4

The Moral Law

Kants project in the Groundwork is the search for and establishment of the
supreme principle of morality (G 4:3!"# The establishment of the moral principle
apparentl$ relates to onl$ one of its form%lations& the third main form%la&
the form%la of a%tonom$# The search res%lts in form%latin' the principle
in three wa$s# Two of them ha(e si'ni)cant (ariants that are s%pposed to
brin' the moral principle closer to int%ition& and th%s to feelin' and
thereb$ to pro(ide entr$ and d%rabilit$ for its precepts (G 4:4*+& 43,"# The
-irst .ection& be'innin' from common rational moral co'nition& arri(es
onl$ at the )rst and most pro(isional form%lation of the law& while the .econd
.ection (proceedin' more philosophicall$ from an acco%nt of the will
and carr$in' the search to completion" arri(es at all three# The ar'%ment
of this section follows a pro'ressi(e de(elopment proceedin' from the concept
of a cate'orical imperati(e# /ere are the di0erent form%lations of the
moral law as Kant presents them:
First formula:
-1L Formula of Universal Law: Act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal
law (G 4:4!23 cf# G 4:4*!"3 with its (ariant&
-L4 Formula of the Law of Nature: .o act& as if the ma5im of $o%r action
were to become thro%'h $o%r will a universal law of nature (G
4:4!23 cf# 4:43,"#
econd formula:
-/ Formula of !umanity as "nd in #tself: o act that you use humanity$ as
much in your own person as in the person of every other$ always at the same
time as an end and never merely as a means (G 4:4!3 cf# 4:43,"#
%hird formula:
-6 Formula of Autonomy: # # # the idea of the will of every rational being as
a will giving universal law (G 4:4323 cf# G 4:43!"& or 4ot to choose
,,
%he &oncept of a &ategorical #mperative ,7
otherwise than so that the ma5ims of ones choice are at the same
time comprehended with it in the same (olition as %ni(ersal law
(G 4:44*3 cf# 4:43!& 434& 438"& with its (ariant&
-9: Formula of the 'ealm of "nds: 6ct in accordance with ma5ims of a
%ni(ersall$ le'islati(e member for a merel$ possible realm of ends
(G 4:433 cf# 4:433& 437& 438"#
2# The ;oncept of a ;ate'orical <mperati(e
Kant proposes to deri(e -1L& -/& and -6 (as well as their int%iti(e (ariants&
-L4 and -9:" from the concept of a cate'orical imperati(e& which (he
ar'%es" is the form all properl$ moral principles m%st ta=e# <t is with this
concept& therefore& that it ma=es sense to be'in# Kants theor$ of the will
ta=es %s to be a'ents who are self>directin' in the sense that we ha(e the
capacit$ to step bac= from o%r nat%ral desires& re?ect on them& consider
whether and how we sho%ld satisf$ them& and to be mo(ed b$ them onl$
on the basis of s%ch re?ections# 6n inclination (that is& a habit%al empirical
desire& s%ch as h%n'er" mo(es %s to act onl$ when we choose to set its object
as an end for o%rsel(es# This choice then sets %s the tas= of selectin' or
de(isin' a means to that end# <f < see an apple in a tree and a desire to eat it
occ%rs to me& then < will eat it onl$ if < )rst decide to ma=e eatin' it m$ end&
and then de(ise a means (s%ch as climbin' the tree& or reachin' for the apple
with a stic=" to achie(e the end# .ettin' an end is the most basic normati(e
act& beca%se (Kant holds" there is no action witho%t an end to be prod%ced
b$ it# This act in(ol(es the concept of an object (or state of a0airs" to be
prod%ced and also the concept of some means needed to prod%ce it# That
is wh$ instr%mental reason is the lowest common denominator& so to spea=&
of all practical reason#
.ettin' an end th%s s%bjects me to a normati(e principle commandin'
me to perform the action re@%ired as a means to the end# Kant calls this
principle a h$pothetical imperati(e# <t is called an Aimperati(e beca%se it
is a command of reason re@%irin' the a'ent to do somethin'3 it is h$pothetical
beca%se the command 'o(erns o%r action onl$ on the condition that
we will the end in @%estion# B$ contrast& an imperati(e that has no s%ch condition
wo%ld be called a Acate'orical imperati(e# ;ate'orical imperati(es
are cate'orical beca%se their (alidit$ is not conditional on some prior end#
<f $o% ma=e a promise& =eep it ma$ be a h$pothetical imperati(e in the
'rammatical sense& b%t it is not one in Kants sense& beca%se the if>cla%se
does not refer to an end that conditions the (alidit$ of the imperati(e#
6 moral imperati(e is categorical beca%se its f%nction is not to ad(ise %s
how to reach some prior end of o%rs that is based on what we happen to
want b%t instead to command %s how to act irrespecti(e of o%r wants or o%r
contin'ent ends# <ts rational bindin'ness is therefore not conditional on o%r
settin' an$ prior end# 6 moral r%le or principle ma$ (er$ well be conditional
,8 %he (oral Law
in other wa$s witho%t a0ectin' its cate'orical stat%s# The s%preme principle
of moralit$ admits of no conditions or e5ceptions& of co%rse& beca%se there
is nothin' hi'her b$ reference to which conditions or e5ceptions co%ld be
j%sti)ed# B%t a secondar$ moral r%le or principle& whose bindin'ness on %s&
when it applies& is cate'orical& ma$ admit of conditions# -or instance& in the
principle that we sho%ld =eep o%r promises& there ma$ be implied conditions
that wo%ld release %s from a promise& and %nder those conditions there is
no cate'orical imperati(e to =eep the promise# <t is therefore an elementar$
mis%nderstandin' to thin= that Kantian ethics is committed to a s$stem of
in?e5ible moral r%les j%st beca%se it re'ards moral imperati(es as cate'orical
imperati(es#
Beca%se e(er$ action aims at some end to be prod%ced& actions that follow
cate'orical imperati(es do so too# /ence& the fact that cate'orical imperati(es
are not conditional on a prior end does not mean that the actions
obe$in' them ha(e no end# <n fact& Kant thin=s that cate'orical imperati(es
wo%ld be impossible if there were not some ends that are in their concept
d%ties# 6ccordin' to Kants Coctrine of Dirt%e& these ends fall %nder two 'eneral
concepts: o%r own perfection and the happiness of others (M.,:38+E8&
cf# G 4:4!!E3"# .o it is also an elementar$ mis%nderstandin' of the concept
of a cate'orical imperati(e to thin= that beca%se Kantian ethics 'ro%nds
obli'ation on s%ch imperati(es& it has no concern for ends or (therefore"
for the conse@%ences of actions#
!# Kants .$stematic Fresentation of the Frinciple of Moralit$
6fter de(elopin' his (ario%s form%lations of the moral law& Kant informs %s
(G 4:43," that these form%las consider the concept of a cate'orical imperati(e
from three di0erent points of (iew: form& matter& and complete
