1

The Philippine Baseline Issue

THE BASELINE ISSUE
A position paper

By:
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV

INTRODUCTION
Last August 2007, this author filed Senate Bill No. 1467 entitled An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippi ne
Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. or otherwise known as the
Archipelagic Baselines Law of the Philippines. The bill was the result of a series of consultations primarily with former Senator Leticia
Ramos-Shahani, who first pushed for the Baselines bill way back in 1993. It basically defines the archipelagic baselines to include the
Scarborough Shoal and designates the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as a regime of islands. To further facilitate the passing of the bill,
the technical details provided by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) as enumerated in House Bil l No.
1202 filed by Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as well as its other provisions were adopted in toto. Congress, however, filed HB 3216
that substituted for HB 1202.

Recently, controversies arose with the discovery of the particulars of the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) being conducted by
RP, China and Vietnam within the waters off Palawan. Thereafter, Malacanang pressured Congress to revert HB 3216 back to the
Committee on Foreign Relations ostensibly to push for certain amendments. These two seemingly unrelated events inevitably pushed
the baselines issue at the top of the national policy agenda. Given this context, now is the best time for us to finally resolve this issue.

This paper intends to explain and justify the position adopted in SB 1467 and differentiate it with the other options, as wel l as to clarify
other closely related subjects surrounding the baseline issue.

PD 1599, TREATY OF PARIS and UNCLOS
The first time the author studied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement was in 1994 as part of a
course in International Law given to graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy who intend to join the Philippine Navy. The
course focused on the UNCLOS provisions particularly: the archipelagic doctrine; the coastal states rights and duties within the
territorial sea, contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); the right of innocent passage; the doctrine of hot pursuit; and
other provisions concerning enforcement of maritime laws.

After graduating, however, the new Navy officers were surprised to find out that the NAMRIA-supplied nautical charts used aboard
Philippine Navy ships defined the territorial limits of the country as those stated in the Treaty of Paris plus the attached KIG borders
defined by PD 1596, and not the UNCLOS definitions as taught to them at PMA. To be fair, NAMRIA has no other basis than the Treaty
of Paris because our country, precisely, has yet to pass a new baselines law that would amend the pre-UNCLOS baseline law, the RA
5446, which is not compliant with the UNCLOS criteria. To complicate matters, the Navy uses PD 1599, a pre-UNCLOS unilateral
declaration of our countrys EEZ, as a mandate to enforce maritime laws in these areas. As a consequence, the author remembers that
when their ship patrolled as far east as the Anson Shoal in the Pacific, they used the Treaty of Paris as reference. And when they
patrolled as far west as the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, they used PD 1599. In short, as of the moment, we have two
sets of boundaries (PD 1599 and Treaty of Paris with PD 1596) and we will yet define another one (UNCLOS).

1. PD 1599, as mentioned above, is a unilateral declaration by the Philippines of its EEZ as measured from the baselines as defined by
RA 5446. It was signed by then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978.

2. The Treaty of Paris is a peace treaty forged between the US and Spain in 10 December 1898. It detailed, among others, the
territorial limits of the Philippine archipelago as being ceded by Spain to the US. These same limits were then used to define our
national territory when we eventually gained indepedence from the US in 1946.

3. The UNCLOS, formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS III and also called the Law
of the Sea Convention, refers to the international agreement that came out of the UN conferences from 1973 to 1982. The agreement
consists of 320 articles and 9 annexes. To date, 155 countries have already ratified the UNCLOS and it officially came into f orce in 16
November 1994. The Philippines became the 11th country to ratify UNCLOS on 08 May 1984. It defines, among others, the limits of the
territorial sea, contiguous zone and the EEZ of a coastal or archipelagic State.

Each of the above reference options has its own strengths and weaknesses, but if we are to consider both the validity in International
Law and the area covered, the UNCLOS option is superior to the other two.

PD 1599, while almost as vast as the UNCLOS option in terms of area, has practically no binding effect in International Law by virtue of
its being a unilateral declaration in the pre-UNCLOS era. Moreover, since we have ratified UNCLOS and, therefore, agreed to its
provisions, we are obliged to rescind PD 1599.

The Treaty of Paris, meanwhile, may still have a binding effect in International Law, notwithstanding the UNCLOS ratification. However,
its total area covered is significantly smaller because it cannot avail of the EEZ provisions of the UNCLOS.

