Understanding Itihasa

UNDERSTANDING ITIHASA
Sibesh Bhattacharya

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY
RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA

First published 2010

Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
or transmitted, in any formor by any means, without the
written permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978-81-7986-084-7
Published by
The Secretary Indian Institute of
Advanced Study Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla-171005

Typeset at Sai Graphic Design, New Delhi and printed at Pearl
Offset Pvt. Ltd., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi

In memory of my elder son
Saugata (1965-1992), an
ardent lover of books, A
National Talent Scholar

Contents

Preface ix
Part One The Path that Great Men Walked 1
Part Two In the Shadow of the Absolute 83
Epilogue 155
Bibliography 169
Index 177

Preface

The following pages represent a modest endeavor to examine
the contention that traditional India had no conception of history.
However, instead of approaching the problem from this negative
focus, we have tried to approach it from a positive perspective.
We have rather centered our attention, firstly, on understanding
how the past was viewed and constructed in the traditional Indian
worldview. And secondly, we have tried to consider to what
extent this understanding is compatible with the modern concept
of history. We have thus pursued a twofold objective: (i) to
understand and amplify the traditional Indian point of view on
past, and, (ii) to highlight the similarities and dissimilarities of the
Indian point of view with the current view of history.
The present monograph has developed out of a project on
'History in Early India: Theory and Practice' for which a
fellowship was kindly granted by Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, Shimla. As we pursued the theme of the project it seemed
appropriate to us to somewhat enlarge its scope to include how the
traditional understanding has been interpreted and elaborated by
modern Indian scholars. The monograph thus has two main parts;
Part One on early Indian understanding of past and Part Two on
the modern understanding of the tradition. We are of the view that
for the sake of placing the theme in proper perspective this
enlargement was necessary. One more point perhaps calls for
clarification. We have in our formulation often used the
expression 'Indian' to underline the geographical and cultural
contexts of our theme. However, the traditional Indian perspective
did not normally think in the restricted terms of cultural or
geographical identities; it preferred to think in universal and
human terms. And it is in these universal human terms that the
view of itihasa was perceived.
In the preparation of this monograph I have received help and
encouragement from numerous quarters and persons. I am
particularly beholden to the authorities of the Indian institute of
Advanced Study, Shimla for kindly granting me a fellowship to
prepare the monograph. The excellent support system and the
facilities that the Institute provides along with the academic
environment of a truly high order make working in the Institute a
memorable experience. To my teacher, Professor G.C. Pande,
who fortunately also happens to be the President cum Chairman of

the Institute at present, I owe a debt too heavy and too subtle to
express in words. But for his kindness and constant
encouragement it would not have been possible to undertake and
complete the work. I would rather remain eternally indebted to
him than belittle his kindness by a wordy expression of gratitude.
Professor Bhuvan Chandel, the Director of the Institute, has
always been unfailingly kind to me. I do not know how to express
my thanks to her for her innumerable acts of kindness and
encouragement.
I shall be failing in my duty if do not mention the cooperation
that I always received from Shri D. K. Mukherjee, the Librarian
and other Library Staff of the Institute. A special word of thanks is
due to Smt. Alekha J abbar, the Asst. Librarian, who cheerfully
bore my numerous demands on her expertise and knowledge. Dr.
S. A. J abbar, Dr. Debarshi Sen, Shri T. K. Majumdar, Shri A. K.
Sharma, Shri Kundan Lal and other sectional heads and their staff
at the Institute made my stay at the Institute comfortable and
pleasant. The mess and canteen staff deserves a special word of
thanks. I have also received suggestions and encouragement from
a number of fellows and scholars at the Institute. Professor D. P.
Chattopadhyaya was very kind to spare time from his very busy
schedule of work to
Preface 7
go through the draft of Part One of the monograph and gave a
number of suggestions. I do not know how to thank him
adequately for this kindness. I have also often held stimulating
discussions with a number of Fellows at the Institute. Professor
Suresh Chandra Pande, Professor G. C. Nayak, Professor Kishor
Chakravarti, Dr. Navjyoti Singh, Professor Om Prakash, Professor
S. N. Dube, Professor R. N. Misra deserve special mention. The
monograph has benefited from these discussions. I am grateful to
all of them

Sibesh Bhattacharya

PART ONE

The Path that Great Men Walked
Early Indian Attitude to History

Prologue

The superstition that history has to be similar in all countries must
be abandoned. The person who has become hard-boiled after
going through the biography of Rothschilde, while dealing with
the life of Christ is likely to call for his account books and office
diary. And if he fails to find them then he will form a very poor
opinion of Christ and would say: "A fellow who was not worth
even a nickel, how come he can have a biography?" Similarly,
those who give up all hope of Indian history because they fail to
find the royal genealogies and accounts of the conquests and
defeats in the "Indian official record room" and say, "How can
there be any history when there is no politics?" are like people
who look for aubergine in paddy fields. And when they do not
find it there, in their frustration they refuse to count paddy as a
variety of grains at all. All fields do not yield the same crop. One
who knows this and thus looks for the proper crop in the proper
field is a truly wise person.
Rabindra Nath Tagore Bharatavarsher Itihas,
Bhadra 1309 Bengal Era, August 1903; Translated
from original Bengali by Sumita Bhattacharya and
Sibesh Bhattacharya
Human history must in effect aspire after being a spiritual
autobiography of man, a 'discovery of lost times' which is
simultaneously a creative transformation of present, a discovery
of what is hidden in the past experiences of the soul.
G.C.Pande, The Meaning and Process of Culture,
Allahabad 1989, Preface
Without Writing, without a literature, the past constantly ate itself
up.
V. S. Naipaul, Beyond Belief, New Delhi, 1998, p.71

For Kramer, the right view of history is his own, i.e., that of a
twentieth century American professor who specializes in
academic expertise in ancient civilizations. He can not bring
himself to admit that the ancient Sumerians might have had
another view. Or if they did, he can not admit that it was a valid
view of history. For to admit that would undermine his own
beliefs about the nature of his discipline.

Roy Harris, History, Science and the Limits of Language,
p. 26, Shimla 2003.
I
The question that we intend to investigate in part one basically
involves two issues. Firstly, was history as a discipline known and
practiced in early India? And, secondly, if it was, then what was
its nature?
History is perhaps not the most appropriate expression in the
context of our investigation. History as a discipline, it is well
known, is a product of Western experience and endeavour.
Moreover, since the eighteenth century the discipline of history
has so evolved as to possess certain distinguishable
characteristics. It is regarded as a discipline based on rigorous
study of facts. Among its claimed features, the two factors,
factuality and empiricism, in spite of some recent challenges from
the resurgence of the narrative in history and the assault of the
Post Modernists, continue to be the two principal ones. Over the
greater part of the twentieth century, covering the first
three-quarters, history has been veering more and more towards
social science and moving away from humanities.
1
Among the
practicing historians, particularly in India, this still continues to be
the dominant trend. With this growing trend it is empiricism that
has been increasingly becoming the most important instrument in
the tool-bag of historians. Like other social sciences, in the
historical methodology as well, a constant effort has been afoot to
approximate to scientific methodology. Despite being splendidly
unreachable, the Rankean ideal of 'exactly as it had happened'
remains the beacon light of a great many historians. If we intend to
pursue our investigation from this perspective, it ought to be
admitted right at the outset that it is more or less a nonstarter. A
mode of knowledge based on a meticulous and painstaking
collection of all facts, where factuality does not demand anything
more than a mere happening, did not develop in early India.
The prospect, however, considerably brightens up if we
The Path that Great Men Walked 12
deviate a little from the above perspective. The room for this
adjustment in standpoint is available even within the bounds of the
current conception of history. 'Varieties of history' is an accepted
notion within the discipline. The expression 'varieties' does not
only signify different divisions of history, like political,
diplomatic, social, economic, etc., but various perspectives from
which events can be viewed. It is now readily accepted that history
can be viewed and pursued from different standpoints and that
these different standpoints do not necessarily contradict and cancel
out each other. They may often be complimentary and help
illuminate different aspects of the past human life. There can be
history of smaller range (approximating the notion of particular);
there can be history of larger range (moving towards the notion of
universal). Moreover, the demands of factuality will vary
according to the chosen range. We will deal with these issues in
some more details later. For the present it will suffice to take note
of the fact that the notion of perspectival history allows space for
viewing the past from different viewpoints.
In view of the above, we may rephrase the basic issues of our
investigation. We will try to understand the following questions.
What was the Early Indian attitude towards past? What were the
modes of its articulation? What were the implications of this
attitude?
II
The received wisdom and the burden of Western Indological
scholarship are that the sense of history was lacking in early India.
Indian mind reveled in myths and legends, often displaying a keen
sensitivity to the essence of human life, a refined moral vision, and
a touching quest for fulfillment in the life beyond. But the Indian
mind failed to come to terms with 'facts' and to produce what can
really be termed as history.
Various explanations of this 'deficiency' were also offered; the
most persistent being the one that Indian outlook in its
philosophical and psychological makeup was anti-historical. This
anti-historicity has been seen both as a virtue as well as a glaring
defect. The following remark of Amaury de Riencourt is a good
example of the former. "If the history of the Indians is as shadowy
as has already been pointed out on more than one occasion, it is
largely because, of all the peoples on this earth, they were the least
interested in history. The picture of India's historical development
is as blurred as the development of Indian soul is clear and sharply
defined. The key to an understanding of Indian culture lies
precisely in this total indifference toward history, toward the very
process of time. Aryan India had no memory because she focused
her attention on eternity and not on time."
2
Reactions of Hegel and
J ames Mill to the 'anti-historical' character of the Indian attitude
represent the latter.
3
13 Understanding Itihasa
The point has been stretched in different directions with added
nuances. Macdonell, Winternitz and Keith may be cited as
examples. Macdonell observed that history was an area of
conspicuous weakness in Indian literature. As a matter of fact, it
was more than a weakness; it was actually non-existent. A total
lack of historical sense and a complete lack of precise chronology
characterized the whole course of Sanskrit literature. These
defects have gravely vitiated the history of Sanskrit literature.
Even the date and time of the greatest Indian poet, Kalidasa, can
not be ascertained. The controversy regarding his time is so great
that dates as distant as thousand years from each other have been
suggested. Mostly, precise dates of authors were not recorded;
only approximate dates have to be surmised on the basis of
indirect evidence. "Two causes seem to have combined to bring
about this remarkable result. In the first place, early India wrote no
history because it never made any. The ancient Indians never went
through a struggle for life like the Greeks in the Persian and the
Romans in the Punic wars, such as it would have welded their
tribes into a nation and developed political greatness. Secondly,
the Brahmanas, whose task it would naturally have been to record
great deeds, had early embraced the doctrine that all actions and
existence are a positive evil, and could therefore have felt but little
inclination to chronicle historical events."
4
According to Winternitz, it was not that the Indians did not
have a taste for history, what the Indians lacked was a taste for
critical inquiry into historical truths. And, he attributed this
uncritical attitude to the kinds of people who made it their
business to write history in early India. These authors belonged to
two classes: either they were court-poets or they were
religious-minded persons. The court-poets were mainly interested
in composing eulogies of their patron princes and their ancestors.
In the process they glorified not only the achievements of their
patrons and their ancestors, but also invented stories. The saints on
their parts were keen to protect and augment the interests of their
own sects. So they praised their sects and promoted their points of
view and gave preaching and sermons to the members of their
sects. The Indian historian "will not penetrate deep into the
connected topics, set down the historical data critically and
explain them psychologically; on the contrary he will entertain
and instruct as a poet (kavi), above all teach morals, when he will
explain with examples the influences of moral behaviour on the
destiny of man."
5
In his work on Sanskrit literature Keith observed
'in the whole of the great Sanskrit literature there is not one writer
who can be seriously regarded as a critical historian.' According to
him the probable causes of 'this phenomenon' were the lack of 'any
sentiment of nationalism', the belief in the doctrine of Karman, the
absence of 'the scientific attitude of mind which seeks to find
natural causes for the events of nature' and the 'tendency of the
Indian mind to prefer the general to the particular'.
6
The status of current opinion on the issue has been summarized
in the latest publication on the subject:
" The view that Hinduism as a religion, or the Hindus as a
people, lack a sense of history has been expressed so often as to
have become a clichE. Even when scholars have tried to take a
more sophisticated as opposed to a cliched view, the effect has
been to reinforce it. Professor A.L. Basham, for instance, would
concede to the Hindus a sense of the past, but still not history.
Elsewhere he allows for a sense of antiquity as well, if only to
suggest that Hinduism possessed an exaggerated sense of it, while
some have argued that Hinduism possessed a sense of historical
pessimism but, again, no history.
Even when scholars take a more nuanced view and distinguish
between: (1) lack of chronology, (2) lack of history, (3) a lack of a
sense of history, (4) a lack of historiography, and (5) the lack of
theory of history, the net effect is the same. The alleged lack of
historiography and a theory of history in India only buttress the
previous claim of a lack of a sense of history, while its abundant
history makes the lack of sense of history only stand out more
starkly."
7
Many scholars no longer accept the Orientalist formulation that
ancient Indians lacked a sense of history.
8
For instance, writing in
the late 1950s A.K. Warder reacted sharply against the two major
postulates of the formulation. He dismissed both the propositions
that 'ancient India produced little or no historical literature' and
that the ancient Indians did not possess a sense of history because
they were too engrossed in religious affairs to pay any attention to
history. "We need not trouble ourselves overmuch with the
analysis of such superficial misconceptions."
9
The impatience of
Warder is not wholly unjustified. To say that a people did not have
a sense of history amounts to saying that they had no view of the
past or an awareness of time. Such an obviously untenable
proposition could have been hardly seriously made about early
India. Early Indian philosophical systems reflect an acute
consciousness of time.
10
Thus the central contention of scholars
like Macdonell, Winternitz and Keith seems to have been that the
way the discipline of history developed in the West is found
practically absent in early Indian literary tradition. Ghoshal and
Warder have succeeded in demonstrating that even this contention
is not fully maintainable.
11
But the proposition may also be approached and evaluated from
another perspective. We may try to understand the kind of past
events that occupied or engaged the interest of ancient Indians and
how they viewed those events and in what manner they related
themselves to those events.
12
In other words, we may try also to
understand the conceptual and analytical universe within which
past events were viewed in early India. However, before we take
up these issues for consideration it may be profitable to turn our
attention to some of the features of history as a discipline.
III

In the context of our study, the most significant development in
the contemporary philosophy of history has been a vigorous
assertion that "history is essentially a narrative mode of knowing,
understanding, explaining and reconstructing the past."
13
This
assertion has generated a fresh series of excited debates on the
nature of history as a discipline. In some ways history, its nature
and relevance, has long been a subject of debate among thinkers.
Louis Mink, a leading protagonist of the narrativist school, begins
one of his influential essays by underlining the low esteem in
which the Western philosophers had been traditionally holding
history. "Philosophers have always betrayed a certain scorn for
both history and romance. 'I knew that the delicacy of fiction
enlivens the mind,' says Descartes, explaining how he had
liberated himself from the errors of the schools, and 'that famous
deeds of history ennoble it.' But in the end, he concluded, that
these are negligible merits, because 'fiction makes us imagine a
number of events as possible which are really impossible, and
even the most faithful histories, if they do not alter or embroider
things to make them more worth reading, almost always omit the
meanest and least illustrious circumstances, so that the remainder
is distorted.' This was Descartes first and final word on all the tales
and stories of human life, and until very recently it could have
served to sum up the consensus of Western philosophy."
14

However, in spite of Descartes, many Western philosophers,
especially the Idealists, found the historical process a fascinating
subject of philosophical reflection.
15
The debates in philosophy of
history currently revolve around the analysis of issues related to
historical knowledge, or history as a discipline. The study of
historical process has gone out of fashion; it is greeted with some
suspicion and scorn. But, nonetheless, it remains a fact that
philosophy of history, including its present analytical concerns,
developed out of the interest in the historical process and the
debates that this interest had generated.
Generally speaking, it was the thinkers and theorists who
carried on these debates. Practicing historians usually kept away
from them. They preferred to stay focussed on their chosen area of
concrete evidence and the study based on them without being
affected by the currents and the crosscurrents of philosophical
debates.
16
At least, that was what the historians claimed, and that
was the impression they succeeded in giving.
17
Since the 1960s the
scene, however, began changing markedly. Professional historians
began taking much more active interest in the problems of
historical understanding being discussed in philosophy of history.
Metahistory, which till then occupied only a marginal territory in
the concerns of philosophy, and commanded practically no space
in the concerns of history, since 1960s and 1970s began exercising
a considerably wider measure of influence among historians.
Moreover, the traffic of influence was no longer one way;
historians were no longer just listening to the debates, they began
participating in them.
For the discipline of history a more significant aspect of this
development was the entry in the philosophy of history of what
has been called 'the linguistic turn'. This entry was not a sudden
event. It was effected gradually and in stages. In the 1960s and
1970s when the practicing historians were excitedly pursuing
various forms of the 'New History' under the predominant
influence of social sciences, something of a paradigm shift was
taking place in the field of philosophy of history. The focus of
philosophical interest in historical knowledge began moving away
from the traditional debates about the epistemological problems of
historical knowledge. The earlier debates centered on such
questions as how past can be known? What do historical
explanation and causation mean? What are their implications? Is
objective knowledge possible in history?
18
These issues were
displaced by a new set of questions engendered by the acceptance
that the narrative embodies the essential or the typical mode of
historical knowledge. "With this linguistic turn, the topics of
narration and representation replaced law and explanation as
burning issues of the theory and philosophy of history. And
because what might be called the poetics of history now came to
the fore, the question 'how is history like and unlike fiction?'
replaced 'how is history like and unlike science?' as the guiding
question of metahistorical reflection."
19
"There was a certain irony
about this growing philosophical interest in narrative history since
it came at a time when there was what Paul Ricoeur subsequently
called the 'eclipse of narrative' in the discipline itself."
20
The
practicing historians were still profusely using concepts and
methods borrowed from different social sciences in their works.
Within the discipline of history, it was the diverse forms of 'New
History' that was the dominant trend. The influence of the French
Annales School, the Marxists of various persuasions, quantitative
history and new social history in various parts of the world that
conditioned the major part of historical research and study. This
widespread influence produced such an impact on the practice of
history that it appeared that the old fashioned narrative history has
been shown the door for good. Perhaps the affect of the impact
was exaggerated; the narrative had never been completely
subjugated or banished from history. Lawrence Stone who himself
had fallen under the spell of New History
21
later exultantly
declared: "Historians have always told stories. From Thucydides
and Tacitus to Gibbon and Macaulay the composition of narrative
in lively and elegant prose was always accounted their highest
ambition. History was regarded as a branch of rhetoric. For the last
fifty years, however, this storytelling function has fallen into ill
repute among those who regarded themselves as in the vanguard
of the profession . . . . Now, however, I detect evidence of an
undercurrent which is sucking many prominent 'new historians'
back into some form of narrative."
22
The entry of the linguistic turn in history was itself a part of a
larger shift that was taking shape right across the humanities.
23
This shift began in the fifties. It questioned some of the basic
premises of positivist framework that dominated the thinking in
social sciences as well as humanities. " O thinkers increasingly
criticized a number of the concepts and distinctions central to
positivism: the analytic vs. the synthetic; fact vs. theory;
description vs. explanation; fact vs. value; the verifiable vs. the
non-verifiable; science vs. metaphysics. In so doing they began to
emphasize the perspectival character of all knowledge."
24
In
contrast to the scientific attitude nurtured by the positivist
framework, a different attitude towards language and its relation
to reality began to assert itself. While the positivist view looked at
language as something transparent through which reality is seen,
the linguistic turn viewed language as something opaque and that
it 'creates or structures what is called Real'.
25
Reality thus can not
be represented; it is interpreted or constructed. There can be no
objective representation of fact, but only a reflexive construction.
All statements are thus rhetoric. In contradistinction to the
positivist scientific attitude, this is called rhetorical attitude. Since
1970s the rhetorical attitude has been playing a very significant
role in shaping the contemporary outlook on the nature of history.
In the first phase of its influence the rhetorical attitude restored
the narrative back to history as its characteristic mode. The issue
that dominated the debates during this phase centered on the
narrative as the device of explanation of the past. How narratives
perform the job of explanation of past events? How narrative
explanations are different or similar to causal explanations? What
is the relation between the narrator and the narrative? These were
some of the important questions in the debate. It is in answers to
these questions that thinkers like Louis O Mink, Hayden White
and F. R. Ankersmit gave the rhetorical attitude its most radical
departure from the positivist positions.
26
They asserted that history is not something given, it is
constructed; it is not discovered, it is produced. The construction
takes the form of a narrative; it is essentially a story. The narrative
structure does not naturally emerge from the evidences but rather
results from a specific discursive ordering of the evidence.
27
The
narrative is a form in which the outcome of the historian's
conclusion is embedded in the narrative itself; 'it is directly
reported'. "It is the narrative history itself which claims to be a
contribution to knowledge, not something else which the narrative
history merely popularizes or organizes. The claim of a narrative
history is that its structure is a contribution to knowledge, not just
a literary artifice for the presentation of a series of factual
descriptions."
28
Historical narratives are imaginative construction
based on the ordering of evidences. And they draw their meanings
not just from the 'so-called facts they describe' but also from the
form of narrative in which facts are packed.
29
Historical narratives
are thus stories in which fictional devices like 'emplotment,
story-types, figurative language, and so on' are employed. These
stories do not replicate actual life, they are made by the historian.
"But to say that the qualities of narrative are transferred to art from
life seems a hysteron proteron. Stories are not lived but told. Life
has no beginnings, middles or ends; there are meetings, but the
start of an affair belongs to the story we tell ourselves later, and
there are partings, but final partings are only in the story. There are
hopes, plans, battles and ideas, but only in retrospective stories are
hopes unfulfilled, plans miscarried, battles decisive, and ideas
seminal."
30
Selectivity characterizes every stage of the construction of the
narrative. From the choice of the theme to the selection of the
narrative form, it is the historian who makes the decision but he is
guided by the demands of the story he has chosen to relate.
Michlet and Tocqueville wrote different kinds of histories of the
French Revolution. " Neither can be said to have had more
knowledge of the 'facts' contained in the record; they simply had
different notions of the kind of story that best fitted the facts they
knew. Nor should it be thought that they told different stories of
the Revolution because they had discovered different kinds of
facts, political on the one hand, social on the other. They sought
out different kinds of facts because they had different kinds of
stories to tell."
31
It is the cultural heritage, particularly the inherited literary
tradition and attitude, that presents the menu for the choice of the
form or the 'emplotment' the historian recourses to. It is the shared
cultural milieu that on the one hand enables the historian to weave
the intended meaning in his emplotment, and on the other, it
enables the reader to grasp that meaning. The reader is able to
identify the particular form the historian has chosen and get the
meaning embedded in the form. He can thus follow the story and
understand it. It is in this manner that the narrative performs the
task of explicating. And this is the real nature of historical
explanation. "How a given historical situation is to be configured
depends on the historian's subtlety in matching up a specific plot
structure with the set of historical events that he wishes to endow
with a meaning of a particular kind. This is essentially a literary,
that is to say fiction-making operation. And to call it that in no
way detracts from the status of historical narratives as providing a
kind of knowledge. For not only are the pregeneric plot structures
by which sets of events can be constituted as stories of a particular
kind limited in number, as Frye and other archetypal critics
suggest; but the encodation of events in terms of such plot
structures is one of the ways that a culture has of making sense of
both personal and public pasts." The issue of meaning in history in
the narrativist formulation is linked to the culture complex where
the encodation and the decodation of the narrative take place. The
significance and relevance of itihasa-purana or carita as historical
artifacts resided within the culture complex where they were
produced and they can not be fully and fairly assessed in terms of a
different set of culture-norms.
IV
Contemporary philosophical interest in history is restricted almost
exclusively to the questions that pertain to what is called critical
philosophy of history. These questions do not show much concern
with the historical process
33
. Although interest in universal history
or 'the grand narrative' in the academic circle is fast becoming a
synonym for charlatanism, the relevance of 'history as events', as
distinct from 'history as account', can not be shaken off.
34
The
issue of historical understanding, its nature and its value, can not
be completely detached from the issue of understanding the
historical process. Even the most radical narrativist formulation
will not be able to defend a complete disregard for history as
events. It is the past events that provide the basic impetus for the
generation of the narrative even if the narrative does not represent
the events.
35
The solicitation of meaning in history through the
narrative, through the device of emplotment, metonymy and
synecdoche,
36
can not be completely divorced from the desire to
locate the meaning of events.
And once we grant legitimacy to the seeking of meaning of
'events', or if one prefers, the seeking of the meaning of history
through the events, then it is difficult see how the grand narrative
can be avoided. The notion of meaning in this context can not be
detached from the notions of significance and value. And
significance presupposes relationship. Once embarked, this
trajectory finally takes us on to the fundamental question of value
and significance of human life. It is from this point of view that all
the grand narratives were constructed. And there has been a long
line of grand narrativists, from St. Augustine to Toynbee and
Sorokin.
37
V
An important function that history performs is that it keeps alive
an awareness of one's debt to the past, gives one a sense of
belonging to what might be called a tradition and heritage and
generates a sense of continuity.
38
This sense of belonging and
continuity is not necessarily the same as conservatism or a
backward looking attitude. This sense of belonging and continuity
gives a temporal depth to one's existence, a depth that is absolutely
necessary and without which life runs the risk of becoming
rootless. The cultural and the intellectual orientation of early India
bears diverse marks of sensitivity towards past. Conscious steps
were taken to maintain and promote the sense of belonging to a
tradition coming down from the past. Ancestors were called
departed fathers (pitar) and they were remembered with reverence
and gratitude. It was one's sacred duty to repay the debt of the
fathers (pitr rna). No ritual, no ceremony, could begin without
offering food and water to the departed fathers. It was also a
sacred duty to remember the debt one owed to the sages of yore
(rsi rna) and preserve and increase the cultural and intellectual
heritage they had bequeathed. The importance given to kula, desa,
etc., the laws and customs (dharma, aca~ra) of kula, jati, grama,
desa, etc., the system of gotra-pravara were all designed to
reinforce the awareness of continuity from the past, a sense of
belonging, an awareness of history. All these were also reminders
of one's responsibility to what has been bestowed by the past. It is
extremely significant that the two primary divisions of the
knowledge system of early India should bear the names of sruti
(that what has been heard) and smrti (the remembered wisdom of
past). Practically the entire intellectual output of early India was
but an elaboration of these two. And both of these hark back to
past for their source and inspiration.
Awareness of past is found embedded in the Veda itself. The
Vedic poets refer to kings and dynasties of past. This awareness
was more than just a disparate relic of past stuck in the memory.
The Vedic poets were keenly conscious of the passage of time
from the past into the future and the responsibility of the present
generation for preserving the heritage for future yuga.
39
Witzel has
noted that Indian languages have all preserved, in their own way,
some aspects of the evolution of their history. "They all have quite
involved systems of expressing various stages in the past, and thus
a whole array of forms relating to several past 'tenses'." The
beginnings of this attitude can be seen already in the authors of the
Vedic texts."
40
He remarked that Indians often provided a social
framework for these changes. Thus the Maitrayani Samhita states
that while the form ratrim was alright for men, the devatas used
the purer form of ratrim for night. What is actually meant is that
the form with dirgha i was an earlier form.
41
There are also
references to older times and learned persons of yore in the
Rgveda itself.
42
The way the Veda was preserved without distortion for
thousands of years is truly a unique feat of conservation of history;
no parallel to this can be instanced from anywhere else in the
world. It is noteworthy that while the sruti persevered to preserve
the patrimony of past without change, the smrti preserved a
socially constructed tradition that was ever responsive to the
demands of changing time and situation. The dynamics of
kaiadharma and desadharma were readily recognized and
appreciated in smrti. It was not a frozen, solidified past that smrti
represented but a moving dynamic continuity. It may be noted that
itihasa-Purana was a part of smrti.
43
The chosen instrument for
keeping abreast of time in the purana was upavrmhana. Viewed
from the perspective that every culture strives to preserve from its
past heritage what it regards valuable, early India in no way can be
called less history-conscious than Greece or Rome or China. Only
that this consciousness articulated itself differently.
The high premium that early India had put on preserving this
awareness of continuity, ironically, instead of creating the
impression that India was keenly history-conscious, resulted in
producing the opposite effect. It gave birth to the stereotype of
unchanging India, India that had turned its back on history.
Fortunately, this stereotypical reading of Indian culture as a
stationary one unable to respond to the calls of change is no longer
taken seriously.
44
It was not just at the collective level but at the individual level
as well that we find instances of a keen sensitivity to the past
history. Writers belonging to all branches of literature kept on
referring to earlier works and authors. It was a common practice.
Grammar, linguistics, art, in all the various disciplines, we find the
later authors show close familiarity with earlier authors and
acknowledge their indebtedness to them. In a large number of
instances the names and works of earlier authors survive only in
the references made to them by later writers. Even the colossal
figures like Panini, Yaska, Bharata, Caraka, etc., those who were
the defining authorities of their respective disciplines, freely spoke
of their intellectual ancestors.
45
In the Raghuvamsa, Kalidasa expresses his debt to the
predecessors (purvasun) in his inimitable style. He says that the
predecessors had already done all the hard works, only the easier
task remained for him. The predecessors had collected the
diamonds and left them cut and ready, all that he had now to do
was to just pass the thread through them.
46
In the Meghadutam he
refers to village elders who were experts in ancient lore
(kathakovid gramavrddha).
47
While describing the city of Ujjayini
he mentions certain 'historical' spots in the city that were hallowed
by the memory of Pradyota, Udayana, etc.
48
Memory of old events
and episodes thus continued to survive in diverse forms and
manners and they were continually evoked.
The notion that the early Indian lacked a sense of history seems
to have been set in motion by Alberuni. In his account of India
Alberuni observed, "Unfortunately the Indians do not pay much
attention to the historical order of things, they are very careless in
relating the chronological succession of their kings, and when they
are pressed for information they are at a loss, not knowing what to
say, they invariably take to tale-telling. But for this we should
communicate to the reader the traditions, which we have received
from some people among them."
49
This statement has assumed a
kind of a sovereign status among modern practitioners of Indian
history.
50
It is not necessary at this stage to go in detail into the
question why Alberuni formed this impression. For the present it
may suffice to note that in early India the study of historical events
in precise chronological order did not enjoy the same degree of
attention and popularity in the intellectual world as some other
disciplines. The light in which past was viewed in early India was
also quite different from the one that Alberuni was familiar with.
We will try to deal with these aspects in some subsequent sections.
It is, however, pertinent to point out that neither the Greco-Roman
nor the Chinese travelers seem to have exactly shared this
perception.
51
It is not that records were not kept or that care was not taken to
maintain them properly. Evidences rather tell a different story.
Kautilya tells us that the state used to have a very elaborate record
keeping system.
52
The main record office was known as
aksapatala. It was situated in the capital and housed in a spacious
building containing many halls and rooms for keeping records.
The records pertained to '(1) the activity of each state department,
(2) the working of state factories and conditions governing
production in them, (3) prices, samples and standards of
measuring instruments for various kinds of goods, (4) laws,
transactions, customs and regulations in force in different regions,
villages, castes, families and corporations, (5) salaries and other
perquisites of state servants, (6) what is made over to the king and
other members of the royal family, and (7) payments made to and
amounts received from foreign princes, whether allies or foes.'
53

One will heartily endorse the remark of Kangle, 'A more
comprehensive record-house can hardly be thought of.'
54
Besides
the central record office, the aksapatala, functionaries in charge of
administrative and financial affairs, for example, an officer like
samahartr as also his subordinates sthanika, gopa,etc., had to
maintain their own records pertaining to the areas of their charge
and function.
55
In the Rajatarahgini there is a reference to an
officer with special expertise in the preparation of documents.
This officer was called pattopadhyaya. And he belonged to the
establishment of aksapatala and had the responsibility of
preparing appropriate documents in execution of royal grants.
56
Epigraphic evidence also refer to other categories of record
keepers apart from aksapatalika (in charge of aksapatala) like
pustapala, pustakapala, petapala, pettapala, pedapala, etc.
57
"To
transmit the royal decrees a crops of secretaries and clerks was
maintained, and remarkable precautions were taken to prevent
error. Under the Colas, for instance, orders were first written by
scribes at the King's dictation, and the accuracy of the drafts was
attested by competent witnesses. Before being sent to their
recipients they were carefully transcribed, and a number of
witnesses, sometimes amounting to as many as thirteen, again
attested them. In the case of grant of land and privileges an
important court official was generally deputed to ensure that the
royal decrees were put into effect. Thus records were kept with
great care, and nothing was left to chance; the royal scribes
themselves were often important personages."
58
There are numerous evidences to the effect that states used to
take great pains to prepare and maintain records. In an extensive
note Arvind Sharma has given a neat summary of the
dharmasastra material pertaining to the significance, preparation,
preservation and classification of documents. Documents were
numerous as well as varied. There were official documents
bearing official seals and stamps. There were several varieties of
official documents. And then, there were peoples' documents
(laukika, janpada); there were private documents. Elaborate
procedures were developed to verify their validity.
60
Arvind Sharma gives an interesting account of the way the
dharmasastra writers projected the importance of documentation.
It is the Creator himself who created documents.
59
This divine
initiative was necessary because without documents ' the world
would have come to grief', there would have been no 'indubitable
means of apprehending the time, the place, the object, the
material, the extent and the duration of a transaction'. Since people
begin to entertain doubts about a transaction even in a matter of six
months, 'the Creator created in the hoary past letters' to be put on
record 'on writing material (patra).
61
The viewpoint articulated by
the dharmasastri in the above formulation is significant. It shows
that the view that the early Indians were so completely swamped
by their concept of the cosmic time flowing incessantly without
beginning and end that they lost all perspective of historical time
is apt to be very one sided. The outlook of Narada or Brhaspati
was firmly and unambiguously historical.
It is also clear that all records did not pertain to administrative,
legal and financial matter. Documents more directly historical in
nature were also prepared and preserved. Yuan Chuwang referred
to the official practice of maintaining records of events both at the
royal court in the capital as well as in the provinces. There were
special officers who were entrusted with the task. It is interesting
that these records were called 'blue deposit'. These records
'mentioned good and evil events, with calamities and fortunate
occurrences'.
62
Alberuni had noticed genealogical lists of the Sahi
rulers of Afghanistan written on silk. These lists were kept for
preservation at the fortress of Nagarkot. From the manner of
Alberuni's statement it appears that this was a dynastic chronicle
of the Sahi kings spanning a period of more than one thousand
years from the foundation of Kusana power to the fall of the
Brahmana Sahis in the 11th century.
63
According to D. C. Sircar
official charters of many ruling families of post-Gupta period
contain historical accounts covering many generations spread
over, sometimes, several centuries. Such accounts would have
been difficult to prepare without the assistance of written records
already existing.
64
It is well known that Kalhana in the preparation of his book had
before him twelve earlier works on the history of Kashmir.
65
Besides written works, he had also consulted other evidences like
grants, consecration-inscriptions, prasastis, etc.
66
There is also no
reason to believe that the methodology of scrutiny, verification,
collation, etc., that Kalhana followed was not known earlier. The
tradition of composing chronicles was not limited to Kashmir
alone. There are definite evidence of their existence in Assam ( in
the form of Burahjis) and in Nepal (in the form of Vamsavalis).
On the basis of what we have observed above regarding the
custom of keeping records of 'events', it can be safely surmised
that the keeping of chronicles was a common custom all over the
country.
67
To this may be added the chronicles maintained by the
various religious organizations. The Buddhist Mahavamsa and
Dipavamsa are well-known examples of this class.
68
There are a number of inscriptions that mention past events
with dates. We find the narration of events belonging to the reign
of a single monarch in chronological order. There are inscriptions
that describe events that happened at different dates and belonged
to the reigns of different rulers and were under the charge of
different officers and took place at different places, but the
chronological order of enumeration was strictly maintained.
69
This is a suitable point to take note of another small problem.
Sometimes the assertion that early India lacked a sense of history
is formulated in the shape of another assertion that early India did
not possess a sense of chronology. It is not clear what actually is
meant by the lack of a sense of chronology. Does it mean an
apprehension of the affairs of the world as though they exist in a
dateless expanse of time, where the passage of time in its
sequential order is not properly comprehended and where no
method of calibration of the passage is used? In such a case it will
be a kind of cognition "where all generations become as it were
contemporaries."
70
Such a formulation about early India is totally
untenable. India's familiarity with the computation of time
sequence goes back to very early period. Jyotisa was one of the
Vedahgas and the very inspiration behind the study of jyotisa was
the precise determination of appropriate time for the performance
of ritual. Even in the Rgveda there are suggestions that passage of
time was computed through succession of years.
71
Another way the lack of a sense of chronology has been
formulated is that there was an absence of a long term dating
system as well as the consciousness that such a system was
necessary. Early India by no means can be accused of suffering
from an absence of a long term perspective of time. The pumnic
concept of the cyclic succession of huge eons, para, kalpa, yuga
encompasses a time dimension that is mind-boggling in its
vastness; and its very immensity makes it appear meaningless.
72

