By Mark Vernon on Saturday, April 26 2008, 10:50 - Philosophers - Permalink

Do you sometimes have the feeling that an opinion is coming at you from all sides? Right
now, I have that feeling about the greatness of David Hume. The excellentPhilosophy
Bites had a recent podcast in which he was heralded as possibly the greatest English-
speaking philosopher. Then I was reading Edward Craig's Philosophy A Very Short
Introduction with the same accolade and a whole chapter devoted to Hume's Of Miracles.
And, speaking at an event on secularism, he was again brandished as a champion.
Now, no less a figure than Bernard Williams said Hume had written one of the five top
moral philosophy books of all time, his Second Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals - though Williams disagreed with him on Hume's denial of objectivity in ethics:
according to Williams, Hume confused what scientific and ethical truth might be.
Hume is also a great read, clear and complex: that makes him stand out, not least if you
want to read some big-hitting philosophy in its original language and that language must be
English.
However, I can't help but feel that Hume's trumpet is being overblown.
For example, it seems there is a profound paradox at the heart of his philosophy that he
tries to finesse but that arguably renders it incoherent. On the one hand, he is a thorough-
going sceptic - doubting everything from his sense of self to the power of induction in
science. But on the other hand, he falls in with the common sense philosophy of Reid. So
having doubted himself, he then, famously, dissolves the crisis in a game of backgammon.
Or having unsettled the foundations of science, he then declares it to be the best grounds
for knowledge.
This ambivalence comes to a head in his thoughts on religion. Take the celebrated
chapter Of Miracles. Though packed with interesting arguments - which is why Hume is
undoubtedly worth reading - his scepticism about miracles rests on the observation that to
believe in miracles requires accepting what someone who has seen a miracle claims to tell
you; that rests on the principle that the world for them is the same as it is for you. However,
that same principle requires you to deny the testimony, because you do not see miracles
yourself, having to rely on the testimony of others. Believing in miracles is, therefore,
incoherent.
However, could not exactly the same be said about science? I do not experience a world
made of atoms, for example. I have to rely on scientists who tell me that the hard stuff of
daily life is, actually, mostly nothing. So on the same grounds that Hume doubts miracles,
he'd have to doubt science, and perhaps all knowledge - which is maybe what he did in
sceptical mode, until common sense told him that was ridiculous. Maybe, to the believer,
believing in miracles is perfectly common-sensical too. Who's to decide the difference?
Then, there's Hume's supposed atheism. Whilst he often begins lines of argument with a
theologically positive statement, it is claimed that this is mostly self-preservation, and that
if you read between the lines, his atheism shines through. I don't see it myself. For one
thing, his most sustained critique of belief in God, theDialogues Concerning Natural
Religion, was published posthumously and presented its arguments via characters rather
than in his own voice, both strategies for minimizing personal risk and maximizing self-
expression.
And then, when you turn to the Dialogues, and see the character Philo as closest to Hume,
since Philo is the sceptic, you read that Philo admits that the reasons for and against the
existence of God ultimately hang in the balance: (I) believe that the arguments on which
it is established exceed the objections which lie against it, he concludes. This would
suggest that Hume is certainly against organized religion but is an agnostic when it comes
to the particular question of God.
The irony is that when the Dialogues were published they hardly caused a ripple.
In his own lifetime, I believe, Hume was known as a great historian. Maybe there is a good
reason for that. Or am I missing something?

Comments
1. On Sunday, April 27 2008, 02:31 by Peter Millican
It's understandable why most readers of Hume have thought his philosophy
problematic in the respects you mention, but I think that's because they've
tended to focus too much on the Treatise, which leaves a lot of unresolved
loose ends. The first Enquiry is clearer (see www.amazon.co.uk/dp/01992...for
my edition which explains this point of view). Also, to make sense of Hume it
helps to understand Hume's philosophical opponents, who wanted to claim
rational insight as a means to knowledge of the world (often with a theological
agenda). Against this, Hume wanted to insist that induction (i.e. inference
from past experience) was the ONLY route to truth about the world, and that
even this was fallible, could not itself be justified by rational insight, and
required the weighing up of competing evidence. In all of this, he's very much
an advocate of the modern scientific method. His denial that induction is
founded on rational insight is clearly in a sense a sceptical point, but that
doesn't imply he's a sceptic in the sense of thinking we shouldn't rely on
induction - quite the reverse (to assume that it DOES imply that is just to take
for granted the very thing that Hume is denying: that we can and should base
our lives on rational insight). And there's no paradox at all in his discussion of
miracles, if properly understood: he's simply arguing for proper assessment of
inductive, statistical evidence (and avoidance of the now familiar "base rate
fallacy"), and also that this is most unlikely ever to favour a miracle report,
especially if religion is involved. Moreover he's dead right here (which is not,
of course, to deny that some aspects of his philosophy are problematic).

I say more on all this on a Philosophy Bites interview, at:
nigelwarburton.typepad.co...

