This article was downloaded by: [Patterson, William R.]
On: 20 November 2008 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 905798525] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Power Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t778749998 Smart power in reunified Germany William R. Patterson a a International Studies Program, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA Online Publication Date: 01 December 2008 To cite this Article Patterson, William R.(2008)'Smart power in reunified Germany',Journal of Power,1:3,339 354 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17540290802479236 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17540290802479236 Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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Patterson* International Studies Program, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA Taylor and Francis Ltd RPOW_A_348091.sgm 10.1080/17540290802479236 Journal of Power 1754-0291 (print)/1754-0305 (online) Original Article 2008 Taylor & Francis 13000000December 2008 WilliamPatterson wpatt001@odu.edu Since its reunification, Germany has struggled with the dilemma of power. Many of Germanys European allies feared the possibility of a resurgently powerful German nation that would revert to power politics and endanger the established European order. Such worries were prevalent even among many Germans who, still struggling with their past, werent sure that they could trust themselves with the use of power. Yet Germany, just as any other country, had foreign policy objectives and global responsibilities that sometimes required the use of power to achieve. This article examines how Germany responded to this dilemma and how the use of both hard and soft power have evolved in German foreign policy since reunification. It demonstrates that at first Germany relied almost exclusively on the use of soft power. As Germany established trust among its allies, the international community, and its own citizens, it gradually began to increase its use of hard power and to take on greater international responsibilities. Today Germany uses a mixture of soft and hard power what Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye have dubbed smart power to meet its foreign policy goals and to fulfill its international responsibilities. Keywords: Germany; German reunification; soft power; hard power; smart power Introduction The issue of power has been a tricky one for Germans in the years following reunification. During the Cold War, Germany had largely renounced the use of hard power since the rejec- tion of militaristic values was a necessary condition for Germany to come to grips with its recent Nazi past. Germany was a paradigmatic example of a country rejecting hard power (at least in its most aggressive forms) on the basis of a historically shaped moral outlook. This outlook did, of course, affect German military capability. The development of the kind of hard power which the United States embraces was impeded in Germany by its own cautious view of power based upon its history and the values it espoused as a member of the European Union. Another impediment was the refusal of the rest of Europe to accept such power in Germany due to old suspicions that have not been completely laid to rest even today. Germanys reunification struck fear in the hearts of many Europeans that the Germans would quickly regain their preWorld War II lust for power and expansion and would once again pose a threat to peace on the continent. This did not come to pass, however, and many scholars and pundits were surprised at Germanys continued introversion and lack of will- ingness to accept a position of global leadership. This became such a problem, in fact, that many began accusing the Germans of failing to live up to their international responsibilities. Germany took especially harsh criticism from the US, for example, for its failure to contribute *Email: wpatt001@odu.edu D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 340 W.R. Patterson troops during the Gulf War. Germans soon came to realize that their newfound position in the global community would no longer allow them to retire from the international stage as they had during the Cold War. Germany found itself in an odd position. Historical memories still made the develop- ment of hard military power difficult for the Germans as too much of a build-up would rile suspicions among its neighbors. On the other hand, however, the strength of Germanys economy and position in the world brought with it many responsibilities that could in some cases only be fulfilled with the utilization of hard power. In order to dampen fears of expan- sionism while simultaneously living up to the expectations of its allies, Germany was forced to be very smart about its use of power. Out of this necessity, the Germans have developed a complex amalgamation of hard and soft power, what Armitage and Nye (2007) have recently called smart power. During the Cold War, soft power had come to dominate German foreign policy since the development of hard power was unacceptable to its European neighbors. The accumula- tion of soft power before and since reunification, however, has allowed for a greater build-up and use of hard power when necessary as long as that use remains consistent with the values that sustain Germanys soft power. In Germany, hard and soft power are interdependent. Germanys soft power has come to rely on at least some amount of hard power. Without the military muscle to back up its high ideals, Germanys commitments to its foreign policy goals would not be taken seriously and its soft power would dwin- dle. Without a large degree of soft power, on the other hand, Germanys hard power would be too threatening to the rest of Europe and could not be successfully accumulated and applied without strong resistance. Hard and soft power in Germany are inextricably intertwined. This article explores the interplay of hard and soft power in German foreign policy since reunification. It argues that Germany has actively pursued a foreign policy that has supported its own international goals in the most efficient way open to it, through the smart application of both soft and hard power. Germany has taken an active role in exerting its soft power, and increasingly its hard power, to meet its foreign policy objectives. The important issue for the purposes of this article, and one that has often been overlooked, is how the Germans have mixed these two elements of power so expertly. Germany provides a real-world example of Armitage and Nyes concept of smart power. