The Illegal War

in Afghanistan

The unlawful nature of military action

by HM Armed Forces in Afghanistan
2001 - 2009

by Chris Coverdale of Make Wars History

commissioned by John Tipple of Linn & Associates

for presentation to the military court at Bulford

in defence of L/Cpl Joe Glenton

October 2009
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“War between nations was renounced by the

signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This
means that it has become throughout
practically the entire world an illegal thing.
Hereafter, when nations engage in armed
conflict, either one or both of them must be
termed violators of this general treaty law....
We denounce them as law breakers."

Henry Stimson, USA Secretary of State 1932

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CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
The Brief.
3 Summary of Findings.
3 Author
3 The Duty to Disobey Unlawful Orders
4 The legal duty to disobey unlawful orders
4 Identifying a manifestly unlawful order
6 What is an unlawful order?
6 Examples of manifestly
unlawful orders 7 A soldier’s duty to
disobey unlawful orders 7 The Laws of War
8 All
war is illegal. 8
Threatening or attacking a nation state is always illegal 9
The UN Security Council cannot authorise the use of armed force.
9 The only legitimate use of armed force is self defence
10 Pre-emptive attacks are prohibited
10 Taking part in a war of aggression is a universal crime
11 Wilful killing is a war crime
12 Killing a person because of their nationality
is genocide 12 Deliberately destroying members of a
national group is genocide 13 Leaders are responsible for the war
crimes of subordinates 14 Aiding or abetting a war or
the use of armed force is a crime 15 Every citizen has a legal
duty to disobey illegal orders 15
Unlawful superior orders 17
Prime Ministerial orders to attack Afghanistan [2001 – 2009] 17
False justification for war 20
War Crimes 23
A Crime Against Peace 23
Genocide 24
A Crime Against Humanity 24
War Crimes 25
Conspiracy 26
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861
27
Proving intent 27
Conclusions 28
Appendices 30
UN Charter – Chapter VII 30
UNSCR 1386 33
UNSCR 1510 35
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Tony Blair’s Statement on military action in Afghanistan – October 7th 2001 37

Gordon Brown’s speech on Afghanistan – September 2009 39

Brief
1) I was asked to prepare a report on the legality of UK military action in Afghanistan to be
presented to the military tribunal at Bulford in defence of L/Cpl Glenton’s claim that he has a
lawful duty to disobey orders as the war with Afghanistan is unlawful.

Summary of findings
2) Having researched the duty to disobey unlawful orders, the laws of war, the legality of HM
Government’s orders relating to the war with Afghanistan and the legality of HM Armed Forces’
actions in Afghanistan, I confirm that:

• every member of HM Armed Forces has a legal duty to disobey unlawful orders;
• the conflict taking place in Afghanistan is manifestly unlawful;
• the claim by HM Government that the war with Afghanistan is authorised by the UN
Security Council is false;
• the orders by the CiC and the Chiefs of the Defence Staff to take part in the war with
Afghanistan are manifestly unlawful;
• the actions of individual members of HM Armed Forces in taking part in the wilful
killing of Afghan citizens constitute the criminal offences of ‘genocide’, ‘crimes against
humanity’, ‘war crimes’, ‘murder’ and ‘a crime against peace’;
• every British citizen has a legal duty to disobey the orders of the UK Government
whilst it continues to violate the laws of war and commit war crimes.

Author
This report has been written by Chris Coverdale, a behavioural scientist, governance
consultant and peace campaigner with expertise in war law and the emerging science of
memetics [cultural change].
Between 1969 and 1998 he worked as a consultant and company director in the management
of behaviour change, transforming individual, group and organizational behaviour. In 2002 he
helped to set up Legal Action Against War to use the justice system to halt British
involvement in the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan and hold leaders to account for their war
crimes. In 2008, having conducted extensive research into violations of the domestic and
international laws of war, he founded Make Wars History, a voluntary organisation promoting
non-violent direct action to end and prevent war.
Papers - The Laws of War 2005 - The Iraq Conspiracy 2006 - Accounting for Genocide 2009
Contact: Tel 020 8540 2865 or by e-mail to ccovers@googlemail.com
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The Duty to Disobey Unlawful Orders

1) After the horrific consequences of two world wars the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials
made it clear that every citizen and in particular every soldier has a legal duty to humanity to
prevent governments from waging aggressive war and causing injury or death to innocent
people.

“The very essence of the [London] Charter is that individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State.
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State, if the State in authorising action moves outside its competence
under international law…”

“That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war
has never been recognised as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter
here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test,
which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence
of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible…”

Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal 1946

2) That these international duties apply to every member of HM Armed Forces was confirmed
with the publication of The Manual of Military Law in 1955 which states:

“If a person, who is bound to obey a duly constituted superior, receives from the superior
an order to do some act or make some omission which is manifestly illegal, he is under
a legal duty to refuse to carry out the order and if he does carry it out he will be
criminally responsible for what he does in doing so…

Manual of Military Law, Pt I, Chapter VI, Article 24

3) Article 24 of the Manual of Military Law makes it quite clear that members of the armed
forces have a lawful duty to disobey orders from their superior officers if they believe that
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those orders are unlawful. It also makes it quite clear that if they do carry out an unlawful
order they will be held criminally responsible for the consequences of the order.

4) The publication of the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict by the Ministry of Defence in 2004
reconfirmed the principle and made it quite clear that the duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful
order applies to all superior orders from wherever they originate.

16.47.3 Orders from a superior in this context include those of a government, a superior
- military or civilian - or a national law or regulation. A serviceman is under a duty not
to obey a manifestly unlawful order.

Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Chapter 16, Article 47

5) That a soldier can be held criminally responsible for his actions when following unlawful orders
was confirmed after the Vietnam war when the US Court of Military Appeals rejected the plea
of superior orders and confirmed the guilty verdict on Lt William Calley for his part in the My
Lai massacre.

“A determination that an order is illegal does not, of itself, assign criminal responsibility
to the person following the order for acts done in compliance with it. Soldiers are taught
to follow orders, and special attention is given to obedience of orders on the battlefield.
Military effectiveness depends upon obedience to orders. On the other hand, the
obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning
agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person. The law takes these
factors into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts done in compliance with
illegal orders.

The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him by his
superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior's
order is one which a man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under the
circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the
accused to be unlawful.

Whether Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the United States Army in
Vietnam, or the most intelligent, he must be presumed to know that he could not kill the
people involved here… An order to kill infants and unarmed civilians who were so
demonstrably incapable of resistance to the armed might of a military force as were
those killed by Lieutenant Calley is, in my opinion, so palpably illegal that whatever
conceptual difference there may be between a person of "commonest understanding"
and a person of "common understanding," that difference could not have had any
"impact on a court of lay members receiving the respective wordings in instructions," as
appellate defense counsel contend.”

United States Court of Military Appeals, December 21, 1973

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Identifying a manifestly unlawful order

6) When receiving an order from an officer, a soldier, as a reasoning agent, is obliged to respond
not as a machine but as a person, as a human being. This means that instead of
automatically responding to orders without thinking he must stop and think and use his
reasoning ability to deliberate on the issue and decide for himself whether or not the order is
lawful. In making high quality choices or decisions a soldier needs to undertake several
distinct thought processes.

• In the first place he needs to consider what an order entails, the actions and activities
that he will be involved in.
• Then he needs to consider the likely or expected outcome, the results or
consequences of the order.
• Then he needs to examine his conscience and establish whether or not the action he
is being asked to take or the consequence he is being asked to bring about is right or
wrong and complies with his own moral values and standards.
• If it does, he then needs to consider whether or not the order and its likely
consequences complies with his own understanding of the law and whether it is or is
not a criminal offence.
• If after thinking it through he is happy that his conscience is clear and that the
consequences of his actions will be lawful then he has a duty to follow the order.
• If however his thought processes have thrown up moral or legal questions or
concerns then he is obliged in law to raise his questions and concerns with his
‘superior’ officers.

If a soldier believes that by following an order he will transgress his own moral code of
conduct or international or domestic law then he has a lawful duty to disobey the order.

What is an unlawful order ?

1) An unlawful order is:

• Any order which if followed will cause physical injury, mental harm or death.
• Any order which if followed will break the law.
• Any order which if followed will lead to the commission of a criminal offence.
• Any order to take part in an unlawful activity

Examples of manifestly unlawful orders

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1) Any political, civil or military order to

• Use high-explosive weapons against inhabited villages, towns and cities.

