THE DEADLY PRICE

OF POLICE COMPLACENCY

The complacency over peace in Punjab was shattered by the bomb blast that
killed Punjab chief minister Beant Singh in front of the Punjab and Haryana
secretariat building at Chandigarh on August 31, 1995. The assassination
vindicated the axiom that superficial calm in a situation of serious conflict can be
deceptive.
Complacency on the part of the general public is understandable;
complacency even on part of ordinary government functionaries can be
accepted. But how authorities responsible for security functions ignored the
prime tenets of internal security, and slackened their guard in respect of Punjab
terrorism is something difficult to answer.
Firstly, it is unreasonable to presume that the blaze of terrorism which raised
its head with the Akali-Nirankari clash of April 13, 1978, reached its crescendo
in 1985 and continued with undiminished vigor up to 1992, died down
immediately after an elected government came to power. A bomb blast near the
Indian Youth Congress office in Delhi on September 11, 1993 killed eight
persons though Youth Congress president M.S.Bitta survived the attempt and
the Khalistan Liberation Force kidnapped the son of Ram Niwas Mirdha.
A minor blast in a car in proximity to chief minister Beant Singh near
Dholewas Chowk in Ludhiana, the hub of previous terrorist activities, preceded
the more daring venture. Thirdly it is rather foolish to believe that a movement
that dug deep roots in countries like Pakistan, the USA, the UK and Canada
through committed cadres withered away just because an elected government
was restored, or militants were overpowered.
It was often claimed by political observers that terrorism in Punjab in general
and the activities of the Babbar Khalsa International in particular came to a virtual
end with the death of Babbar Khalsa leader, Sukhdev Singh Babbar, after being
caught at patiala in August 1992 Such assessments are far from ground realities.
No militancy having deep roots depends for its survival on a few leaders, the
fear of the government or the resolution of minor issues. Such developments

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may only bring about an ephemeral lull in their activities. It is simplistic to

presume that transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and settlement of water and
territorial disputes of Punjab with Haryana and Rajasthan would have banished
militancy. Terrorism has its own cycles of rise and fall, before it finally withers
away with a loss in emotional fervor.
A lull in militancy for a few months or years should not lead to conclusion
that terrorism is out. Ironically, Beant Singh as chief minister knew this better than
anybody. He often spoke about the continued threat of militants and called for
a joint security zone to fight them.
The fact remains that there was no social base to militancy in Punjab even at
the best of times. The close family links of Sikhs and Hindus with often both
religions coexisting in a single home and family render the demand for Khalistan
rather unrealistic and shallow. Issues like Chandigarh and water and territorial
disputes with neighboring states scarcely arouse the passions of the hoi polloi
among Sikhs. Lives, finance and peace having been shattered by 15 years of
insurgency and insecurity, they are keen to establish themselves in an atmosphere
of peace. The murders, extortions and rapes, which the terrorists indulged in,
rubbed off the sheen of martyrdom from their names.
There are reports of a working relationship of late among the militants and
their Pakistani masters. Sukhdev Sing Babbar confessed during interrogation in
1992 to the total disillusion of Sikh militants about Pakistani intentions. The Inter-
Services intelligence of Pakistan met its cul de sac in recruiting Sikhs after ant
insurgency operations were strengthened in 1992. Most of the top terrorist
leaders fled Punjab in fear. Prominent leaders like Pritam Singh Sekhon of the
Khalistan Liberation Force, Wadhawa Singh of the Babbar Khalsa International
and Wassam Singh Zafarwal of the Khalistan Commando Force are still hiding
in Pakistan. Some other leaders operate from the USA, the UK or Canada.
Pakistan’s efforts to persuade Khalistani leaders hiding there to resuscitate
terrorism in India failed badly. The ISI deputed Parmjit Singh Panjwar of the
Khalistan Commando Force to Punjab in 1994, to recruit youths from Ludhiana
and surrounding areas. The KCF leader made no headway in his efforts. In a
desperate bid, the ISI mobilized about 1,500 Sikh immigrants from Europe and
trained them, but the immigrants lacked the enthusiasm to carry out tasks in India
at the behest of the ISI.
This lull in terrorism cannot be presumed to be the end of terrorism, which
is the handiwork of a few activists who form a farthing part of the local
population. It is wrong to presume that these activities represent the aspirations
and fervor of the common people around them. This silent majority becomes

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a hostage under inevitable pressures. Once, the people of Punjab found that they
were not under terrorist pressures, they collected courage to express their
disinclination towards terrorism. It is a blunder to interpret this disinclination as
signs of terrorism being uprooted from Punjab.
To trained eyes, signs of terrorism lurking in shadows were already there.
There were no signs of Pakistan beating the retreat. Rather, there was every
indication of Pakistan going radical in rousing Sikh passions. Virulent attacks of
Pakistan’s government controlled electronic media on the Indian government’s
alleged repression of minorities and popular movements, human rights
violations and its efforts to rouse Sikh sensibilities by its programmes on Sikh
traditions and culture give evidence of Pakistan’s dishonest intentions.
The continued terrorism after restoration f popular government in 1992,
though in reduced frequency, should have lead those in charge of anti-insurgency
operations to conclude that terrorism was alive and may come out of its shell.
Failures on the fronts of analysis, research and use of intelligence also
contributed to the complacency over Punjab. Indian security agencies did
intercept Sikh militants crossing the Indo-Pak border in 1994, and seized from
them a document called ‘Policy paper’ of Punjab militants, wherein plans to
resuscitate terrorism were laid down in detail.
Intelligence agencies had information about plants to use human bombs to
eliminate those involved in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots and leaders like Beant Singh
and Bhajan Lal.
Sikh militants crossing over to India were arrested and subjected to
interrogation. Through this process, intelligence agencies should have possessed
vital information about the future of militancy. It is a dismal commentary on anti-
insurgency operations that Indian security forces could derive no benefit from
it.
Beant singh being perceived as extremely valuable to terrorist strikes was
provided the highest grade of security cover available—‘Z plus.’ His security
arrangements were next only to that of the Prime Minister.
It is a shocking commentary on the security system that chauffeurs of such
heavily protected personages as Beant Singh used to drive his official cars to their
houses for lunch. His security chief was transferred out sans measures in advance
to expose the incumbent chief to existing security compulsions.
The new chief took charge of the post just the previous evening of the
assassination, after the post being vacant for a period, as the officer originally
transferred to the post was reluctant to hold charge and went on leave.

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These developments do not speak highly about administration in a security

apparatus. The very fact that the human bomb, a rank outsider in a police
constable’s uniform, could reach Beant Singh, speaks volumes about what really
our ‘A plus’ security cover is.
Once terrorists strike, the police do make appreciable headway in
investigating and detecting the case. Indian police always do it; they did it in the
Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, the Indira Gandhi assassination case and the
Mahatma Gandhi assassination case. However, good investigations cannot
compensate the provision of adequate protection.

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