Framework

2AC O/V
TREAT FRAMEWORK LIKE T UNDER COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS DEBATE SHOULD HAVE
STRONG DATA, THEY DON'T MEET IT, AND OUR STANDARDS ARE MORE EDUCATIONAL - ITS A
VOTER TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT

2AC Education

WE CONTROL THE BEST INTERNAL TO EDUCATION
A) EPISTEMOLOGY CURRENT DEBATE IS TERMINALLY FLAWED POLICY DEBATERS READ
DISADS AND ADVANTAGES WITH RIDICULOUS INTERNAL LINKS THAT LAUGHABLY SUPPOSE EVERY
ACTION ENDS THE WORLD. THIS IMPACT-FIRST FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE HAS REDUCED US TO
MAGICIANS OF THE IMPROBABLE AND EXPERTS OF NOTHING. NONE OF WHAT THEY SAY IS TRUE
BECAUSE NONE OF IT IS METHODOLOGICALLY SOUND.
B) OUR EXTERNAL IMPACT IS GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKING SAKS SAY WE MUST LEARN
THE METHOD OF DATA TO REALLY HAVE AN IMPACT POLICYMAKING
C) EDUCATION OUTWEIGHS FAIRNESS IT MAY BE PERFECTLY FAIR TO HAVE DEBATES OVER #1
VERSUS #2 PENCILS BUT WE DON'T HAVE IT BECAUSE ITS EDUCATIONALLY BANKRUPT TRAINING
MUST TO RELEVANT US OR WE WON'T DO IT.