• Take any action that could cause injury or death to children or unarmed civilians.
• Take part in a war of aggression.
• Use armed force other than in defence of the nation.
• Take part in an armed attack in foreign territory.
• Take part in the invasion or occupation of an independent sovereign nation state.
• Kill an enemy combatant.
• Take any action that could result in the destruction of others’ property.
• Drop bombs or fire rockets or cruise missiles at enemy positions.
• Prepare or train to use nuclear weapons.

A Soldiers Duty to Disobey Unlawful Orders

1) Ever since the end of the Second World War every citizen and every member of a military force
has had an international legal duty to disobey superior orders when the orders they receive
from their government or their political, civil and military leaders and officers are obviously
unlawful. Unfortunately neither the British Government nor HM Armed Forces have made any
efforts to help soldiers, sailors and airmen to decide for themselves when an order is unlawful.
On the contrary, members of the armed forces are taught to follow orders without questioning
them and in many cases they are punished if they dare to question an order. As a result
ordinary human beings become brutalized to such an extent that they accept without question
that killing men, women and even children in their thousands is all part of the job. This has to
change. All of us have a duty to mankind to take a stand and force our leaders and
governments to stop the killing and adopt a peaceful approach to the resolution of difficulties.
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The laws of war

“The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of
states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of
justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts.”

Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal 1946

All war is illegal.

2) War was outlawed in 1928 by the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War [Kellogg-Briand
Pact]. Sixty three nations, including Britain, America and Afghanistan, ratified the Pact
condemning recourse to war and agreeing to settle all disputes peacefully. This treaty is still
in force.

ARTICLE I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
one another.

ARTICLE II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may
arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War [Kellogg-Briand Pact]
3) The Kellogg-Briand Pact formed the legal basis for the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials. Under
its terms armed attacks on any independent nation state violate this binding treaty and render
a nation’s political, civil and military leaders criminally liable for the same offence of waging
aggressive war for which Germany’s leaders were convicted and hanged in 1946.

“In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that which is
equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the
Hague Convention. In interpreting the words of the Pact, it must be remembered that
international law is not the product of an international legislature, and that such
international agreements as the Pact have to deal with general principles of law, and not
with administrative matters of procedure.”
“After the signing of the Pact, any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national
policy breaks the Pact. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as
an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such war is
 10

illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war with its
inevitable and terrible consequences are committing a crime in so doing.”

“The charges in the indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars
are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are
not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war
of aggression therefore, is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international
crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
evil of the whole.”

Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal 1946

Threatening or attacking a nation state is always illegal

4) The UN Charter is widely recognised as the world’s premier war law. When a nation state
signs and ratifies the UN Charter it makes a binding agreement never to threaten or attack
another member state and to settle all international disputes peacefully.

2.3 All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered.

2.4 All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The UN Security Council cannot authorise the use of armed force.

5) The UN Security Council is a peacekeeping body and it may never use armed force. Claims
by UK and US governments that the Security Council can authorise armed attacks on another
state under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are false. Whatever peacekeeping measures the
Security Council decides to implement they may not involve the use of armed force.

41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon members of
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 prove
to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces.
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6) The Security Council is a peacekeeping body committed to the non-violent resolution of

conflicts and the preservation of human life. It may not under any circumstances plan or
undertake any action that could result in injury or death to another human being.

The only legitimate use of armed force is self defence

7) The only occasion when a limited and proportional use of armed force is lawful occurs when a
nation is forced to defend itself from an armed attack. Under Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN
Charter, if a nation is attacked it may legitimately use armed force to defend itself, but it may do
so only until the UN Security Council implements measures to resolve the conflict.

51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security.

8) Under the UN Charter the only people authorised to use armed force in the Afghan conflict are
the people of Afghanistan. Under Article 51 they have the right to defend themselves from
unlawful attacks by ISAF forces and if they notify the UN Security Council of the attacks they
can use armed force until the UN Security Council implements peacekeeping measures.

9) Every one of the suggested measures for the resolution of conflicts listed in Articles 41 and 42
of the UN Charter is non-violent and although the measures may involve the use of air, sea or
land forces [blue beret troops] they may NOT involve the use of armed force.

Pre-emptive attacks are prohibited

10) All pre-emptive attacks were outlawed 150 years ago as a result of Britain’s underhand pre-
emptive attack on an American vessel “The Caroline” at Niagara.

Taking part in a war of aggression is a universal crime

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11) The seven international war laws known as the Nuremburg Principles, derived from the
Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals by the International Law Commission, were
adopted as universal statute war law by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950.

I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is
responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
II. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a
crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from
responsibility.
III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not
relieve him from responsibility.
IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or a superior does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice
was in fact possible to him.
V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on
the facts and law.
VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:
Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of
prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime
against peace or any war crime.
VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.

12) Since 1950 when the Nuremburg Principles were agreed by the United Nations General
Assembly, the supreme governing body of the UN, it is not only unlawful to take part in a
war of aggression but it is a criminal offence of a ‘crime against peace’.

Wilful killing is a war crime

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13) Whether in a time of war or peace it is never lawful, legal or right to kill another human being.
The wilful killing of nationals [combatants or civilians] of another state is never lawful and is a
crime. The first and foremost war crime specified in the Geneva Conventions, the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Court Act 2001 is
‘wilful killing’.

For the purposes of this Statute “war crimes” means:

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing; (ii) Torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments; (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

14) In addition to the prohibitions on wilful killing the UK Human Rights Act specifies:

Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided in law.

15) It is never lawful for a serviceman to wilfully [deliberately] kill an enemy. Whenever a person
dies as a result of an act of aggression those responsible for giving, transmitting or executing
the orders that caused the death commit a crime and become criminally liable for murder.

Killing a person because of their nationality is genocide

16) Setting out to kill a person because of their nationality, race, religion or ethnicity is a crime of
genocide under the Genocide Convention1, the Rome Statute and the International Criminal
Court Act 2001.

For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part…

17) The widely held assumption that it is lawful to kill an enemy during times of war is incorrect. It
must be stressed that it is always a crime to wilfully kill or deliberately cause the death of
a person even if they are described by our political leaders as ‘the enemy’. The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court was enacted with the specific purpose of preventing Heads
of State, Governments, Parliaments and political leaders from waging wars and killing human
beings because of who they are, because of their nationality, ethnicity, race or religion. Killing

1 In the USA The Genocide Convention Implementation Act 1988 [known as The Proxmire Act] applies
 14

a person as part of a state policy [war] because they happen to be Iraqi, Afghani, Hutu, Tutsi,
Palestinian, Israeli, British or American is an act of genocide.

Deliberately destroying members of a national group is genocide

18) When George Bush and Tony Blair launched the shock and awe attack on Iraq in 2003 using
missiles and rockets to attack targets in Baghdad, they knew that innocent Iraqis would be
killed. By intentionally choosing and following a course of action that they knew would destroy
members of a national group for no other reason than their membership of that national group
they committed an act of genocide. The only reason that the victims died was that they were
living or present in the area under attack. None of them had done anything to warrant being
attacked and all of them had the right to expect that the Governments and people of developed
nations would abide by their solemn and binding agreements never to wage war or attack
another nation state.

19) It is not only Heads of State who are criminally liable for the crime of genocide when launching
an armed attack on another state, but every person involved with the attack. In law under
Article 25 of the Rome Statute every resident of every State which takes part in an armed
invasion or occupation in which citizens of the nation under attack are injured or killed is
criminally liable for the consequences and can be charged with genocide, conduct ancillary to
genocide, accessory to genocide or conspiracy to commit genocide.

Rome Statute - Individual criminal responsibility

Article 25

3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime2 within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or
is attempted;

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing
the means for its commission;

(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either:

(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or

2 Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes.

 15

(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;

(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide;

(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by
means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances
independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to
commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable
for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.

Leaders are responsible for the war crimes of their subordinates

“The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances protects the
representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal
by international law. The authors of these facts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.

Nuremburg War
Crimes Tribunal

20) Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes it clear that no matter
who launches the rockets, fires the cruise missiles, drops the cluster bombs or deploys
depleted uranium shells, responsibility for the resulting deaths, injuries and destruction lies with
the political, civil or military leaders who ordered the attack.

27. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or Parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

21) The British legislation makes it quite clear that it is a nation’s political, civil and military leaders
who are primarily responsible for the criminal offences associated with a war of aggression.

