WILLIAM R.

PATTERSON
Ph.D Candidate, Old Dominion University, Virginia, USA;
Detective, Virginia Beach Police Department
ENFORCING FIREARMS LAWS AT
THE LOCAL LEVEL: A CASE
STUDY OF THE VIRGINIA BEACH
POLICE DEPARTMENTS GUN
TRACE UNIT
Gun violence remains a serious threat to public safety through-
out the United States. Numerous federal and local agencies
have taken a variety of steps in an attempt to deal with this
perennial problem. One of the most common tactics has been
the development of task forces between local agencies and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).
This is the approach that the Virginia Beach Police Department
took until recently. In April 2008, however, the department
disbanded its task force and developed its own internal unit
tasked with the investigation of rearms-related crimes called
the Gun Trace Unit. This article details the new units mission,
how it functions, and what advantages it has over the pre-
viously instituted task force approach. The Gun Trace Unit has
been a successful innovation in Virginia Beach and may serve
as a useful model for other jurisdictions.
Keywords: rearms, gun trace
Introduction
The prevalence of rearm-related crimes is a continuous problem
plaguing local communities throughout the United States. A
study by Franklin E. Zimring (2004) found that
gun assaults are seven times as likely to kill as all other kinds
of criminal assault, and about ve times as likely to kill as
are knives, the next most deadly weapon that is frequently
used in criminal attacks. Firearms robbery is about four times
as likely to produce a victim death as a non-rearms robbery.
(2004: 34)
Firearms increase the lethality of violent crimes and as such
represent a serious threat to public safety, especially when they
are in the hands of prohibited persons.
268 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
DOI: 10.1358/pojo.2010.83.3.514
As a result of the threat posed by gun violence, many local
jurisdictions have developed programmes specically targeting
rearms-related crimes in an attempt to reduce them. The
Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, for example, utilises a
focused-deterrence strategy that targets criminal street gangs
(Engel et al., 2008), New York Citys Operation Gun Stop is an
anonymous tips programme designed to obtain intelligence about
illegally obtained or possessed rearms (Golden & Amo, 2004),
and Richmond Virginias Project Exile (later expanded into the
statewide Virginia Exile) focused on obtaining stiff mandatory
prison terms for specic offenders such as felons convicted of
possessing rearms and people in possession of both drugs and
rearms (Payne & Gainey, 2008). This article will detail the
Virginia Beach Police Departments recent initiative to inves-
tigate and prosecute crimes related to the illegal possession of
rearms through its development of a Gun Trace Unit.
The city of Virginia Beach has a population of around
430,000 people and has a police department of approximately
800 sworn ofcers. The city has consistently been ranked as one
of the safest large cities in the country and was the safest city
with a population between 350,000 and 900,000 in the country in
2007 (Virginia Beach Police Department 2008: 35). Despite the
relatively low rate of crime in Virginia Beach, however, gun
violence and the illegal possession and transfer of rearms
remain a serious problem for which the police department has
developed its Gun Trace Unit as a response.
In addition to the threat that rearms-related crimes pose to
its own citizens, the need to focus on this problem has become
even more salient as Virginia has been identied as a major
source state for crime guns recovered throughout the United
States, especially in the Northeast. A source state is dened as
the state in which the original point of sale of a crime gun
recovered in another state occurred. In 2007, statistics compiled
by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) and cited in a report by the group Mayors
Against Illegal Guns indicated that Virginia ranks as the fourth
highest source state in the country, with 2,261 interstate crime
guns which originated in Virginia being recovered in that year.
In per capita terms, Virginia ranks sixth, with 29.3 crime guns
per 100,000 inhabitants exported to other states. This is more
than twice the national average of 11.3 crime guns exported per
100,000 inhabitants (Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2008: 67).
Virginia has become a notorious segment of what has been
referred to as the Iron Pipeline, the transit route of rearms
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 269
from the Southeast up to the mid-Atlantic and New England
states.