2AC Fairness
1. THIS ISN'T UNFAIR ITS NO DIFFERENT THAN A CRITIQUE IMPACT CALCULUS THAT
TOOK OUT THE AFF HARM AND SOLVENCY. CRYING ABOUT NOT BEING PREPARED TO
DEFEND THE VALIDITY OF YOUR ADVOCACY IS NO DIFFERENT THAN CRYING ABOUT
BEING UNABLE TO ANSWER THE NEWEST POLITICS SCENARIO OR NIETZSCHE
REINCARNATION.
2. WE'RE PREDICTABLE THE DATA FRAMEWORK HAS BEEN AROUND FOR SIX YEARS NOW,
AND YOU JUST HAVE TO DEFEND YOUR METHOD OF TRUTH.
3. PREDICTABILITY ISNT IMPORTANT FOR FAIRNESS A DECADE OF CRITIQUE AFFS PROVE
DEBATE WILL SURVIVE AND MANY ALTERNATIVE CAUSALITIES LIKE RESOURCES,
INTELLIGENCE, COACHING, AND REP WILL OFFSET THE DAMAGE
4. QUANTIFICATION IS THE BEST INTERNAL LINK TO FAIRNESS OUR FRAMEWORK PROVIDES
THE MOST PREDICTABLE AND FAIR WAY TO COMPETE
City of Tucson 97
[city of tucson's response to the stranded cost working group report] [ct] [http://www.cc.
state.az.us/divisions/utilities/working/strand-6.htm]
The Report's position on this issue should be reexamined. Any subsequent discussion of stranded costs should include a full discussion of the
presumed rights of the Affected Utilities to recovery. Coincident with that discussion should be a discussion of the quantified stranded costs
under consideration, even if in the form a preliminary estimate, or range of estimates. There is no ability to gauge the fairness, or end result that
is the purpose of the regulatory process without such quantification to guide policy-making. This leads to a second threshold topic requiring
comment. B. Stranded Cost Estimates and Public Policy Making Members of the Working Group also requested that, as part of the Working
Group's activities, the Affected Utilities should perform and make available estimates of their retail stranded costs. Given that the function of
regulation is to provide a fair outcome, and that policy recommendations by the Working Group need to be based on a clear understanding of
the possible impacts of certain policy choices, this request was eminently reasonable. However, the Staff did not support this request and
provided five reasons to support its decision. 1) The "overriding objective of this Working Group is to develop recommendations for Rules
covering the procedures to be used in connection with the quantification and recovery of stranded costs, not an actual quantification of stranded
costs." As noted above, the purpose of regulation is to provide a fair outcome. It is not reasonable to expect that methods determined in
isolation from an understanding of relative impacts will produce a reasonable and fair outcome. In fact, not addressing quantification of
outcome for policy-making jeopardizes the opportunity to produce policies that will result in a fair outcome. Indeed, if utilities have
differing assumptions, or coincident assumptions within their preliminary estimates, it would help to clarify and advance discussion. It is
reasonable to expect that the quantifications discussed in the Working Group would not be final numbers. It is also reasonable to expect that
development of final numbers will only come through specific discussion of preliminary estimates and specific policies that may be determined
based in part on those estimates. Setting policy on calculation methodology and preferred assumptions prior to submission of the formal
estimates due by January 1, 1999 seriously jeopardizes sound policymaking and the resulting impact on the effectiveness or viability of a
competitive retail market.
AT: C/I Author Quals
AT: C/I Judge Discretion/ Not Voter
LETTING JUDGES WEIGH CARD BY CARD IS A REASONABILITY CLAIM REJECT IT.
1. THEY'RE NOT REASONABLE THATS THE WE MEET DEBATE AND ZELLNER SAYS THEY ARE
NOWHERE NEAR REASONABLE SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CITY OF TUCSON SAYS QUANTIFICATION
PRODUCES THE MOST REASONABLE RESULTS.
1. JUDGE INTERVENTION - LEAVING IT TO THE JUDGE TO DECIDE PROBABILITIES ON A
CASE BY CASE BASIS IS EXACTLY HOW WE GOT INTO THIS MESS INTO THE FIRST PLACE.
FACTLESS IDEOLOGIES AND BIASES WILL CREEP INTO THE DECISION CALCULUS WHICH
IS WHAT A MAJORITY OF JUDGE INTERVENTION IS STICK TO A STRONG DATA STANDARD
TO PREVENT INFINITE REGRESS INTO BASELESS CLAIMS OR ARBITRARY DECISIONS.
2. VOTING AFF IS AN INCENTIVE IT ENCOURAGES TEAMS TO ACTUALLY RESEARCH AND
DEBATE DATA INSTEAD OF REWARDING THE LAZY THIS IS A LINEAR EDUCATIONAL
NETBENEFIT TO OUR INTERP ONLY THE BALLOT CAN GET
3. AND WE PROVIDED STRONG DATA JUDGES EMPIRICALLY CAN'T ACCESS RISK CASE BY CASE
THATS THE 1AC VISCUSI EV (OR READ IT)
2AC

