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Naxal Epilogue - BDG
Naxal Epilogue - BDG
Biplab Dasgupta
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Wed Feb 13 13:20:52 2008
BIPL AB DASGUPT'il
FOR two major reasons it has been necessary to write again on the
Naxalite Movement alnlost four years after t h e first publication of t h e
book The ~YaxaliteMouenzent.' First, the need to take into account the
new documents a n d facts about the first five stormy years of t h e
movement. T h e material for t h e hook was collected during 1970-71 a t a
time when the movement was passing through its most explosive,
violent a n d critical phase which ended in its ruthless suppression by
t h e government. Given t h e character of the movement, its m o d e of
functioning a n d t h e trying conditior~s under which it was operating a t
t h e time, there was obviously a limit to the scope for research i n this
field. Second, t h e urgent need to u p d a t e t h e d a t a . Since t h e d e a t h of
h f a z u m d a r , the movement has taken a new turn; a n d whether t h e Nax-
alism of today is a continuation of the movement Icd by M a z u m d a r or
not, t h e fact remains that it has established itself a s a n i ~ n p o r t a n ttrend
within the left-wing movement of the country. I t is important t o ask
why this trend persists, despite the fact that Naxalism stands for different
things to different factions, despite their lack of unity a n d organization,
a n d despite the ideological confusion in their ranks d u e to splits a n d twists
a n d turns in Chinese politics. And why, even after the harrowinp
experience of 1967-72, some of them continue to f o l l o ~ vdoggedly a n d
4 SOCIAL. SCIENTIST
Charu Mazumdar
LVe begin with a n evaluation of the role of C h a r u Irlazumdar; b u t
not with a view to personify t h e entire movement. h l a z u m d a r as a priv-
a t e person does not interest us; his attitudes, whims, habits a n d prejudi-
ces which d o not have any impact on public life a r e not o u r concern.
W h e t h e r h e was a saint, a rogue or a crank, whether h e was a teetotaller
or a n alcoholic a n d drug-addict, a n d whether his commitment to instant
revolution was qenuine o r a ploy t o make his mark in history with
Chinese support, all these a r e trivial compared to t h e objective role h e
played in Indian politics. History has shown t h a t it is just as possible
for a self-sacrificing idealist t o play into the h a n d s o f the reactionaries
a s i t is for a person with a less than perfect personal life to play a prog-
ressive role.
IVe a r e interested in Mazumdar's political role, because of his
place in the movement. Mazumdar initiated Naxalism long before Nax-
albari, he acted as t h e main source of inspiration behind Srikakulam
a n d other a t t e m p t e d a r m e d revolts led by t h e Naxalites, a n d firmly
controlled t h e party organization until his d e a t h . H e was the father
figure of t h e movement, a replica of C h a i r m a n M a o on a n I n d i a n scale.
I n t h e words of one of his admirers a n d trusted comrades, Saroj Dutta,
"The history of I n d i a has given Charu M a z u m d a r the role t o carry out
the historic task (of conducting socialist revolution). I n the present situ-
ation C h a r u M a z u m d a r is C P I (LIL)."' L'fazumdar was the 'rcvolution-
ary authority'; his talks a n d comments became t h e 'party line', a n d not
to accept his leadership unconditionally amounted t o defying t h e party."
"'Ct'ith t h e d e a t h of M a z u m d a r a particular phase in the movement
ended. Naxalism implied not only a call for i m m r d i a t e armed struggle
a n d devotion to the Chinese path, hut also t h e annihilation theory, the
rejection of a united front, mass organizations a n d mass activities a n d
u r b a n guerilla activities among others. All these carried t h e personal
mark of Mazumdar. IYithout these policies a n d without Mazumdar,
Naxalism could not have been what it was in 1967-72."'