Regarding Hume's atheism, there isn't space here to do the issue justice, but
bear in mind that "theological lying" - starting and ending an essay with
statements of faith, while all the intervening arguments point in the opposite
direction - was very common (look at the essay "Of the Immortality of the
Soul" for a very clear example). You mention the Dialogues, but though
published posthumously this work was mainly composed in the early 1750s,
and Hume was persuaded not to publish it then. He had previously used
dialogue form to conceal his own views - see Section XI of the Enquiry (1748),
where it's clear that the arguments of "Epicurus" are Humean. Not only would
he have been keen to avoid potential prosecution or excommunication, but
also to avoid offence to his friends and putting off potential readers. Finally,
you say that "Philo admits that the reasons for and against the existence of
God ultimately hang in the balance: (I) believe that the arguments on which
it is established exceed the objections which lie against it, he concludes". But
this is to overlook the subtlety of Hume's text. The statement which Philo
assesses in this way is "that the cause or causes of order in the universe
probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence". That superficially
sounds theistic, indeed. But now add to this a statement from earlier in Part
XII - almost certainly added when he was dying of cancer - which says that
there is "a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of nature ... the
rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human
thought [are] energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other".
The phrase "some remote analogy" occurs nowhere else in any of Hume's
writings, and it seems almost certain that Hume intended these two passages
to be read together. What they imply is that Philo is agreeing to no more than
this: that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear as much
analogy to human thought as they do to the rotting of a turnip! That clearly is a
very long way indeed from theism. Quite apart from this, even if he were to
accept the real possibility of a genuinely intelligent cause of the universe,
Philo's arguments in Parts X and XI quite clearly suggest that that cause is
morally indifferent, and certainly not perfectly good. This is clearly atheism if
"God" is understood as in Christianity.
2. On Sunday, April 27 2008, 11:22 by Mark Vernon
Peter ??"

Many thanks for taking the time to respond to my blog.

One initial point: not believing in the Christian God is not the same as being an
atheist. Christians themselves have branded people atheists for not believing
in the particularities of their faith, even merely for immoral behaviour.
But using atheist in that way is politics not theology. There is a big difference
between denying Christianity and not believing in God. Plus the dialogues are
explicitly about establishing the existence of God by reason, not the larger
matter of the Christian religion.

On the more substantial issue of the Dialogues. Im not Humean scholar,
only a Hume reader. But I have to say that Philos conclusion which I quoted
seems like a fair summary and not easily reconciled with the reading you
suggest. I cant help but wonder whether you are reading back into the text,
dare I say in a moment when the reasoning might be a slave to certain atheistic
passions. Plus, your reading seems to condemn everything to being
comparable to a rotting turnip, including those things like human thought
which are of humanistic value. That would fit with the strand of misanthropy
in Humes thought ??" religion being perhaps only the best manifestation of
the enthusiasms and superstitions of the masses which he loathed.
But that does not seem to commend it morally.

From what you say, Hume argued induction is valuable, but not on the
grounds of reason, only of past experience and evidence. I would think that
this reading of induction still leaves his theory struggling to account for much
of modern science, not least in cosmology and quantum mechanics which is a
highly speculative discipline, based upon mathematics, for which evidence is
then sought ??" evidence that itself requires a lot of theory to interpret because
it is so wildly different from experience.

Also, as I understand it, the validity of the base rate fallacy in relation to
miracles would depend entirely on what you make of religion. Hume did not
have a high opinion of religion. Fair enough. But then his miracle argument
rests merely on his opinion which strikes me as personally persuasive for him,
and those who share his assessment of religion, but weak as a more general
argument.

Maybe Hume overplayed his hand in standing up to his opponents. After all,
even in the Enquiry he has a low estimate of reason for understanding ultimate
things: Human understanding is by no means fitted for such remote and
abstruse subjects. That may be true; no-one said theology was easy, though,
granted, some atheists today treat it is if it is no more sophisticated than a
Sunday school lesson! But Humes low estimate and his battle with his
opponents, do not seem like good grounds for dismissing the power of human
reason. (I prefer a more Socratic kind of scepticism which sees the genius of
reason as having a way of critiquing its own powers, which in a way is to value
reason all the more.) Also, it seems like bad grounds for insisting on a radical
empiricism that almost by definition will not be able to get to grips with
remote and abstruse subjects.

Isnt the basic problem with Humes philosophy the same as that which
haunts any full-blooded empiricism: the position undermines itself by
depending upon reason for its own justification, reason that the theory itself
denies?
3. On Tuesday, April 29 2008, 02:17 by Peter Millican
Dear Mark,

Quick responses to your points, but proper discussion of some of them
requires much more careful discussion of texts than would be appropriate
here.

1. "One initial point: not believing in the Christian God is not the same as
being an atheist."