1. DATA IS INEVITABLE BOTH TEAMS USE DATA OR A CRITERIA TO ESTABLISH WHY
WHAT THEY KNOW IS TRUE THEY USE WEAK DATA LIKE QUALIFICATIONS, CLAIMS,
PUBLICATION, DATES, AND EMPIRICAL CORRELATIONS TO ESTABLISH TRUTH THAT GETS
COOPTED OR CALCULATED WAY WORSE THAN ANYTHING STRONG DATA CAN DO.
2. WE CONTROL U MARGINALIZED GROUPS ARE GETTING SCREWED NOW AND CLAIMS
TO CALCULATION AND TRUTH WILL BE USED REGARDLESS, ONLY A CHANCE STRONG
DATA HELPS EXPOSE STATUS QUO STEREOTYPES AND BIASES
Reuter 86
[Peter Reuter Senior Economist in the Washington Office of the Rand Corporation.THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE DEMAND
FOR QUANTIFICATION Journal of Policy Analysis and Management Volume 5 Issue 4, Pages 807 - 812] [ct]
That we live in a quantitative age is one of those rare statements that can be made without quantification. We consume
numbers from the time we wake up (slugging averages, infant mortality in Ethiopia) through breakfast (percentage RDA of
calcium in our cereal) to the evening news (percentage favoring more defense expenditures). Numbers are a particularly
American passion ; after all, this is the nation that put the requirement of a decennial census in its founding document. Casual
sociology suggests that our love affair with numbers relates to the American faith in the perfectibility of society. Numbers
suggest understanding and the possibility of improvement. "Numbers don't lie" is probably heard far more often than Mark
Twain's reference to "lies, damn lies and statistics." Numbers have also become essential in policy debate . Not only do politicians
and bureaucrats cite statistics mercilessly, but the policy analysis community also encourages them by strongly endorsing th e
notion that "hard" numbers are the bedrock for developing good policy . This dedication to numbers in policy has significant
costs. The demand for quantification often creates its own supply. Policy advocates generate their own numbers which,
particularly in newer areas of policy making, are frequently of poor quality and difficult to evaluate. These numbers can exert a
baleful influence in policy debates. This essay sketches the nature and extent of the problem. It also argues that advocacy-by-
number is likely to become more prevalent in the future and suggests that little can be done to prevent the growth of the problem.
CARD CONTINUES
In a rational policy world, the allocation of government resources. whether legal-coercive power or expenditures, is heavily
influenced by the perceived scale of a problem. Without being able to show that large segments of the population need help, it is
difficult to lay claim to those resources. But exaggerating the scale of a problem can be successful only if it is hard to
determine its true scale. In many areas of public policy, we are now knowledgeable enough to readily expose false quantitative
claims . A claim that the rates of unemployment or inflation are vastly higher than official estimates will be readily dealt with
; there is a large expert community that spends its time analyzing such measures. The weaknesses of official measures are not
minor, but these measures are generally recognized as superior to the alarmists' alternatives. We have , for such matters, a benign
Gresham's law; good estimates drive out bad.
CARD CONTINUES
The diagnosis of number-creating advocacy made here can be summarized in four propositions: (1) In a world increasingly dedi -
cated to rational allocation of resources, claims on the government sectors are heavily influenced by evidence about the scale of a
problem; (2) The consumption of government services turns out, in the long run, to be appetite arousing; the more that are
available, the greater the demand for additional services; (3) In some areas of social policy, particularly new ones, known that
good numbers are difficult to produce and bad numbers are hard to refute; and (4) Policy advocates are often either credulous or
un scrupulous about how they use numbers in support of their cases. Is there a prescription for the ailment? Remedies?
Specified differently, the question is how can we ensure quality control of numbers used in public policy debates? Just
framing the question makes the answer distressingly clear: Not bloody likely. Politicians, who are major producers and
propounders of these numbers, are not enthusiasts of any constraints on their discourse. Who would exercise this quality
control? How could it be distinguished from censorship? The more practical , though scarcely comprehensive, remedy is simply
to ensure that policy researchers be more bloody minded in exposing these numbers. On the economic costs of regulation, the
research community did a reasonable job of preventing the worst excesses of advocacy numbers. 14 The drug income numbers, in
con trast, have not been successfully challenged, but that may reflect the general research community indifference to a
particularly messy problem with very poor data.

3. LACK OF STRONG DATA ENSURES CO-OPTION BY THE RIGHT
Latour 04
[Bruno Why Has Critique Run ouyt of Steam? From Matters of FAct to Matters of Concern]