Virginias position as a source state for illegally possessed
rearms demonstrates the fact that illicit rearms transactions
represent a threat not only to the local community but also to
other communities throughout the United States. Anthony Braga
and his colleagues argue, in an article published in the journal
Crime and Justice, that local police departments can quite
possibly be effective at disrupting local gun markets, but only if
they concern themselves with gathering the necessary intelli-
gence and acting on it (Braga et al., 2002: 348). It is precisely
with those purposes in mind that the Virginia Beach Police
Departments Gun Trace Unit was developed.
The rst section of this article will describe the purpose and
structure of the Gun Trace Unit. It will discuss some of the cases
investigated by the unit and demonstrate where it has been most
successful. The following section will explore some of the
advantages and disadvantages that the unit has experienced as
opposed to the previous method of assigning a detective to an
ATF task force. This information may be helpful to other US
departments and jurisdictions in deciding how they should
address the issue of the criminal transfer, possession and use of
rearms.
The Gun Trace Unit
For many years the Virginia Beach Police Department
approached the problem of rearms crimes by participating in an
ATF task force. Though the task force detective was ofcially
assigned to the Special Investigations division (which primarily
conducts narcotics and vice investigations), the detective worked
most of the week out of the ATF ofce in the nearby city of
Norfolk. This detective was given federal authority and could
therefore enforce federal laws and work across jurisdictional
lines. The detective served as a liaison between the police
department and the ATF. Although this detective focused his
time on rearms crimes that occurred within Virginia Beach, he
also assisted in investigations in surrounding jurisdictions.
In an effort to take a fresh approach to the problem of
rearms-related crimes, the Virginia Beach Police Department
ended its involvement with the task force and developed the Gun
Trace Unit in April 2008. The main difference between the new
Gun Trace Unit and the old task force is that the assigned
detective now works in the police departments detective bureau
rather than out of the ATF ofce. Because of this, the detective
270 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
does not have federal authority to make arrests across jurisdic-
tions or for violations of federal crimes. The Gun Trace Unit
detective works only on cases that originate in Virginia Beach.
The primary mission of the unit is to investigate the illegal
transfer and possession of rearms. The unit detective conducts
investigations to determine the origins of rearms found in the
possession of felons or other unauthorised persons, and of
rearms used in the commission of violent crimes. The detective
also serves as the departments liaison with the ATF and
forwards cases for federal prosecution under the appropriate
circumstances.
The unit functions by monitoring all rearms seized or
otherwise obtained by police ofcers in the city. When a rearm
comes into police possession it is vouchered (the process of
ofcially entering evidence into the Property and Evidence Unit,
which establishes a chain of custody so the evidence can be used
in court) and is then sent to the Property and Evidence division.
The personnel in Property and Evidence use the paperwork
turned in with the weapon to conduct an e-Trace procedure
through the ATF. Once the e-Trace data have been inputted, the
paperwork is forwarded to the Gun Trace Unit detective. In this
way, the detective is aware of all rearms seized in the city and
the circumstances detailing how the rearm came into the
departments possession.
The ATF e-Trace system works in a rather roundabout way.
The ATF is prohibited by law from maintaining a rearms
registration database. In order to determine the identity of the
original purchaser of a rearm, therefore, the ATF must obtain
information via the chain of manufacture and sale. All rearms
that have been either manufactured in or imported to the United
States since 1968 must be stamped with a unique identifying
serial number. The manufacturers, importers and retailers of
rearms are required to maintain records pertaining to the
distribution of those rearms (Braga et al., 2002: 322). In order
to determine who originally purchased a particular rearm the
ATF contacts the manufacturer or importer and provides it with
the model and serial number of the weapon. The manufacturer or
importer then accesses its records and, assuming that the records
have been properly maintained, informs the ATF of the whole-
saler or retailer to which the rearm was shipped. The retailer is
then contacted and the individual purchasers information is
thereby acquired, again assuming that the retailers records have
been kept appropriately and have not been lost, stolen or
destroyed.