determination# This triad is drawn from Kants theor$ of concept formation#
:(er$ concept has a form& pro(ided b$ the %nderstandin' and b$
the role of the concept in j%d'ments and rational inferences# <t also has
a matter or condition of co'niti(e application& consistin' in a possible
int%ition thro%'h which an instance of the concept mi'ht be 'i(en in e5perience#
:(er$ concept also determines the s%bject to which it is applied as
a predicate in a j%d'ment# -ollowin' LeibniG& Hol0& and Ba%m'arten& Kant
thin=s that %ni(ersal concepts (s%ch as Ah%man" are %ni(ersal beca%se the$
are not completel$ determined E the concept Ah%man is %ndetermined
relati(e to s%ch pairs of opposites as maleEfemale& $o%n'Eold& and man$
others# B$ contrast& a f%ll$ indi(id%al concept wo%ld ha(e to be completel$
determined with respect to e(er$ pair of contradictories#
<t is far from self>e(ident wh$ Kant chooses this triad as his (ehicle for
s$stematiGin' the form%las of the moral principle# ;learl$ the elements of
the triad themsel(es are bein' %sed in e5tended (or e(en metaphorical"
senses# M$ conject%re is that Kants choice is based on the idea that e(er$
concept is somethin' %ni(ersal that ser(es as a r%le (KrD 682"& beca%se this
)resentation of the upreme )rinciple of (orality ,
propert$ is shared b$ the moral law# Kant also compares the three form%las
to the three cate'ories of @%antit$: %nit$& pl%ralit$& and totalit$& claimin'
that there is a de(elopment between these form%las that parallels the
'eneration of pl%ralit$ o%t of %nit$ and arri(es at the concept of totalit$ b$
combinin' the cate'ories of %nit$ and pl%ralit$: A progression happens here$
as through the categories of the %nit$ of the form of the will (its %ni(ersalit$"&
the plurality of the matter (the objects& i#e# the ends"& and the allness or
totalit$ of the s$stem of them (Groundwork 4:43,& cf# KrD 68*IB2*,"#2
Th%s when we read Kants (ario%s form%lations of the moral law in the
Groundwork& we m%st not thin= that these are merel$ cas%al restatements of
basicall$ the same idea (which most readers tend to re'ard as ha(in' been
de)niti(el$ stated in -1L"# He cannot %nderstand Kants form%lation of
the moral law %ntil we see wh$ he mo(es from one form%la to the ne5t& and
we cannot ma=e j%d'ments abo%t which form%la to re'ard as primar$ (or
primar$ for which p%rpose" %ntil we %nderstand the s$stematic de(elopment
of the form%las presented in the .econd .ection# Kant sa$s that all three are
form%lations of precisel$ the same law& b%t the$ present the moral law from
di0erent sides& hence di0er both objecti(el$& in what the$ command& and
e(en more s%bjecti(el$& in the aspect of the law the$ present to the moral
a'ent#
Kant claims that the three form%las also constit%te a de(elopmental pro'ression#
This stron'l$ s%''ests& )rst& that we need all the form%las in order
to ha(e a complete acco%nt of the content of the s%preme principle& and&
second& that the later form%las -/ and abo(e all -6 and -9: sho%ld be
considered more complete and ade@%ate statements of the law than -1L
and -L4# 6s will appear below& < thin= these s%''estions are correct#
*a+ %he First Formula: FUL and FLN
<t is deplorabl$ common to re'ard -1L and -L4 (%s%all$ not clearl$ distin'%ished
from each other" as the chief& if not the onl$& form%lation of
the moral law# :(en some of Kants most faithf%l defenders spea= of them as
AThe ;ate'orical <mperati(e (with capital letters" E as if there were no other&
and no more ade@%ate& form%lations of the moral principle# That seems to
me almost as misleadin' as 'i(in' the name 4ewtonian Fh$sics to the law
of inertia E as if there were nothin' else to 4ewtonian mechanics besides
the -irst Law of Motion# -1L represents onl$ the )rst sta'e of a comple5
ar'%ment that ta=es abo%t )fteen pa'es to de(elop and c%lminates in Kants
s$stematic presentation of the three main form%las of the moral law# <t is the
most pro(isional form%la& the merel$ formal one& hence the least ade@%ate
to e5pressin' the content of the principle#
6ll ma5ims ha(e& namel$&
(2" a form& which consists in %ni(ersalit$& and then the form%la of the moral
imperati(e is e5pressed th%s: AThat the ma5ims m%st be chosen as if the$ are s%pposed
to be (alid as %ni(ersal laws of nat%re3
7* %he (oral Law
(!" a matter& namel$& an end& and then the form%la sa$s: Athat the rational bein'&
as an end in accordance with its nat%re& hence as an end in itself& m%st ser(e for
e(er$ ma5im as a limitin' condition of all merel$ relati(e and arbitrar$ ends3
(3" a complete determination of all ma5ims thro%'h that form%la& namel$: Athat all
ma5ims o%'ht to harmoniGe from ones own le'islation into a possible realm of ends
as a realm of nat%re (G 4:43,"
-1L corresponds to the cate'or$ of %nit$ b$ brin'in' to e5pression the
%nit$ of form that ma5ims m%st ha(e in order to be compatible with the
moral law# B$ the Aform of a cate'orical imperati(e& Kant appears to mean a
formal propert$ of ma5ims s%ch that a ma5ims ha(in' this propert$ ma=es
it consistent with all cate'orical imperati(es (i#e#& ma=es actin' on it morall$
permissible"# This formal propert$& accordin' to -1L& is that the a'ent co%ld&
witho%t contradiction or con?ictin' (olitions& will the ma5im to be a %ni(ersal
law3 accordin' to -L4& it is that the a'ent co%ld& witho%t contradiction
or con?ictin' (olitions& will the ma5im to be a %ni(ersal law of nat%re#
Testing maxims for universalizability. <n -1L& therefore& the term %ni(ersal
law appears to be meant normatively# That is& the test is whether $o%
co%ld will it to be permissible (%nder the moral law" for e(er$one to act on
the ma5im# <n -L4& the test is whether $o% co%ld will that e(er$one act%all$
follow the ma5im with the re'%larit$ of a law of nat%re# Th%s in the
-irst .ection& where Kant deri(es onl$ -1L& he as=s: Ho%ld < be able to
sa$ that an$one ma$ ma=e an %ntr%thf%l promise when he )nds himself in
embarrassment which he cannot 'et o%t of in an$ other wa$ (Groundwork
4:4*3"# <n the .econd .ection& where -L4 is applied to the same ma5im&
the @%estion is whether $o% co%ld will that& as a law of nat%re& all rational
bein's act%all$ ma=e false promises when the$ )nd themsel(es in )nancial
diJc%lt$ (G 4:4!!"# The ar'%ments in the -irst and .econd .ections di0er
correspondin'l$# 9eaders ha(e sometimes noted this di0erence b%t ha(e
more often seen it as an inconsistenc$ on Kants part than as a di0erence
in ar'%ment that is re@%ired b$ the objecti(e di0erence between -1L and
-L4#
There are two %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests: whether $o%r ma5im can be tho%'ht
