Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row !

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Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith (escri)es faith as an act of personality an(
e*amines how faith participates in the (ynamics of the personality& The )ook also
e*amines the con+ict )etween faith an( (ou)t& The si* chapters of the )ook are
entitle(: ,-& .hat Faith -s/ ,--& .hat Faith is Not/ ,---& 0ym)ols of Faith/ ,-1& Types
of Faith/ ,1& The Truth of Faith/ an( 21-& The 3ife of Faith&/
Tillich (e4nes an( e*plores faith as ultimate concern& Faith is a centere( act of
)ein5 ultimately concerne(&
This (e4nition is am)i5uous an( nee(s further e*planation& -f faith is ultimate
concern with what is it ultimately concerne(6 To )e concerne( we must )e
concerne( with somethin5& Tillich says that the content of faith (oes not matter for
the (e4nition of faith& 7ut to resol8e this am)i5uity Tillich's (e4nition of faith may
)e interprete( to mean that faith is a concern with ultimate reality&
9ccor(in5 to Tillich faith is an act of the total personality& Thus the (ynamics of
faith must account for the (ynamics of personality& Faith is the free(om to choose to
)elie8e in somethin5& Faith is :ecstatic' in that it is a centere( act of the total
personality&
Faith is not simply the will to )elie8e says Tillich& -t is a co5niti8e a;rmation of the
transcen(ent nature of ultimate reality& This is achie8e( not simply )y a process of
intellectual in<uiry )ut )y an act of acceptance an( surren(er&!
Reli5ious faith )rin5s an awareness of the sacre(& Tillich says that faith is certain
insofar as it is an e*perience of the sacre( )ut that it is uncertain insofar as it
)rin5s 4nite )ein5s into relation with an in4nite reality& The element of uncertainty
in faith cannot )e a8oi(e( an( must )e accepte(&=
Tillich ar5ues that (ou)t is inclu(e( in e8ery act of faith&> The (ynamic concept of
faith helps to e*plain the interaction )etween faith an( (ou)t& ?8ery act of faith
reco5ni@es that there may )e a possi)ility for (ou)t&
-f ci8il or reli5ious authority enforces conformity amon5 mem)ers of a community of
faith then faith loses its uncertainty an( the element of risk is remo8e( from the
act of faith& This may also happen if a law cree( or (octrine e*clu(es any
possi)ility for uncertainty or (ou)t&
Faith as ultimate concern re<uires the coura5e to make a personal commitment&
The risk in8ol8e( in faith is relate( to the presence of uncertainty& Faith may )ecome
nonA(ynamic or static when the risk of uncertainty is e*clu(e( )y a law cree( or
(octrine& Thus faith may )e either: (ynamic when uncertainty is reco5ni@e( an(
o8ercome )y faith or non(ynamic when the possi)lity of any uncertainty is
e*clu(e( )y faith&
9ccor(in5 to Tillich faith is not a )elief that somethin5 has a certain (e5ree of
pro)a)ility& Faith is not a type of theoretical knowle(5e that is )ase( on pro)a)ility&
Tillich says that many historical con+icts ha8e resulte( from the misun(erstan(in5
of faith as a type of knowle(5e supporte( )y reli5ious authority&B
Faith is not an act of knowle(5e relate( to uncertainty e*plains Tillich nor is it a
)elief )ase( on incomplete e8i(ence& 7ecause it is not an act of knowle(5e it (oes
not ha8e to )e supplemente( )y an act of will& Thus the will to )elie8e (oes not
create faith&#
Cltimate reality transcen(s any atttempt to (escri)e it a(e<uately an( can only )e
(escri)e( )y the use of sym)ols& The lan5ua5e of faith says Tillich is a sym)olic
lan5ua5e use( to (escri)e ultimate reality& For e*ample the wor( ,Do(/ is a sym)ol
for ultimate reality& Therefore to ar5ue a)out whether Do( e*ists or (oes not e*ist is
futile an( meanin5less&E The <uestion is not whether Do( e*ists )ut whether we
are concerne( with or in(iFerent to the nature of ultimate reality&
Tillich ar5ues that myths are sym)ols of faith which tell stories to portray situations
of ultimate concern& Gyths may )e :)roken' or :un)roken&' Cn)roken myths are
