Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009
POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife Julialinda, daughter Anna Regina and son Adrian
Roberto, joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of
1991. The tour group arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25 October 1991, the second to the last day of
the tour. As the group had arrived late in the city, they failed to engage in any sight-seeing. Instead, it was
agreed upon that they would start early the next day to see the entire city before ending the tour.
The following day, the last day of the tour, the group arrived at the Coster Diamond House in
Amsterdam around 10 minutes before 9:00 a.m. The group had agreed that the visit to Coster should end by
9:30 a.m. to allow enough time to take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam. The group was ushered into Coster
shortly before 9:00 a.m., and listened to a lecture on the art of diamond polishing that lasted for around ten
minutes.
1
Afterwards, the group was led to the stores showroom to allow them to select items for purchase.
Mrs. Pantaleon had already planned to purchase even before the tour began a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut,
and she found a diamond close enough in approximation that she decided to buy.
2
Mrs. Pantaleon also
selected for purchase a pendant and a chain,
3
all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his American Express credit card together with his
passport to the Coster sales clerk. This occurred at around 9:15 a.m., or 15 minutes before the tour group was
slated to depart from the store. The sales clerk took the cards imprint, and asked Pantaleon to sign the charge
slip. The charge purchase was then referred electronically to respondents Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon that his AmexCard had not yet been approved.
His son, who had already boarded the tour bus, soon returned to Coster and informed the other members of
the Pantaleon family that the entire tour group was waiting for them. As it was already 9:40 a.m., and he was
already worried about further inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the
sale. The store manager though asked plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the store manager
informed Pantaleon that respondent had demanded bank references. Pantaleon supplied the names of his
depositary banks, then instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize to the tour group for the
delay.
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his AmexCard, and 30
minutes after the tour group was supposed to have left the store, Coster decided to release the items even
without respondents approval of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the bus. It is alleged that
their offers of apology were met by their tourmates with stony silence.
4
The tour groups visible irritation was
aggravated when the tour guide announced that the city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of
remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry at Calais, Belgium to London.
5
Mrs. Pantaleon ended up
weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves.
It later emerged that Pantaleons purchase was first transmitted for approval to respondents
Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time, then referred to respondents Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then
finally approved at 10:19 a.m., Amsterdam time.
6
The Approval Code was transmitted to respondents
Amsterdam office at 10:38 a.m., several minutes after petitioner had already left Coster, and 78 minutes from
the time the purchases were electronically transmitted by the jewelry store to respondents Amsterdam office.
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United States before
returning to Manila on 12 November 1992. While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx
card, several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha. On
30 October 1991, Pantaleon purchased golf equipment amounting to US $1,475.00 using his AmEx card, but
he cancelled his credit card purchase and borrowed money instead from a friend, after more than 30 minutes
had transpired without the purchase having been approved. On 3 November 1991, Pantaleon used the card to
purchase childrens shoes worth $87.00 at a store in Boston, and it took 20 minutes before this transaction was
approved by respondent.
On 4 March 1992, after coming back to Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter
7
through counsel to the
respondent, demanding an apology for the "inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment he and his family
thereby suffered" for respondents refusal to provide credit authorization for the aforementioned purchases.
8
In
response, respondent sent a letter dated 24 March 1992,
9
stating among others that the delay in authorizing
the purchase from Coster was attributable to the circumstance that the charged purchase of US $13,826.00
"was out of the usual charge purchase pattern established."
10
Since respondent refused to accede to
Pantaleons demand for an apology, the aggrieved cardholder instituted an action for damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 145.
11
Pantaleon prayed that he be awarded P2,000,000.00,
as moral damages; P500,000.00, as exemplary damages; P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
12

On 5 August 1996, the Makati City RTC rendered a decision
13
in favor of Pantaleon, awarding
him P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as attorneys fees,
and P85,233.01 as expenses of litigation. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal, while Pantaleon moved for
partial reconsideration, praying that the trial court award the increased amount of moral and exemplary
damages he had prayed for.
14
The RTC denied Pantaleons motion for partial reconsideration, and thereafter
gave due course to respondents Notice of Appeal.
15