witho%t contradiction as a %ni(ersal law (or law of nat%re" and whether
$o%r ma5im can witho%t con?ictin' (olitions be willed as a %ni(ersal law (or
law of nat%re"#! There has been m%ch disp%te in the literat%re abo%t how
these tests are s%pposed to wor=# Too m%ch of this disp%te is d%e to f%ndamental
mis%nderstandin's of what is 'oin' on in the Groundwork& and in
Kantian ethical theor$& which pre(ail almost as often amon' Kants defenders
as amon' his critics# The %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests& namel$& are s%pposed
to constit%te a %ni(ersal moral criterion& a so>called ;<>Froced%re& that is
applicable to an$ concei(able ma5im that mi'ht be proposed# <t is s%pposed
to be a method for 'ro%ndin' all moral d%ties& or e(en for constr%ctin'
the content of all moralit$# -1L and -L4 are often tho%'ht to constit%te
)resentation of the upreme )rinciple of (orality 72
Kants chief (or perhaps his onl$ si'ni)cant" contrib%tion to moral philosoph$#
Kn the basis of these tho%'hts& and with the dominant (.id'wic=ian"
model of moral theor$ as the implicit bac='ro%nd& -1L and -L4& or (ario%s
(e(er more creati(e and epic$clical" interpretations of them& are treated as
candidate principles within the now fashionable a'enda in moral philosoph$
that see=s to j%stif$ moral principles b$ showin' that the$ s@%are with o%r
moral int%itions abo%t real or ima'inar$ cases# The interpretation has to
ma=e the test come o%t ri'ht e(en when applied to the most ra(ishin'l$
in'enio%s ma5ims de(ised as co%ntere5amples# The fate of Kantian ethics
is e(en seen as t%rnin' on the s%ccess or fail%re of this enterprise#
<n the pre(io%s chapter& we saw how that enterprise is alien to Kants whole
project& and therefore how %tterl$ irrele(ant to it wo%ld be the s%ccess or
fail%re of Kantian ethics (as Kant concei(es it" to pro(ide an interpretation
of -1L or -L4 that mi'ht )t o%r int%itions abo%t all cases# Kant does not
propose these form%las as wa$s of s$stematiGin' moral int%itions# The$ are
not 'ro%nded on an$ consilience of o%r moral int%itions b%t deri(ed from
the concept of a cate'orical imperati(e& and the ar'%ment that there is s%ch
an imperati(e& which also in(ol(es no appeal to moral int%itions& is presented
in the Third .ection of the Groundwork#
Kants use of the universalizability tests. The fo%r famo%s e5amples are
intended not as con)rmations of -L4 b%t onl$ as he%ristic aids to the reader&
ill%stratin' how the more int%iti(e (ariant of the )rst& most abstract form%la
of the moral law mi'ht $ield res%lts that correspond to some moral d%ties
we alread$ reco'niGe# Kants %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests are onl$ tests of the permissibilit$
or impermissibilit$ of partic%lar ma5ims# The$ therefore cannot
possibl$ be wa$s of deducing the positi(e d%ties chosen to ill%strate them#
Beca%se the$ r%le o%t onl$ one ma5im at a time& the$ can ne(er show that a
kind of action that is contrar$ to d%t$ (s%ch as committin' s%icide& or ma=in'
a promise $o% dont intend to =eep" co%ld not be permissible if performed
on some other ma5im#3
6fter presentin' his fo%r e5amples& Kant sa$s one m%st be able to will
that a ma5im of o%r action sho%ld become a %ni(ersal law: this is the canon
of the moral j%d'ment of this action in 'eneral (G 4:4!4"# <t mi'ht be
nat%ral to ta=e this as sa$in' that -1L (or -L4" is to be %sed on e(er$ possible
occasion to tell %s what we o%'ht to do& or at least to decide whether
the ma5ims we propose to o%rsel(es are permissible# B%t < thin= it is not
clear that this is Kants intention# -irst& beca%se he has $et to introd%ce an$
other form%las& it seems premat%re to decide that he is pic=in' o%t -1L
or -L4 as the canon of moral j%d'ment as opposed to them# .econd& a
canon for Kant is not necessaril$ a strict criterion# ;anons are %ni(ersal
r%les that ser(e as fo%ndations of sciences (DL :77"& b%t the$ often ta=e
the form of pro(erbs& mottoes& or aphorisms (DL !4:738"& the most commonl$
%sed e5pressions in pop%lar j%d'ments of the %nderstandin' and
7! %he (oral Law
reason (DL !4:8,8"# %here is no basis to take ,ant as saying that any formula
of the moral law is be used as a strict criterion in some rigorous deductive procedure
for deciding$ in all cases$ what we should do or even what it is permissible
to do#
The %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests are in an$ case @%ite ill s%ited to ser(e as permissibilit$
tests for an$ and e(er$ concei(able ma5im# The tests the$ propose&
so emplo$ed (or rather& so misemplo$ed"& are notorio%sl$ s%bject to both
false ne'ati(es and false positi(es# The false ne'ati(es are morall$ permissible
ma5ims that do not (iolate moral laws b%t also co%ld not themsel(es
ser(e as %ni(ersal laws# (:5ample: < will 'i(e a lar'er percenta'e of m$
income to charit$ than the a(era'e person does#" 6n infallible recipe for
prod%cin' a false positi(e is to form%late a ma5im in(ol(in' a =ind of action
that we =now is contrar$ to d%t$ b%t is presented in the ma5im in s%ch speci)c
terms that e(en if the ma5im were a %ni(ersal law (or a law of nat%re"&
that law wo%ld foreseeabl$ ha(e no instances e5cept the present (int%iti(el$
immoral" action# <n that case& it co%ld be no more diJc%lt for the a'ent to
will the ma5im as a %ni(ersal law than to will this action itself& and so an$
ar'%ment from the %ni(ersaliGabilit$ test wo%ld either be circ%lar or its res%lt
inconcl%si(e# ;onfronted with these cases& self>appointed Kantians desperatel$
see= e(er more creati(e interpretations of Kants test in a passionate
e0ort (as the$ see it" to sa(e Kantian ethics from obli(ion#4
<f we loo= at Kants own %se of -L4 in his fo%r famo%s e5amples (G
4:4!2E3"& we see that whate(er shortcomin's there ma$ be in his disc%ssion&
his approach is caref%ll$ limited in a wa$ that a(oids both problems j%st mentioned#
Kant be'ins: 4ow we will en%merate some d%ties& in accordance
with their %s%al di(ision into d%ties toward o%rsel(es and toward other
h%man bein's& and into perfect and imperfect d%ties# Two thin's here
are cr%cial: -irst& Kant chooses these e5amples beca%se he ta=es them to be
%nproblematic ill%strations of d%ties his a%dience wo%ld alread$ reco'niGe
(some of them& especiall$ the s%icide e5ample& ma$ not seem so %nproblematic
to %s& b%t that sho%ld not distort o%r %nderstandin' of what he is tr$in'
to do"# .econd& the ma5ims he 'oes on to form%late are chosen beca%se
the$ are s%pposed to be clear or e(en t$pical e5amples of ma5ims on which
someone mi'ht (iolate (or be tempted to (iolate" these d%ties# -rom this it
follows& )rst& that beca%se we are considerin' onl$ ma5ims that are ass%med