myths which are accepte( as literal statements of reality& 7roken myths are myths
which are interprete( as myths as sym)olic statements of reality&$
9ccor(in5 to Tillich the primiti8e mytholo5ical consciousness is con8ince( of the
literal truth of myth an( resists any attempt to (emytholo5i@e the mytholo5ical
worl( )ecause it )elie8es that the )roken myth is (epri8e( of its truth an( power&
7ut this insistence upon the literal truth of myth actually attempts to restrict
ultimate reality to the le8el of the 4nite an( con(itional&H
-n (iscussin5 the truth of faith Tillich e*amines the relation )etween faith an(
reason& Faith is not in con+ict with reason& Tillich says that reason is a precon(ition
for faith an( that faith is an act in which reason ecstatically transcen(s itself&"
?cstacy (oes not (eny rationality )ut ful4lls it& Reason ful4lls itself when it )rin5s
an awareness of the presence of ultimate reality&
Tillich )elie8es that the truth of faith (oes not con+ict with scienti4c truth unless
faith claims to e*press scienti4c truth or unless science e*presses faith in a
particular mo(el of reality& The truth of faith is also in(epen(ent of historical truth
an( historical truth is in(epen(ent of the truth of faith&
Tillich says that the truth of faith can neither )e a;rme( nor (enie( )y scienti4c
historical or philosophical truth& Faith is true insofar as it a(e<uately e*presses a
concern with ultimate reality&!I
The (ynamics of faith are e8i(ent in the con+ict )etween participation in an(
separation from ultimate reality& Tillich e*plains that faith )y its nature inclu(es
separation -f there is no separation from the o)Ject of faith then it )ecomes a
matter of certainty an( not of faith& Participation in ultimate reality )rin5s certainty
to faith )ut separation from ultimate reality )rin5s uncertanty to faith&!!
Dou)t can )e suppresse( )y con8entional or non(ynamic faith& 7ut non(ynamic
faith can )ecome (ynamic faith&
Tillich conclu(es that the triumphant aspect of the (ynamics of faith is that faith
cannot )e reJecte( or (enie( unless another faith attempts to replace it& Thus faith
is necessary an( uni8ersal&
Dynamics of Faith is an insi5htful an( thou5htApro8okin5 work of reli5ious
philosophy& .hile e*plainin5 how the meanin5 of faith has )een misun(erstoo(
Tillich also (e4nes what faith is how faith is possi)le an( necessary an( what
(ynamics are re<uire( for the life of faith& -n (escri)in5 the life of faith he clearly
e*plains what 5i8es faith its power&
9n opposin5 ar5ument may )e presente( to the concept of participation an(
separation in faith& Tillich says that there can )e no faith without separation from
ultimate reality& 7ut it can )e ar5ue( to the contrary that if we ha8e faith in
ultimate reality we are no lon5er separate( from it& -f we ha8e faith in Do( then we
are no lon5er separate( from Do(&
9nother pro)lem is the <uestion of what 5i8es truth to faith& Tillich says that faith
can ha8e )oth su)Jecti8e an( o)Jecti8e truth& 7ut it can )e ar5ue( that faith is
su)Jecti8e an( not o)Jecti8e as an act of concern )ecause it woul( not )e
necessary if there were o)Jecti8e certainty&
-n (eterminin5 the truth of faith it is also necessary to (istin5uish )etween the act
of faith an( the content of faith& 7y Tillich's criteria it is possi)le to ha8e true faith
)ut to ha8e false )eliefs& -t is also possi)le to ha8e true )eliefs )ut false faith& This
may lea( to an irresol8a)le ar5ument a)out what is true or false faith&
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Dynamics of Faith, along with The Courage to Be, proves to be one of Paul Tillichs more
accessible texts for a popular audience without technical training in theology or philosophy of
religion. Tillich himself seems to have written the text with such intentions noting in his
introductory remarks that the word faith has become so trivialied and diluted in the public
sphere that one may well be tempted to expunge it from theological discourse altogether.