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 271
Local law enforcement ofcers trigger the tracing process
through the submission of an e-Trace. This is an internet-based
system through which the pertinent information of a recovered
rearm (make, model, serial number, etc.) is sent to the ATF.
The ATF then follows the chain of distribution and provides the
purchasers information back to the originating jurisdiction.
Once e-Trace data are obtained through this process, it remains
in the ATF system for future use. This is helpful in identifying
rearms trafckers if multiple e-Traces lead back to the same
purchaser.
Once an e-Trace result is obtained, the Gun Trace Unit
begins its investigation. An e-Trace provides only the identity of
the original purchaser of the rearm; there are no available
records of transactions that occur subsequent to the original sale.
Garen Wintemute (2002) found that, of the rearms recovered
and traced in 1999, only 11% were possessed by the original
purchaser (2002: 63). As Anthony Braga and his colleagues put
it, although trace studies provide useful information on the age
and origin of crime guns, they do not describe the pathways
through which rearms were illegally diverted to prohibited
persons (2002: 334). Investigating and uncovering those path-
ways is one of the major functions of the Gun Trace Unit.
Once a rearm has been purchased from a licensed dealer,
there are several ways in which that rearm can be diverted to
persons prohibited from owning them. In some cases rearms are
diverted through what are called straw purchases. A straw
purchase occurs when a person prohibited from purchasing a
rearm recruits another person to do so for them. People may be
prohibited from making such a purchase because they are a
convicted felon, too young, have previously been involuntarily
committed to a mental health institution, are an illegal alien, a
non-resident of the state, have been convicted of a domestic
assault, are the subject of a protective order or are restricted for
some other reason. The actual purchaser of the rearm will be
someone with no prohibitions who can pass the background
check. After the initial sale is complete, the straw purchaser then
provides the prohibited person with the rearm, usually at a
prot. Such straw-purchasing transactions are illegal and are a
major focus of the ATF and the Virginia Beach Police Depart-
ments Gun Trace Unit.
Firearms can also be obtained by prohibited persons directly
from licensed dealers without the use of a straw purchaser in
several ways. Prohibited persons can use false identication to
have their background check run under an assumed or false
272 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
identity. The dealer might also disregard the legally imposed
identication requirements and conduct the background check
merely based upon who the purchaser claims to be. Additionally,
rearms dealers can simply disregard the requirement to conduct
a background check and illegally sell rearms to restricted
persons under the table. Though dealers are required to main-
tain records of the guns that they sell, audits occur very infre-
quently. Even if audited, dealers who conduct illegal transactions
can avoid being discovered by purchasing rearms from indi-
viduals and then selling them without recording either the
purchase or the sale. Finally, dealers can sell rearms to pro-
hibited persons without a background check or other attendant
records and then report the guns as stolen. Of course, if such
dealers report stolen guns too frequently it may draw the
attention of law enforcement but it can be done occasionally
without resulting in much scrutiny.
In addition to straw purchases and illegal transactions con-
ducted by licensed dealers, rearms can also be diverted to
prohibited persons through legal sales in the secondary market.
Under federal law private individuals can legally sell rearms
without a licence and without conducting background checks as
long as they are not selling a large enough quantity of rearms to
qualify them as running a gun-dealing business. The number of
rearms necessary to classify one as an ofcial rearms dealer is
not quantied by law and is therefore difcult, and somewhat
arbitrary, for law enforcement ofcials to identify. In many
states there are very few, if any, additional restrictions on private
rearms transactions. People in Virginia can advertise their
rearms for sale in newspapers (or anywhere else) and have no
obligation to acquire any information about the persons to whom
they sell them. In order to charge someone for selling a rearm
to a prohibited person under Virginia law, it must be proven that
the seller knew that the buyer was prohibited from purchasing a
rearm. Private sellers, however, have no legal responsibility to
inquire about the buyers legal status. Braga and his colleagues
have estimated that between 30% and 40%of all rearms trans-
actions occur in this unregulated secondary market (2002: 323).