already recogni-ed to violate determinate duties& there can be no occasion for %s
to consider an$ of the ma5ims that 'enerate the problem of false ne'ati(es#
.econd& beca%se the ma5ims he considers represent typical e5amples of ma5ims
on which someone mi'ht be tempted to (iolate the reco'niGed d%t$ in
@%estion& this more or less '%arantees that the problem of false positi(es will
also be a(oided& beca%se the ma5im is speci)call$ form%lated as to represent
a determinate contrar$ of the moral principle behind the d%t$ in @%estion& a
principle we alread$ accept# 6ltho%'h some of the now familiar worries
abo%t the 'eneral applicabilit$ of -L4 had alread$ been e5pressed in his
)resentation of the upreme )rinciple of (orality 73
own da$& Kant ne(er bothered to repl$ to them#+ < s%''est that a correct
%nderstandin' of his aims shows wh$ he re'arded them as beneath his
notice#
<f we read Kant with the ass%mption that -1L and -L4 are candidate principles
to be tested a'ainst o%r moral int%itions abo%t an$ concei(able ma5im&
then these restrictions will loo= li=e mere e(asions: Kant will be acc%sed of
ta=in' %p onl$ e5amples where the principle wor=s and e5cl%din' all the
cases where it ma$ not# B%t s%ppose we loo= for a moment at Kants ill%strations
of -L4 in li'ht of his real intention E namel$& to show how some
of what we alread$ reco'niGe as d%ties can be seen to conform to the spirit
of the )rst& poorest& and most abstract form%lation he has deri(ed from the
concept of a cate'orical imperati(e& on the wa$ to other and more ade@%ate
form%lations# Then we can see that these e5amples are @%ite reasonable
wa$s of f%l)llin' his aims (which do not incl%de pro(idin' %s with a 'eneral
test for the permissibilit$ of ma5ims& m%ch less a %ni(ersal decision proced%re
for moralit$"# The chief aim is to show %s that when we (iolate a d%t$&
we are t$picall$ tr$in' to ma=e for o%rsel(es an e5ception to some moral
principle that we will to hold %ni(ersall$ for all rational a'ents# Kant e(en
sa$s this e5plicitl$ ri'ht after his disc%ssion of the e5amples:
4ow if we attend to o%rsel(es in e(er$ trans'ression of a d%t$& then we )nd that we do
not act%all$ will that o%r ma5im sho%ld become a %ni(ersal law& for that is impossible
for %s& b%t rather will that its opposite sho%ld remain a law 'enerall$3 $et we ta=e
the libert$ of ma=in' an e5ception for o%rsel(es& or (e(en onl$ for this once" for the
ad(anta'e of o%r inclination# (G 4:4!4"
<f readers of the Groundwork tend to o(erloo= this passa'e and what it sa$s
abo%t Kants principal moti(ation for presentin' the e5amples& the$ often
fasten tenacio%sl$ on two other promissor$ notes he iss%es& treatin' them
as de)niti(e of the ethical theor$ for which he is la$in' the 'ro%nd: First&
Kant sa$s it clearl$ meets the e$e that the fo%r d%ties en%merated here&
and others besides (note that he never ma=es the claim for all d%ties"& are
deri(ed from the -orm%la of the Law of 4at%re (G 4:4!3E4"#, econd& he
declares that one easil$ sees that all ma5ims (iolatin' perfect d%ties fail
the contradiction in conception test (G 4:4!4"# <n these remar=s& Kant is
often ta=en at his word& witho%t ones as=in' whether what he sa$s is tr%e or
whether it corresponds at all to his act%al attempts to de(elop a moral theor$
in the (etaphysics of (orals& and a conception of Kantian ethics con'eals
accordin' to which -1L or -L4 (a'ain& %s%all$ not distin'%ished from each
other" is treated as %he ;ate'orical <mperati(e from which e(er$thin' else
is to be ded%ced (or as presentin' %s with a ;<>Froced%re from which all
ethical tr%th is to be constr%cted"#
B%t lets face it: 4either of these claims is the least bit obvious# The )rst
claim mi'ht concei(abl$ be true& b%t onl$ if we emplo$ an e5tremel$ loose
conception of what it is for a d%t$ to be deri(ed from the form%la of a
74 %he (oral Law
principle#He sho%ld beware here of importin' conceptions of deri(ation E
in(ol(in' strict ded%ctions of precise practical concl%sions E drawn from
now standard models of ethical theor$# Ferhaps b$ identif$in' a temptin'
polic$ of action we =now we sho%ld a(oid& Kants ill%strations do pro(ide
insi'ht into some wa$s o%r actions are s%bject to constraints we reco'niGe
as the d%ties in @%estion# <f < am ri'ht in conject%rin' that the relation
of the moral law to the d%ties fallin' %nder it is not a ri'oro%s ded%cti(e
proced%re b%t rather somethin' li=e an act of interpretation& then Kants
claim becomes more pla%sible# Ferhaps this is all the deri(ation from -1L
or -L4 that these d%ties admit# <n an$ case& Kant later deri(es the same
d%ties E more s%ccessf%ll$& < thin= E from -/ as well#
He ha(e alread$ seen that the %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests act%all$ 'i(e %s at
most permissibilit$ tests for certain indi(id%al ma5ims that (iolate determinate
d%ties we alread$ reco'niGe# Therefore no positi(e d%ties at all (to do
or to omit an$ 'eneral =inds of actions" co%ld e(er be directl$ ded%ced from
them# 4ote too that Kant ne(er claims to have derived these fo%r d%ties from
-L4& onl$ to ha(e made it ob(io%s that the$ are deri(ed from it (in some as
$et %nspeci)ed sense of that phrase& with the deri(ation itself apparentl$
ha(in' occ%rred elsewhere& or bein' deferred to some other occasion"# The
contents of the (etaphysics of (orals belie the claim that Kant pro(ides an$
sort of deri(ation from -L4 of e(en these fo%r d%ties& m%ch less of his entire
s$stem of d%ties#
<f the )rst of the two claims seems e5tremel$ do%btf%l& the second& contrar$
to what Kant sa$s& seems plainl$ false# 6s Barbara /erman has pointed
o%t& the ma5im of con(enience =illin' E < will =ill other h%man bein's
whene(er that is a safe and e0ecti(e wa$ of promotin' m$ own self>interest E
is @%ite thin=able as a %ni(ersal law of nat%re& e(en if we co%ld not will it
to be one#7 B%t the d%t$ not to =ill another is s%rel$ a perfect d%t$ if an$
is# :(en if Kants claim were tr%e& a set of 'eneraliGations abo%t the ma5ims
that (iolate (ario%s =inds of d%t$ wo%ld not directl$ pro(ide an$ principle
for deri(in' (or e(en ta5onomiGin'" the d%ties themsel(es# <n short& neither
of these statements is as ob(io%s as Kant ta=es it to be& and beca%se at
the time Kant wrote the Groundwork he had $et to attempt an$thin' li=e a
deri(ation of d%ties from an$ form%lation of the s%preme principle& he was
in no position to ma=e either of them# < thin= too man$ people allow these
two o(ercon)dent and %ns%pported remar=s to determine their readin' of
Kants entire ethical theor$#
*b+ %he econd Formula: F!