!gainst this inclination, Tillich argues that there is as yet no substitute expressing the reality to
which the term "faith points #xxi$. The aim of the book, then, is to reinterpret and re%situate
this contested term such that readers come to know the hidden power of faith within themselves
and of the infinite significance of that to which faith is related #xxii$.
&n the first chapter, Tillich succinctly delineates his own definition of faith. Put 'uite simply, faith
is the state of being ultimately concerned, the dynamics of which are the dynamics of mans
ultimate concern #($. )hile faith may certainly involve rationality and emotion, for Tillich it
transcends them both without destroying either, thereby overcoming the gap between sub*ectivity
and ob*ectivity #+, (,$. &n one of the more interesting passages of the book Tillich claims that the
holy mysterium tremendum et fascinans - that which grasps a person ultimately - lies in a
substratum below good and evil, appearing as both creative and destructive #(.ff.$. /ur
ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us, Tillich writes, 0b1ut we never can be without
it #(2$. 3ikewise, faith also involves the risk or wager of existential courage, i.e., the
acceptance of uncertainty within the element of certainty. 4nder the conditions of existential
estrangement, the only certainty is ultimacy as ultimacy, the infinite passion as infinite passion
#(5$.
6hapter two explicates Tillichs assertions of what faith is not. 7ere he explores three primary
distortions of the meaning of faith as the centered act of being ultimately concerned with ones
whole personality, i.e., of ones whole being. 8or Tillich, each of these misunderstandings of
faith stem from the tendency to collapse the whole of faith within only one of the functions that
constitute the whole personality #9.$. The first and most pervasive distortion of faith is the
penchant to identify or conflate faith as an act of knowledge with little evidence. )hen this
occurs it is almost certain that one is referring to cognitive belief rather than faith itself. The
second distortion assumes and builds upon the first. &f faith means belief with little or no
evidence then it must be supplemented or complemented by a sub*ective act of the will. This is
what Tillich calls the voluntaristic distortion of the meaning of faith. &n :oman 6atholicism this
amounts to an act of the will enabled by grace and contingent upon assent to the teachings of the
church; in Protestantism the will to believe is also enabled by grace and is directly connected to
personal piety and moralism. !gainst these tendencies, Tillich claims that insofar as it involves
the existential weight of that which is ultimate no command to believe and no will to believe
can create faith #<<$. 8inally, there is the emotionalistic distortion of faith. :ather than
embracing faith as either a matter of the intellect or the will alone this misunderstanding
relegates faith to the sphere of sub*ective feeling without a content to be known and a demand
to be obeyed #<=$. 8or Tillich, such a view dilutes the potency of religion to the point that no
claims to truth can be made by it #&bid.$.
6hapters three and four outline the symbols of faith and delineate between different types of
faith. 7ere Tillich explains that any expression of ultimate concern must be expressed
symbolically because symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate #<+$. >od
functions as the most fundamental symbol for ultimate concern. :egardless of whether one
accepts or re*ects >od, the symbol of >od is always affirmed insofar >od is a type of
shorthand for what concerns humanity ultimately #=,%=9$. ?yths in this view serve as the
language and narrative through which ultimate symbols are communicated or transmitted.