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, the concept of power is exam- ined and its main aspects hard, soft and smart are explored. How Germany has relied upon its soft power to achieve its foreign-policy objectives since reunification is the focus of the second section. In the third section, Germanys incremental development and use of hard power is examined. Finally, in the fourth section, the interaction between soft and hard power in German foreign policy is discussed. This section will outline how Germanys use of hard and soft power have impacted the development of each other and come to form an effective example of smart power. What is power? To some scholars, hard power is the only type of power that really matters. Robert Kagans discussion of power in his famous book Of Paradise and Power (2004b), for example, focuses overwhelmingly on hard power. In Kagans view, power is gauged by military capacity and the ability to achieve desired results, with force being one of the primary ways of doing so. To analysts in Kagans camp, a states power can be measured by the military force that it can bring to bear. How many tanks, fighter planes and soldiers a country has, D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 341 along with its economic capacity to build more, provides a good measurement of that countrys power. Real power has only two elements military and economic capability. This limited concept of power, however, is, in the view of many other scholars, too narrow. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, for example, argue in their book Power and Interdependence: Power has always been an elusive concept for statesmen and analysts of international politics; now it is even more slippery. The traditional view was that military power dominated other forms, and that states with the most military power controlled world affairs. But the resources that produce power capabilities have become more complex. (2001, p. 10) From the point of view of these scholars, hard military capability is only one element on a broader spectrum of power. Because Germany, for example, chooses to downplay its hard military power does not mean that it has rejected all forms of power. The Germans have come to recognize that the unreflective use of hard military power is no longer optimal for them. In its place, they have begun to accumulate a different type of power soft power. Since its reunification, Germany has been developing such power as a replacement to the traditional military power that it once craved. Joseph Nye broadened the definition of power by developing the concept of soft power. He defines power as the ability to obtain the outcomes that one wants (2003, p. 65) and points out that military coercion is not the only way to do this. He divides power into two general forms rather than just one: soft power and hard power. Military power and economic power, he explains, are both examples of hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks) (Nye 2002, p. 8). The other type of power, soft power, is subtler and does not rest on outright coercion. This type of power is created through moral and ideological persuasiveness and leadership in multilateral international organizations. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness (Nye 2002, p. 8). Hard power rests on the capacity to force others to ones position while soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce (Nye 2003, p. 66). As a country develops a reputation for upholding certain values, such as respect for human rights, a desire for peaceful relations, and a level of deference to international institutions, that countrys ability to persuade other like-minded states is enhanced. Consistently endorsing and supporting such values increases a states legitimacy and makes its leadership more desir- able. Soft power allows a state to influence the preferences of others and to place its own goals at the forefront of the agenda. As Nye puts it: Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. (2002, p. 9) Influence is an important measure of a states power. Baumann et al. argue that a states influence is a measure of how strongly it can itself impact its environment, in particular the behavior of other states and the collective decision-making in, and action of, international organizations (2001, p. 40). These authors argue that the ability to influence other actors within the international system is crucial to that states ability to meet its security and other foreign policy goals. A state is interested in influencing the behavior of other states or collective actions of international organizations to suit its purposes. Otherwise, other states, which are potentially D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 342 W.R. Patterson threatening, could shape these actions and decisions to suit their purposes, which would run contrary to the states security interests. Hence every state is interested in transforming its capabilities into influence. (Ibid., p. 41) Developing soft power is one effective way of doing this. Some scholars remain skeptical of soft power. Niall Ferguson has written: The trouble with soft power is that its, well, soft. All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDs starring Tom Cruise. Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely not. (2003, p. 21) Since the Islamic world has been exposed to Britney Spears but still hasnt warmed up to the US, scholars such as Ferguson claim that soft power hasnt proven itself to be very effective or particularly useful. But when Ferguson and others attack soft power in this manner they are attacking only a caricature. Soft power is more than Britney Spears. It arises, Nye tells us, from the attractiveness of a countrys culture, political ideals, and policies (2003, p. 66). Culture is only one element of soft power, and pop-culture only a sub-element of that. It has been US policy, rather than its culture, that has damaged its relationship with the Islamic world, though this is not to say that the relationship would be totally friendly had the US made different policy choices. US policies concerning such issues as Guantanamo Bay and the scandal at Abu Ghraib have affected Americas image and political legitimacy throughout the Islamic world and have damaged Americas relations with those countries. This has undermined the USs soft power and has made it more difficult for the US to obtain the outcomes it wants when dealing with these countries. Issues such as these have also weakened Americas ability to work cooperatively with its European allies. Even one of the gurus of hard power, Kagan, has lamented that the US has stumbled into a crisis of legitimacy. He argued in a 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs: The struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be among the most critical contests of our time. In some ways, it is as significant in determing the future of the U.S. role in the international system as any purely material measure of power and influence. (2004a, p. 67) Where the US ultimately stands in this struggle will be largely dependent on its ability to project soft power. Even Ferguson, in the same article in which he downplays the importance of soft power, writes: Two things can greatly magnify or diminish the ability of any entity to project power: first, its own legitimacy in the eyes of its individual members and second, its credibility in the eyes of other powers. These are the unquantifiable but perhaps most important elements of power. (2003, p. 22) But this is exactly what is argued by the proponents of soft power! It seems that the prob- lems scholars such as Kagan and Ferguson have