[http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/issues/v30/30n2.Latour.html]
In which case the danger would no longer be coming from an excessive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters
of factas we have learned to combat so efficiently in the pastbut from an excessive distrust of good matters of fact disguised
as bad ideological biases! While we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective
statements, do we have now to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices ?
And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are
made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always the prisoner of language,
that we always speak from one standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social
construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives . Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies?
Is
it enough to say that we did not really mean what we meant? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument
is closed for good?
Should I reassure myself by simply saying that bad guys can use any weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and
social construction when it suits them? Should we apologize for having been wrong all along? Should we rather bring the sword of criticism to criticism itself and do a bit of soul-
searching here: What were we really after when we were so intent on showing the social construction of scientific facts? Nothing guarantees, after all, that we should be right all the time. There is
no sure ground even for criticism.4 Is this not what criticism intended to say: that there is no sure ground anyway? But what does it mean, when this lack of sure ground is taken out from us by
the worst possible fellows as an argument against things we cherished?
Artificially maintained controversies are not the only worrying sign. What has critique become when a French general, no, a marshal of critique, namely, Jean Baudrillard, claims in a published
book
that the World Trade Towers destroyed themselves under their own weight, so to speak, undermined by the utter nihilism inherent in capitalism itselfas if the terrorist planes were pulled to
suicide by the powerful attraction of this black hole of nothingness?5 What has become of critique when a book can be a best-seller that claims that no plane ever crashed into the Pentagon? I am
ashamed to say that the author was French too.6 Remember the good old days when revisionism arrived very late, after the facts had been thoroughly established, decades after bodies of evidence
had accumulated? Now we have the benefit of what can be called instant revisionism? The smoke of the event has not yet finished settling before dozens of conspiracy theories are already
revising the official account, adding even more ruins to the ruins, adding even more smoke to the smoke. What has become of critique when my neighbor in the little Bourbonnais village where I
have my house looks down on me as someone hopelessly naive because I believe that the United States had been struck by terrorist attacks? Remember the good old days when university professors
could look down on unsophisticated folks because those hillbillies naively believed in church, motherhood, and apple pies? Well, things have changed a lot, in my village at least. I am
the one now who naively believes in some facts because I am educated, while it is the other guys now who are too unsophisticated to be gullible anymore: "Where have you been? Don't you
know for sure that the Mossad and the CIA did it?" What has become of critique when someone as eminent as Stanley Fish, the "enemy of promise" as Lindsay Waters calls him, believes he
defends science studies, my field, by comparing the law of physics to the rules of baseball?7 What has become of critique when there is a whole industry denying that the Apollo program landed
on the Moon? What has become of critique when DARPA uses for its Total Information Awareness project the Baconian slogan Scientia
est potentia ? Have I not read that somewhere in Michel Foucault? Has Knowledge-slash-Power been co-opted of late by the
National Security Agency? Has Discipline and Punish become the bedside reading of Mr. Ridge?
Let me be mean for a second: what's the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized, that is a teachable, version of social critique inspired for instance by a too-quick reading of, let's say,
a sociologist as eminent as Pierre Bourdieuto be polite I will stick with the French field commanders? In both cases, you have to learn to become suspicious of everything people say because "of
course we all know" that they live in the thralls of a complete illusio on their real motives. Then, after disbelief has struck and an explanation is requested for
what is "really" going on, in both cases again, it is the same appeal to powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently,
continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we, in the academy, like to use more elevated causes society, discourse, knowledge-slash-
power, fields of forces, empires, capitalism while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents,
but I find something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the
wheeling of causal explanations coming out of the deep Dark below . What if explanations resorting automatically to power, society,
discourse, had outlived their usefulness, and deteriorated to the point of now feeding also the most gullible sort of critiques ?8
Maybe I am taking conspiracy theories too seriously, but I am worried to detect, in those mad mixtures of kneejerk disbelief, punctilious demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation
from the social neverland, many of the weapons of social critique. Of course conspiracy theories are an absurd deformation of our own
arguments, but, like weapons smuggled through a fuzzy border to the wrong party, these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite of all the deformations, it is easy to recognize, still burnt in the
steel, our trade mark: MADE IN CRITICALLAND.
4. PREFER THE LINK TURN ITS A LOT EASIER TO MANIPULATE WEAK, HIDDEN
DATA

Loury 2000,
[Glenn. Merton P. Stoltz Professor of the Social Sciences and Professor of Economics at
Brown University."Social Exclusion and Ethnic Groups: The Challenge to Economics:
page 227-8] [ct]

