Every office, factory or shop has at least one a piece
of equipment that is getting on a bit, spends more time broken than working, and probably costs more in repairs than it would cost to replace. It could be a coffee machine, or a printer, or something as simple as a price-labelling machine. This dwindling usefulness is what economists (and accountants) call depreciation: the value of capital goods falls over time because they no longer work as well as they once did. Businesses have to buy new capital goods to replace the old ones, otherwise they will not be able to produce as much as they could before (because the machines keep breaking down). These capital goods must be produced from somewhere, so they contribute to gross domestic product (GDP). Even if they are imported, they will at least contribute to the GDP of the country where they were produced. Business investment spending is often described as spending on new equipment and structures to expand capacity. This statement is mostly wrong. More precisely, in the US this statement is usually about 70-80% wrong. Depreciation spending to replace worn out capital goods has historically made up the vast majority of investment spending. So most investment is actually spending on new equipment and structures to maintain capacity. Only 20-30% of investment spending has historically gone towards actually expanding capacity. The rate at which capital stock depreciates varies a lot. For structures, the rate is about 3%. So in 2011, the value of nonresidential structures in the US was put at around USD 11.5 trillion. The cost of maintaining that level of stock in 2012 was about USD 360 billion. Equipment depreciates more quickly at about 14%, as would be expected given that machinery tends to have a lot more moving parts. Computers and software in particular depreciate very quickly, although over time this has been offset by other equipment lasting longer. Intellectual property, the third component of investment spending, depreciates most rapidly at about 25% each year. This may sound high, but think about how much value the intellectual property associated with VCRs is worth in the age of Blu-ray and downloads. Following the financial crisis, US gross business investment (which includes depreciation) fell to its lowest level as a share of GDP since the 1960s (see chart 1). Since then, it has recovered somewhat but only to match the low-point of the last cycle in 2004. This in itself suggested that gross business investment looks unusually low. What is really unusual this time is how low net investment (i.e. excluding depreciation) has been. Joshua McCallum Head of Fixed Income Economics UBS Global Asset Management joshua.mccallum@ubs.com Gianluca Moretti Fixed Income Economist UBS Global Asset Management gianluca.moretti@ubs.com Business investment spending in the US has started to pick up but what is often unappreciated is that most of investment spending is simply replacing ageing equipment. Spending on new capital goods to actually expand capacity remains extremely low, and will need to rise if the US economy is to grow properly once more. Chart 1: Under-capitalised US gross and net business investment, % of nominal GDP Economist Insights A capital idea Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Net Recession Gross 2010 2000 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 The views expressed are as of July 2014 and are a general guide to the views of UBS Global Asset Management. This document does not replace portfolio and fund- specific materials. 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The opinions expressed are a reflection of UBS Global Asset Managements best judgment at the time this document is compiled and any obligation to update or alter forward-looking statements as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise is disclaimed. Furthermore, these views are not intended to predict or guarantee the future performance of any individual security, asset class, markets generally, nor are they intended to predict the future performance of any UBS Global Asset Management account, portfolio or fund. UBS 2014. The key symbol and UBS are among the registered and unregistered trademarks of UBS. All rights reserved. 23971 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, firms were busy downsizing: firing staff, cutting back on expenses and cancelling expansion plans. Net investment dropped to less than 1% of GDP, compared to a long-run average of about 3-4%. Even now it has risen to only 2% of GDP. The massive policy uncertainty created by the debt issues in Washington DC cannot have helped encourage businesses to expand capacity. Several years of very low net investment have also created a backlog of missed investment; a sort of net investment gap. The lack of business investment is one of the contributory factors to recent low growth in the US but mainly in terms of a lack of spending on capital goods, rather than productive capacity. However, the lack of investment has fed into some of the concerns about structural stagnation. If the labour force is growing less quickly and firms are not expanding capacity, where is growth meant to come from? These concerns would be put to rest if net investment picks up again, but that is a crucial if. If not now, then when? Just looking at the numbers, there is little apparent reason for US firms to hold back on investment. Corporate balance sheets remain strong, with lots of cash available to finance investment. Interest rates remain close to zero, and corporate bond yields dropped to all-time lows once the post-crash panic faded. This not only makes borrowing cheaper, but it also makes the opportunity cost of investment spending even lower: there will be no shortage of investment projects that would be expected to return more than a firm would get by sticking its money into a bank account. Surveys of equity investors also suggest that shareholders are looking for higher capital expenditures from the firms whose equity they hold. So far there has been little sign of this. Firms respond by saying that they are being cautious because of all the uncertainty around government policy. The debt ceiling, government shutdown and Obamacare have all created a lot of uncertainty. It is easy enough for firms to choose to delay their investment plans until the situation becomes more clear, and this is what they have been doing. But this excuse is rapidly fading. A commonly used measure of policy uncertainty has been correlated with the weakness in investment (see Economist Insights, 21 October 2013), but the index has recently dropped back to pre-2006 levels. There are initial signs that firms do intend to invest. The longest-running survey of investment intentions in the US is the Philadelphia Feds Business Outlook survey. While this only covers a small part of the US, it has long been highly correlated with business investment. This indicator points to a resurgence in business investment this year (see chart 2). If correct, net business investment could finally stage its promised recovery. This could be the final factor that triggers a more rapid pace of US growth. Businesses are running out of excuses not to invest. Time to not just replace that run-down coffee machine, but also to buy a second one. Chart 2: Time to spend Real business investment growth and the Philadelphia Fed survey on expected capital expenditures over the next 6 months Source: BEA, Philadelphia Fed -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 Business investment YoY (lhs) 2013 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Philly Fed capex (rhs, 12m avg)