with soft power are more about semantics and definitions than over real issues. Armitage and Nye (2007) have expanded the concept of power even further in their recent study on smart power commissioned by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Spurred on by what they view as a counterproductive over-reliance on hard power in recent American foreign policy, Armitage and Nye explore the possibility of D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 343 combining hard and soft power in a more effective, and smart, manner. They explain: Smart power is neither hard nor soft it is the skillful combination of both (Ibid., p. 7). They further elaborate that smart power is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action (Ibid.). Their study is meant to convince American policymakers that an over-reliance on hard power is a counterproductive and inefficient means to achieving its ends, while also conced- ing that soft power alone will not be enough. What the US needs to do, they argue, is to combine its use of hard and soft power in an intelligent and strategic way so that these two elements of power can complement and reinforce each other. They warn that an over- reliance on only one element of power can have counter-productive results. In regards to the issue of terrorism, for example, they point out: Excessive use of force can actually abet terrorist recruitment among local populations. We must strike a balance between the use of force against irreconcilable extremists committed to violent struggle and other means of countering terrorism if we want to maintain our legitimacy. (Armitage and Nye 2007, pp. 1011) In order to meet its foreign policy goals, the report contends that the US should respond to provocations with force when necessary but refrain from overreacting. The US must also eliminate symbols that erode Americas image abroad (such as Guantanamo Bay), increase Americas diplomatic capability, and provide a more positive vision of the US to the rest of the world by working for the global good and by making policy decisions that display a recognition of the needs and aspirations of others. In sum the United States must find ways of transforming its power into a moral consensus that ensures the willing acceptance if not active promotion of our values over time (Armitage and Nye 2007, p. 12). Though the CSIS study was commissioned specifically to analyze elements of American power, this article applies the concept to Germany. Germany has increasingly relied upon its hard power since reunification but only in accordance with its firmly held values. The Germans have combined the use of hard and soft power effectively and have thereby enhanced the effectiveness of their overall power. The foreign policy of the reunified Germany serves as a perfect case study for the development and use of smart power. The Germans are a bunch of softies To many, German reunification was an ominous occurrence. Numerous politicians (with Margaret Thatcher and Franois Mitterrand being prime examples) and scholars (especially neo-realist theorists) believed that a reunified Germany would be a resurgently powerful and dominating Germany. Even among those who outwardly cheered German reunification, there was often an undertone of apprehension. Division had been the primary guarantee that Germany would remain weak and could never again threaten to subjugate the rest of Europe. Was this guarantee shattered with the new-found power that a unified Germany possessed? Would the Germans revert to a Bismarckian foreign policy of realpolitik? Would they attempt to struggle free from the international institutions that had previously constrained them and reverse the course of the European Union? Would they march towards rearmament on a massive scale and seek nuclear weapons? Many people asked these questions with trepidation. The answer given by Thomas Bergner was not an uncommon one. He wrote: D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 344 W.R. Patterson Germany will clearly no longer tolerate different treatment than is received by other European countries. The Germans have made clear that a policy of singularity according to which Germany is expected to operate under special conditions not shared by other nations, will no longer be acceptable. (1991, p. 92) It was widely assumed that a reunited Germany would be a resurgently powerful Germany and a Germany that would be reluctant to play by the old rules of the game that had curtailed its use of power during the Cold War. Europe braced itself for an unrestrained German superpower in its midst. The reality, however, turned out to be quite different. Much to the relief of the rest of Europe, and indeed the world, Germany did not attempt to dominate. In fact, it did none of the things that neo-realist foreign policy theorists would have predicted. It did not rebuild its army or seek nuclear weapons; on the contrary, it was a strong advocate for peaceful relations among nations and a primary force behind nuclear non-proliferation initiatives. It did not attempt to free itself from the bonds of international organizations; instead it became one of the strongest proponents for wider and deeper European integration. It did not adopt a policy of realpolitik but argued for a world constrained by international values and norms. Germanys foreign-policy behavior remained remarkably restrained, and its outlook on power did not change, at least not right away. Even after reunification, Peter Katzenstein noted: The German approach to power, and the practices that sustain and reformulate it, emphasizes its soft elements (1997, p. 3). Rather than revert to the use of hard military power, Germany maintained its reliance on soft power. The possible reasons for this are many. The Germans have remained haunted by their past. Their defeat in two world wars, and the crimes that they committed during them, has created a reflexive disdain for the use of military force in the German psyche. The Germans, at least in West Germany, have also been part of a deepening European Community for the past forty-five years which has ingrained in them a certain set of norms and values that cannot easily be disregarded. Finally, the Germans recognized the distrust harbored towards them by many other European nations. A resurgence of military power would only have heightened that distrust and caused a Europe-wide backlash. A resort to hard military power would simply not have been effective; in fact, it would have been counterproductive. As Simon Bulmer put it: Germanys agent power may be facilitated by various resources, such as authority, money, legitimacy, information, or organizational capability. Military capacity a traditional power resource in realist analysis is of limited value for the articulation of German European policy interests, because it is not the currency the EU deals in. (1997, p. 75) Since reunification, Germany has developed a set of foreign policy goals that simply would not be best met through the use of hard power. These include: the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe, the advancement of human rights worldwide, the furtherance