The thesis that there was a lack of a sense of chronology among
early Indians thus has also been presented in the following form:
as early India subscribed to the cyclic concept of time, it inhibited
the growth of the concept of linearity of time. Therefore, early
India did not develop any system of reckoning of time like an era
till such dating system was introduced by invading ruling
dynasties.
73
We will take up the question of the interrelationship between
the concepts of circular and linear time and the parts they played in
forming the notion of history in early India in a later section. As
regards the question of the prevalence of dating and era, the
practice of a dating system and the practice of reckoning based on
an era are not exactly the same. And, the idea of chronology does
not have to be necessarily identified with either of them. The
consciousness of chronology simply means a consciousness of
sequence of events. A dating method takes form when in addition
to the consciousness of sequence, the sequenced events are also
placed in some kind of reckoning, irrespective of the length of
scale. Moreover, it can not be definitely ascertained whether or not
there were some old and indigenous eras current in the country.
There are some indications that eras dating from important events
like the onset of Kaliyuga or the demise of Mahavira or Buddha
were current in early India.
74
The practice of dating according to
the year of reign of the ruling monarch does not necessarily prove
that reckoning in eras was unknown. A large number of powerful
rulers continued to use regnal years in their inscriptions long after
the use of eras had become widely known.
75
VI
A large number of terms denoting past events were in continuous
vogue in ancient India right from the Vedic age. It is true that the
exact connotations of these terms are debatable and that it is not
possible to ascertain how far these terms referred to actual
historical past and to what extent to mythical time. But all the
same they do represent the prevalent attitude towards past. And
they are significant from that point of view.
Despite the fact that religion is the basic theme of Vedic
literature, it contains references to certain forms of compositions
that may be termed as historical. Songs and verses were composed
in praise of worthy deeds. The Rgveda states that kings were very
fond of eulogies as a form of literary composition.
76
It appears that
there was a class of versifiers and singers similar to the latter-day
bards: gathin, vinagathin, vinaganagin, etc., who specialized in
the composition and narration of this kind of eulogies.
77
Besides
the eulogies, mainly of royal power and glory, the beginnings of a
different tradition of history writing are found in the succession
lists of Vedic sages. Relatively earlier lists are found in some
brahmanas and in Sahkhyayana Aranyaka and Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad and somewhat later lists in some grhya and srauta
sutras. These lists are called vamsa and gotra-pravara lists.
78

These lists differed from the gatha, narasamsi in the sense that
they show a conception of continuity, an idea of a relatively longer
time span and connectivity between events, and that they were not
purely episodic.
Various terms connoting 'historical' compositions like gatha,
narasamsi, itihasa, purana, akhyana, etc., are found referred to in
Vedic literature. These compositions, it appears, became a part of
the ritualistic tradition that dominated the Vedic literature. The
recounting of glorious and heroic stories of past was a part of the
great Vedic sacrifices like asvamedha.
19
These were also narrated
in the course of some domestic rituals.
80
Similarly, the vamsa and
gotra-pravara lists harked back to divine ancestors and mythical
sages.
81
The dominance of religion and ethics over history in
varying degrees remained a permanent feature of Indian view of
history and the two were never fully de-linked.
However, there are certain indications that these historical
compositions originated independently of the ritual tradition in a
milieu that was mainly secular and later got incorporated into the
ritual system. The term narasamsi signified 'verse celebrating
men.'
82
The Aitareya Brahmana distinguished gatha from rk by
stating that while the former is merely human, the latter is divine.
83

Although gatha and narasamsi had often been distinguished, they
had as often been represented as kindred terms.
84
A passage in the
Atharvaveda enumerated the following kinds of works: rk, saman,
yajus, brahmana, itihasa, purana, gatha, narasamsi.
85
The
passage seems to refer to two different classes of compositions,
the one may be termed as religious or adrstarthaka (rk, saman,
yajus, and brahmana) and the other secular or historical or
drstarthaka (itihasa, purana, gatha, narasamsi). The Kathaka
Samhita describes both gatha and narasamsi as false (anrtam).
86

There is a statement in the Satapatha Brahmana, which appears
interesting in this context: "Twofold, verily, is this, there is no
third, viz. truth and untruth.
87
And verily, the gods are the truth
and man is the untruth." Anrta here seems to connote apara or
earthly. It appears that gatha and narasamsi did not belong to the
domain of religious-spiritual, but to the human and secular.
88
It
may perhaps be surmised that right from the early Vedic age there
was a floating tradition of historical compositions, originally
non-Vedic and non-ritualistic, which celebrated the heroic and
noble deeds of men. These were mainly eulogistic songs and their
main patrons were kings who were fond of such compositions.
89
In
consequence of the growth of big Vedic sacrifices historical
narratives acquired a place in the ritual system because the kings
who were the clients of these elaborate Vedic scarifies were also
the patrons of historical narratives. This paved the way for the
inclusion of secular heroic narratives as parts of religious
sacrificial lore. Narasamsa, from which narasamsi was derived,
was associated with rites devoted to deceased fathers.
90
The
recounting of glories of departed ancestors or past generations
thus formed an important component of what was regarded as
historical narratives. The recitation of lore of past became an
important element in the performance of rajasuya, asvamedha,
etc.
91
There were experts, akhyanavid, puranavid, etc., in the
narration of historical lore, whose services were utilized in the
rituals.
92
According to Yaska the school of aitihasikas specialized
in interpreting Vedic hymns through itihasa, in contrast to the
nairuktas who relied on etymology for Vedic interpretation.
93
Gatha, narasamsi, akhyana, etc. seem to have been
predominantly legends celebrating heroic and noble deeds. In
them the line separating the human and superhuman was not
important. Thus there were indragathas and yajnagathas, and the
akhyana of the union of a divine nymph with a mortal hero and its
inevitable tragic consequences.
94
These narratives in the Vedic
literature were considered as having a mystical aspect about them
which facilitated their way into the ritual system.
Among the various history-denoting terms current in early
India, the central space was occupied by the twin terms: itihasa
and purana, often joined together in a compound. It is not easy to
define these terms precisely and to bring out the precise
relationship between the two. Both the terms apparently were very
old; itihasa clearly and unambiguously had made its appearance
already in the Atharvaveda.
95
Then in the Brahmanas and
Upanisads, it is a frequently occurring term and usually in
association with purana.
96
And already in the Vedic period itihasa
and purana, jointly or separately, had acquired the status of a
Veda.
97
It is clear that itihasa and purana had a very intimate
relationship; their subject matter must have covered a great deal of
common ground and must have often overlapped. The
continuation of both the terms over a very long period suggests
that they were not regarded as synonymous to begin with. With the
passage of time the points of distinction between the two got
blurred and confused. This confusion is strikingly illustrated by
the contradictory positions taken by such famous authorities as
Medhatithi and Sankaracarya on the one hand and by Sayanacarya
on the other. Whereas Sankaracarya and Medhatithi describe the
creation account (sristiprakriya) as constituting purana and
Urvasi-Pururava legend as itihasa, Sayana regards creation
account as itihasa and Urvasi-Pururava legend as purana
998
In the
arthavada (i.e., explanatory) portions of the Brahmanas, however,
the akhyanas of Urvasi-Pururava and that of Sunahsepah have
been given as examples of itihasa and creation account as that of
purana.
99
There is a very interesting and revealing passage in the
Arthasastra of Kautilya. The passage gives us a fairly accurate
and broad idea about the perspective in which itihasa was viewed
at that time. The Arthasastra perspective is also additionally
significant because it is the product of an age in which Puranic
literature was receiving its standardized form.
100
It may indicate
that Kautilyan view might have had linkages with that of the
purana.
The Arthasastra passage occurs in the chapter on the training of
the prince. The training programme had a clearly structured
character. The training started at a very early age immediately
after the tonsure ceremony (caula) was performed. At this primary
stage the prince was first introduced to alphabet and numbers as a
foundation for the more rigorous intellectual training to follow.
After the sacred thread ceremony (upanayana) began the training
on the three Vedas and the philosophical systems and the
management of economic and political affairs. After gaining a
thorough grounding in these and after the prince attained manhood
he was asked to cultivate constantly the association of wise and
knowledgeable people 'for the sake of improving his training'.
101
It
is in this context that Kautilya prescribed that the prince should
spend the second half of everyday in 'listening to itihasa'.
102
And
then comes the passage describing the scope and constituents of
itihasa. "The puranas, itivrtta, akhyayika, udaharana,
dharmasastra and arthasastrathese constitute itihasa".
11003
Despite sharing certain common elements the purana,
dharmasastra and arthasastra represented distinct classes of
literature. And each has a distinctive personality. It may be
surmised that the other three, i.e., itivritta, akhyayika and
udaharana, too must have had their separate existences and
distinctive characters. Again, purana, itivrtta, akhyayika and
udaharana appear to have shared a common family trait; all of
them seem to have been narratives of old events. They differed
from one another not so much in character as in scope and range.
Udaharana, as the term suggests, probably signified a
collection of separate events exemplifying success and failures.
Kautilya apparently gives us a few samples of udaharana in the
chapter entitled 'Casting out the Group of Six Enemies' dealing
with the necessity of controlling the evil impulses and passions by
the prince.
104
The udaharana narratives were strung together
because of their illustrative value. The narratives did not seem to
have any temporal order or sequential unity. The incidents in an
akhyayika, on the other hand, had internal relatedness and unity.
Akhyayika was a variant of, or derivation form, akhyana. This
form of narratives appears to have been popular since the Vedic
period for their dramatic quality and for their morals and was
given a place in the ritual system.
105
Generally akhyana dealt with
a particular story. Sometimes, however, a number of akhyanas
were strung together as in the pariplavani cycle.
106
Even the whole
of the Mahabharata was sometimes called an akhyana although it
contained within itself numerous independent akhyanas.
107

Akhyayika later appeared to have acquired a standardized
narrative form pertaining to the lives and activities of rulers.
108

Anyway, this seems clear that akhyana-akhyayika had for its
theme a single thread: an
'event' or a string of events constituting a 'story' with a beginning,
middle and end. Itivrtta and its synonym puravrtta perhaps
signified events covering a longer period and range than
akhyayika; the suffix vrtta suggests a sequential order. Itivrtta also
seems to hint at a circular or cyclical concept of history. Itivrtta or
the variant puravrtta perhaps meant a cycle of events.
It is not possible to trace the evolution of the term purana with
precision. That it referred to accounts of 'olden past' is obvious;
the very expression purana is a sufficient indication. Whether
Puranic traditions antedated the Vedas, whether they were
anti-Vedic and anti-Brahmanic are questions that will have to wait
for precise answers.
109
This, however, seems clear that by the time
the Arthasastra was composed and the Puranic literature was
getting formalized, the scope of the theme of puranas had
acquired a truly vast sweep. It included the entire process of
creation and evolution and accommodated within this frame a
number of secondary beginnings and disintegration of the world
and the succession of the yugas and the accounts of all significant
beings and events. It is not only the sumptuousness of the
marvelous elements in these accounts, but also the vastness of the
scope that disagrees so strikingly with our contemporary
sensibilities. The point that we are trying to make here is that
udaharana, akhyayika, itivrtta and purana represented a series of
graded perspectives in history; the scope of akhyayika was wider
than udaharana, itivrtta was wider than akhyayika, and purana
was wider than itivrtta. According to Kautilya, itihasa included all
of the above and even more; it also included dharmasastra and
arthasastra. The inclusion of dharmasastra and arthasastra
appears particularly interesting as it seems to underline the social
perspective of history.
110
The underlying suggestion seems to say
that events ought to be situated against the dharma and artha
perspectives. To act as an aid to the realization of the purusarthas
was the central raison d'etre of ithasa.
111
Itihasa in the light of the Arthasastra passage appears to have
been considered as a wholesome study of the affairs of this world
preparing man to comprehensively meet his social obligations. Its
study seemed to have an especial value for a ruler. It ranked in
importance next to the three Vedas and anviksikl. The Vedas and
anviksikl were geared predominantly to the realization of moksa,
and vartta and dandanlti to economics and politics.
112
Itihasa, in
contrast, put equal emphasis on all of the caturvargas .
113
The Arthasastra passage would also afford us an idea about the
way that an 'event' in history was conceived. Any narrative was
not necessarily historical; to acquire the status of history a
narrative had to be instructive.
114
It is the ability to teach and
instruct that invests an event with significance. The notion of
significance from this point of view is essentially ethical because
only that has the ability to instruct which can contribute to
well-being and happiness and because the attainment of
well-being hinges on the ability to make the distinction between
right and wrong. It is noteworthy that although Kautilya's
Arthasastra was a text that predominantly dealt with such secular
matter as the success of royal policies; the way history (itihasa)
was perceived by Kautilya had a strong ethical underpinning.
115
This is clear from the narration of events of excesses committed
by the rulers of yore that led them to their doom. Kautilya narrated
those events as part of instructions to the prince as illustrations of
conduct to be abjured.
116
Normally an event was also regarded as one with a fulsome
story. It usually contained one or more of akhyana/akhyayika
characterized by different parts that succeeded in sequential order.
Prof. V.S. Pathak has described and illustrated these parts in his
work.
117
These parts were: beginning (prarambha), the efforts
(prayatna), the hope of achieving the objective (praptyasa), the
certainly of achievement (niyataptV) and the achievement
(phalagama). A book of itihasa could consist of a single
akhyana/akhyayika like Harsacarita.
im
It could also include many
akhyanas sewn around a central theme as in the
Mahabharata that was also called Bharatakhyana though it
contained a large number of other independent akhyanas.
119
The Arthasastra passage also sheds some light on the
relationship between itihasa and purana. In Kautilya's view, we
have noted above, purana was a part of itihasa, and the two were
thus intimately related. The scope of itihasa was perhaps wider
than purana, for purana was only one of the various elements or
forms of itihasa. Generally, the Arthasastra passage has been
interpreted as indicating that purana was only one among the
several elements which together constituted itihasa. However, the
passage is also liable to interpretation to the effect that iitihasa had
many forms or variants as specified by Kautilya and that these
variants separately or together merited the name of itihasa. We
have also noted above that the relation between itihasa and purana
and the scope and content of them were a matter on which famous
authorities disagreed and took opposite positions. Thus it is not
possible to decide whether the passage in the Arthasastra
represented merely Kautilya's personal view of itihasa or it
reflected the commonly perceived perception of his time. That
Kautilya included dharamasastra and arthasastra in itihasa may
help us to understand why the Epics and puranas included didactic
material and dharmasastra and arthasastra matters in such
abundance.
It is worth trying to understand why the expression purana
stood both for ancient lore as well as for a specific class of
literature. Winternitz has surmised that a mass of ancient lore and
traditions existed as a floating body which served as a common
storehouse from which various forms of literary expressions like
gatha, narasamsi, vamsa, akhyana, etc., drew their material.
120

The Puranic form seems to have developed by absorbing many of
these forms within it. The Visnupurana, for example, tells us that
there were three constituent elements of the puranas: gatha,
akhyana and supplementary akhyana.
121
They were collated
within the framework of vamsas to produce the vamsanucarita to
provide the puranas with some of its so-called distinctive
marksthe pahcalaksanas.
122
The development of puranas
through adaptation, absorption and integration of earlier mass of
historical traditions and compositions represented a process of
growth of historical narratives. It represented growth even in
physical terms in the sense that purana came to constitute a
collection of an enormous corpus much larger in scope and
volume than the earlier forms of historical narratives. However,
the growth of purana reflected more than mere physical
expansion; it also marked the broadening of the scope and subject
matter of history as new elements and aspects were added by
puranakaras. puranas thus also represented a widening of the
perspective in the conceptual framework of history. Since puranas
became the repository of diverse aspects of past, the expression
purana came to signify both the old lore as well as the class of
literature preserving the old lore.
From another perspective also, pumnas may be considered as
marking a continuous and dynamic growth of the historical
narrative. Through the process of upabrimhana new material
covering immediate past was continuously added to the existing
corpus updating the narrative and keeping it attuned to
contemporary requirements and tastes.
123
This saved the narrative
from getting stale investing it with a certain amount of evergreen
quality. This, moreover, also underlined the relevance of past to
the present by relating the past to the contemporary.
It is clear that the custom of documenting the past in India had a
very long and old history. There were bards and minstrels whose
business was to compose, narrate and preserve glorious and heroic
deeds. It seems that a class of specialists arose who developed
expertise in preserving the records of past; these experts
constituted the 'school of historians' for the society. We have noted
above that originally they did not seem to have been an integral
part of the Vedic ritualistic tradition. The matter that was of
primary concern to the preservers of heroic lore, the school of the
aitihasika-puranika, was mainly secular in character. These were
heroic and noble deeds of great men.
And it appears that the orthodoxy did not always view the
composition of these accounts kindly. Even if one does not
wholeheartedly agree with Pargiter's view
124
that purana-itihasa
tradition represented Ksatriya tradition in contrast to the Vedic
Brahmanicalthe two might not have been as antithetical as
Pargiter contendsthere is no denying the fact that they originally
belonged to two distinct traditions.
A large number of terms for these specialists are found. Some
of the more frequently used terms in Pauranic literature were
puravid, puranavid, puranajna, puranika, vamsavid,
vamsacintaka, vamsa-puranajna, anuvamsapuranajna, etc. It is
not possible to locate and demarcate specific areas of
specialization associated with these terms. They were often used
loosely without adhering to a fixed meaning.
125
From the puranas
it appears that these specialists were also known by a common and
broader term, the suta. The duties and functions of suta can be
sketched with certain amount of definiteness. "The sutas special
duty as perceived by goodmen of old was to preserve the
genealogies of gods, rishis and most glorious kings, and the
traditions of great men, which are displayed by those who declare
sacred lore in the itihasa and puranas."
126
It was thus suta's
function to preserve the memories of 'glorious kings', 'the
traditions of great men', 'the eulogies' of famous people and 'the
genealogies.' The suta was a pauranika, a specialist in ancient
lore, a vamsakusala, an expert in genealogies.
127
The pauranika sutas were different from the varna samkara
sutas mentioned in the smrti literature. Kautilya makes a clear
distinction between the two.
128
The pauranika sutas appear to
have been learned people and apparently they belonged to the
cultivated class. V.S. Pathak has drawn the attention of scholars to
the fact that the Bhrigvangirasa families had shown special
aptitude and interest in the preservation and propagation of
historical lore.
129
The close relation between the Bhrigvangirasas
and itihasa-purana has been recorded especially in the Candogya
Upanisad. At one place it states that the Atharvaveda bears the
same relation to itihasa-purana as the Rgveda to rik, Samaveda to
saman, Yajurveda to yajus. At another place we find a clearer
statement: "Atharvangirasas are the bees, the itihasapurana is the
flower." At yet another place it states that the hymns of the
Atharvangirasas brooded over the itihasapurana.
130
It is possible
that the paumnika sutas belonged to the Bhrigvangirasa extraction
and the antiquity of the itihasapurana was not very much shorter
than that of the
Vedas.
131
An account of the compilation of purana is found in the Vayu,
Brahmanda and Visnu purana. There the compilation is attributed
to Veda Vyasa. After accomplishing the stupendous task of
systematization and division of Vedas into four, the Rk, Saman,
Yajus and Atharva and entrusting them to four of his disciples
Paila, Vaisampayana, J aimini and Sumantu respectively,
Maharsi Krisna Dvaipayana complied a purana samhita and
entrusted it together with itihasa to his fifth disciple suta
Lomaharsana or Romaharsana. After that he composed the
Bharatakhyanam.
132
This account of the systematization of the Vedas, the
compilation of the purana and the composition of the
Mahabharata is highly interesting. Even though generally
scholars have treated this account with skepticism, no really valid
argument can be advanced for completely dismissing off its
authenticity. If Vedic literature is silent about this tradition of
Vyasa's dividing the Veda into four; there is nothing surprising
about this omission. Vyasa had merely organized the Vedas; there
is no reason why the texts should contain any reference to him, he
only arranged the Vedic texts without, presumably, any kind of
interference with the texts themselves which were already in
existence before his own time and which were traditionally
regarded as of non-human (apauruseya) origin. It is also natural
that the language, culture and the universe reflected in the Vedas
on the one hand and the purana and the Mahabharata on the other
should be quite distinct because the methods followed by Vyasa in
regard to the Vedas and purana-Mahabharata were quite
different. In the case of the Vedas, Vyasa's work was limited
merely to arrangement and organization, in the case of the purana
and the Mahabharata he was not just an organizer but also a
composer author. It is interesting further to note that whereas for
the Vedas he divided a single text into four divisions, for the
puranas he collected a large number of existing traditions and
accounts into a single whole. As for the Mahabharata Vyasa is
credited with composing it.
That the later history of the development of Vedic Literature
and purana itihasa should take on different lines was also natural;
the reason for this lay inherent in the very nature of the texts. Vedic
texts were finished products, they dealt with things become, the
purana on the other hand dealt with things becoming, there was
scope for continuous addition of new material to it as new
historical facts kept piling up. When looked at from this point of
view, Vyasa's work in regard to the arrangement of the Vedas
proved much more enduring than his compilation of the
purana-samhita; the Veda-samhitas as arranged by Vyasa have
remained intact, the purana-samhita compiled by Vyasa has got
buried under later growth.
The traditional number of the purnnas is considered eighteen,
although the extant numbers of puranas greatly exceed this
traditional number. These different puranas appear to have
branched out of the original puranasamhita compiled by Vyasa.
This original purana could hardly have condensed all the existing
past traditions, there must have been other existing ancient
traditions leading to its augmentation and later proliferation into a
number of puranas. The puranas by their very nature easily lent
themselves to augmentation and adaptation. According to Pargiter
the later Brahmana editors of the puranasthe custody of the
purana passed from the hands of professional sutas into those of
sectarian Brahmana priestly classtook full advantage of the
situation to introduce a great deal of extraneous matters,
particularly religious and didactic, besides the fresh historical
material that were accumulating over the time and stamp the
puranas with their sectarian views and attitude. Thus the
handiwork of Vyasa got lost.
133
The Brahmanical embellishments
led to a change in the nature of the puranas by giving the original
secular Puranic accounts a religious character and thus narrowing
the gulf that divided the theological Vedic traditions and the
non-religious Puranic heritage.
134
The traditional account of the compilation of the original
purana-samhita by Vyasa tells us that he had collected akhyana,
upakhyana, gatha and kalpa-jokti for the same.
135
In this
connection it may also be noted that traditionally purana was
regarded as a class of literature that contained the following five
characteristics (pahcalaksana): original creation (sarga),
dissolution and re-creation (pratisarga), genealogy (vamsa),
transition of Manus (manvantara) and accounts of persons
mentioned in the genealogies (vamsanucarita).
136
These give us a
fair idea about the kinds of materials originally used for the
composition of the Puranic literature. Same kinds of material must
have also constituted the basic raw material of the itihasa. The
subject matter of the original purana thus seems to have consisted
mainly of traditions about gods, about ancient rsis and kings,
about ancient genealogies and biographies.
No great distinction seems to have been made between
itihasa-purana and akhyana; they were often treated as
synonymous. "As collective terms itihasa and purana are often
mentioned as distinct, and yet are sometimes treated as much the
same; thus the Vayu calls itself both a purana and an itihasa, and
so also the Brahmanda. The Brahma calls itself a purana and an
akhyana; the Mahabharata calls itself by all these terms."
137
An
akhyana, however, does not seem to have been just any kind of old
tales. It seems to have been a tale of special nature, a tale to
illustrate a moral or a lesson. It was generally didactic. It is
important to remember that the concept of history in ancient India
generally had always been strongly didactic in nature. However,
according to Pargiter, the didactic dharma matter which loom very
large in the extant puranas were added later by the Brahmanas
into whose hands the task of the preservation of the puranas had
passed from their original custodians, the sutas.
138
It is significant
that dharma does not directly figure at all among the five
characteristic features of the puranas (the pahcalaksana). Neither
does it figure in the list of the materials used by Vyasa for his
compilation of the original puranasamhita. Upakhyana obviously
belonged to the same genre as akhyana, the difference being
perhaps in size and dimension.
139
Gatha meant a song in praise of
noble and heroic deeds.
140
Besides the kalpajoktis, the heroic
traditions, lore and tales of past embodied in akhyana, upakhyana,
gatha, etc., constituted the main Puranic material.
Of the original five characteristics of the purana, the
pahcalaksana, (original creation, dissolution and recreation, the
manvantaras, ancient genealogies and accounts of persons
mentioned in the genealogies) Pargiter writes "The first three
subjects that puranas should treat of, are based on imagination, are
wholly fanciful, and do not admit of any practical examination,
hence it would be a vain pursuit to investigate
them ... The fourth and fifth subjects are, however, genealogies
and tales of ancient kings, profess to be historical tradition and do
admit of chronological scrutiny, hence they are well worth
considering."
141
Not questioning the validity of Pargiter's observation it may be
pointed out that although it is true that the first three subjects are
not valuable for empirical history, nevertheless they provide a
grand sweep to the concept of history. Such sweeps form one of
the chief characteristics of some of the most influential schools of
historical interpretations. An obvious example is the Christian
idea of history, which encompasses all empirical events within a
single all comprehensive framework of divine plan.
142
Similarly,
the Puranic framework of creation and dissolution, within which
the vamsa and vamsanucarita have their existence, give all
empirical events a meaningful perspective and from that point of
view these three subjects sarga, pratisarga, manvantara are
highly valuable. They provide a synthesist framework and try to
look at empirical events from the point of view of totality and not
piecemeal.
We have noted above that this grand cosmological scheme
provides a comprehensive framework for situating the historical
events. The Puranic view of progressive decline is found in
several works but the most elaborate accounts are found notably in
the Vayupurana.
1473
The Santiparvan in the Mahabharata gives
practically the same account.
144
The Santiparvan explains how in
the krta age there was at first no state, but eventually passion and
greed developed among men, consequently Brahma invented the
state and government. The Puranic tradition places the beginning
of corruption and division of society not in the krta but after its
end in the early treta. According to the Vayu-purana account after
the development of agriculture during the treta which led to the
appropriation of property, Brahma created state and gave
Ksatriyas the right to rule.
A.K. Warder finds in this account an echo of the transition from
the food gathering to food producing economy. Warder further
feels that the original version of the theory placed the beginning of
agriculture and state during the treta. This was later modified by
Brahmanical editors in order to place the beginning of kingship in
the most perfect age, the krta itself and accommodate a number of
kings in that age. On account of their bias against kingless
republican societies, the royalist authors, according to Warder,
were unable to bear the idea that the most perfect age in human
evolution should have been the age when there was no king and no
state.
145
Three levels of time can be distinguished in the grand
cosmological scheme of the puranas. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that history in the puranas is divided into two parts:
the 'history of the past' and the 'history of future'. The kaliyuga was
the dividing line between the two parts.
146
The coupling of the past
and future is not a feature typical of the Puranic perception alone.
It is also found, for example, in the jatakas where stories are
divided into those pertaining to atitavatthu and to
paccupahhavatthu.
141
The analogy may be extended further. In the
early Christian concept, history is divided into two halves. There
the birth of Christ constitutes the dividing line. The two halves
were christened as the history of 'Old Dispensation' and the history
of 'New Dispensation'. The first was regarded as the preparation
for the coming of Christ and the second as the embodiment of the
consequences of the birth
of Christ.
148
By the time the Puranic literature developed and proliferated,
the old Vedic suspicion of and hostility towards historical
concerns seem to have gone down substantially. In fact, the
prestige and authority of the puranas came to rank next only to the
Vedas. The puranas came to be regarded as complementary and
aid to the proper understanding of the Vedas. "The dvija who may
know the four Vedas with the angas and upanisads, should not
really be (regarded) as having attained proficiency, if he should
not thoroughly know the purana. He should reinforce the Veda
with the itihasa and purana. The Veda is afraid of the little learned
man thinking 'he will injure me."
149
The heavy theistic
embellishments in the Puranic literature might have also
contributed to the melting away of the old hostility towards
historical compositions.
J udged by modern canons of historical study, the puranas are
found wanting in cogency and reliability as historical works.
However, it should be noted that even such a skeptical scholar as
V. Smith
150
has accepted the value of puranas as historical
document for certain ruling houses.
151
Pargiter and Morton Smith
made praise-worthy endeavour to vindicate Puranic dynastic
accounts as genuine history. puranas may be judged to be poor
history by modern measure, but they embody a philosophy of
history, which may serve as an interesting foil to the modern
notion of history. After all philosophy of history in the deepest
sense is nothing but a philosophy of life, a vision, a search for the
essence of the universe and man's place and destiny in that
universe. This quest naturally has to go beyond mere empiricism.
puranas were avowedly not history in the modern sense where
history is regarded as a product of empiricism, a record of
empirical facts. puranas represent a worldview manifesting itself
through the narration of past events, events that are worth
remembering and recording, events where men attained heroic
proportions and achieved practically the stature of the divine and
thus sublimated the remorseless wheel of time from krta to kali.
In early India historical facts were also often stated through the
medium of art. These statements often took symbolical form. The
Lion Slayer Type of coins of Candra Gupta II have long been
recognized as visual representation of Candra Gupta's victory over
the Sakas. Recently H. Von Stietencron has shown that the Pallava
Sivagangadhara images in fact contain a political narrative; they
are artistic statements recording the Pallava's victory against the
Western Gangas. Similarly, the famous Varaha images of the
Gupta period, the most celebrated example being the Udaygiri
image, are visual narratives of Candra Gupta Vikramaditya's
important victory over the
Sakas.
152
VII
It may be mentioned in passing that itihasa was not purported to
be an imaginary didactic tale, although it is easy to confuse it with
the latter. There are indications that itihasa referred to events of
past and not to just any imaginary edifying tale. The word itihasa
formed from iti ha asa 'so in truth it was'.
153
Itihasa thus was
clearly believed to be based on 'facts' or on what was considered to
be the true view of past. In numerous passages in the
Mahabharata that refer to itihasa, the narration begins with the
stereotyped statement "here they cite this ancient itihasa"
(atrapyudaharantimam itihasam puratanam).
154
It is worth noting
that the narration of 'historical accounts' during the performance of
death-rites was a widely prevalent custom. Asvalayana Grhya
Sutra mentions that when a person died his friends and relatives
would sit together and recount histories of famous men. It is also
mentioned that distinguished itihasas and puranas were recited on
that occasion.
155
Here too the symbolic significance of the custom
is only too obvious; it again signified the aspiration of the friends
and relatives of the deceased person that the deceased might also
be counted as a part of the great historical past. Since the death
which occasioned the invocation of the past was a concrete event,
the past with which its merger was sought would not have perhaps
been entirely mythical. The narasamsa, for example, was
associated with the rite of the 'departed fathers' (pitar).
156
This
strongly suggests that the concern of narasamsa was with the
'actual' than the mythical past. The past that Itihasa was concerned
with was perceived as constituting actual human past. At least that
seemed to have been the theoretical premise; it was not conceived
as something imaginary or invented or unreal.
It seems that a fiction and a narrative based on actual happening
were distinguished from each other. It is noteworthy that Bana
calls Kadambari a katha and Harsacarita an akhyayika. Bhamaha
in his Kavyalamakara elucidates the difference between katha and
akhyayika. Katha he says is an imaginary tale, where as an
akhyayika is based on actual event (svacestitavrtta).
151
Similarly,
commentator Sridhara quotes an old verse that describes
akhyayika as drstarthakathana}
Si
It is well known that Kalhana
unambiguously describes the purpose behind the composition of
the celebrated work Rajatarahgini as narration of past events
(bhutarthakathana) .
159
It is not our intention to argue that these were 'factual'
narratives in the current sense of the term. The issue of factuality
in historical narratives is highly complex and the perception and
constitution of fact in history are generally influenced by the
prevailing climate of thought and belief within which fact is
perceived. Narration of any episode always involves abstraction to
a certain extent. In the wake of the onset of narrativist and
postmodernist theories, the clarity of positivist distinction
between fact and imagination in the context of history has been
considerably blurred.
160
But it is not our plea that an akhyayika
belonged to the same class of historical narrative as a modern
historical work. We are only trying to say that itihasa ought to be
distinguished from a professedly imaginary tale in the sense that
itihasa is based on abstraction of past episodes and that an
akhyayika was not the same as a katha. And, to that extent it bears
factuality and from that perspective itihasa was distinguished
from purely fictional material. Itihasa therefore generally referred
to events of past as viewed by the narrators and not just to any
arbitrary tale. It was supposed to have its basis on factuality. The
substratum of factuality on which the itihasa account was built
often was embellished with edifying elements to heighten the
effect. Moreover, itihasa or itihasa-purana appears to have been a
floating mass of past traditions mostly preserved through oral
transmission over generations. These often led to the accretion of
mythical material over them. Nevertheless, there was a core of
factuality; of course this factuality resided within the boundaries
the notion of factuality was viewed and constituted in the context
of itihasa.
VIII
Let us attempt a sketch of the outlines of early Indian outlook on
past. The belief in the principle of karma gave the Indian
perception of past and the significance of the past for the present a
special dimension. But the karmik past and the historical past are
distinct and they can not be combined. The past karma can
influence individuals as historical agents, but the role of karma in
the creation of historical legacy (which is another name of
historical past) can not be worked out. Therefore karma as a factor
should be left out while considering history or itihasa. Since our
objective is to understand the attitude to history we would not
consider the theory of karma while dealing with the outlook on
past. Our subject matter is 'this life' led by men in past and not the
series of 'former births' that every individual has to go through
according to the theory of karma. Our interest thus does not extend
to the 'past lives' as viewed in the theory of karma. Although in the
formation of the total outlook on past the karma theory played a
significant role in early India, in the context of our present theme
we will not enter the area of former births.
161
An example may
clarify what we are driving at. In our purview, the life of Siddartha
Gautam, the prince of Kapilavastu, would figure but not the lives
of numerous past Buddhas and Bodhisattvas except as part of
Mahayana Buddhist belief system. So by early Indian outlook on
past we mean the attitude to past human episodes that were the
part of the drstarthaka visible world. The lives of, say, three
successive generations of past men a, b, c, in our view form part of
historical past, but not the previous births of a, b, and c. We are
interested in understanding what was the attitude that early India
showed towards past; a past that was viewed within the confines
of 'one life for one individual' seen through ordinary mortal sight.
Thus the theory of Karma and its impact on the mental attitude
will not form a part of our sketch of the early Indian outlook on
past.
Early Indian outlook on past was unabashedly didactic. Past
events had no relevance unless they were significant in a positive
way to the present. An event in such a formulation does not
acquire an automatic value because of its antiquity. Early Indian
outlook on past was entirely different from the antiquarian.
162