Rather than purchase a rearm through either the primary or
secondary markets, prohibited persons often obtain them through
theft. Stolen rearms are a major source of guns used in crimes
and possessed by prohibited persons (Braga et al., 2002: 326).
Whether obtained illegally through the primary or secondary
market or through theft, it has been estimated that ve out of six
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 273
rearms used in crime are acquired in some illegal manner
(Ridgeway et al., 2008: 1).
Investigating these types of illegal rearms transactions is
one of the primary goals of the Gun Trace Unit, especially when
the rearms have been recovered in violent crimes, from gang
members, or from the hands of prohibited persons. The unit
begins its investigations with the original purchaser information
that is obtained through the e-Trace system. If the purchaser is
other than the person from whom the rearm was recovered, an
investigation is begun. The rst step is to conduct background
investigations into both the purchaser and the possessor in an
attempt to draw a link between them. The second step is to locate
the original purchaser and conduct an interview with that person
regarding how the rearm left his or her possession. If possible,
the offending possessor is also interviewed in an attempt to
obtain information about where he or she obtained the rearm.
Success at this stage of the investigation relies heavily upon the
investigators interviewing skills.
In many cases, the rearm under investigation was purchased
many years, sometimes even decades, before being recovered in
a crime. The longer the time between the original purchase of a
rearm and a law enforcement agencys recovery of it, called the
time to crime, the more difcult it usually is to obtain the
complete history of the rearm. As noted earlier, there is no
requirement in Virginia (or in many other states) to conduct
background checks or even to notate the purchasers personal
information in sales that occur on the secondary market. The
longer the time to crime the more likely that the rearm in
question has been sold numerous times on the secondary market
and the less likely that there will be any record of the chain of
transaction. A lengthy time to crime does not necessarily,
however, mean that tracing the rearms history is impossible.
The original purchaser may have possessed the rearm for
decades and only recently sold it or had it stolen. An investiga-
tion should not be deterred simply due to there being a long
period of time between the original purchase and the recovery
date.
In the rst 14 months of its existence the Gun Trace Unit has
been responsible for 21 felony arrests, 4 misdemeanour arrests,
and has sent 5 cases to the ATF for further investigation and
prosecution at the federal level. This is in contrast to the fewer
than ten arrests attributable to the detective assigned to the ATF
task force in the previous year. The unit has also uncovered
information that was valuable to ongoing investigations by patrol
274 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
ofcers and other units in the detective bureau. The increased
number of arrests by the Gun Trace Unit detective is primarily
attributable to the monitoring of pawn shops, the policy of
entering all recovered rearms into e-Trace, and the investiga-
tion of cases with times to crime that exceeded one year. In
order to provide an indication of the types of cases that have
been successfully investigated by the Gun Trace Unit, a brief
summary of several of these cases follows.
The Gun Trace Unit opened one investigation when the
parents of a 16-year-old boy turned a pistol over to police after
they had discovered it among the childs belongings. Precinct
detectives interviewed the boy but were able to elicit only the
rst name of the individual from whom he had received it. The
information was then forwarded to the Gun Trace Unit. An
e-Trace was conducted which revealed that the rearm had been
purchased by an adult male at a local gun store several years
earlier. A search of police databases revealed that the original
purchaser had committed suicide only three months prior to the
parents locating the gun and turning it over to police. A Gun
Trace Unit detective contacted the widow of the original pur-
chaser and inquired as to what had happened to the rearm. She
replied that the rearm had been inherited by her son who was in
his early twenties. The sons rst name was the same as that
provided by the 16-year-old boy in the initial interview.
A background investigation on the son was conducted and he
was then contacted and asked to come into the detective bureau
for an interview. He began the interview by claiming that he had
not noticed the rearm was missing until he was contacted by the
detective and asked about it. He stated that the gun must have
been stolen without his knowledge. He admitted to being
acquainted with the 16-year-old boy and to having purchased
marijuana from him in the past. Although he at rst suggested
the teenager stole the gun from him, inconsistencies in his story
eventually led him to confess that he had given the gun to the
boy. He was subsequently charged with providing a handgun to a
juvenile, which in Virginia is a Class 6 felony.