of international law and the power of global international institutions and organizations, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Of these goals, the expansion and deepening of the EU is perhaps the most important. Germany has a strong interest in the further development of the EU and of its own posi- tion within that organization. The integration of Eastern Europe has been of special impor- tance to Germany. Germany conducts a vast amount of trade with these countries and is in close geographical proximity to many of them. Germany, more than any other Western European state, has benefited in both economic and security terms by bringing Eastern Europe into the peaceful capitalist structure of the EU. This outcome could not have been accomplished through military means, so Germany used its soft power to meet its interests. D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 345 Germany created the soft power that it needed to influence the EU by being a primary supporter of it. Ulf Frenkler has written: Germanys efforts and continued willingness to maintain and at times expedite the integration process through its own initiatives are to be seen as clearly positive. Germany was aware of its central significance for the success or failure of the European unification process and commit- ted itself willingly to this responsibility. (2001, p. 29) This commitment to the EU continued throughout Germanys own unification process and did not waver despite its growing power. At precisely the time when many scholars and politicians throughout Europe were fear- ful that Germany would begin to unravel itself from international institutions, its effort to strengthen them only grew. Following its own reunification, Germany immediately began to champion further European integration, despite the skepticism by many other EU member-states about the ability of Eastern Europe to acclimate to the rules and culture of the EU. Jeffrey Anderson notes that Germany pushed strongly for enlargement to the east; a general consensus among political elites held that the prospect of EU membership for Central and Eastern European countries would undergird their path to democracy and markets, thereby contributing to political stability and economic prosperity in the region. The German government spearheaded the creation of EC assistance programs like PHARE (Pologne-Hongrie assistance a la restructuation des economies) and TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). It also provided much of the impetus for the string of European Agreements negotiated with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic republics, and Slovenia, which were viewed as precursors to formal membership in the EU. (1999, p. 53) This aggressive and consistent push for European integration not only reassured the rest of Europe of its own good intentions but also gave Germany a seat of influence within the European integration process. Because of its strong endorsement of integration, it could push for the implementation of its own preferences and gain a modicum of control over the process itself. Bulmer argues: In certain central areas of policy, it has been possible for the FRG to play an active role in shaping institutional development in such a way as to mobilize a bias in the character of EU governance (1997, pp. 7374). Germany was the strongest backer for the expansion of the EU to those Eastern Euro- pean countries who qualified. While others worried more about the economic and govern- mental pressures that would come with further expansion, Germany continually pushed for it. This strong support fostered gratitude among the Eastern Europeans and helped advance the German goal of creating a peaceful trade and security relationship with the East. Through its use of soft power, Germany has successfully pushed for greater and greater European integration, especially with the Eastern European countries, and has created for itself a position of leadership within Europe. It has been able to shape the preferences of other European nations, and of the EU itself, to more closely accord with its own prefer- ences. It has utilized its values and moral influence to mold European integration to meet its own goals. This trend continues today. During her EU Presidency, for example, Germanys Chan- cellor, Angela Merkel, made reconsideration of the European Constitution, which was rejected by referendums in France and Holland, a top priority. Just prior to her accession, the news organization Deutsche Welle reported: Merkelsaid when Germany takes over the EUs rotating presidency in 2007 it would work to promote the European Constitution despite its rejection by French and Dutch voters last year. D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 346 W.R. Patterson We absolutely need the constitution to ensure the European Union is effective and capable of action, Merkel said, but she also warned of moving too hastily. We must reflect how we can bring the constitution project to a successful conclusion. (2006) Germanys contribution to the EU is not the only example of its commitment to multi- lateral institutions. Germany is highly committed to multilateralism and has demonstrated this through a variety of organizations. John Duffield notes: More than their counterparts in most countries, German leaders have been inclined to comply with institutional rules and to work through institutional channels. They have also been more favorably disposed toward maintaining and strengthening existing international institutions and toward creating new ones. (1998, pp. 56). The Germans have utilized international institutions and organizations to forward their agenda on human rights and nuclear non-proliferation and, most notably in recent years, to express their discontent with American actions in Iraq. Despite the fears held by many that a reunified Germany might seek to become a nuclear power, the Germans have fought vigorously against nuclear proliferation. Oliver Meier argues: Germany has become one of the strongest supporters of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and Germanys decision to be a non-nuclear weapon state can be considered permanent. The period after Germanys unification in 1990 has proven that the German commitment to remain a non-nuclear weapon state is as strong as ever. (2001, p. 69) Germanys forceful rejection of nuclear weapons has eased tensions with its European partners and provided it with the moral influence to be a key player in multilateral non- proliferation negotiations. Germanys leadership on non-proliferation issues was evident at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference during which Germany was one of the driving forces behind the European Unions very successful efforts to convince those non-nuclear weapons states that were opposed to an indefinite extension of the NPT or undecided on the issue of indefinite extension to change their minds. (Ibid., p. 71) Germany demonstrated through its own behavior that security without nuclear weapons was possible and was therefore able to lead a multilateral effort to convince others that they could similarly afford to forgo