Kne of the most common objections to Kantian ethics is that it is too formalistic&
that its moral principle mis'%idedl$ attempts to dispense with all
s%bstanti(e (al%es# 6 correspondin' objection is made to the (er$ concept
of a cate'orical imperati(e E s%ch a concept& some ar'%e& is %nintelli'ible
)resentation of the upreme )rinciple of (orality 7+
beca%se it is the notion of a principle that we o%'ht to obe$ j%st beca%se
we o%'ht& a principle we co%ld in principle ha(e no reason or moti(e to
obe$# Those who brin' this objection almost ne(er notice that Kants second
form%la is speci)call$ moti(ated b$ the @%estion to which the$ thin= he can
ha(e no answer and that it pro(ides a (er$ direct (and < thin= more than
satisfactor$" answer to that @%estion# Kant be'ins his e5position of the moral
principle b$ considerin' it from the side of form& b%t then he proceeds to
consider the principle from the side of its matter E b$ which Kant means
the objecti(e end that moti(ates obedience to it (G 4:43,"# Traditionall$& the
end of an action is ta=en to be some object or state of a0airs that is to be
bro%'ht abo%t b$ the action# Kant follows tradition in holdin' that e(er$
action m%st ha(e an end of that =ind# B%t if this were the end that moti(ated
obedience to a cate'orical imperati(e& then the bindin'ness of the imperati(e
wo%ld be conditional on o%r ha(in' set that end E and that wo%ld render
the imperati(e onl$ h$pothetical# Therefore& he concl%des that the end that
'ro%nds a cate'orical imperati(e m%st be a di0erent =ind of end& an objecti(e
end& for which Kant %ses the term end in itself# <t will be the b%siness
of the ne5t chapter to e5amine what =ind of end that is& and of ;hapter
to loo= at the s$stem of d%ties Kant deri(es lar'el$ b$ appeal to -/#
*c+ %he %hird Formula: FA and F'"
Kant has now deri(ed two distinct form%las of the s%preme principle of
moralit$& both from the concept of a cate'orical imperati(e# The )rst was
deri(ed from the concept of the 'eneral form of a ma5im that is compatible
with this =ind of imperati(e# The second was deri(ed from the concept of
the =ind of s%bstanti(e (al%e (or end" that co%ld pro(ide a rational 'ro%nd
or moti(e for a rational a'ent to follow a cate'orical imperati(e# Kants ne5t
step is to combine the two ideas behind these two distinct lines of ar'%ment
in order to deri(e a third form%la:
The 'ro%nd of all practical le'islation& namel$& lies ob.ectively in the rule and the form
of %ni(ersalit$& which ma=es it capable of bein' a law (at least a law of nat%re" (in
accordance with the )rst principle"& b%t sub.ectively it lies in the end3 b%t the s%bject
of all ends is e(er$ rational bein' as an end in itself (in accordance with the second
principle": from this now follows the third practical principle of the will& as the
s%preme condition of its harmon$ with %ni(ersal practical reason& the idea of the
will of every rational being as a will giving universal law# (G 4:432"
The third form%la combines the conception of a law (alid %ni(ersall$ for
all rational bein's (in -1L" with the conception of e(er$ rational nat%re
as ha(in' absol%te worth as an end in itself (-/"& to 'et the idea of the
will of e(er$ rational bein' as the so%rce of a %ni(ersall$ (alid le'islation
(-6"# -6 does not follow deductively from -1L and -/ b%t res%lts when
we combine the conception of a %ni(ersall$ (alid law (from -1L" with that
7, %he (oral Law
of the objecti(e worth of the rational will (from -/"& which can therefore
consider itself not onl$ as s%bject to s%ch a law b%t also& at least ideall$& when
it adopts the ma5ims it sho%ld adopt in accordance with the law& as 'i(in'
the law to itself# Kant pro(ides %s with another (ersion of this same ar'%ment
a little later& when he sa$s:
The practical necessit$ of actin' in accordance with this principle& i#e# d%t$& does
not rest at all on feelin's& imp%lses& or inclinations& b%t merel$ on the relation of
rational bein's to one another& in which the will of one rational bein' m%st alwa$s at
the same time be considered as universally legislative& beca%se otherwise the rational
bein' co%ld not thin= of the other rational bein's as ends in themsel(es# 9eason th%s
refers e(er$ ma5im of the will as %ni(ersall$ le'islati(e to e(er$ other will and also to
e(er$ action toward itself& and this not for the sa=e of an$ other practical moti(e or
f%t%re ad(anta'e& b%t from the idea of the di'nit$ of a rational bein' that obe$s no
law e5cept that which at the same time it 'i(es itself# (G 4:434"
/ere it is clear that we re'ard e(er$ rational will (not merel$ o%r own" as
%ni(ersall$ le'islati(e E le'islati(e for all rational bein's E and for this we m%st
also consider other wills as le'islati(e for %s beca%se otherwise we co%ld not
thin= of them as ends in themsel(es# 6t the same time& howe(er& we do not
re'ard the law as 'ro%nded in ends or interests ori'inatin' o%tside it& or o%r
obedience to it as 'ro%nded in somethin' else besides it that we will (which
wo%ld render the law heteronomo%s"# <nstead& we assert the absol%te worth
or dignity of e(er$ rational will& e@%all$ o%r own and that of other rational
bein's& beca%se in obe$in' the objecti(el$ (alid moral law& that will re'ards
itself as at the same time 'i(in' that law (G 4:434& 43+"#
The term idea %sed in Kants form%lation of -6 is especiall$ important
(and is %sed se(eral times in this passa'e: twice initiall$ at G 4:432& twice
a'ain at G 4:43!& and once more at G 4:434& perhaps a'ain at G 4:43
cf# also G 4:4*"# 6n idea is a concept of reason to which no empirical
object can e(er correspond b%t which we %se re'%lati(el$ in arran'in' o%r
co'nitions in a s$stem (KrD 632!E!*IB3,8E77& 6,4!E7*4IB,7*E73!"# To
re'ard the le'islator of the moral law as the idea of the will of e(er$ rational
bein' is precisel$ not to sa$ that the law is 'i(en b$ $o%r arbitrar$& fallible&
and corr%ptible will or mine#
Therefore& it is not an$ s%bjecti(e act of le'islation on anyone/s part that
'ro%nds the (alidit$ of the moral law# 9ather& the law is a practicall$ necessar$
command of practical reason& 'ro%nded not in an$ bein's (olitions b%t
absol%tel$& in the nat%re of thin's& independentl$ of how an$ bein' sho%ld
choose to loo= at the matter# <t binds %s not beca%se we ha(e willed it& b%t
thro%'h the objecti(e (al%e or absol%te worth of rational nat%re that 'ro%nds
it# (He will f%rther e5plore this point E which 'i(es the lie to c%rrentl$
fashionable readin's of Kantian ethics E in the ne5t two chapters& especiall$
in ;hapter ,#" He ma$ consider the law as ha(in' been le'islated b$ each
of %s& howe(er& b%t onl$ insofar as o%r will corresponds to a p%re rational
)resentation of the upreme )rinciple of (orality 77
concept (or idea" of what it o%'ht to be (b%t alwa$s falls short of bein' in
o%r actions and ma5ims that do not conform to law"#
-rom this we ma$ also infer that for a Kantian& an$ conception we ha(e
of o%r d%ties or principles of d%t$& incl%din' the moral law itself& m%st
alwa$s be merel$ pro(isional& %nless it too is s%pposed to represent an idea
whose application to o%r actions is ne(er more than a fallible appro5imation#
This r%les o%t the possibilit$ that we mi'ht e(er ha(e in o%r possession an$
form%la or proced%re from which we co%ld deri(e what we o%'ht to do# <n
other words& it r%les o%t e(en the possibilit$ of what -1L and -L4 are often