Through symbol and myth faith is tangibly manifest in the life of the individual ontologically
and morally. /ntologically, that which grasps a person ultimately is experienced as being
present, here and now, and in the act of faith one see0s1 in a concrete piece of reality the
ultimate ground and meaning of all reality #..$. @rawing a distinction once again between the
structure of faith and its determinate content, Tillich claims that this ontological type of faith is
universal, sacramental, and present in all formal religions. &t is the state of being grasped by the
holy through a special medium and not the belief that something is holy and other things are
not #.+, italics original$. 6onversely, the moral type of faith demands moral obedience,
conceiving of >od as the one who gives law as a gift and as a command #+<$. Thus, the
content of faith is emphasied over its ontological structure. Aecause each type of faith - the
ontological and the moral - are incomplete in themselves, Tillich claims that while one may
certainly gain precedent over the other in the life of faith, persons should seek to unite both in
dynamic, mutual participation so that each might experience the transcendence of itself
through the aid and supplement of the other #2B$.
&n the final two chapters, Tillich outlines what he calls the truth of faith, i.e., its relationship to
other disciplines #reason, science, history, and philosophy, etc.$ and the life of faith as the
integration of the totality of ones personality within the religious community. 8or Tillich, faith
and reason are not incompatible nor are they mutually exclusive. :ather, the latter is the
precondition of the former. 8aith is the act in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond itself
such that reason rises above its own finitude within the conditions of sub*ective existence #2+$.
3ikewise, epistemologically, the truth of faith is not contradictory to the truth of science, history,
or faith - and vice versa. Cince faith is the religious structure of that which grasps a person
ultimately, its truth cannot be completely confirmed or validated by the truth of history or
science, nor can it be denied. 8aith functions more as an interpretive discourse in relation to
science, history or philosophy; it asks 'uestions of ultimate meaning and is therefore in no
position to pass *udgment upon the validity of historical investigation or scientific
experimentation. 8inally, the life of faith is one marked with various tensions - between doubt
and courage, estrangement and wholeness, individual and community - and the attempt to
maintain balance such that faith, hope and love are concretely present within the totality of the
human personality. 8aith then, in Tillichs view, is eternally present within the life of the human
being insofar as it is the symbolic apprehension of that which concerns one ultimately #(<.$.
This slim but rich little volume is perhaps the best introduction to Tillichs work and his overall
contribution to theology outside of his Systematic Theology itself. &t succinctly and concisely
delineates Tillichs understanding of the symbol, his method of correlation, and provides a basic
schematic for his ontology and his doctrine of >od. 8or its time, Dynamics of Faith stands
among works such as 7. :ichard Diebuhrs Christ and Culture in its attempt to reincorporate
religious language and symbolism within a shifting, so%called secular culture. 8or his part,
Tillich appears to have succeeded were Diebuhr, and certainly Earl Aarth, failed, i.e., in
constructing a theology of culture that views the world as a text to be exegeted for its latent yet
rich religiosity rather than a monolith to either be re*ected #Aarth$ or transformed a priori
#Diebuhr$. ?oreover, in our time, when one of the fastest growing religious demographics in
Dorth !merica are those who call themselves spiritual but not religious, Tillichs broad
understanding of faith as ultimate concern provides an interesting and fecund basis for
theological discourse unrestricted by a rigid dogmatics.
&ts laudable merits notwithstanding, Tillichs work in Dynamics of Faith highlights a few issues
which strike to the heart of Tillichs theological system, issues which, for some, may not surface
without an intensive study of the system itself. This, too, is significant insofar as it affords the
reader the opportunity to engage Tillich in a singular volume, to catch a glimpse into the heart of
his immense and intense theological edifice in an uncharacteristically crystallied form. The
'uestion at hand, however, is whether a few key problems raised in Dynamics of Faith are
revelatory of Tillichs own theological nearsightedness and his indebtedness to the Deoplatonic
tradition. 8or brevitys sake, & will only mention the single problematic here which & believe
drives to the very foundation of Tillichs entire theological enterprise. 8or Tillich, faith involves
a fundamental dynamic between several different sets of existential or ontological polarities, the
culmination of which is best seen in the difference drawn, though not explicitly in this work,
between existential and essential being. )ithin Tillichs theological system the latter functions
as the original and most fundamental state of reality, a state in which the conditions of the latter,
i.e., of existential estrangement are once and finally overcome. !gain, though Tillich does not
explicate this distinction in detail in Dynamics of Faith, the irreducible gap between essence and
existence is the foundation upon which his understanding of faith as ultimate concern is erected.
