct and its participants in order to
determine whether or not an application for leniency has been made in respect of the
same conduct. )t is not necessary for the applicant to disclose its identity at this stage.
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Applications ma) also be hand delivered to the $ommission9s offices.
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11.1.1.%)f another firm has already made an application in respect of the same conduct" the
Commission must ad&ise the applicant accordingly in writing or by telephone within fi&e
(3) days" or within a reasonable period after receipt of the application.
11.1.1.')f no firm has made an application already" the Commission must ad&ise the applicant
accordingly in writing or by telephone. The applicant must thereafter within fi&e (3) days"
or within a reasonable period after receipt of such ad&ice from the Commission ma1e an
arrangement for the first meeting with the Commission. !t this stage the Commission
would re5uire the full identity of the applicant.
11.1.2 *irst +eetin, with the Co%%ission
11.1.%.1The applicant must bring all the rele&ant information" e&idence and documents at its
disposal relating to the cartel acti&ity for consideration by the Commission. The applicant
must answer all the 5uestions that the Commission may as1 in relation to conduct being
reported or matters relating thereto.
11.1.%.%The purpose of this meeting would be to find out whether the applicants case would
5ualify for consideration under the C7P. !t this stage the Commission may only ha&e sight
of and peruse all the documents brought by the applicant but may not ma1e copies. The
Commission must within fi&e (3) days" or within a reasonable time after the date of the first
meeting ma1e a decision on whether or not the applicants case 5ualifies for consideration
and inform the applicant accordingly in writing.
11.1.%.')f the Commission decides that the applicant 5ualifies for consideration under the C7P"
arrangements for a second meeting will be made. !t this stage the applicant would
officially be considered as the first applicant in respect of the cartel acti&ity in 5uestion.
11.1.%.*)f the Commission decides that the applicant does not 5ualify for leniency the applicant
would be ad&ised so in writing. This would be regarded as 2o )mmunity.
11.1.3 -econd %eetin, with the Co%%ission
11.1.'.1The aim of this meeting would be to discuss and grant conditional immunity to the
applicant pending finalisation of any further in&estigations by the Commission in the
matter. !t this stage the applicant will be re5uired to bring forward any other rele&ant
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information" e&idence and documents that it may still ha&e in its possession or under its
control. The Commission would be able to ma1e copies of all documents pro&ided.
11.1.'.%! written agreement between the applicant and the Commission" otherwise 1nown as the
conditional immunity" which will be granted subect to the general conditions and
re5uirements of the C7P" as well as any other specific conditions and re5uirements" will be
agreed upon between the applicant and the Commission.
11.1.'.'The Commission shall maintain confidentiality on all information" e&idence and
documents gi&en to it throughout the process. ;se of documents and information obtained
from the applicant at the Tribunal in terms of the !ct shall not amount to the breach of
confidentiality.
11.1.4 In.esti,ations/ 0nalysis and 1erification
11.1.*.1!fter the granting of conditional immunity" the Commission will mo&e forward with its
in&estigations relating to the cartel acti&ity. The Commission will analyse and &erify
information or documents gi&en by applicant against any e(isting or disco&ered
information and<or documents. !t this stage the Commission may use all methods and
tools pro&ided for in the !ct" including inter&iew" subpoena" search or summon any firm(s)
whom it belie&es could assist in connection with the matter.
11.1.*.%?nce the Commission is through with this e(ercise and is satisfied that all the conditions
and the re5uirements are met" a final meeting would be arranged. =imilarly" should the
Commission not be satisfied it can call a meeting with the applicant either to re&o1e the
conditional immunity or to solicit further documents or information so as to enable the
Commission to complete the e(ercise.

11.1. *inal %eetin,
11.1.3.1!fter the Commission has completed its in&estigation and is satisfied that it has sufficient
information to institute proceedings" it will con&erge with the applicant in order to grant
total immunity to the applicant" which will cancel the conditional immunity. Total immunity
will be in writing.
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11.1.3.%Total immunity is characterised by an underta1ing on the part of the applicant completely
agreeing to be the witness for the Commission" where necessary" in the proceedings
relating to the cartel acti&ity in respect of which it has been gi&en immunity. 8urther" total
immunity will" as a condition" re5uire the applicant to fully co-operate with the Commission
in all aspects concerning that cartel acti&ity. )n turn the Commission will not prosecute or
fine the successful applicant.
11.1.3.'=hould the applicant wish to stop its participation in the process" it runs the ris1 of being
dealt with in terms of the !ct. !lthough the Commission will not use the e&idence obtained
from the applicant in subse5uent proceedings" there is nothing precluding it from getting
such e&idence from the applicant by the methods created by the !ct.