Only that sort of past or past events which have the quality to
vivify the present society in a positive way are the ones that are
truly memorable and worth preserving and recounting. This is
how the relevance of past accounts was visualized in early India.
Early Indians were very clear about the role of history; history has
to teach and instruct. History teaches by example: history is
philosophy by example, history is politics by example. It is in this
way that the role and function of history were perceived in early
India. History was not conceived as an account of the entire body
of human past; it was an account of only those parts of past or
aspects of past that held a valuable lesson for men. And all lessons
were basically instructions on 'dos' and 'don'ts' and the means of
achieving the goals of life (vidhi, nisedha, upaya, purusartha,
sreyasadhana, nihsreyasa, etc.). Itihasa was viewed as "an event
of olden time, conjoined with a tale and provided with a
demonstration of dharma, artha, kama and moksa".
163
It is from
this angle that the Ramayana and the Mahabharata were regarded
as itihasa. It was not just any narrative of olden time; it was a
narrative of special kind, a narrative testifying merit. "The
Mahabharata is described as an itihasa mahapunyah ('an itihasa
of great merit'; e.g., in Mahabh I. Lxii.16 [2298]), and reference is
frequently made to its punyah kathah (meritorious tales')."
164

Similarly, the Ramayana calls itself as the history of Rama (rama
caritam), which is "sacred, sin-destroying, merit-bestowing like
the Veda itself (pavitram papaghnam punyam vedaisca
sammitam).
165
Itihasa thus is selective in its scope; it is not an
indiscriminate, impartial and disinterested accumulation of all
possible facts pertaining to past. The past that deserves to be
included within the fold of itihasa is the one that is capable of
imparting instructions. Itihasa is a repository of knowledge
(vidya); it is in fact one of the Vedas.
166
Kalhana's Rajatarngini has usually been hailed by modern
scholars as the lone work that in its fidelity to the factual base of
the narrative sets it apart from the normal run of excessively
eulogistic carita kavyas of early India. It has been pointed out that
the scope and the canvas that Kalhana charts for himself at once
distinguish him from the panegyrists of carita kavyas. He attempts
a comprehensive and connected account of the entire history of
Kashmir from the earliest times to his own days. And he also
maintains a chronological sequence in his narrative. These virtues
make him a kindred spirit of modern historians.
161
In adherence to
his objective to 'place the past times before the eyes of men' he
consciously cut some of the poetic frills that other poets of early
India found so irresistible and he purposely adopted a relatively
simpler and straightforward style to save digressions.
168
Yet, when
it came to identify the deeper motive behind the composition of
this
'River of Kings', Kalhana without any hint of apology or
hesitation, in clear firm tone, reiterates the old Epic attitude. "This
narrative [of mine] which is properly arranged and which
resembles a medicine, is useful where the [accounts regarding the]
place and time of kings are fluctuating. Or if [another aspect be
considered], what intelligent man's heart would not be pleased by
such a composition which treats of numberless events of ancient
times? When [the hearer] has pondered over the sudden
appearances of living beings that lasts for a moment only, then let
him judge of the sentiment of tranquillity (<anta rasa) which is to
rule supreme in this work."
169
Here the very kernel of the
underlying didactic motive reveals itself. The tumult of temporal
events ultimately reveals only their ephemeral nature leaving
behind a sentiment of quiet contemplation. Stein in his
introduction to the translation of Rajatarangini beautifully
captures the spirit of the work. "The transitory nature of all
mundane glory, the uncertainty of all royal possessions, and the
retribution which inevitably follows offences against the moral
laws, these are lessons which Kalhana never tires to impress upon
his readers. The chapters of Kashmir history which lay nearest to
his own time, and which he knew best, furnish Kalhana with
ample illustrations for these texts."
170
According to Tagore in some of Kalidasa's works, especially
his Raghuvamsa, the central theme is a portrayal of the violation
of dharma and its unfortunate consequences. This theme
expresses itself in the Raghuvamsa in the contrast intentionally
built between the way the founding of the line of Raghu and its
end are depicted. "The line of the Raghu begins in self-control
(samyama) and rigorous spiritual practice (tapasya), it ends in the
excess of dissipation and lust."
171
In the context of Kalhana's work the comments of Stein on the
worldview of the early Indian chroniclers is worth quoting. "
Neither the general drift of Hindu thought nor the specific
character of Kalhana's chronicle would justify us in looking to the
latter for conscious appreciation of what we understand as the
philosophy of history.... Yet this fact must not lead us to assume
that the Hindu chronicler could contemplate the records of the past
without being influenced by certain general ideas. Individual
events present themselves to his mind not as phenomena to be
traced to their causes. He looks upon them merely as illustrations
of those maxims, religious, moral or legal, which make up what
the Hindu designates so comprehensively as 'Dharma'."
112
The
statement, if we ignore the condescending Western superior tone
of the day in which it is couched, underlines an important aspect of
the world view that conditioned the early Indian outlook on past.
Right from the very beginning, i.e., the time of the composition
of the Rgveda, the time since which we begin getting evidence of
historical compositions,
113
the didactic profile of historical
narratives seems to have been prominent. These were generally
tuned to the celebration of positive aspects of human lives and
endeavours. Both gatha and narasamsi, the earliest class of
historical narratives that we encounter, were praises celebrating
men; the celebration of the heroic and noble dimensions of men
was their clear purpose.
114
The emphasis was unambiguously on
praiseworthy deeds. The Nirukta defines narasamsi as
compositions that sing the praise of men.
115
The few examples of
the actual Vedic gathas found quoted in the Brahmanas also
exemplify noble and heroic deeds and spacious times.
116
During
the horse sacrifice on the day the horse was let loose the lute
players had to sing freshly composed gathas praising the liberality
and military exploits of the sacrificer.
111
When this is viewed
along with the fact that a cycle of narration called pariplavam
consisting of akhyanas celebrating heroic and noble deeds of yore
was recounted over a whole year when the horse roamed about
freely,
118
it affords us a glimpse of the perspective in which past
was held. Here we find that the noble and heroic deeds of the
performer of sacrifice are juxtaposed with the similar memorable
deeds of the past. It symbolized, firstly, the model or the standard
that was set before the sacrificing king. The past was put forward
as an exemplar. Secondly, it also symbolized the aspiration of the
present to be a part of the traditions of greatness of past. Here the
present is depicted as seeking affiliation with the past. Moreover,
it also shows that the present is conscious of its responsibility for
the continuation of the past heritage of nobility and righteousness.
The Taittiriya Aranyaka which contains the earliest reference to
akhyayika
119
used the expression to illustrate a moral precept to
the effect that the teacher and the student should not quarrel.
180
This is how Sabara also interprets the significance of the term.
181
The Nirukta refers to a school that believed in interpreting the
Vedic hymns as representing itihasa or historical memory.
182
Similarly, the thinkers of the Mimamsa and the Nya~ya schools of
philosophy considered ancient events as arthavada or illustrations
of religious, moral and social precepts embodying age-old
wisdom.
183
A didactic role of a different order and level was also assigned
to historical accounts. This was didacticism of a more practical
and down to earth variety. An example of this kind of practical
relevance of 'past history' is found in the passage in Kautilya's
Arthasastra we have referred to above. Lessons in itihasa were
specially useful for a ruler. Itihasa was regarded as a practical
guide to right policy decisions. The general guidance in the
running of the state, in politics, in statecraft, in economics, could
be had from dandaniti and vartta. The general guidance in right
and wrong could be had from the Vedas (trayi) and philosophy
(anviksiki). These contained general guidance that could be
applied to broad policy choices. But when it came to specific
situations, the ruler looked to itihasa for light. Sieg has drawn
attention to such passages in the Mahabharata that have a formula
like look: "This doubt, O sage, is, like a dagger, implanted in my
heart; tear it out by the recital of itihasas that is my supreme
desire."
184
It is in the context of facing difficult situations
demanding appropriate course of action that 'the Mahabharata
usually quotes' the 'numerous itihasas' 'with the formula
atrapyudaharantimam itihasam puratanam'.
185
For a ruler itihasa was a kind of a ready corpus of practical case
histories of the application of dharma. The primary duty of the
king was to protect and govern people and to punish the
wrongdoers. But he could properly do so only when he
harmonized the act of governance with the fundamental principle
of order that sustains the universe (rta, dharma). The king was
called the upholder of dharma, the dharmapati, the dhrtavrata.
186

But dharma was not a set of dogma; every time place and occasion
would have its own rationale to determine what was proper and
good. Thus Santiparva wrote, "In response to time and place what
is proper may become improper and what is improper may
become proper".
181
The king was therefore often in fix to decide
what was dharma and what was adharma. The predicament is
colurfully given voice by Apastabmba: "Dharma and adharma do
not go about saying 'here we are', nor do gods, gandharva or
(departed) fathers say 'this is dharma, this is adharma'."
188
In the
Vanaparva we find an echo of the same: "Reason is fickle, the
scriptures (sruti) are discordant; no one sage's opinion is
authoritative. The truth about the dharma is buried in the cave. So
the path to follow is the one that has been walked by the great
men."
189
Itihasa is significant because it sheds light on the 'path of
the great'.
Obviously, the concept of caturvarga purusartha was an
important conditioning factor in determining the attitude towards
past. The relevance of a historical account had an intimate relation
with its ability to demonstrate the application of appropriate
purusarthas to individual conduct as well as to social transactions.
Itihasa in its broadest sense comprised lessons in all the four
purusarthas by illustrating how all four of them ought to be
pursued in a balanced and harmonious way without transgressing
the law of dharma. As Sieg had pointed out, the Sauti's question in
the beginning of the Mahabharata reflects this relation between
itihasa and purusarthas.
190
"What, ye twice-born shall I tell? The
meritorious tales collected in the Puranas filled with precepts of
duty and profit, (or) the acts of (itivrtta) of princes of men and
great-souled seers?"
191
The Mahabharata speaks of itself also as
arthasastra, dharmasastra and kamasastra.
192
We have noted
above that Kautilya's view of itihasa also reflects the same
attitude.
Itihasa in its widest sense thus covered within its scope all the
worthwhile aspects of human life, worthwhile aspects, as they
were understood in early India. And the more comprehensive
varieties of itihasa writings like the Ramayana, Mahabharata,
Puranas, Vamsas, etc., paid a balanced attention to all the four
purusarthas where all the four ends of life were harmoniously
blended with the central focus being on dharma. However, the
same kind of balanced attitude was not necessarily maintained in
all classes of works dealing with past. By the time the tradition of
historical writing began producing the relatively later carita
kavyas under courtly patronage, the texture of blend began
changing.
193
There was a marked shift in emphasis and focus.
Instead of the play and operation of dharma, the theme of these
carita kavyas centered on royal glory. Commenting on the nature
of the historical caritas Prof. Pathak remarked, "Because of the
romantic spirit of the age, the ornate style of the epic, and the
tradition of the Ramayana and the Brihatkatha, the poet historians
represented the abstract idea of royal glory in the form of a
beautiful princess symbolisig the goddess of fortune (mjya-sri),
whose love the king wins after overcoming insurmountable
difficulties."
194
In this new genre of historical writing dharma and
moksa are overshadowed by the dazzle of artha and kama.
In the works which had a lager frame than individual
biographies of ruling monarchs, the works, for example,
belonging to the vamsa tradition, continued the earlier standpoint.
Vamsa literature seems to have originated amidst a religious and
spiritual environment. The earliest specimens of vamsa literature
are found in the Brahmanas and Upanisads.
195
They contained
genealogical lists of ancient sages. That they do not make
reference to ruling kings can not be without significance. This
may in fact suggest that in the horizons of significance of the
authors of these texts political actors did not occupy too important
a space. Then the Buddhists adopted the form and reinforced its
religious association.
196
Perhaps because of this strong relation
with the sacred domain in its early days, the vamsa literature
despite its later association with royalty could not give up its
character. Its moorings remained anchored on the dharma. The
Rajatarngini may be cited as an example.
191
Since the akhyana,
akhyayika forms had associations with love and romance quite
early in the course of their development their association with
romantic figures like Pururava, Yayati, etc. goes back to the Vedic
periodthere were no such constraints for them to beget the
carita kavyas with marked predilections towards artha and
kama.
198
The concept of purusarthas not only influenced the
formation of the general attitude towards past in early India, but
the relative importance given to different purusarthas also acted
as markers for distinguishing different shades within that outlook.
The theory of four yugas provided the grand background
spectrum against which history was situated. This grand scheme,
expressed in the theory of yugantara and manvantara (kalpajokti
seems to have denoted the same thing), depicts the passage of vast
cosmic-time cycles.
199
The theory also incorporates a version of
cosmology. Yugantara denotes a cycle of four great successive
ages (yugas): krta, treta, dvapara, kali, charting a course of
progressive decline, moral as well as biological. Seventy-one of
such four-age periods (krta to kali) made up a manvantara.
200
This
scheme of progressive decline from the pristine golden age of krta
through treta and dvapara to the kali is a Puranic theory.
However, it bears more than a general similarity to the Buddhist
theory of the origin of civil society.
201
It appears that both the
Buddhist as well as the Puranic theories developed from a
common original source.
202
There are great many common
elements in them. The general pattern is the same: it is a story of
descent and the descent follows the genesis of avarice and
selfishness. And they bring in their train conflict and violence. The
decline is not only a moral degeneration but also physical; even
the physical stature of men dwindles.
Time in this scheme was conceived primarily at two levels:
cosmic and historical. But the first point that should be taken note
of is the astoundingly generous amplitude of time. "In contrast to
other civilizations which have been content to see man's history in
terms of thousands of years, Indians Buddhist, J ains as well as
Hindusspoke of billions of years. But even these figures, which
are nearly meaningless in their magnitude, are dwarfed by the
concept of cycles of aeons, endlessly renewing themselves,
without beginning or end. Time and historical process are parts of
a vast cyclical movement, but not, as in some cyclical versions of
history, a simple cycle of birth, growth, death and then rebirth with
a repetition of the past. Hindu model is of concentric circles,
moving within each other in a complex series of retrogressive
movements. The vastest cycle was a 'year of Brahma' which by
some reckoning was 311,040,000 million years long, with
Brahma's life lasting for one hundred of these cycles. This was
followed by the dissolution of all the worldsthose of men and
godsand then creation once more took place."
203
Within this mind-boggling time span covering the life of
Brahma, there is a smaller cycle, a kalpa or a day of Brahma which
lasts for 4,320 billion years long. A kalpa consists of the cycle of
succeeding four yugas. The duration of each of the yugas
progressively decreases. The kali within which the present history
is taking place is of the shortest duration, which
is 432,000 years.
The concept of time was posited at different levels. The cosmic
time comprising the cycle of primary 'creation' and 'dissolution
and re-creation' (sarga and pratisarga) forms the first level. Time
works havoc with the world making it old, defiled and polluted. It
can be regenerated only by calling into existence the beginning of
time, the re-creation of the world anew after the dissolution of the
old.
204
The cycle of sarga and pratisarga keeps on occurring in
repetitious rhythm weaving the fundamental pattern of cosmic
process, the succession of a series of remorseless decline from
krita to kali to pralaya. Running through these cycles of sarga and
pratisarga exists the second level, the historical time spanning the
vamsas and vamsyanucaritas, the genealogies of gods and sages
and the accounts of royal dynasties. It is the vamsas and
vamsyanucaritas, which provide focal points and centres to the
drifting sands of time lending the process its meaning and
significance for man as a social being. In the overarching theme of
drift and decline, the vamsa, manvantara and vamsanucarita
provide the footholds for history, however, precarious and
transitory they may be, in the total scheme of creation process.
There was also a third level. This third, however, can be described
as a part of the second level or subsidiary to it, because it resides
within that. This was the level of periodisation. Manvantaras
(cycles of manus) and vamsanucarita (dynastic accounts)
represented this level. The framework here allows room for the
entry of political history.
Yugantara theory contained within it a fusion of both circular
and linear notions of time expressing it as events. The creation and
dissolution, the sarga and pratisarga, and the endless cycles of
these successions represented circularity. But the succession of the
yugas, from krita to kali, is one steep descent that is somewhat
linear. It is noteworthy that vamsa and vamsyanucarita, the staple
historical elements in this scheme, fall within the linear range.
Thus while from the cosmological point of view the yugantara
theory represents circular dimension, from the perspective of
history it also bears a linear aspect.
Set against this vast magnitude, dates and chronology are
reduced to invisible specs of dust. But then what is the value of
human life and itihasa in this cosmic march without beginning and
end? It is only by taking hold of the plank of dharma that one
attains meaning and significance in this endless drift, and in this
way one can save oneself.
205
Past thus was considered relevant so
far as it could guide men to lead life in consonance with the
purusarthas, especially in consonance with dharma.
It taught man precepts of duty.
206
History shows the right path to
follow in a world that is primarily ephemeral.
207
It held before him
shining examples of how the difficult path of duty can actually be
trodden despite trials and tribulations.
208
The early Indian
perception of history would endorse the statement of Collingwood
that history demonstrates what man is capable of. One does not
know one's capacity unless one has tried doing a thing. History
shows what man has done in the past and thus shows what man
can do.
209
However, the convergence of the early Indian attitude to past
with that of the modern in regard to its value and relevance does
not go along the same route. Early Indian perception strongly
believes that history holds important lesson for man, but it does
not engage in a Positivist project to discover that lesson through an
exhausting empirical method of doubtful validity. It does not
believe that itihasa is capable of yielding the knowledge of
universal laws that govern the society. The value of itihasa does
not lie in that direction; it does not lead to discovery; it
exemplifies. It is the trayi and anviksiki that yield the knowledge
of the laws that govern the society, and not itihasa.
210
Even a
pragmatic writer like Kautilya gives itihasa a lower position than
trayi and anviksiki.
211
The laws of the rta or dharma that govern
the universe, including the functioning of human society, can not
be discovered from ithasa. Itihasa only demonstrates that human
life is subject to the inexorable laws of dharma. Similarly, early
Indian perception does not believe that the study of itihasa can
lead to the discovery of the inexorable law of the succession of the
yugas. An understanding of the operation of the laws of yuga on
the other hand enhances the understanding of the nature of itihasa.
There was a certain amount of ambivalence in the attitude to
itihasa as a source of knowledge. Initially gatha and narasamsi,
because of their secular overtone, were viewed with some
suspicion, and, even, disapproval. They were sometimes even
regarded as false.
212
Yet, the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad put itihasa
almost on equal footing with the Veda.
213
Candogya
Upanisad granted itihasa-purana the status of the 'fifth Veda'.
214
Itihasa-purana continued to enjoyed that status in the subsequent
periods as well. The mediation of the Atharvan and Angirasa
priests might have smoothened the passage of the Itihasa-purana
to the Vedic fold as it appears from another very interesting
reference to the Itihasa-puranaa in the third adhyaya of Candogya
Upanisad. The relevant passages occur in the context of the
exposition of the doctrine of honey.
215
The import of the adhyaya
is of course spiritual and mystic, and its vocabulary and idiom are
preponderantly symbolical.
216
But the important information that
the passages yield for us is that Itihasa-purana constituted the
very core of Atharvaveda; it was the 'flower' that supplied honey
to the Atharvaveda in the same manner as the rk supplied honey to
the Rgveda, the yajus to the Yajurveda and the saman to the
Samaveda. Itihasa-purana was the very heart of Atharvaveda.
Itihasa also came to take its place among the vidyasthanas or
the sources of dharma. But too much perhaps should not be read in
this. Sheldon Pollock has mentioned that there was a growig
tendency to inflate the list of the vidyasthanas; with the passage of
time more and more disciplines and sciences were
accommodated.
217
Kumarila accommodated gandharvaveda,
ayurveda, arthasastra, etc. in the list.
218
And more and more
disciplines began claiming either descent from the Veda or
revelatory status in the sense that originally a god had propounded
the discipline.
219
But the moot point is what was the status of
itihasa as a source of dharma? Pollock has pointed out that
Kumarila was careful to distinguish the adrstarthaka or the
transcendent disciplines that were 'independently authoritative'
from the drstarthaka which were not so.
220
Itihasa belonged to the
drstarthaka category.
It is noteworthy that itihasa does not figure among the sources
of dharma in the dharmasastra tradition or in the arthasastra
tradition.
221
Referring to the sources of law (dharmamulaa), the
Dharmasutras name just three: the Veda, the smrti, the good
custom (sadacara, sistacara).
222
Manu and
Yajnavalkya list one more source to these three: the inner
satisfaction (svasya priyam atmanah, atmatusti).
223
Lingat has
shown that the appeal to the inner voice as a source of dharma
from purely legal point of view could be problematic.
224
This
opened the way for the entry of reason and logic as the ground of
dharma. Gautama, Yajnavalkya, Narada, Brhaspati more openly,
and Manu a little less unambiguously, allowed some scope for
reason and logic.
225
In other words, this would give some space to
anviksikl as a source of dharma.
226
It is also true that some smrtis
do give as much importance to the study of itihasa and purana as
to that of the Vedas.
221
But in spite of all these, it remains clear that
it did not acquire any direct and active role as a source of
knowledge; its role was illustrative and not constitutive. Its value
lay in demonstrating the workings of dharma. As a source of
dharma, it did not get the status like sruti or smrti. Nilakantha in
his commentary states that the Mahabharata is actually an
'illustration of the essential meaning of all the fourteen
vidyasthanas".
228
As far as the theoretical position is concerned,
one did not look to Itihasa for the exposition of dharma, except as
part of an old narrative; one looked to it for instances of
exemplification of dharma.
229
Although itihasa was regarded at some level as affirming the
operation of a sovereign law, say, of dharma, it will be incorrect to
think that itihasa was assigned the role of validation. Early Indian
perception did not think that dharma required validation by
history. The nature of aitihasika lesson was only considered as
illustrative. This is how the Nirukta looked upon the school of
aitihasika.
230
IX
Let us now attempt a recapitulation of the foregoing discussion
mainly in the light of the questions we identified in the first
section. In its philosophical and intellectual outlook early India
was definitely not ahistorical. Right from the days of Rigveda, a
lively consciousness of past permeated the whole body of her
intellectual output. There is hardly any branch of discipline she
was interested in that does not exhibit this consciousness. This
consciousness did not represent a faded memory of a distant past
devoid of relevance to the present. On the other hand this
consciousness of past represented a precious heritage handed
down by the wise ancients, the fathers, the predecessors (purve
srotriyah, pitar
2231
purvasmi). This heritage embodied the
tradition (amnaya) of knowledge and wisdom (jhana) regarding
the fundamental truth or law (rita, dharma) and its operation in the
world of men (acara, vyavahara).
Early India was intensely alive to the dynamics of time and
events and their interrelationship. In the context of history this
interrelationship between time and events were conceptualized
within the universal paradigm of a process of creation and
dissolution. This dyad of creation and dissolution have to pass
through an endless cycles of eons and still larger eons in a series of
concentric circles. The succession of these cycles weaves the
fundamental pattern of universal history. The path charting the
movement from the creation to dissolution is one of steady
regression. Within this universal paradigm the history of temporal
world is primarily circular. It looks pessimistic; and coupled with
its deterministic character, it looks even more irretrievably
pessimistic. However, dharma opens ajar the door of escape from
temporality. When human history is grounded on dharma it lights
up the avenue the great men have walked. History is an exemplar;
it should exemplify the working of dharma in human affairs. But it
should do so by recounting what had happened in this temporal
(dristarthaka) world and not by imaginary tale (katha). This is the
basic theme of itihasa (history), and this is its grand archetypal
image.
Within this grand cyclical theory of history comprising endless
successions of yugantaras, there exists room for linear segments
that can become the vehicles of histories of more limited
dimensions. These 'limited' histories too have dharma as their
central theme and their narrative pattern often tries to follow the
archetypal model.
232
But they also bear a greater degree of
likeness to the modern look of history. Itihasa, purana, gatha,
narasamsi, akhyana, akhyayika, vamsa,carita, etc. all signified
history, but in their conception and scope they were not the same.
The puranas, more comprehensively, and the Ramayana and
Mahabharata, more restrictively, represented the universal
paradigm of history, the itihasa-purana proper. The gatha,
narasamsi, akhyana, akhyayika, vamsa, carita, etc. represented
history of linear segments. These linear histories again represent
segments of different length. While gatha and narasamsi were
essentially episodic, the vamsa spanned the history of a lineage.
233

Akhyana, akhyayika were also generally episodic, but could cover
more than one episode. Carita was essentially biographical
history. While dealing with historical narratives of early India, at
least three levels should be distinguished: (a) the universal history
of itihasa-purana, (b) history of linear segments and (c)
contemporary records that were maintained by state and other
organizations. Contemporary records maintained by professional
experts
234
provided the basic material for larger works.
Early Indian concept of itihasa differed from the modern idea
of history on many counts. Some of the major differences may be
noted.
235
In the early Indian perception there existed no sharp
distinction between myths, heroic legends, and hagiography.
Itihasa often mixed elements from all the three. In the
contemporary perception, history is regarded basically as a
humanistic discipline. Humanism projects man in his ordinary
day-to-day life that reveals both his noble as well as his less
agreeable aspects. In other words, the concern of history now is
with the man in his ordinary and normal self. Itihasa on the other
hand is not interested in describing man in his ordinary self, it
rather seeks to unfold the ideal man or the ideal in man. In history
there is no place for the supernatural, the miraculous, or the
transcendental. Itihasa on the other hand gave the transcendental
and the miraculous an important place in its concerns.
236
There are some other interesting differences between history and
itihasa in the way they view the train of events relating to the life
and actions of men. Both view them as a process or processes. But
the notions of this process in history and itihasa differ
fundamentally from each other. Historical process, in the modern
concept of history, is regarded as subject to the law of cause-effect
as it obtains in the world of nature. This has led history to embrace
more and more the methodology of science. The historical process
is regarded as linear and progressive. It believes in the
inevitability of progress. Moreover, the orientation of history now
has become predominantly social. It is the society that is now
regarded as the proper subject matter of history.
231
So the progress
in history means the progress of the society. And, the business of
history is to elucidate the course of this progress of society. The
itihasa view of the process is wholly different. The process is not
linear; it is cyclical. The course of this process is regressive, from
krta to kali. There is a strong underlying notion of inevitability in
it. Since the conflict of the sat and asat constitutes the
fundamental theme of itihasa, an individual can circumvent to a
certain extent this inevitability by mounting the vehicle, as it were,
of the sat. Some great men appear from time to time to show the
way to the realization of the sat. The orientation of itihasa is
individualistic. It is the extraordinary individuals who show the
way, and it is the individuals who have to strive to follow the right
path.
238
Itihasa is not an objective account of a causally
determined course of events, but an account of the striving for the
realization of purusarthas embedded in the social and moral laws.
Itihasa thus stimulates right action; it illustrates a seeking of
values within the world of action.
239
History puts the highest premium on factuality. A progressive
disposition to eliminate the role of intuition in historical
interpretation has become the hallmark of historical study today.
The notion of factuality in itihasa belonged to a different level.
We have noted above that contrary to widespread belief, primary
records, especially those pertaining to administration were
compiled in early India with care and diligence. But when these
facts were presented as parts of larger statements to the public,
whether in the epigraphic form of prasastis or in the literary form
of caritas, they were set into a conventional pattern.
240
We have
seen above that according to some narrativist theorists it is the
availability and utilization of the culturally evolved literary forms
and conventions that make the construction and communication of
meanings of a narrative effective.
241
Literary conventions seem to
have inspired the growth of formalized patterns of presentation
that the caritas and prasastis followed. Epigraphic prasastis
usually followed the literary kavya style and form; the constraints
of space, of course, did not allow the freedom of elaboration to the
same degree as in literary kavyas. Prof. Pathak has underlined how
the caritas deployed a structured emplotment in their narrative.
They followed a fixed line in the development or the unfolding of
the story through a uniform succession of stages from prarambha
to phalagama.
242
The tendency of the caritas and the prasastis to highlight only
the brighter side of their protagonists may have been also due to
the influence of another literary convention that there should be
happy endings to the stories generating a sense of fulfillment.
Moreover, the presentation of the brighter side also served the
immediate political objective of publicity and legitimization of
power. It also accorded with the requirements of itihasa with its
emphasis on the 'memorable'. In the longer vamsa variety of works
like Raghuvamsa or Rajatarangini the narrative is not limited to
the highs alone but also includes the low.
243
The desire to conform
to a pattern, the desire for literary felicity, the desire for political
prestige and legitimacy, etc., sometimes resulted in the
overworking of the original material. Moreover, even at the
primary stage of recording, in great many instances it was done
orally. Many of the professional class who were entrusted with the
task of keeping these records, like the genealogists, the bards,
committed the primary material to memory. It was only natural
that distortions took place. But there is no ground to disbelieve
that these historical narratives contain some substructure of
factuality. Interpreted with patience, skill and imagination they
can yield interesting trustworthy information.
244
While dealing
with the pastm, the present has a natural inclination to assume a
sense of superiority and to look at it with suspicion and
condescension. Unless one succumbs to such temptations, these
works may be sifted for reaching to that substructure of truth.
Itihasa-purana literature played a very significant role in the
formation of early Indian culture and it played an even more
crucial role in the dissemination of that culture among the masses.
It acted as a living repository of the past, its glories, its wisdom, its
ideal of righteous conduct. Itihasa-purana achieved a relatively
more intimate contact with the mass than perhaps any other strand
of early Indian tradition. But as a source of knowledge its role
remained secondary. Itihasa-purana scarcely had any primary
role in the generation or construction of knowledge; its role was
illustrative. The notion of historical knowledge does not resonate
well with the character of itihasa. Even though it had been
included among the vidyasthanas, it was thought that itihasa did
not provide any special kind of knowledge that are not available
from other sources. Its value was illustrative rather than
generative. Whatever value it had in the direction of knowledge
formation, it was derived from the fact that itihasa came to be
regarded as a part of smrti. As a source of the knowledge of
dharma, it enjoyed a peripheral position. But it enjoyed great
importance as a storehouse and propagator of the idea of dharma;
and it exemplified dharma in operation. In this context it is
noteworthy that even in ancient Greece, which is regarded as the
land of birth of the discipline of history, history did not enjoy any
central role in the Greek universe of knowledge. "Recent work on
Greek and Latin historiography shows, for example, that, contrary
to accepted belief, the idea of history did not constitute in itself an
important philosophical, religious or cultural question in antiquity,
and that history was largely marginalized in both philosophical
and popular thought."
245
MacIntyre has noted the absence of "any
sense of specifically historical in our sense in Aristotle, as in
any other Greek thinkers". He has in fact noted the absence of any
sense of "historicity in general" in ancient Greece.
246
Why no regular historiographical literature has been found
from early India? We may briefly touch on this question. We have
noted above the opinions of Macdonell, Winternitz, Kieth,
Riencourt, etc. The relation between consciousness of history and
a heightened sense of nationalism, to put it mildly, is rather
problematic. If Persian war created a sense of nationality among
the Greeks, the success against the Persian invasion and the role of
Athens in it led to the aggravation of the already existing political
cleavages between the Greek states.
247
Winternitz's claim that
Indians did not have a taste for critical analysis is not fully
admissible. In the context of Winternitz's contention, a school of
philosophy like the Navya Nyaya, for instance, demonstrate the
pitfall of attributing any blanket character to the complex
civilization of early India.
Recently some more opinions on the issue have been expressed.
Sheldon Pollock has referred to the suggestion of Herman Kulke
that the functional disjunction created by the varna system had
inhibited the development of historiography as a discipline in
early India.
248
Since the record keepers belonged to the caste of
Kayasthas and the potential writers of history belonged to the
Brahmana varna, this disjunction took place. Kulke's formulation
magnifies the impact of varna and jati differences on the
functioning of the society. Despite occupational divisions, various
occupational and jati groups often cooperated in common
endeavours. The ratnins belonging to different occupational
groups participated in the coronation rituals.
249
Even in the temple
rituals different jati groups had their assigned roles. Damodarpur
inscriptions bear testimony to the cooperation of various groups in
the running of the local administration. These are only a few of the
very well known instances of cooperation of different jati and
occupational groups.This alleged disjunction did not seem to have
created any problem for the Brahmana Kalhana in consulting the
old records to which he seemed to have enjoyed smooth access.
In an interesting elaboration of the theory that the nature of the
intellectual environment in early India was anti-historical,
Sheldon Pollck has tried to identify the factors behind the
development of this environment and give an explanation of the
anti-historical mentality.
250
"I would like to explore this context by
examining a set of notions developed by Mimamsathe
pedagogically and thus culturally normative discipline of
Brahmanical learningwhich may not only have contributed to
discouraging the kind of referentiality we are concerned with, but
more may be said to have sought to deny the category of history
altogether as irrelevant, or even antithetical, to real knowledge."
251