As Hume said, "I shall not dispute about a word" (Enquiry 10.5). I don't much
mind how you choose to use the word "God", but until we're agreed on its
usage, "belief in God" remains undefined. So we need to fix what we mean.
Presumably not just any supernatural being will do: most would not count
belief in A GOD (e.g. Vulcan) or in an evil Creator as "belief in God", and at
least the conventional omniperfect Creator has the advantage of being specific
and widely understood. Presumably that's why most contemporary writing in
philosophy of religion takes for granted that this is the meaning being
employed.

2. "the dialogues are explicitly about establishing the existence of God by
reason, not the larger matter of the Christian religion."

Not so: in fact they're EXPLICITLY said to be about the nature, not the being
of God. And I don't agree that Christianity is a LARGER matter in the relevant
sense here. Theism embraces (conventional) Christianity together with lots of
other possible religions, so theism is in that sense larger. If theism is refuted,
then (conventional) Christianity is refuted. So the Dialogues do implicitly
address the truth of Christianity, in addressing - negatively - the truth of
theism. (This is not to deny the possibility of unconventional - atheistic -
Christianity, but most would I think consider that beyond the pale.)

3. "I have to say that Philos conclusion which I quoted seems like a fair
summary and not easily reconciled with the reading you suggest. ... Plus, your
reading seems to condemn everything to being comparable to a rotting turnip"

I'm not denying Philo's words, only pointing out how very little they imply.
"Some remote analogy" in his mouth clearly says very little indeed, enough to
encompass the analogy between human thought and the rotting of a turnip.
I'm not reading my own views into this; just pointing out what he himself very
explicitly says. And it can't be fanciful to see as important to the understanding
of the Dialogues the very last paragraph which Hume composed, specially
inserted on his deathbed! (Sandy Stewart, who established the dating, called
the paragraph in question "Hume's dying testament to posterity", without
noting the link that I pointed out.) It doesn't follow at all that everything is
"comparable" to a rotting turnip, either. At most, it says that lots of other
things bear "some remote analogy" to a rotting turnip, which is very different
indeed, and doesn't in any way rule out comparative judgements of closeness
(e.g. a rotting corpse has a much closer analogy etc.).

4. "From what you say, Hume argued induction is valuable, but not on the
grounds of reason, only of past experience and evidence. I would think that
this reading of induction still leaves his theory struggling to account for much
of modern science, not least in cosmology and quantum mechanics which is a
highly speculative discipline, based upon mathematics, for which evidence is
then sought ??" evidence that itself requires a lot of theory to interpret because
it is so wildly different from experience."

The notion of "reason" is a slippery one. Hume was a fan of reason IN A
SENSE. But he didn't think induction could be founded on PURE reason, i.e.
pure a priori rational insight. Hume was well aware that science was far more
complicated than the simple inductive story that he takes as a paradigm. For
example at Enquiry 4.12 (within the very section that discusses induction) he
talks of scientists' aim being "to reduce the principles, productive of natural
phaenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects
into a few general causes ...". In the following paragraph he gives an example
of mathematisation, in the conservation of momentum. The crucial point, for
him, is that all this has to be based on empirical success, NOT intuitive
naturalness (and this is where there's a massive contrast between Hume and
both Aristotelians and Enlightenment mechanists such as Galileo, Descartes,
Boyle, and Locke - even Newton). The development of Relativity Theory and
Quantum Mechanics is actually a vindication of the Humean approach, and I
don't think it's a surprise that Hume became far more popular after these
theories came to prominence, because they showed that all the a priorists -
championed after Hume by Immanuel Kant - were simply dead wrong.
Scientific truth can only be discovered by experience.

5. "Also, as I understand it, the validity of the base rate fallacy in relation to
miracles would depend entirely on what you make of religion. Hume did not
have a high opinion of religion. Fair enough. But then his miracle argument
rests merely on his opinion which strikes me as personally persuasive for him,
and those who share his assessment of religion, but weak as a more general
argument."

This doesn't take account of the point of Hume's argument. He very explicitly
aimed it at those who wanted to appeal to miracles as a basis for belief, as at
Enquiry 10.36: "I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say,
that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of
religion." Of course if you take theism as already established, that may change
your assessment of the prior probabilities. But if you're arguing FOR theism,
you have to start from unbiased experience. Hume also has another argument
that's relevant here (see Enquiry 10.38): even if you ARE a theist, you can only
judge what God will do on the basis of experience. Going further here would
require getting quite technical, but in short, I don't think Hume can be
condemned on this sort of obvious point.

6. "Hume ... has a low estimate of reason for understanding ultimate things:
Human understanding is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse
subjects. That may be true; no-one said theology was easy"

This seems very complacent. Has theology ever reached any solid conclusions
about ultimate things, based on evidence that doesn't crucially depend on
subjective faith or ancient books that are taken for granted in the context?
Why do theologians of different religions differ so much in their views, without
having any shadow of a decision procedure to adjudicate between them? This
is not to say that theology isn't worth studying (as it happens, I've studied it a
lot myself). But to hint that it can somehow get round the Humean concerns -
without any indication of how it might do so - seems a bit glib.