65. A military commander, or a person effectively acting as a military commander, is

responsible for offences committed by forces under his effective command and control
or his effective authority and control… A person responsible under this section for an
offence is regarded as aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the
offence.
International Criminal Court Act 2001

22) It is a common error in Britain to believe that the law is different or not applicable in times of
war. This is not the case. That a nation is at war provides no legal protection, excuse or
defence to these crimes. Since September 2001, when the International Criminal Court Act
was enacted, if one or more persons is injured or killed through the deliberate action of Britain’s
 16

military forces against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, then a crime of genocide has
been committed and those responsible for it are criminally liable and may be indicted and tried
for the offence. So for example, if an RAF officer under orders fires a rocket or drops a bomb
that causes death or injury to men, women and children, then he or she together with the
political, civil and military commanders who commissioned the bombing can be charged with a
war crime. If any member of HM armed forces intentionally kills or injures one or more persons
who are members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as part of a widespread or
systematic attack on that group, then both the individual killer and all those in the chain of
command responsible for giving the orders to use armed force are criminally responsible for the
crimes of ‘genocide’ or ‘conduct ancillary to genocide’ under Sections 51 and 52 of the
International Criminal Court Act 2001.

Aiding or abetting warfare or the use of armed force is a crime

23) Whenever a government embarks on illegal warfare, citizens and particularly members of the
armed forces, arms manufacturers, suppliers and taxpayers become criminally liable for
complicity in the crimes of their government and subject to the sanctions of domestic and
international law. Actions such as fighting, supplying weapons, paying tax, voting in
Parliament, speaking or writing in favor of a war of aggression are all criminal offences.

Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence,
whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be
passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

Accessories and Abettors Act 1861

Every citizen has a legal duty to disobey illegal orders

24) Article 24 Chapter VI of the Manual of Military Law applies to every British citizen and taxpayer
as well as to servicemen and women. This means that if a government embarks on an illegal
war everyone is duty bound to refuse all government orders associated with the war.
Servicemen and women must refuse active service orders, armament suppliers must refuse to
supply weapons and taxpayers must withhold taxes.

24. If a person who is bound to obey a duly constituted superior receives from the
superior an order to do some act or make some omission which is manifestly illegal, he
is under a legal duty to refuse to carry out the order and if he does carry it out he will be
criminally responsible for what he does in doing so.

25) Anyone who co-operates with a government that wages a war of aggression is complicit in a
crime against peace and is criminally liable as an accessory to war crimes. As the judges at
Nuremburg explained when convicting Germany’s leaders for breaches of the laws of war:

“The very essence of the [London] Charter is that individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State.
 17

He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the State, if the State in authorising action moves outside its competence
under international law…”

Unlawful superior orders

 18

Prime Ministerial orders to attack Afghanistan [2001 – 2009]

26) On October 7th 2001 the Prime Minister, Tony Blair announced3 to the nation that Britain’s
armed forces were operating in Afghanistan. He made the following statements:

“As you will know from the announcement by President Bush military action against
targets inside Afghanistan has begun. I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in
this action…

… No country lightly commits forces to military action and the inevitable risks involved but
we made it clear following the attacks upon the United States on September 11th that we
would take part in action once it was clear who was responsible. There is no doubt in my
mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available evidence,
including intelligence material, that these attacks were carried out by the al-Qaeda
network masterminded by Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear that his network is
harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan.

It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, it is more than two weeks since an
ultimatum was delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the
consequences. It is clear beyond doubt that they will not do this. They were given the
choice of siding with justice or siding with terror and they chose to side with terror.

… The military action we are taking will be targeted against places we know to be
involved in the operation of terror or against the military apparatus of the Taliban.
This military plan has been put together mindful of our determination to do all we
humanly can to avoid civilian casualties.

… We have set the objectives to eradicate Osama bin Laden’s network of terror and
to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it. As to the precise
British involvement I can confirm that last Wednesday the US Government made a
specific request that a number of UK military assets be used in the operation which
has now begun. And I gave authority for these assets to be deployed. They
include the base at Diego Garcia, reconnaissance and flight support aircraft and
missile firing submarines. Missile firing submarines are in use tonight. The air
assets will be available for use in the coming days.

… People are bound to be concerned about what the terrorists may seek to do in
response. I should say there is at present no specific credible threat to the UK that
we know of and that we have in place tried and tested contingency plans which are the
best possible response to any further attempts at terror.

… This, of course, is a moment of the utmost gravity for the world. None of the leaders
involved in this action want war. None of our nations want it. We are a peaceful people.

3 The complete statement is attached as Appendix 1

 19

But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace we have to fight. Britain has learnt
that lesson many times in our history. We only do it if the cause is just but this cause
is just. The murder of almost seven thousand innocent people in America was an attack
on our freedom, our way of life, an attack on civilised values the world over. We waited
so that those responsible could be yielded up by those shielding them. That offer was
refused. We have now no choice so we will act and our determination in acting is total.
We will not let up or rest until our objectives are met in full.”

Prime Minister Tony Blair 7/10/2001

27) Eight years later on September 4th 2009 Prime Minister, Gordon Brown made a statement4 on
the UK Government’s strategy in Afghanistan which included the following points.

“Our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001. We are in Afghanistan as a result of a

hard-headed assessment of the terrorist threat facing Britain.

… It is right that eight years ago Britain with America and our allies, on behalf of
the international community as a whole, helped to remove from Afghanistan a
regime which enabled Al Qaeda to plot terror around the world, and which
culminated in the attacks on September 11th, not just on America, but of course attacks
on the freedoms and values of us all.

… But we knew that as we removed the Taleban from power and drove Al Qaeda from
Afghanistan, so Al Qaeda would relocate – and they did so, on the remote mountains of
Pakistan. A new crucible of terrorism has therefore emerged. The Director-General of
our security services has said that three quarters of the most serious plots against the
UK have had links that reach back into these mountains. At present the threat mainly
comes from the Pakistan side, but if the insurgency succeeds in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups will once again be able to use it as a sanctuary to train, plan
and launch attacks on Britain and the rest of the world.
The advice I receive from the security agencies is clear. The sustained pressure on Al
Qaeda in Pakistan combined with military action in Afghanistan is having a suppressive
effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to operate effectively in the region – but despite these
difficulties, the main element of the threat to the UK continues to emanate from Al
Qaeda and Pakistan.
… In Afghanistan, the Afghan army and police are not yet ready to take on the Taleban
purely by themselves. That is why the international coalition must maintain its military
presence… we will have succeeded when our troops are coming home because the
Afghans are doing the job themselves. From that day on we will be able to focus our
efforts on supporting the elected government on security and on development and on
human rights. The right strategy is one that completes this job, which is to enable the
Afghans to take over from international forces and to continue the essential work of
denying the territory of Afghanistan as a base for terrorists.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown 4/9/2009

4 The full text of the statement is attached as Appendix 2 to this report

 20

28) A recent letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Bill Rammell attempts to
justify Britain’s occupation of Afghanistan on the grounds that it is authorised by the UN
Security Council.

“I can only reiterate here that the UK is in Afghanistan at the invitation of the
democratically elected government of that country, operating along with the other
partner nations under United Nations Security Council Resolution Nos 1386 (2001)
and 1510 (2003). The UN authorisation was most recently extended in UNHCR 5 No
1833 (2008).”

Letter from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office 17/6/09

False justification for war

5 Presumably this should read UNSCR as the UNHCR [UN High Commission on refugees] cannot
authorise action.
 21

29) When Tony Blair committed Britain’s armed forces to the conflict in Afghanistan he did so at
the request of George Bush. It was NOT at the request of the Afghan Government or the UN
Security Council.

30) When giving the reasons for the war he explained that we were attacking Afghanistan with the
stated purposes to “eradicate Osama bin Laden’s network of terror and to take action against
the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it.” These two objectives have nothing whatsoever to do
with defending Britain from an armed attack [the only basis on which the Prime Minister is
authorised to order the use of armed force]. This armed attack on the men, women and
children of Afghanistan, none of whom had had anything to do with the attack on the twin
towers, was a blatant violation of international treaties and the laws of war.

31) At no stage did Tony Blair claim that Britain had been attacked by Afghanistan and was acting
in self-defence [the only lawful justification for the use of armed force]. On the contrary he
made the specific point that

“there is at present no specific credible threat to the UK that we know of”

Compare this with the statement made by Gordon Brown eight years later in September
2009 when he attempted to justify Britain’s illegal presence in Afghanistan.

“Our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001. We are in Afghanistan as a result of a

hard-headed assessment of the terrorist threat facing Britain.