Is Good Science Good Enough? That good science might prove to be an antidote to group hatred has been a hope of
progressive social observers throughout the modern age. The story goes some-thing like this. Antagonism toward a particular race
may involve supposedly objective claims about the nature of a political agenda and ceases to be an autonomous intellectual
activity -people of that race-about their moral deficiencies or intellectual inferiority, for example. These claims can be subjected
to scientific scrutiny and refuted . Confronted with these scientific arguments, rational people might then alter the beliefs on
which their racial enmity rests. In this way sound science , a value-neutral enterprise, can produce the ethically desirable result of
undermining racial antagonism by replacing prejudice and stereotypes with data and rigorous analysis. This story is
plausible, with ample historical precedent . It is only made more compelling when one recalls how totalitarian political regimes-
particularly the Nazis -have used bad science to justify their racist political programs . If science falls under the influence of a
political agenda and ceases to be an autonomous intellectual activity,if it becomes bad science-then it can abet the spread of racial
hatred . Thus proper scientific argument can foster racial tolerance, while the abuse of science can lead to disturbing results. Yet
these outcomes are by no means guaranteed. Whether science is good or bad depends on its conformity with disciplines and
methods that practitioners see as meeting their standards of evidence and argument. This essentially technical matter
has relatively little moral content. In any event, scientific argument is a specializeddiscourse within a narrow community of
investigators governed by strict norms anddisciplines. Indeed, it is an indication that a field has matured as a science when
itsdiscourse takes on the quality of what might be called sociolinguistic closure.Thomas Kuhn (1962) stressed just this point in his
influential work, The Structureof Scientific Revolutions.

Case
Demo Bad War
Demo Now
Extinction o/w Bostrom
T QPQ
1. Appeasement is a subcategory of engagement we meet.
Rock 2k Stephen R. Rock, Associate Professor of Political Science at Vassar College, 2000 (The Study of Appeasement, Appeasement in
International Politics, Published by the University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 0813132282, p. 23)
Nevertheless, appeasement and engagement are similar, and the two strategies overlap in certain
respects. Several of the cases of appeasement examined in this volume contained elements of
engagement, and could perhaps be interpreted by some as examples of the latter rather
than of the former. It may, in fact, be appropriate to think of appeasement as a
subcategory of engagement. For these reasons, this work on appeasement is intended to be of interest to scholars who study
engagement and of relevance to practitioners of foreign policy who must decide whether and how to pursue such a strategy.

2. Counter interpretation - Lifting export controls is a form of economic
engagement

Gaffney 95 (Frank, ITS ECONOMIC SECURITY, STUPID: DAMATO-KING-AIPAC EFFORT ON IMPORT CONTROLS SHOULD APPLY TO IRAN,
BEYOND, Center for Security Policy, April 3, 1995, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1995/04/03/its-economic-security-stupid-damato-
king-aipac-effort-on-import-controls-should-apply-to-iran-beyond-2/, njw)

In the years since Bill Clinton successfully campaigned for president on the motto Its the economy,
stupid, his foreign policy seems to have been defined by a variation on the theme: U.S. interests will
be determined by short-term economic considerations, no matter how ill-conceived the resulting policy might be. The
corollary to this governing principle appears to be the axiom If you cant beat em, join em: As long as other nations are stupidly pursuing
trade policies contrary to either their long-term strategic interests or our own, we have no choice but to follow suit. On these
grounds, for example, the Clinton Administration has: facilitated the dismantling of the multilateral
regime for controlling exports of militarily relevant technologies (known as COCOM); aggressively
marketed such technologies to China; essentially normalized relations with Vietnam; and repeatedly
dallied with the idea of easing the trade embargo against Cuba. The same considerations are also at
work in its decision to reward North Korea with not only $4 billion in new nuclear reactors but also
with trade relations. And the Administration is actively contemplating at least the partial lifting of
economic sanctions against Serbia and Iraq in the face of mounting pressure from its allies.
Convergence Theory To varying degrees, this expediency-driven policy has been rationalized as
economic engagement . It amounts, ironically, to a capitalist mutation of the Marxian doctrine of
economic determinism and assumes that liberal Western values and democratic institutions will
inevitably follow from exposing closed economies to market forces. In practice, however, such a policy is doomed to the same
results as its precursors appeasement and detente: If unconditioned upon and unaccompanied by systemic political and economic reform,
the result will be to provide life-support to totalitarian regimes, extending their brutal hold on power at home and greatly increasing their
potential for malevolence abroad. Thanks to the Clinton Administration, there is scarcely an odious regime in the world today that is not
already enjoying trade and financial relations with the United States or that is reasonably expecting to do so shortly. What About Iran:
CoNogo The Clinton Administration has been discomfited in recent days by growing public debate over
its policy of continuing economic engagement towards a totalitarian regime it supposedly wants to
contain. Irans frightening arms build-up, including its acquisition of key ingredients of a nuclear weapons production complex from
Russia, and its threatening military actions in the Persian Gulf compelled Mr. Clinton in mid-March to block a massive investment in Iran by
the U.S. oil company, Conoco.