7. "Humes low estimate [of theology] and his battle with his opponents, do
not seem like good grounds for dismissing the power of human reason."

No, of course not. It's his powerful ARGUMENTS that give the grounds, such
as that in Enquiry Section 4 on induction. It was powerful enough to upset
Kant and impress Russell, Popper and plenty of others. Kant's response
doesn't work, and the argument remains a serious concern, 260 years after it
was published. You say that "I prefer a more Socratic kind of scepticism which
sees the genius of reason as having a way of critiquing its own powers, which
in a way is to value reason all the more." But Hume's very keen on using
reason to critique its own powers - that's exactly what such arguments do.
What we PREFER - whether theist, atheist, rationalist, or empiricist - isn't
really the point, here. It's the force of the arguments that we have to take
account of.

8. "Isnt the basic problem with Humes philosophy the same as that which
haunts any full-blooded empiricism: the position undermines itself by
depending upon reason for its own justification, reason that the theory itself
denies?"

Hume doesn't deny reason - he's actually very keen on it. But his notion of
reason isn't the same as that of - say - Descartes. He sees it as a natural
(animal-like) faculty rather than a supernatural (God-like) insight. Would you
want to say that a scientist who is keen on using his reason, while
acknowledging that it's a product of evolution, is "undermining himself"? If
not, then I don't see why Hume should be presumed to be doing so.

All this isn't to deny that some of what Hume wrote raises deep problems in
the areas you've mentioned. I'm just making the point here that he can't be put
down by the sort of quick objections you've suggested. He repays careful study
and criticism, which will find plenty of insights and also plenty to argue with.
He's unquestionably a very great philosopher, which is why his work is still
discussed so much by philosophers, not only historical scholars, but also those
who are trying to get clear about fundamental questions in (e.g.) aesthetics,
epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion and philosophy of science.

All the best,
Peter
4. On Tuesday, April 29 2008, 10:34 by Mark Vernon
Dear Peter ??"

Thanks again for your time.

Just to start another response somewhere: I don't agree that Christianity is a
LARGER matter in the relevant sense here. When I referred to the Christian
God and the Christian religion, and contrasted that with the natural religion of
the Dialogues, I meant that the Christian God is the one fundamentally defined
for Christians not by natural reason but by revelation. Even if the existence of
God could be proven by reason or experience that would not make you a
Christian. That requires belief in the Trinity and incarnation, say, too. These
words dont even appear in Humes Dialogues, I think. And Id still say
that not believing in the Christian God is not the same as being an atheist.

The description of God as a good creator is the philosophers God. It is
fair enough insofar as it goes. However, whenever a philosopher of any
theological sophistication has pondered the nature of God further ??" like say
Thomas Aquinas ??" theyve quickly realized that nothing positive can be
said about God; the positive talk about God in theology is actually a reflection
a merely human experience of God. Hence, you get the apophatic
tradition, or negative way, which is often forgotten in our positivistic days. As
the medieval preacher Meister Eckhart said: If thou lovest God as God, as
spirit, as Person or as image, that must all go. Love him as he is: a not-God, a
non-spirit, a not-Person, a not-image.

This sets up a tension in theology, to say the least! It makes it unlike all other
human subjects. If you study physics you know both what you are studying,
namely the universe, and the nature of what you are studying, that is
fundamental constants and so on. But if you study theology you can say what
you are studying, God, but you really have little idea about the nature of what
you are studying.

I imagine that this difficult in theology is what Hume was at least partly
referring to in remote and abstruse subjects. Ironically, Aquinas would
agree, though he has other strategies for continuing the god-talk nonetheless.
That atheists can often take so little notice of this is what I meant by my no-
one said theology was easy comment. Apologies if it seemed glib: it was
actually quite serious. How could theology reach solid conclusions on God?
That is called idolatry. Of course, that can seem like an evasion, and an
annoying one for people who want to pin God down, atheist or believer. But if
you want to talk about God, then I think youve got to go for the best theology
available. And the best says it is inconclusive by definition. (Perhaps the most
interesting things always are!)

On Philos conclusion, it seems to me that if the words imply little, then it
would be perfectly possible to make the case that two some remote
analogy references could imply little too. Last words are intriguing but
surely a shaky basis for hermeneutics. And wouldnt Hume himself be
laughing at the close discussion that readings requires of what is and what is
not comparable to rotting turnips?!

I completely agree that Hume highlighted philosophical problems that people
still discuss, and so still read him. However, that works both ways too, of
course, since it implies that whilst Hume raised great questions, he himself
settled little. My problem, as it were, is reading him as if he had settled, say,
the question of God.