A similar case involved an 18-year-old who was arrested for
using a handgun to commit a robbery. An e-Trace was submitted
to the ATF but was unsuccessful due to missing records at the
retail outlet. A Gun Trace Unit detective interviewed the suspect
while he was in gaol and obtained an admission that he had
enlisted a friend to purchase the gun for him since he was too
young to purchase one himself (federal law prohibits the sale of
handguns to persons under the age of 21). He provided his
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 275
friends name and detailed information about how the transaction
occurred. The friend was located and interviewed. Confronted
with the information already provided by the robbery suspect, he
confessed to his role in obtaining the rearm for him. The
robbery suspect was charged with soliciting another to purchase
a rearm for a prohibited person and the provider of the rearm
was charged with obtaining a rearm in order to provide it to a
prohibited person; both charges are Class 6 felonies under
Virginia law.
Another case demonstrates the Gun Trace Units utility in
assisting the investigations of other units. Two individuals, both
convicted felons, were stopped by a patrol ofcer in Virginia
Beach. The ofcer discovered a rearm in the vehicle and
charged both subjects with possession of a rearm by a con-
victed felon. The Gun Trace Unit conducted an e-Trace of the
rearm and received a response. Background on the original
purchaser revealed that he had reported the rearm stolen in a
burglary only weeks prior to the two suspects being stopped by
police. Stolen rearms are routinely entered into the US National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which enables
police ofcers anywhere in the country to identify rearms as
stolen. Unfortunately, a stolen rearm can be entered into the
system only if the owner knows its serial number. Many owners
do not know the serial numbers of their rearms and these
therefore cannot be entered into the system if stolen. A patrol
ofcer has no way of knowing whether a particular rearm is
stolen if it hasnt been entered into the NCIC system, as was the
case with this rearm.
Background checks on the two suspects revealed that they
both lived within two blocks of the burglary in which the rearm
found in their possession had been stolen. Both suspects had
pending charges for a burglary that they were suspected of
having committed in the same neighbourhood and one of them
had already been convicted of a burglary. The Gun Trace Unit
contacted the property crimes detective that had charged the two
suspects in the pending burglary. During that detectives initial
interview of the suspects they had admitted to burgling another
house in the neighbourhood but the detective had not been able
to locate the report. With the additional information provided by
the Gun Trace Unit the detective was able to charge both
suspects with the burglary in which the rearm was stolen.
One of the most successful initiatives of the Gun Trace Unit
has been a monthly check of pawn shop records. All local pawn
shops are required to send records pertaining to the property that
276 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
is sold or pawned to them to the police department. Each month
the departments Pawn Unit runs Computerised Criminal History
(CCH) checks on all of the people who have either sold or
pawned rearms to pawn shops during the previous 30 days.
Any information discovered relating to individuals who were
convicted felons or otherwise prohibited from possessing a
rearm at the time of the sale is forwarded to the Gun Trace Unit
for further investigation. This tactic has led to numerous arrests
for possession of a rearm by a convicted felon, possession of a
rearm after being involuntarily committed to a mental institu-
tion, and possession of a rearm by a person currently subject to
a protective order.
In one of these cases the suspect had been convicted of
malicious assault, which is classied as a felony, and had two
previous convictions for possession of a rearm by a convicted
felon. In another of these cases it was determined that the suspect
had purchased the rearm from a dealer who conducted the
background check with a false name. This information was
provided to the state police who initiated an investigation into
the gun store. Suspiciously, the store burned to the ground and
all of its records were destroyed before the investigation could be
completed.