On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
16
reversing the award of damages in
favor of Pantaleon, holding that respondent had not breached its obligations to petitioner. Hence, this petition.
The key question is whether respondent, in connection with the aforementioned transactions, had
committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon. In addition, Pantaleon submits that even assuming that
respondent had not been in breach of its obligations, it still remained liable for damages under Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
The RTC had concluded, based on the testimonial representations of Pantaleon and respondents
credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, that the normal approval time for purchases was "a matter of seconds."
Based on that standard, respondent had been in clear delay with respect to the three subject transactions. As it
appears, the Court of Appeals conceded that there had been delay on the part of respondent in approving the
purchases. However, it made two critical conclusions in favor of respondent. First, the appellate court ruled that
the delay was not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it ruled that respondent "had
exercised diligent efforts to effect the approval" of the purchases, which were "not in accordance with the
charge pattern" petitioner had established for himself, as exemplified by the fact that at Coster, he was "making
his very first single charge purchase of US$13,826," and "the record of [petitioner]s past spending with
[respondent] at the time does not favorably support his ability to pay for such purchase."
17

On the premise that there was an obligation on the part of respondent "to approve or disapprove with
dispatch the charge purchase," petitioner argues that the failure to timely approve or disapprove the purchase
constituted mora solvendi on the part of respondent in the performance of its obligation. For its part, respondent
characterizes the depiction by petitioner of its obligation to him as "to approve purchases instantaneously or in
a matter of seconds."
Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the three requisites for a finding of default are that
the obligation is demandable and liquidated; the debtor delays performance; and the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtors performance.
18
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals had wrongly
applied the principle of mora accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the obligee in accepting the
performance of the obligation by the obligor. The requisites of mora accipiendi are: an offer of performance by
the debtor who has the required capacity; the offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be
performed; and the creditor refuses the performance without just cause.
19
The error of the appellate court,
argues petitioner, is in relying on the invocation by respondent of "just cause" for the delay, since while just
cause is determinative of mora accipiendi, it is not so with the case of mora solvendi.
We can see the possible source of confusion as to which type of mora to appreciate. Generally, the
relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor,
20
with the card
company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the
creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as between a bank and its
depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is considered as the creditor.
21
Petitioner is
asking us, not baselessly, to again shift perspectives and again see the credit card company as the
debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the obligation to the customer as creditor/obligee to act promptly on its
purchases on credit.
Ultimately, petitioners perspective appears more sensible than if we were to still regard respondent as
the creditor in the context of this cause of action. If there was delay on the part of respondent in its normal role
as creditor to the cardholder, such delay would not have been in the acceptance of the performance of the
debtors obligation (i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it would be delay in the extension of the credit in the
first place. Such delay would not fall under mora accipiendi, which contemplates that the obligation of the
debtor, such as the actual purchases on credit, has already been constituted. Herein, the establishment of the
debt itself (purchases on credit of the jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it remained pending the approval
or consent of the respondent credit card company.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that respondent was in mora solvendi, we will have to first recognize
that there was indeed an obligation on the part of respondent to act on petitioners purchases with "timely
dispatch," or for the purposes of this case, within a period significantly less than the one hour it apparently took
before the purchase at Coster was finally approved.
The findings of the trial court, to our mind, amply established that the tardiness on the part of
respondent in acting on petitioners purchase at Coster did constitute culpable delay on its part in complying
with its obligation to act promptly on its customers purchase request, whether such action be favorable or
unfavorable. We quote the trial court, thus:
As to the first issue, both parties have testified that normal approval time for purchases was a matter of
seconds.
Plaintiff testified that his personal experience with the use of the card was that except for the three
charge purchases subject of this case, approvals of his charge purchases were always obtained in a matter of
seconds.
Defendants credit authorizer Edgardo Jaurique likewise testified:
Q. You also testified that on normal occasions, the normal approval time for charges would be 3 to 4
seconds?
A. Yes, Maam.
Both parties likewise presented evidence that the processing and approval of plaintiffs charge
purchase at the Coster Diamond House was way beyond the normal approval time of a "matter of seconds".
Plaintiff testified that he presented his AmexCard to the sales clerk at Coster, at 9:15 a.m. and by the
time he had to leave the store at 10:05 a.m., no approval had yet been received. In fact, the Credit
Authorization System (CAS) record of defendant at Phoenix Amex shows that defendants Amsterdam office
received the request to approve plaintiffs charge purchase at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time or 01:20, Phoenix
time, and that the defendant relayed its approval to Coster at 10:38 a.m., Amsterdam time, or 2:38, Phoenix
time, or a total time lapse of one hour and [18] minutes. And even then, the approval was conditional as it
directed in computerese [sic] "Positive Identification of Card holder necessary further charges require bank
information due to high exposure. By Jack Manila."
The delay in the processing is apparent to be undue as shown from the frantic successive queries of
Amexco Amsterdam which reads: "US$13,826. Cardmember buying jewels. ID seen. Advise how long will this
take?" They were sent at 01:33, 01:37, 01:40, 01:45, 01:52 and 02:08, all times Phoenix. Manila Amexco could
be unaware of the need for speed in resolving the charge purchase referred to it, yet it sat on its hand,
unconcerned.
To repeat, the Credit Authorization System (CAS) record on the Amsterdam transaction shows how
Amexco Netherlands viewed the delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence expressed in Phoenix time from
01:20 when the charge purchased was referred for authorization, defendants own record shows:
01:22 the authorization is referred to Manila Amexco
01:32 Netherlands gives information that the identification of the cardmember has been presented
and he is buying jewelries worth US $13,826.
01:33 Netherlands asks "How long will this take?"
02:08 Netherlands is still asking "How long will this take?"
The Court is convinced that defendants delay constitute[s] breach of its contractual obligation to act on
his use of the card abroad "with special handling."
22
(Citations omitted)
Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card purchases are approved "within seconds," there
really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company
to approve or disapprove a customers purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties.
Yet this is one of those instances when "youd know it when youd see it," and one hour appears to be an
awfully long, patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase. It is long
enough time for the customer to walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money over the counter, and return
to the store.
Notably, petitioner frames the obligation of respondent as "to approve or disapprove" the purchase "in
timely dispatch," and not "to approve the purchase instantaneously or within seconds." Certainly, had
respondent disapproved petitioners purchase "within seconds" or within a timely manner, this particular action
would have never seen the light of day. Petitioner and his family would have returned to the bus without delay
internally humiliated perhaps over the rejection of his card yet spared the shame of being held accountable
by newly-made friends for making them miss the chance to tour the city of Amsterdam.
We do not wish do dispute that respondent has the right, if not the obligation, to verify whether the
credit it is extending upon on a particular purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder, and that the
cardholder is within his means to make such transaction. The culpable failure of respondent herein is not the
failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same,
whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that respondents credit authorizers did not have sufficient
basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why respondent could not have promptly informed
petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time. In that
way, petitioner would have had informed basis on whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster, given the
attending circumstances. Instead, petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn winds in a
foreign land and soon forced to confront the wrath of foreign folk.
Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, and the court should find that under the circumstances, such damages are due. The findings of the trial
court are ample in establishing the bad faith and unjustified neglect of respondent, attributable in particular to
the "dilly-dallying" of respondents Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurique.
23
Wrote the trial court:
While it is true that the Cardmembership Agreement, which defendant prepared, is silent as to the
amount of time it should take defendant to grant authorization for a charge purchase, defendant acknowledged
that the normal time for approval should only be three to four seconds. Specially so with cards used abroad
which requires "special handling", meaning with priority. Otherwise, the object of credit or charge cards would
be lost; it would be so inconvenient to use that buyers and consumers would be better off carrying bundles of
currency or travellers checks, which can be delivered and accepted quickly. Such right was not accorded to
plaintiff in the instances complained off for reasons known only to defendant at that time. This, to the Courts
mind, amounts to a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply with its contractual obligations, or at least abuse of
its rights, under the contract.
24