Or take the on-going debate about the nature of mathematics and therefore the
nature of science. If you read physicists like Roger Penrose, they are explicitly
Platonists. The philosophical clarity with which he works out and states his
position is unusual amongst scientists, but I doubt that most physicists would
be happy with an evolutionary account of mathematics (or reason for that
matter), unless they share the faith of some evolutionists that evolution should
explain everything. That surely is evolution at its most wildly, even
ridiculously, speculative. It would no doubt require all sorts of shaggy-dog
stories from evolutionary psychology, as Stephen Jay Gould described
them.

Alternatively, my impression (perhaps its worth adding, having studied
physics at university) is that both relativity and quantum mechanics are not
simply based upon experience: they are profoundly counterintuitive. Einstein
performed thought experiments, but that was precisely to shake off everyday
experience. Or again, if empirical success was the criteria by which
physics departments were judged, most would be shut down tomorrow: its
quite routine to pursue matters that cant be conclusively empirically
verified, quite possibly in principle ??" string theory, multiverses and the like.
(Though physicists keep the hope alive, with an eye to funding.)

The discussion has expanded from my initial blog, and thanks for that. So
perhaps to return to Hume on miracles, and make a slightly different point.
a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of
religion. To be honest, I think this is a bit of an Aunt Sally. I dont think
that there is a system of religion that founds itself on a miracle. Perhaps, in our
positivistic times, Hume can be excused for thinking that Christianity is
founded upon a miracle, say of the resurrection. But I think that is a
misunderstanding, for its the resurrection as mystery not miracle that
counts. That would involve more theological discussion, though its quite
routine in undergraduate theology, even A-level biblical studies. So please
excuse my quick comment but essentially, I think most people are Christians,
and most theology is done, not because Christians and theologians believe in
miracles but because they believe they have an experience of a God of love and
the world as a gift and they are trying to make sense of it. Some no doubt go in
for miracles in the way that Hume disliked. But mostly that is a way of talking
about the more fundamental sense that life is blessed ??" though just how, is,
of course, a mystery.
5. On Thursday, May 1 2008, 13:29 by Peter Millican
Dear Mark,
I'll try to make a fairly brief response, and I hope you won't mind if I focus on
matters close to Hume (excuse the pun - his name was originally "Home").

1. I think we are both agreed that (conventional) Christianity involves Theism
PLUS other doctrines. In one obvious sense, that makes Christianity a larger
matter than Theism - because it involves more doctrines. But when the
doctrines are being ATTACKED, Theism is in a relevant sense "larger",
because refuting Theism suffices to refute Christianity but the opposite does
not follow. (E.g. refuting the Trinity would refute conventional Christianity,
but would not refute Theism in general.) That simple logical point was all I
intended: Theism covers a larger range of beliefs than Christianity, precisely
because it is less specific.

2. You say that "nothing positive can be said about God", but doesn't God at
least have to mean some sort of intelligent power, who in some way had a vital
hand in fashioning the world? If not, then I have no idea what you're
attempting to refer to when you say "God", nor do I see how you can have any
confidence at all that you're actually referring to anything (even something
imaginary) - it's just apparently an empty term without any meaning. Also, if
theologians really agreed this to be the case, they've have to forget about
having any belief (let alone any remotely justified belief) about "His" nature.
So bang goes the Athanasian Creed and much else besides. Forget about
calling him "good", at least if you intend to mean anything more by it than an
honorific label. Hume's worth reading on this sort of "mysticism" - see the
Dialogues, end of Part III and beginning of IV. You mention Aquinas, who was
keen on appealing to analogical predication as a way of getting round the
problem. But Parts X and XI of the Dialogues address this - the empirical
evidence is that God's "moral" qualities seem to be strongly disanalogous to
ours. The closer you define them to be, the more the counter-evidence against
the existence of such a being.

3. You say that "On Philos conclusion, it seems to me that if the words imply
little, then it would be perfectly possible to make the case that two some
remote analogy references could imply little too. Last words are intriguing
but surely a shaky basis for hermeneutics." I hope you won't mind if I say this
sounds like vague hand-waving. My argument is perfectly specific here,
pointing out a clear logical implication of what Hume wrote. You have claimed
that a certain passage indicates that Hume is a theist - despite all the
arguments earlier in the Dialogues (and elsewhere) that point in the opposite
direction. This is a claim that YOU are making, and I am simply concerned to
refute it. To make the argument that Hume is an atheist, I would appeal much
more widely than this, and my interest here is just to show that your
specifically quoted evidence has no weight on the other side. I am countering it
by reference to another passage, from the same speaker in the Dialogues, and
in the same section, that directly undermines any force it has as a theistic
statement. The fact that one of the two references to which I appeal was
written on Hume's deathbed is of interest, and indicates that it might be of
special importance, but that's not really central to the point. The central point
is that the logic of what Philo says - both here and earlier - shows that "some
remote analogy" amounts to very little indeed. Please also bear in mind the
care that Hume put into his writing - on his deathbed, he spent his time
making corrections for a final edition of his works etc. In a letter to his printer
written only ten days before his death, he said of the Dialogues that "On
revising them (which I have not done these 15 Years) I find that nothing can be
more cautiously and more artfully written." It is not at all implausible to find
these subtle links between different passages in his writings, and that is part of
what makes Hume scholarship so fascinating.