As to the legal alternative of retaining the Treaty of Paris while availing of the UNCLOS option, we, as a self-respecting people living
within a community of nations, should not have two sets of boundaries that we can use for our own convenience. It is simply not fair; it
is simply not right. Therefore, it is in our countrys best interest to adopt solely the UNCLOS option.
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THE BASELINE METHODS
Baselines are reference lines drawn by a coastal or archipelagic State using different methods as discussed below. They are used to
measure the breadth of the territorial sea (12nm), contiguous zone (24 nm), EEZ (200nm) and continental shelf (up to 350nm). Also, the
waters enclosed by the baselines are called archipelagic waters over which an archipelagic State exercises sovereignty.

According to the UNCLOS, there are three methods that can be employed in determining a States baselines, namely:

1. Normal Baseline, according to Art. 5, is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by
the coastal State.

2. Straight Baseline, according to Art. 7, can be employed if ever the coastlines are indented and cut into or there is a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinity.

3. Archipelagic Baseline, according to Art. 47, is a method of joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of
an archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main island and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water
to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1.

Of the three methods, the archipelagic baselines method is most applicable and advantageous to an archipelago such as ours.
Otherwise, to use either the Normal or Straight baseline methods, which are primarily designed for coastal States, would effectively
waive our status as an archipelagic State and lose much of the archipelagic waters as defined above.

THE BASELINE OPTIONS
NAMRIA has prepared the following baseline options to cater to the varying political persuasions of the policymakers:

1. OPTION 1: The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands.
This is the option adopted by SB 1467.

2. OPTION 2: Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of
islands. This is the official position of Malacanang through recent pronouncements and the DFA position paper written on 02 Aug 2005.

3. OPTION 3: The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.

4. OPTION 4: The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines. This is the option adopted by HB
3216.

To have a better view of the differences between the baseline options, the table below (which includes RA 5446) was lifted from the
briefing documents prepared by NAMRIA.
THE BASELINE OPTIONS

FEATURES OPTION 1
(SB 1467)
OPTION 2
(Malacanang)
OPTION 3 OPTION 4
(HB 3216)
RA 5446
Baseline
enclosure
Main
Archipelago
&
Scarborough
Main
Archipelago
only
Main
Archipelago
& KIG
Main
Archipelago,
Scarborough
& KIG
Main
Archipelago
only
No. of
baselines
135 101 134 135 80
No. of long
baseline
(100-
125nm)
4 3 4 4 1>125nm
No. of
basepoints
occupied by
other
claimants


0


0


7


7


0
Area of
archipelagic
waters*
172,109 sq
nm
171,146 sq
nm
212,181 sq
nm
210,443 sq
nm
166,858sqnm
Area from
baselines to
EEZ limit**
498,870 sq
nm
485,310 sq
nm
468,250 sq
nm
468,250 sq
nm
413,080sqnm
Total area
of archi
waters and
EEZ
670,979 sq
nm
656,456 sq
nm
680,428 sq
nm
691,233 sq
nm
579,938sqnm
Area under KIG KIG & Scarborough None None
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regime of
islands
Scarborough
Addl
requirement
Designation
of sealanes
Designation of
sealanes
Designation
of sealanes
&
construction
of lighthouse
at Sabina
Shoal
Designation
of sealanes
&
construction
of lighthouse
at Sabina
Shoal


RA 5446: There are a few weaknesses in RA 5446. One, it violates para 2 of Art. 47 of UNCLOS where it states: The length of such
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles except that up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines enclosing the archipelago
may exceed that length, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles. As we can see from the table, RA 5446 has one baseline that exceeds
the 125nm limit for long baselines.

Another weakness of RA 5446 is: it does not optimize the area of the EEZ since it excluded both Scaborough Shoal and KIG from the
baselines and both were not designated as regime of islands.

OPTION 1/ SB 1467: The main strength of this option is that it maximized the area by including Scarborough Shoal without violating the
archipelagic baselines provisions by classifying KIG as regime of islands. It is, therefore, UNCLOS compliant.

However, there are some misconceptions regarding the label regime of islands that it supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our
sovereignty over the areas labeled as such. On the contrary, regime of islands is defined in Art. 121 as: 1) island/s that is naturally
formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone,
200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the exact same way as
other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal States would be forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is
because such territory is impossible to enclose within the baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island
group is one example. Since the UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline,
it has no choice but to classify Falkland as a regime of islands. The US (if ever it ratifies UNCLOS) would probably classify Hawaii as a
regime of islands by virtue of its distance from the mainland.