Prefer our counter interp
1. Predictability Teams would look to Historical accounts to determine what to research, so
wed set a predictable limit.
2. Affirmative Ground We lose a third of the topic - Removing the embargo is a prerequisite to
engaging Cuba economically. Embargo affs have the best solvency advocates.
3. Substantial checks, and debating foreign aid is inevitable
Prefer reasonability - competing interpretations leads to arbitrary definitions.


Neolib
. PERM DO THE CP / ALT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE STRONG DATA SHOULD ESTABLISH
COMPETITION DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PLAN AND THE CP MUST BE
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
A) MOST EDUCATIONAL FORCING THE AFF TO DEFEND TRIVIAL STATISTICALLY
INSIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS TO THEIR AFF SHIFTS THE DEBATE AWAY FROM
STRONG DATA TO WEAK DATA MEANS THEY LINK TO THE ENTIRITY OF FRAMEWORK.
B) ALLOWS PLENTY OF GROUND THEY CAN RUN EMBARGO PICS, ALT ACTORS, OR
ALT ACTION CPS. THEY ONLY NEED TO HAVE STRONG DATA FOR WHAT
DISTINGUISHES THE COUNTERPLAN TO THE PLAN.
C) PERMING THEORIES OF COMPETITION CAPTURE ALL OFFENSE WE CAN REQUIRE
(FUNCTIONALLY/TEXTUALLY) AND STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT COMPETITION FOR
COUNTERPLANS.
D) SOLVES INFINITE REGRESS BOTH FUNCTIONAL AND TEXTUAL COMPETITION LEAD
TO BAD CPS THAT SHIFT THE DEBATE AWAY TO SOME TRIVIAL DETAIL ZELLNER
PROVES ONLY STRONG DATA CREATES AN OBJECTIVE BRIGHTLINE FOR RESEARCH AND
PREP.
E) PERMS DON'T HAVE TO BE TOPICAL PARAMETRICS MEANS COUNTERPLANS HAVE
TO NEGATE THE DATA USED TO JUSTIFY THE RESOLUTION NOT JUST THE RESOLUTION
ITSELF. THEY MAKE OFFSETS COMPETITIVE AS WELL AS CRAPPY REZ WORDS PICS NOT
SPECIFIC TO THE PLAN.
2. PERM DO BOTH. DOUBLE SOLVENCY.
3. NO SOLVENCY - NO DATA FOR THEIR SOLVENCY MECHANISM MEANS YOU
PRESUME THEY DON'T DO ANYTHING.
4. NO DATA FOR THE NETBENEFIT MEANS YOU SHOULD VOTE AFF EVEN IF THEY
SOLVE 100% OF CASE.
5. PRESUMPTION FLIPS ONCE THEY READ A COUNTERPLAN
A) WE HAVE TO MAKE IMPACT CALCULUS TO BOTH WORLDS, LIMITING OUR DEPTH
AND DIRECTION.
B) THEY'VE AGREED WITH THE REZ ONCE THEY'VE JETISONED THE STATUS QUO
C) DISENCOURAGES DEBATES OVER TRIVIAL NETBENEFITS LIKE THE THE CP OR
CONSULT THAT SHIFT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE CORE OF THE AFF
6. CONDITIONALITY BAD TIME AND STRAT SKEWS THE 2AC MAKING THE BLOCK
EASIER AND THE 1AR NEAR IMPOSSIBLE, AND DISPO SOLVES ALL OFFENSE BECAUSE IT
ENCOURAGES CP RESEARCH DEPTH.
Prioritizing critical theory over political action creates a vicious cycle of flawed
knowledge production that fails to solve real problems
Owen 2002 Reader on Political Theory at the University of Southampton
(David Owen, Re-Orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Practical
Reasoning, Millenium Journal of International Studies, 2002, accessed through Sage Journals)
The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of
ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple
function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its
ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no
means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be
sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain
kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be
the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this
class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of
rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weaknessbut this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of
problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of
theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it
is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that
because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical
first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian
Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or
phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in
question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, theory-driven work is part of a reductionist
program in that it dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows
from the preferred model or theory. 5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary
for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as
Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is
a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry. 6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips
into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that
the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IRwhat might be called
(only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander viewnamely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite
occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the
disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology
stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the
theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and
so a potentially vicious circle arises. It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR
by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiros remarks
are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its
exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate.