12. When can leniency be re.o2ed?
1%.1 /e&ocation may occur at anytime in respect of either a conditional immunity or total immunity.
1%.% The Commission will re&o1e a conditional or total immunity in writing.
1%.' /e&ocation may occur for &arious reasons" which include" lac1 of cooperation by the applicant"
misrepresentation of facts" dishonesty and failure by the applicant to meet conditions set for
either a conditional or total immunity"
1%.* )t must be noted that" in terms of section 6'(%)(d) of the !ct" a person commits an offence when
s<he 1nowingly pro&ides false information to the Commission. Thus" an applicant whose immunity
has been re&o1ed by the Commission based on the pro&ision of false information" will be liable to
penalties stipulated in section 6*(1)(b)" if con&icted of such an offence.
1%.3 Bhere either a conditional or total immunity is re&o1ed" the Commission may decide to pursue
the matter in terms of the rele&ant pro&isions of the !ct.
13. What is the effect of unsuccessful applications under the CLP?
1'.1 8actors such as lac1 of cooperation" failure to meet the re5uirements" dishonesty" pro&iding
insufficient e&idence or ha&ing instigated a cartel would result in an unsuccessful application" the
effect of which would include the following.
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1'.1.1 The Commission would be at liberty to in&estigate the matter and refer it for adudication
in terms of the pro&isions of the !ct if it deems it necessary to do so.
1'.1.% The Commission may" depending on the matter" as1 for a lenient sanction when referring
a matter to the Tribunal in respect of a firm whose application has been unsuccessful.
1'.1.' The Commission and<or the unsuccessful applicant may initiate negotiations for a
settlement agreement or a consent order" which may also result in reduction of a fine that
may be imposed in terms of the !ct
1%
.
14. Conclusion
.
1*.1 )n de&eloping the C7P" the Commission has done a re&iew and comparison of leniency policies
adopted by competition authorities in the 9uropean ;nion (9;)" Canada" !ustralia" ;nited
Cingdom (;C) and ;nited =tates of !merica (;=!).
1*.% !fter re&iewing and comparing these policies and how they ha&e been implemented" it appears
that leniency policies in almost all urisdictions concerned ha&e pro&ed to be one of the most
effecti&e tools to deal with cartels.
1*.' The C7P has been tailored to be consistent with the legal and regulatory framewor1 that e(ist in
=outh !frica.
1*.* The general re5uirements for granting leniency also seem to be substantially the same and
consistent in all the urisdictions re&iewed. The C7P is therefore based on those general
re5uirements.
1*.3 The effecti&e implementation of the C7P will re5uire dedicated resources in order to achie&e the
desirable outcome.
1*.4 Da1ing the leniency policy a&ailable to the public will create awareness of benefits that firms" big
and small" may ta1e ad&antage of. The C7P will" therefore" also be a&ailable in a boo1let form
and on the Commissions website.

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#he #ribunal has po%ers to order a fine of up to 15: of the firms9 annual turnover in terms of the Act.
14
1*.6 )t is en&isaged that a leniency of the nature adopted by the Commission in the C7P would lead to
detection and e(peditious finalisation of cases that otherwise would ha&e been difficult" if not
impossible" to crac1.
13. Bhom to contact at the Commission regarding the C7PE
13.1 8irms see1ing to ma1e general en5uiries on the C7P or see1ing clarification on whether or not
leniency would be considered may contact the Corporate Co%pliance Coordinator.
Compliance @i&ision at.
Telephone number F2" 12 4#2 $(!!
8acsimile number. F2" 12 4#2 $12(
e-mail address. ccsa3co%pco%.co.4a
13.% 8irms see1ing to ma1e an application may forward them for the attention of the +ana,er.
9(emptions and 9nforcement @i&ision at.
@edicated 7ine. 52" 12 4#2 $(12
8acsimile number. F2" 12 4#2 $11#
9-mail6 dianet3co%pco%.co.4a or
>and deli&er the application to. cnr +lenwood /d and ?beron =tr. Gloc1 G" +lenfield
?ffice Par1" 8aerie +len" Pretoria.
13.' 8irms may also &isit the Commissions Bebsite at www.compcom.co.,a for further information.
7eferences
1.Cartel /egulation. +lobal Competition /e&iew" %::'
%. 8ighting >ard-Core Cartels. >arm" 9ffecti&e =anctions and 7eniency Programmes" ?9C@" %::%
'. !CCC 7eniency Policy 8or Cartel Conduct. Hune %::'
*. )mmunity Program ;nder The Competition !ct. Competition Gureau )nformation Gulletin" %:::
3. Corporate 7eniency Policy. @epartment ?f Hustice" !ugust 1$$'
1!