32) This claim that our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001 is false and is a blatant example of the
lies and propaganda that the UK and US Governments use to deceive the armed forces and
the public into believing that the war with Afghanistan is lawful.

33) Gordon Brown contradicts himself when he states, the main element of the threat to the UK
continues to emanate from Al Qaeda and Pakistan. If this is the case then why are we
fighting in Afghanistan killing innocent Afghani citizens when the threat comes from Pakistan?
It is never lawful to attack another nation on the grounds of a potential threat from a group of
its’ citizens. If it was possible to justify the war on the grounds of preventing the terrorist
threat, which it isn’t, then logically we should be attacking Pakistan not Afghanistan.

34) The argument that Britain is in Afghanistan at the invitation of the democratically elected
government of that country operating under UNSC resolutions 1386 and 1510 is false and
misleading. Tony Blair announced that British forces attacked Afghanistan at the request of
President Bush not at the invitation of the democratically elected government of that country.

35) British and American forces began bombing Afghan cities and killing innocent men, women
and children on October 7th 2001 more than ten weeks before resolution 1386 was put before
the UN Security Council on December 20th. To claim that Britain’s forces were in Afghanistan
authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1386 is palpably false.
 22

36) The Security Council is a peacekeeping operation governed by Articles 39 to 51 [Chapter VII]
of the UN Charter. Article 41 restricts the Security Council to using measures not involving the
use of armed force. For Bill Rammell and the FCO to claim that the use of armed force in
Afghanistan is authorised by the UN Security Council under UNSC resolutions 1386 and 15106
is false and misleading. Neither resolution 1386 nor resolution 1510 could or did authorise
Britain’s presence in Afghanistan and neither resolution authorises the use of armed force.

37) UN Security Council resolutions are not international law. They are the non-violent operational
decisions of the Security Council and they do not and cannot apply to the armed forces of
Member States acting independently of the Security Council. They apply solely to [blue beret]
peacekeeping forces operating under the auspices and command of the Security Council and
they cannot authorise independent action by UK or US forces.

38) The statement by Tony Blair that “this military plan has been put together mindful of our
determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties” is false and thoroughly
misleading. The military plan to open hostilities against Afghanistan by using high explosive
weapons such as cruise missiles, rockets and bombs on Kabul and other villages and towns
was designed to cause maximum civilian casualties. With several hundred non-violent lawful
civil and military options open to Tony Blair and George Bush to arrest and punish the
perpetrators of the 911 atrocity, the indiscriminate bombing of the capital city of Kabul was the
single choice short of using nuclear weapons that was most likely to cause civilian casualties.

39) NATO [The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] was set up in 1949 to provide mutual defence
against the potential threat of the Soviet Union. It was never meant, and has certainly never
been authorised to wage aggressive war. To use its massive resources for armed attacks on
one of the world’s poorest countries, injuring, maiming and killing hundreds of totally innocent
men, women and children is a gross violation of international law and an atrocity.

40) The truth of the matter is that there is not now and has never been any lawful reason for
attacking Afghanistan. It was an ill considered unlawful retaliatory attack on totally innocent
people in one of the poorest most undeveloped countries in the world. Not one of the victims
had attacked Britain or British interests; not one was allowed to plead for their lives in court
and not one was shown any mercy before they were massacred in a show of military might by
the British and American Governments.

41) The only legitimate lawful use of armed force in international affairs occurs under Article 51,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter when a nation state has suffered an attack from another nation
state and it responds to that armed attack with a proportionate use of armed force. Not only
is there no evidence of an attack by the Afghan Government on either Britain or America, but
there is no evidence whatsoever that the attack on the twin towers on Sept 11th was ordered or
even instigated by the Afghan Government.

6 For the full text of Resolutions 1386 and 1510 see Appendices Nos. 2 and 3
 23

War Crimes
 24

42) In attacking Afghanistan British, American and ISAF forces violated international treaties and
the laws of war and in doing so British and American citizens committed many of the most
serious crimes associated with warfare and armed conflict. They committed:-

A Crime Against Peace

Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of

aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii)
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts
mentioned under (i).
Article VI, The Nuremburg Principles
1950

43) The orders in October 2001 from George Bush and Tony Blair to attack, invade and occupy
Afghanistan using high-explosive weapons to bomb Kabul and other undefended Afghan cities
killing and injuring hundreds of innocent men, women and children violated the laws of war.
These actions constitute a ‘crime against peace’ under Article VI of the Nuremburg Principles
and all those involved in planning, preparing, initiating or waging this war of aggression in
violation of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War are complicit in the crime and can
be charged with a ‘crime against peace’ or ‘complicity in a crime against peace’. Offenders
include Heads of State, Government Ministers, Members of Congress and both Houses of
Parliament, civil servants, members of the Armed Forces, law enforcement officers and
taxpayers all of whom are criminally liable for the resulting deaths and injuries.

Genocide
For the purposes of this Statute “Genocide” means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

44) The number of Afghan civilians [men women and children] known to have been killed as a
direct result of this war is between 12,460 and 32,057. With the number of ‘insurgents’ killed
estimated at 22,500, the total number of violent deaths of Afghan citizens caused by ISAF
forces is at least 35,000. Intentionally killing 35,000 people all of whom are members of the
Afghan national group is an act of genocide under section 51 of the International Criminal
Court Act 2001 and Article 25 of the Rome Statute as well as a crime of genocide in the USA
under the Proxmire Act 1988. All of those who have taken a direct part in the killing are
 25

criminally liable for the deaths and can be charged with ‘genocide’, whilst all those who have
had an indirect part in the crime are also criminally liable for the deaths and can be charged
with ‘conduct ancillary to genocide’ under section 52 of the International Criminal Court Act.

Crimes against Humanity

For the purposes of this Statute “Crime against humanity” means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement;
deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of
apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

45) Bombing Kabul and other towns and villages using indiscriminate weapons of mass
destruction such as cruise missiles, rockets, cluster bombs, mortars and depleted uranium
artillery shells in the knowledge that anyone in the vicinity would be injured or killed constitutes
a crime against humanity under section 51 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and
article 25 of the Rome Statute. Every planned attack in which civilians are killed and which
has taken place as part of the war in Afghanistan constitutes a crime against humanity and
renders all those involved in conducting or aiding and abetting the attack criminally liable for
the consequences.

War Crimes
For the purposes of this Statute “war crimes” means:

(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing; (ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments; (iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health; (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (v) Compelling a prisoner of war or
other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; (vi) Wilfully depriving a
prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; (vii)
Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; (viii) Taking of hostages.

(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts: (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
 26

against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii) Intentionally directing
attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives; (iii)
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; (iv) Intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (v) Attacking or bombarding,
by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and
which are not military objectives; (vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid
down his arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, or of the flag or of the military insignia and
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury; (viii) The transfer,
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of
the occupied territory within or outside this territory; (ix) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not military objectives; (x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of
an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously
endanger the health of such person or persons; (xi) Killing or wounding treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; (xii) Declaring that no quarter will be
given; (xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; (xiv) Declaring abolished,
suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the
hostile party; (xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the
belligerent’s service before the commencement of the war; (xvi) Pillaging a town or
place, even when taken by assault; (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; (xviii)
Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials
or devices; (xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced
with incisions; ....... (xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment; (xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy as defined in article 7, paragraph 2(f), enforced
sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions; (xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations; (xxiv)
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport,
and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity
with international law; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully
 27

impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions; (xxvi)
Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.

It is quite clear from press reports and the reports of soldiers returning from Afghanistan that
several of the thirty three separate war crimes specified in the legislation have been committed
by ISAF forces. Although those responsible for the crimes are primarily the political, civil and
military leaders responsible for the war they rarely if ever are held to account for the crimes
and the blame often falls on the shoulders of the lower ranks. If these crimes are ever brought
to court strenuous efforts will need to made to ensure that the political, civil and military leaders
responsible for the crimes are prosecuted rather than the soldiers, sailors and airmen following
the unlawful orders.

Conspiracy

“If a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be
pursued which amounts to or involves the commission of any offence or offences by
one or more of the parties to the agreement, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the
offence or offences in question.”
The Criminal Law Act 1977

46) The crime of conspiracy applies to all criminal offences. It therefore applies to the planning
and preparation of wars of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, murder
and any of the other crimes associated with war and military conflict. If anyone takes part in
the planning, commissioning or support of any of these crimes they become criminally liable
for conspiracy to commit the crime.

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861

“Whosoever shall solicit, encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade, or shall

propose to any person, to murder any other person, whether he be a subject of Her
Majesty or not, and whether he be within the Queen’s dominions or not, shall be guilty of
an offence, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to imprisonment for life.”