4. You say "I doubt that most physicists would be happy with an evolutionary
account of mathematics (or reason for that matter), unless they share the faith
of some evolutionists that evolution should explain everything. That surely is
evolution at its most wildly, even ridiculously, speculative." There is nothing at
all ridiculous in considering that our reason is an evolved faculty; indeed I
would take this to be absolute scientific common-sense these days. That isn't
the same, of course, as saying that "evolution can explain everything", or even
that evolution can explain everything about our reason.

5. You say "my impression (perhaps its worth adding, having studied physics
at university) is that both relativity and quantum mechanics are not simply
based upon experience: they are profoundly counterintuitive." Absolutely: they
are counterintuitive, and the reason why we were driven to adopt such
counterintuitive theories is precisely that EXPERIENCE refuted the more
"natural" theories of Aristotle and Galileo etc. We use mathematics and so
forth - and also thought-experiments, imagination, intuitive judgements of
simplicity etc. - to analyse data and generate and systematise theories, but
experience is the ultimate arbiter. That's exactly the core Humean message
with regard to science.

6. You say "a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. To be honest, I think this is a bit of an Aunt Sally. I
dont think that there is a system of religion that founds itself on a miracle.
Perhaps, in our positivistic times, Hume can be excused for thinking that
Christianity is founded upon a miracle, say of the resurrection. But I think that
is a misunderstanding, for its the resurrection as mystery not miracle that
counts." You imply that the Humean position is anachronistic (in being
modern and "positivistic"), but in fact your own is. For most of its history, the
Church has appealed explicitly to miracles as verification of its claims. The
Roman Catholic Church still does, which is why "proven" miracles are required
in the procedure for canonisation of a saint. The same thing features a lot in
the Bible, at least as far back as Elijah and the prophets of Baal, and lots in the
New Testament. It's very much a modern idea to consider the Christian
miracles inessential - most historically would agree with Saint Paul that "If
Christ is not risen, our faith is in vain".

All the best,
Peter
6. On Friday, May 2 2008, 10:59 by Andrew
Though the idea of a mind that is trying to define the nature of the genius from
whose essence the universe is manifested- this being a reasonably natural
understanding of God- is rather comical. How can a mind seeking to define
what it apparently has no experience of, possibly define such a being? All that
can happen is it formulates some concept existing purely within the
parameters of its own intellect, and then decides whether it believes in this
concept itself has produced, or not. The absurdity of it all offers amusement
value, but nothing of any living worth. The question can only be answered by
direct experience. "Why dost tho prate of God. Everything you can say is false,"
said Eckhart.
7. On Friday, May 2 2008, 11:00 by Andrew
"thou prate"
8. On Sunday, May 4 2008, 00:25 by Enquirium
Excerpted from an e mail I recently sent to Mark ....

PS .You're discussion with Peter Millican is interesting . I wouldn't want to
interfere on the Blog in you're discussion . However he seems to think that
you're asserting that Hume was still in some way a conventional THEIST .
Instead of pointing out that ( along with most commentators ) is that all
HUME demonstrates when discussing the conventional rational theistic proofs
is that they fail to achieve what they set out to do . This leaves us in the
position that the existance of such a being remains an open question ( In
modern parlance AGNOSTICISM ) . To go any further ( such as the denial that
any such being exists ) with what texts Hume has left us with, is stretching
whatever evidence we have , and probably to be involved in a little creative (
wishfull ) thinking

Enquirium
9. On Sunday, May 4 2008, 13:58 by Peter Millican
Dear Enquirium,

As I said to Mark, I really don't mind how you choose to use words such as
"God" or "theism", as long as we can agree on the meanings attached. I tend to
prefer using the word "God" (capitalised) for the conventional omniperfect
(omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good) creator, in which case "theism" can
be understood in a corresponding way. Thus understood, people who believe
in an evil omnipotent creator wouldn't count as "theists", though we could - if
we chose - use the words differently and say that they do believe in God, but
just disagree with conventional theists about His nature. Nothing of any
philosophical or interpretative importance hangs on the language we use to
describe Hume's position, as long as we avoid confusion, so it's best not to get
hung up on this, and just adopt a simple convention that is explicitly specified.
I adopt my (pretty standard) usage of the words "God" and "theism" in
precisely this spirit.

There is another ambiguity in "theism": to be a theist, is it enough to BELIEVE
ON BALANCE that there is a God, or does one have to be ABSOLUTELY
CONFIDENT? My own preference is just to require belief in order to count as
a theist, not certainty, and I think this would be pretty standard. But again we
just need to get clear on our usage, and this isn't a matter of philosophical
significance.