The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it
alleges to have consumed more than one hour to simply go over plaintiffs past credit history with defendant,
his payment record and his credit and bank references, when all such data are already stored and readily
available from its computer. This Court also takes note of the fact that there is nothing in plaintiffs billing history
that would warrant the imprudent suspension of action by defendant in processing the purchase. Defendants
witness Jaurique admits:
Q. But did you discover that he did not have any outstanding account?
A. Nothing in arrears at that time.
Q. You were well aware of this fact on this very date?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jaurique further testified that there were no "delinquencies" in plaintiffs account.
25

It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to damages is not simply because
respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the
particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative.
26
Moral
damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of the simply impatient, so this decision should not be cause for
relief for those who time the length of their credit card transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual
attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster that there was a deadline for the completion of that
purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions gave
rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by
the petitioner, as concluded by the RTC.
27
Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise to a
general entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of facts.
We sustain the amount of moral damages awarded to petitioner by the RTC. There is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts, however, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury
suffered.
28
Petitioners original prayer for P5,000,000.00 for moral damages is excessive under the
circumstances, and the amount awarded by the trial court of P500,000.00 in moral damages more seemly.1avvphi1
Likewise, we deem exemplary damages available under the circumstances, and the amount of P300,000.00
appropriate. There is similarly no cause though to disturb the determined award of P100,000.00 as attorneys
fees, and P85,233.01 as expenses of litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.