The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines primarily because its distance from Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this,
our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that
Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to para 3 of Art. 121, the regime of islands definition has an exception and that is:
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to designate KIG as a regime of islands, we woul d be depriving ourselves of the EEZ
and continental shelf of Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands.

Of course, China is expected to protest the inclusion of Scarborough Shoal within our baselines. Probably, it may even be the reason
why Malacanang pressured Congress to freeze legislative action on HB 3216. But if we truly believe that our claim over Scarborough
Shoal is legitimate then we have every right to enclose it within our baselines. This does not mean, though, that we are provoking China
into a war because, according to Art. 279, State Parties to the UNCLOS are obliged to settle any dispute by peaceful means.

OPTION 2/MALACANANG OPTION: The main weakness of this option is, while it is UNCLOS compliant, it failed to protect the interest
of our country by not including Scarborough Shoal in the baselines when there is no hindrance to do so. True, thi s option designates
Scarborough as a regime of islands but, as discussed above, a rock formation is not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf when
labeled as such. Even if it will still have its own territorial sea and contiguous zone, these would have no effect in terms of additional
area since the EEZ measured from west coast of Luzon will extend over these zones.

OPTION 3: There are several weaknesses with this option. Aside from those mentioned in Option 2 with the designation of
Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands, this option is also not UNCLOS compliant for including KIG in the baselines. This will be
discussed extensively below since Option 4 also included KIG in the baselines.

OPTION 4/HB 3216: At first glance, this may seem to be the best option. However, it violated para 4 of Art. 47 which states: Such
baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless a lighthouse or similar installations which are permanently above
sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of
the territorial sea from the nearest island. Based on the table above and HB 3216 itself, Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are low-tide
elevations. A low-tide elevation, according to Art. 13, is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-
tide but submerged at high tide. Hence, we still need to construct a lighthouse each on these areas so that they can qualify as
basepoints. Even this measure, however, is no longer possible because of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea which was signed by the ASEAN members and China in 2002. In the declaration, we agreed to exercise self-restraint in
the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining
from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a
constructive manner. Both Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are presently uninhabited but are being claimed by RP, China and
Vietnam.

Another major defect of Option 4/HB3216 is, as we can see from the table, seven of the designated basepoints are islands presently
occupied by other countries. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Isands, these are: Kalantiaw Cay (Vietnam); Paredes
Reef (Vietnam); Kagitingan Reef (China); Mariveles Reef (Malaysia); Pugad Is. (Vietnam); Kanluran Reef (Vietnam) and Investigator
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Reef (being claimed by China). To insist on using these islands/reefs as basepoints is in contravention of the 2002 ASEAN-China
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and may cause outrage among affected States. Designating basepoints
on uninhabited, though contested areas such as Scarborough Shoal can be defended legally and politically. But to place basepoints on
foreign-occupied territory, no matter how strong our claim, is an act of aggression.

If the proponents of Option 4/HB 3216 have not yet realized this, then the information provided by this paper, hopefully, will make them
reconsider.

In view of the discussions above, the best option to adopt is Option 1 as stated in SB 1467.


The SPRATLY ISSUE
As explained above, the passing of SB 1467 will not weaken our claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or what is internationally
known as the Spratlys. Still, the fact remains that, we are only one of many claimants in that group of islands. Of these, only Brunei has
not physically occupied its claimed territory. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands (it admits the reports are varying),
Vietnam has occupied 25 islands; China, 13; RP, 8; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.

With this situation, it is impossible to expect a scenario where all these countries will just suddenly pack up and go home. On the
contrary, we should even expect some of these claimants to assert their presence more in the coming years to explore potential oil
deposits amidst the increasing demand and diminishing oil reserves elsewhere. In such a scenario, skirmishes are not unlikely as our
Navy ships and fishing boats are regularly navigating these waters. In the meantime, nobody gets to benefit from whatever rich natural
resources the area has to offer.

There are several avenues enumerated in the UNCLOS as regards conflict settlement, foremost of which is the mutual agreement of all
claimant States. But after factoring in the unpleasant experiences (including our own) of countries conducting joint development
agreements with China (Wain 2008), it may be best to strengthen ties within the ASEAN first. This way, our collective position would be
at parity with China in any future agreement. This is the only peaceful way to resolve this issue.