Because M a z u m d a r meant so much t o Naxalism a n d t h e Naxalites,
i t was inevitable that h e would become t h e principal target of attack
with the failure of the movement. T h e criticism related t o both the way
h e r a n t h e party organisation (for example, see t h e criticism by t h e
Satyanarayan Singh group o f his establishment of 'personal regime',
which they considered as "perverse a n d alien to Llarxist-Leninist norms
of party o r g a n i ~ a t i o n " )a~n d t h e ideologies h e preached. By now all but
three of the Naxalite factions have repudiated what they describe as
'Charuisrn', the strongest criticism coming from t h e S N S group in the
following words: cannot a n d must not unite with those who uphold
a n d practise the ultra 'left' line of C h a r u hkizumdar, t h a t is, the line o f
individual terrorism, the line of boycott a n d opposition to mass struggles,
the line of a r m e d struggle without t h e party, without t h e people a n d
without politics, whether they call themselves anti-Lin o r pro-Lin
f a c t i o n s . " T h e S N S group has also rejected his assessment about the
prospects of revolution in India: while victory is absolutely certain,
according to this group it is not going to be a "smooth walk over", a n d
t h e I n d i a n revolution would have to '(traverse a tortuous a n d protracted
course a n d there will be n o easy a n d quick victory."' Again, while
"an excellent revolutionary situation is misting a n d growing in I n d i a
today", the g r o u p contended, "it would be wrong to conclude that all
t h e people a r e ready for a r m e d strugglr all over t h e country".' hlazurn-
dar's two other formulations t h a t the entire bourgeoisie in I n d i a was
'comprador' a n d t h e entire section of the rich peasantry were feudal in
nature have also been heavily criticised as being roo ~ i m p l i s t i c . ~
O n t h e other side of this intra-Naxzlite debate, t h e pro-Chart1
h l a z u m d a r groups argue t h a t t h e setback in t h e m o v e m e n t was not d u e
t o any failing on the part of M a z u m d a r as t h e party's leader a n d
theoretician, b u t t o the faulty application of his preachings by t h e local
leadership. T h e y point out t h a t even t h e Communist movement in China
suffered m a n y setbacks under t h e leadership of Mao: not only various
types of right a n d left deviations occurred, but the situation even reached
a stage where M a o himself h a d to ask t h e party cadres to "bombard
t h e (partv) headquarters".1° T h e y cite several letters of Charu h4azum-
d a r which purport to show that h e often tried t o correct the excesqes
which were being committed by t h e party cadres in the implementation
of the annihilation line I n one such letter h e wrote: "Not all the officers
are our enemies-only t h e corrupt and anti-people officers should be t h e
targets of our attack." (18-1 1-1971)." And in another letter he stated,
"We should remember t h a t not all busiriessmen a r e our enemies. O n t h e
contrary after a n area has been liberated some of these businessn~en
would contact us in their own interests." (13-12-1970).1a T h i s last
statement, however, would be seen by many as confirming t h a t in t h e
'liberated areas' of Calcutta, t h e businessmen used the Naxalites to keep
t h e CPI(h4) t r a d e unionists a n d their sympathisers out of their work
places.
I t is clear that the role of h l a z u m d a r will continue as a major
subject of debate a m o n g the Naxalites for many years t o come. T h i s is
natural, expected a n d hralthy, given his importance in the history of
t h e movement. But w h a t is surprising, m o r e t h a n the hero-worship of the
pro-CM factions, is the tendency a m o n g others to m a k e h l a z u m d a r t h e
G SOCIAL SCIENTIST
gramnies were mainly shaped by its leader. I n its functioning this group
faced challenges from both the 'right' a n d the 'left'. T h e 'right' was in
favour of a policy of 'lying low' for some time; some of their s,pokesmen
including R N Upadhaya, Mahendra Singh and Shiv Kumar Mishra,
even spoke for organizing the party on a 'democratic' basis under the
conditions, and opposed the centralisation of the party apparatus. T h e
'left' on the other hand was critical of the failure of the party to give
leadership to armed struggle, a n d was criticised in its turn by the
central committee for being 'a body of idle romantics' a t a time when
there were 'very few armed squads' under the leadership of the party.
These differences within the group eventually brought the central
leadership in direct confrontation with three of the principal state units
-Bengal, Bihar and Orissa-and led to several e x p u l ~ i o n s . ~ '
capture of state power, in the belief that the people of India are ready
for revolution, has been discarded by the Naxalitrs, and like the C P l ( h l )
they too are now committed to a series of parrial struggles on economic
and political demands, in order to raise the political consciousness of' the
~ e o p l eo r to establish links with the broadest possible section of masses.