G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
1
dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution
2
dated August 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the September 27, 2006 decision
3
of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pias City, finding petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access Devices Regulations
Act of 1998; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone from a
certain "Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a
Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, private complainant invited Rochelle
Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City. While in his office, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private
complainant to her immediate boss, a certain "Arthur" [later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone
conversation, [petitioner] told private complainant to submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified as
Ronald Gobenchiong). Private complainant submitted various documents, such as his Globe handyphone
original platinum gold card, identification cards and statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant
followed up his loan status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.
During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe handyphone statement of
account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification with
the phone company, private complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name,
and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged signature. Private
complainant also checked with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database
information was altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation (Metrobank).
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobanks junior assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged
a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche [Arteche], together
with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Pias around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of
the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked for Henry
Yu. [Petitioner] responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards which
bore the name and signature of private complainant, while the picture showed the face of [petitioner].
[Petitioner] signed the delivery receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced himself as an NBI operative and
apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche] recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification cards he presented to
[Arteche] earlier.
4

Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a counterfeit
access device or access device fraudulently applied for." The accusatory portion of the Information reads:


That on or about the 13th day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in the City of Las Pias, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with certain
Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain Ronald Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo and all of them
mutually helping and aiding each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
complainant HENRY YU by applying a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. 8484, from
METROBANK CARD CORPORATION, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal
documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully
issued and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued. After the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that he was not in physical
and legal possession of the credit card presented and marked in evidence by the prosecution. In an Order
dated May 2, 2006, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence as it preferred to rule on the merits of the case.
6

On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. "Henry Yu,"
"Arthur" GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484 (Access Device
Regulation Act of 1998). Accordingly, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 8484 and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to not more than ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Further, accused is also ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the offense committed.
SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC by
deleting the terms prision correccional and prision mayor.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the Information is valid;
(2) Whether or not the Information charges an offense, or the offense petitioner was found guilty of;
(3) Whether or not petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him;
(4) Whether or not petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case.
8

The petition is without merit.
Petitioner was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e), which reads as follows:




Section 9. Prohibited Acts. The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for.
Petitioner assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was not informed of the accusation
against him. He explains that though he was charged with "possession of an access device fraudulently applied
for," the act of "possession," which is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
We do not agree.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information. It states:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused is petitioner "Mark
Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur." It was also specified in the preamble of the Information that he
was being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit access device or
access device fraudulently applied for. In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the offense were
clearly narrated in that "[petitioner], together with other persons[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded
private complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from
Metrobank Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents
fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and
delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of
the real Henry Yu." Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was private complainant Henry Yu and
the crime was committed on or about the 13th day of August 2004 in the City of Las Pias. Undoubtedly, the
Information contained all the necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, although the word "possession" was not used in the accusatory
portion of the Information, the word "possessing" appeared in its preamble or the first paragraph thereof. Thus,
contrary to petitioners contention, he was apprised that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484,
specifically section 9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The Courts discussion in People v. Villanueva
9
on the relationship between the preamble and the
accusatory portion of the Information is noteworthy, and we quote:
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive
words and phrases. It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The
preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the preamble. It lays
down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary
details. The preamble and the accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and
meaning to the indictment
Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word "accuses," which sets in motion the
constitutional process of notification, and formally makes the person being charged with the commission of the
offense an accused. Verily, without the opening paragraph, the accusatory portion would be nothing but a
useless and miserably incomplete narration of facts, and the entire Information would be a functionally sterile
charge sheet; thus making it impossible for the state to prove its case.


The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole document
serving one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled
against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully
and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled x x x.
10
lawph!l
Besides, even if the word "possession" was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the Information,
the acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement "[that the] credit card in the name of Henry Yu
was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to
the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu." Without a doubt, petitioner was given the necessary data as to
why he was being prosecuted.
Now on the sufficiency of evidence leading to his conviction.
Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the subject credit card because he was arrested
immediately after signing the acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not yet know the contents of the envelope
delivered and had no control over the subject credit card.
11

Again, we find no value in petitioners argument.
The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for, penalized
by R.A. No. 8484. The law, however, does not define the word "possession." Thus, we use the term as defined
in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The
acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus
possidendi or the intent to possess it.
12
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of
which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
13

