TIO vs.

VRB
151 SCRA 208
GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
"The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to
impose the tax was to favor one industry over another."

FACTS: The petitioner assails the validity of PD 1987 entitled an "Act creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board," citing especially Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross
receipts payable to the local government. Petitioner contends that aside from its being a rider
and not germane to the subject matter thereof, and such imposition was being harsh,
confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawfully restraints trade in violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Is PD 1987 a valid exercise of taxing power of the state?

HELD: Yes. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes
is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as those rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is,
in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature
to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another.


CITY OF BAGUIO vs. DE LEON
25 SCRA 938
GR No. L-24756, October 31, 1968
"There is no double taxation where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by
the city."

FACTS: The City of Baguio passed an ordinance imposing a license fee on any person, entity or
corporation doing business in the City. The ordinance sourced its authority from RA No. 329,
thereby amending the city charter empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate businesses,
trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in the City. De Leon was assessed for
P50 annual fee it being shown that he was engaged in property rental and deriving income
therefrom. The latter assailed the validity of the ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires for there
is no statury authority which expressly grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax, and that there it
imposed double taxation, and violates the requirement of uniformity.

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendant-appellant tenable?

HELD: No. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code
empowering the City Council not only to impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of
revenue, thus the ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires for there is more than ample
statury authority for the enactment thereof.
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city, so that where, as here, Congress has clearly
expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results.
And third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the
same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.


BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ
74 SCRA 306
GR No. L-41631, December 17, 1976
"The entrusting of the collection of the fees to private entities does not destroy the public
purpose of a tax ordinance."

FACTS: Aside from the issue on publication, private respondent bewails that the market stall fees
imposed in the disputed City Ordinance No. 7522, which regulates public markets and prescribes
fees for rentals of stalls, are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said
corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract."

ISSUE: Does the delegation of the collection of taxes to a private entity invalidates a tax ordinance
and defeats its public purpose?

HELD: No. The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not
go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the
corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The
entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So
long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is
dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and
object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or
corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for
a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.


PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived
from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."

FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works
particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the
feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were
nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio
Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which
projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to
the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people
living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the
government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets,
made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government?

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue
for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus
the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage
of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.


COMMISSIONER vs. BOAC
149 SCRA 395
GR No. L-65773-74 April 30, 1987
"The source of an income is the property, activity or service that produced the income. For such
source to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived
from activity within the Philippines."

FACTS: Petitioner CIR seeks a review of the CTA's decision setting aside petitioner's assessment
of deficiency income taxes against respondent British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) for
the fiscal years 1959 to 1971. BOAC is a 100% British Government-owned corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the United Kingdom, and is engaged in the international airline
business. During the periods covered by the disputed assessments, it is admitted that BOAC had
no landing rights for traffic purposes in the Philippines. Consequently, it did not carry
passengers and/or cargo to or from the Philippines, although during the period covered by the
assessments, it maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines Wamer Barnes and
Company, Ltd., and later Qantas Airways which was responsible for selling BOAC tickets
covering passengers and cargoes. The CTA sided with BOAC citing that the proceeds of sales of
BOAC tickets do not constitute BOAC income from Philippine sources since no service of carriage
of passengers or freight was performed by BOAC within the Philippines and, therefore, said
income is not subject to Philippine income tax. The CTA position was that income from
transportation is income from services so that the place where services are rendered determines
the source.

ISSUE: Are the revenues derived by BOAC from sales of ticket for air transportation, while having
no landing rights here, constitute income of BOAC from Philippine sources, and accordingly,
taxable?

HELD: Yes. The source of an income is the property, activity or service that produced the income.
For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the
income is derived from activity within the Philippines. In BOAC's case, the sale of tickets in the
Philippines is the activity that produces the income. The tickets exchanged hands here and
payments for fares were also made here in Philippine currency. The site of the source of
payments is the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded from, and occurred within, Philippine
territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the Philippine government. In consideration of
such protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of supporting the government.


ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING DEVT CORP vs. CIR
524 SCRA 73, 103
GR Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007
"The taxpayer must justify his claim for tax exemption or refund by the clearest grant of organic
or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague implications."