A united front is no longer taboo; in fact in some instances, for exarrlple
the JP-led movement, the Naxalites have appeared willing to be even
more accommodating than the CPI(M), without feeling embarrassed
about their association with rightwing elements.
Differences, however, persist on severai issues. First, the allegiance
of the Naxalites to the Chinese party or its various minority factions.
Whatever their differences with one another on interpretation, all the
Naxalite groups accept Mao's thoughts as their guiding principles. Their
characterisation of the Soviet Union as 'social imperialist', a n d as being
more dangerous than U S imperialism, their 'three world' analysis
which even makes the capitalist countries of Europe the allies of the
revolutionaries in their fight against 'social imperialism', and their
refusal to accept the ~iationalaspirations of the people as being the main
force behind the Sangladesh liberation struggle-all these are cases of
important differences on international questions which cannot be easily
bridged. Whereas rhr CPI (M) leadership is prepared to have friendly
relations with the Communist Party of China, in contrast with the
attitude of the Naxalites, they would expect such relationship to be
governed by the principles ol total equality between the fraternal parties,
non-interference in each other's affairs, and resolution of conflicts
through party-to-party affairs, and rtsolution of conflicts through party-
to-party dialogue. Although China does not figure s o prominently in the
Naxalite literature of today as it did only five years ago, even now the
foreign policy of China continues to have a major i n ~ p a c on t the policy
formulation of the Naxalites.
A second area of difference would be their contrasting position on
the analysis of class character of the Indian state. While both the
C P I ( M ) and the Naxalitrs talk of bourgeoisie-landlord rule, there are
vast differences between them on the natureof such rule." Furthermore,
the Naxalite analysis talks of 'four mountains' on the back of the Indian
people, the other two being the two superpowers who are controlling
the two dominant Indian classes. Here again, t h e recent acceptance by
t h e C P I (ML) group led by Singh that not all the bourgeoisie is 'com-
prador', and not all the rich peasants are 'feudal', goes a long way
towards correcting the highly simplistic class analysis, and brings it
nearer to the C P I (M) position, but not enough yet.
Thirdly, even where there a r e similarities in the formal position
of the two-for example on the use of the parliamentary institutions, or
on the use of mass organizations for developing political consciousness
among the people-doubts and suspicions persist, as to whether these
K A X A L I T E MOVEMENT 21
statements are really meant o r are being advanced to hide the real
counter-revolutionary intentions. A reading of Naxalite literature would
prove how deep this sense of mistrust is among them regarding the
CPI (M).
Lastly, perhaps the biggest stumbling block is t h e history of the
1967-72 period, the confrontations between the two, t h e killings, a n d
the hatred generated by all this. T h i s partly explains why, even after
their recognition of the inadequacies o f their earlier s t a n d , a n d despite
their disillusionment w i t h the Chinese party after the 'Lin Piao' a n d
'gang o f four' episodes, many of the Naxalitcs have hesitated to join the
C P I ( M ) . This emotional barrier between t h e two cannot be easily dis-
mantled; this is as true of t h e Naxalites as of the C P I (M) rank a n d file.
A11 this does not exclude the possibilities which exist for t h e
Naxalites and the C P I ( M ) , a n d indeed many other groups to join h a n d s
on specific issues-whether localised o r national in scope-be it the civil
liberties campaiyn which has not lost its relevance with t h e accession to
power of t h e J a n a t a government, or t h e partial struggles of t h e poor
peasants, workers a n d the middle class. T o a great extent such united
action is already taking place in many areas a n d work places.
While the ideological conflict between the Naxalites a n d t h e
C P I ( M ) will continue-and the conflict by its very nature might even
be a n antagonistic one-there is no reason w h y this cannot be resolved
in a non-antagonistic way. I t is important for t h e Naxalite leaders o f
various persuasions to ensure t h a t they a r e not used by t h e government
a n d t h e ruling classes t o weaken the CPI (M) a n d other leftwing parties,
as they were in West Bengal d u r i n g 1967-72. A major lesson o f t h a t
period is that a n attack against the C P I (M)-particularly the govern-
m e n t led by t h e C P I (M) in West Bengal-would eventually be turned
into a n attack against all types of leftwing forces including the Naxalites
in t h e second phase. T a k i n g t h e country as a whole, the left is too weak
t o indulge in the luxury of fratricidal war which will only bsnefit t h e
ruling classes, a n d confuse the people. While ideological conflict a n d
polemics will persist as long as there are many leftwing parties, it is
important that they make the ruling classes, a n d riot one another, t h e
m a i n target of their a t t a c k .
