This document contains a mid-semester exam for an introduction to cognitive science course. It includes 5 questions testing knowledge of key concepts in philosophy of mind, tacit knowledge and expertise, and computational models of cognition. The questions cover topics such as idealism, Searle's Chinese room argument, chunking, collaborative problem solving and gaze, and the development of theory of mind in children.
This document contains a mid-semester exam for an introduction to cognitive science course. It includes 5 questions testing knowledge of key concepts in philosophy of mind, tacit knowledge and expertise, and computational models of cognition. The questions cover topics such as idealism, Searle's Chinese room argument, chunking, collaborative problem solving and gaze, and the development of theory of mind in children.
This document contains a mid-semester exam for an introduction to cognitive science course. It includes 5 questions testing knowledge of key concepts in philosophy of mind, tacit knowledge and expertise, and computational models of cognition. The questions cover topics such as idealism, Searle's Chinese room argument, chunking, collaborative problem solving and gaze, and the development of theory of mind in children.
Please answer all parts of each question in the same place.
Q. 1. Philosophy [4x4 = 16] a) Idealism argues that there is no reality there is only one kind of thing, and that is the mind. You can construct quite a valid argument based on this. What is its main weakness?
If everything is inside the mind, and there is no outside reality, how can different minds agree as to whether a ball will fit into a hole or about any physical aspect.
b) Describe the Chinese dictionary mental experiment of Harnad.
Supposing a foreigner in Beijing wants to read a sign. He has a Chinese-to-chinese dictionary. If he looks up a sign, he gets more Chinese signs. In the end, the definitions are circular. Therefore, any system of symbols, without external (sensorimotor) reference will inevitably lead to circularity of definitions or infinite regress. Hence symbols must be grounded in something outside of the symbol space - e.g. sensorimotor structures.
c) What is strong AI and how is Searle's argument directed against it? Why doesnt it affect weak AI?
Strong AI: Simulating a mind is the same thing as building the mind itself. Weak AI : Simulation is a model, not really the same thing.
Searles Chinese room argument tries to show that a simulation executed by Searle does not understand Chinese in the same sense as a mind, though it can follow complex rules on a complex database and appear to be conversing in Chinese.
d) What is cognitive toil and semantic theft? Which is more used for human learning?
Sensorimotor toil: direct interaction with the environment to acquire concepts Symbolic theft : using the grounded meanings of existing symbols to learn new definitions and relations
Human learning for most concepts in the adult mind is overwhelmingly based on symbolic theft. In their paper Cangelosi and Harnad show that in multi-agent simulations of a foraging group, agents that learn from the utterances of others (theft) have some advantages over those that learn directly - and that a population ultimately converges to nearly all members adopting theft.
Q2. Tacit knowledge and Expertise [3x4 = 12] a) Around the turn of the century, Edouard Claperede conducted an experiment with a pinprick. How is this relevant to tacit knowledge?
Claperede was working with severely amnesic patients, who could not remember events even immediately afterwards. With an elderly woman patient, he would have to introduce himself every day. Once he concealed a pin in his palm as he shook her hand. Next time she was reluctant to shake his hand, though she had no recollection of ever having met him or of the episode.
b) What is a chunk? How is it related to a chess grandmasters expertise?
A chunk is an encoding of a pattern that is commonly associated with good (or bad) performance on a function. By encoding (building models for) such chunks, a person can reduce the conscious overload in many tasks. In chess, this enables the grandmaster to effortlessly remember thousands of board games and results.
c) Discuss if this is correct: It is efficient for much of expert knowledge to be subconscious.
d) Conscious deliberation is slow and inefficient, owing to the extreme high dimensionality of the input and decision spaces. Chunks encode the good answer regions in this mapping, and automaticity enables us to execute these chunks effortlessly or fast decision making. Even where conscious decisions are needed, they can work with these subconscious processes either before or after to provide solutions.
Q. 3. [Attempt 10 out of these 12 questions. Pls do not attempt more than 10] [ 40 marks]
I. [Magnitude estimation] a) It was well-known that musicians are better at temporal discrimination. What position is argued for by [Agrillo etal 2012] when they also show that they are also better at spatial and large number estimation tasks?
In 2003, an argument was made by Walsh based on neurological evidence that spatial, temporal, and number estimates were all computed in the same region of the parietal cortex. This bolstered earlier ideas that these three systems were related. However, no direct tests were done for this. In this work, Agrillo et al attempt to establish that musicians, who are known to have a better temporal sensitivity, are also better at spatial and numerical tasks, thereby supporting the unified magnitude theory.
b) Walsh 2003] suggested the ATOM theory - what does ATOM stand for?
ATOM = A theory of magnitude. Though it was known that spatial and temporal magnitudes were correlated, it was thought that countable numbers may be represented somewhat differently from continuous quantities. However Walsh argued that these functions were integrated in the parietal area so as to provide a faster sensorimotor response.
II. [Computational image description] c) In [kulkarni & berg]s image descriptions paper, for each object classified, there were 21 attributes. During text generation phase, how was it determined which attributes would be generated and using what text?