47) Any Government Minister, MP, civil servant, serviceman or woman, journalist, political advisor,
commentator or taxpayer who says or does anything in support of a war of aggression or an
armed attack that results in the death of one or more persons, commits a serious crime under
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. This applies at all times, and the fact that we are
at war provides no legal excuse or defence to offenders.

Proving ‘intent’
 28

48) Individuals will undoubtedly attempt to argue that they had nothing to do with the war and the
crimes committed by Britain’s armed forces. However since the end of WWII this argument will
not wash with the courts. Wars cannot take place without the willing consent and support of a
majority of a nation’s population. Citizens may say that they did not intend to commit a crime,
but as the meaning of intent is defined in the legislation they will find it hard to argue that they
did not know that the British government was fighting a war or that they were not aware that
anyone might be killed.

(a) a person has intent:-

(i) in relation to conduct, where he means to engage in the conduct, and
(ii) in relation to a consequence, where he means to cause the consequence or
is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events; and
(b) “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of events.

49) That the perpetrators intended to destroy part of a national group as such is proven by their
choice of tactics and their use of high-explosive weapons. The deliberate choice to use cruise
missiles, rockets and bombs on cities such as Kabul demonstrates the intent to destroy
Afghan nationals. They knew that innocent people would be killed. After the first attacks they
knew that innocent people had been killed and yet knowing this they chose to repeat the tactic
over and over again. This deliberate planned repetition of a criminal act will demonstrate to
even the most biased court that George Bush, Tony Blair, Barack Obama and Gordon Brown
as well as all the civil political and military leaders involved in these atrocities intended to
destroy part of the Afghan national group and by doing so committed the worst crime known to
mankind.

Conclusions
50) Having researched the duty to disobey unlawful orders, the laws of war, the legality of HM
Government’s orders relating to the war with Afghanistan and the legality of HM Armed
Forces’ actions in Afghanistan, I confirm that:-
 29

51) There is widespread ignorance amongst British citizens of international treaties and the laws
of war. With very little knowledge or understanding of domestic and international war law it
is no surprise that no more than a small minority of citizens know of the existence of The
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, understand the implications of the Nuremburg
War Crimes Trials or have heard of the Nuremburg Principles and the Rome Statute. It is
less understandable why so few servicemen and women know of their duty to disobey
unlawful orders as it has been included in military law manuals for more than fifty years.

52) It is quite clear from the research included in the first part of this report that every member of
HM Armed Forces has a legal duty to disobey an unlawful order, that few if any of them
know of this duty and none of them is able to recognise when they have been given
unlawful political orders associated with war and the use of armed conflict.

53) It is also quite clear that the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict issued by the Ministry
of Defence in 2004 is faulty and gives a misleading account of the laws governing the
relationships between nations. This has led to Ministers of State, Parliamentarians,
members of the armed forces and law enforcement officers having a partial and incomplete
knowledge and understanding of the laws of war. This state of ignorance causes people to
assume that Governments know what they are doing, and leads them to obey orders
despite their misgivings. This ‘obedience’ syndrome is so powerful that it leads soldiers and
others to ignore their personal moral values and standards and willingly take part in such
heinous acts as the waging of war and the mass murder of women and children.

54) An analysis of the political orders from the British Government relating to the war with
Afghanistan indicates quite clearly that it is unlawful on every count. There is not now and
never has been a lawful reason for attacking Afghanistan and murdering its people. It is
clear that Tony Blair and Gordon Brown are following ‘instructions’ from George Bush and
Barack Obama to destroy the Taliban in Afghanistan and have put out false and misleading
propaganda to persuade HM Armed Forces and the public that the war and the fighting is
lawful and is authorised by the UN Security Council.

55) There is no getting away from the facts that all war is illegal, the UN Security Council can
never authorise the use of armed force and that the only time when the use of armed force
is lawful is in defence of a nation suffering an armed attack.

56) For these reasons all the orders emanating from the Chiefs of the Defence Staff relating to
the war with Afghanistan are unlawful and must be disobeyed.

57) The effect of following unlawful orders is that every action that leads to harm being done to
an innocent person is a crime in both domestic and international law, and renders all those
involved criminally liable for the consequences. This means that every former and current
member of the Armed Forces who has served or is serving in Afghanistan has committed a
crime against peace, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In order to end
this atrocity it is the duty of every serving member of the Armed Forces to report these facts
to their superior officers at once and refuse to follow all unlawful orders.
 30

58) The duty to rebel and refuse unlawful orders is not confined to HM armed forces. Every
citizen of Britain and every nation state involved in the war with Afghanistan has a duty in
international law to refuse to obey the orders of their Government as the actions of ISAF
forces in Afghanistan are unlawful and in breach of international war law.

Chris Coverdale The Campaign to Make Wars History September 2009

APPENDIX 1

UN Charter
Chapter VII - Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace and Acts of Aggression
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to
comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
 31

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its
call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree
of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be
provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of
the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by
the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not
represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under
Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement
action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their
combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or
agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces
placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
 32

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members
of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not
permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be
associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the
participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.
Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or
by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out
the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council,
any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted
with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have
the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
 33

APPENDIX 2

UNSC 1386
Adopted unanimously by the Security Council at its 4443rd meeting, on 20 December 2001
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1378 (2001) of 14
November 2001 and 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001,
Supporting international efforts to root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations,
and reaffirming also its resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28
September 2001,
Welcoming developments in Afghanistan that will allow for all Afghans to enjoy inalienable rights and
freedom unfettered by oppression and terror,
Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country
resides with the Afghan themselves,
Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the
re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001
(S/2001/1154) (the Bonn Agreement),
Taking note of the request to the Security Council in Annex 1, paragraph 3, to the Bonn Agreement to
consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of an international security force, as well as
the briefing on 14 December 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on his
contacts with the Afghan authorities in which they welcome the deployment to Afghanistan of a United
Nations authorized international security force,
Taking note of the letter dated 19 December 2001 from Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to the President of the
Security Council (S/2001/1223),
Welcoming the letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General of 19 December 2001
(S/2001/1217), and taking note of the United Kingdom offer contained therein to take the lead in
organizing and commanding an International Security Assistance Force,
Stressing that all Afghan forces must adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights law,
including respect for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national
unity of Afghanistan,
Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and
security,
Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security Assistance
Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by the Bonn Agreement,
Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 34

1. Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an
International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of
security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the
personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;
2. Calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the
International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of
the Force and the Secretary-General;
3. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;
4. Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation with the Afghan
Interim Authority in the implementation of the force mandate, as well as with the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General;
5. Calls upon all Afghans to cooperate with the International Security Assistance Force and relevant
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and welcomes the commitment of the
parties to the Bonn Agreement to do all within their means and influence to ensure security, including
to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and all other
personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan;
6. Takes note of the pledge made by the Afghan parties to the Bonn Agreement in Annex 1 to that
Agreement to withdraw all military units from Kabul, and calls upon them to implement this pledge in
cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force;
7. Encourages neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to the International Security
Assistance Force such necessary assistance as may be requested, including the provision of overflight
clearances and transit;
8. Stresses that the expenses of the International Security Assistance Force will be borne by the
participating Member States concerned, requests the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund through
which contributions could be channelled to the Member States or operations concerned, and encourages
Member States to contribute to such a fund;
9. Requests the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide periodic reports on
progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary-General;
10. Calls on Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to provide
assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan
security and armed forces;
11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
APPENDIX 3
UNSC Resolution 1510
The full text of resolution 1510 (2003) reads, as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1386 (2001) of
20 December 2001, 1413 (2002) of 23 May 2002 and 1444 (2002) of 27 November 2002,
“Reaffirming also its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
and national unity of Afghanistan,
“Reaffirming also its resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28
September 2001 and reiterating its support for international efforts to root out terrorism in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
 35

“Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the
country resides with the Afghans themselves and welcoming the continuing cooperation of the
Afghan Transitional Authority with the International Security Assistance Force,
“Reaffirming the importance of the Bonn Agreement and recalling in particular its annex 1
which, inter alia, provides for the progressive expansion of the International Security Assistance
Force to other urban centres and other areas beyond Kabul,
“Stressing also the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of
Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all armed
factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National
Army and Police,
“Recognizing the constraints upon the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement resulting
from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan,
“Noting the letter dated 10 October 2003 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan
(S/2003/986, annex) requesting the assistance of the International Security Assistance Force
outside Kabul,
“Noting the letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to the Secretary-General (S/2003/970) regarding a possible expansion of
the mission of the International Security Assistance Force,
“Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace
and security,
“Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security
Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors,
“Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1.Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow
it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the
maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the
Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international
civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate
in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in
support of the Bonn Agreement;
“2.Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close
consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors and the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom
Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate, and to report to the Security Council on
the implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1;
“3.Decides also to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force, as
defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and this resolution, for a period of twelve months;
“4.Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to
take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;
“5.Requests the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide quarterly
reports on the implementation of its mandate to the Security Council through the Secretary-
General;
“6.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”
 36

APPENDIX 4
Tony Blair’s statement on military action in Afghanistan
7 October 2001
The full statement is set out below:
Prime Minister Tony Blair: "As you will know from the announcement by President Bush military action
against targets inside Afghanistan has begun. I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in this action. I want to
pay tribute if I might right at the outset to Britain’s armed forces. There is no greater strength for a British Prime
Minister and the British nation at a time like this than to know that the forces we are calling upon are amongst
the very best in the world.
They and their families are, of course, carrying an immense burden at this moment and will be feeling deep
anxiety as will the British people. But we can take pride in their courage, their sense of duty and the esteem with
which they’re held throughout the world.
No country lightly commits forces to military action and the inevitable risks involved but we made it clear
following the attacks upon the United States on September 11th that we would take part in action once it was
clear who was responsible.
There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available evidence,
including intelligence material, that these attacks were carried out by the al-Qaeda network masterminded by
Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear that his network is harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside
Afghanistan.
It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, it is more than two weeks since an ultimatum as delivered
to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences. It is clear beyond doubt that they will not do
this. They were given the choice of siding with justice or siding with terror and they chose to side with terror.
There are three parts all equally important to the operation of which we’re engaged: military, diplomatic and
humanitarian. The military action we are taking will be targeted against places we know to be involved in the
operation of terror or against the military apparatus of the Taliban. This military plan has been put together
mindful of our determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties.
I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this action will last but we will act with reason and resolve. We have set
the objectives to eradicate Osama bin Laden’s network of terror and to take action against the Taliban regime
that is sponsoring it. As to the precise British involvement I can confirm that last Wednesday the US
Government made a specific request that a number of UK military assets be used in the operation which has now
begun. And I gave authority for these assets to be deployed. They include the base at Diego Garcia,
reconnaissance and flight support aircraftand missile firing submarines. Missile firing submarines are in use
tonight. The air assets will be available for use in the coming days.
The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force required in leading this operation. But this is an
international effort as well as UK, France, Germany, Australia and Canada have also committed themselves to
take part in the operation.
On the diplomatic and political front in the time I’ve been Prime Minister I cannot recall a situation that has
commanded so quickly such a powerful coalition of support and not just from those countries directly involved
 37

in military action but from many others in all parts of the world. The coalition has, I believe, strengthened not
weakened in the twenty six days since the atrocity occurred. And this is in no small measure due to the
statesmanship of President Bush to whom I pay tribute tonight.
The world understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting the dangers of inaction are far, far
greater. The threat of further such outrages, the threat to our economies, the threat to the stability of the world.
On the humanitarian front we are assembling a coalition of support for refugees in and outside Afghanistan
which is as vital as the military coalition. Even before September 11th four million Afghans were on the move.
There are two million refugees in Pakistan and one and a half million in Iran. We have to act for humanitarian
reasons to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan people and deliver stability so that people from that
region stay in that region. Britain, of course, is heavily involved in actually (indistinct) effort.
So we are taking action therefore on all those three fronts: military, diplomatic and humanitarian. I also want to
say very directly to the British people why this matters so much directly to Britain. First let us not forget that the
attacks of the September 11th represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. The
murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon Britain. But even if no British
citizen had died it would be right to act.
This atrocity was an attack on us all, on people of all faiths and people of none. We know the al-Qaeda network
threaten Europe, including Britain, and, indeed, any nation throughout the world that does not share their
fanatical views. So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self defence to protect British lives. It was also
an attack (indistinct) just on lives but on livelihoods. We can see since the 11th of September how economic
confidence has suffered with all that means for British jobs and British industry. Our prosperity and standard of
living, therefore, require us to deal with this terrorist threat.
We act also because the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime are funded in large part on the drugs trade.
Ninety per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originates from Afghanistan. Stopping that trade is, again,
directly in our interests.
I wish to say finally, as I’ve said many times before, that this is not a war with Islam. It angers me, as it angers
the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are
terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion and the acts of these people are wholly
contrary to the teachings of the Koran.
These are difficult and testing times therefore for all of us. People are bound to be concerned about what the
terrorists may seek to do in response. I should say there is at present no specific credible threat to the UK that we
know of and that we have in place tried and tested contingency plans which are the best possible response to any
further attempts at terror.
This, of course, is a moment of the utmost gravity for the world. None of the leaders involved in this action want
war. None of our nations want it. We are a peaceful people. But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace we
have to fight. Britain has learnt that lesson many times in our history. We only do it if the cause is just but this
cause is just. The murder of almost seven thousand innocent people in America was an attack on our freedom,
our way of life, an attack on civilised values the world over. We waited so that those responsible could be
yielded up by those shielding them. That offer was refused, we have now no choice so we will act. And our
determination in acting is total. We will not let up or rest until our objectives are met in full. Thank you."

APPENDIX 5

Gordon Brown’s speech on Afghanistan

Monday 7 September 2009
The Prime Minister outlined the Government’s long-term strategy in Afghanistan and answered questions during
a speech at the Institute of International Strategic Studies, London on Friday, 4 September 2009.
 38

Read the speech

Let me say first of all how grateful I am to Dr Chipman, to the renowned and august International Institute of
Strategic Studies, and to its distinguished members who are with us today, not just for hosting the speech that I
am giving today but for your long-term interest in Afghanistan and for your leadership in addressing problems of
terrorism round the world.
We meet here in the week we commemorate the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War,
and it is impossible not to feel an overwhelming sense of awe and humility at the scale of achievements and the
record of service and sacrifice that has defined our British armed forces for generations. It is a history of
extraordinary courage and of dedication, often in the face of the greatest of adversity. It is a history of a spirit of
service that is recognised in every corner of the land in the great national acts of remembrance on Armistice Day
and now on Armed Forces Day. And as people gather in Wootton Bassett, as they have done today, to honour
two brave servicemen, a local tribute that has become a national symbol of honour and gratitude, which
remembers all those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for our country.
Nowhere have I seen more clearly that sense of service but also the resilience of spirit of our armed forces than
on each of my visits to Afghanistan. As I travelled around Helmand province last weekend, our forces were the
first to point out to me the positive signs amid the challenges. I visited a police station that had been a polling
booth and heard stories of Afghans voting for the first time. I witnessed the joint operation room in Lashkar Gah
at work, British forces supporting the Afghan army and police in bringing security and the rule of law to that
provincial capital. And I heard from the governor, Governor Mangal, about the real progress being made
combating the heroin trade. But I also saw – as others who have visited and Sir David Richards is here with us
today – the scale of the challenges now and in the months ahead. Today has seen another serious incident in the
northern province, where Taleban hijackers had to be intercepted. In Helmand in the last four months, over 50
British servicemen have been killed. 64 have been seriously injured. These are not just statistics. Each one is the
loss of a professional, dedicated and brave serviceman and in each case there is the grief of a family whose lives
will never be the same again. Each one a hero who deserves the same unending gratitude that we give to the
heroes of the First and Second World Wars. And it is right that their service will be recognised by the new
Elizabeth Cross announced by Her Majesty the Queen. There is nothing more heart-breaking in the job I do than
meeting people who have lost someone who is a loved one in their family. There is nothing more heart-breaking
than, as I did this week, meeting a teenager who has lost his leg. These young men, we have got to thank for the
service to their country.
I want to take head on, therefore, the arguments that suggest our strategy in Afghanistan is wrong, and I want to
answer those who question whether we should be in Afghanistan at all. There are, of course, those who fear that
history shows international intervention in Afghanistan is doomed to failure. There are of course those who
argue that our counter-insurgency strategy cannot establish the security and stability we seek; and there are those
who also argue that policies for development – while admirable in principle – will make no difference in a
country that is one of the poorest and most corrupt in the world – no difference, at least, for many years. And
there are those who answer that a strong Afghan state is not just a long and laborious task but probably an
impossible one in the near future.
So I want to answer those who argue that while our motive, to deprive Al Qaeda and terrorists of a base, may be
well-intentioned, our strategy is flawed. And I want to remind people that what we are doing in Afghanistan is
part of an international strategy. It is right, of course, that we play our part, and we do not leave the people of
Afghanistan to struggle with their global problems on their own. So others too must take their share of the
burden of responsibility. 42 countries are involved, and all must ask themselves if they are doing enough. For
terrorism recognises no borders. All of us benefit from defeating terrorism and greater stability in this region,
and all members of our coalition must play our proper part. The British strategy is part of a wider international
strategy and must be understood in that context.
Our aim in 2009 is the same as in 2001. We are in Afghanistan as a result of a hard-headed assessment of the
terrorist threat facing Britain. We are part of a coalition of more than 40 countries embracing not just NATO –
with the Danes and Estonians alongside British troops in Helmand – but countries like Australia. So this
remains, above all, an international mission. We’ve all seen the reality of this threat: in Bali, Madrid, Mumbai,
and of course on the streets of London four years ago.
 39