&ndeed, the supposition that essential being is an actually existing reality toward which human
beings are ontologically driven enables Tillich to make the claim that the risk of faith involves
the totality of the human personality such that, in the final instance, the cleavage between
sub*ect and ob*ect is overcome and the conditions of existential disappointment ultimately
con'uered #(9$.
The crucial 'uestion here is whether Tillich, despite all his important work to free 6hristian
theology from myopic dogmatism, is still tacitly reliant upon a linear and indeed Deoplatonic
theological tra*ectory still pervasive in 6hristianity, even in many liberal%progressive 'uarters.
This structure unfolds thuslyF humanity and creation initially existed in a state of perfection from
which they are now estranged. The ultimate telos toward which all creation, including especially
humanity, is oriented is the restoration of this original, essential state of being. )hether one
interprets this tra*ectory literally vis%G%vis the biblical text matters very little if at all. Tillich
certainly does not and for that theologians can be very grateful. 7owever, it is unclear,
especially in the present text, as to whether his theological enterprise is buttressed by this linear,
triumphalistic tra*ectory such that the ultimate eschatological end involves the final and indeed
terminal realiation of essential being over and against existential estrangement. &nsofar as
Tillich privileges the eventual triumph of one side of all the various ontological and existential
polarities in Dynamics of Faith and elsewhere it would seem that this may be the case. )ould it
not be more true to the vicissitudes of existential reality as such to suggest that the dynamic
between essence and existence is not one of linearity, but of oscillationH :ather than forcing
experience into a theological structure which seems to prescribe final reconciliation and
restoration a priori perhaps Tillichs distinction between essence and existence might be better
interpreted as a true gap or aporia, one which is never fully overcome or mended but always
remains open as a fissure inscribed into the heart of reality and the ground of being itself.
Issence may indeed eclipse existence but such a transfiguration is only momentary, always
fleeting and never final or complete. Thus, these two concepts - essential being and existential
being - would function not as total opposites on the spectrum of experience but as symbols of
reality which are always implicated in one another, presenting themselves as inextricable aspects
of human nature, not as phases or stages through which one progresses straightforwardly. To be
fair, there instances in Dynamics of Faith where Tillich, whether he realies it or not, creates the
possibility for such a reading, namely his insistence that faith is always an act of courage and risk
from within the conditions of existence #(5%,Bff.$. Devertheless, Tillichs Deoplatonic
proclivities and his reliance upon the linear tra*ectory outlined above cannot be overlooked.
Thus, Tillichs own conviction that tradition and the thinkers which form and constitute it much
be met with a constructive yes and a critical no must surely be applied to himself.
&n sum, Tillichs Dynamics of Faith, while assuming some potentially problematic theoretical
background better explicated in his Systematic Theology, is undoubtedly one of his more
accessible #and successful$ works, solidifying his position as one our last ,B
th
century public
theologians. 7is recovery of faith as the existential dynamic or structure of that which
apprehends and grasps a person ultimately regardless of particular form or content is an
important theological achievement in itself. This combined with his salient discussion of the
function of symbols within theological discourse and religious experience constitute the enduring
legacy of Dynamics of Faith as a text which aims to crystallie an intricate, erudite and indeed
robust theological system in a succinct yet compelling manner for the non%specialist.
Review by SL
0DoteF This review references the pagination of the 8irst 7arper Torchbook edition published in
(5=2.1
&n an effort to convince readers of their power and significance in relation to faith, Paul Tillich,
in his book Dynamics of Faith, redefines and reinterprets the meaning of the term faith, a
highly contested and distorted word in religious language #ix$. 8rom the outset, Tillich defines
faith as the state of being ultimately concerned #($. Comething that holds ultimate concern for
us must meet two criteriaF it must demand unconditional acceptance of the claim and it must look
forward with the promise of ultimate fulfillment. &f the demand is not adhered to, exclusion
from the ultimate fulfillment would result #,$.