tho%'ht to be#
< s%''est that a Kantian sho%ld thin= of an$ form%lation of the s%preme
principle of moralit$ (incl%din' all of Kants own form%lations" as pro(isional
e5pressions of a principle to the conception of which we limited
and fallible rational bein's m%st alwa$s aspire# He ma$ treat these form%lations
as placeholders& so to spea=& for somethin' we will alwa$s be on the
wa$ to comprehendin' more perfectl$# He can treat the moral law this wa$
beca%se& as < ar'%ed in the pre(io%s chapter& no form%lation of it is e(er
to be %sed directl$ to specif$ what we are to do& or e(en directl$ to form%late
the r%les or d%ties thro%'h which& b$ moral j%d'ment& we decide what
to do# 6n$ e5pression of the s%preme principle of moralit$ is merel$ o%r
best attempt so far to artic%late the %ltimate 'ro%nd of all these r%les or
d%ties#
Diferent ways of stating FA. Ferhaps j%st beca%se it is the form%la in
which the other two are combined or s%mmed %p& -6 is stated in a (ariet$ of
di0erent wa$s: Co not choose otherwise than so that the ma5ims of ones
choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same (olition as
%ni(ersal law (G 4:44*"# Kr a'ain: 6ct in accordance with ma5ims that
can at the same time ha(e themsel(es as %ni(ersal laws of nat%re for their
object (G 4:437"#
<n man$ of its form%lations& -6 so%nds s%per)ciall$ li=e -1L (or -L4"&
b%t in fact it ma=es a m%ch stron'er demand on ma5ims and $ields m%ch
stron'er concl%sions abo%t what we o%'ht to do# Hhereas -1L and -L4
pro(ide onl$ a permissibilit$ test for ma5ims ta=en one b$ one E consistin'
in its bein' possible (witho%t contradiction or con?ictin' (olitions" for $o%
to will some ma5im as a %ni(ersal law E -6 tells $o% positively to follow j%st
those ma5ims (that is& that collecti(e system of ma5ims" which actually contain
in themselves the rational volition that the$ sho%ld be %ni(ersal laws E and
therefore& %nder the idea of e(er$ rational bein' as %ni(ersall$ le'islati(e&
actually are universal laws# 6 ma5im mi'ht pass the p%rel$ ne'ati(e test that
there is no contradiction in thin=in'& or con?ictin' (olition in willin' it
to be a %ni(ersal law& witho%t belon'in' to the s$stem of moral laws or
containin' in itself the (olition that it sho%ld be a %ni(ersal law# The criterion
for le'islati(e ma5ims proposed in -6 is si'ni)cantl$ stron'er than that for
merel$ permissible ma5ims 'i(en in -1L or -L4#
78 %he (oral Law
Let in fact -6 does not pretend to o0er %s an$ test at all to discriminate
between ma5ims that ha(e this rationall$ le'islati(e propert$ and ma5ims
that do not# /ence Kants moral principle& in its most de)niti(e form& simpl$
isnt abo%t ha(in' nift$ little tests or proced%res read$ to hand for tellin'
o%rsel(es what to do %nder an$ ima'inable circ%mstances# M$ best attempt
to sa$ what -6 is abo%t is that it tells %s to thin= of o%rsel(es as members of
an ideal comm%nit$ of rational bein's& in which each of %s sho%ld stri(e to
obe$ the moral principles b$ which we wo%ld choose that members of the
comm%nit$ sho%ld ideall$ 'o(ern their cond%ct# Hhat it 'i(es %s is a spirit in
which to thin= abo%t how to act and not a proced%re for ded%cin' actions
or principles to act on# 6s < ha(e alread$ said& Kantian ethics denies there
co%ld e(er be s%ch a proced%re#
The realm of ends. M%st as Kant earlier pro(ided a more int%iti(e (ersion
of -1L in the form of -L4& so here he also pro(ides a more int%iti(e (ariant
of -6& -9:# -9: pro(ides a new characteriGation of the s$stem of le'islation
referred to in -6 b$ describin' the nat%re of the comm%nit$ of rational
bein's that is to res%lt from it# <t calls this comm%nit$ a realm of ends ('eich
der 0wecke"# B$ a Arealm Kant means a s$stematic combination of (ario%s
rational bein's thro%'h comm%nal laws& or a'ain& a whole of all ends in
s$stematic connection (G 4:433"# The term Arealm of ends is therefore
%sed in two senses: <t is either a comm%nit$ made %p of rational bein's or a
certain relationship between all the ends set b$ the bein's that are members
of s%ch a comm%nit$#
The terms Kant %ses most often to e5press the relationship between the
rational bein's that are members of a realm of ends are s$stem (ystem" and
combination (1erbindung"# 6t the end of the Anthropology& Kant describes
historical pro'ress as the pro'ressi(e or'aniGation of citiGens of the earth in
and to the species as one s$stem& cosmopoliticall$ combined (D6 7:333" E
in other words& tr%e h%man pro'ress is pro'ress toward a realm of ends# 6
collection of ends constit%tes a realm if these ends are not in con?ict or
competition with one another b%t are combined into a m%t%all$ s%pportin'
s$stem# The laws of a realm of ends are those that& if followed& wo%ld combine
the ends of rational bein's (both the rational bein's themsel(es as e5istent
ends& accordin' to -/& and the ends set in the ma5ims chosen b$ those
rational bein's" into a m%t%all$ s%pportin' harmon$# -9: commands %s to
follow ma5ims in(ol(in' ends that belon' to this s$stem& and it forbids %s to
adopt ends that wo%ld stand in the wa$ of it# :nds that are neither re@%ired
for nor incompatible with the s$stem are permissible#
Kant thin=s there are two main modes of h%man cond%ct that ill%strate
what it is to act accordin' to the idea of a realm of ends# Kne is the idea
of friendship& in which the happiness of both friends is swallowed %p
in a common end that incl%des the 'ood of both (M. ,:4,E73& cf# D:
!7:4!,E"# The other is the idea of the reli'io%s comm%nit$ (or free ethical
commonwealth"& which for Kant sho%ld be bo%nd to'ether not b$ creeds
or script%ral traditions b%t b$ the shared p%rs%it of the hi'hest 'ood as
'elations among the Formulas 7
a common end (9 ,:8E2*"# The all too pre(alent characteriGation of
Kantian ethics as indi(id%alistic %s%all$ in(ol(es o(erloo=in' -9: or failin'
to %nderstand its implications#
-9: commands %s to a(oid all patterns of end settin' that in(ol(e f%ndamentall$
competiti(e relations between o%rsel(es and other rational bein's#
<t forbids %s to relate to others in an$ wa$ that in(ol(es the fr%stration of
an$ persons deepest ends# ;on?ict or competition between h%man ends
is compatible with -9: onl$ if it is in ser(ice of a deeper s$stematic %nit$
amon' all h%man ends E a s$stem& combination& or comm%nit$ in which
no member of the realm of ends is left o%t# (6 later form%lation of the
same idea was: 6n association in which the free de(elopment of each is the
condition for the free de(elopment of all#8"
The moral law commands %s& in other words& to see= the welfare of o%rsel(es
and others onl$ on the condition that it can be %nited with the common
welfare of all# <f this means obtainin' less total welfare than co%ld be
'otten b$ permittin' f%ndamental con?icts between the ends of di0erent
rational bein's& then less than ma5imal welfare belon's to the end that the
moral law commands %s to see=# <f& as seems ob(io%s& too m%ch ine@%alit$
between people E in power& wealth& or social stat%s E is incompatible with
their p%rs%it of common ends& then Kantian ethics implies that that limitin'
h%man ine@%alit$ sho%ld alwa$s ta=e priorit$ o(er ma5imiGin' h%man
welfare#
Mohn 9awls is well =nown for contrastin' Kantian with %tilitarian ethics b$
claimin' that %tilitarianism does not ta=e serio%sl$ eno%'h the di0erences
between persons (9awls& TM !7"# This wa$ of loo=in' at the contrast ma=es