Policy discussions are key it forces engagement with and resolution of competing
perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined---
and, it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as
agents of decision-making
Esberg & Sagan 12 *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center
on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND **Scott Sagan is a
professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and
Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,
2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108
These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-
level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about
the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and
the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the
Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government
officials to overcome bureaucratic myopia, moving beyond their normal organizational roles and
thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of
imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for
real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in
2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institutions Saban Center and at Harvard Universitys Belfer
Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of
misunderstanding foreign governments preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent
behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict
accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By
university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on
simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their
assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since
simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded
on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving
communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding
by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into
the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs
for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to grapple
with the issues arising from a world in flux.11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students
about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in
Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts*
but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving
knowledge, students actively research their governments positions and actively argue, brief,
and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to
contextualize and act on information.14

Debate role playing reverses current spectator mindsetslearning the language of
political power is key.
Coverstone 5Masters in communication from Wake Forest and longtime debate coach, Alan H.,
Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact, Paper presented at the
National Communication Association Annual Conference, 11/17/05
Im up againsttheir aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing
presupposes. Its as if such students cant imagine any rewards for being a public actor
or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere
may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in
public will have an effect on the world. Todays students lack of faith in the power of
persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for
centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and
college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that
actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat
that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far
more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal
power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that nothing they
can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy. Contest
debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of
faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in
debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine
individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of
a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both
fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of
active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I
would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does
make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The
other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the
language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until
we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches
students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the
way for genuine and effective political activism.