nuclear weaponry. Another issue on which Germany has successfully utilized multilateral organizations in order to advance its own interests is that of human rights. Human rights issues are very salient in Germany. In an attempt to atone for their past, and to prevent future atrocities, the Germans have taken a leading role on these issues both domestically and internationally. Germany has continually proven its commitment to human rights through its domestic policies and behavior. Florian Pfeil argues: Compared to other constitutions, the German Basic Law accords an eminent status to guarantees of a wide range of human rights, and The internal human rights situation in Germany by any global standard is very good (2001, p. 91). This domestic commitment to human rights has allowed Germany to become a leader on human rights issues in the international arena as well. Pfeil notes: Germany has signed up to all important human rights covenants and plays an active role in the UN human rights regime (2001, p. 91). As part of its goal to increase human rights accountability, Germany was one of the primary backers of the Treaty of Rome establishing the International D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 347 Criminal Court (ICC). Having been the defendants in the Nuremberg Trials only 50 years before, the strong support that the Germans gave to the ICC was dramatic and had a significant impact on its acceptance by the international community. The adoption of the ICC statute can be seen as a great success for German human rights policy in the area of institution-building (Ibid., p. 93). The German commitment to international organizations and international laws was displayed most stridently during the run-up to the most recent Iraq war. To Germany (and to most of Europe), more was at stake than Saddam Hussein. To them, the entire international order of multilateralism and the efficacy of international law was at stake. August Pradetto points out: Schroder justified his rejection of the Iraq War in February 2003 asking, whether there is (or rather should be) a single power determining the course of the world (2006, p. 25). The US was seen to be overbearing and disdainful of European opinions. International law seemed to have no place in the Bush Administrations reasoning and their willingness to act unilaterally, as stated repeatedly by the president, was disconcerting to most Europeans. In response to this perceived unilateralism, Germany, along with several other countries, utilized its soft power to erode the legitimacy of the American actions. Nye argues: Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise the price. (2003, p. 66) This is a prime example in which several states pooled their soft power to at least partially counteract the hard power of a militarily dominant state. Even Kagan has written: Ideals and interests often coincide, and Europes assaults on the legitimacy of the U.S. dominance may also become an effective way of constraining and controlling the superpower (2004a, p. 65). Germanys record on multilateralism has not been perfect, however. In fact, Germany has acted unilaterally in some instances that remain controversial. Its recognition of Slove- nia and Croatia in 1991, in contravention of an EU consensus not to do so, is a prominent example. Germanys unilateral recognition of these countries was particularly worrying to many of its European partners because it came so soon after its own reunification. To many this seemed an ominously defiant first step in the foreign policy of a newly united Germany (Crawford 1996, p. 482). The decision angered EU member-states and was viewed as a deliberate action to undermine a multilateral agreement. Germanys decision in this case, however, can still be viewed as upholding values upon which its soft power has been built. One of the prime normative values held by the Germans, and by the international community, is that of the right of self-determination. Having only recently reunited after decades of the domination of East Germany by Soviet aggression, the Germans were particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Croatians and Slovenians. In a clash between two conflicting norms, that of multilateralism and self-determination, the Germans chose to support self-determination (Crawford 1996, p. 485). The fact that Germany was not attempting to undermine the European Union, as some at the time feared, has been borne out by subsequent history. Soft power matters, and since reunification Germany has, with only a few exceptions, relied heavily upon it to meet its foreign policy goals. Germany has used its soft power to enhance its own international reputation and to allay the fears of other states that it might once again seek to dominate Europe. It has pursued its national interests in widening the EU to Eastern Europe, deepening EU integration between all of its member-states, preventing nuclear proliferation, enforcing international human rights standards, and standing up to D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 348 W.R. Patterson what it perceived to be American unilateralism, all without resorting to military power. Germanys successful use of soft power in achieving its foreign policy goals demonstrates that conceptions of power that focus exclusively on the application of hard military power are too narrow. In order to get a true picture of any given states power capabilities, a broader picture is necessary. This section has focused on the development and use of soft power in Germany. The impression that Germany completely lacks hard power, however, would be a mistaken one. Germany cannot, of course, match the US in regards to its military might, but it does none- theless possess some military capability. In recent years, Germany has been less and less reticent to apply this hard power. The next section will explore Germanys development and use of hard military power. Toughening up Initially, fears of German post-unification military power were great. Franois Mitterrand, for example, openly worried: A reunified Germany would represent a double danger for Europe, by its power and because it would create pressure for alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. That would mean certain war in the twenty-first century (cited Crawshaw 2004, p. 80). Such anxiety was felt not only by foreigners, but by many Germans themselves. Could the Germans trust themselves after the horrors they had committed during World War II? At first they were not at all confident that they could. To ensure that they could never be responsible for a second Holocaust, the Germans largely repudiated the use of force, especially in a realpolitik setting. Katzenstein argues that there are virtually no traces of Germanys return to realist normalcy, to balance of power poli- tics in an anarchical international system. Germans shun the practice of power politics and balancing (1997, p. 9). Germanys renunciation of military force became immediately apparent in its shrinking military budget. Between 1960 and 1990, the West German defense budget had risen steadily at just under 3% per year and increased by 4.7% in