The same ambiguity carries over, even more strongly, to affect the words
"atheism" and "agnosticism". "Atheism" was used in a very broad sense in
Hume's day, but considered outrageous, and when Huxley coined the word
"agnostic" a good century later in 1870, this aimed to distance the position
from some of this opprobrium (i.e. "I'm an agnostic, not an atheist, so don't
think of me so badly!"). What is today meant by these words retains some of
this flavour, and many people distinguish between "atheism" as meaning
"completely sure that there is no God" (a far narrower usage than in the
eighteenth century) and "agnosticism" as "not sure either way". Thus
characterised, "atheism" is often thought to be an unreasonably dogmatic
position, even while "theism" is understood in a far more relaxed way, as
implying just BELIEF rather than CERTAINTY. Yet again, it doesn't really
matter how we choose to use the words, as long as we understand each other
and are consistent. But my own preference is to use the word "atheism" as
meaning "belief that there is no God" rather than "certainty that there is no
God". That way, "theism" and "atheism" involve a similar sort of attitude -
namely belief - but for contradictory positions. Bringing in the 19th century
invention of "agnosticism" as something that impacts on the meaning of
"theism" or "atheism" just complicates the picture unnecessarily. Though it's
fine to use it as a catch-all for the "middle ground" that remains: neither
believing that there is a God, nor believing that there isn't. The main point of
this is to avoid yet another ambiguity: "I don't believe in God" (i.e. I'm not a
theist) can often be confused with "I believe there is no God" (i.e. I'm an
atheist), and saying "I'm an agnostic" avoids the misunderstanding.

With all that out of the way, I am totally confident, on the basis of his writings,
that Hume is an atheist: he DOES NOT BELIEVE in an OMNIPERFECT
CREATOR. That's it! And if you wish to suggest that this is mainly based on
wishful thinking on my part, then I suggest you go and read some of the stuff
I've written - and argue explicitly with it - before you indulge in gratuitous
insult. (I can give references if you do wish to follow this up in detail.)

Whether Hume is TOTALLY CERTAIN that there is no omniperfect creator is
another matter - to assert this would involve delicate interpretation of "totally
certain", especially in the light of his general sceptical views. In at least one
sense, I think, he is not totally certain: he would acknowledge the possibility of
an omniperfect creator, even given all the evidence against. But that's saying
very little, because Hume thinks that almost any matter of fact whatever is
possible in that sense.

Whether Hume believes in a "god" of some other kind is also another matter,
though I'm pretty confident he doesn't. Of course he was writing a century
before Darwin, so he doesn't have a satisfactory alternative explanation of the
order in the biological world, let alone the physical world. But even so he
resists being drawn to intelligence (even a less-than-omniperfect intelligence)
as the ultimate explanation, insisting that we have no basis for privileging
intelligence over generation or vegetation, for example. On this matter I
suspect he would be "agnostic" - i.e. without any definite belief - and indeed
probably sceptical about the possibility of our ever having a justified belief on
the issue.

In short, an awful lot of the debate over Hume's "atheism" is horribly
complicated by the ambiguity of the terms. When I say with complete
confidence that Hume is an atheist, I simply mean that he believes there is no
omniperfect creator. The best evidence for this is what he says on the Problem
of Evil, but there is plenty else.

All the best,
Peter
10. On Monday, May 5 2008, 09:02 by Mark Vernon
Peter -

Thanks again for coming back. I guess we are going around in circles now. So
just to respond in a couple of details:

1. On the place of miracles in the Christian religion, I think there's pretty
strong evidence that theologians have been far less wedded to them than you
might think. (Let's say that the church has placed more emphasis on miracles
since they can be methods of control, as in the making of saints.) Again, I refer
to Thomas Aquinas: he thought miracles occurred, after all he lived in the 13th
century. But they did not play a significant role in his system of religion, not in
his 'proofs' for example. The reason they are secondary is that miracles were,
in a sense, not special for him, since God is always, everywhere involved in the
created order anyway. Augustine arguably thought something similar. Buried
at the end of the voluminous 'City of God' are a few comments on miracles that
culminate in the exclamation that the miracle of miracles is the existence of
the world itself. He implies that miracles can be a sign, but the 'proof' of the
resurrection is the difference Christianity has made in people's lives.

Similarly, when Paul says 'If Christ is not risen, our faith is in vain', it is
important to pay attention to what is being said. For example, that he says
'Christ' not 'Jesus' is significant. He is developing his theology of the 'cosmic
Christ', which was an attempt to capture everything that the 'Jesus event'
might mean, and which as someone who never met Jesus, embraced far more
than the details of his life. So when he refers to his own experience of the
resurrection it is clearly far more than a 'conjuring trick with bones', but
something like a vision. Thus, it's quite routine amongst Biblical scholars to
read the phrase you refer to as an exclamation of hope - hope, not proof, being
the currency of faith. This is very different from setting up some kind of test
for Christianity. Which is not to say that Paul did not believe in miracles. Just
that they are a secondary issue at best.