Briefly, Pollock's argument runs like this. Mimamsa theory
comprises the following parts:
(1) ' dharma, that which constitutes the good (artha) in human
existence' alone forms the subject matter of knowledge proper,
(2) dharma is a 'transcendent entity', (3) dharma is 'unknowable
by any form of knowledge not itself transcendent'. This
formulation, Pollock argues, leaves no space for history because
transcendent is eternal and is without a beginning. Thus Veda
alone embodies knowledge, for, the Veda does not have any
beginning; it is timeless. The aitihasika school of interpretation
failed to cut any ice because it attempted to fix the Veda in a
timeframe. Consequent upon the dominant influence of Mimamsa,
there was a complete Vdicization of discourse. And under the
dispensation of this dominant discourse even itihasa (what has
actually taken place) became 'merely another texualization of
eternity, an always-already given discourse'.
252
Pollock is right in
his formulation that since dharma constituted the proper subject
matter of itihasa, it did not encourage the development of a
historiography anchored on chronology. But he could have
skipped the elaborate Mimamsa argument. It has not really added
much substance to his main thesis. Moreover, the alleged
Mimamsa dominance over the discourse will not be able to
account for why the Buddhist and J ain showed the same manner of
predilection towards dharma in their vision of history as the
vaidika vision.
253
History, however, can not acquire any meaning
and significance unless it posits some invariant entity. Can history
accommodate the postulation of a transcendent invariant? This
issue we will take up later in part two and in the epilogue of our
work.
Navjyoti Singh has advanced the interesting thesis that there
can not be any history of justice.
254
J ustice as events and events of
justice do not lend themselves to linearity. History is actually a
history of injustice while itihasa aimed to become a narrative of
justice.
255
Thus history and itihasa can not be put in the same
category.
Since the historical records, and also perhaps dynastic histories,
were kept in the archives of states or in the custody of the ruling
families, their preservation was likely to be affected by political
vicissitudes. As these were kept in politically sensitive places,
they were particularly vulnerable to political disturbances. And
many of the royal biographies or the praises of the rulers did not
presumably achieve great literary quality. Those that did had a
much higher chance of being carefully preserved. In times of
disturbance people try to preserve what they value most. People
did not set much store by historical records or ordinary historical
compositions. Their chance of survival in disturbance-prone areas
was never very bright. It is interesting that historical chronicles
and genealogies have been found more in the borderland areas of
the country, compared to the heartland: in Kashmir, in Nepal, in
Assam, etc. Perhaps because these areas did not suffer the same
degree of disturbances as the heartland.
256
REFERENCES
1. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. I. University of Chicago Press, 1985,
pp.95ff. The hold of scientific model is somewhat slackening now with
narrative making a comeback in history; See below Section III. But
already there are signs of reaction against narrative, Reconstructing
History, ed. Elizabeth Fox-
Genovese &Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Routledge, New York, London,
1999; cf. Allex Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, Polity Press,
Cambridge 1995; Brian Fay, 'Introduction' in History and Theory:
Contemporary Readings, edited by Brian Fay, Philip Pomper, Richard T.
Vann, Blackwell, 1998.
2. Amaury de Riencourt, The Soul of India, Sterling, New Delhi,
1986, p. 15.
3. Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, Sunny
Press, Albany, 1988, pp. 87ff gives a gist of Hegel's and Mill's evaluations;
cf. Romila Thapar, Early India, Penguin Books, London, 2002, pp. 5ff
4. A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature, William Heinemann,
London, 1900, pp. 10-11; cited by Arvind Sharma, Hinduism and Its Sense
of History, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, p.28, note 60 points
out that while making his evaluation Macdonell did not have the
advantage of fully considering Kalhana's Rajataranginl which had just
appeared.
5. M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, vol. III, pt. I,
tr. Subhadra J ha, Delhi 1977, p. 3.
6. A. B. keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, Delhi 1973, pp.14447; K. M.
Panikkar thinks that the inhibition of 'the emergence of a conception of
Hindu nationhood' was in a way both a cause and effect of lack of interest
in developing historiography, The Foundations of New India, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1963, p. 67
7. Arvind Sharma, Hinduism and Its Sense of History, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi 2003, p.1. Sharma has given, particularly in the first
three chapters, a wide variety of examples of such opinions covering
different shades and nuances.
8. Sheldon Pollock, 'Mimamsa and the Problem of History in Traditional
India', Journal of the American Oriental Society, 109.4, 1989, pp. 603-
610; Michael Witzel, 'On Indian Historical Writing : The Role of the
Vamsavalis', Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies,
2, 1990, pp. 1-57, Arvind Sharma, op.cit., are some of the examples.
9. A. K Warder, 'The Pali Canon and its Commentaries as an Historical
Record' in Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. C. H. Philips,
London 1961, p. 44.
10. Nyaya-Vaisesika systems may be cited as obvious examples; cf. Anindita
Niyogi Balslev, A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy, Otto Harrassowitz,
Wiesbaden, 1983, Chapters VII & VIII are especially pertinent from our
point of view.
11. See U. N. Ghoshal, Studies in Indian History and Culture, pt. One,
Calcutta 1965; A. K. Warder, An Introduction to Indian Historiography,
Bombay 1973.
12. A noteworthy endeavour in this direction is the work of V.S. Pathak,
Ancient Historians of India, Bombay 1966 and Gorakhpur 1984.
13. Geoffrey Roberts, 'Introduction' in The History and Narrative Reader, ed.
Geoffrey Roberts, Routledge, London and New York, 2001 p. 1.
14. Louis Mink, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension' in History
and Theory: Contemporary Readings, edited by Brian Fay, Philip Pomper,
Richard T. Vann, Blackwell, 1998, p. 121, cf. B. Croce, "For Aristotle
history was 'less philosophical' and less serious than poetry, for Sextus
Empiricus, it was 'unmethodical material'.", 'Historical Determinism and
the Philosophy of History' in Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner, The
Free Press, New York, 1959, p. 238.
15. Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History, part I.
16. G.R. Elton, Practice of History, (Second Edition) Blackwell,
Oxford, 2002.
17. Historians, however, were not so impervious to the debates on
issues like the question of objectivity in history, Peter Novick,
That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
American Historical Profession, Cambridge University Press,
1988.
18. W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, London 1951; P.
Gardiner, The Nature of HistoricalExplanation, OUP, Oxford, 1952, P.
Gardiner, ed. Theories of History; W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History,
Prencie Hall, 1964; Gardiner, ed. The Philosophy of History, OUP, 1974;
R. F. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation in History, Macmillan,
London 1978, give a fair sample of the traditional interests of philosophy
of history.
19. Brian Fay, 'Introduction' in History and Theory: Contemporary Readings,
ed. Brian Fay, et al, p. 2.
20. Geoffrey Roberts, 'Introduction', Roberts, ed. The History and Narrative
Reader, p.2 ; cf. P. Ricoeur, Time and the Narrative, vol. I, University of
Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 95ff.
21. G. Roberts, op.cit., pp.2-3, 18, note 5.
22. Lawrence Stone, 'The Revival of Narrative' in Roberts, ed. The History
and Narrative Reader, p. 281.
23. Richard Lanham, Literacy and the Survival of Humanism, New
Haven 1983.
24. Brian Fay, op.cit. p.2; cf. Structure, Consciousness and History, ed.
Richard H. Brown and Stanford M. Lyman, Cambridge University Press,
1978.
25. Brian Fay, op.cit. p. 3.
26. Louis O Mink, Historical Understanding, Cornell University Press, Ithaca
NY,1987; H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth Century Europe, The J ohns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore 1973; H. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse
and Historical Representation, The J ohns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore 1987; F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of
Historian's Language, The Hague 1983; F. R. Ankersmit, History and
Tropology, University of California Press, Berkeley 1994.
27. Mink, Historical Understanding, p. 12.
28. Mink, Historical Understanding, p. 168, Italics authors own
29. Brian Fay, op.cit. p. 5.
30. Mink, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension' in History and
Theory: Contemporary Readings, ed. Brian Fay, et al., p. 135.
31. H. White, 'The Historical Text as Literary Artifact' in The history and
Narrative Reader, ed. Geoffrey Roberts, p.224
32. H. White, 'The Historical Text as Literary Artifact' in The History and
Narrative Reader, ed. Geoffrey Roberts, pp. 224225, Italics authors.
33. The consideration of historical processes has not completely disappeared
from the radar screen of critical philosophy of history, Frederick A.
Olafson, The Dialectic of Action: A Philosophical Interpretation of
History and the Humanities, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979.
34. By grand narrative I do not mean only the Marxist interpretation of
history, but any overarching narrative that takes the universal historical process
as its theme. Cf. Peter Burke, 'History of Events and the Revival of Narrative' in
Geoffrey Roberts,op.cit.,
p. 305.
35. See above the views of Mink and White.
36. White, 'The Historical Text as Literary Artifact' in The History and
Narrative Reader, ed. Geoffrey Roberts, pp. 231, 233.
37. W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History, Chapters 5-8. Alex Callinicos,
Theories and Narratives, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995, argues that
theories of history covering entire course of history are necessary for an
understanding of past. One can perhaps detect faint sounds of footstep of
the return of the grand narrative in Huntingon's 'civilizational'
framework,Samuel Muntington The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remking of World Order, Simon Schuster, New York, 1996.
38. Huizinga defined history as "The intellectual form in which a civilization
renders account to itself of its past" and contended that the history
produced in a civilization should reflect its characteristic value system, J .
Huizinga, 'A Definition of the Concept of History' in Philosophy and
History, ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J . Paton, New York, 1936, pp.
8-9.
39. Rgveda, VII.87.4; Michael Witzel, 'On Indian Historical Writing: The Role
of the Vamsavalis', Journal of the Association for South Asian Studies, 2,
1990, p. 6.
40. Witzel, op.cit., p. 6.
41. Witzel, ibid.
43. Anirvana, Veda Mimamsa (Bengali), vol. I, Calcutta Sanskrit College,
1991 (reprint). P. 235, cf. pp. 222ff.
44. Strong streaks of continuity and change are found embedded in Indian
culture; D.G. Mandelabaum, Society in India, vols. I &II, Berkeley,
California, 1970; Milton Singer, When a Great Tradition Modernizes,
Praeger, New York, 1972; Rudolph, S.H and Rudolph, L.I., The Modernity
of Tradition, Free Press, New york 1964; Y. Singh, Modernization of
Indian Tradition, Delhi
1973.
45. Panini mentions more than sixty previous authors, Caraka
mentions over fifty. Bharata lists hundred experts in dramaturgy.
Yaska records the existence of several exegetical schools that
approached the Vedas from different points of views, Arvind Sharma,
op.cit. pp. 106-107. Kautilya mentions the names of various arthasastra
schools besides the names of some individual authorities,K.P. Kangle,
Kautillya Arthasastra, part III, University of Bombay 1965, pp. 42ff.
46. Raghuvamsa I. 4.
47. Meghadutam, Purvamegha, 31.
48. Meghadutam, Purvamegha, 34.
49. Ainslie T. Embree, ed. Alberuni's India Translated by Edward C Sachau,
New York, W. W. Norton & Company,1971, Part II, pp. 10-11.
50. See Arvind Sharma's comment, op. cit. pp. 27-28, note 46
51. From their observations we can draw the following conclusions that seem
to be relevant to the issues under discussion: (a) Indians were not keen on
military conquests of foreign countries, (b) they were not unfamiliar with
the practice of keeping written records or averse to it, (c) they were
inclined to keep durable written records of matters of legal implications,
and, (d) their intellectual and academic transactions were still heavily oral
in orientation, Arvind Sharma, op.cit., pp. 2-9. The Greco-Romans and
Chinese were as history conscious as the Arabs.
52. Arthasastra, 2.7.1-2.
53. Kangle, Kautlliya Arthasastra, Part III, p. 201.
54. ibid.
55. Arthasastra, 2.35.1-7; Kangle, op.cit., Part III, pp. 197-98
56. Rajatarangini, V.397 -398. There are also references to the 'store-house of
plates' (phalaka vara) maintained by states and other record offices,
besides aksapatala in inscriptions, D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, Delhi
1965, p. 99.
57. D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, p. 99.
58. A.L. Bashma, The Wonder that was India, Fontana Books, in association
with Rupa & Co, 1974, Second Impression, p.101, quoted by Arvind
Sharma, op.cit., p.124, note 136.
59. Arvind Sharma, op.cit., pp.122-23, note 132.
60. ibid.
61. ibid.
62. Samuel Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World Translated from the
Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang; cited by Arvind Sharma, op.cit., p. 124, note
135. These records were not just eulogistic, they also included events of
negative dimension.
63. D. C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, p.14. Afghanistan and India generally
shared the same cultural and intellectual milieu.
64. D. C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, pp.14-15.
65. Rajatarhgini, I.14.
66. Rajatarhgini, I.15.
67. A. K. Warder, An Introduction to Indian Historiography, has given a short
account of the historiography current in different regions of the country.
68. Material preserved in the Mathas, Bhandams, etc., have not yet been
utilized properly; only some beginnings have been made. Material
pertaining to the life of Sankaracarya in Sringeri and Kanchi mathas have
been utilized by Prof. G. C. Pande, in his works on Sankaracarya.
Nepalese Vamsavali had been used earlier by Levy, Bendall, and now by
Witzel, Witzel. Op.cit.,
pp. 38-39.
69. J unagarh Inscription of Rudradaman, Mandasor Inscription, Hatigumpha
Inscription, Siaydoni Inscription, etc. D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, pp.
19, 21-22.
70. These colourful words were used by Tocqueville in the context of
mediaeval Europe, cited by Andre Beteille, The Idea of Natural Inequality
and Other Essay, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 40.
71. Rgveda, II.12.11, reference is made to Indra's tenacious search of Sambara
for 'forty autums' after which he succeeded in slaying him.
72. See below, Section VIII.
73. D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, p. 241.
74. D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, pp. 237ff.
75. Colas, Pandyas, Palas and some other dynasties continued to use year of
reign for dating, D.C. Sircar, Indian Epigraphy, pp.
241-42.
76. Rgveda, IX.10.3.
77. Macdonell and Keith, Vedic Index, Delhi 1967, vol. I, p. 225,
vol. II, p. 316.
78. U.N. Ghoshal, Studies in Indian History and Culture, Calcutta
1965, pp. 2-6.
79. Satapatha Brahmana, XIII, 4.2.8-11, 4.3.15; Katyayana Srauta Sutra
XX.2.7-8.
80. ASvalayana Grhyasutra, 1.14.6-7.
81. Satapatha Brahmana, X.6.5.9; Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, VI.3.
14.
82. Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 445.
83. Aitareya Brahmana, VII. 18.
84. Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 224 s.v. gatha notes 3, 4.
85. Atharvaveda, XV. 6.3.4.
86. Kathaka Samhita, XIV.5.
87. Satapatha Brahmana,1.1.1.4.
88. V.S. Pathak, Ancient Historians of India, p. 2.
89. Rgveda, IX.10.3.
90. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 4-5.
91. Aitareya Brahmana, VII.18; Satapatha Brahmana, XIII.4.3.2.15.
92. Aitareya Brahmana, III.25.1.
93. Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 122.
94. Ghoshal, op.cit., p. 8; Rgveda, X.95; for Urvasi-Pururava legend
Winternitz, op.cit. vol. I, tr. S. Kelkar, Delhi 1972, p. 100ff.
95. Atharvaveda, XB. 6.4 et.seq.
96. Vedic Index, vol. I. pp. 76-78.
97. Candogya Upanisad, VII.1.2 combines itihasa and purana to constitute
the fifth Veda. Gopatha Brahmana,1.10 speaks both of itihasaveda
andpumnaveda. cf., Sankhyayana Srauta Sutra, XVI,, 2.21.27; Satapatha
Brahmana XIII. 4.3.12.13.
98. S.N. Roy, Historical and Cultural Studies in the Puranas, Allahabad 1978,
pp. 9-10.
99. Ghoshal, op.cit. p. 17. The general opinion of early authorities thus
identify creation accounts with purana.
100. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I, p. 519. Date of Kautilya's ArthaSastra continues
to be debated. Many scholars accept the tradition that Kautilya was the
chancellor of Candragupta Maurya.
101. The training programme is detailed in ArthaSastra chapters 1.57. For the
text and translation of ArthaSastra we have used R.P. Kangle, Kautiliya
ArthaSastra parts I & II, Bombay 1969, 1972
102. ArthaSastra, 1.4.13.
103. ArthaSastra, 1.4.14.
104. ArthaSastra, 1.6.
105. For akhyana and akhyayika see V.S. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 6-9
and Vedic Index, vol. I, pp. 52,77. Bana's Harsacarita is called
akhyayika, see Pathak, op.cit., pp. 14, 26-29.
106. Satapatha Brahmana, XIII. 4.3.15.
107. Pathak, op.cit., p. 8.
108. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 26ff, 36-37, 84-85.
109. F. E. Pargiter,Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, Delhi 1972,
chapters I, XXV, XXVI.
110. The concept of history in the Arthasastra thus was surprisingly
liberal and modern.
111. See below, sections VIII & IX.
112. Arthasastra, 1.5.7-14.
113. See below, section VIII.
114. Learning for the prince was not just an academic or intellectual luxury;
it was of practical value for the disciplining of conduct and the building
of character and. "From (continuous) study ensues a (trained) intellect,
from intellect (comes) practical application, (and) from practical
application (results) self-possession; such is the efficacy of sciences.",
Arthasastra, 1.5.16, Kangle, part II, p. 11.
115. Kautilya, despite his open advocacy of single-minded pursuit of power
by the prince, kept on repeating that it is the temperate conduct and
character of the ruler that provides a sold foundation for durable power.
"Acquisition of learning is, however, not enough for the ruler. He must
be able to exercise control over his senses (indriyajaya), and keep such
passions as lust, anger, avarice, pride and so on in check. It is also
considered essential that he should avoid addiction to vices."; Kangle,
op.cit., Part III, p.130. Lessons in itihasa help the ruler to cultivate
indriyajaya; it demonstrates the disastrous consequences of intemperate
conduct, see note 116.
116. Arthasastra,1.6.4-12.
117. Pathak, op.cit. pp. 27-29.
118. Harsacarita, Introduction, verse 10; Pathak, op.cit. p. 36.
119. See above note 65; Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I, P. 317 note 1 and
pp. 375ff.
120. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 311-316.
121. Visnu Purana, III.6.15. See also Pargiter, op.cit., p. 21,
especially note 13.
123 Upavrmhana was the process through which fresh material was added.
124. See below note 133.
125. Pargiter, op.cit., pp. 25-28.
126. Vayu Purana, 1.31-32. C.f., Padma Purana, V.1. 27-28.
127. Garga Samhita, Golakakhanda referred to by Pargiter, op.cit., p. 17, note
2; S.N. Roy, Historical and Cultural Studies in the Puranas, p. 20.
128. ArthaSastra, 3.7.29; see also Kangle's comment that the sutra might not
have been a part of the original text, R. P. Kangle, Kautiliya ArthaSastra,
pt. III, Bombay 1965, pp. 27-28.
129. Pathak, op.cit., pp.9-17, 21-26.
130. Candogya Upanisad, III.3.4; III.4.1-2.
133. Pargiter, op.cit., pp. 24, 36-37. The line of argument of Pargiter that
originally the puranas were the works of professional sutas untouched by
Brahmanical influence is not acceptable to many scholars. We have noted
above Pathak's opinion that pauranika sutas were originally Brahmanas.
Moreover, the original compiler of the Puranasamhita, Krsna Dvaipayana
was a Brahmana. This would also go against Pargiter's theory.
134. Winternitz thinks that religious and didactic matters formed parts of
original Puranas and that old traditions about creation, the deeds of gods,
heroes, saints. Etc., added to the original dharma works to produce
Puranic literature. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I., pp. 518-521.
135. Brahmanda Purana, II.34.21, Vayu Purana, 6021, Visnu Purana, III.6.16.
136. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I, p. 622, n.1.
137. Pargiter, op.cit., p. 35.
138. see above notes 133,134.
139. See above notes 105-108.
140. Vedic Index, vol. I, pp. 224-225.
141. Pargiter, op.cit.,p. 39.
142. For an account of the Christian, and its precursor, the Hebrew, views of
history, see T.R. Tholfsen, Historical Thinking, London 1967, pp. 39-71.
143. Vayu Purana, Adhyaya VIII.
144. Santi Parvan, LIX.
145. A. K. Warder, An Introduction to Indian Historiography, pp.
10-14.
146. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 523-24.
147. Winternitz, op.cit., vol. II, trs. Mrs. S. Kelkar and Miss. H.
Kohn, Delhi 1977, pp. 105-115.
148. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Oxford 1946, p.50
149. Vayu Purana, 1. 200-201, the verse was quoted by Ramanuja who was of
the view that although the knowledge of itihasa purana led to the cleansing
of the sin, the attainment of highest knowledge of Brahman could be had
only from the Vedas, Winternitz, op.cit., vol. I. pp. 527-28, Pargiter,
op.cit., p. 1.
150. V. Smith, Early History of India, pp. 11ff.
151. F.E. Pargiter, Purana Texts of the Dynasties of Kali Age, London 1913;
Ancient Indian Hisatorical Traditions; R. Morton Smith, Dates and
Dynaties in Eastern India, Delhi 1973.
152. Heinrich Von Stietencron, 'Political Aspect of Indian Religious Art',
Visible Religion, IV/V, 1985/86 cited by Arvind Sharma, op.cit. pp.
109-12; cf. Pollock, op.cit., p. 606. The political significance of the
varaha images was noticed by Prof. Raychaudhuri before Stietencron,
Arvind Sharma, op.cit. p. 111.
153. E. Sieg, op.cit., p. 461.
154. E. Sieg, op.cit., p. 461; similar formula was adopted while
citing gathas, Roy S.N., 'The Origin and Growth of Purana
Literature A Review of Some Aspects' in History of Science,
Philosophy and Culture, vol. I Part 2 ed. G. C. Pande, New
Delhi 2003.
155. Asvalayana Grhya Sutra, IV.6.6.
156. V. S. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 4-5.
157. Kavyalamkara, I.25-29; cf. Pathaka, op.cit., p. 36, n. 41.
158. S.N. Roy, 'Orign and Growth of Purnaic Literature: A Review
of Some Aspects' in History of Science, Philosophy and Culture,
vol. I Part 2 Ed. G. C. Pande, New Delhi 2003, p. 75; Upadhyaya,
Purana Vimarsa, pp. 66-67.
159. Rajatrahginl, I.7.
160. See above section III, specially the views of Mink and White.
Hayden White is known for his very radical stand on this point.
"Obviously I regard this view of the relation between historical
story-telling and historical reality as mistaken or at best misconceived.
Stories, like factual statements, are linguistic entities and belong to the
order of discourse.", White, 'Historical Emplotment and the Problem of
Truth' in The History and Narrative Reader, ed. Geoffrey Roberts, p. 374.
161. Kalhana in his evaluation of the achievements and character of the kings of
Kashmir does refer to the role of karma, U.N. Ghoshal, 'The Chronicle of
the Kings of Kashmir' in Studies in Indian History and Culture, pp.
163-165; A. L. Basham, 'The Kashmir Chronicle' in Historians of india,
Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. Philips, pp. 64-65. The collection of articles,
Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. Wendy D.
O'Flaherty, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, have not dealt with question
of the influence of Karma on history.
162. Age without wisdom could not automatically command respect or
deference. A teacher younger in age but vastly superior in learning used to
address his students older than him as 'my sons' Manusmrti, II.151-56.
163. V. S. Apte, Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary, Poona, s.v. Itihasa; the
stock definition of itihasa is given in the verse that reads thus:
Dharmarthakamamoksanam-upadesa-samanvitam Purvavrttam
kathayuktam-itihasam-pracaksate Cited by Pathak, op.cit., p. 27, note 218.
164. E. Sieg, 'Itihasa' in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. VII, p.461.
It is surely more than a mere coincidence that that Tagore should use a
kindred expression Bharatavarsher Punymantrer Punthi (India's book of
sacred benediction) in the context of the indigenous historical traditions of
our country, 'Bharatavarsher Itihas', Rabindra Nath Thakhur, Itihasa,
Lokasiksha Granthamala, compiled by Prabodhchandra Sen and
Pulinbihari Sen, Visvabharati, Bhadra 1395, Bengal Era, p. 7.
165. Ramayana, 1.1.98; English rendering M.N. Dutt's
166. Candogya Upanisad, VII.1.2 For references to the description of itihasa,
alone or with purana, as a Veda, usually as the fifth Veda, see Macdonell
and Keith, Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 76.
167. "The interest of Kalhana's Rajatarangini for Indian history generally lies in
the fact that it represents a class of Sanskrit compositions which comes
nearest in character to the chronicles of Mediaeval Europe and of the
Muhammadan East. Together with late Kashmir chronicles which continue
Kalhana's narrative, it is practically the sole extant specimen of this class",
M.A. Stein, Kalhana's Rajatarahgini,vol. I, Delhi 1961, Reprint, p. 4. cf.,
R. C. Majumdar, Ideas of History in Sanskrit Literarture' in Historians of
India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. Philips, p. 13.
168. Rajatarahgini, I.3-10.
169. Rajatarahgini, I. 21-23.
170. M.A. Stein, Kalhana's Rajatarahgini, vol.I, p. 23.
171. Rabindra Nath Thakhur, 'Tapovana' in Sadhana reprinted in Vichitra, ed.
Kanai Samanta, Visva Bharati Granthlaya, Kalikata, 1368 Bengali Era, p.
230. The quoted line has been translated by the present author. For a fuller
account of Tagore's point of view the whole essay should be read as also
his essay 'Kumarasambhava O Sakuntala', in Prachin Sahitya.
172. M.A. Stein, op.cit. vol. I, p. 35.
173. Pathak, op. cit, Chapter I.
174. Pathak, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
175. Yena narah praSasyante sa naraSamso mantrah, Nirukta IX.9 cf. Rgveda,
IX.10.3 which speaks of the fondness of kings in listening to eulogies
(praSasti). Clearly praiseworthiness was regarded as an important quality
for passage to historical account.
176. Ait. Br., VIII.21; Sat. Br., XIII. 5.4.2-8; cf. Ghoshal, Studies in Indian
History and Culture, pp. 7-9.
177. Sat. Br. XIII.4.2.8-11; Katyayana Srauta Sutra, XX.2.7-8
178. Sat. Br.XIII.4.3.2-15.
179. Taittiriya Aranayaka, I.6.3.
180. V.S. Pathak, op.cit. pp. 9, 36-37.
181. Pathak, op.cit. pp. 36-37, notes 45-47.
182. Vedic Index,vol. ,p. 122.
183. Pathak, op.cit., p. 27, note 27.
184. E. Sieg, op.cit. p. 461.
185. Sieg, ibid.
186. U. N. Ghoshal,A History of Indian Political Ideas, New Delhi,
1966, pp. 20-27.
187. Santiparva, 79.31.
188. Apastamba Dharmasutra, 1.7.20.6.
189. Mahabharata, Vanaparva, 313, 117; quoted by P.V. Kane, History of
DharmaSastra, vol. III, p. 860.
190. Mahabharata, 1.1.16, cited by Sieg, op.cit., p. 461. The verse, however,
does not appear in the Critical Edition.
191. E. Sieg, op.cit. p. 461.
192. Mahabharata, 1.2.383 referred to by Sieg, op.cit., p. 461. Although, the
verse has not been included in the Critical Edition, it has been noticed in
the notes, p.61, Volume One, Critical Edition, Mahabharata.
193. The nature, implications and the background of this change have been
brought out by V.S. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 21ff, 41ff, 80ff, etc. Chapter VI of
his book is particularly important.
194. V.S. Pathak, op.cit. p. 27.
195. V.S. Pathak, op.cit., p. 17, notes 155-158.
196. V. S. Pathak, op.cit., p. 17.
197. See above notes 1699, 170.
198. Reference to Pururava and Yayati in Vedic akhyana, Pathak, op.cit. pp.
6,9.
200. Pargiter, op.cit., 17-5-79.
201. Aggannasuttanta, Digha Nikaya.
202 A. K. Warder, An Introduction to Indian Historiography, chapter
II.
203. Ainslie T Embree, The Hindu Tradition, Randomhouse, New York, pp.
220-21; the life span of Brahma is called para.
204. M Eliade, Myth of the Eternal Return, London 155 gives an interesting
account of the Eastern Civilizations' attitude to history and advanced the
theory that these civilizations developed the notion of the renewal of the
corrupted defiled world back to its original pure nature.
205. Ainslie T Embree, op.cit. p. 221. In fact, it has been said that achieving
salvation in the kali age has become easier than the more austere earlier
yugas.
206. See above the definition of itihasa and the question of Sauti in the
beginning of the Mahabharata, cited by Sieg, op.cit.p. 461, see notes 190,
191 above.
207. Rajatarahgini, I.21-24.
208. Ramayana, See above note 165.
209. Collingwood, Idea of History, p.10, Paperback Edition.
210. If the positivist formulation of the doctrine of general laws in historical
explanation, Carl. G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History',
in Theories of hstory, ed. P. Gardiner, pp. 344- 356 and 'Reasons and
Covering Laws in Historical Explanation' in The Philosophy of History,
ed. P. Gardiner, pp. 9-105, is no longer accepted, the stand of the White
and his followers that no law whatever exists in history has not met with
acceptance either, Perez Zagorin, 'Historiography and Postmodernism:
Reconsiderations' in History and Theory: Contemporary Readings, ed.
Brian Fay, et. al., pp. 193-204.
211. Early Indian attitude vis-e-vis the relation between history and philosophy
thus is quite different from that of many of the modern historians. Their
attitude was different from, say, that of Elton, G.R. Elton, The Practice of
History Chapters 1 & 2.
212. See above notes 86,87,88.
213. The Great Being breathed forth itihasa and purana as also many other
disciplines and sciences as He had breathed forth the Vedas,
Brhadaranyaka Upnisad, 2.4.10. However, the intention of the passage
does not seem to be to proclaim equality of status of the various disciplines
enumerated. The intention seems to be to underline, in the same spirit as
the Vibhuti Yoga adhyaya of the Bhagvadgita did later, the underlying
monistic unity behind the apparent diversity.
214. Candogya Upanisad, 7.1.2.
215. Ch. Up. 3.4.1-2; the significance of the passages was noted by Pathak,
op.cit. pp. 12-13.
216. Anirvana, Veda Mimamsa, vol. I, pp. 125-35.
217. Pollock, /A<9S,109, 4, 1989, p.609,n. 32
218. Tantravarttika, 1.122. This tendency seems to have been quite old, much
older than the time of Kumarila. In a significant reference made in
connection with brahmayajna, Sat. Br. 11.5.6 refers to some branches of
study that a brahmavadin was expected to read everyday for his
svadhyaya. The list includes, besides the four Vedas, anuSasana (science
of sacrifice: Brahmanas and Vedanga), Vakovakya (disputation: Mimamsa
and Nyaya), itihasa, purana,gatha, naranSamsi. At another place in the
Sat. Br. 13.4.3 the list of disciplines includes even the knowledge of the
snakes (sarpavidya); cf. Ch. Up.,7.1.2-4, 7.7.1; Anirvana, Veda Mimamsa,
vol. I., p. 45.
219. Pollock, JAOS, 109.4., 1989, pp. 609-10.
220. Pollock, JAOS, 109.4., 1989, pp. 609, n. 32.
221. Itihasa is not counted as a source of dharma unless it is constituted as part
of smrti because it belonged to the smrti prasthana, Anirvana, Veda
Mimamsa vol. I., pp. 45, 222, 235.
222. Gautama, I. 1-2; Vasistha, I.4-6.
223. Manusmrti, II.12; Yajnavalkya Smrti, I.7.
224. Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, Thomson Press (India)
Limited, new Delhi, 1973, pp. 6-7.
225. Lingat, ibid.
226. However, "When Mimamsa method came to be applied to the texts of
smrti it left very little room for atmatusti", Lingat, op.cit.,
p. 7.
227. Yajnavalkya Smrti, I. 39-45.
228. Nilakantha on Mahabharata, 1.1.1; similar interpretation of the Ramayana
was offered by Srivaisnava commentators; cited by Pollock, 'Mimamsa
and the Problemof History in Traditional India', Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 109.4, 1989, p. 610, n. 34.
229. Santiparva contains a great deal of material that is reflective in nature.
Similar instances in smaller scale are found in other parvas of the
Mahabharata as well. In spite of the inclusion of religious, philosophic,
legal, political, etc., material, the itihasa-purana did not gain the status of
agama, anviksiki, dharmasastra, etc. History of philosophy, for example,
does not become the same as philosophy.
230. Macdonell and Keith, Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 122.
232. An evident example is Sandhyakara Nandin's Ramacarita which
recounted the life story of Ramapala of Bengal. It has been composed in
such a way that one can read it either as the story of the Ramayana or as the
biography of Ramapala. We noted above that like the Mahabharata,
Kalhana in Rajatarahgini attempts to reach finally the santarasa.
233. Vamsa could be a line of rulers (Raghuvamsa, Harivamsa), a line of
teachers-students (as in the Vamsa Brahmana,
Brhadamnyaka Upanisad), the history of a church (MahavamSa,
DipavamSa), etc.
234. Gathina, vamSavid, suta, carana, pustapala, etc. There were always such
experts, from the Vedic time down to the later periods.
235. Here we have closely followed Professor G.C. Pande's formulation, see
Govind Chandra Pande, Sankaracarya: Vicar aur Sandarbh, National
Publishing House, Daryaganj, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 3-4, 21-23.
236. ". . .while accurate information may have been history's defining
characteristic in Greco-Roman antiquity, the gods and their acts remained
a permissible and important part of its subject matter", Pollock, op.cit., p.
605.
237. Opinions of course do differ on the question whether society can be
understood in terms of individuals, or individuals can be understood in
terms of the society, but there does not seem to be any real disagreement
on the view that history should concern itself with the study of society,
Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts', Ernest Gellner, 'Holism versus
Individualism in History and Society, in Theories of history, ed. Gardiner,
pp. 476-503.
238. Itihasa does not think in terms of some causally determined general laws
as governing the course of events. It believes that in place of such laws
there exists a body of statements embodying the collection of actions of
great men which grows into a tradition (agama).It is the job of itihasa is to
exemplify this agama, G.C. Pande, Sankaracarya: Vicar aur Sandarbh,
pp. 3-4.
239. Abhinavagupta, Evamprakarah pratyaksa paridrisyamana agamikarthah
karmaphalasambandhasvabhava yatraste sa itihasah, quoted by Prof.
Pande, Sankaracarya: Vicar aur Sandarbh. p. 3.
240. Kavya style of composition was adopted in both caritas and praSastis,
Ratna Datta, The Development of Historical and Literary Style in Sanskrit
Inscriptions, Calcutta University Ph.D. thesis, 1988 cited by Witzel,
op.cit., pp. 11-12; D.C. Sircar, op.cit. pp. 25-28; V.S. Pathaka, op.cit.
passim.
241. Hayden White, 'Historical Text as a Literary Artifact' in Roberts, ed. The
History and Narative Reader, p. 225.
242. See above note 118.
243. In the RaghuvamSa narrative the negative aspect of the rule of the dynasty
in its later days has been depicted in a very subtle way. It can be perceived only
by contrasting the dharma leavened ambience of the time of earlier rulers with
ambience of bhoga fired rule of the later kings, See Rabindra nath Tagore,
Tapovana in Sadhana reprinted in Vichitra, ed. Kanai Samanta, Visva Bharati
Granthlaya, Kalikata, 1368 Bengali Era.
244. Some examples, Pargiter, Morton Smith, Dates and Dynasties of the
Puranas, Motilaldas, H.C. Raychaudhuri, Political history of Ancient
India, Calcutta University,etc. for utilization of Purnaic material, V.S.
Pathak, op.cit., for the carita.
245. Pollock, op.cit., p. 605.
246. Cited by Pollock, op.cit., p.605, see especially Pollock's notes
11-13.
247. See Macdonell's view above, as also that of Keith.
248. Referred to by Pollock, op.cit., p. 607.
249. Ratna havimsi, Ghoshal 'Vedic Ceremonies of Royal and Imperial
Consecretion' in Studies in Indian history and Culture, pp. 212-216.
250. Pollock, op.cit.
251. Pollock, op.cit., p. 607.
252. Pollock,op.cit., pp. 607-609.
253. The J aina Puranas share practically the same characteristics as the
Brahmanical puranas. Majumdar quotes J inasena's definiton of itihasa
from the J aina Adipurana, I, 24-25: "Itihasa is a very desirable subject.
According to Tradition it relates 'what actually happened'. It is also
described as itivrtta, aitihya and amnaya (Authentic tradition). It is also
called Arsa for it was composed by the rsis (sages), sukta, for it instructs
through good and pleasant discourses, and Dharmasastra, for it prescribes
dharma (religion or moral principles."; R. C. Majumdar, 'Ideas of History
in Sanskrit Literarture' in Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed.
Philips, p.15. Itihasa, according to J inasena's definition represents both
amnaya as well as dharmasastra; it deals with spiritual and religious
tradition (amnaya) on the one hand and dharma on the other.
254. Not the history of jurisprudence or judicature.
255. Navjyoti Singh, 'Nature of Historical thinking and Aitihya: Problem of
Significance' in Studies in Humanities and Social
Sciences, vol.,X. No.2 Winter 2003, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla,
pp. 1-28. 256. D.C. Sircar, op.cit.p.13ff; recently Witzel has revived the theory of
the responsibility of invasions for the loss of historical works and documents,
Witzel, op.cit., pp. 54-55.