The JMSU ISSUE
The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was initially entered into by RP and China on 01 Sept 2004. Vietnam initially voi ced
concern as it was a violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Wain 2008). But at some point,
Vietnam was won over when it was included in the project. Because of this, it is now officially called a Tripartite Agreement for Joint
Marine Seismic Undertaking in The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.

The JMSU agreement is highly flawed for the following reasons:

1. It smacks of bad faith on our part as it was forged without consulting with the other members of the ASEAN while there was an
existing status quo agreement among them. (Wain 2008).

2. It excluded other claimant States like Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

3. It was grossly disadvantageous on our part because it included areas that were not disputed.
4. Because some subject areas are solely ours, it violated certain provisions of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution relat ing to the exclusive
use of our own marine wealth or, if it is a joint exploration, the Presidents obligation to submit such agreement to Congress within 30
days.

5. We are not at parity with China in terms of the actual conduct of the exploration since we are relegated to mere observers aboard
their research vessels. Hence, there can be no guarantees about the integrity of the research results.

The CONTINENTAL SHELF
According to para 1 of Art. 76 of the UNCLOS, the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200nm from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

According to para 6 to 8 of Art. 76, a coastal State is allowed to claim the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond the 200nm but not
exceeding 350nm from the baselines as long as the information on the said limits are submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS would then make the recommendations to the coastal State regarding the outer limits and the
adoption of which would make it final and binding.

Art. 4 of Annex II, on the other hand, states: Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with Art. 76, the outer limits of
its continental shelf beyond 200nm, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and
technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.

Since the UNCLOS officially entered into force 16 November 1994, supposedly, the ten-year deadline would have expired on 15
November 2004. However, because of the difficulties encountered by developing countries in coming up with technical requirements of
Art. 4 of Annex II, a decision was made during the May 2001 Meeting of State Parties to UNCLOS to extend the deadline to 12 May
2009. (Sands 2005: 5).

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With this, our country has a little over a year to submit the particulars of our continental shelf beyond the 200nm to the CLCS. Thus, it
is imperative that all pertinent institutions of government provide and extend all the necessary support to NAMRIA to make
sure that it accomplishes its mission on time.

To compound this deadline problem, we still do not have a new baselines law from which to measure the outer limits of our continental
shelf. While there is no deadline in the submission of particulars for a States baselines, it is, however, the basis for measuring all
maritime regimes including the extended continental shelf (VERA Files 2008). Therefore, we should pass the new baselines bill
even way before the 12 May 2009 deadline to give NAMRIA ample time to adjust their data on our continental shelf, assuming
that it would have the necessary data by then.

The SABAH CLAIM
The approval of SB 1467 is without prejudice to our existing claim on Sabah. Although the bill is not as explicit as Sec. 2 of RA 5446
where it mentioned that RP has dominion and sovereignty over Sabah, still Sec. 5 of SB 1467 states that the baselines law shall be
without prejudice to other claims. To be sure, Article I of the 1987 Constitution has already covered our claim over Sabah and other
similarly situated territories and no law can possibly override this Constitutional provision.

Having said that, the Sabah claim will always be a lingering issue for as long as we will not be brave enough to confront it. Sadly, all the
administrations since 1986 refused or lacked the political will to resolve it.

As things stand, our country has a strong existing legitimate claim over Sabah, on behalf of the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. On the
other hand, Malaysia had been in actual possession and control over the island for more than a century now and, worse, the inhabitants
of Sabah have expressed their desire to remain under Malaysian rule. Hence, it is very unlikely that Malaysia would give up its claim
even with extreme pressure from the international community.

Maintaining status quo may be the preferred option of our past and present National leaders so as to avoid either being accused of
selling-out our interests, or creating tension in diplomatic ties with Malaysia. However, maintaining status quo is favorable to Malaysia
as they continue to possess, control and exploit Sabah. Moreover, as time passes by that the issue is not resolved, the farther removed
are we from the actual circumstances on how Malaysia got to possess Sabah in the first place, which is essential to proving our claim.
And, of course, the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu are continuously deprived of their inheritance.

War is definitely not an option not only because our armed forces are ill-equipped for such an endeavor but, more importantly, because
we, as a people, have not reached and is nowhere near the level of nationalism and patriotism necessary for launchi ng a politically,
socially and economically costly undertaking such as a full-scale war with another country.