The outputs of the classifiers served as nodes in the CRF. The main computation of the attribute-object association was done through a potential function which used a large set of text descriptions from Flickr (obtained by posting the attribute-object pair as query) to learn the object-attribute potential map. These were later smoothed with an internet corpus for the same keywords, obtained via google.
d) were spatial relations such as near learned from a training set or hand-coded?
They were hand-coded. Spatial relations were hand-coded. E.g. A near B was defined as a function of a ratio - the distance between the centroids of the enclosing rectangles, divided by the size of A.
e) in the erroneous captions, cite examples if you can to discuss which errors are most serious - i) errors in object class, ii) errors in attribute, or iii) errors in relations?
Errors in object class detection, such as furry road for a cat, or one person where there are none, are perhaps most disconcerting for humans. Spatial errors are not perceived that critically. Attribute errors can be problematic e.g. when four persons are counted for three, but these are not as serious, at least in my view, as object errors.
III [Collaboration and Gaze] f) what is the set up of the collaborative tangram puzzle task used in [kuriyama etal]? how is gaze evaluated with respect to the others statement?
One subject can see the goal shape to be assembled, but cant move the pieces; the other can move the pieces but does not know the goal. Now A gives instructions to B to solve the puzzle. These instructions contain specific references to objects. As A starts to utter the word that refers to an object, the gaze or listener B and speaker A tend to converge at least for the successful trials.
g) what is "common ground" and how is it related to gaze?
Among two collaborating people, common ground is a shared understanding of the context for the task. In tangram, it may be an understanding about which piece is to be moved where. One test or this is that shared common ground results in shared gaze.
h) what may be the reason for gaze matches occurring earlier when a pronoun was used in the description rather than a noun phrase?
NPs resulted in gaze match typically 2 seconds after the onset of utterance, whereas gaze match was practically instantaneous for pronouns . Two possible explanations: i. pronouns are more likely to be used only if the object is more salient (otherwise it may be hard to disambiguate). Ii. Pronouns are shorter and are uttered more quickly in the speech .
IV [Attributing false beliefs] i) It was been long known that children younger than 4 are not able to attribute false beliefs to people who leave the room and come back while an object has been moved. What evidence do Baillargeon et al present for an earlier age at which this is partially understood?
Baillargeon, working with Onishi and later with Song, showed that infants as young as 14 months look longer when such an adult demonstrates behaviour inconsistent with his knowledge, which results in the correct reach. Yet when asked about which box the person would go for, they give the wrong answers till 4 years or beyond.
j) What neurological processes may account for the failure of younger children in the false belief task, despite being aware of it?
Though infants have some awareness of what actions are consistent with what the other person knows, they may not be able to a) represent the fact of the others belief, b) compute the right response, and c) inhibit their own awareness of the right action.
Baillargeon suggests a possible neurological process that may account for this. The region of the brain where the false belief may be encoded is in the temporal-parietal boundary whereas the response areas are in the pre-frontal area. Connections between these two areas are slow to mature, and this may account for the delay.
V. [Mirror Neurons] k) Might mirrror neurons have some role in observations that action production primes action recognition?
Mirror neurons are in the pre-motor area, and fire when the agent does the action. It is known that these areas backproject to the visual areas particularly the superior temporal sulcus or STS, where action recognition is thought to occur. Thus, doing the action may enhance stimulation in the recognition areas thus helping in priming. [a stimulus primes a later response if it is related in some way.]
l) Do you agree: Mirror neurons that differ based on the view of the action may have a role in discerning intentionality.
Caggiano etal show that different neurons in the pre-motor area fire while observing differing views of the same action. These view-dependent neurons thus inform the system whether the action is occurring by them in their sensorimotor space (0 deg), across from them (180 deg), or beside them (90 deg). This would help discriminate whether the action is being done by them or by some other, and therefore intentionality of the other.
Q4. (Shorts) Explain the following terms and how they are used: (2x8=16) i) Subitize
Subitize = Knowing the count without counting. A mechanism used for smaller numbers.
ii) VOE
VoE = Violation of Expectation. Used to assess an infants mental models of situations. If they expect outcome A they will look significantly longer at B.
iii) Geon
Geon theory : 3D shapes are constructed out of volumetric units called geons (e.g. sphere, cuboid, bent cylinder, etc.) .
iv) SNARC effect
SNARC effect : the right hand is faster to respond to addition tasks or tasks involving somewhat larger numbers.
v) Allocentric
Allocentric view = view from outside, others view. (as opposed to egocentric self view).
vi) Place cell
Place cell= neurons in the cerebellum that fire when the organism is in a specific location.
vii) F5
F5 = area in the frontal cortex (pre-motor area just next to the motor area beside the central sulcus). One of the sites for mirror neurons
viii) A-not-B
A-not-B error: Infant is habituated to toy being in box A. Now, in front of infant, toys is shifted to B. But they persevere in looking for it in A. from abt 5 to 8 months,