there are many groups and factions in the movement, a large nurnber of
Naxalites, despite maintaining a broad sympathetic attitude towards
the movement, are opposed to joining one group or another. I n fact the
dominant trend among the Naxalitcs is opposed to the hasty formation
of a highly centralised party organization without first engaging in full
and open discussions o n variousmideoiogical 2nd organizational issues
among them. Some would even argue that groupism and factionalism is
'inevitable' in this particular phase in t h e history of their movement.
T h e classification of various factions into some broad groupings
is not easy, given the shifts in political position, movement of individ-
uals from one group to another, mergers and splits-all of which have
dogged the movement almost from the very first d a y of its existence.
Broadly speaking, a minority of the groups still adhere to the preaching
of Mazumdar, while the great majority of them are opposed to it. T h e
pro-CM Naxalites are again divided into the following three groups:
~ r o - L i nPiao, the group led by hlahadev Mukherjee and supported
among others by a body called North Bengal-Bihar regional cornmittee
of the C P I ( M L ) ; anti-Lin Piao, the group which is now conducting a
mini-revolt in Rhojpur district in Bihar; and the C O C ( M L ) group led
by Suniti K u m a r Ghosh, and Appalasuri, which has a large following
among the Naxalites of Srikakulam. T h e largest anti.CM group is of-
course the one led by Satyanarayan Singh, which is called by the name
of its parent body CPI(ML), and in this postscript we have provided a
good deal of detail about its position on a wide range of issues. T h e
second largest is perhaps the U C C R I ( M L ) , the Andhra-based group,
popularly known as the Nagi Reddy group, which was the first to defect
from Mazumdar's organization, which never joined the CPI(ML), and
which now seems to feel with a great deal of justification, that its
ideological stand against Xlazumdar has been vindicated by the history
of the movement. This group is now led by D Venkateswara Rao,
a leading figure of the 'Telengana uprising' of 1946-51. A long way
behind these two is the Unity Committee led by Khokan hlazumdar, a
Naxalite from North Bengal who was closely associated with Charu
Mazumdar, and Kaushik Banerjee, about whom very little is known.
Many other groups-Maoist Communist Centre, and CPIML (Bolshevik)
among them--exist, most of which are centered around one or two pro-
minent individuals. And a point we made earlier, a vast number of
Naxalites d o not belong to any of these groups, despite their sympathy
for the movement. Although several attempts have been made in the
past to unite the Naxalites, and several cornmittees to unify, coordinate
or consult were formed, none of these could be sustained for long; and
the 'dialogue' among them, while beginning in t h e friendliest of spirit
soon degenerated into mutual accusations of 'revisionism', 'trotskyism',
'opportunism', and so on. Debates on ideological and political issues
have often become very subjective - based on the assessment of the
NAXALITE MOVEMENT 23
Ibid.
'Problems and Tasks before the Party', a review by the extended central committee
meeting of C P I ( M L ) of the period from November 1971 to June 1974, Ibid.
"Indian Revolution and its Path,' a document produced by the central committee
of CPI(hfL) o n 2 2 April 1975, Liberation, June-July 1975.
' T h e Problems and Tasks before the Party', op cit.
I' Sfulinga, op cit., no 2, 1974. They even argued, quoting Mao, that "setback is
necessary".
11 Ibid.
" Ibld.
la < ' L i k ~I,in Piao, Mazumdar can now be made the scapegoat for all the failings of
C P I ( M L ) in 1967-72". See Dasgupta, p 233.
l4 See Dasgupta, op cit., p 195, for the details.
See Dasgupta, op cit., Chapter 6 for details.
16 Dasgupta, op cit., p p 189-190.
l7 Liberation, October 1974-June 1975, op cit.
la U C C R I ( M L ) , ''1Mao Tsetung will live in our hearts for ever", resolution of the
central committee on the death of Comrade Mao Tsetung p p 76-37.
19 Etpht historic documents on tht uncornfiromising ~ t r u p g l e a ~ a i n s l revisionism by our