In its rst year of existence the Virginia Beach Police
Departments Gun Trace Unit has been successful in bringing
numerous rearms-related cases to trial. The unit has success-
fully brought charges for and adjudicated cases involving illegal
rearms transactions, the possession of rearms by prohibited
persons, and rearm thefts. Though the Gun Trace Unit has
demonstrated its effectiveness, whether or not it has been
superior to participation in an ATF task force remains an open
question. In the following section the advantages and dis-
advantages that the unit has in comparison with such a task force
are explored.
Advantages and Disadvantages in Comparison with a Task
Force
The decision by a police department to discontinue its involve-
ment with an ATF task force in favour of an internal rearms
unit has the potential to result in several disadvantages. The
advantages to such an approach, however, may outweigh what-
ever problems arise. After slightly over a year of operation it is
possible to take a retrospective look at the Virginia Beach Police
Departments Gun Trace Unit and to make some preliminary
judgements about its effectiveness in comparison with the former
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 277
task force approach. This analysis may be helpful to decision
makers in other departments when deciding whether to maintain
a task force or to develop an entire rearms unit instead.
Disadvantages
The two most obvious disadvantages of discontinuing the task
force were that the police departments connection with the ATF
would be reduced and the Gun Trace Unit detective would not
receive the federal authority enjoyed by the former task force
member. These were seen as potentially serious problems. The
ATF has access to information that is not available at the local
level and which can often be crucial to police investigations.
Loosened ties with the ATF could hamper the departments
ability to acquire this valuable intelligence. This is especially
true in regard to suspects who may be acting across city or state
lines, as is often the case with rearms trafckers. Without
access to information that illuminates the broader picture, a local
department may nd itself unable to identify persons of interest
within its jurisdiction.
A similar problem could result from the Gun Trace Unit
detectives lack of federal authority. Illegal rearms transactions
and trafcking often occur in cities other than that in which the
rearm is recovered. Research by Payne and Gainey found that
a signicant number of . . . gun users came from another
community/legal jurisdiction (2008: 191). Without federal
authority, a local detective is powerless to bring charges for
rearms-related crimes that have transpired outside his own
jurisdiction. If the detective, for example, were to discover that
an offender who used a rearm in Virginia Beach to commit a
robbery purchased it illegally in the neighbouring city of
Norfolk, he would be unable to take action on that information.
Lack of federal authority also means that the detective is unable
to enforce any rearms laws that exist in the federal code but are
not mirrored in the Commonwealth of Virginias code.
Fortunately, these potential disadvantages have been largely
avoided by continued close cooperation with the local ATF
ofce. The Gun Trace Unit detective acts as the departments
ofcial liaison with the ATF and has maintained frequent contact
with agents in that ofce in order to conduct joint investigations
and to share information when needed. Whenever the ATF has
conducted rearms-related investigations in Virginia Beach, it
has contacted the Gun Trace Unit detective, who has provided
whatever cooperation has been necessary. Similarly, if an invest-
igation being conducted by the Virginia Beach Police Depart-
278 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
ment has had elements that crossed city or state lines, the ATF
has been able to provide the necessary assistance to continue the
investigation. In cases in which the Gun Trace Unit has dis-
covered that a crime has been committed in another jurisdiction
or which is not covered by state law, the investigative informa-
tion has been forwarded to either the appropriate local jurisdic-
tion or to an ATF agent for federal prosecution.
Despite the fact that greater physical separation from the
ATF and the lack of federal authority are potentially signicant
disadvantages, Virginia Beachs experiences indicate that they
can be overcome by a concerted effort to keep communication
open and to maintain close cooperation. The mere fact that the
Gun Trace Unit detective does not work in the same building as
his ATF colleagues does not in itself entail a decreased level of
cooperation by either party. Furthermore, the lack of federal
authority granted to the local detective can be overcome by
having the detective forward cases that require it to the ATF, as
a liaison to any federal agency would normally do.