It is our efforts at home and abroad – the efforts of our allies, the efforts of our armed forces, of the police and
security services back in Britain – which prevented and continue to prevent further terrorist attacks. It is a
totality of effort which in Britain is better resourced and better coordinated than before – from increased counter-
terrorist policing at home, to stronger checks at our borders, to international capacity-building, and to the work
of our armed forces and other agencies abroad. It is right that eight years ago Britain with America and our
allies – on behalf of the international community as a whole – helped to remove from Afghanistan a regime
which enabled Al Qaeda to plot terror around the world, and which culminated in the attacks of September 11th
– not just on America, but of course attacks on the freedoms and values of us all. But we knew that as we
removed the Taleban from power and drove Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, so Al Qaeda would relocate – and they
did so, on the remote mountains of Pakistan. A new crucible of terrorism has therefore emerged. The Director-
General of our security services has said that three quarters of the most serious plots against the UK have had
links that reach back into these mountains. At present the threat mainly comes from the Pakistan side, but if the
insurgency succeeds in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will once again be able to use it as a
sanctuary to train, plan and launch attacks on Britain and the rest of the world.
The advice I receive from the security agencies is clear. The sustained pressure on Al Qaeda in Pakistan
combined with military action in Afghanistan is having a suppressive effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to operate
effectively in the region – but despite these difficulties, the main element of the threat to the UK continues to
emanate from Al Qaeda and Pakistan. Al Qaeda retains some contacts and provides limited support to the
Afghan insurgency, principally through the provision of training for foreign fighters and military expertise;
continues to view Afghanistan as fundamental in the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate; and therefore a
peaceful and stable Afghanistan would for them be a severe propaganda blow and strategic failure for Al Qaeda.
A safer Afghanistan means a safer Britain.
It is on this basis that I made clear in the Spring – as did President Obama – that preventing terrorism coming to
the streets of Britain, America and other countries depends on strengthening the authorities in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda, and also the Pakistan and Afghan Taleban. For if in either country the Taleban
are allowed to undermine legitimate government, that would open the way once again for Al Qaeda to have
greater freedom from which to launch terrorist attacks across the world – and would have longer term
implications for the credibility of NATO and the international community, and for the stability of this crucial
region and for global stability. That is why our Strategy, published in April, reflects an integrated approach
across both countries. And we are now seeing what has not been obvious before: joint and complementary action
on both sides of the border. In Pakistan in the last few months, the army and security services have taken on the
Pakistan Taleban in Swat and elsewhere. Last week President Zardari told me his forces are preparing to tackle
the threat in Waziristan, because he fully recognises that terrorism poses as serious a threat to Pakistan as to the
rest of the world.
We also agreed on the importance of stepping up action against Afghan Taleban leaders based in Pakistan. In
Afghanistan, the Afghan army and police are not yet ready to take on the Taleban purely by themselves. That is
why the international coalition must maintain its military presence. I believe that most people in Britain accept
this - but I know they are concerned about how long international forces – and British forces in particular – will
have to stay. And they ask what success in Afghanistan would look like. The answer is that we will have
succeeded when our troops are coming home because the Afghans are doing the job themselves. From that day
on, we will be able to focus our efforts on supporting the elected government on security and on development
and on human rights. The right strategy is one that completes this job, which is to enable the Afghans to take
over from international forces; and to continue the essential work of denying the territory of Afghanistan as a
base for terrorists.
As the reviews of General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry will make clear: to reach that point where
international forces can return home, we must place a greater emphasis on building up the Afghan army and
police; on a unity of effort across international and Afghan authorities; on focusing our resources – both military
and civilian – in the areas that matter most; and thus on securing the population. It is security that comes first –
as in any counter-insurgency campaign. As I heard at the shura I attended in Lashkar Gah in April, giving
Afghans security matters more to them than anything else we or their government can offer. And as General
McChrystal has said: the measure will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence, not the numbers of
enemy killed. That security, however, comes at a price. The last four months, as I have said, have seen over fifty
British fatalities. August was also the worst month for American fatalities since the campaign began in 2001.
This was undoubtedly in part because both British and American forces went on the offensive – and the main
 40

offensives, Operation Panther’s Claw and River Liberty, were successful in bringing security to areas in central
and Southern Helmand previously under the control of the Taleban. There has been much comment on
Panther’s Claw. Our commanders, NATO commanders and international leaders all agreed the Taleban should
not be allowed free rein in these key population areas.
We do not yet know the full facts of the election – but it is already clear that thousands did vote in Central
Helmand, rather than the few hundred some have claimed. Turn out was not as high as many, like me, might
have hoped, and the incidents of voter irregularity and intimidation being reported must be thoroughly
investigated, including by the Electoral Complaints Commission. But the very fact of the first elections run by
Afghans themselves is an important step forward for the people of Afghanistan. And we should remember that
the Taleban vowed to destroy this election – and they failed. Despite the fact that part of the country is in
conflict an election was held. And 6,000 polling stations opened across Afghanistan. Now as we look beyond
the elections the biggest challenge facing our forces remains that of defeating the Taleban tactic of using
explosive devices – mines and roadside bombs. Having failed in 2006 and 2007 to defeat international forces by
conventional means, the Taleban have more than doubled their IED attacks over the past year. International
casualties are almost twice as high as this time last year as a result, and three quarters of them are due to IEDs.
This is a tactic which of course is inherently hard to defend against but having spoken at length to our experts
and commanders – who have been working closely with the Americans and the coalition in reviewing how best
to respond to this evolving threat – I am confident we are fully focused on dealing with it. Bob Ainsworth and I
are determined that in doing so our forces will have every possible support. It requires not just new equipment
but new tactics, better surveillance, specialised troops, and offensive operations – not just one single response
but many. So we have since 2006 spent over £1billion from the reserve on new vehicles for Afghanistan,
including 280 mastiffs which offer world-leading protection against IEDs. Between November 2006 and April
this year we have increased the number of helicopter hours by 84% – and on top of that, as well as sharing
coalition helicopters, we lease hundreds of hours each month from other operators for routine supplies. Let us be
clear: while we are committed to giving our commanders more options, what separates successful counter
insurgency from unsuccessful counter insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.
Already this year we have deployed 200 specialist counter-IED troops. Last week our forces cleared one of the
most dangerous stretches of road in the world, the notorious ‘Pharmacy Road’ and ‘Route Sparta’ near Sangin –
and their great skill and bravery uncovered and defused 37 IEDs, in the area where seven British soldiers have
been killed by IEDs in the last month. And our offensive operations are also focusing more on countering the
IED threat. Last month in a dawn raid by British and Afghan forces one of the largest IED-making facilities ever
found in Helmand – hidden in a warren of mud buildings – was seized and destroyed along with a massive haul
of 50 pressure plate IEDs, fuses, detonators, batteries, chargers and quantities of TNT and ammonium nitrate – a
haul we believe was destined for Sangin. I can report that this brings the number of explosive devices found
during the current tour by 19 Light Brigade to over 1,000. IEDs – 1,000 of them – designed to kill and maim but
successfully dismantled by British forces.
And now, as I announced last week, we are sending another 200 specialist forces and new equipment to find and
defuse the IEDs, and identify and target the networks who lay them. We are increasing our surveillance to track
the Taleban and target their bomb-makers. To ensure we have the best protected vehicles for road moves, we are
buying, on top of the ones already ordered and coming into the theatre, another 20 ridgeback mine-protected
patrol vehicles so that more will be going into operation over the next three months. And the first Merlin
helicopters – which I saw being adapted for Afghanistan at RAF Benson in July – will now be flying in Helmand
within two months and, together with enhancements to other types, by next spring compared to 2006 we will
have doubled the number of helicopters, and increased flying hours by 130%. Of course the equipment has to be
manufactured, delivered and adapted – and the personnel trained to operate it. But it is simply wrong to doubt
the speed of our response as we adapt to the new tactics of the Taleban, and the scale of the financial
commitment both to our soldiers and to this campaign.
Military spending in Afghanistan – the spending that comes from the Treasury reserve, over and above the
defence budget – is going up far in excess of this significant increase in troop numbers: it was around £180,000
per year to support each soldier fighting in 2006; it is now over twice that number, £390,000, for each soldier. In
recognition of the debt we owe to our forces as well as the need to properly equip them, we are increasing pay
for our forces at a faster rate than for other public servants. In 2006 we introduced the first flat rate bonus for all
who serve in Afghanistan and other operational theatres – paid for out of the treasury reserve – money now
 41