Kantian ethics appear indi(id%alistic b$ comparison with %tilitarianism&
tho%'h this is hi'hl$ misleadin'# 6 better wa$ to loo= at the contrast is to
point o%t that Kantian ethics places a hi'her priorit$ on h%man comm%nit$ E
it (al%es the conditions of rational cooperation amon' persons& and their
sharin' of common ends& more than it does the a''re'ate welfare of indi(id%als
considered in isolation# /ence& the point that Kantian ethics reall$
has in mind in ta=in' serio%sl$ the di0erences between persons is that this is
necessar$ in order to de(elop a conception of ethical norms based on a tr%e
idea of h%man comm%nit$ (instead of red%cin' the common deliberation
of di0erent people to the deliberation of a sin'le indi(id%al a'ent"# <n this
wa$& it is %tilitarianism that is indi(id%alistic and onl$ Kantian ethics that
tr%l$ places h%man comm%nit$ at the fo%ndation of ethics# <t is not often
appreciated that 9awls sees the contrast this wa$ too (see 9awls& TM +,4E+"#
3# 9elations amon' the -orm%las
-6 is arri(ed at b$ combinin' -1L with -/ E that is& combinin' the idea of
%ni(ersal law with the (al%e of the rational will& representin' the latter as
s%itable for 'i(in' the law# <mmediatel$ after deri(in' -/ in this wa$& Kant
then writes: The three wa$s mentioned of representin' the principle of
8* %he (oral Law
moralit$ are& howe(er& f%ndamentall$ onl$ so man$ form%las of precisel$
the same law& one of which from itself %nites the other two in itself (deren
die eine die anderen -wei von selbst in sich vereinigt" (G 4:43,"# This is often
mistranslated as sa$in' that each of the form%las %nites the other two in itself#
B%t it is onl$ abo%t -6 that Kant e(er e5plicitl$ claims that it %nites the other
two in itself# 4o s%ch claim is e(er made on behalf of -1L or -/# The idea
that -6 alone combines the other two form%las is also s%''ested b$ Kants
analo'$ with the cate'ories of @%antit$& where he thin=s of the concept of
totalit$ as combinin' the concepts of %nit$ and pl%ralit$#2* ;onse@%entl$&
-6 has a pri(ile'ed stat%s amon' the three form%las: <t is the one form%la
that s%ms %p the two others# <t is also& appropriatel$ eno%'h& the form%la
Kant %ses to establish the moral law in the Third .ection of the Groundwork#
The issue of euivalen!e." /ow do the three (or )(e" form%las relate to
one another in achie(in' Kants aim of see=in' and establishin' the s%preme
principle of moralit$N 6s we obser(ed earlier& in Groundwork 4:43, Kant
presents the three form%las as a s$stem& or'aniGed b$ the triad form&
matter& and complete determination# 6 s$stem is a whole composed of
hetero'eneo%s parts that complement one another# 6 whole whose parts are
essentiall$ homo'eneo%s or interchan'eable co%ld not constit%te a s$stem#
/ence if the three main form%las of the moral law constit%te a s$stem& that
implies that the$ complement one another and hence& altho%'h the$ are
m%t%all$ consistent& that the$ also di0er si'ni)cantl$ in content# ;ontrar$
to this implication& howe(er& it is deplorabl$ common in the literat%re to
)nd ascribed to Kant the claim that the three form%las of the moral law are
e@%i(alent# Hhen we loo= at the te5t& howe(er& we )nd him sa$in' nothin'
of the =ind# He )nd instead the followin':
The three wa$s mentioned of representin' the principle of moralit$ are& howe(er&
f%ndamentall$ onl$ so man$ form%las of precisel$ the same law& one of which from
itself %nites the other two in itself Oderen die eine die anderen -wei von selbst in sich
vereinigtP# 4onetheless& there is a (ariet$ amon' them& which is to be s%re more
s%bjecti(el$ than objecti(el$ practical& namel$& that of brin'in' an idea of reason
nearer to int%ition (in accordance with a certain analo'$" and& thro%'h this& nearer
to feelin'# (G 4:43,"
Three claims are made here:
2# The three form%las are onl$ so man$ form%las of precisel$ the same
law#
!# Kne of them %nites the other two in itself#
3# There is a (ariet$ amon' them& which& howe(er& is more s%bjecti(el$
than objecti(el$ practical# (G 4:43,"
(2"& ta=en all b$ itself& mi'ht be compatible with the claim that the form%las
are e@%i(alent& b%t it certainl$ does not assert it# The three form%las
of the moral law represent three di0erent approaches to precisel$ the same
'elations among the Formulas 82
law# That implies that the$ are not inconsistent with one another& b%t it does
not precl%de di0erences in content between them# Two or more none@%i(alent
assertions mi'ht be ta=en as statements of the (er$ same proposition&
especiall$ if it is also claimed that one of them combines two others and
that the$ represent di0erent approaches to that common proposition# -or
e5ample& two si'ns posted in an K5ford colle'e co%rt$ard& one sa$in' Keep
o0 the 'rass& the other Hal= on the path& wo%ld normall$ be considered
two form%lations of the (er$ same inj%nction& e(en tho%'h the posted commands
are not e@%i(alent#
(!" appears to s%pport the claim that the three form%las are e@%i(alent
onl$ if it is mistranslated# ;orrectl$ translated& it draws a distinction in
content between the sin'le form%la that %nites the others in itself and the
two pro(isional (one>sided b%t m%t%all$ complementar$" form%las that are
%nited in that form%la#
(3" is a ?at denial of the e@%i(alence of the form%las# <t asserts that there is
a di2erence amon' them in ob.ective practical content& tho%'h it also implies that
this di0erence is not 'reat and it emphasiGes that the s%bjecti(e di0erence
between the form%las is 'reater than the objecti(e di0erence# < s%bmit that
the chief objecti(e di0erence between the form%las is that the )rst form%la
(-1L and -L4" is more abstract and poorer in content than the others&
beca%se it pro(ides onl$ formal tests of permissibilit$& pro(ides no 'ro%nd
for determinate d%ties& and sa$s nothin' abo%t the end of moral le'islation
or the 'ro%nd of its a%thorit$#
/owe(er& < thin= e(en the 3uestion of whether the form%las are e@%i(alent
ma$ alread$ be based on a serio%s mis%nderstandin'# This @%estion
s%''ests E what is false E that each of the form%las has& all b$ itself& a set
of practical conse@%ences that is determinate eno%'h that we can compare
them and decide whether the$ are the same or di0erent# The @%estion conj%res
%p the pict%re that if $o% p%t one of the form%las to'ether with all the
tr%ths holdin' in e(er$ possible world& then that form%la di(ides all possible
actions for each world into neat sets of the obli'ator$& the forbidden& and
the permissible# To sa$ that the three form%las are e@%i(alent wo%ld then
mean that the e5tension of the three sets is e5actl$ the same for each of the
three form%las# The same concl%sion follows 'i(en the common mistranslation
of (!"& beca%se $o% co%ld ded%ce each form%la from an$ other (or
ma$be from each of the other two ta=en jointl$"#
The entire @%estion of e@%i(alence& howe(er& seems to pres%ppose the
conception of moral theor$ on which the moral stat%s of an$ act is s%pposed
to be ded%cible directl$ from a moral principle (to'ether with the rele(ant
facts"# <f& howe(er& moral theor$ is concei(ed as Kant and Mill concei(e it&
then the application of the s%preme principle of moralit$ is not a ded%cti(e
proced%re (from a principle and a set of facts" b%t res%lts instead in
a set of moral r%les or d%ties (which are not ded%ced from the principle"#