the year 1990 (Tartter 1996, p. 489). This trend came to an abrupt halt following reunification, and defense spending was placed on a downward trajectory. From a high of slightly over $42 billion (in US dollars) in 1990, defense spending was down to $28 billion in 2000. Since 2000, and with Germanys increased military commitments around the world, defense spending has increased again but in 2007 still fell below the 1990 figure at just under $42 billion (NATO 2007). Relying solely upon these numbers, however, to judge Germanys use of hard power would be misleading. Germany has increasingly been doing more with less and while on paper Germanys hard power may seem to be reduced in comparison to the Cold War days, its actual use of hard power has been steadily growing. Rainer Baumann has noted: Step- by-step, post-unification Germany has given up its reservations about participating in out- of-area operations (2001, p. 174). Whereas prior to reunification Germanys military played a completely defensive deterrent role, Germany has since become much more comfortable using its military capability in a greater variety of missions and in an interna- tional context. By 2003, Germany had nearly ten thousand troops deployed in numerous international missions, working in concert with other countries under UN and NATO mandates to secure peace, fight terrorism and support democracy. Through its commitment to international cooperation, Germany has become the second largest contributor of troops to multilateral missions after the United States. German armed forces are deployed in Afghanistan, in Kuwait, in the Horn of Africa, in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia. (Germany Info Webpage 2008) D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 349 That Germany would participate to such a large degree in international military opera- tions was not inevitable. Indeed, during the Gulf War, its first major challenge to contribute troops to an international cause, the Germans balked. This war was led by one of Germanys primary allies (the US), had extensive international backing, and was being undertaken for the ostensive reason of thwarting an aggressive state and upholding international law. To most of the international community, this was a legitimate war. Yet the Germans refused to contribute military forces nonetheless. There were several reasons for the German reticence to contribute armed forces. First was the fact that their Constitution was widely interpreted as prohibiting it. In the view of many Germans, the Basic Law simply did not allow for the deployment of military forces overseas. Second, Germany was in the midst of reunification. Despite reunification being a major historical achievement, it was also a tumultuous time for the Germans. A rift of 55 years had created many differences between the East and West Germans that did not disappear with the dismantlement of a stone wall. Questions of German identity and the German future were abundant, and the answers were not at all clear. Too much distrust still existed between the Easterners and Westerners for them to provide a coherent military contribution to the war. Before getting involved in foreign adventures they first needed to discover who they were. A third reason was, of course, fear of power. Reunification greatly enhanced Germanys power position in the world and there was much apprehension about that, both within Germany itself and throughout Europe as a whole. To take a strong military stance in an international conflict so soon after reunification would have confirmed many peoples worst fears. The Germans had not yet built up the international trust to enable them to field military units abroad. Germany needed time before it was ready to send its military on out-of-area missions, but not too much time. The united Germany first tested the waters of international military deployment in 1992. In that year, Germany began its participation in the UNTAC mission in Cambodia to which it contributed approximately 140 Bundeswehr soldiers. Most of these soldiers were medical personnel rather than combat troops, yet even this commitment was controversial within Germany. Other missions would, however, follow in quick succession. According to Steve Crawshaw, Cambodia marked only the beginning of a cascading series of changes involving Germans in war zones (2004, p. 119). Only two months after the commitment of troops to Cambodia, Germany elected to send AWACS aircraft to aid in the enforcement of the no-fly zone and embargo being imposed upon Yugoslavia. These were reconnaissance rather than fighter aircraft, so it was justified as a non-combat mission. Additionally, this mission was taking place inside Europe, which could plausibly be regarded as being within the self-defense jurisdiction of NATO. The third appearance of German military personnel abroad began the next year, 1993, with the Bundeswehr deployment to Somalia in support of UNOSOM II. This deployment was much more robust, with over 1,500 soldiers participating. These soldiers were involved in technical assistance such as engineering and logistics and again, no troops were involved in actual combat. The operation was rationalized by the German leadership as being purely humanitarian and therefore not a violation of the Basic Law, which precluded the deploy- ment of military troops beyond German borders. These missions were bitterly opposed by several factions in the German government, most specifically by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). These parties challenged the deployment of troops through the German court system. This would prove to have momentous repercussions for German foreign policy. The court ultimately found the deployments to be constitutional, thereby granting full legal legitimacy to the use of Bundeswehr personnel in foreign opera- tions for the first time. Kerry Longhurst remarks: D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 350 W.R. Patterson In mapping the trajectory of change in Germanys post-Cold War security policy, the Consti- tutional Courts decision of 12 July 1994 is of central significance. This decision essentially ratified the CDU-CSU strategy of incrementally extending the Bundeswehrs remit, without recourse to constitutional amendments. (2004, p. 64) This decision gave the German government the green light to become even more involved in future international military operations. Germanys next international engagement would once again be in Yugoslavia. In 1994, NATO requested that the Germans provide aircraft to aid in the extraction of UN peacekeep- ers involved in the UNPROFOR mission. A combat role was again avoided, and the mission was justified to the German people on the grounds that it was a mission of protection for international peacekeeping forces. This deployment foreshadowed Germanys subsequent non-combat involvement in the IFOR mission in Bosnia in 1995. Within five years of reunification, German military forces had been sent to participate in international missions in Cambodia, Somalia, and various areas in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, these deployments had