PART TWO

In the Shadow of the Absolute Contemporary
Indian Responses to History

I saw Eternity the other night, Like a great ring of pure and
endless light, All calm, as it was bright; And round beneath it,
Time in hours, days, years; Driven by the spheres Like a vast
shadow moved; in which the world And all her train were
hurled.
Vaughan
Quoted by T.M. P. Mahadevan 'Time and
Timeless' Contemporary IndianPhilosophers of
History

I
Till now we have been engaged in discerning the early traditional
understanding of past in India especially in the context of itihasa.
Let us now consider some of the modern formulations based on or
colored by the traditional notions. Some of these formulations can
be described as explicatory. Their character is to some extent
exegetical: they clarify, elucidate and amplify the itihasa
standpoint. In this endeavor they attempt to situate the itihasa
view in the world of modern historicism. And in their enterprise
they make use of contemporary notions and vocabulary. However,
it will not be correct to construe their aim as just the validation of
the traditional point of view. It should rather be looked as more of
an attempt to sympathetically understand the itihasa point of view
than pleading for its validation. It will also not be correct to
consider these as mere restatements of the traditional attitude.
They often bring to bear upon the traditional point of view fresh
insights and enrich and enlarge and deepen our understanding of
the traditional Indian understanding of past. Moreover, the
purpose of these formulations is also different from the old ones.
Unlike the itihasa-purana of the Ramayana-
Mahabharata-Mahapurana variety or the akhyana-carita of the
old, these formulations do not aim to regale and teach the people.
These formulations aim to situate itihasa within the framework of
contemporary 'historical mode of knowledge'. But in spite of the
use of modern frameworks of reference, modern vocabulary and
idiom, and the fact that they target the modern academic and
intellectual audience, these formulations remain mainly
explicatory. Their character remains anchored to elucidation and
elaboration of traditional viewpoint. Nevertheless, there are some
that not only provide fresh insight into the way traditional material
ought to be read, but also reveal the underlying theoretical
structure that these ancient writing contained. The work of V.S.
Pathak may be cited as a premier example of this class.
1
There is another class of formulations which are more
constructivist than elucidatory. They are constructivist in the
sense that by using the traditional Indian world view and
philosophy and other traditional resources, they try to construct an
Indian philosophy of history. These attempts are more than
elucidation of an already existing philosophy of history; they are
in some sense forging a fresh one. If the explicatory formulations
can be called renovation and enlargement of an existing structure
(jirnoddhara), the constructivist formulations can be called as

building a fresh edifice using old material and joining old plans in
a new symmetry. Since the plan and the material have been taken
from the old traditional universe, the edifice, it seems to be the
underlying assertion, represents the traditional ambience. Such
formulations may also be described as extrapolative; they
represent new extrapolations from traditional premises. In other
words, the premises are traditional and old, but the constructions
in the form of extrapolations are modern. The issues and the
concerns that these modern extrapolations address are also new.
These issues and concerns have been thrown by contemporary
Western concepts of history. Since different sets of material and
plans, all, of course, taken from the same old traditional universe
of thought and beliefs, have been used by different authors, we
find an interesting variety of such formulations. Some of these
formulations try to build holistic theories of Indian historical point
of view by integrating various aspects of traditional thought and
beliefs. On the other hand some formulations take up only a single
aspect or a limited issue from the traditional philosophy or
doctrine and build their arguments on that basis. Thus, for
example, Kalidas Bhattacharya attempts to locate the concept of
'revolution' within the early Indian universe of philosophy and
belief and to work out its implication
2
and Dhirendra Mohan Datta
and Bimal Krishna Matilal take up the doctrine of karma and
consider its implication in the context of the issue of moral values
in history.
3
Then there is a third group. These are full-fledged theories of
history by some Indian thinkers charting the course of historical
developments. These theories usually do not make any overtly
claim that they are based on, or that they are an elaboration, of the
traditional Indian point of view. However, in their spirit they
belong to the Indian world of thought. Moreover, these theories
usually do not represent autonomous domains in the
thought-world of the thinker concerned, but are parts of their
general philosophy. And it is clear that the general philosophies of
these thinkers are deeply imbued with traditional Indian
philosophy and metaphysics. It is from this point of view that they
derive their context and validity to be treated as a part of Indian
attitude to history.
4
The views of G.C. Pande can be cited as a
representative example of this group.
5
The divisions that we have made should not be taken as
watertight compartments and the demarcating lines in many
instances become highly nebulous. And there are formulations

that do not exactly conform to any of the given divisions. Some
formulations also bear the features of more than one division.

II
A collection of articles edited by T. M. P. Mahadevan and Grace E
Cairns offers a variety of interesting viewpoints on Indian attitude
to history.
6
As examples of holistic reconstruction of traditional
view of history based on Indian philosophy and metaphysics, we
may refer to the articles by Swami Adiswarananda, T. M. P.
Mahadevan, and V. V. Deshpande in this collection.
7
Adiswarananda follows the traditional Indian methodology and
begins his article by delineating the pUrvapaksa. He first
considers three other important views of history: (a) the
Providential view of J udaism and Christianity; (b) the Idealistic
view of history as the expression of pure reason; and (c) the linear
view of naturalistic and humanistic thinkers. He takes up Marxism
as the representative example of linear view of history. It is
against these views that he places the cyclical view of Hindu
thinkers. According to Adiswarananda the J udeo-Christian
Providential view is based on 'some dogmatic' assumptions like
miracles, chosen people, exclusive mediatorship, unique
revelations, salvation only through grace and damnation at death
for the unrighteous. Moreover, it is actually a deeply pessimistic
philosophy for it reduces all human efforts as fruitless; there is
nothing one can do but to wait helplessly for grace. The view
allows no space to reason and is exclusively contingent on faith.
8

Kant and Hegel are the representative figures of the Idealistic
view, according to Adiswarananda. The rational method that
Hegel detects amidst the chaos of history in the supposed
self-development of spirit or the march of reason, according to
Adiswarananda, are not philosophically satisfying and factually
tenable. He recognizes that Idealism does posit an Absolute in the
form of reason in its perfect manifestation. He, however, finds it
theoretically unsatisfying that the Absolute should exhaust itself
in the process of historical evolution. Moreover, the scheme is not
factually borne out. Despite the supposed progress of reason, man
has not learnt to behave more reasonably than before; animal
nature in man remains as untamed as ever. And history does not
conform to a preconceived plan. Similarly, the Marxist linear
view is 'logically untenable and factually impossible'.
9
'Happiness
is not an object but the condition of a peaceful mind, which no
system of economic production, however perfect, can ensure'.

'The linear view of history replaces the idea of "being" by
"having" and reduces man to the needs of the society'.
10
Gaining
the world at the cost of losing one's soul is a foolish bargain.
Against the perspective of these theories, the Hindu cyclical
view is considered. Although the Greeks and the Romans also
believed in cyclical view of history, the Hindu view differed from
them; the Hindu view goes deeper into the metaphysics of cyclical
pattern. The historical process in the Hindu view is integral with
the beginningless and eternal cycle of creation, preservation and
destruction. The process of creation and destruction belongs to the
phenomenal reality, the noumenal from which the phenomenal
arises is the eternal, unchanging Pure Being. The entire cosmos is
an integral manifestation of the Pure Being. Man is also a
manifestation of the eternal. 'According to Hindu philosophers,
man is essentially subject and not object. He is more than an
individual, more than the sum of his appearances. The truth about
the real nature of man lies hidden in the depth of his inner
foundation. He is a soul who uses his body and mind as
instruments to gain experience. His real personality is a cosmic
personality, the personality of God'.
11
It is the egocentric
consciousness that man develops separates him from the Pure
Being. This is a self-created prison into which man hurls himself
and the gets driven by pain, pleasure, birth and death, virtue and
vice and so on, the opposites that texture the phenomenal reality.
These opposites create their own laws, the laws of polarities, the
cause and effect. These laws, however, do not operate or have any
impact on the noumenal reality, the Pure Being.
The creation, actually is without beginning and without end; it
is the manifestation and non-manifestation of the Pure Being that
keeps on recurring in an endless series of eons. This cycle with its
divisions and duration of each have been described in the Puranas.
In each cycle the same material phenomena recur and will
continue to do so till eternity. 'No force can die; no energy can be
annihilated'.
12
'Thus the universe, when looked at from the point
of view of the Absolute has no history or development. The idea
of history applies to the phenomenal universe'.
13
The phenomenal
universe, subject to the conditions of time, space and causation
produces history. But as the phenomenal reality remains integral
to the noumenal reality, 'such history is always integral and
universal'.
14
The cyclical concept does not conjure an idea of illusory
progress; there is no progress in reality, there is only change. The
phenomenal world being a texture of the opposites, the total

quantity of happiness and unhappiness always remains the same.
There can be only change of form and locus. What may appear as
development in one area is always balanced by
negative-development elsewhere. Thus there is no genuine
progress. Similarly, there is no such thing as an ideal society or an
ideal historical situation. The interactions of the three gunas keep
the total amount of happiness and unhappiness in a society same
irrespective of the type of social arrangement obtaining at a given
point of time. So there is not much to choose between one kind of
social arrangement and another. It is not that the form of society
remains stationary. Leadership of the society, for example, has
been changing over time. Four successive phases of this change
are clearly perceptible. First it was the priests, then the warriors,
then the commercial class who had dominated past societies. Now
it will be the turn of the workers in whose hands the leadership
will pass. This has been the general pattern all over the world.
Thus the four varnas, the Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas, the Viasyas
and the Sudras, in turn hold the reins of leadership. As the leaders
tend to monopolize power and do not want to share it with the
society at large, these changes do not ensure any genuine
progress. This has been happening again and again in a cyclical
pattern. So the prospect does not look too bright for the future
either unless everybody giving up his worldly vanity and faith in
organizations like government comes to the refuge of the Lord.
15
Hindu cyclical concept does not posit a theory of mechanical
evolution; history is a manifestation of the divinity of man. It
denies man-nature dichotomy. Human history is not an account of
man's triumph over nature or man's progressive mastery over
organizational problems. History does not record a linear
movement towards a goal for men to be collectively achieved, it
rather represents a texture of diversity and opposites including an
interminable cycles of creation and dissolution. Within this
scheme of things the meaningful human unit is individual. The
individual has to operate under the law of karma that makes
him/her indubitably and completely accountable for his or her
actions. The law of karma, in fact, is a law of justice. 'One cannot
escape the good and evil consequences of one's good and evil
deeds. It would be a rule of injustice if it were so.'
16
It is up to the
individual who can achieve for himself the merger with the
Absolute and the Universal and thus attain true fulfillment
through dharma and true knowledge. In his efforts the knowledge
of the law of karma can only act as an additional motivation and
source of strength.

Swami Adiswarananda's reconstruction of the Hindu view of
the philosophy of history embodies the entire Hindu view of life,
its philosophy and metaphysics from the Advaita point of view. It
also powerfully posits the question whether the notion of
progress, an important adjunct of contemporary historicism, can
seriously be maintained? Has material advancement delivered a
truly happier world? Has it opened the path to a genuine sense of
fulfillment for man? These are important questions and from this
viewpoint, Swamiji's article is very interesting. However, one
critical question is likely to crop up in this context. Swamiji in his
treatment reduces history to metaphysics. He leaves practically no
room at all for history in the conventional sense. By history he
means the entire gamut of human life as part of 'phenomenal
reality'; it is not specifically limited to the account or memory of
past. In his formulation history as an account of past is almost
completely absent. The fundamental problems and issues of life of
course holds an important place in history, but the understanding
and resolution of these problems within the scope of history and
philosophy of history have to be approached from historical point
of view. The same problems may be approached with profit from
other perspectives, like metaphysical perspective, for instance, as
well. But the moot question is: can such approaches be
legitimately considered valid in the context of history when
history as a mode of knowledge or thinking is absent from the
focus of such approaches? Such approaches will lead to the
question as to what is the role of history if metaphysics alone is
capable of explaining human life and conditions? Or, is history
then totally redundant?
Mahadevan also puts forward an Advaita perspective of
history.
17
He pinpoints his attention on one of the premier axioms
of modern notion of history accepted more or less universally. It is
the notion that the locus of history, either as events or memory of
events, is in time and therefore history has nothing to do with the
Absolute or the Timeless. Mahadevan disputes this notion. And in
so doing he also disputes the contention that Indians had no sense
of history because they fixed their gaze on the Absolute. His main
contention is that history and the Absolute are not mutually
exclusive and that Indian philosophical attitude was not anti
historical. He grounds his argument on the analysis of the nature
of time and the relation of time with the Timeless.
Mahadevan asserts that the widespread belief among Western
thinkers that Indian philosophy and metaphysics in their outlook
were pessimistic and 'without serious concern for human history

and human progress in history' is a misconception. Although the
intensity of this misconception is now gradually ebbing and there
is a greater readiness and sympathy in the West to understand the
Orient, the vestiges of the nineteenth century notion still continue.
This misconception developed, firstly, on account of the
misapprehension of the nature of the theories of karma and
samsara and secondly, because of the dominating influence of
Darwin and the faith in the notion of progress. The doctrines of
karma and samsara have a positive rather than a negative content
and force. They in fact motivate people to cast off their little egos
and strive for the larger good which is the same as moksa. Moksa
is not the prerogative of any individual or a select few; it is 'the
common goal of all beings'. 'Moksa is not freedom for the
individual; it is freedom from individuality'.
18
Moksa thus can not
be an aspiration for private salvation, for, individuality being
dissolved the notion of private can not continue. Indian
philosophy and metaphysics in fact sensitize one to one's
responsibility not only to one's fellow human beings, but to all
beings. 'So one need not go away from Indian thought to discover
that human history has a purpose'.
19
The nineteenth century notion of progress, particularly under
the impact of the doctrine of biological evolution and the
technological advancements, came to mean 'getting richer and
richer and having a better and better time'. "And the evolutionary
philosophy of Spencer seemed to prove that such a process must
of necessity go on, and go on indefinitely".
20
But that faith to a
large extent has been shaken by the subsequent developments, the
two shattering World Wars, the nuclear arms race, the widening
cleavages and mutual hostility between different power blocs, the
environmental degradation, etc. It has become evident that
progress is not to be measured so much by outer change, but by
inner transformation'.
21
Mahadevan endorses Collingwood that historical knowledge is
knowledge of thought and the function of history is human
self-knowledge. This thought is 'not things thought about, but the
act of thinking itself'.
22
The only way the historian can discern the
thoughts he is trying to discover is by rethinking those thoughts.
Thought has the ability to transcend the 'before'
'after' categories; it has a Timeless quality. Mahadevan's initial
agreement with Collingwood, however, ends because he can not
reconcile Collingwood's juxtaposition of the two opposites:
thought and self-knowledge on the one hand and the transient and
concrete in history on the other. Mahadevan contends that thought

and self-knowledge are the proper object of history and therefore
history has to reach what is beyond time.
A substantial part of Mahadevan's paper is devoted to the
discussion of the nature of time. He generally agrees with the
assessment of Bradley that " Time is so far from enduring from the
test of criticism that at a touch it falls apart and proclaims itself
illusory."
23
But he is unable to agree with the other part of
Bradley's assessment that time somehow 'belongs to the
Absolute'. If time is illusory, it is an appearance. And, how can
appearance be a constituent of the Absolute? From the standpoint
of the Absolute time can not be. At the same time it is not possible
to dispense with time altogether. Time, Mahadevan reasons, is a
puzzle; like maya it is indeterminable, indescribable. It is
anirvacaniya.
24
The purpose of time is to serve as the gateway to
reality. 'Meditation on time is recommended in the Upanisads as a
method of getting beyond time to the timeless reality which is
Brahman.'
25
If it is not a constituent of the Absolute, it is akin to it.
Of all things with attributes, time is the nearest to the
Attributeless. The contemplation of time leads to the eternity. This
is how the Maitri Upanisad puts it: "There are two froms of
Brahman: Time and the Timeless. That which is prior to the sun is
the Timeless (akala) without parts (akala). But that which begins
with the sun is the Time, which has parts."
26
Time is said to cook
everything because it ripens everything, makes everything mature
and finally it leads the way to the re-absorption of everything in
the Brahman. 'Time is not the true nature of the Absolute. Time is
with parts, whereas the Timeless is without parts. Brahman is the
Timeless.'
27
Purposeless creativity as in the philosophy of Bergson, for
example, is unsatisfactory and unacceptable. Life then becomes
only a synonym for chaos with no regulatory principle. Similarly,
some evolutionary philosophers like Alexander and Lewis
Mumford place God at the end of evolutionary process, that is, at
the end of time. The God is yet to be.
28
It is not possible to make
sense of the proposition. How can God be the product of
something else? And then the question remains who sets the
process of evolution in motion? Or, is the proposition only the
second half of the circle of creation and re-absorption of the
phenomenal world? Is it the same as the inbreathing of the
Brahman?
In Indian view, whether the theistic deity or the monistic
Absolute, it was conceived as existing beyond time. The limited
and the unlimited, the manifest and the unmanifest, the sarlra

(body) and the sarlrin (soul), the amsa (part) and the amsin
(whole), the prakara (type, mode) and the prakarin (the basic
reality), they and He, in the theistic conception, exist in a relation
of aprthakasiddhi (inseparability). They are the attributes
(visesana) and He is the substance (visesya).
29
However,
according to Mahadevan, the theistic conception, textured, as it is,
on relation can not reach the Timeless; all relations, howsoever
exalted they may be, remain bound in time. Thus the more
satisfying is the monistic position. "Reality, in the view of
Advaita, is truly timelesstimeless not in the sense of endless
duration, but in the sense of eternity and completeness, requiring
neither a 'before' or an 'after'."
30
All affirmations about Brahman
like satyasya satya, vijnanam anandam brahma, sattyam jnanam
anantam, etc. are mere symbolic statements and not true
affirmations. Moksa is the supreme goal, the true goal of human
life. It is this goal that gives meaning to life. But moksa is not
attaining something new; it is regaining what is always there, the
eternal (nitya). It is, as Sankara puts it, not something that is
achievable (asadhya).
Mahadevan makes a number of highly significant points. Time
can not exist as an autonomous self-existing category. It derives
its being and meaning only in its link to the Absolute. To locate
history in time is only partially tenable. It may even be conceded
that the visible part of history resides in time and therefore in the
phenomenal world, but it is an act of grievously dwarfing history
to keep it tied down to the limits of time and phenomenal world
alone. Without reference to the Absolute, history will lack goal
and direction. It amounts to reducing it to chaos.
The second point that he makes is that it is a myopic
misapprehension to call Indian attitude as otherworldly and life
negating. This misapprehension arises from a misunderstanding
of the goal of moksa. Moksa is not so much the individual
liberation (mukti) as the goal of universal release (sarva mukti).
"Appaya Diksita, for example, maintains that when an individual
is released, he attains identity with Isvara, and not with Brahman.
It is only when all jlvas are released that the final identity with
Brahman is realized."
31
"Our good lies in the good of all." It is the
need for helping every being along the road to the final goal that
Sankara stresses when he says that sages like Apantaratamas,
Bhrgu, and Narada work for the welfare of the world, even after
death." Lokasamgraha or service to the world is a well-known
ideal as also the motto of vasudhaiva kutumbakam. "The purpose
of history is the cosmic realization of the eternal perfection. The

object of avataras is precisely this, and by their adevent the world
process as a whole is accelerated in the advance towards the
goal... With each avatara or divine descent, the world is helped to
move a stage further in the ascent to God."
33
The Indian
philosophy of history in Mahadevan's formulation does not have
individual orientation. It is life affirming. It is universal in its
outlook, 'universal' in the very broadest sense.
V. V. Deshpande's article is similar in tone and tenor.
34
Here also
history is situated amidst the broad canvas of philosophy of life as
advocated in early India. However, the framework of disquisition
is etched more specifically; the purusarthas are selected as the
specific field or locus for itihasa and purana, the two
representative modes of history in early India. Nevertheless,
purusarthas naturally bring in their train, especially in the context
of dharma and moksa, the entire philosophy of life and a good
deal of metaphysics. Although itihasa-purana has been strongly
grounded on philosophy and metaphysics by Deshpande, he has
not allowed them to completely submerge the boundaries of
history. The specific functional role of itihasa and purana has
been depicted in clear terms. He has also underlined the didactic
nature of both of them. He begins his article by recounting the
story of the origin of the itihasa-purana literature.
35
Veda Vyasa
noticed the sorry spectacle that the common mass of people had
no reliable guide to the proper conduct conforming to the Vedic
teachings and the Vedic way of life. He then took upon himself the
stupendous task of composing the Mahabharata and the Puranas
in order to provide the common people the requisite instruction on
Vedic purusartha vidyas. By choosing the very expression
purusarthas vidyas instead of simple purusarthas, Deshpande has
underlined the didactic functional role that was assigned to
historical narratives in early India. And by recounting the story of
the origin of this genre of literature he has emphasized another
important aspect of the itihasa-purana. Itihasa-purana
represented and embodied a philosophy of life enshrined in Vedic
teachings; itihasa-purana were lessons in purusarthas.
The recollections of heroic events of ancient times
exemplifying Vedic purusartha vidyas constitute the subject
matter of itihasa-purana. The protagonists of these heroic events
are shown as upholding the ideals of purusartha vidyas against all
odds and they carry them till their final triumph.
36
Deshpande also
describes the method through which these heroic stories received
their composed form. The writing developed in two stages. In the
first stage the memory of these events in collected form is carried

on as 'unbroken traditions from one generation to another, either
orally or as a part of daily theological instructions, or authentic
records'. In the second stage they are 'systematically marshalled
and presented in the form of the highest type of epic poetry both
picturesque and passionate'.
37
Itihasa-purana then were narratives of past, but they were not
factual narratives in the modern sense; they were exemplification
of purusartha vidyas. And purusartha vidyas stood for a
comprehensive plan of human life. This way, in Desphande's
formulation, itihasa-purana transcends the limitations of factual
narrative and transforms itself into philosophy, especially
metaphysics. Deshpande over the major part of his article
delineates the fundamentals of Indian philosophy and beliefs
about the meaning and goal of human life. In the phenomenal
world there are only three permanent entities: jiva, isvara,
brahman (or parabrahman). Brahman represents the ultimate
reality and the achieving of merger with the brahman is the
ultimate goal of human life, which is moksa. This can be achieved
in only two ways. Firstly, by comprehending the illusory nature of
all sensually perceptible phenomenal existence. This
comprehension, of course, is what the Indian concept of jnana
signifies; it is realization by one's entire being and not the modern
intellectual apprehension. The second way through which this
merger can be achieved is to wait for the end of the epochal
dissolution (pralaya) when the entire phenomenal world is
re-absorbed into the ultimate reality. The second option,
obviously, is not really an option. Every individual therefore has
to strive to achieve moksa accepting total responsibility under the
inexorable law of karma for each of his/her action. And one has to
fully meet one's obligations, moral, spiritual, social and
communal (the purusarthas) and discharge all his debts (mas).
One should not, either individually or collectively, plunder the
earth for man has obligation to all jlvas. Only one-sixteenth part of
earth's resources are meant for men, the rest is for other species.
The notion of progress obviously has no relevance in this
conception of history.
Like Adiswarananda, Deshpande also takes a dim view of the
modern way of life and thinking. He specially underlines the
abdication of value from knowledge as one of the premier causes
of the ills of the modern wold. Because of this deficiency the
modern science and science-based disciplines that are growing at
the expense of humanistic education are unlikely to lead to a

happier world. On the contrary, they are leading to an increasing
disintegration of society and brutalization of man.
Finally, Deshpande also puts forward a defence of
itihasa-purana and the Vedic ideals.
38
His arguments are
structured at two levels. Firstly, he says that modern science
despite its claim for certainty has not been able to provide a stable
basis for social organization; there are far too many opinions and
divergences in both precepts and practice. Compared to this, the
Vedic idea of society had been able to provide a relatively more
durable basis of social setup which had endured for a very long
time and has not disappeared completely till now. Thus this has
served better than the modern knowledge system can claim for
itself. Secondly, considering the fact that history, even in its
recent-most incarnation has not been able to escape the snare of
relativity and achieve full objectivity, there is no valid ground to
reject itihasa-purana by calling it mythical, concocted or as
ideological propaganda. On none of these counts the present-day
histories can be considered better off. As far as history as
propaganda is concerned, it is rather on an ascending curve than
on decline.
39
Deshpande's article is both exegetical as well as
constructivistic. It is explicatory in the parts in which he tries to
elucidate the nature, purpose and method that characterized the
composition of itihasa-purana literature and its kin. Even the
constructivist parts comprising the elaboration of the philosophy
of prurusartha vidyas, as it has been pointed out above, do not
lose their history-moorings because they remain tied to the
itihasa-purana.

III
Dhirendra Mohan Datta and Bimal Krishna Matilal have situated
the doctrine of karma in the domain of history and endeavored to
figure its implication. In their approach they do differ
substantially, but they converge on the point that karma provides
an important and strong ground of morality. It needs no reiteration
that a valid theory of history can hardly be conceived that does not
have as a major concern for morality in some form or measure.
But the most significant statement that Datta and Matilal seem to
be making remains unstated. The belief in the doctrine of karma
has very often been singled out as one of the primary reasons for
the alleged anti-historical outlook of Indian mind. Both Datta and
Matilal seem to be contesting this assumption. And both have

done it without making any reference to the assumption. Their
reticence in this regard enhances the force of their statement.
Datta begins by noting the consequences of recent scientific
advancements, especially that of the theory of evolution, in vastly
expanding the Western notions about the dimensions of space and
time.
40
In both these areas the traditional Indian notions,
compared to the traditional Western, are more compatible with the
modern scientific ideas. The evolutionary viewpoint has now
influenced all branches of knowledge. Thus man's kinship and
relation to other beings have to be borne in mind while dealing
with human history. In this respect also the traditional Indian ideas
are not inhospitable. The philosophy of karma contains the belief
that human birth is a rare blessing which one achieves after
repeated births as other creatures in consequence of the good
actions in previous births. Datta asserts that the theory of
biological evolution is not inconsistent with the theory of karma
even though it is preponderantly moral in its configuration and
import.
Karma, however, is basically a moral theory. It has been
generally misinterpreted in the West as pessimistic and fatalistic.
It is true that according to this theory the accumulated merits and
demerits of previous lives are held responsible for the conditions
and situations of the present life, but they do not shutoff freedom
of will and action. Personal initiative and effort, i.e., purusakara
can offset the daiva or the force of past actions. Through
discipline and enlightened actions one can free oneself from the
snares of ignorance which arises from the wrong actions of past.
Except the materialists, this is the quintessence of the messages of
all the schools of Indian philosophy. The theory of karma offers a
logical explanation of the problems of evils and the inequalities of
birth.
41
The crux of Datta's formulation is that it is the force of moral
actions that provide the basic impetus to progress in history. It is
not reason, but moral virtue, dharma, that distinguishes man from
other animals. In fact it is the moral quality that supplies the
sinews for the survival and forward movement in the evolutionary
path. It is not physical power that comprises the fitness for
survival. Had it been so then the giants like dinosaurs or
mastodons would not have become extinct. Mere material
prosperity, and by implication the possession of scientific
knowledge and technological skill, will not suffice for the
progress of men. Datta asserts that the known history of man
'supports the belief that moral values constitute survival values as

well'.
42
These values have evolved over millions of years of
human experience. Without the possession of such virtues as
ahimsa, maitn,karuna,satya, asteya,aparigraha,samyama,etc.
collective and common life can not endure and flourish. These are
the very basic values on which rest the principle of society.
It is these virtues that lie at the root of unity and co-operation.
And finally, Datta endeavors to capture the main strain of
human development over the history of mankind. 'Up to the
sub-human level of evolution, the tendency was towards
increasing divergence. But competent biologists, such as J ulian
Huxley and P. Teilhard, point out that after the diversification of
human race this tendency has been reversed by "hominization",
toward a gradual convergence'.
43
History is gradually moving
towards the realization of the unity of mankind. Datta says that a
historian like Toynbee has traced this strain of growing unity
through the course of human history. And, the Indian epics,
celebrate the vehicle that carries forward this unity in the famous
remark in the Mahabharata, 'the victory is there where there is
dharma'.
It can hardly be gainsaid that moral ideas and values play a
crucial role in any worthwhile human affair. And, all philosophies
of history recognize their importance, even though the ways the
moral ideas and values are constituted often differ substantially
from one another. However, one feels a little uncertain whether
Datta's basic endeavor to reconcile the theory of karma with the
evolutionary interpretation of history, and, especially the idea of
progress, can really be maintained. Even methodologically the
question arises whether an Indian philosophy of history be
reconstructed only on the basis of karma theory? Such a
methodology suffers from piece-meal approach. In the face of the
idea of four yugas, to argue for idea of progress as an Indian
concept seems a little too radical. To construe the cyclical theory
of yugas as representing spirals
44
seems a bit of special pleading.
45

In extenuation of Datta, however, it needs to be added that he calls
his essay his personal philosophy of history and not a statement of
Indian point of view. His defence of the doctrine of karma and
Adviata position as not necessarily anti-historical is sound. The
doctrine of Karma is not life negating. Similarly, Sahkara's
Advaita does not deny the 'reality' of this world. Datta writes: "We
believe with Sahkara [e.g., his commentary on the Brahmasutra
2.1.16], that the world, considered as rooted in its ground or cause,
is always real."
46
It is this positive spirit of Advaita, says Datta,
that led Sahkara to lokasamgraha or organization of society.

Matilal in his article mainly concentrates on two aspects.
47
Firstly, he attempts to sketch the background of beliefs, ideas and
motives that led to the growth of the doctrine of karma and its
twin concept of samsara. And, secondly, he underscores the fact
that in its genuine orientation the theory of karma is not
pessimistic. On the contrary, it breathes a spirit of healthy
confidence in man's own ability to chart his own future. It
eliminates the role of chance and fate and lessens the necessity of
conceiving a regulator of the world as an omnipotent God who
nevertheless remains somewhat whimsical and arbitrary. He also
notes that despite different philosophical standpoints, practically
all schools of thought and belief in early India subscribed to the
idea of karma and the weight of opinion regarding its character
was heavily loaded against deterministic fatalism (niyativada) or
capriciousness (yadrcchavada). It is the growth of the other
theory, the idea of samsara or transmigration, which got mingled
with the theory of karma that gave the latter its veneer of
pessimism and fatalism. Karma theory on its own does not
preclude freedom of choice. 'Not everything has been totally
determined or fixed by our previous karma, or to use a more
neutral terminology, by our background. Alternative courses of
action are possible and open to mankind. Otherwise, the Buddha's
teaching about the way to Nirvana or Sahkara's prescription about
the way to moksa would have been pointless. The whole
moksa-sastra would be an uncalled for endeavour.'
48
Matilal's
thesis is that there is no getting away from the moral
responsibilities of one's actions. And this responsibility has to be
recognized in philosophy of history. If karma can be extricated
from the theory of samsara, he feels that it may become
acceptable to modern sensibility too. He suggests that karma
theory may be extended to include collectivities like nations or
societies and that it is not necessary to keep it limited to
individuals alone. 'Individual moral responsibility should be
extended to make room for collective moral responsibility.' Such a
concept may have some influence on philosophy of history.
While Matilal has cogently argued that the thrust of karma
theory is not pessimistic and that it does not arrest the freedom of
action, his project of 'modernizing' the concept by divesting it of
the 'silly' transmigration theory
50
may not find many takers. One
may find that his approach in this paper looks rather apologetic;
this has no doubt arisen from his perception that the karma
outlook appears antiquated. Moreover, he gives the impression
that philosophy of history is a blueprint or a manifesto of proposed

action plans rather than an attempt to understand the nature of
history. Even if a philosophy of history does become in effect a
political programme, as it has in the case of Marxism, the
philosophy is worked out on the analysis of history, either looked
at as a process or a mode of knowledge. In Matilal's essay we do
not find any such attempt. Even as an attempt at reconciling
karma with history, Datta's article seems to have been relatively
more successful.

