Notes from Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function.

Sources of warrant: memory, our knowledge of ourselves, and of

others, testimony, a priori knowledge, induction, and epistemic
probability.
(This means that these belief-forming mechanisms produce
warranted beliefs, which eventually lead to knowledge.)

What is evidence?
Plantinga answers this question by asking two broader questions
that are related to the design plan.
(1) "How shall we understand the alleged contrast between
foundationalism and coherentism?"
(2) "What is evidence, and what is its connection with warrant? In
particular, is it true, as the evidentialist claims, that any
proposition or belief that has warrant for me is one for which I
have evidence of one sort or another?"

Plantinga argues that coherentism is merely an offshoot of
foundationalism. Coherentists argue that coherence is the only
source of warrant or justification. He argues, on the contrary, that
it is neither necessary not sufficient for warrant, that is:
(1) there are beliefs that are warranted without the alleged
warrant-conferring coherentism, and
(2) there are belifs that are not considered warranted even
with the presence of this alleged warrant-
conferring coherentism.

If x is not a necessary condition for p to be B:
- even if x is not present in p, p is still B.
(Being pecuniarily rich is not necessary for Ann to study at a
prestigious university:
- even if Ann is not pecuniarily rich, she can still study at a
prestigious university)

If x is not a sufficient condition for p to be B:
- though x is present in p, p is still not B.
(Being pecuniarily rich is not sufficient for Ann to study at a
prestigious university:
- though Ann is precuniarily rich, she still cannot study at a
prestigious university)

Plantinga rejects coherentism, but endorses a version of
foundationalism. He, likewise, will reject evidentialism, another
variety of foundationalism.

I. Coherence and Foundations

A. Ordinary Foundationalism

The common understanding of coherentism is done by
contrasting it to foundationalism. According to Plantinga, the
crucial difference between the two is that the former accepts
circular reasoning whereas the latter does not.

To foundationalism, evidence plays a significant role because it is
that which confers warrant to another proposition. This form of
evidence is called propositonal evidence.
(Although there are other kinds of evidences: physical
evidences at a court trial, evidences of the senses,
evidences of memory, consciousness, testimony, axioms, and
reasoning).

Propositional evidence plays a big role in the difference
between coherentism and foundationalism.

Beliefs are either basic or nonbasic:
- Basic beliefs are those that are "not accepted on the
evidential basis of other beliefs."
(e.g. self-evident beliefs - beliefs about how one is appeared
to or one is in pain)
- Nonbasic beliefs are those that are "accepted on the
evidential basis of foundational beliefs."

Thus, basic beliefs are considered propositional evidences for
nonbasic beliefs, or to put it in Plantinga's phraseology: "basic
beliefs are the evidential bases, and evidentially
support nonbasic beliefs."

The way of how basic beliefs act as propositional evidences to
nonbasic beliefs is done in any of the following:
- deduction
- induction
- abduction

For a foundationalist, the basis relation of the noetic structure of
S is "finite and terminates in the foundations."

Going back to the crucial difference between foundationalism and
coherentism: circular reasoning
- For foundationalism, given that there is a considerable
number of beliefs, yet these beliefs are finite. And
this evidential chain will always end up with the basic beliefs
or foundational beliefs, which are then accepted
without the evidential support of any other.
- For coherentism, this evidential support may end up with
where it started. To put it a logical way:
(1) Belief A0 is accepted solely on the evidential basis of
belief A1.
(2) Belief A1 is accepted solely on the evidential basis of
belief A2.
(3) Belief A2 is accepted solely on the evidential basis of
belief An.
(4) Belief An is accepted solely on the evidential basis of
belief A0.

This is a case of circular reasoning in epistemic
justification.
- "The reason, in brief, is that warrant cannot be
generated just by warrant transfer."

For a foundationalist, this is epistemically improper.