not only been given an official stamp of approval by the German high court but had also met with broad international appreciation. Germany was incrementally, but quickly, overcoming its reluctance to utilize its military in out-of-area operations. This reluctance would be even further shattered in 1998 when Germany agreed to participate in the NATO mission in Kosovo. Kosovo was a watershed moment for German military involvement because it was the first mission since its establishment that the Bundeswehr would be involved in actual combat missions. Longhurst argues: Germanys involvement in Kosovo certainly was qualitatively different to any other previous deployment, principally because this time the Bundeswehr was engaged in an offensive military operation against a sovereign state with- out a clear mandate from the UN (2004, p. 70). Germany had moved from participating in UN-sanctioned, non-combative, peacekeeping missions to involvement in a full combat scenario supported only by NATO. This was a huge step in German foreign policy. An even greater step would come following 11 September 2001 when Germany made a full commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan. The NATO article of common defense was invoked immediately after the attacks and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder prom- ised unconditional solidarity with the US war on terrorism. Nearly 4,000 Bundeswehr troops were deployed to Afghanistan, and Germany even accepted the position as the lead nation in charge of NATO combat operations in that country. These actions of support are, according to Longhurst, firm expressions of Germanys commitment to having a role in international security and accepting the utility of armed force (2004, p. 77). German foreign policy, and its willingness to use military force abroad, has come a long way since the Gulf War. German smart power As demonstrated in the previous two sections, Germany has resorted to both soft and hard power in pursuit of its national interests. It has used soft power to strengthen its position in international organizations, prevent nuclear proliferation, enforce human rights standards and stand-up to unilateral American power. It has utilized hard military power to solidify its posi- tion in the world, to stabilize situations of conflict and to combat terrorism. What is most significant about German power, however, is how the elements of soft and hard power have formed a mutually supportive nexus that has allowed for the increase of both: its smart power. The possession of a large degree of soft power was a necessary precondition for the development of any significant amount of hard power in Germany. The rest of Europe was far too suspicious of German power to have allowed it to pursue hard military power with D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 351 any degree of exuberance. Writing at the time, Bergner noted: Even the hint of an indepen- dent military course will be sufficient to set capitals from London to Moscow off in search of new alliances in the old game of national power politics (1991, p. 89). Any sign of resurgent German power would have set into motion a game of balancing and power politics that Germany wanted nothing to do with. Duffield echoed these sentiments when he wrote: Germany has continued to be watched more closely and with greater mistrust than would another country in the same geopolitical circumstances, while German initiatives have still been more likely to be met with suspicion, criticism, and even resistance. Consequently, Germany has continued to have strong incentives to act cautiously in order to reassure its neighbors that they have nothing to fear. (1998, p. 48) That is precisely what developing its soft power allowed Germany to do. By proving to its European partners that it had no intentions of revamping its old war machine or rekindling its old aspirations of European conquest, Germany was incrementally able to increase and actively use its hard power. European fears were allayed by Germanys continued deference to international institutions, its strong support for human rights issues and its leading role in creating nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Duffield argues: By acting through established institutional channels, states may be able to reassure others about their intentions, thereby reducing international tension and mistrust (1998, p. 19). Rather than immediately striking out on the path to hard military power, Germany first built up its international reputation as a peaceful nation and one that was devoted to multilateralism and international law. This provided them with greater latitude in the future when it came to issues of military deployments abroad. Thomas Banchoff has noted: Concerns in 199091 about the possibility of a more nationally oriented German foreign policy faded in the years that followed (1999, p. 163). In fact, the Germans were at first so reluctant to utilize military force that their refusal to do so began to erode their soft power. While the Germans constantly spoke about the importance of international law and the enforcement of human rights norms, their refusal to back these values up with force when necessary made them look disingenuous at best and downright hypocritical at worst. In order to maintain their soft power, the Germans needed to occasionally back it up with hard power. The first hint that Germany may not be able to rely on its soft power alone came early on with the Gulf War. Germanys refusal to participate in the war militarily caused some consternation with its allies, especially the US, which felt that it was playing checkbook diplomacy. Nina Philippi writes: Although Germany finally paid about 16 billion Deutsch Marks to help finance Operation Desert Storm, this only partially compensated for the German absence and their allies disap- pointment at Germanys lack of solidarity. The pressure on Germany to play a greater role in world politics grew in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis. (2001, p. 52) Germany, then, seemed trapped. On the one hand, they had to be cautious about using their hard power too openly so as not to arouse suspicions of a reversion to realpolitik, while on the other they were being accused of not sufficiently supporting their allies and their own values when they rebuffed requests for military contributions. This problem only deepened with later crises. Crawshaw points out, for example, that: During the early years of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, German politicians openly advocated tougher action against Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies, especially D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 352 W.R. Patterson after the discovery of concentration camps in Bosnia. In the words of the defence minister, Volker Ruhe: concentration camps in Germany were stopped by soldiers, not by demonstra- tions in another country. On the other hand, the government insisted that Germany itself could not possibly send troops because of the Second World War. The British government gleefully accused Bonn of rank hypocrisy. (2004, pp. 119120) German atrocities in World War II started to look less like a rational reason for restraint on the foreign deployment of troops and more like an excuse. The Germans resolved this dilemma by agreeing to send the Bundeswehr abroad, but only when asked to do so by the UN or some other multilateral organization and only when it was absolutely necessary to protect the moral values and interests that they espoused. As Longhurst puts it: The new German perspective towards the use of force was characterized by a greater disposi- tion to consider using the Bundeswehr in a wider range of missions. Consensus and agreement to actually deploy armed forces, though, would be governed by strict criteria, which would include the presence of a UN mandate, a multilateral framework, a clear mission statement, as well as an unambiguous humanitarian dimension. (2004, p. 69) The humanitarian aspect was always clearly spelled out in the missions that the Bundeswehr was dispatched to. Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo all had clear humanitarian elements that could be pointed to as justification for armed intervention. For Germany, hard power has not been used in pursuit of power politics as neo-realists would expect, but rather it has been employed in the support of values and ideas that have been agreed upon by the majority of the international community. This policy has met with a good deal of success. Crawshaw writes, for example: When German troops arrived in Prizren in western Kosovo they were stunned by their reception. Thousands hugged and kissed the conscripts, and put flowers in their flak jackets. Crowds chanted: Deutsch-land! A young Kosovo Albanian described her reaction on seeing the German tanks. I fainted right on the street. This was a miracle. Germans had spent years telling each other that the world would be horrified if they were to set foot in a war zone ever again. Now, it was clear that this assumption was based on a misconception. (2004, p. 125) The old saying goes that nothing succeeds like success, and this has definitely been the case with German foreign policy. Germany has been able to wrap its hard power in an exte- rior of soft power and has found the combination quite useful. The fears of its Europeans friends have been allayed, and the tumultuous internal dissent has been largely quieted. Only 17% of the German population had supported intervention in the Gulf War, a few years later 54% supported involvement in Bosnia, and a full 69% supported involvement in the war on terrorism immediately following 9/11 (Pradetto 2006, p. 24). Germany seems to have found the solution to its power dilemma. As Crawshaw puts it, Germans are an inter- national fighting force for the first time in six decades. At last, that fact frightens neither the Germans nor the rest of the world (2004, p. 131). Conclusion Since its reunification, Germany has been able to expertly combine its hard with its soft power. German foreign policy has been marked by a respect for international law and multi- lateral institutions. Human rights issues have also played an important role in German as opposed to recent American foreign policy. But this is not to say, as analysts such as Kagan might, that Germans have an allergy to the use of power in all its forms. D o w n l o a d e d
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2 0 0 8 Journal of Power 353 Since reunification, Germany has focused on the development of its soft power in order to solidify its influence over other international actors, especially within Europe. This strat- egy has allowed Germany to allay the fears of its neighbors and allies, and to reassure them that Germany does not present a risk to their security. It has increased Germanys influence over the behavior of other states and over the actions of the international organizations to which it belongs. Furthermore, it has helped create an international environment in which the development and use of German hard power has become more acceptable. The goals that Germany has recently been pursuing through its foreign policy have been more achievable through the use of soft power, reinforced with limited and restrained hard power, than would be possible through a more muscular and militaristic approach. Robert Jervis reminds us: It is important to remember that power is not a goal in itself but is a means to reach other objectives (1989, p. 247). To resort to hard power when such action is not likely to achieve the desired objectives is counter-productive. The Germans have taken a wiser, smarter, approach and have built up their soft power to an extent that makes their hard power more palatable to the rest of the international community. Contrary to being allergic to power, Germany has used its soft power, and its increasing hard power, in an assertive way to meet its foreign policy goals. Since its reunification, Germany has accu- mulated and used a considerable amount of smart power. Germany has developed a foreign-policy consensus that allows it to maintain its reputa- tion as a peaceful nation devoted to multilateral institutions while simultaneously making a substantial military contribution to global crises when the right conditions are met. The Germans have managed to fuse together the elements of hard and soft into a complex amalgamation of power that exemplifies what Armitage and Nye call smart power. In German foreign policy, hard power is made permissible by soft power, and soft power is made credible by hard power. Though the use of American power is not likely to mirror that of the Germans any time soon (nor should it considering their different histories and current positions in the world system), the case of Germany does provide a useful example of how smart power can be developed and used. Hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive ends on the spectrum of power; on the contrary, Germany has demonstrated that these two elements of power can be used most successfully when adeptly combined in such a way as to increase both. The US, and other states as well, could learn valuable lessons about the application of smart power from the case of Germany. Notes on contributor William R. Patterson is a PhD candidate in the International Studies program at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. Primary research interests include issues relating to international policing, political philosophy and European studies, and he has previously published in the journals Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Journal of Social Philosophy, International Journal of Applied Philosophy and International Topics. References Anderson, J., 1999. German unification and the union of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armitage, R.L. and Nye, J.S., co chairs, 2007. CSIS commission on smart power: a smarter, more secure America. Pre-publication draft, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. Banchoff, T., 1999. The German problem transformed: institutions, politics, and foreign policy, 19451995. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. D o w n l o a d e d
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