IV
In a short and lucid paper J . N. Mohanty turned his attention to
locate the reason(s) as to why a philosophical concern for history
did not develop in early India.
51
He records the fact that itihasa or
aitihya did not attain the status of an independent pramana; it was
subsumed under either anumana or sabda. But, as Mohanty
pertinently remarks, that just this did not constitute a sufficient
ground why no philosophical interest should have developed in
history. Even within the bounds of their view of history as a
pramana, it was still possible to develop, for instance, logic of
historical inference or semantics of historical knowledge. Before
embarking on an investigation of the causes, he notes that this lack
of concern was not just for history, but also for mathematics.
Furthermore, he says that this lack of philosophical concern was
present in ancient Greece as well. It was with the advent of
Christianity that a proper philosophical interest in history
developed.
Mohanty clarifies that a keen and sophisticated philosophical
interest in time had developed in early India. Practically all the
Western views of time, from the Newtonian, Leibnezian and
Kantian to the Bradleyan, are found presaged in the various
schools of Indian philosophy. Nyaya-Vaisesika viewed time as a
partless and infinite objective reality; the Vaisesika regarded time
as the basis of all temporal relations. For the Buddhist time had an
infinitesimally momentary character. The Safikara considered
time as a form of prakrti as one of its evolutes and, in the Advaita
time represented the relation between Brahman and maya. Thus
the lack of concern for history can not be attributed to a lack of
interest in the concept of time. Despite this lively and
sophisticated interest in time it was not perceived as something
that could lead to the achievement of anything new. This is why
interest in time did not produce a corresponding interest in history.
Two overarching concepts robbed the possibility of achieving

anything new over the time process. Firstly, there was the concept
of caturvarga in which the final goal of life was identified as
moksa; and moksa represented something that was regained rather
than something newly achieved. Secondly, there was the concept
of four yugas repeating themselves in endless cycles of creation
and dissolution.
Likewise, truth and value were regarded as ageless and thus
were beyond and above history. Truth was not a human product.
Various Great men could only teach it at various times; there was
no first discoverer of truth. 'Great men like Sri
Krishna and Buddha claim only to be teaching truths which others
without number had seen before.'
52
A philosophy that is concerned
with ultimate ageless values and eternal truths does not need to be
concerned with history of events. Although the law of karma does
offer scope for freedom of will and action, but because it is
individualistic in orientation and because its notions of rebirth and
transmigration are transhistorical, it has not helped the growth of
interest in history. 'A doctrine of spiritual evolution of the soul
through successive births is as little historical in nature as is a
doctrine of cosmic change. Both these doctrines were developed
in Indian philosophywith no consequential advantage in favour
of philosophical interest in history.'
53
History, Mohanty asserts, is the history of man; it is not a mere
process of change. The awareness that nothing lasts is not the
same as the awareness of history. History of man is the history of
human consciousness. History thus is the account of changing
human consciousness. 'Recognition of the historicity of
consciousness is the necessary and sufficient condition of a
philosophical concern for history.'
54
In the philosophical view that
was predominant in India, human consciousness was above
change.
According to Mohanty the following constitutes the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the growth of 'meaningful'
philosophy of history. These are: (a) belief in the ontological
reality of time, (b) rejection of the view that man is essentially a
manifestation of either nature or the Absolute, (c) rejection of both
the notions of total determinism and absolute freedom, and (d)
replacement of the essentialist notion of self by the notion that
consciousness is essentially temporal. Mohanty seems to be
taking something of a Hegelian position. History is the history of
man and it is also the evolution of consciousness. It is basically the
development of human consciousness over time. This
consciousness is not something that is eternal like atman, but a

historical entity that evolves over historical time. The course of its
development is neither totally predetermined nor totally free.
Consciousness is neither totally transparent nor totally opaque.
And finally Mohanty concludes that consciousness has two
dimensions: one that is historical and the other supra historical. In
its supra historical aspect the traditional Indian views can act as
corrective to the Western notion of history.
Kalidas Bhattacharya moves towards locating the Indian
philosophical position vis-a-vis history from a localized query.
55
His initial project appears as an attempt to situate the notion of
social revolution in the context of traditional Indian philosophical
parameters.
56
From our point of view the more interesting part of
the essay comes towards its end where he formulates the Indian
philosophical angle to history. He sums up the Indian view of
history as 'metaphysics translated into the language of time'.
57
All
metaphysics, he stresses, bears the point of view of eternity.
History, however, belongs to the temporal. Progress in history is
the actualization of the potential or the process through which the
potential becomes the actual. It is in fact a twofold process'the
potential becomes the actual and the actual finds itself in the
bosom of that in which its potentiality was'.
58
It is through dharma
that the mediation between the non-temporal (or eternal) and the
historical takes place. Dharma represents the eternal divine order
of harmony. Whenever a disharmony issues in place of satya and
dharma, mithya and adharma occur. A disjunction is thus created,
the order is disturbed and it cries for restoration. This restoration
takes place by the intervention of God or by the four yuga process
of decline and dissolution when again the age of truth is
established when undiminished dharma again rules supreme.
History is a process where more and more diversity emerges over
time, yet in the same process the more they emerge, the more they
move towards a profound unity. History in other words is a
continuous story of recovering the unity ' in the midst of, and
through, the actual differences that emerge in time'
Bhattacharya concludes that India had its own notion about
history and how it proceeds and he also tries to give an answer to
the question why no historical literature was produced in early
India. His answer is that Indians were aware that the study of
history as an accurate record of actual happenings would lead to
social discord and mutual antagonism among different groups of
people. They valued peace and stability over other things. And for
the sake of maintaining peace and stability they discouraged the
writing of history in the manner that is now the common mode.

The underlying statement of Bhattacharya's observation may be
put in the form of the following question: has the study of factual
history served the cause of peace? Bhattacharya here seems to
share some of the misgivings of Descartes regarding the efficacy
of history as a wholesome subject of study.
60
Finally,
Bhattacharya also questions the merit of completely disregarding
the speculative philosophy of history. He, however, warns that the
speculative philosophies of history should be taken as indicators
of broad trends and not as constitutive laws.
Both Mohanty and Bhattacharya's papers propose to address
some specific questions but gradually broaden the scope of the
discussion to cover some of the central issues relating to the nature
of Indian understanding of past. While Mohanty concludes that
Indian view can act as a supplement to the modern Western view
of history, Bhattacharya projects the Indian understanding as an
alternative mode of historical knowledge which from the
perspective of peace and social harmony has served India well. In
his conclusion Bhattacharya seems to be veering to the same view
as Deshpande.
61
V
How early Indian historical narratives should be read? What was
the structure that was employed in the narratives? What was the
mode of emplottment of the story and what were the stages
through which the story developed and culminated? For a
penetrating analysis of these questions there could hardly have
been a better guide than the work of V. S. Pathak. For a masterly
exposition of the underlying structure, for the implied hint of the
strength of the theoretical framework of early Indian historical
carita kavyas, the slim volume of Prof. Pathak remains
unequalled.
It is interesting that before the linguistic turn in historical
interpretation had acquired the currency among historians that it
now enjoys
62
Pathak should have put forward the narrativist
concept of historical interpretation so forcefully.
63
Pathak writes: '
...history is a conceptual integration of past events in the
framework of time and space ... through the idealising process
which happens in the mind of the historian. It is, in essence, an
abstraction of actuality for the sake of its integration with human
culture in terms of sequential time.... Therefore, the study of the
actuality from a historical record is a complicated process. It
requires an appreciation of the nature and form of the idealising
agentsa penetration of the mental recess of the historian, his

spiritual makeup and ideal mould.'
64
Pathak's project is the
exposition of the idealizing process that the historical narratives in
early India, especially the carita literature, recourse to. His is an
enterprise to understand and analyze the narrative form employed
in the kingly biographies or carita kavya and reveal its
significance. It is as much an attempt to read the encoded
statement as also the study of the structure of encoding as well as
the significance of the employed structure. It should be borne in
mind that what Pathak undertakes is not so much a journey of
discovery of the 'spiritual makeup and ideal mould' of the
individual authors he studies. It is rather a voyage to discover the
cultural terrain that gives the authors their narrative form and its
accompanying texture of meaning and significance. In other
words Pathak is asserting that the culture and its conventions of
which the narrative is a part, determines the narrative mode that
the historian chooses. The narrative draws its form and the
orientation of its meaning and significance from the literary
universe of the culture concerned.
Pathak in his work repeatedly emphasizes the idealized nature
of these narratives. These carita kavyas have for their theme the
glory and the heroic achievements of prominent mediaeval rulers.
However, these narratives stitch the actual on to an archetypal
ideal. Although these were purported to be episodic history, they
were presented in a symbolical garb. "...the broad meaning of
itihasa that it comprised 'ancient events' arranged in the form of a
story to illustrate the truths of moral, aesthetic, worldly and
spiritual spheres, was narrowed down to an account of events
culminating in the achievement of royal glory by the king.
Because of the romantic spirit of the age, the ornate style of the
epic, and the tradition of the Ramayana and the Brhatkatha, the
poet-historians represented the abstract idea of royal glory in the
form of a beautiful princess symbolizing the goddess of Royal
Fortune (rajya-srl), whose love the king wins after overcoming
insurmountable difficulties." This motif, according to Pathak, is
implicit in the Ramayana where Rama is anointed as the king of
Kosala after he liberates Sita. From fourth century onwards this
motif becomes really popular and is found in numerous historical
works including the Raghuvamsa, Ratnavald, Balabharata, etc.
Even the inscriptions of the Guptas, the Palas, the Pratiharas, the
Rashtrkutas, etc. also make frequent use of the motif.
66
And in keeping with the idealized nature of the narrative the
'story' develops organically adhering to a given form of fivestage
sequence. The course of the organic development stretches from

seed to fruition, from prarambha to phalagama. The intermediate
three successive stages are the exertion or prayatna, the hope of
achieving the goal or praptyasa, the certainty of achievement or
niyatapti.
67
In this sequential order of development of the 'event' a
calendar-based chronology did not have to figure. Time,
conceived in ancient India as the puppeteer (string-puller
sutradhara) of this 'great show' of the world, gives an ordered
form to the happenings of the world by the employment of its
powers of sustaining (abhyanujha) and obstruction (pratibandha).
But for the intervention of time, everything would have been
simultaneous the seed, the sprout, the stem, the stalk would all
emerge and exist concurrently. Reality (satyam) operates at two
levels, the absolute reality that is beyond change and the relative
reality that is subject to constant flux. The latter is the level of
nama-rupa. History exists at the nama-mpa level and is subject to
the law of cause and effect. Thus an event has to be understood in
its causal matrix, by its anterior and subsequent states. This matrix
is its real temporal statement, its true chronology. Dates and years
in this context are superfluous.
68
Pathak observes that the reading of the historical works of
ancient times demands an understanding of the concerned
historian's idea of history, which has to be situated against the then
ontological perspective. It is this perspective that supplies the
historian his conceptual universe of relevance and signification.
The imposition of modern historical ideas and tools on them
would be a futile exercise and would be counterproductive. A
wholesale rejection of these works can often be like throwing the
baby out with the bath water. A patient, careful and sympathetic
reading of the texts within their own ontological universe may be
much more rewarding. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that
these texts are 'deliberately artistic and organically designed'. It is
thus imperative to understand the organic linkages in the
employed form and the statement that is being made through it.
69
The narrative structure from seed to fruition should be seen
within the ontological universe in which it is grounded. A story is
not complete unless it reaches the stage of fulfillment; it amounts
to the smothering of the seed. It is necessary to remember that the
five stages from prarambha to phalagama should not be viewed
as an ordinary development of any or every theme; they represent
a progressive achievement of a goal that is truly fulfilling. The
story through the five successive stages of conflict and
tribulations must gradually move towards the resolution of all
conflicts, to harmony, which is the 'natural' order of things. This is

the real disposition of the universe, the only course. Every seed
that comes into being must ultimately reach the fruition whatever
may be its lot of intermediate course of journey. J ust as every drop
of water that falls from heaven ultimately must merge with the
ocean (akasad patita toyam yatha sagaram pratigacchati), every
seed must reach the shore of phalagama. This is the one single
story that exists, there is no other. This is the only story that man
wants to hear, because this is the only story that makes sense. This
therefore is the real itihasa, this is the only narrative that is worth
remembering and recounting. In such a narrative dates and
chronology in the ordinary sense have no place.
70
It may be
recalled in this context that literary theorists of early India did not
view tragedy as a form of literature with much favor. It would
amount to doing violence to the real disposition of the universe
and amount to the assassination of the seed. Thus every Sanskrit
play ended in the Bharatavakya, the sanctification of the harmony
and peace at the end of all conflicts when all earthly passions are
exhausted and an all pervasive sovereign tranquillity descends.
71
The above paragraph can be considered a simplified summary
of the conclusion that Navjyoti Singh draws in his complex
elaboration of the viewpoint of Pathak regarding the narrative
form of historical kavyas. Navjyoti, however, covers a number of
other issues apart from the structure of the narrative. It is not easy
to make a brief synopsis of the complex web of his dense
arguments. His main project is to elucidate the differences
between the paradigmatically opposite enterprises of itihasa and
history and indicate the way they can be related. Although both
are based on the recollection of past, yet, they remain basically
asymmetrical. While itihasa, he suggests, is based on the
recollection of 'justice', history is based on recollection of
injustices. The theories of history "are classically founded on the
premise of hopping from 'tragic to tragic'. "In contrast theories of
itihasa are founded on a search trajectory of 'contentment' where
the 'tragic' only occasions the commencement of the
trajectory...."
72
This divergence between history and itihasa is
found ingrained in the grossly inadequate interpretations of India's
attitude towards past and the ambivalence that the modern
enterprise of history harbours. The cleavage has run so deep that
the foremost examples of itihasa, the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata for instance, traditionally honoured as authentic in
India are not recognized as history at all by modern historians.
It is thus necessary to get to the root of this cleavage. And this
requires an understanding of the nature of history as a discipline.

'Historical thinking has to move on two legs empirical content
and trans-historic content'. The empirical content consists of what
is called historical facts that are time-and-space-specific objects.
They are datable and locatable. Apart from the historical facts,
historical thinking also inevitably involves a time-space free
dimension. This consists of the issues of significance, historical
interpretation, constitution of historical knowledge. Without some
kind of constancy or invariance across history, these would not
have been possible. All historical interpretations are actually a
quest for capturing this invariance which gives historical process
its goal and momentum.
73
This leads to a paradox. All historical
thinking is impregnated by an idea of ahistoricity. Modern
historical thinking rests on the conceptualization of two sets of
objects : historical facts and historical inevitability. While facts
pertain to objects that can be dated and indexed, historical
inevitability is perceived as some kind of a 'force' which reveals
the fated outcome. In fact, the function of the historical facts is
viewed as providing the evidential base for the articulation of the
historical fate. Among the historical facts, there are some objects
that can be called 'vital objects', like nation, class, race, etc., which
have a longer duration over time than the rest of the historical
facts. It is these vital objects that are supposed to be the vehicle of
the historical force.
74
In contrast to history, itihasa, making use of the narrative
structure of seed to fruition (referred to above), consists of
'temporally discriminated stitching of events and episodes
collected or construed to demonstrate the fruition of the
re-cognized seed'. The seed may, or rather, it usually does, contain
conflict and discord. However, the fruition represents the
resolution of discords to a morally desirable state. The resolution
of discord does not result fromjust the internal dynamics of the
form (that is, seed-to fruition structure), it does implicate the rest
of the world in its resolution. 'This necessity is important and is an
intrinsic reason for the temporal deferment or temporal passage in
the fruition of the seed.'
75
The form also enshrines the belief that
all discords are inherently resolvable. 'The recognition of the seed
is at once old and contemporaneous'. The memory of similar
seed-to-fruition events of old continues to inform the event at
hand. Thus the narrative acquires its trans-temporal foundation.
'The resolvability of morally impregnated seeds is of
trans-historical interest of man'.
76

History, according to Navjyoti, is 'temporally discriminated
significant account of the past human activity'.
77
Temporal
discrimination of material objects does not pose many problems.
There can be firm temporal discrimination of material objects,
while there can be only relative temporal discrimination of mental
entities. In the context of history vital objects are mental entities
which are also related to the question of significance. Historical
significance presupposes a constancy that survives the change
wrought by time. Without this constancy the notion of significant
would have been totally time bound and historical enterprise an
exercise in futility. Singh observes that there can not be a history
of the mental capacities of men, form the angle of mental
capacities man has remained the same. The attempts to write the
history of mental capacities of men in the context of prehistory are
only conjectural. Of course, there can be purely descriptive
history of objects that can be temporally indexed with accuracy
with their temporal loci frozen in time. But the moment the notion
of significance is brought to bear on historical account, the issue
of temporal invariance is bound to arise. 'In itihasa significant
account simply overlooks indexicality'.
78
Navjyoti discusses the issue of significance in past human
activity from the point of view of the cognizance and articulation
of significance. He offers a theory of significance.
79
It is the way
human activities are summed up in wholes that gives the key to
the cognizance and articulation of significance. And he analyzes
the concerned issues from the Vaisesika and Mimamsa
perspectives. First level of summation pertains to physical actions
like walking, speaking, writing, etc. An expression like 'walking'
sums up in a cognizable whole the functions and reactions of
millions of molecules. The second level consists of human
activities that may be described as 'purposive actions' that are
done with an intent and purpose. Actions at this level become
'deed' or karma. 'Human activities are read, evaluated and
reinterpreted in the units of deeds. A reading of each others deeds
is a pet and compulsive engagement of men.'
80
A deed has an
inbuilt structure of 'intention-action-fruition'. The deeds are also at
the same time open ended in the sense that they can clash with
each other and can create discord. It is these discords that produce
the ground for the third level of summation. The third level
consists of those special deeds that lead to the resolution of the
discords. These deeds may be called 'judicious deeds' or 'feats'.
These judicious deeds contain an injunctive content and are
classically called vidhi. This is the highest level of summation, no

higher level of evaluation is needed. 'Construction of significance
automatically comes to a halt here. Feat is an embodiment of
closure. And there are good reasons to believe, in accordance with
the Mimamsa tradition, that such feats are plural.'
81
It is at the
level of the feats (vidhi) that the significance for history and
itihasa gets constituted. 'Historical significance' does not inhere at
the levels of actions and deeds.
"Accounting for discordant deeds amounts to recollecting and
reading injustice. Success in the operation and recognition of the
third reduction (sil. J udicious deeds or feats) leads to accounting
for feats. Accounting for feats amounts to recollecting and reading
justice. Usually, history, if not limited to pure description, is a
narrative of recollecting injustice. From deeds to feat is an
injunctive continuum and in their recollection and operation is
situated the enterprise of history and itihasa."
82
However, in the
peaks of feats even the residue of temporality that characterizes
the continuum also disappears. Feats are 'radically contemporary',
they attain the status, as Mimamsa tradition observes, of 'beyond
the human' (apauruseya) and 'the uncreated' (anadi). J ustice thus
defies temporal discrimination, whereas injustice born in the
domain of created deeds are temporally locatable. The disjunction
between history and itihasa can be bridged. If history does not
remain imprisoned in the snares of injustice and becomes ready to
take the final step towards the resolution of discords it can merge
in itihasa. And, from the perspective of itihasa, temporal
discrimination does not have to be ignored for its native structure
absorbs within itself segments that admit of temporal
discrimination from bdja to niyatapti.

VI
There have not been many Indian authors who have made a
comprehensive study of the nature of historical knowledge. Prof.
D. P. Chattopadhyaya is an exception. In 2001 he published a
book under the title The Ways of Understanding the Human Past}
3

In this book he makes a detailed analysis of the historical modes
of understanding. What is of particular interest and relevance to us
is that he devotes a substantial part of his book to the study of
itihasa as a mode of knowledge of the past and that he
distinguishes this mode of knowledge from the current mode of
historical thinking.
Running through the rich texture of multifold arguments of the
book, there is a gentle yet resolute assertion that history or the

understanding of past is essentially dialogical in nature.
84
This
constant dialogue between the present, i.e., the abode of the
historian, and the past, i.e., the object of his study, leads to the
continuous urge to update the historical accounts. The urge to
updating may, it in fact often does, lead to an urge to discard the
earlier historical versions as untrustworthy or even useless. This
lack of sympathy for the earlier times and their formulations gives
rise to a paradoxical situation. Such an attitude is basically
anti-historical, because it denies the value of past. The enterprise
of history can not even subsist without reposing some faith in the
value of past. The past that cries out for understanding has to be
approached with sensitivity to its own terms; there can not be a
unilateral imposition of the standpoint of the present on to the
past. The present often arrogates to itself (the delusion of)
omniscience and looks at past with ridicule and sneer. This
attitude is both anti-historical and unproductive. Thus when we
look at itihasa as a mode of knowledge of past, it is necessary to
disabuse the mind of the
'arrogance of present'.
85
Furthermore, Prof. Chattopadhyaya
repeatedly emphasizes that there is no single monolith that can be
called the present; that it does not present itself in one fixed
uniform shape to everybody's consciousness. The present has its
own variegated manifestations which in their turn form the
perspectives for the interpretations of past. History therefore can
not be packed in a straightjacket either form-wise or content-wise.
Before taking up the itihasa mode of understanding the past,
Prof. Chattopadhyaya explores the nature of historical knowledge.
He makes so many interrelated points that it is not easy to
summarize them. History, he remarks, is clearly a time-related
entity and discipline, yet at the same time it refuses to stay limited
to the bounds of time. There is a dimension in history, which, in
some way and to a certain extent, is free from the bounds of
time.
86
It is this invariant dimension that provides the links of the
past with the present, without this link the past would not have
been accessible to the historian at all. Moreover, history is not
unidirectional; it is not just a passage from the present to the past.
History has a twofold direction; it is as much a voyage from the
present to the past as a movement from the past to the present. In
its onward movement from the past it does not stop at the present,
it tends to thrust forward towards the future. If the present,
especially in the context of human life, is coloured, conditioned
and governed to some extent by the past, the present also acts as a
factor in the shaping of the future. "Since our past, present and

future can not be sharply demarcated, certainly not existentially,
the future is in a way always available in our present."
87
History
thus has also future a dimension, though it may remain invisible
from the view, tucked in a fold, as it were, and waiting to be
unfolded. "Compared to the past, the future is more open-ended. I
may hate to remember some bad or tragic things that happened to
me. But I can not, strictly speaking, erase out the past events or
deeds of my life. In relation to the future this question does not
arise at all. I may choose one particular course of action or
another, I may decide to follow a particular course of thought or
another, but in neither case the question of erasure does arise."
88
Although the presence of here and now can not be eliminated
from the account of past, history has to be essentially grounded on
the past. It has to be basically an account of the past; it is the past
that is the real subject matter of history. Since the historian cannot
completely tear himself from the present, some intrusion of the
present in history can not be helped. His apparatus of
interpretation, his methodology and his ideas, will tend to be
contemporary, as will also be his audience. But on that score he
cannot impose the present on the past. "He cannot telescope the
present into the past. Interestingly enough, as said before, nor can
he separate the past from the present; it is on the basis of present
evidences and currently available ways of interpreting those
evidences that the historian can possibly infer or reconstruct the
past.... The most important defining trait of history, then, turns out
to be the historian's interest in the past as past, not as dominated by
some or other practical consideration of the present."
89
Thus the inseparability of the past, present and future produces
certain problems in the enterprise of history. But all the problems
of the discipline of history do not issue out from the encroachment
of the present and future on it. There is another aspect that is
equally invasive; it is the cultural mediation. History is 'embedded
in culture'.
90
The universe of meaning and significance within
which the actors of history as well as the historian operate is to a
very large extent culturally constituted. Bereft of the cultural
context the meaning and significance of the historical events are
not only lost to a very large extent, but also become susceptible to
distortions and misapprehension. One of the demanding burdens
that the historian has to bear is that he has to be faithful to the
universe to which the historical event he is studying belongs.
"Every age, every culture, every people deserve to be understood
in their own terms. Understanding, not judgement, is the key
concept in all humanistic studies."
91
Identification with the subject

matter thus is a principal responsibility of the historian; the
historian is required to make a conscious and determined effort to
cross the barriers of time and culture.
At the same time the historian can not afford not to be selective.
Memory is selective by nature, interest, traits and orientation
influence the selection process. Although one can play with one's
memories up to a point; one can prefer to remember certain things
while forget others, but one can not totally obliterate one's
memory. Nonetheless, the nature of memory normally is
selective. Moreover, when past memory is committed to writing
the question of relevance and significance become very important
conditioning factors. This inevitably entails selection. And then
there is the element of imagination. Selective memories arrayed
according to the demands of relevance and significance, which are
themselves governed by choice, and illumined by imagination are
the constituents of historical narrative. Imagination opens the door
for creativity to enter historical compositions. 'While memory is
primarily compulsive, ...imagination may prove interpretative,
creative, and also distortive and manipulative.... But, on reflection
and careful scrutiny it is found that both memory and imagination,
in spite of their diverse capacities, are unitive.'
92
This unity flows
from the unity of the personality or the 'identity' of the author.
History thus is only a mode of experience and not the totality of
experience.
93
Multiple choices being available to the historian means that
history can be written in diverse forms and manners. This
multiplicity does not only include a multiplicity of themes and
problems, but also accommodates multiple points of views on the
same theme and problem. Obviously, therefore historical
construction is different from scientific construction. Historical
narratives do not bear the same kind or degree of abstraction as
scientific theories or laws. "Because of their generality, laws and
theories, the crux of scientific knowledge, are abstract, more or
less and space-time invariant. In brief, science is abstract and,
therefore, in a way paradoxically, its gaze and reach, compared to
history's, go much deeper and farther at the macro level and are
finer at the micro level."
94
Historian's world, from that angle, is
relatively more particularized. "While the scientist's theory is
relatively abstract, the historian's narrative is relatively
concrete."
95
History does not deal with such clear, stable,
well-defined and impersonal objects that lend themselves to the
derivation of higher order laws and theories. If history is to claim
scientific status then it should be able to formulate such higher

order laws and theories that will be able to account for all sorts of
historical events from the point-instant ones to those that are long
enduring, from the micro to the macro.
96
But these are neither the
aim of history, nor its capabilities.
Similarly, history need not aim for causal explanations of
scientific kind. "Unless history is defined or legislated as a
science, I find no compelling reason why it should be required to
offer causal explanation of the events of past. Cause of history lies
within history. It is internal to its own coherent structure."
97
Chattopadhyaya here makes an important point; it has pivotal
significance in his formulation. He further adds: "To allow causal
incursion into history distorts it beyond recognition." History can
not be, and it does not have to be, reduced to a natural science.
History does involve some ordinary generalizations using general
laws and methods. And, these generalizations and laws
distinguish history from the works of art or art experiences which
are totally individualistic and particular.
99
But these laws and
generalizations, as it has been clarified above, do not bear the
character of laws of natural sciences. History occupies an area that
lies midway between pure science and pure art.
It can not fairly be called that the nature of history is scientific;
'in very many ways it is akin to literature'.
100
In content, form and
language history is primarily literary in character. Artistic
expositions have as their basic categories matter or thing, form or
structure and content or subject.
101
"Matter may be generic or
specific. Naturally, the generic matter may be articulated in very
many ways, whereas specific matter lends itself to fewer possible
ways of organization."
102
History thus can be organized as a
'quasi-causal narrative, fictionalized story and an epic poem'. "As
a form of literature, history tries to express its theme in words.
Words are organized in a meaningful relation. Meaningfully
related words are the main subject of history. Meanings are both
cognitive and evocative (if appropriately organized). The
language of history turns out to be imagistic and conative. The
historian being wedded as he is to the literary form of expression,
takes the liberty of using the words without defining them. Like
the artist's, his language is ordinary."
103
This is so because the
historian's basic interest is humanistic and thematic. 'He wants to
capture in his narrative the peculiar traits of the human beings
involved in or who have authored a particular event.'
104
And,
because his concern is lives of human beings and themes related to
human lives in their particular manifestations and not in any
general abstract law, he uses the tools of ordinary language and

communication. He does not need to resort to either symbolic
expressions or to the precision of mathematical expressions.
While the scientist is mainly concerned with the study and
articulation of the spatio-temporal world of natural process, the
historian's world is multi-dimensional and consists of 'an
interesting blend of facts and fiction'.
105
In form, style and
presentation history generally shares the characteristics of fiction.
The form and style of presentation often render the facts presented
assume normative and evocative qualities. The style and language
usually follow the current literary norms and conventions. And in
their intent and flavour the historical works are often, overtly or
covertly, philosophical, reflective, normative, didactic, etc. The
Indian traditional historical works like the Epics and the puranas
exemplify these qualities in abundance: they are history, poetic
compositions, fiction, philosophy, ethics all rolled in one. History
also shares another feature of literature. Both history and literature
have for their audience the general public and they do not demand
the kind of professional expertise on the part of their readers as
sciences. Moreover, while constituting their stuff both literature
and history make use of imagination. Thus both literature and
history are creative constructions; creativity is a feature of history
as well like it is of literature. However, historical imagination has
to take into account the requirements of historical objectivity or
truth-claims of history. History is reconstructive, 'but this
reconstruction presupposes the objectivity of the elements out of
which history is reconstructed.'
106
The dialogue between the present and the past, which produces
history, does not follow any set type or style. There are various
ways through which this dialogue can take place and a host of
factors ranging from the personal preferences to cultural modes
condition the way the past is looked at and articulated. It is against
this perspective that itihasa mode of looking at and articulating
the past should be viewed.
Prof. Chattopadhyaya has taken the two epics, the Ramayana
and Mahabharata, as the representative examples of the itihasa
mode.
107
He notes some of the striking features of the two works
that allow us a view of their distinctive character, especially in the
context of modern historical works.
108
The feature that immediately attracts attention is the authorship
of the two works. These were not in the conventional sense works
of individual authors. The very names, Valmiki and Vyasa appear
as rather type names than personal names. Veda Vyasa, for
example, literally means one who arranged the Vedas. These two

epics seem to have grown over time as compilations. The putative
authors were responsible for creative compilation and
arrangement of an old and a growing tradition. These books were
not products of particular dates; they do not represent the mind
and the outlook of a particular author or period or even a particular
society. Not only temporally but also spatially, these works
embraced a wide expanse. It was truly Pan Indian in its spread.
Moreover, both the vertical and horizontal reach of the epics was
also characterized by a dynamic quality that seems to have never
got frozen. It went on growing. It was especially true of the
Mahabharata. It was no exaggerated claim or a mere rhetoric that
the Mahabharata came to be regarded as the embodiment of
Bharatavarsa itself. It represented not an individual author, a
particular kingdom or a region, a single theme or an episode, a
particular age; it represented a whole dynamic culture.
Especially with reference to the Mahabharata, some critics
have noted the lack of thematic unity in the work.
109
This apparent
lack of order and symmetry, the juxtaposing of odd and opposite
things, however, seems to carry the subtle flavor of a higher order
or symmetry, the natural and raw symmetry of an eclectic work.
110

It does not matter if this symmetry does not correspond to the
chiseled symmetry of a consciously produced work of art.
111
The
Indian epics do not narrate the development of a single tale. They
are in fact a kaleidoscope of a multihued society reflecting it in
and through its changing times and social mores and customs.
112

They encapsulate all aspects of human life in all its variety and
incongruity in both its universal and individual articulations.
113
In the context of this character of the works, the question of
date of composition does not seem too relevant.
114
What seems
more relevant is the fact that these works carrying within them
generations of varied experiences, accommodating additions and
accretions of different periods and various areas and peoples
should have been able to ingrain themselves in the heart and mind
of the people of this vast country across various areas and regions
and languages and customs.
115
These works embody a delightful
fusion of history and literature. A remarkable union of history
consciousness (ithasa cetana) with literary sense (sahitya rasa)
gave these works a pervasive appeal. This lay at the root of the
extensive popularity of these epics.
116
"The long span of time over
which these were composed, revised or decomposed, adding new
themes and ideas (stories, parables, fables, emerging events,
didactic, religious and philosophical instructions, etc.) to, and
shedding parts from the old compositions, lend them an implicit,

but unmistakable, aitihasika (pro-historical) ambience. After all
whatever pertains to humans represents, directly or indirectly,
their ideas and actions, memories, dreams and dispositions, social
backgrounds and hoped-for utopias."
117
Moreover, these works
for a very long period retained a kind of openness about them and
were not closed and finished like the works of individual writers.
Thus they did not shut themselves off from the continuous
reinterpretations according to the demands of changing times.
Different recensions and translations and adaptations in different
regional languages further extended this commodiousness. And
constant communications and interactions between different
social groups created an atmosphere of common cultural
ambience.
118
The cumulative effect of all these created the
conditions for the extensive appeal of these works and their
continued hold over popular imagination.
Idealization, at times on a massive scale, is writ large on the
epics. It is well known that imagination plays an important role in
literary works. In history imagination plays comparatively a more
subdued role, but it remains important nonetheless. As long as
imagination does not run riot and creates chaos, imagination and
idealization are not necessarily impediments to understanding. In
fact, imagination creatively utilized can sharpen and vivify
understanding instead of blocking it. Of course, itihasa, i.e., the
epic and the puranas, can not be considered as substitutes for
history, in the currently received sense of the term history.
119

Itihasa and history belong to two different types of works. But
such questions as 'whether history is more reliable than itihasa'
are misplaced. For an understanding of the ideas, institutions and
the actions of the ancient times, the itihasa is a valuable means.
The interpretative apparatus and assumptions in the two are
different, but both of them, itihasa and history are constructions
all the same. In the understanding of past both reality and
imagination have their roles. "If it is right to affirm 'there is no
escape from imagination', it is equally right to affirm 'there is no
escape
from reality' ..... If this line of argument is admitted, we can not
deny the reality of myths or even shadows."
120
Myths too have
their reality and rationality. Our mind does not act in void, it has
certain predisposition acquired through the views and values we
hold. These views and values are composite by nature. Our mind
is 'simultaneously tradition-bound, rooted in the present and
forward-looking'. "But because of the inherent freedom and

creativity mind's orientation and projection are neither uniform in
character nor identical in content."
121
However, Chattopadhyaya believes that our contemporary
notion of history is a product of the milieu that we are living in.
And this milieu is largely conditioned by the modern and
contemporary ideas. And from this point of view the itihasa
notion of past does not feel fully satisfying as they do not answer
our desire for the specifics that we seek in the account of past. But
he is not in favour of subsuming the distinctive mode of
past-consciousness that itihasa represents by the contemporary
model of scientific knowledge. For, that will lead to the blotting
out of the difference between 'the sane role of science and its
scientistic or its reductionist pretension'.
122
The earlier notions of
history were basically non-cognitive. And they attached a great
deal of value to the role of imagination, entertainment,
propagation and interpretation in the narratives of past.
123
It will
not be an unmixed gain to give up the earlier notions of history
altogether in the name of scientific and objective history. Despite
all the tall claims the ideal objectivity will continue to elude us,
for, man can not emulate 'God's-eye-view of history' which alone
can resolve all temporality, all relativity.
124
History has not been
able to attain the status of science and has not been able to produce
the level of abstraction that is necessary for the formulation of
laws in the manner of science. Historian can only make some
generalizations, and this is what they will continue to do. "Unlike
scientific explanation, historical explanation relies on the well
understood and implicitly apprehended general truths."
125