These r%les re@%ire determinate actions or omissions onl$ when applied
8! %he (oral Law
to empirical sit%ations thro%'h acts of j%d'ment whose decisions are not
ded%cti(el$ deri(able from them# -or instance& the ma5im of ma=in' a
deceitf%l promise to a(oid )nancial embarrassment is wron' beca%se it does
not treat the rational nat%re of the person decei(ed as an end in itself (G
4:4!E3*"# <t seems plain eno%'h that s%ch a polic$ has that meanin'& b%t
it is not ded%cible from the principle to'ether with a set of fact%al claims
abo%t acts of deceit# 4or does the d%t$ in @%estion in(ol(e a speci)cation of
the conditions %nder which it applies (as Kant sa$s e5plicitl$ in the case of
the d%t$ not to commit s%icide& G 4:4!"#
Th%s e(en if the three form%las are all the best possible statements of
the f%ndamental principle of moralit$& there is no determinate fact& prior
to s%ch an interpreti(e application to speci)c d%ties and the application of
these thro%'h j%d'ment& abo%t how an$ of the form%las partitions possible
actions into obli'ator$& forbidden& and permissible# A fortiori& in Kantian
ethics there is no sense to the @%estion of whether the form%las are e@%i(alent
in the sense of entailin' the same e5tensions of forbidden& permitted&
and obli'ator$ actions# The closest $o% co%ld come to claimin' their e@%i(alence
wo%ld be to sa$ that the$ do not contradict one another and that in
appl$in' them& one sho%ld interpret each in li'ht of the others#
4# The 1ni(ersal -orm%la
<n presentin' the form%las s$stematicall$& Kant chooses the more int%iti(e
(ariants of the )rst and third form%las (-L4 and -9:" o(er the more abstract
ones# /e does this& he sa$s& beca%se if one wants to obtain access for the
moral law& then it is (er$ %sef%l to ta=e one and the same action thro%'h the
three named concepts and& as far as ma$ be done& to brin' the action nearer
to int%ition (G 4:43,E7"# /owe(er& one does better in moral j%d'in' alwa$s
to proceed in accordance with the strict method and ta=e as a 'ro%nd the
%ni(ersal form%la of the cate'orical imperati(e: AAct in accordance with that
maxim which can at the same time make itself into universal law (G 4:43,E7"#
The main point Kant is ma=in' here is that the wa$ of thin=in' (closer to
int%ition" that does best at animatin' h%man hearts and actions on behalf
of moralit$ is not the same as the wa$ of thin=in' that does best when it comes
time to pass critical j%d'ment either on the actions we ha(e performed or
on the ma5ims we are proposin' to adopt# -or this latter tas=& a more a%stere
and abstract principle is better beca%se& corr%pt h%man nat%re bein' what
it is& the same feelin's and int%itions that ma=e %s enth%siastic friends of
(irt%e also ma=e %s more s%sceptible to self>deception and more li=el$ to
pass o0 corr%pt actions and ma5ims to o%rsel(es as morall$ commendable
ones# <n short& Kant is sa$in' that moral sentimentalists 'et thin's e5actl$
wron' when the$ s%ppose that moral p%rit$ is to be fo%nd in what satis)es
the heart b%t not the head#
B%t what are we to ma=e of Kants identi)cation of a %ni(ersal form%laN
/ow is this form%la s%pposed to relate to the three form%las he has alread$
%he 4Universal Formula5 83
arri(ed atN 6 closer loo= re(eals that the form%la he %ses here is (er$ close
in its wordin' to the s%pposedl$ de)niti(e form%lations of the law that Kant
pro(ides in the &riti3ue of )ractical 'eason and the (etaphysics of (orals#
-1 Universal Formula5: Act in accordance with that maxim which can at the
same time make itself into a universal law (G 4:43,E7"#
;ompare:
-K .o act that the ma5im of $o%r action co%ld alwa$s at the same time
hold as a principle of %ni(ersal le'islation (KpD +:3*" and
-M 6ct %pon a ma5im that can also hold as a %ni(ersal law (M. ,:!!+"#
<n an article in (ind written more than si5t$ $ears a'o& Kla%s 9eich made
the interestin' s%''estion that this %ni(ersal form%la is none of the three
(or )(e" partic%lar form%las deri(ed so far b%t is a distinct si5th form%la#22
6bo(e < ha(e followed 9eich pro(isionall$ b$ statin' this form%la separatel$
as -1# B%t this onl$ raises the @%estion of where this new form%la is s%pposed
to ha(e come from& and in what wa$ it is more %ni(ersal than the
form%las that ha(e alread$ been deri(ed and e5plained# .%rel$ it is most
nat%ral to s%ppose& as the most common interpretation does& that -1 is one
of the form%las alread$ deri(ed# The @%estion is: Hhich oneN
Most scholars ha(e concl%ded E almost witho%t thin=in'& often as tho%'h
it were j%st somethin' Kant had e5plicitl$ said E that the %ni(ersal form%la
is -1L#2! This concl%sion admittedl$ consorts well with the e@%all$ common
(iew that -1L (and the associated %ni(ersaliGabilit$ tests" constit%tes the
;ate'orical <mperati(e E or e(en the ;<>proced%re for constr%ctin'
the content of moralit$#23 The tho%'htless identi)cation of -1 with -1L
ma$ f%rther be prompted b$ a fail%re to percei(e the si'ni)cant di0erences
there are between Kants di0erent form%las& and also the fail%re to notice
that there is e(en a @%estion abo%t how the$ )t to'ether s$stematicall$# -1L
is simpl$ the onl$ Kantian form%la people pa$ m%ch attention to3 it so%nds
similar eno%'h to -L4 and to -6 that it mi'ht seem to stand for them as
well# /ow -1 relates to -/ and -9:& which admittedl$ dont so%nd m%ch
li=e -1L& ma$ remain (a'%e in their minds& b%t an$ worries on this score
are @%ic=l$ p%t to sleep b$ incantin' the assertion& almost %ni(ersal in the
literat%re& that the form%las are all e@%i(alent an$wa$# .o ob(io%sl$ -1L
seems the onl$ possible candidate for -1# B%t once we loo= more closel$
at the te5t in li'ht of a clearer %nderstandin' of the di0erences amon' the
form%las& this ob(io%s tho%'ht is seen to ha(e little or no pla%sibilit$# <t is
s%pported neither b$ the presentation of the form%la in the te5t& nor b$ the
o(erall ar'%ment of the .econd .ection& nor e(en b$ what -1 itself sa$s# 6ll
three considerations point to the identi)cation of -1 with -6#
-irst& the %ni(ersal form%la occ%rs in the same para'raph de(oted to
-9:& which is the more int%iti(e (ersion of -6& while -6 is the more a%stere
(ersion of the same form%la& hence the one Kant is sa$in' we sho%ld %se for
moral j%d'ment# .econd& -6 is the form%la that combines the other two in
84 %he (oral Law
itself& and in that sense it is alread$ the %ni(ersal form%la in which the search
for the s%preme principle of moralit$ has c%lminated# Third& there is simpl$
what the %ni(ersal form%la says: <t tells %s to act on that ma5im which can
make itself into a %ni(ersal law# <f a ma5im can ma=e itself into a %ni(ersal law
b$ containin' in itself the (olition that it sho%ld be a %ni(ersal law& then
this $ields the e@%i(alence of the %ni(ersal form%la to -6 in se(eral of its
(erbal form%lations# 6 similar loo= at the wordin' of -K and -M shows that
the$ are also best %nderstood as (ersions of -6# -or if bein' able to hold as
%ni(ersal law is the same as bein' able to ma=e itself into a %ni(ersal law&
then -K and -M sa$ the same thin' as -1& and all three sa$ the same thin'
as -6# -inall$& and for 'ood meas%re& -K in the &riti3ue of )ractical 'eason
is said reciprocall$ to impl$ freedom of the will (KpD +:!8E3*"3 -6 is the
onl$ form%la in the Groundwork abo%t which this claim is made (G 4:44,E"#
That is $et another reason to thin= that -1 m%st be -6 and cannot be an$
other form%la#