In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private
complainant various documents showing the latters identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using
private complainants identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name and
personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the
"messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification
cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name and forged signature of private complainant. As evidence
of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the
messenger, indicating therein that the content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to
petitioners contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered to him,
the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the
identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the
same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his
signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred
to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as
clearly indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity of
private complainant.
Lastly, we find no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA. Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8484 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and not more than ten (10)
years, and a fine of P10,000.00 or twice the value of the access device obtained, whichever is greater. Thus,
the CA aptly affirmed the imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six years to not more than ten years
imprisonment, and a fine of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180945 February 12, 2010
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, AS THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF OPAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS
(SPV-AMC), INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MERCEDES CORPUZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VALENTINA CORPUZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD, J .:
This case is about the need for a mortgagee-bank, faced with suspicious layers of transfers involving a property
presented for mortgage, to exercise proper diligence in ascertaining the bona fide status of those transfers.
The Facts and the Case
On October 4, 1974 respondent Mercedes Corpuz delivered her owners duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) 32815 to Dagupan City Rural Bank as security against any liability she might incur as
its cashier. She later left her job and went to the United States.
On October 24, 1994 the rural bank where she worked cancelled its lien on Corpuzs title, she having
incurred no liability to her employer. Without Corpuzs knowledge and consent, however, Natividad Alano, the
rural banks manager, turned over Corpuzs title to Julita Camacho and Amparo Callejo.
Conniving with someone from the assessors office, Alano, Camacho, and Callejo prepared a falsified
deed of sale, making it appear that on February 23, 1995 Corpuz sold her land to one "Mary Bondoc"
for P50,000.00. They caused the registration of the deed of sale, resulting in the cancellation of TCT 32815 and
the issuance of TCT 63262 in Bondocs name. About a month later or on March 27, 1995 the trio executed
another fictitious deed of sale with "Mary Bondoc" selling the property to the spouses Rufo and Teresa
Palaganas for only P15,000.00. This sale resulted in the issuance of TCT 63466 in favor of the Palaganases.
Nine days later or on April 5, 1995 the Palaganases executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses
Virgilio and Elena Songcuan for P50,000.00, resulting in the issuance of TCT 63528. Finally, four months later
or on August 10, 1995 the Songcuans took out a loan of P1.1 million from petitioner Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and, to secure payment, they executed a real estate mortgage on their title. Before granting the loan, the
PNB had the title verified and the property inspected.
On November 20, 1995 respondent Corpuz filed, through an attorney-in-fact, a complaint before the
Dagupan Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Mary Bondoc, the Palaganases, the Songcuans, and petitioner
PNB, asking for the annulment of the layers of deeds of sale covering the land, the cancellation of TCTs 63262,
63466, and 63528, and the reinstatement of TCT 32815 in her name.
On June 29, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision granting respondent Corpuzs prayers. This prompted
petitioner PNB to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). On July 31, 2007 the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC and denied the motion for its reconsideration, prompting PNB to take recourse to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not petitioner PNB is a mortgagee in good faith,
entitling it to its lien on the title to the property in dispute.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner PNB points out that, since it did a credit investigation, inspected the property, and verified
the clean status of the title before giving out the loan to the Songcuans, it should be regarded as a mortgagee
in good faith. PNB claims that the precautions it took constitute sufficient compliance with the due diligence
required of banks when dealing with registered lands.
As a rule, the Court would not expect a mortgagee to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the history
of the mortgagors title before he extends a loan.
1
But petitioner PNB is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a
bank.
2
Banks are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals in dealing with lands, even registered
ones, since the business of banks is imbued with public interest.
3
It is of judicial notice that the standard
practice for banks before approving a loan is to send a staff to the property offered as collateral and verify the
genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners.
4

One of the CAs findings in this case is that in the course of its verification, petitioner PNB was
informed of the previous TCTs covering the subject property.
5
And the PNB has not categorically contested this
finding. It is evident from the faces of those titles that the ownership of the land changed from Corpuz to
Bondoc, from Bondoc to the Palaganases, and from the Palaganases to the Songcuans in less than three
months and mortgaged to PNB within four months of the last transfer.
The above information in turn should have driven the PNB to look at the deeds of sale involved. It
would have then discovered that the property was sold for ridiculously low prices: Corpuz supposedly sold it to
Bondoc for justP50,000.00; Bondoc to the Palaganases for just P15,000.00; and the Palaganases to the
Songcuans also for justP50,000.00. Yet the PNB gave the property an appraised value of P781,760.00.
Anyone who deliberately ignores a significant fact that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable
person cannot be considered as an innocent mortgagee for value.
6

The Court finds no reason to reverse the CA decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
31, 2007 and its resolution dated December 17, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 60616.