VII
If Prof. Chattopadhyaya has dealt in details with the nature of the
discipline of history, particularly in the context of itihasa mode of
knowledge, Prof. Pande has dealt with the nature of historical
process. Prof. Pande in his treatment does not make any direct
reference to traditional Indian understanding of past or makes any
explicit reference to the itihasa mode of knowledge. Bu the fabric
of his formulation is unmistakably traditional Indian. The primacy
that he gives to the intuitive realization of truth and the role he
assigns to it in the generation of culture and society make it
abundantly clear that his point of view represents Indian ethos.
Prof. Pande's treatment of culture seeks to reinforce and extend
and thus restore the relevance of the ancient and traditional
perspective. This exercise of rehabilitation has not been attempted

by taking recourse to crude 'archaism'. It has been done with sober
and reasoned evaluation of the grounds of modernity and
scientism. These qualities lend a unique distinction to Prof.
Pande's views. The views of Prof. Pande deserve to be considered
in some details.
"Culture is the social expression of value seeking and history is its process"
"Human history must in effect aspire after being a spiritual autobiography of
man, a 'discovery of lost times' which is simultaneously a creative
transformation of present, a discovery of what is hidden in the past
experiences of the soul"
These two remarks from the Preface of Prof. Pande's The
Meaning and Process of Culture may serve as convenient entry
points to his views on history. The Meaning and Process of
Culture, based on a series of lectures given by him in the
Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, J aipur, in the
late sixties of the last century, contains the most elaborate
statement of his views on culture and history.
126
Aspects of gist of
his views have subsequently been given expression to in a number
of other lectures, articles and monographs.
127
His Bharatiya
Samaj: Tattvik Aur Aitihasik Vivechan
i2fi
comprising the annual
Govind Ballabh Pant Memorial Lectures delivered in 1991 at
Govind Ballabh Pant Social Science Institute, Allahabad,
represents a penetrating analysis of the nature of society in the
context of traditional Indian idea of social arrangement. Bharatiya
Samaj is another of his seminal work, and should be treated as a
companion volume of The Meaning and Process of Culture. In
our treatment of Prof. Pande's views we have relied mainly on
these works.The nature and significance of history has been a
theme with which Prof. Pande has remained constantly engaged.
Aspects of gist of his views have subsequently been given
expression to in a number of other lectures, articles and
monographs. It may also be added that his views on culture and
history may be taken to represent the very core of Prof. Pande's
intellectual thinking and it is these concerns which are central to
his intellectual and academic endeavours. Thus these concerns
can be found as colouring and permeating the amazingly diverse
fields of his scholarship and output.
In the two remarks quoted above two distinct but entwined
formulations about the nature of history may be observed. In the
first formulation where history is called a process, it refers to
'history as event'. The process signifies a series of happenings in
space and time and weaving, as it were, an order and a

configuration. In this way, history is an observable phenomenon.
In the second remark history is viewed as a 'study', an account of
what happened in past, an account intent on understanding and
making sense of what had happened. Thus in the second
formulation history is viewed as a discipline. These two remarks
draw our attention to the two usage in which the expression
history is used. History, in the words of Atkinson, " . . . . may
stand either for what happened or was done in past (call this
'history
1
') or for the study of it (call this 'history
2
') In the former
sense history is the historian's subject matter, in the latter it is the
study of it." This division, however, has further implications than
just distinguishing two different ways of looking at history. In
fact, it embodies something of a fissure in the emerging field of
philosophy of history parceling it into two packages of speculative
and analytical philosophy of history with separate groups of
votaries for each. It is important to note that in Prof. Pande's
formulation these two parts have been woven together into one
single matrix.
The second quotation also underlines Prof. Pande's view on the
concern and the role of history as a discipline and also hints at its
methodology. The study of history should be centrally concerned
with man's spiritual enterprise, its role being the fashioning of the
present on the spiritual foundation of the past. The role of history
and the historian is not just undertaking a journey to the past. It is
not a one-way traffic; entering the past is important but equally
important is the return journey. The function of the historian is not
just that of an antiquarian, he ought to play a role in vivifying the
present with the knowledge of history. Since the historian should
endeavour to make explicit the past experiences of the soul, the
methodology that underlies this formulation seems to bear kinship
with hermeneutics and narratives.
Understanding history has to begin with understanding culture,
for history is the articulation of the processual career of culture.
History also articulates the process through which the transition
from 'culture' to 'cultures' takes place. Prof. Pande's formulation of
culture is different from that of the modern behavioral sciences
and social history.
129
Behavioral scientists and modern historians
of society take culture as a form of behaviour characterizing a
group of people located in a certain geographical area or age.
Sometimes culture is also taken to signify 'the symbolic
expressive aspects' of the behaviour of a defined group of people.
Such formalist positivist approaches to culture, according to Prof.
Pande, suffers from an inherent infirmity emanating from the

unresolved tension between the notions of universalism and
pluralism that underlie them. The universalism arises from the
belief that implicit in human nature there is a bed of universality
based on rationality and humanism which make man amenable to
science and technology and to such values as freedom, equality,
justice, welfare, peace, etc. The plurality of cultures is regarded as
an empirically substantiated fact; it is all there for any one to see.
The opposite pulls of universality and plurality have been sought
to be reconciled 'through the ideas of evolution, development and
progress'. The plurality of cultures is thus regarded as various
rungs on a uniform upward ladder. Thus prehistoric cultures were
'primitive'; the modern Western cultures are more 'evolved' and
'progressive' than the less dynamic Oriental ones. Such labels as
'primitive', 'evolved', 'progressive', etc., according to Prof. Pande,
are expressions more of the article of faith embellishing the
notions of modernity itself than verifiable scientific truths.
130

Moreover, it is well known that the shadow of doubt over the
limitless capacity of scientism appears to be now lengthening ever
more and more.
The accepted theoretical domain within which the current
social science disciplines operate constitutes the background
against which Prof. Pande develops his own thesis. Put
differently, it may be said that the prevailing theoretical universe
of social sciences represents the purvapaksa of Prof. Pande's
thesis. For the last two centuries, science has established a
hegemonic discourse that has overflowed into practically all
disciplines. And around this discourse and its methodology a class
of disciplines, usually grouped under the label of social or
behavioral sciences, have come into being and have come to
occupy an unchallenged position in our contemporary
understanding and study of society. This development has totally
displaced, in fact, outlawed, the traditional understandings of
culture and society and the grounds of those understandings. The
traditional views of culture and society in the contemporary
academic dispensation have relevance only as historical evidence,
a part of the belief systems of bygone peoples and ages. They are
regarded as totally bereft of any contemporary relevance as an
alternative basis of social organization or even as alternative tools
of analysis for understanding of culture and social reality. Prof.
Pande's work is a plea for the intellectual and academic
reconsideration of the traditional understandings.
131
The nature of society is regarded as 'factual', i.e., a society is
regarded as a product of certain constituent facts. To understand a

society one has just to grasp these facts and their interrelationships
and the basis of the interrelationships. And, the basis of these
interrelationships is again viewed as 'factual' in
character'interests' being their central ingredient. There are of
course a number of views as to how the multiplicity of interests,
often conflicting in character, gets articulated in social setup. But
there is hardly any difference of opinion on the point that a society
essentially is a matrix of interests. It is thus natural that the
prevalent social science views the societal facts as value-neutral.
In other words, as material for study, social facts are considered as
value-neutral and as amenable to empirical observation in the
same way as the objects of study in the natural sciences.
The suitability of social science mode for an understanding of
society raises several issues and there are grounds for misgivings
about the validity and utility of the effort to attribute the character
of scientific knowledge to that of society. These misgivings spring
from the fact that man constitutes the object which is studied in
social science. Moreover, human behavior is not only enormously
more complex than the behavior of a 'falling stone', but man is
also essentially different from a material body. Here, i.e., in the
differing perception of the essential nature of man, lies the
dividing line between the contemporary social science views and
those of Prof. Pande.
In contrast to the current scientific or social scientific view of
man, the traditional view may be counterpoised.
132
It may be
remarked here that in delineating the traditional perception, Prof.
Pande relies mainly on the Indian. However, it also needs to be
noted that all old traditions, including the Indian, are practically
unanimous in differing from the materialistic concept that regards
matter as the fundamental entity in the world. Man, in the
traditional view, is not primarily a manifestation of materiality. It
therefore follows that the pursuit of material ends alone does not
reflect the whole of human aspirations and man's quest for
fulfillment. Want and interest represent the physical and
biological needs of men; these by themselves are incapable of
expressing the deeper human urges that spring from the core of
their being. The social organizations or social formations are not
analyzable in terms of conflict, tension and convergence of
interests alone.
It is not that the material needs are of no consequence. Artha
and kama are important pursuits (purusartha) in life, but they are
not ends in themselves.
133
Not by bread alone has been a common
refrain in all religious traditions. The futility of chasing

fulfillment and perfection in the ever widening and elusive
horizons of economic development, not withstanding the
theoretical possibility of equitable distribution of power and pelf,
is writ large in the very foundational principle of
economics'wants are unlimited'. The simple truth is that there is
an innate sense of inadequacy, a pervasive feeling of insecurity,
which characterizes the very fact of human existence. Although a
substantial part of the efforts that constitute 'modernity' is directed
towards making man forget this very fact, the project can not be
said to have succeeded. This pervasive sense comes from an
instinctive awareness that life rests in the shadow of death. There
is an enduring sense of suffering (duhkhabodha) that afflicts
human being. The spring from which this sense of inadequacy
wells up in human heart is not a feeling of deprivation in ordinary
sense; it springs up from a deeper awareness of the limitedness
and impermanence of human existence. This is the real import of
the famous Buddhist assertion 'sarvam duhkham duhkharti. The
awareness of the limitation of the earthly existence infuses an
omnipresent pallor of sadness to human life from which man
seeks release.
134
To transcend this limitation, to achieve
immortality and limitlessness, have been the deepest yearnings of
man. The attainment of this state has been given various names
like isvaraprapti, amritattva, mukti, moksa, nirvana, etc.
It is on these premise that Prof. Pande has grounded his theory
of culture.
The very expression culture contains the notion of
improvement or refinement. And implicit in such notions of
improvement and refinement, particularly in the domain of
culture, there underlies the recognition of human agency and
intervention in facilitating the improvement. The world of culture
thus is the world wrought by human beings. The world of culture
thus is distinct from the world of nature. It should, however, be
underlined that Prof. Pande affiliates his idea of the element of
refinement or re-formation of human nature residing in culture
with the Indian notions of samskara, bhavana and sadhana.
Regarding the fountainhead of culture as a phenomenon and
the ramifications of its course, we may quote a passage from Prof.
Pande's article 'Culture and Cultures'. He writes: "Culture would
then be essentially nothing but the tradition of philosophia
perennis, sanatanadharma or aryamarga, a universal and
perennial but occult tradition of wisdom (amanaya, vidya) which
has been diversely interpreted and expressed in different symbolic
traditions (agama) of value-seeking (purusartha sadhana,

aryaprayesana) embodied in historically given societies or
civilizations."
135
This passage, as in a sutra, contains the central
elements of his concept of culture that are relevant to us here.
Philosophia perennis is the fountainhead from which culture
flows. This philosophy of life is actually a vision of life without
afflictions of limitations. This vision, asserts Prof. Pande, is occult
in nature. The transmission of this vision, which is essentially
occult and transcendental, to the temporal world is effected
through the mediation of extraordinary human beings. These
extraordinary men are called prophets, seers, etc. It is an act of
bringing on to the earth and the temporal world what is divine and
timeless. The transmission of this vision and the process of its
dissemination play key roles in the making of a society because
they provide the foundational stuff for its genesis and
development. Moreover, it is this vision, and not the external
form, which continues to be the vital part of a society. It is the
philosophy of life, the Philosophia Perennis, which creates and
nurtures the tradition or the agama that sustains a society.
136
The
agama or the tradition provides the nourishment for sustaining the
life of a society as well as the bond that keeps it together. The
tradition also gives the society its personality and its identity. It is
not only the vision that is occult by nature, but also the praxis that
is prescribed for attaining it.
137
Philosophia perennis is truly universal in nature, for it is a
philosophy for the entire mankind and is not inhibited by the time-
space differentials of human affairs. It is therefore, sanatana. It is
also universal in the sense that it gets articulated in every society.
And as it is sanatana, it is also transcendental. Now, since culture
is located within human affairs and since it is at the same time
transcendental in nature, the starting point of culture and its course
has to be charted from the transcendental to the human. This
transmission of a thing that is essentially trans-human to begin
with from the transcendental plane to the plane of culture is
comparable to the descent of the Ganga to the earth. The
transmission is effected through the mediation of extra-ordinary
human agents like Bhagiratha.
Philosophia perennis has to be naturally occult and spiritual in
character. It is akin to revelatory knowledge. We are intentionally
using the qualifying phrase 'akin' in order to underline that
perennial philosophy or vision does not partake of the narrow
dogma that normally seems to grow around revelatory creeds. The
sanatanadharma is based on the spiritual-mystical apprehension
of the Absolute by some specially endowed individuals; it is the

articulation of the envisioned truth in human vocabulary and
idiom. This articulation of the truth automatically, almost
inevitably, gets conditioned by space and time factors. Thus in its
expressive mode and in its communication profile, the articulation
of envisioned truth acquires a local and social countenance. The
seeds of the sprouting of diverse cultures lie here.
138
While the articulation of the truth envisioned takes on a
symbolical form, it lays a great deal of emphasis on praxis which
lends itself to exposition in clearer terms than the experience of
the envisioning of the truth itself. This leads to the growth of the
tradition (the vidya, the amnaya, the agama).
139
The tradition
grows both in its corpus of exposition as well as in its acquisition
of a body of followers. All these threethe envisioning of the
truth by the finely tuned seeker, the exposition of the truth and its
praxis, and the acquisition of a body of followersresult from the
perennial yearning of the soul for transcendence providing them
the common ground for coalescence. And these three in their
cumulative effect give a society its distinctive personality, its
weltanschauung, a matrix of values. This Weltanschauung derives
or constitutes itself from a vision of cosmology that endows life
with meaning and goal in the most fundamental way. Thus it
becomes both the repository and the standard of value. The
formation of the weltanschauung, however, does not take place in
logical formal manner and is therefore not reducible to logical
formal categories. But on that score alone it does not deserve to be
either set aside as something opaque or dismissed as fevered
imagination. The value of the visitation of grand vision beyond
the idiom of logic and analysis suffusing the perception with an
extraordinary and ineffable light has not only been attested to by
spiritual seekers and mystics but also by creative artists and even
scientists.
There can not be a society without a sense of a society. It is this
consciousness, which may be called 'social consciousness'
(samajik bodh) that brings a society into being. The social
consciousness crystallizes around a philosophy of life that is
wider than the mere struggle of existence at the physical and
material level for livelihood and gratification of senses (artha and
kama). The awareness or knowledge of the self (atmabodha) is the
fountainhead from which the social consciousness flows. The
consciousness of the self has several layers. At least two of them,
the physical and psychological, are recognized in modern science
too.
140
Indian philosophical systems have consistently been
asserting that there is a deeper layer called atman and that it is the

same as the universal self.
141
The self-awareness (atmabodha) is
thus to be understood in the sense of the famous saying 'know
thyself' (atmanam viddhi). The transcendental vision of the
meaning of human life centers on this notion and the social
consciousness arises from a collective acceptance of this notion.
Thus it is not the convergence of material interests that constitutes
the kernel of a society but a philosophy about the meaning of life.
The social consciousness thus is an embodiment of the traditions
of value that a society builds and inherits. It may be said that the
characteristic feature of the social consciousness is that it knits the
individual's sense of belonging, his sense of the past and
continuity, his idea of duties and obligations, his beliefs and
aspirations into a relatively more durable, yet somewhat invisible,
system of regulations. It may be described as the omniscient and
ever-present conscience (antaryaml atma) of the society that
keeps on guiding the individuals about their ideals, their rights and
duties and defines the area of fulfillment in a life of activity and
work.
142
It is the inherited traditions that demarcate one society
from another. And the traditions form around the agama.
Agama in its original form is not articulated as a system; its
earliest expression takes place in poetic or mythological
utterances. In its original form it gives complex utterance to the
mystical apprehension of truth in iridescent symbolical idioms.
143

In fact, agama in its original form, that is amnaya, is sanatana
(timeless, ahistorical) and is avyakta (unmanifest). And since the
utterances of the seers and prophets are symbolic expressions of
supra-sensual truths, they do not remain untouched by
interpretative endeavors. These utterances should not be confused
with full-scale or systematic expositions they are utterances
quivering with suggestive symbols. They thus remain objects of
contemplation and interpretation.
144
This process of interpretation
gives rise to a body of statements and assertions that grow into a
tradition. Culture is but another name of this tradition and society
is the physical frame of culture. A society gets its individuality
from the culture it carries. A human society is distinguishable
from, say, a herd of cattle by the fact that the former is
characterized by dharma. The animals too are sometimes seen
forming groups, but that does not entitle them to be given the
name of a society. Even biological kinship (samaja, i.e., of equal
birth) and herd-behavior do not constitute a society; humanness is
its essential attribute. And the distinctive mark of humanness is
dharma. It is the possession of dharma that distinguishes humans
from animals. "ahara (eating), nidra (sleep), bhaya (fear),

maithuna (sex) men share with animals; it is dharma which is the
special bit of extra that men have. Bereft of Dharma men are but
animals."
145
Dharma at the personal level signifies the ultimate
truth, the goal of life, the knowledge of the self (atmabodha), the
dictate of conscience (viveka-buddhi), etc. But its social
countenance takes the form of a set of regulations (acara,
vyavahara) enshrining a set of values that a society generates
from its agama. A society thus also is a configuration of values.
A society is also a texture of relationships. Unlike the natural
world, the relationships in the social domain do not remain
constant. These relationships pertain to two areas: (1) artha,
which relates to material life and includes economic and political
aspects, (2) dharma, which relates to the ideal life and includes
ethical and spiritual. Although the original source of a truly
fundamental philosophy of life lies in the sphere of vision and has
something of an ethereal quality about it in the beginning, it starts
acquiring a body first in symbolical forms in the domains of
feeling and aesthetics and then it works its way into more tangible
areas of thought and philosophy and finally into the social and
political norms and practices and organizations. Thus culture in
Prof. Pande's formulation holds within its fold a subset which is
also sometimes called civilization. Civilization is the formal and
organized social expression of culture. It is the unity of goal, the
goal being the foundational value sought after, that binds the
symbolical and the formal aspects of society. These formal
aspects that constitutes the civilization, in fact, represent
institutionalized values. One of the implications of Prof. Pande's
formulation is: society or social organization can not be analyzed
fully and properly in functional, behavioral, mechanistic and
systemic terms. Social organization, which is a part of
civilization, can be better understood as embodying values a
society strives to achieve. And from this point of view,
civilization and its component, the social organization are among
the most important fields of study for the historian. Like
Hobsbaum , history of society is a central concern of Prof. Pande.
Only he does not agree that society should be viewed merely as an
instrument for the satisfaction of man's material needs. It would
also be wrong to construe that Prof. Pande discounts the
importance of economic and material pursuits. He is only
unwilling to concede these pursuits, and the tensions and conflicts
arising from these pursuits, and the physicality of these tensions
and pursuits, the centrality that Hobsbaum gives. Prof. Pande
would rather like to reach out to the vision of the 'ideal good'

around which the structure of society and civilization develops.
According to him three elements are woven in a seamless texture:
(I) institutional structure of a society or civilization, (ii) system of
values as basis of civilization and (iii) values as preferred ends and
means resting on faith and knowledge. Although conceptually
these three can be distinguished and separated, in their actual
existence they are bound together as in a compound.
There are both civilizational and cultural elements in a society.
Science and technology, art and literature, language and law,
are elements of civilization. Culture is the spiritual and the
ethical values that characterize these elements of civilization
and which functions as the internal thread knitting them. Thus
culture is the philosophy of life of a society that regulates, or
aspires to regulate, the relations of interests. The culture
emanates from the society's view of dharma rooted in its
agama. The elements of civilization are relatively
culture-neutral and thus can extend to various societies.
146

Culture remains bound to a particular society in the sense that
same culture can not produce different and distinct societies. In
fact culture and society are coterminous. The extension of a
culture would automatically lead to the extension of the
concerned society. It is culture that gives the society its
distinctive personality and identity.
147
Culture, civilization and state are distinct entities embodying
successively narrower concepts. Culture reflects the original
universal consciousness (maulika dristi) which assumes distinct
forms (rupa bheda) from distinct forms of interpretations (vyakya
bheda). All cultures reflect, or endeavour to reflect, essentially the
same vision, the vision of an ideal life. All cultures thus have the
same fundamental urge from which they originate. Differences
arise because of different perceptions about the ideal life or about
what constitutes the ideal life. It is these differing perceptions that
lends each culture its distinctiveness. In contradistinction to
culture, civilization embodies the organizational setup of a society
for meeting practical ends. A civilization acquires its
distinctiveness of character from situational and technological
differences. Like a sheath, however, it protects and nourishes the
culture it contains. J ust as in legal systems the interests of state
and the ends of justice gets intermeshed, in the social systems too
the elements of culture and civilization get intermeshed. It is well
known that state is the political organization of a society.
148
If culture is regarded as the configuration of a system of values,
then the area in which a particular value system operates should

determine the geographical dimension of the corresponding
culture. In the spread of culture language and art play key roles. In
ancient times, e.g., Sanskrit and Indian art had spread to Central
Asia and South East Asia. These areas were parts of Indian culture
and hence of Indian society. However, in matters of customs and
practices and in organizational aspects these areas differed from
the Indian mainland. But the customs and practices along with the
organizational aspects, as we have seen, are elements of
civilization and not of culture. Thus a society as a cultural unit
may contain within its bounds more than one civilization or
civilizational components. Similarly, there may be more than one
state functioning within a culture. Thus culture or society is the
basic matrix growing around a philosophy of life. Within the
bounds of a culture there may be more than one civilization and
state. Boundaries of culture, civilization and state are thus not
necessarily coterminous.
A culture is characterized by self-awareness. It has its
distinctive idioms and vocabulary that imbue its signs and
symbols with meaning and purpose. Apprehension of cultural
world is possible only by "taking into account the matrix of
awareness from which it proceeds, a matrix which is fashioned by
history and subsists by way of symbolic tradition". A historian has
to gain passage into this symbolic tradition and follow this
tradition down its historical course to have an inside view of the
tradition and the historical course of the tradition. A coordinated
and twofold endeavour comprises the principal constituents of the
historian's methodology: (a) researching into the tradition and
interpreting its meaning hermeneutically for viewing it from
inside and (b) viewing and locating it in the larger context of
universal history. A historian thus should be endowed with both
scholarship and empathy; his tools being the hermeneutical skill
and judgement of a critical scholar and the empathy of a literary
artist. And it is through these that the historian can very largely
disabuse himself of the subjective and cultural baggage he is
naturally burdened with. The reconstruction of past world of
consciousness through historical empathy, Prof. Pande notes, is
not really in conflict with the sophisticated methods of empirical
research that have been developed in social sciences. These two
methodologies are not exclusive; they are, in fact, complimentary.
Although each culture has a distinctive idiom of signs and
symbols with unique sensibilities, it is possible for the historian to
enter a cultural world even if he is not a native of the concerned
culture through scholarship and empathy. J ust as it is possible to

learn a foreign language and achieve a degree of rapport with the
cultural universe of a foreign language, it is possible for a
historian to study and understand an alien culture. Thus cultures in
Prof. Pande's formulation are not totally closed and impenetrably
self-contained system completely defying inter-cultural
communication, as in Spengler's.
Prof. Pande's views on history at various points may remind
one of some other thinkers. His emphasis on culture as a unit of
historical study, for example, may seem close to Spengler,
Toynbee, Sorokin, etc. But if there are resemblance in certain
aspects, there are also vital differences. We have already noted
that Prof. Pande does not consider culture as so completely insular
as to preclude the possibility of inter-cultural communication and
understanding. A more significant difference is that Spengler's
understanding of culture is biological, Prof. Pande's is spiritual.
Unlike Spengler and Toynbee, Prof. Pande is not centrally
concerned with charting the path of rise and decline of various
cultures as distinctive organisms. Similarly, Prof. Pande does not
share Sorokin's sociological predilection of drawing typological
distinctions between various kinds of cultures. He is more
interested in situating at the center of history man's universal
yearning for spiritual fulfillment.
Concerning historical understanding his ideas remind one of
Dilthey's application of hermeneutics to it.
149
He also shares some
of the concerns of the historians of mentality. Of late, however,
the history of mentality is showing sings of becoming more and
more interested in deviant behavior or becoming mere intellectual
history.
150
One may also perhaps add the names of Croce and
Collingwood to the list betraying resemblance to Prof. Pande.
151

However, it needs to be underlined that some elements of Prof.
Pande's views in their individual profiles may seem to bear
similarity to those of many a other thinkers, but these are only
individual elements in an integrated view of history. And it is the
integration of the various elements into a texture of coherence that
gives a view its strength and appeal. These elements therefore
should be seen and understood in their proper perspectives as
parts of a whole and not detached for the sake of comparisons per
se.
In view of its contemporary practice, Prof. Pande's
interpretation of history is likely to produce doubt about its
feasibility and misunderstanding about its nature. To take up the
latter first, some historians of today, raised as they have been in
the intellectual climate dominated by empirical social sciences

and socialistic doctrines, may find the concern with the spiritual
and the cultural not palatable enough for their taste and contend
that history has been posited in a rarified plane. The more militant
historians, especially in the charged political atmosphere in our
country today, may even regard Prof. Pande's formulation as
subversive. It hardly needs to be underlined that sober history
ought to have inherent substance and strength so as not to be
tossed to and fro by the changing winds of contemporary politics.
But even if we set aside the contemporary political concerns and
ideological preferences, the issue of the focus of historical study
remains important and has to be addressed. No meaningful study
of history is possible without a clear idea about what it should
centrally deal with. A proper appreciation of the importance of
this issue would considerably help in clearing the ground of
possible misunderstanding.
The engaging historicist ideal of Ranke to narrate 'what
actually happened' has long been given up as an unattainable ideal
and is now looked upon more as a figure of speech than a practical
guide. A historian has to be inevitably selective; everything that
could be potentially included can not, in fact, be accommodated.
The rejection involved here is not the same as what is done on the
basis of unreliability. What is unreliable does not have the
potentiality to be included; it is a non-starter. The selection that
we are referring to is one of conscious choice and not a
mechanical device. It involves discriminatory judgement of
relative significance among a host of acceptable material, all of
which can not be accepted for want of relevance or space or
because of intractability. As the number of variables keep on
increasing, there is a corresponding increase in the strain on
manageability till it reaches the bursting point. The strengthening
and refinement of techniques and methods may widen the area of
manageability and push the bursting point further, but the bursting
point can not be eliminated; it remains. Thus a historian has to
select some areas or aspects. He can not include all. Even within
the chosen area, the historian has to be selective; he can not
include all. Selection is the inevitable lot of the historian; he can
not escape it. The notion of 'totality' in 'total history' is not totality
as physical fact; it is rather an ability to create an ambience of
totality.
152
The notion is not factual; it is suggestive. It is the
suggestive ability of the narrative that gives the total history its
content of totality and not totality as a fact.
The point that we wanted to make is that the idea of
significance plays a pivotal role in the writing of history. What is

significant is included in history in preference to what is not
significant. There is of course no objectively defined and
universally accepted basis of determining what lends significance
to a thing, but it is generally agreed that significance has more to it
than individual whims or fancy. And once the notion of
significance is let in, it would inevitably bring in its train the
whole gamut of issues ranging from the essence of man to the
meaning and goal of human life. And in this context it becomes
necessary to move into areas beyond the satisfaction of man's
biological needs and drives. It has been consistently contended
that biological needs and drives are traits common to human being
as well as other animals. Thus these can not be considered as his
distinctive characteristic.
153
Even in the socialistic formulation of
history, the goal is a condition of perfect harmony where the state
has withered away and the society has been set free and rendered
unencumbered from the pressures of material needs affording
space for higher pursuits.
All the human pursuits can not be assigned equal status. Unless
human life is rendered devoid of a goal or center and is made
bereft of meaning and direction, a hierarchical ordering of human
pursuits is unavoidable. Thus logically there is room for only one
human pursuit that has the endowments to be the end or the goal
of human life; the rest can only be its means. And even as means,
all can not have equal importance. Thus artha, kama and dharma
are all means for the attainment of moksa. But even among the
means dharma is more important than artha and kama. The means
are not unimportant; they are highly important and are essential
aids like vehicles navigating a terrain. But the vehicles are not the
destination; they only help in reaching there. The difference
between vehicles and destination can not be sublimated.
One of the highly interesting aspects of Prof. Pande's
formulation is the interrelationship of value, culture, society and
civilization. Normally, culture is regarded as the product of a
society and society is considered to be the primary or the original
phenomenon and culture as a kind of secondary creation of the
society. This view looks upon society as the cause and culture as
its effect. Prof. Pande inverses this relationship. Culture is not
created by society; it is the other way round. It is culture that
brings society into being. It thus follows that a society is not a
natural organism. It is not a biological entity that is endowed with
an innate life force as in Spengler's theory. A society is also not
just a human group engaged in the task of production and
distribution. Any collection of human beings does not

automatically qualify it to be designated as a society. It is only
when a human group coheres around a philosophy of life based on
a system of values, it becomes a society. The philosophy of life
based on a system of values constitutes a culture, which in its turn
calls the society into existence. It must be added that in Prof.
Pande's view the values are essentially moral values. Neither
culture nor society is a given. They are created. Borrowing Vico's
terminology culture and society can be counted as factum.
An attractive dimension of Prof. Pande's formulation is its
liberal spirit. Since culture is a vision of life of moral and spiritual
fulfillment expressed through a tradition embodying a system of
values, any number of communities may embrace it. A society in
Prof. Pande's formulation does not have to be a monolith. It does
not demand an all-encompassing conformity; it only asks for
sharing a certain core values and not for conversions. While a
society's cultural personality, in this formulation, will wear a
degree of distinctiveness and a certain amount of individuation, it
leaves ample free space for the existence of plurality of customs,
conducts and organizational diversities. Thus a society as a
vehicle of a culture can contain within its fold a number of
political communities and civilizations. Such a liberal concept
appears particularly attractive and relevant in the context of the
present state of world with its rising tides of narrow ethnicism.
Moreover, in his theory there is nothing that would negate the
possibility of the growth of a global culture based on a uniform
system of values derived from the spiritual and moral essence of
man. It is here that the value of a traditional culture, especially
Indian culture, lies.

REFERENCES
1. V. S. Pathak, op.cit.
2. Kalidas Bhattacharya, 'The Meaning and Significance of Social
Revolution and the Idea of Progress in Hegelian, Marxian and Indian
Philosophies of History' in Contemporary Indian Philosophers of History,
ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan and Grace E Carins, The World Press, Calcutta
1977, pp. 59- 92.
3. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, 'My Philosophy of History: The Significance of
Moral Values in Human History', Bimal Krishna Matilal, 'KarmaA
Metaphysical Hypothesis of Moral Causation in History' both in
Contemporary Indian Philosophers of History, ed. Mahadevan and
Cairns, pp. 115-134, 235-247.
4. We want to clarify that our use of the expression Indian attitude to history
should not be construed as either parochial or apologetic. We do not
subscribe to the view, which seems to be quite widespread now, that

things Indian, in the areas of thought and ideas, are culture-bound and
have validity only for India of a bygone age. We want to assert that the
Indian attitude to history, in many of its aspects, is India-specific only in
its distinctive mode of thinking and articulation but has universal validity.
5. See below.
6. Contemporary Indian Philosophers of History, ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan
and Grace E Carins, The World Press, Calcutta 1977,
pp. 59-92.
7. Swami Adiswarananda, 'Philosophy of History: The Hindu
View', T. M. P. Mahadevan, 'Time and The Timeless' and V.
V. Deshpande, 'Itihasa and Purana in Hindu Purusartha Vidyas'
in Contemporary Indian Philosophers of History ed. by
Mahadevan and Cairns, pp. 22-58, 203-232, 136-166.
8. A different profile of Christian concept of history is depicted by
Christopher Dawson, Dynamics of World History.
9. Adiswarananda, op.cit.p. 28
10. Adiswarananda, op.cit., p. 29
13. Adiswarananda, op.cit., pp. 37-38
14. ibid.
15. Adiswarananda, op.cit., pp. 41-42
17. Mahadevan, 'Time and The Timeless' in Contemporary Indian
Philosophers of History, ed. Mahadevan and Cairns, pp. 203232
18. Mahadevan, 'Time and The Timeless', p. 205
19. ibid.
20. R. G. Collingwood quoted by Mahadevan, "Time and The Timeless', p.
206
21. ibid.
22. Collingwood quoted by Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 207
23. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, quoted by Mahadevan, op.cit.p. 211
24. Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 212
26. Maitri Upanisad, VI.15, quoted by Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 211
27. Mahadevan, op.cit., pp. 214-15
28. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, 2 vols. and Lewis Mumford, The
Conduct of Life cited by Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 217
32. ibid.
33. Mahadevan, op.cit., pp. 230-31
34. See above note 7
35. V. V. Deshpande, op.cit., p. 139
36. Deshpande, op.cit., p. 161
37. ibid.
38. Deshpande, op.cit., pp. 161-166

39. Deshpande, op.cit., p. 165
40. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, 'My Philosophy of History: The significance of
Moral Values in Human History' in Contemporary Indian Philosophers of
History, ed. Cairn and Mahadevan, pp. 116-34
41. Datta, op.cit., p.120; See also G. C. Nayak Evil and the Retributive
Hypothesis, Delhi 1993.
42. Datta, op.cit. pp. 123-24
43. Datta.op.cit., pp. 125-26
44. Datta, op.cit.,, pp. 129-31
45. The significance of the yuga theory and cyclical time have been discussed
above in Part I
46. Datta,op.cit., p. 134
47. Bimal Krishna Matilal, 'Karama A Metaphysical Hypothesis of Moral
Causation in History' in Cairns and Mahadevan ed. Contemporary Indian
Philosphers of History, pp. 235-247
48. Matilal, op.cit., p. 245
49. Matilal, op.cit., p. 247
50. ibid.
51. J . N. Mohanty, 'Philosophy of History and its Presuppositions' in Cairns
and Mahadevan ed. Contemporary Philosophers of History, pp. 251- 262
52. Mohanty, op.cit., pp. 254-55
53. Mohanty, op.cit., p. 255
54. Mohanty, op.cit., p. 256
55. Kalidas Bhattacharya, 'Meaning and Significance of Social Revolution
and of the Idea of Progress in Hegelian, Marxian and Indian Philosophy of
History' in Contemporary Indian Philosophy of History, ed. T. M. P.
Mahadevan and Grace E. Cairns, pp. 61-92
56. He parameterizes the notion of revolution as tattvantara parinama.
57. Bhattacharya, op.cit., p. 89
58. Bhattacharya, op.cit., p. 87
59. ibid.
60. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 59-60 (Paperback Edititon)
61. See above, Part II, Section II
62. See supra part I, section III
63. Pathak was writing in the early nineteen sixties.
67. Pathak,op.cit., pp. 28-29, 31, 46-48, 135, etc. Prof. Pathak has taken these
stages in the development of the story from the theories of dramatic
literature of ancient India.
69. Pathak, op.cit., pp. 137-140.
70. Pathak, op.cit., pp 28-29. Navjyoti Singh has developed and elaborated the
ideas of Pathak and bound them into a cohesive theoretical framework,
'Nature of Historical thinking and Aitihya: Problem of Significance' in
Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, vol.,X. No.2 Winter 2003,
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, pp.1-28. I have, to a large

extent, followed Navjoyti's formulation in my discussion of Pathak's point
of view.
71. For example, the benediction at the end of the Mricchakatikam
72. Nasvjyoti, op.cit., pp. 1-2.
73. Hegelian or Marxist, or for that matter any other school of historical
interpretation, look for some invariant version of human nature or ultimate
telos.
74. Navjyoti Singh, op.cit., pp. 10-12.
75. Navjyoti Singh, op.cit., p. 7.
8 3. Published by the Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi. We have
used the 2003 edition.
84. This is how Prof. Chattopadhyaya himself evaluates the central statement
of his arguments, The Ways of Understanding the Past, p.IX., p. 134ff.
85. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 33.
86. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp.1, 10.
87. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 4, cf. pp. 161-63.
89. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p.8; cf. pp..135-37.
91. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 33; cf. pp. 136, 138.
93. ibid.
95. ibid.
96. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 11-12.
98. ibid.
99. ibid.
102. ibid.
103. ibid.
105. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp. 13-14.
107. He also refers to the Puranas and some other forms of historical literature
such as gatha, but it is the epics that he mainly focuses on.
108. Chattopadhyaya devotes practically the entire chapter 'Itihasa and Epics'
to the enumeration and elucidation of these features, op.cit., pp. 22-59.

110. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp. 26-27; cf. Sri Aurobindo quoted by
Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
111. Cf. the views of Tagore in 'Ramayani Katha' in Prachin Sahitya, complete
the ref.
113. ibid
114. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp. 27, 29.
119. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., pp. 37, 40.
124. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 90ff.
125. Chattopadhyaya, op.cit., p.118. See the entire chapter under the title
'History as Science: Indian Context', pp. 100-132.
126. The lectures were later published in book form under the title The Meaning
and Process of Culture. In the present article we have used the second
edition published in 1989 by Raka Prakashan, Allahabad, in 1989.
127. Bharatiya Parampara ke Mula Svara, New Delhi 1982; An Approach to
Indian History and Civilization, BHU, Varanasi, 1985; Foundations of
Indnain Culture, vols I & II, Delhi 1990 are some of the more important
books, and the article 'Culture and Cultures' in the Journal of Indian
Council of PhilosophicalResearch, vol. 11, 1993-94, pp.41-61 that may be
mentioned in this connection.
128. Published in 1994 under the auspices of G.B. Pant Social Science Institute,
Allahabad by National Publishing House, Daryaganj, Newdelhi.
129. The Meaning and Process of Culture, p. 2ff.
130. 'Culture and Cultures', p. 46.
131. It is of course easy to brand this as obscurantism and 'hang' it by giving it
such a name. But in the intellectual arena prejudice should not normally be
allowed to prejudge an issue before giving due hearing to the case.
132. The view about the nature of the fundamental constituent of the world
appears to be undergoing some fundamental change in the current
scientific perception. It appears that the notion of inert material substance
is changing and is veering to the traditional oriental notion of conscious
substance as the fundamental entity.
133. The Meaning and Process of Culture, p. 5.
134. The Meaning and Process of Culture, p. 141.
136. 'Vision (vidya), praxis (sadhana), tradition (agama), structure of norms
and principles of practice (dharma and niti) constitute the underlying basis of a
culture or a distinctive marcro-society.', 'Culture and Cultures', p.42; cf. 'Culture
and Cultures', pp. 53-56. Modern thinkers too recognize the importance of

ideology for the formation of cultural personalities. In fact, science in its form as
scientism is fast becoming an ideology and is trying to supplant all older beliefs.
137. Culture and Cultures, p. 42.
138. 'So culture may be described as an order of values, which derives from
transcendental wisdom and its praxis and thus aspire after universality but
is actually limited by manifesting upadhis, historic conditions and barriers
of communication.', 'Culture and Cultures', p. 59.
140. Bharatiya Samaj, p. 23.
141. Atma of course can not be an object of direct perception; it can not be
shown as a cow can be by 'taking it by horns', Bharatiya Samaj, p. 24.
146. "Thus while science and technology are inevitable end universal elements,
they occupy different places in the different traditions of culture. At the
same time, since science and technology deal with a common objective
reality, their symbolism easily crosses cultural frontiers and this fact again
enhances their universality.", The Meaning and Process of Culture, p. 5.
147. Bharatiya Samaj, pp. 36-39.
149. Patrick Gardiner, ed. Theories of History, New york, 1967 (Eighth
Printing), pp. 211-225; Richard Harvey Brown, 'History and
hermeneutics: William Dilthey and the dialectics of interpretive method' in
Structure, Consciousness, and History. Ed. Richard Harvey Brown and
Stanford M. Lyman, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 38-52.
150. Robert Darnton, 'The history of mentalites : Recent writings on revolution,
criminality, and death in France', in Structure,
Consciousness, and History, ed. Richard Harvey Brown and Stanford M
Lyman, pp. 106-138.
151. For succinct accounts of the views of Croce and Collingwood, Patrick
Gardiner, ed. Theories of History, pp. 225- 242, 249262.
152. David A. Bell, 'Total History and Microhistory: The French and Italian
Pradigms' in A Companion to Western historical Thought, ed. Lloyd
Kramer and Sarah Maza, Blackwell publishers, Oxford, 2002,
pp.262-276. The article by Bell focuses on how the old Annales ideal of
total history exemplified in the works of old masters like Marc Bloch,
Lucien Febvre, etc., and especially of Fernand Braudel, came to be
restricted in scope in the works of their successors like Le Roy Ladurie. It
is noteworthy that Braudel himself seems to have selected a 'defined'
scope for his historical canvas, see Fernand Braudel, On History, tr. Sarah
Matthews, University of Chicago Press,
1980.
153. See above note 145.

Epilogue

Narrative of Past: Memory and Significance

It is commonly agreed upon that history is a narrative of human
past. Man occupies the centre of history. From this point of view
history is a deeply humanistic subject. Humanism here, however,
should not be seen as signifying an imperious sway of man over
the world where he has his being or even over the destiny of his
own life merely because man happens to be a special kind of
biological organism. It is humanistic in the sense that man
constitutes the basic subject matter of history. And this fact that
man constitutes the basic subject matter of history, distinguishes
history from certain other disciplines like geology, paleo-botany,
paleo-zoology, etc. which also deal with past. History is centrally
concerned with the past of man. In its account of human past,
history does often move to areas beyond the strictly human world
and deal with natural world, but it deals with it so far as it
impinges on the human affairs.
The term history is also sometimes used to signify the actual
past and not just the description or account of past. However, the
difference between the actual past and the account of past can not
be pushed beyond a point. The difference remains predominantly
perceptual. On account of the nature of time and the inextricable
relationship between time and change, the past as a bodily entity
does not exist. What remains is its memory. And the articulation
of the memory can not but take a descriptive form. History thus,
whatever may be its focus, is basically an account of past.
There are two principal ingredients that go into the making of
this account. These are memory and significance. All past
accounts, we have emphasized above, are based on memory data.
Memory constitutes the basic resource of historical study.
The form that the historical study recourses to is narrative. The
positivist assertion that the historical mode of knowledge shares
scientific character has fallen into disfavor. History does not
exemplify scientific mode of knowing, it represents narrative
mode; history essentially tells story. However, this story is based
on memory and not on imagination. History is not an imaginary
tale; it is not a hatha, it is itihasa. It narrates what has happened
(iti ha asa). Lionel Trilling observed that while history describes
what has happened, fiction describes what might have happened.
Truth claims of history and fiction do not coincide, but in some
respects they do overlap. Fiction does not have facts in the
ordinary sense as its basis, but it does not necessarily do violence
to the demands of reality and thus can claim some order of
factuality.
Historical narrative does not, in fact it can not, aim at the
replication of past. History is representational. The decision as to
what is represented is conditioned by the notion of significance.
Anything and everything that takes place can not be included in
history. History necessarily has to choose and the choice depends
on what is considered as important. As memory is the
fundamental resource of history, there is a natural and automatic
element in the choice. The holding capacity of memory is limited
by nature and this sets a natural limit to the field of choice. Apart
from this natural choice, a further round of choice also takes place,
which is more discretionary and judgmental than the natural one.
It is this later round of choice that reflects the notion of historical
significance. It is only that which is considered as significant is
chosen to represent the past. The account of what has happened, in
contradistinction to what has taken place, is the same as the
account of what has been and continues to be significant. Itihasa is
a narrative of a universal paradigm. It is not just ordinary memory
of past, it is the memory of memorable events.
Memory once it steps beyond the realm of the lives of
individuals can survive only in the form of narratives. Collective
memory is articulated memory and the articulation has to be more
than in the form of disparate statements. It takes the form of
narrative and it essentially contains a story. A narrative consists of
a collection of statements, it has an internal unity. It is a body of
codified and significant statements. As a matter of fact, narration
itself is an act of signification. It does this through a process that
can be described as summation. Every act involves countless
activities, movements, repercussions, reactions, etc. Every act
thus has innumerable dimensions to it all of which are not even
immediately perceivable. Descriptive labels are attached to the
acts that help us in their cognition. The attaching of such
descriptive labels is also an exercise in summation. And, the
summation other than helping as a cognitive apparatus also
performs the job of signification. A simple expression as
Epilogue 128
'walking', for example, summarizes the countless activities and
movements of the molecules in the body, the activation of
millions of atoms on the surface of the earth because of the
pressure exerted by the moving feet. Moreover, this expression
also indicates what constitutes the significant essence of those
countless activities of atoms, molecules and tissues, and muscles,
etc. This significance is captured in the descriptive label 'walking'.
It is needless to emphasize that this construction of significance
has relevance for the human world.
There are different levels and orders of significance and these
levels can be arranged in a scale of higher order of significance.
This scale moves upward from the physical and biological
towards purposive and intentional to the moral and universal.
Thus the expressions 'lifted', 'he lifted his bow', and 'Rama lifted
his bow for the protection of dharma' are summations of
significance of different levels. The hierarchy of ever-higher order
of summation has to reach towards the universal paradigm
ofjustice and peace. And it is this universal paradigm that really
constitutes the proper subject matter for history.
It is perhaps necessary to reiterate that the question of historical
significance has to be distinguished from the notion of interest.
Interest, either from the point of view of individuals, or of groups
or even of larger units like society, nation, etc., remains entangled
in the domain of conflict. Interest has a natural tendency to clash
with other interests or interests of others. Thus it remains hemmed
in the arena of conflict. Therefore, what may appear as significant
purely from the point of view of interest can not be considered as
fully or indubitably significant; at best it can be significant in a
partial and limited way. Now, if history is a significant account of
past, it has to aspire to reflect that which is of universal and
undisputed significance. Ideal history should be an account of
harmony, peace and justice. Harmony, peace and justice are
universal not only because they transcend localization, they are
also universal because they do not change with the change of time.
One of the major problems of the modern notion of history springs
from its refusal to sort out the problem of change and invariance.
Moreover, the modern notion of history seems to emphasize
differences, discord and conflict. It seems as if history refuses to
leave behind the area of conflict and move ahead into the area of
harmony and justice.

Perception of Past: Change and Invariance
History, looked at either as a process or as an account of past, is
basically a quest; it is a quest for significance. The enterprise of
making sense of the past has had a ubiquitous presence in all
human societies across all climes and ages. This urge to
understand the past occupies a major part of the consciousness of
man and his endeavours. History consciousness, in some form or
other, is ingrained in the very nature of man, for, without this
consciousness human life would have been a mere biological
existence of feeding, sleeping, fear and procreation (ahara nidra
bhaya maithunddi). It is history consciousness that really makes a
genuine social life possible. Man derives his identity, his sense of
belonging, his aspirations, his sense of direction and purpose from
this consciousness. It is the past and the memory of the past which
generates the order that is so very necessary for a purposeful life.
All knowledge, all experience emanates from the past. To be
human is to be historical. Everybody has to have some knowledge
of history; without this knowledge it would be impossible for us to
lead our normal lives. Carl Becker put it very effectively. To
become bereft of all knowledge of history is to be 'a lost soul
indeed'. "I suppose myself, for example, to have awakened this
morning with loss of memory. I am all right otherwise; but I can't
remember anything that happened in the past. What is the result?
The result is that I don't know who I am, where I am, where to go,
or what to do. In short, my present would be unintelligible and my
future meaningless."
History deals with the past. It is the past that is the real subject
matter of history. But it can not be the past for the sake of past. In
fact, such a proposition as 'past for the sake of past' is a mere
rhetoric; it is a chimera. All past is apprehended from the vantage
point of the present. There is no other way of apprehending it.
Thus the present can not be eliminated from the understanding of
past. The presence of present is an inevitable element in the
cognition of past. But in the discernment of past the present ought
not to be an intrusive element. The present is only the ground for
the view of the past and not the view itself. Historical account can
not be a back projection of the present and the present can not be
allowed to become an obstruction in the viewing of the past. An
uncontaminated perception of the past without the alloy of the
present perhaps does not exist, but the view of the past can not be
the same as the view of the present. It is the past that forms the
primary view. The present being the ground from which the view
is obtained will condition to an inevitable extent the limits of the
view, but it can not constitute the view itself. The grafting of the
present on the past is not historical understanding. History is
primarily and predominantly an account of past.
The course and operation of change find particularly strong
articulation in the composition of past. Temporality is a special
feature of the composition. The present and the future also reflect
temporality but that reflection is not as vivid as it is in the case of
past. The temporality characterizing the present and the future can
be apprehended mentally, through logical deduction, but the
temporality in the present and future does not have the same kind
of corporeality that it manifests in the case of past. Past thus is a
characteristic repository of change. As an account of past the
Epilogue 130
function of history is therefore considered as particularly related
with the depiction of the process of change. The generally
accepted idea of history is that it should give voice to the passage
of change that had been occurring in the lives of men from its
hoary beginnings to its contemporary expression. From this point
of view, it may be contended that the business of history is the
depiction of the ephemeral nature of the phenomenal world
including the affairs of men.
However, there is an obvious danger in overplaying the
element of change in history. If history is thought to deal merely
with change then its depiction will lose all meaning and would
become a pointless exercise. If everything keeps on changing
incessantly, if nothing lasts what is the point in charting it? It will
amount to a depiction of a continuous drift, of a nonstop
movement that does not lead to anything and never reaches
anywhere. Historical process then would be a futile toil like that of
Sisyphus, here condemned to an unending journey in which he
moves on and on and on never reaches anywhere. Such a totally
nihilist view is hard to digest.
Besides the underlying utterly nihilist philosophy, there is a more
serious reason why such a view of unmitigated change can not be
accepted. The notion of an unrelieved succession of changes with
nothing abiding would leave no scope for the comprehension of
anything. It will shutoff all possibility of understanding or
perceiving the past, there would be no link between the present
and the past. With everything lying separated, everything cut off
from everything else, no connection can be established between
things and thus no comprehension whatever will be possible. Even
the most extreme ksanikavada has to posit some stable entity,
even if it has to do it at the trans-phenomenal level. No concept of
history can sustain purely on the basis of the notion of change.
History's basic postulate is that past can be perceived. Without this
postulate history as a discipline will cease to exist. History thus is
predicated on the assumption that besides the fact and process of
change, there lies an area that is not affected by change. If history
deals with the variants, it also deals with the invariant. Moreover,
the change itself can not qualify to be counted as the invariant, the
invariant has to be located somewhere outside the change.
It is on the issue of identification and location of the invariant
that the various Western schools of historical interpretation differ
from each other. The Christian, the Idealist and the Marxist differ
in their concept of the invariant while agreeing on the format and
features of historical dynamics. All these schools believe that the
historical process gradually but inexorably moves forward to a
given goal of perfection through a series of conflicts between
opposite forces. In these respects they agree with each other. Their
difference lies in their differing formulations of the goal and the
invariant element that provides the driving force behind the
historical movement. For the Christian it is the establishment of
the city of God and will of God that represent the goal and the
invariant respectively. Similarly, for the Idealist the attaining of
the stage of perfect self-realization and the spirit represent the goal
and the driving force, while for the Marxist these are the classless
society and the mode of production respectively.
The Christian, the Idealist, the Marxist all posit the notion of
progress and its inevitability. The idea of progress, even after
being fortified by the idea of inevitability attached to it, can not
fully release itself from the grip of temporality. Any process of
graduation remains a subject to the course of time and
automatically partake of change. Progress really belongs to the
domain of change. Moreover, the notion of progress in the context
of history inevitably leads to the point where all history has to end,
where all history has to freeze, as it were. It leads to a curious and
paradoxical situation. The idea of progress entails the
achievement of a final goal. The theories of progress, particularly
in the Idealist and Marxist formulations, visualize the state of
perfection as the one where time will continue to operate but will
not affect the human life, men will not be required to pursue any
ideal or to strive for it. The Marxist commentary on this point, for
instance, has sought to meet this objection by saying that after the
classless society has been achieved men being unburdened from
the pressure of economic exploitation and tension will be free to
achieve self realization. In that case, however, the real invariant in
history can not be located in the mode of production. The
economic interpretation of history will then be rendered as
applicable to a small segment of history, that is, up to the
establishment of the classless society and not to the whole of it. It
will be 'small' both in terms of temporal length as well as in terms
of significance. Human history will be left to pursue other distant
goals like spiritual fulfillment. The goal of history then will have
to be relocated in a non-material domain. It seems that the
problem of the freezing of history within the theory of progress
can be circumvented by either positing different grades of
millennia or by putting the state of perfection at an unreachable
distant future. But by doing so the very force of the idea of
progress will have to be surrendered. Progress then will lose all its
significance.
History therefore can not afford to remain locked up in the
domain of the ephemeral, of the changing and the brittle (ksara), it
has to deal also with the stable, the invariant (aksara). Yet, the
invariant can not also be located in some trans-historical sphere; it
has to be located within the human past.
Itihasa and History
Itihasa in contrast to history appears to face the question of
invariance more steadfastly. It does not set great store by the
Epilogue 132
depiction of mere change. What is valuable and worth
remembering and worth recording is not the world of change and
mutation. That which comes into existence merely to pass away is
fated to disappear whatever may be the effort to preserve it. In
fact, the very effort is misplaced; it is stillborn. The futility and
barrenness of such efforts are the stuff that tragedy is constituted
of. History, taking its birth in Greece in the midst of not too
hospitable surroundings, seems to have retained the Greek
fascination for the tragic. Itihasa on the other hand celebrates not
the wastage of efforts, but its fulfillment. The terrain of conflict
thorough which the efforts and endeavors of human being have to
traverse must finally reach the shores of fulfillment; the seed that
is planted in the soil must bear fruit. The overpowering sense of
wastage that the Greek tragedy leaves did not find much favour
with the itihasa narratives in India.
Itihasa narrative basically charts a movement from the
beginning (pmrambha) to accomplishment (phalagama), from
seed to fruition. A story that does not traverse this whole course is
not a complete story; it is an aborted story, a story that goes astray.
Such a narrative is a barren story, a fruitless exercise devoid of
any real value. And, a barren story can not be the proper subject of
itihasa. Whatever is not valuable and significant is not historical.
It is not that Itihasa does not recognize conflict and difficulty in
the path of the accomplishment of the goal. Conflict and difficulty
are, in fact, the very driving force, as it were, of itihasa. It is the
conflict and difficulty that makes the triumph over them truly
memorable. Itihasa is not a fairy tale of all smooth; it is the story
of the rough and smooth, the smooth being the final outcome of
the roughs. The seed that drives forward to fruition is planted in
the soil of this earth and it has to labor its way forward through
this soil. It is therefore not the everyday story; it is not the story of
everyday happening; it is a very special, a very extraordinary
story, a narrative of past which gives the intimation of eternal
paradigm (sanatana dharma). It is the saints, the pure souls, who
envision this paradigm and articulate it, and it is the great men
who act this paradigm out in their actions and deeds. Itihasa is the
narrative (akhyana) of these deeds.
It may appear that there is a kind of linearity embedded in
itihasa. However, this linearity has to be distinguished from the
linearity that is generally posited in the current concept of history
and its outcome the notion of progress. The linearity in itihasa is
the linearity of the narrative structure or the linearity embedded in
an action or a cluster of actions driving forward to self-fulfillment.
This linearity does not have anything to do with the notion of
progress characterizing the entire course of human history. Itihasa
being the narration of what actually is an eternal paradigm
repudiates any notion of continuous progress. Because the
paradigm is eternal, it has a changeless quality in it and thus it can
not accommodate the idea of progress or the concept of a
continuous linear change. Moreover, the larger conceptual
framework of the temporal process that was current in early India
was of cyclical character. It was within the thought climate where
the cyclical theory of succession of yugas held sway that the
concept of itihasa had developed. The idea of progress thus is
totally alien to the nature and environs of itihasa mode of
thinking.
There are a number of other differences between itihasa and the
current notions of history. History with its emphasis on empirical
facts considers everything that happens as suitable for inclusion
within its ambit. All happenings, according to it, are potentially
historical. Of course, the historian has to make selections, for
everything can not be included. Had it been possible to include
everything, everything would have been included. Conceptually
at least there is no bar in this respect in history. Itihasa on the other
hand is much more explicitly and transparently selective. It makes
no bone about the fact that it is only those extraordinary events of
the past, the ones that exemplified the practice of the sanatana
dharma, those which exemplified the practice ofjustice and peace,
that alone qualify to be counted as the proper material for itihasa.
History, compared to itihasa, is much more liberal or
indiscriminate in the selection of its material. The consequences
of this permissiveness have not been an unmixed blessing. To a
very large extent history seems to have lived up to the misgivings
of some critics of history. History has helped keep alive the
memory of old sense of injury; in many cases it has dug out many
buried old wounds. Remembering injustice rather than justice is
perhaps the easier of the two options. J ustice to a large extent
being sanatana in character does not lend itself to temporality to
the same extent as injustice does. It is therefore easier to write the
history of injustice. But the moot question is whether the
perpetuation of the memory of old grievances, real or imagined,
has contributed towards the creation of a happier and a more
harmonious world?
Related to this is the issue of the value of itihasa and history.
After all history as an ordered account of past ought to play a
larger role than preventing individuals to fall victim to amnesia
Epilogue 134
as in Becker's formulation. History, as also any other branch of
knowledge, ought to promote human well being. On that count the
record of itihasa narratives in serving the cause of peace and
harmony appears to have been more positive than that of history.

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Index
Absolute 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96,
106, 111, 135, acara 17, 55, 57, 138
adharma 18, 49, 107 adrstarthaka 26, 55
Advaita 91, 92, 95, 102, 103, 105
Afghanistan 22, 70 Agama 134, 135, 136,
137, 138, 140 ahimsa 101 Ainslie T.
Embree 69 Aitareya Brahmana 26, 71
aitihasikas 27 aitihya 104
akhyana 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 51,
58, 85, 166
akhyanavid 27
akhyayika 29, 30, 31, 42, 43, 51, 58
aksapatala 20, 21, 69
Alberuni 19, 20, 22 Allex
Callinicos 65, 68 Amaury
de Riencourt 7 amnaya 57,
136, 137 anadi 116
Andre Beteille 70
Angirasa 55
Anindita Niyogi Balslev 66 Anirvacaniya
94
Anirvana 68, 78, 79
Ankersmit 14 Annales School 12
anti-historical Indian outlook 100
anuvamsapuranajha 34 anviksiki 48, 54,
56, 79 aparigraha 101 Apastabmba 49
apauruseya 35, 116 Appaya Diksita 96
aprthakasiddhi 95
artha 30, 45, 50, 51, 63, 133, 136, 138, 145
Arthasastra 28, 30, 31, 32, 48, 69, 71,
72, 73
arthavada 28, 48 Arvind
Sharma 21 aryamarga 134
aryaprayensana 134 Assam
23, 64 asteya 101
Asvalayana Grhya SUtra 41, 71, 74
Asvamedha 26, 27
Atharvan 55
Atharvangirasas 35
Atharvaveda 26, 27, 35, 55,
Athens 62
atitavatthu 39
atmabodha 136, 137, 138
avataras 96
avyakta 137
ayurveda 55

B. Croce 66, 143, 154
Bana 42, 72
Basham9 Bhamaha
42
Bharata 19
Bharatakhyana 32 Bharatakhyanam 35
Bharatavakya 112 bhavana 134
Bhrigvangirasa 34, 35 bhUtarthakathana
42 Bimal Krishna Matilal 87, 100
Bradley 94
Brahman 74, 94, 95, 96, 98, 105
brahmana 36, 62
Brahmanas 7, 38, 73, 90
Brahmanas 7, 28, 38, 47, 50, 78
Brahmanda 35, 37 Brahmasutra 103
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 80 Brhaspati 22,
56 Brian Fay 65, 66, 67, 78 Brhatkatha 50
Buddha 24, 106
Buddhist 23, 44, 51, 52, 63, 105, 133
BurahjTs 23
C. H. Philips 65
Caraka 19
carita 15, 45, 50, 51, 58, 85, 109, 110
carita kavyas 45, 50, 51, 110 Carl. G.
Hempel 78 Caturvarga 9, 105 Caula 28
Chandra Gupta II 41 China
18
Chinese 2
Christopher Dawson 148 Civilization 62,
139, 140, 141, 145
Colas 21
Collingwood 54, 93, 94, 143 court-poets 8
creation account, sristiprakriya 28 Culture
3, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 35, 61, 109, 110, 120,
124, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135,
138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147
cyclical view 88, 89

D. C. Sircar 22
D. P. Chattopadhyaya 117
daiva 101
Damodarpur inscriptions 62 dandanTti 31,
48 desa 17
desadharma 18
Descartes 10, 11, 108
dharma 17, 30, 37, 38, 45, 46, 48, 49,
50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63,
91, 97, 101, 107, 138, 140, 145,
166, 167
dharmamula 55 Dharmapati 49
Dharmasastra 77, 81 Dharmasutras 55, 76
Dhirendra Mohan Datta 87, 100
Dhrtavrata 49 Digha Nikaya 77 Dilthey
143, 153 DTpavamsa 23, 80 drstarthaka
26, 44, 55, 57 Drstarthakathana 42
Duhkhabodha 133 dvapara 51

Empiricism5, 40, 41
Eulogies 8, 25
Factuality 5, 6, 42, 43, 59, 61, 158 Fernand
Braudel 154 Fox-Genovese 65 Frederick
A. Olafson 67 French Revolution 15
G. C. Nayak 149
G. C. Pande 3, 87
G.R. Elton 66, 78
Gandharva 49
gandharvaveda 55
gatha 25, 26, 27, 32, 37, 38, 47, 54, 58
gathin 25
Gautama 56
Geoffrey Roberts 66, 67, 78, 80
Ghoshal 9, 66, 70, 71, 75, 76, 81 Gibbon 12
Gopa 21
gotra- pravara 17, 25, 26 Grace E. Cairns
87 grama 17 Greco-Roman 20
Greeks 7, 62, 89
grhya and srauta sutras 25 Guptas 110 H.
Von Stietencron 41 Harsacarita 31, 42, 72
Hayden White 14, 67, 68, 74, 80
Hegel 7, 65, 88
Herman Kulke 62 Hindu
philosophers 89 Hinduism
8, 9
Hindus 8, 9
historical process 11, 16, 52, 59, 89,
113, 127, 162, 163 Historiography 9,
61, 62, 63 history as account 16 history as
events 16 Hobsbaum139 Huizinga 68
Huntington 68
Indian philosophy and metaphysics
87, 92, 93
Indian philosophy of history 86, 96,
102
indragathas 27
isvara 96, 98
itihasa 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45,
48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 63, 64 itihasa mahapunyah
45, itihasa-purana 15, 18, 34, 35, 37, 43,
55, 58, 79, 85, 97, 98, 99, 100
Itivrtta 29, 30

J . N. Mohanty 104, 105, 105, 107,
108, 149
J aimini 35 J ames
Mill 7 Janapada
21 Jatakas 39 jati
17, 62 jiva 96,
98, 99 jhana 57,
98
J ulian Huxley 102
Jyotisa 23
K. M. Panikkar 65
Kadambari 42
kaladharma 18
Kalhana 22, 23, 42, 45, 46, 62, 65, 75,
76, 79
kali 41, 51, 52, 53, 59, 74, 77 Kalidas
Bhattacharya 86, 107, 147,
149
Kalidasa 7, 19
Kaliyuga 24, 39
Kalpa 24, 37, 52
kalpa-jokti 37
kama 45, 50, 51, 133, 136, 145 Kangle 20,
69, 71, 72, 73
Kant 88
Kapilavastu 44
Karma 43, 44, 75, 87, 91, 93, 98, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 115 Karman 8
karuna 101
Kashmir 22, 23, 46, 64, 75, 76 Katha 42,
43, 57, 158
Kathaka Samhita 26, 71
Kautilya 28, 29, 32, 54, 71
kavi 8
kavya 60, 80, 109
Kayasthas 62
Keith 7, 8, 9, 65, 70, 75, 79, 81 Ksatriya 34,
90 kula 17
Kumarila 55, 78
Kusana 22
Lasch-Quinn 65
Laukika 21
Lawrence Stone 12, 67 Lewis Mumford 95,
148 linear view 88 Lokasamgraha 96, 103
Lomaharsana or Romaharsana 35
Louis O Mink 14, 67
M Eliade 77
M.A. Stein 76
Macaulay 12
Macdonell 7, 9, 62, 65, 70, 75, 79
Maclntyre 61
Mahabharata 29, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41,
45, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 77, 79, 85, 97,
102, 113, 123, 124,
Mahadevan 83, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96,
147, 148, 149 Mahavamsa 23, 80
Mahavira 24 Mahayana 44 Maitrayani
Samhita 18 maitri 94, 148 Maitri Upanisad
94, 148 Mandelbaum80 Manu 55, 56

manvantara 37, 38, 51, 53
Marxist, Marxists 12, 67, 88, 150,
163, 164
Maya 94, 105
Medhatithi 28
Metahistory 11, 67 Michael
Witzel 65, 68
Michlet 15
Milton Singer 68
Mimamsa 63, 78
Mithya 107
moksa 95, 98
moksa-sastra 103
Nagarkot 22
nairuktas 27
nama-rupa 111
Narada 22, 56, 96
naransamsi, Narasamsa 78, Narrative 5,
10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 29, 31, 33, 41, 42, 43,
45, 46, 56, 57, 60,
64, 66, 67, 68, 75, 76, 80, 98, 109,
10, 112, 113, 114, 116, 120, 121, 122, 144,
157, 158, 159, 165, 166 narrativist school
10
Nationalism62
Navjyoti Singh 64, 81, 112, 150
Navya Nyaya 62
Nepal 23, 64 New History
11, 12
nihsreyasa 45
Nilakantha 56, 79
nirvana 133
Nisedha 45
Nitya 95
niyatapti 31, 111, 117
Niyativada 103
notion of progress 91, 93, 99, 164,
166
nuclear arms race 93
Nyaya 48, 62, 66, 78, 105
Nyaya-Vaisesika 66, 105
P. Teilhard 102
Paccupahhavatthu 40
Paila 35 Palas 70,
110 Pallava 41
Panini 19, 68
para 24, 77
parabrahman 98
Pargiter 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 72, 73, 74, 77,
81
Pariplavam 47
Pariplavani 29
Patrick Gardiner 66, 153, 154
Paul Ricoeur 12
pauranika 34, 35, 73
Pedapala 21 Persian 7, 62
Peter Burke 68
Peter Novick 66
Pettapala 21
phalagama 31, 60, 111, 112, 165
philosophia perennis 134, 135 philosophy
of history 10, 11, 12, 16,
40, 46, 66, 67, 68, 78, 86, 91, 92,
96, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 129,
147, 149
pitar 17, 42, 57
pitr rna 17
Positivism13
Post Modernists 5
practicing historians 5, 11, 12
Pradyota 19
Pralaya 53, 98
Pramana 104
Praptyasa 31, 111
Prarambha 31, 60, 111, 112, 165
Prasastis 60, 76, 80
Pratiharas 110
pratisarga 37, 38, 52, 53
Prayatna 31, 111
Punic wars 7
Purana 29, 36, 147
purana sahhita 35, 36, 37
purana-itihasa 34, 36
puranajha 34
Puranakaras 33
Puranavid 27, 34
Puranic 37, 40
puranika 33
Puravid 27, 34
Puravrtta 30
Pure Being 89
Pururava 28, 51, 71, 77
Purusartha 147
purusartha sadhan 134
purusartha vidyas 97, 98, 100
Purvapaksa 88, 131
purvasmT 19, 57
Pustakapala 21
Pustapala 21

R. C. Majumdar 76, 81
R. F. Atkinson 66 R.
Morton Smith 74
Raghuvamsa 19, 46, 60, 69, 79, 80,
110
Rajasuya 27
Rajatarangini 69
Ranke 144 Rashtrkutas
110

RatnavalT 110 Ratnins 62
Richard H. Brown 67
Richard Lanham67
Riencourt 7, 62, 65 Rigveda
56
Rita 57
rk, saman, yajus 26, 35
Ramayana 45, 50, 58, 75, 77, 79, 85,
110, 113, 123
Robert Lingat 79
Romans 7, 69, 89
Romila Thapar 65
Rudolph, L.I. 68
Rudolph, S.H. 68
S. N. Roy 71, 73, 74
Sabara 48
Sadacara 55
sadhana 134, 152
Sahi rulers, Brahmana Sahis 22
saints 8, 73, 166
Sakas 41
Samahartr 20
Samsara 93, 103
samskara 134
samyama 46, 101
Sanatana 135, 137, 167
Sanatanadharma 134, 135, 166, 167
Sankara 95, 96
Sankaracharya 70, 80, 95, 96
Sahkhyayana Aranyaka 25
santa rasa 46, 79
Santiparvan 39, 74
Sarga 37, 38, 52, 53
satya 95, 101, 107 Sheldon Pollock 55, 62,
65 Siddartha Gautam44
Sieg 48, 49, 74, 57, 76, 77
Sistacara 55
Smrti 17, 55, 79
social consciousness 136, 137 Social
sciences 5, 11, 12, 13, 131, 141, 143, 150
Sorokin 16, 142
Spencer 93 Spengler
142, 146
Sreyasadhana 45
Sridhara 42
sruti 17, 18, 56
St. Augustine 16
Sthanika 21 Sudras 90
Sumantu 35
Sunahsepah 28 Suta
34
Sutradhara 111
Swami Adiswarananda 87, 147
T.R. Tholfsen 73
Tacitus 12
Tagore 3, 46, 75, 81, 151
Taittirya Aranyaka 48, 76 Tantravarttika
78 Tapasya 46
the linguistic turn 13, 109 Thucydides 12
Time 7, 9, 12, 18, 22-25, 28, 30, 32,
35, 37, 39-41, 45-47, 49-53, 55, 57, 59,
64, 66, 67, 78, 80, 81, 83, 90, 92, 94,
96, 96, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107,
109, 111, 113-116, 118, 120, 121,
124, 125, 129, 135, 148, 149, 153,
157, 160, 164
Tocqueville 15, 70 Toynbee
16, 102, 142
Trayi 48, 54
U. N. Ghoshal 66, 70, 75, 76 Udaharana 29
Udayana 19 Ujjayini 19
Upakhyana 37, 38
Upanayana 28
Upanisads 27, 40, 50, 94
Upaya 45
V. Smith 40, 74
V. V. Deshpande 87, 96, 147, 148 V.S.
Pathak 31, 34, 66, 71, 72, 74, 76,
77, 80, 81, 86, 109, 147 Vaidika 64
Vaisampayana 35 Vaisesika 105, 115
Valmiki 123
vamsa 25, 26, 32, 37, 38, 50, 51, 53, 58, 60
vamsacintaka 34
vamsakusala 34
vamsanucarita 32, 37, 38, 53
vamsa-puranajha 34
Vamsavalis 65, 68
vamsavid 34, 80
Vanaparva 49, 77
Varieties of history 6
Varna 34
vartta 48
Vayu 35, 37
Vayupurana 39, 73, 74
Veda 17, 18, 27, 35, 36, 40, 45, 54, 55,
63, 68, 71, 75, 78, 79, 97, 124 Vedahgas
23, 78 Vico 146
Vidhi 45, 116
vidya 45, 134, 136, 152
Vidyasthanas 55, 56, 61
vinaganagin 25 vinagathin
25 Visesana 95 Visesya 95
Visnu Purana 35, 72, 73
Visnupurana 32
Vyasa 35-38, 97, 124
Vyavahara 57, 138
W. H. Dray 66, 68
W. H. Walsh 66

Warder 9, 39, 65, 66, 70, 74, 77
Wendy D. O'Flaherty 75
Index
146
WilhelmHalbfass 65
Winternitz 7-9, 32, 62, 65, 71, 72,
73, 74,
Witzel 18, 65, 68, 70, 79, 80, 82
World Wars 93
Yadrcchavada 103
Yajhagathas 27
Yajnavalkya 56 Yaska
19, 27
Yayati 51
Yuan Chuwang 22
Yuga 18, 24, 54, 107
Yugantara 51, 53

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