Tillich moves on to describe faith as a centered act of the whole individual. &t is an act, a
conscious decision largely influenced by the subconscious elements of an individuals
personality #=$. &n this regard, it is a decision in which both the rational and the nonrational
elements of his being are transcended. #.$ Thus, the act of faith is ecstatic. &t transcends the
rational and nonrational structures of personality to allow one to 0stand1 outside of oneself-
without ceasing to be oneself-with all the elements which are united in the personal center #+$.
This ecstatic element allows the individual to turn to the most truly ultimate of concerns, which
unites the sub*ective and ob*ective side of the act of faith #(B$. @oubt, especially in existential
forms, plays a vital role in relationship to faith as it serves as the opposite pole in the state of
ultimate concern #,,$. @oubt re'uires the individual to show courage in order to accept doubt as
a part of the existential condition. The expression of faith and doubt within communities is
imperative, for language is necessary in the development of an individuals spiritual life.
7owever, communities of faith must not be bound by legalistic ties to doctrinal statements of
belief, but rather assert the freedom of faith within the community #,5$.
&n the second chapter, Tillich addresses what faith is not. &n the intellectualistic distortion of
faith, faith becomes belief rather than the state of being ultimate concerned #9($. 7e also contests
the widely held conception of faith as knowledge with a low degree of probability #9=$. !
second distortion comes in the form of voluntaristic faith. 7ere Tillich contradicts the will to
believe in which faith is dependent upon teachings of the church #6atholicism$ and morality of
the individual #Protestantism$ #9.%+$. The final distortion of faith is emotionalistic. 8or Tillich,
faith is not a matter of merely sub*ective emotions, without a content to be known and a demand
to be obeyed #95$. Through negating these three distortions-faith as matter of intellect, matter
of the will, or matter of emotion-Tillich reasserts that faith is a centered act of the whole
personality #9B$.
Tillich explains in the third chapter the relationship between faith and symbols. 7e asserts, 0!n
individuals1 ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symbolic language alone
is able to express the ultimate #<($. Cymbols are different than signs, and important to
theological language, because they participate in the reality to which they point #<,$. >od
functions as the primary symbol for ultimate concern #<=$. >od is a symbol for >od in that it is
ultimate and has concrete manifestations in ordinary experience #<.$. /ther symbols for
ultimate concern are used with different concrete manifestations from existential experience #<+$.
Tillich then connects the concept of symbols to the ways myths are created through language and
narrative to describe divine%human encounters #<5$.
&n the fourth chapter, Tillich describes two types of faithF ontological and moral. &n the
ontological type of faith, an individuals ultimate concern is manifest in present and concrete
interactions with reality #=2$. This sacramental character of faith is the state of being grasped
by the holy through a special medium #=2$. The moral types of faith are largely influenced by
the gift of the law given by >od, which demands moral obedience #.=$. Tillich explains that
the structure and protection of the law make life possible and satisfying, allowing for
continuous actualiation of the ultimate concern in the existential reality #.+$. 7e sees the two
types of faith, ontological and moral, as both incomplete, and the mutual participation of the
two as the complex, dynamic, and self%transcending goal of faith #+B$.
Tillichs fifth chapter gives insight into the truth within the symbols and myths of faith. :eason
-understood as the human capacity that fosters creativity and growth for humanity within the
structures of reality-gives rise to faith, in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond itself
#+.$. Tillich makes it clear that science and faith should not interfere with each other, in that
neither can prove nor deny the other; they operate on different dimensions of meaning #2=$. &n
terms of historical truth, faith can assert that events of ultimate concern occurred in the past, but
cannot assert the historical truth of any particular events where ultimate concern is supposedly
revealed. Thus, those of faith are free from the burdens of determining the veracity of historical
occurrences #25$. The relationship between philosophical truth and the truth of faith are more
interconnected, in that elements of each exist in the other. 7owever, neither determines the
course of the other #5=$.