2. On agnosticism, I just think there is far more to the word than you seem to
allow. (If I might offer a reference, there's my book 'After Atheism'.) For one
thing, that Huxley goes to the length of inventing a word to capture his
position - he feeling that neither atheism nor theism were adequate - and that
the word sticks is significant. It may have been uncomfortable to call yourself
an atheist in the 1869, but Huxley does not strike me as a man averse to that
when he thought what was true was at stake. That he went on to discuss at
some length, and over many years, just what agnosticism means, and to
distinguish it, set it in a tradition and so on, is also significant. It certainly
complicates the discussion of religion. But then religion is a complicated thing.
11. On Tuesday, May 6 2008, 00:01 by Enquirium
With all that out of the way, I am totally confident, on the basis of his writings,
that Hume is an atheist: he DOES NOT BELIEVE in an OMNIPERFECT
CREATOR. That's it! And if you wish to suggest that this is mainly based on
wishful thinking on my part, then I suggest you go and read some of the stuff
I've written - and argue explicitly with it - before you indulge in gratuitous
insult. (I can give references if you do wish to follow this up in detail

Dear Peter .....

I'm sorry if you took ' wishfull thinking ' as a personal insult , it was definintely
not mean't as such , my apologies if you took offence .

The consideration of terms is minor as I take it that you are asserting Humes
Atheism is as you described ....... that there is no conventional theistic God .
Agnosticism I would take as the later philosophic term , part of which would
be what Hume called 'suspension of judgement ' , as Mark has pointed out
Huxley mean't more than this by his coinage of the term .

My main point is this ..... David Hume was both a clear thinker and a lucid
writer , if any of his meaning is unclear ( especially his writings on Religion )
we can be pretty sure that the obfuscations are deliberate . In his dialogues
concerning Natural religion for example his position is probably a combination
of all three views presented but mainly Philo's . Even to attempt to tease out
Hume's own views is thus a very delicate task involving much analysis and
interpretation and a comments list on an internet blog is not a suitable arena
to go into such details. Inevitably as is usual with such interpretative exercises
the result you achieve depends on which text you consider most important and
what meaning / weight you ascribe to it . The resulting interpretations are
therefore quite variable and so it has proved over the long history of Hume
scholarship . Fortunately the relevant texts are readily available and many
excellent commentaries exist ( Huxley himself produced quite a notable
volume ) .

I merely wish to point out that the discussion of whether David Hume was an
Atheist or an Agnostic has a long history and even with you're noted
contribution I think it will still be going on for many years to come ...

Enquirium .
12. On Saturday, May 10 2008, 15:14 by Peter Millican
To Mark:

1. I'm sympathetic to the idea that miracles shouldn't play a major role in a
mature, sophisticated theism. But I believe that historically - and indeed today
- most theists have put hugely more emphasis on miracles than recent
theologians would approve of. Moreover the change in sophisticated religious
thinking has come about largely in response to sceptical pressure, partly from
Hume's critique, but also the rise of historical criticism (including awareness
of other ancient traditions) and of science which have made most miracle
stories (both in the Bible and elsewhere) simply incredible to most
sophisticated thinkers. Regarding St Paul, I'm happy to accept that he saw the
Resurrection as far more than "a conjuring trick with bones", but that doesn't
touch the obvious fact that in 1 Corinthians 15 he is arguing explicitly against
those who deny the plain fact of the resurrection of the dead, and is claiming
against them that without such resurrection, Christian faith "is in vain". He
certainly doesn't seem to me to be representing this particular question of
plain fact as "a secondary issue, at best". And there are any number of
Christian websites that would agree with me on this.

2. I've no wish to debate what "agnosticism" has meant, or could mean, to
those who are fond of the term. My main concern was to legitimate the use of
"atheist" to mean someone who believes there is no God (in whatever sense of
"God" may be in question). "Atheism", so understood, need not be any more
dogmatic than "theism".

To Enquirium:

3. Apology accepted, but my main concern was just that these things should be
decided on the basis of evidence, and accusing someone who provides
evidence of being differently motivated can just muddy the waters and provide
a pretext for avoiding examination of the evidence.

4. I agree with much of what you say about interpretation, but disagree with
your apparent suggestion that the correct interpretation of Hume will depend
on which texts you choose. I think his message - at least as regards "theism"
understood in the standard way in Christian Philosophy of Religion (meaning
an omniperfect creator) - is pretty unambiguously atheistic. Those who read
him as a theist are going wrong in a pretty straightforward way, and mistaking
conventional pieties for personal convictions. There is indeed, however, plenty
of room for debate on where Hume stands in the spectrum of views that
remains, and as you say, this debate will probably continue for years to come,
perhaps without any decision.

All the best,
Peter