Pragmatically, therefore, the only option to resolve the Sabah issue is a compromise settlement between RP, Malaysia and the
heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. The author concedes, however, that even this option would not be easily accomplished but then again,
reasonable men will always reach a point of agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Push for the passing of SB 1467 and its counterpart in Congress before May 2009 so that there will be a basis for measuring the
outer limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. More importantly, so that our country
can now officially claim the limits of our National Territory that is consistent with the international covenant of UNCLOS.

2. Push for the submission of particulars of the outer limits of the continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf before the 12 May 2009 deadline by supporting NAMRIA and other concerned agencies in their data gathering.

3. On the assumption that recommendations 1 and 2 as stated above are achieved, we should do the following:

A. Modernize our fishing methods and technologies;

B. Invest heavily on marine scientific research and exploration of the EEZ and continental shelf;

C. Reach out to other claimant States of the contested territories in order to settle disputes and come up with an agreement for joint
exploration and development so that all these States can finally benefit from the abundant natural resources in these areas.

D. Comply with the other UNCLOS obligations of an archipelagic State.

4. Modernize the Navy and Coast Guard. Logically, the next step after having firmly and clearly established our territory is to protect it.
Aside from the basic demands of naval defense, we should increase our capability for maritime law enforcement operations.

5. Conduct a legislative inquiry on the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking.


CONCLUSION
As shown in the discussions above, the baseline issue is quite technical and highly complex because of the interplay with other equally
important national security, economy and foreign policy issues. But after carefully analyzing these issues separately, this paper tried its
best to come up with reasonable and feasible courses of action which, hopefully, would be given due consideration. Still, everything
starts when we finally make a stand, as a Nation, by defining the limits of what is truly ours and what will be good for our country now
and in the generations to come.
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PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1599
ESTABLISHING AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, an exclusive economic zone extending to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured is vital to the economic survival and development of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, such a zone is now a recognized principle of international law;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
Section 1. There is hereby established a zone to be known as the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. The
exclusive economic zone shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from
which the territorial sea is measured: Provided, That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the
exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement
with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of international law on
delimitation.
Section 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it territorial sea and continental shelf, it
shall have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established herein the following;
(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the
subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore
terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and
control of pollution, and scientific research;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice.
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of
any license granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the Philippines, no person shall, in relation to the exclusive
economic zone:
(a) explore or exploit any resources;
(b) carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:
(c) conduct any research;
(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation or other structure or device;
or
(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and
jurisdiction herein provided.
Nothing herein shall be deemed a prohibition on a citizen of the Philippines, whether natural or juridical, against the
performance of any of the foregoing acts, if allowed under existing laws.
Section 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight, the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and
communications.
Section 5. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate government office/agency to make and promulgate such rules
and regulations which may be deemed proper and necessary for carrying out the purposes of this degree.
(b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this decree or of any rule or regulation promulgated hereunder
and approved by the President shall be subject to a fine which shall not be less than two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) nor be more than one hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months to ten (10) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Vessels and other
equipment or articles used in connection therewith shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 6. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.



















7

Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand eight.
Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:
Basepoint
Number
Station
Name
Location World Geodetic System of 1984
(WGS 84) Coordinates
Distance
to next
basepoint
(M)
Latitude (N) Longitude (E)
1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21657.73" 1215727.71" 70.08
2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 195738.19" 122946.32" 99.17
3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 181835.30" 1222019.07" 71.83
4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17716.30" 1223128.34" 1.05
5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17614.79" 1223143.84" 0.39
6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17551.31" 1223142.66" 3.29
7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17236.91" 122313.28" 9.74
8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 165918.03" 1222756.61" 3.51
9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 164956.11" 1222650.78" 2.40
10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 164738.86" 122264.40" 30.94
11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 161844.33" 1221406.69" 116.26
12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 142954.43" 1225751.15" 80.29
13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 146.29.91" 1241659.21" 0.54
14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 146.10.40" 1241726.28" 96.04
15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12416.37" 125353.71" 6.79
16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 123618.41" 125850.19" 5.52
17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 1232.33.62" 1251259.70" 0.80
18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 1231.57.45" 1251332.37" 4.90
19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 122836.42" 1251712.32" 1.30
20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 122737.51" 125185.23" 7.09
21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 122141.64" 125237.41" 5.68
22 PAB-16B Panablihon 121727.17" 125270.12" 5.21
23 PAB-16C Alugon 121321.95" 1253019.47" 1.94
24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 121148.16" 1253130.88" 0.54
25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 121120.67" 1253148.29" 5.71
8