Tillich turns in his final chapter to the manifestation of faith in the life of an individual. 7e
describes the experience of faith as a tension between participation and separation, between the
faithful one and 0his or her1 ultimate concern #55$. This is most explicitly experienced through
doubt, which is overcome by courage to assume doubt into the experience of faith #(B($. Tillich
asserts that the concern of faith is identical with the desire of loveF reunion with that to which
one belongs and from which one is estranged #((,$. 3ove serves as the manifestation of the
state of being ultimately concerned within the conditions of existence.
&n this text, written in the same year in which the second volume of his Systematic Theology #CT$
appeared, Tillich offers a sample of his theology with an eye toward the non%academic
community. Dynamics of Faith #@8$ hits on ma*or theological points from the CTF ultimate
concern, non%being, estrangement, and tensive polarities, to name a few. )hile the tone of the
book has a far more popular appeal, Tillich does not shy away from wrestling with grand
theological 'uestions. &n addressing concepts such as creeds in the church, the role of reason in
relation to faith, and the function of doubt in the life of the faithful, among others, Tillich serves
his audience well by confronting problematic issues within religious communities.
Ceveral specific points deserve praise in @8. The first is the nature of Tillichs definition of faith,
which leaves open the opportunity to define faith in terms of other religions. &n fact, Tillich states
in his discussion of moral types of faithF JThe 'uestion of faith is not ?oses or Kesus or
?ohammed; the 'uestion isF )ho expresses most ade'uately ones ultimate concernH The
conflict between religions is not a conflict between forms of belief, but it is a conflict between
expressions of our ultimate concernJ #..$.
7e goes on later to point out that the perspective from which the discussion is arising will
inevitably produce a response that *ustifies the ultimate concern in that perspective #+B%+($.
Tillich acknowledges the many expressions of ultimate concern that exist in the world. !nd
while he would assert that 6hristianity, in its unified form in ontological and moral faith, would
fulfill the dynamics of the history of faith in the past and future #+9$, he gives credence to
other manifestations of being ultimately concerned. )e have to wonder if this publication had
anything to do with Tillichs late%in%life discovery of the veracity of other faiths, and his later
desire to revise the CT with an eye toward a more religiously inclusive theology.
The second accolade due to Tillich in @8 is his depiction of faith as action in the final chapter.
)ith references to the third volume of the CT, Tillich lays out the concept of faith in manageable
and practical ways for the individual. 7is connection of faith to love-explicitly in terms of the
combination of agape and eros, which proves to be a fruitful description of his vision of
ultimately concerned love-allows the reader to get a sense for the direction in which this faith
takes us.
&t is along these same lines, however, that Tillich also should be criticied. 7is definition of love
and its identification with faith in the final chapter revolves around, and is predicated upon. the
notion of being separated and estranged from ones essence. )hile someone who has read the
second volume of the CT would know what estrangement entails, those who have not-and it is
assumed that the ma*ority reading this would have not-would have only a vague idea of what
the state of estrangement means, based on Tillichs slim description in @8. Thus, the point of
faith, that which is concerned with what is truly ultimate, and its connection to love, through
reunion from what humanity is separated, would be lost. )hile Tillich acknowledges that faith is
a universal component in the human condition, and thus all individuals experience it, the lack of
a specific explanation of estrangement leaves the action in Tillichs conclusion hanging.
)hile his treatment of estrangement leaves much to be desired, Tillich gives a compelling
reinterpretation and illumination of faith. 7e strengthens a term that carries much baggage
throughout the history of religious understanding, leaving the reader with a renewed sense of
integrity and purpose appropriate to his vision of faith.