Advantages
While the change from the task force approach risked certain
disadvantages, the development of the Gun Trace Unit also
resulted in several advantages. The most signicant advantage
has been the Gun Trace Unit detectives closer involvement with
other members of the department. Since the unit has been located
within the detective bureau it has been much easier for other
detectives, particularly in the property crimes division and in the
robbery and homicide divisions, to reach out for assistance when
needed. If a gun is recovered in a robbery, for example, and the
detective handling the case needs trace information on it, he can
walk over to the Gun Trace Unit and request it. Collaboration
between the Gun Trace detective and other detectives in the
department has been greatly increased by the units location in
the bureau. The Gun Trace detective is also able to keep a better
handle on whats going on at the street level and in the detective
bureau since the unit is physically located in the bureau.
While the task force detective was also available to assist
detectives and patrol ofcers, the level of physical isolation that
was created by being located in the ATF ofce led to weaker
connections with the rest of the department. If not seen, one can
easily be forgotten. Many patrol ofcers and detectives had not
even known who the task force detective was or how that
detective could assist them in their own investigations. With the
units new location in the detective bureau this isolation has
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 279
been diminished. Whatever disadvantage has been suffered by
weakened ties with the ATF as the result of moving out of its
ofce has been more than compensated for by strengthened ties
between the Gun Trace Unit and the rest of the department.
A second major advantage is that the detective assigned to
the Gun Trace Unit can focus solely on cases involving Virginia
Beach. While the task force detective gave precedence to Vir-
ginia Beach cases, he was also assigned and investigated cases
that originated from outside the city. The federal authority he
received was a double-edged sword in that his ability to invest-
igate cases beyond the jurisdiction of Virginia Beach often led to
his involvement in cases with the ATF that had no bearing on the
city. Because the Gun Trace Unit detective has more limited
jurisdiction and authority, his focus is more specic to the city.
From the perspective of the police department it is more efcient
to utilise its personnel in cases that directly impact the city rather
than have them involved in extraneous investigations that have
either limited or no relationship to Virginia Beach.
A third major advantage is that the Gun Trace Unit is not
restricted by the ATFs time to crime policy. The ATF rou-
tinely investigates only those cases with times to crime below
365 days. Any guns recovered that fall outside that window are
not investigated unless there are specied reasons for doing so.
Yet research shows that most rearms recovered in crimes are
greater than three years old (Braga et al., 2002: 339). By
routinely ignoring these cases, signicant criminal activity may
go undiscovered and uninvestigated. Rather than base case
selection on time to crime, the Gun Trace Unit investigates
cases based upon the circumstances surrounding the recovery of
the rearm. Once identied as a priority, the origin and history
of the rearm will be investigated regardless of time to crime
considerations. This has led to several arrests that otherwise may
not even have been investigated. The case involving the 16-year-
old boy mentioned earlier, for example, had a time to crime of
ve years, which is well outside the ATFs normal parameters of
investigation.
Conclusion
It is notoriously difcult to draw direct causal connections
between rearms laws and policies and a subsequent reduction in
criminal activity (Piquero, 2009: 3). It is equally difcult, if not
even more so, in the case of the Gun Trace Unit. There are too
little data for any type of statistical analysis and even if such data
were available they may not be generalisable beyond Virginia
280 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
Beach. A purely quantitative evaluation of the unit is therefore
extremely limited in its scope.
Despite the limited quantitative evidence currently available,
the qualitative evidence suggests that the Gun Trace Unit
approach is at least as effective as the task force strategy. The
overall number of arrests has increased; cooperation with other
members of the police department has increased; a broader range
of cases that are more specically related to the city has been
investigated; and while the level of communication with the
local ATF has been somewhat decreased due to greater physical
separation, the level of cooperation between the ATF and the
police department remains strong. The successes achieved by the
Virginia Beach Police Departments Gun Trace Unit provide a
viable alternative model to the ATF task forces that many
jurisdictions rely on. While this approach may not be suitable for
all departments, others may wish to consider using Virginia
Beachs experiences as a model for their own efforts to combat
rearm-related crimes and violence.
Works Cited
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