26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao Is. 1267.00" 1253411.94" 83.94
27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 104516.70" 125588.78" 56.28
28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 94959.58" 126106.39" 57.44
29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 85316.62" 1262048.81" 40.69
30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 81311.53" 1262853.25" 30.80
31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 74245.02" 1263429.08" 12.95
32 PAB-22C Languyan 72949.47" 1263559.24" 0.54
33 PAB-23 Languyan 72916.93" 1263559.50" 0.76
34 PAB-23B Languyan 72830.97" 1263557.30" 1.2
35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 72729.42" 1263551.31" 10.12
36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 71719.80" 1263618.26" 1.14
37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 71614.43" 1263557.20" 63.28
38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 61714.73" 1261214.40" 1.28
39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6168.35" 1261135.06" 67.65
40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 52334.20" 1252842.11" 0.43
41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato Pt. 52321.80" 1252819.59" 3.44
42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 62155.66" 1262511.21" 3.31
43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 52158.48" 1252152.03" 0.87
44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5222.91" 1252059.73" 1.79
45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 52320.18" 1251944.29" 78.42
46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 698.44" 1241542.81" 122.88
47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 62647.22" 12213.34.50" 29.44
48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is. 6233.77" 1215636.20" 2.38
49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 618.51" 1215441.45" 1.72
50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6017.88" 1216311.17" 85.94
51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 512.8.70" 1204138.14" 55.24
52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is. 44739.24" 1195158.08" 43.44
53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 42453.84" 1191450.71 0.61
54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4253.83" 1191415.15" 15.48
55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 436"9.01" 119322.75" 6.88
56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 44252.07" 119144.04" 8.40
57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 44555.25" 119315.19" 2.28
58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4475.36" 119512.94" 18.60
59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 45510.45" 119221.30 23.37
60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt. 5223.73" 1194418.14" 44.20
61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 54635.15" 1193951.77" 75.17
9

62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6558.41" 1182657.30" 8.54
63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6414.08" 1181833.33" 13.46
64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan Is. 6114.65" 118654.15" 3.97
65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 61339.90" 118352.09" 5.53
66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 61743.99" 11805.44" 41.60
67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 65214.53" 1182340.49" 75.06
68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is. 73026.05" 1171833.75" 26.00
69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 74830.69" 1165939.18" 6.08
70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 75127.17" 1165417.19" 1.18
71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 75219.86" 1165328.73" 2.27
72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 75436.35" 1165316.64" 5.42
73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 820.26" 1165410.04" 10.85
74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 81118.36" 1165951.87" 30.88
75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 88756.37" 1171551.23" 7.91
76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 84417.40" 1172039.37" 11.89
77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 85332.20" 1172815.78" 13.20
78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 92.57.47" 1173738.88" 81.12
79 PAB.64B Dry Is. 95922.54" 1183653.61" 82.76
80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt. 111319.82" 1191517.74" 74.65
81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 121935.22" 1195056.00 93.88
82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 135324.45" 12015.86" 115.69
83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 154843.61" 1194656.09" 9.30
84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 155761.67" 1194455.32" 12.06
85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16957.90" 11945.15.76" 0.25
86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 161012.42" 1194511.95" 6.43
87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 161634.46" 1194619.50" 0.65
88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 163712.70" 1194628.62" 1.30
89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 161829.49" 1194644.94" 1.04
90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 161928.20" 119477.69" 0.63
91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16204.38" 1194720.48" 80.60
92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 173424.94" 1202033.36" 6.86
93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 174117.56" 120212.20" 14.15
94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17554.13" 1202440.56" 35.40
95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 182932.42" 1203342.41" 1.77
96 PAB-79B Bobon 183052.88" 1203455.35" 58.23
97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 191014.78" 1211252.64" 98.07
10

98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 204315.74" 1214657.80" 25.63
99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21717.47" 1215643.85" 0.08
100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21718.41" 1215648.79" 0.25
101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21712.04" 121573.65" 0.44
Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction
shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions
of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines,
shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish
charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in
this Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2)
newspaper of general circulation.
Approved
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216 was finally passed by the Senate and
the House of Representative on February 17, 2009.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Represenatives
(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate
Approved: MAR 10, 2009
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines