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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG,
ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J.:
Mari o Abong was ori gi nal l y charged wi th homi ci de i n the Court of Fi rst Instance of Cebu but before he coul d be arrai gned the case was rei nvesti gated
on moti on of the prosecuti on.
1
As a resul t of the rei nvesti gati on, an amended i nformati on was fi l ed, wi th no bai l recommended, to whi ch he pl eaded
not gui l ty.
2
Tri al commenced, but whi l e i t was i n progress, the pri soner, taki ng advantage of the fi rst i nformati on for homi ci de, succeeded i n decei vi ng
the ci ty court of Cebu i nto granti ng hi m bai l and orderi ng hi s rel ease; and so he escaped.
3
The respondent j udge, l earni ng l ater of the tri ckery,
cancel l ed the i l l egal bai l bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest.
4
But he was gone. Nonethel ess, the prosecuti on moved that the heari ng conti nue i n
accordance wi th the consti tuti onal provi si on authori zi ng tri al i n absenti a under certai n ci rcumstances.
5
The respondent j udge deni ed the moti on,
however, and suspended al l proceedi ngs unti l the return of the accused.
6
The order of the tri al court i s now before us on certi orari and mandamus.
7
lawphil
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The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal
reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified.
The purpose of thi s rul e i s to speed up the di sposi ti on of cri mi nal cases, tri al of whi ch coul d i n the past be i ndefi ni tel y deferred, and many ti mes
compl etel y abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The ol d case of Peopl e v. Avancea
8
requi red hi s presence at certai n stages of the tri al
whi ch as a resul t, had to be di sconti nued as l ong as the defendant had not re-appeared or remai ned at l arge. As hi s ri ght to be present at these stages
was then hel d not wai vabl e even by hi s escape, such escape thus operated to the fugi ti ve's advantage, and i n mockery of the authori ti es, i nsofar as the
tri al coul d not proceed as l ong as he had not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided
only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is
unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the
escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is
now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes
his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape
"rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the
charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by
preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his
conviction.
The ri ght to be present at one's tri al may now be wai ved except onl y at that stage where the prosecuti on i ntends to present wi tnesses who wi l l Identi fy the
accused.
9
Under Secti on 19, the defendant's escape wi l l be consi dered a wai ver of thi s ri ght and the i nabi l i ty of the court to noti fy hi m of the
subsequent heari ngs wi l l not prevent i t from conti nui ng wi th hi s tri al . He wi l l be deemed to have recei ved due noti ce. The same fact of hi s escape wi l l
make hi s fai l ure to appear unj usti fi ed because he has, by escapi ng, pl aced hi msel f beyond the pal e, and protecti on, of the l aw.
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Tri al i n absenti a was not al l owed i n Borja v. Mendoza
10
because i t was hel d notwi thstandi ng that the accused had not been previ ousl y arrai gned. Hi s
subsequent convi cti on was properl y set asi de. But i n the i nstant case, si nce al l the requi si tes are present, there i s absol utel y no reason why the
respondent j udge shoul d refuse to try the accused, who had al ready been arrai gned at the ti me he was rel eased on the i l l egal bai l bond. Abong shoul d
be prepared to bear the consequences of hi s escape, i ncl udi ng forfei ture of the ri ght to be noti fi ed of the subsequent proceedi ngs and of the ri ght to
adduce evi dence on hi s behal f and refute the evi dence of the prosecuti on, not to menti on a possi bl e or even probabl e convi cti on.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the
language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we
may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of
Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within
sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of
the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent
Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 5-6.
2 Ibid., P. 6.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., pp. 6-7; 1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 19.
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6 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
7 Ibid., p. 66.
8 32 O. G. 713.
9 Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2,63 SCRA 546; People v. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269.
10 77 SCRA 422.
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