"Export processing zones (EPZA) are effectively considered as foreign territory for tax purposes."

FACTS: Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production, and
sale of various mineral products, filed claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on its
purchases of capital goods and on its zero-rated sales in the taxable quarters of the years 1990
and 1992. BIR did not immediately act on the matter prompting the petitioner to file a petition
for review before the CTA. The latter denied the claims on the grounds that for zero-rating to
apply, 70% of the company's sales must consists of exports, that the same were not filed within
the 2-year prescriptive period (the claim for 1992 quarterly returns were judicially filed only on
April 20, 1994), and that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to support its claim for
refund/credit.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that CTA failed to consider the following: sales to
PASAR and PHILPOS within the EPZA as zero-rated export sales; the 2-year prescriptive period
should be counted from the date of filing of the last adjustment return which was April 15, 1993,
and not on every end of the applicable quarters; and that the certification of the independent CPA
attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary of suppliers invoices or receipts
examined, evaluated and audited by said CPA should substantiate its claims.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner corporation sufficiently establish the factual bases for its applications
for refund/credit of input VAT?

HELD: No. Although the Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year
prescriptive period for the filing of claims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted from
the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales to PASAR and PHILPOS inside the
EPZA are taxed as exports because these export processing zones are to be managed as a
separate customs territory from the rest of the Philippines, and thus, for tax purposes, are
effectively considered as foreign territory, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for
refund of its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and effectively zero-rated sales during
the period claimed for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and sufficient
evidence.
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. It is regarded as in derogation of the sovereign
authority, and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. The taxpayer who claims for exemption must justify his claim by the clearest grant of
organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague implications.


BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA vs. CTA, NWSA
8 SCRA 224
GR No. L-18125, May 31, 1963
"A tax on property of the Government, whether national or local, would merely have the effect of
taking money from one pocket to put it in another pocket."

FACTS: National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA), a public corporation owned by
the Government of the Philippines as well as all property comprising waterworks and sewerage
systems placed under it, took over the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System in 1956. It
was assessed by the Provincial Assessor of Laguna, for purposes of real estate taxes, on the real
properties owned by Cabuyao Waterworks. The respondent protested claiming it is exempted
from the payment of real estate taxes in view of the nature and kind of said property and
functions and activities of petitioner. The petitioner denied the protest arguing that such real
properties are subject to real estate tax because although said properties belong to the Republic
of the Philippines, the same holds it, not in its governmental, political or sovereign capacity, but
in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character, which, allegedly, is not covered by the
exemption contained in section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470.

ISSUE: Are the real properties owned by the respondent public corporation subject to real estate
tax?

HELD: No. Republic Act No. 470 makes no distinction between property held in a sovereign,
governmental or political capacity and those possessed in a private, proprietary or patrimonial
character. And where the law does not distinguish neither may we, unless there are facts and
circumstances clearly showing that the lawmaker intended the contrary, but no such facts and
circumstances have been brought to our attention. Indeed, the noun "property" and the verb
"owned" used in said section 3(a) strongly suggest that the object of exemption is considered
more from the view point of dominion, than from that of domain.
Moreover, taxes are financial burdens imposed for the purpose of raising revenues with which
to defray the cost of the operation of the Government, and a tax on property of the Government,
whether national or local, would merely have the effect of taking money from one pocket to put it
in another pocket. Hence, it would not serve, in the final analysis, the main purpose of taxation.
What is more, it would tend to defeat it, on account of the paper work, time and consequently,
expenses it would entail.


PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. CITY OF BUTUAN
24 SCRA 789
GR No. L-22814, August 28, 1968
"The classification made in the exercise of power to tax, to be valid, must be reasonable ."

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola sought to recover the sums paid by it under protest, to the
City of Butuan, and collected by the latter, pursuant to its Municipal Ordinance No. 110 which
plaintiff assails as null and void because it partakes of the nature of an import tax, amounts to
double taxation, highly unjust and discriminatory, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory, and
constitutes an invlaid delegation of the power to tax. The ordinance imposes taxes for every case
of softdrinks, liquors and other carbonated beverages, regardless of the volume of sales, shipped
to the agents and/or consignees by outside dealers or any person or company having its actual
business outside the City.

ISSUE: Does the tax ordinance violate the uniformity requirement of taxation?

HELD: Yes. The tax levied is discriminatory. Even if the burden in question were regarded as a tax
on the sale of said beverages, it would still be invalid, as discriminatory, and hence, violative of
the uniformity required by the Constitution and the law therefor, since only sales by "agents or
consignees" of outside dealers would be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or
on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales, and even if the same
exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established
outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the disputed tax.
It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not
require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the
objects of taxation. The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must,
however, be reasonable and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the
legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to
future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies
equally to all those who belong to the same class.


PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN
69 SCRA 460
GR No. L-31156, February 27, 1976
"Legislative power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries
with it the power to confer on such local governmental agencies the power to tax.

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction to
declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,
unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos.
23 and 27 denominated as "municipal production tax" of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null
and void. Ordinance 23 levies and collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tax
of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked, and Ordinance 27
levies and collects "on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of
this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume
capacity. Aside from the undue delegation of authority, appellant contends that it allows double
taxation, and that the subject ordinances are void for they impose percentage or specific tax.

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the appellant tenable?

HELD: No. On the issue of undue delegation of taxing power, it is settled that the power of
taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to
every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. It is a power
that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the
executive or judicial department of the government without infringing upon the theory of
separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to
which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in
respect of matters of local concern. By necessary implication, the legislative power to create
political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer
on such local governmental agencies the power to tax.
Also, there is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared
unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating
authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not
be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the same for its own
prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law, so
that double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of
the same governmental entity or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case
where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.
On the last issue raised, the ordinances do not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on
sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or
not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayer's production of soft drinks is
considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is not set
ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of the tax.


OSMEA vs. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as
amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of
fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies
in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products
establishment is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the
petitioner points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the
special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by
the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund
is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund;
and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless
remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon
the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by
which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the
local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly
authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.


VILLEGAS vs. HIU CHIONG
86 SCRA 270
GR No. L-29646, November 10, 1978
"A tax law should be declared invalid if it fails to lay down standards to guide or limit the actions
of the taxing authority."

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibits aliens from
being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business, without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00. The repondent challenged the validity of the ordinance upon the contention that it does
not qualify as a valid exercise of the power to tax for as a revenue measure imposed on aliens
employed in the City of Manila, the ordinance is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the
uniformity in taxation, and as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful
and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of
proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or
limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of
legislative powers:

ISSUE: Is there a valid exercise of the taxing power of the local government?

HELD: None. First, the ordinance is not a regulatory or police power measure; it is but a revenue
measure guise in a police power measure. Second, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only
because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based
on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he
is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive.
On the illegal delegation part of the argument, Ordinance No. 6537 is void for it does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been
held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard
to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.

ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. vs. ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
18 SCRA 488
GR No. L-21841, October 28, 1966
"Exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority."

FACTS: Petitioner, engaged in the industry of processing gasoline, oils etc., claims for the refund
of special import taxes paid pursuant to the provision of RA 1394 which imposed a special
import tax "on all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the Philippines." Exempt
from this tax, by express mandate of Section 6 of the same law are "machinery, equipment,
accessories, and spare parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters and
farmers". Petitioner argued that the importation it made of gas pumps used by their gasoline
station operators should fall under such exemptions, being directly used in its industry. The
Collector of Customs of Manila rejected the claim, and so as the Court on Tax Appeals. The CTA
noted that the pumps imported were not used in the processing of gasoline and other oil
products but by the gasoline stations, owned by the petitioner, for pumping out, from
underground barrels, gasoline sold on retail to customers.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? Does the subject imports fall into the
exemptions?

HELD: No. The contention runs smack against the familiar rules that exemption from taxation is
not favored, and that exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Which are but statements
in adherence to the ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tested by this precept, we
cannot indulge in expansive construction and write into the law an exemption not therein set
forth. Rather, we go by the reasonable assumption that where the State has granted in express
terms certain exemptions, those are the exemptions to be considered, and no more. Since the law
states that, to be tax exempt, equipment and spare parts should be "for the use of industries", the
coverage herein should not be enlarged to include equipment and spare parts for use in
dispensing gasoline at retail.