Link turn - Continued embargo empowers Cuban repression against its own people,
promoting inequality and disposability
CSG 13 (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013,
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-
ef7794831032)
Helms-Burton has failed to advance the cause of freedom and prosperity for the Cuban people. This is
not surprising, since never in modern history has there been a democratic transition in a country under a unilateral sanctions framework as
broad and severe as the one codified in Helms-Burton. Its blanket sanctions lack ethical or moral consideration since
they indiscriminately impact all levels of Cuban society, from senior Cuban officials to democracy advocates and private
entrepreneurs. While it is no secret that Cuban government policies are primarily to blame for the Islands economic crisis, their impact
has only been exacerbated and made disproportionately greater among the most vulnerable
segments of the population by the blanket sanctions codified under Helms-Burton. In addition, these sanctions deny Cuba access to
the international financial institutions it would need to implement the type of macroeconomic reforms that U.S. policy has sought for more
than 50 years. Helms-Burton preconditions the lifting of its blanket sanctions on sweeping political change in Cuba. In practice, this waiting
game has strengthened the relative power of the Cuban government vis--vis the Cuban people while simultaneously giving the former a
convenient scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders. Cuban blogger and democracy advocate Yoani Sanchez best
illustrated the impact of the waiting game enabled by Helms-Burton when she wrote: The five decade prolongation of the blockade *as the
embargo is referred to in Cuba+ has allowed every setback weve suffered to be explained as stemming from it, justified by its effects...To make
matters worse, the economic fence has helped to fuel the idea of a place besieged, where dissent comes to
be equated with an act of treason. The exterior blockade has strengthened the interior blockade.ix
Former political prisoner and independent economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe agrees, writing that Helms-Burtons blanket sanctions have only
served to give the Cuban government an alibi to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, to justify repression and to (pass) the blame for the
economic disaster in Cuba.x Conditioning our policy of resource denial on sweeping political reforms strengthens the Cuban state because the
scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and will continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities,
thereby increasing the states relative power and its ability to control its citizens. History has shown that the
negative effects of such isolation can be long lasting and counterproductive to change. During the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe
was not based on isolation or resource denial. Indeed, an analysis of these transitions reveals an extraordinary correlation between the degree
of openness toward former communist countries and the success of their transitions to democracies and market economies.xi

Restitution CP
CXAPPLY PERMS AND COMPETITION
Politics
1. WE OUTWEIGH
A. DISAD HAS NO UNIQUENESS, LINK, INTERNAL LINK OR IMPACT THERE IS A
ZERO PERCENT CHANCE ITS TRUE BECAUSE THEIRS NO STRONG DATA
B. OUR IMPACT IS THAT EACH YEAR SANCTIONS MAKE CUBA WORSE OFF
RESULTING IN MORE ARBITRARY DETENTIONS, LACK OF ELECTORAL
ASSOCIATION, AND VARIOUS OTHER AUTOCRATIC CRACKDOWNS OF
THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE PER YEAR. THIS DIRECTLY IMPACTS THEIR QUALITY OF
LIFE, WITH CUBAN THEMSELVES RANKING DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS AS MORE
IMPORTANT THAN THE ECONOMY TO THEM.

Plan allows the GOP to recapture the entire Hispanic Vote
PJ Media 13(PJ Media, political news commentary widely referenced by Fox News and respected
globally, "Ending Cuba Embargo Could Be Opportunity for GOP Outreach"June 11, 2013
http://pjmedia.com/blog/ending-cuba-embargo-could-be-opportunity-for-gop-outreach/, RLA)

Many experts suggest that this swing away from the Republican majority is due in large part to the growth amongst Cuban-Americans
who have reached voting age as 3rd and perhaps 4th generation Americans. Not only do they self-identify with
Americans more than with Cubans but their grievances against what the Castro regime has done to them and their
family are much less personal. They are much more inclined to seek dialogue and reconciliation with
the Cuban government than their parents or grandparents are. Therefore, Republicans would be wise to take the
lead on this issue instead of following the path that has been opened by the easing of restrictions from
the Obama administration. Demanding that human rights be respected in Cuba and that the government be held to account by the
international community for human rights violations against political dissidents is a position to which many pay lip service but few politicians
follow through on. Speaking out against political oppression in Cuba will also serve Republicans well among
the Hispanic community at large. A number of Hispanics in the United States have lived through or
can identify with restrictive governments found throughout the region, whether it be in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or
Ecuador. It presents itself as an opportunity for Republicans to build back up some trust with Hispanics by identifying concern for issues that
may resonate with some of them. Demand for an end to human rights violations by the Cuban government is principled policy built on a sound
moral foundation. Simultaneously calling for an end to the economic embargo would signal a realization
that it has been ineffective and would be a politically smart move for the future of the Republican
Party. But a combination of principled policy and political calculation has not been common for Republicans as of late.