£2,380, tax free, for a six month operational tour – fairer than income tax relief and offering more money for the
average soldier.
Over the last three years medical care both in Afghanistan and back in Britain at Selly Oak hospital and Headley
Court and elsewhere, has been radically improved – and I want to thank all the medical teams and their support
staff for their dedication and for their achievements. Last year we doubled the lump sum compensation we give
to the most seriously wounded, while recognising that we still need to improve this program and have started an
urgent review. So we are giving our service men and women the additional resources they need to keep
themselves safe, to fight and succeed in their operations and to bring security to Afghanistan. But as we do so,
we will also continue to adapt and improve our counter-insurgency strategy for Central Helmand which we set
out in April and which underpins this summer’s operations. It is a strategy that – let me now explain – starts with
short-term security, but links to medium term Afghanisation and longer term development to create a stake for
Afghans in the future of their country. It is a strategy that has to be based on credible, deliverable and, where
right to do so, time-specific objectives – objectives above all for the advance of Afghan responsibility and
autonomy for their own affairs. The more Afghans can take responsibility in the short term, the less our coalition
forces will be needed in the longer term. And in our case it is a strategy focused on the key population areas of
Central Helmand – not just the towns but also the relatively densely populated Helmand River Valley, where the
fight against the insurgency must be won. And this is a strategy radically different from the Russian Strategy in
Afghanistan and indeed from all previous foreign interventions in Afghanistan, which lacked the support of the
population, which stayed in the cities and ignored the country, and did not seek to empower Afghans themselves
in maintaining security. And ours is essentially a four-pronged strategy for accelerating the Afghanisation of this
campaign.
First we will now partner a growing Afghan army presence in central Helmand. Secondly we will be
strengthening the civilian-military partnership, including on improving policing. Thirdly, we want to support the
Governor of Helmand by strengthening district government – backed by targeted aid – and a more effective and
cleaner government in Kabul. And fourthly we want to build on the success of the ‘Wheat not heroin’ initiative
which I discussed with Governor Mangal at the weekend; we want to extend it to thousands more who depend
on the land for their livelihood.
Back in 2007 I said that we would shift over time the emphasis of the strategy to what I called Afghanisation –
and greater responsibility for Afghans in all those areas. So let me take each in turn and how we plan to progress
it. First, the Afghan army. The numbers of our forces devoted to training and mentoring the Afghan army has
been increasing, albeit slowly. At a national level we have helped train tens of thousands of Afghan troops and
thousands more Afghan police. Afghan forces are already running security in Kabul, and over time they will take
over other districts. In Helmand a British battalion has been mentoring an Afghan army brigade – living, training
and fighting alongside them. But we must now move from simply mentoring the Afghan army to what we call
‘partnering’ – partnering with them as they take more responsibility for their country’s security. When we clear
an area of Taleban, it is the Afghan army and police who must hold that ground and prevent the Taleban from
returning. So when I met the new NATO and US commander, General McChrystal, in Afghanistan last
weekend, I made clear that to back his new counter-insurgency approach Britain supported faster growth both of
the Afghan National army and the police. In the spring NATO announced that we would support the expansion
of the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 by November 2011. That training is already proceeding, but it is at
the rate of 2,000 per month. Britain would support a more ambitious target of 134,000 by an earlier date of
November 2010 – which would mean increasing the rate of training to 4,000 at least per month.
It is clear that to achieve this rapid increase in numbers – and to increase the quality and effectiveness of the new
Afghan forces – this will require a new approach, shifting from mentoring – where small numbers of mentors
work with Afghan units – to this approach of partnering, where the bulk of our combat forces would be
dedicated to working side by side with the Afghan army at all levels. British troops would eat, sleep, live, train,
plan, and fight together with their Afghan partners, to bring security to the population. And this is in our view
the best route to success, the most effective way to transfer skills and responsibility to the Afghan security
forces, the best way to gain the trust of the population – and therefore the most effective way to complete our
tasks. In principle every British combat unit could partner a larger Afghan counterpart. By November 2010 we
envisage up to a third of our troops partnering Afghan forces. That means that our combat units in Helmand
could be ready to partner an Afghan army corps of around 10,000 soldiers. And to help us achieve this goal we
will press the new Afghan President to assign greater numbers of Afghan army forces to Helmand, where the
challenge to legitimate Afghan government, and of course to the security of the people, is today the greatest.
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But this is a military strategy complemented by an even greater emphasis on civilian effort to work with local
communities. And the second element therefore of our strategy is strengthening the security of and support for
the local population by the strongest possible civilian-military partnerships, including support on policing. Our
forces were the first in Afghanistan to set up a fully joint military-civilian headquarters, and we did so in 2008 –
a model which the Americans, having seen it in action, are now looking to roll out across the whole country. In
the 12 months following that we doubled the number of our civilian support experts on the ground. And I saw
this joint approach in action in the joint operational coordination centre in Lashkar Gah. The police are often on
the front line, taking heavier casualties than even the Afghan army – which is why over 100 of our armed forces
are currently dedicated to mentoring them, in addition to our civilian police mentors. The challenge here is
perhaps even tougher than the Afghan army, but there are positive signs – including the success of the focused
district development programme – though we need to go further in tackling problems of illiteracy, drug abuse
and corruption, and logistical problems like ensuring police are paid adequately and on time, without which
progress on tackling corruption and building up our police forces there effectively will be impossible.
Third, at the heart of the future for Afghanistan with its predominant village and rural population is the
strengthening of local and district government – a vital part of any counter-insurgency strategy anyway, but a
vital part of countering the shadow governance of the Taleban. A few months ago, when I was last in
Afghanistan before last weekend, I attended a shura – a meeting of district officials and elders. And it was there
to agree the priorities for the local communities, and they were discussing plans for policing and informal justice
but also new roads, clean water, and other basic services. And as our policy of Afghanisation and localisation
advances, our experts will work with shuras in more villages and more districts in Helmand – and right across
Afghanistan I believe priority must be given to the training and mentoring of the 34 provincial governors but
also 400 district governors as well.
Our development department has over the last three years in Helmand funded 60km of new roads, 1,800 wells,
irrigation for 20 thousand hectares. Construction has now begun on a project to develop the hydropower plant at
Gereshk and work will begin this month to expand the airfield at Lashkar Gah. Construction will soon begin on a
new road linking the two towns. And I can say today that we are ready to fund and partner the first Afghan
district teams to be sent down to Helmand for stabilisation purposes – Afghan officials working alongside our
teams – not only reinforcing the hard gains of our forces during this most difficult of summers but advancing
Afghan responsibility for their own affairs. And to ensure this effort has the widest possible support, we will
provide an extra £20 million for security and stabilisation work in Helmand – including police training and basic
justice – increasing by around 50 per cent what we have provided over the last year.
Now the fourth part of our strategy is moving the economy of Central Helmand over time from heroin to wheat
and to diversify even further. Attacking the heroin trade, while a worthy objective, is not, of course, the
fundamental reason why we are in Afghanistan. The fundamental reason is to ensure Al Qaeda cannot again use
this region as a base to train and plan terrorist attacks across the world. But there are links between the drugs
networks and the insurgency and terrorists; and the drugs networks are one of the most powerful forces standing
against the kind of legitimate Afghan control which over time could take over the job of dealing with terrorism
and the insurgency. That is why we as part of NATO have been part of mounting more than 80 operations across
Afghanistan in this work this year, precisely targeting the links between the drugs networks and the insurgents.
But we also know that the strategy will work best when we provide an alternative livelihood for the farmers.
And I believe that the key to the reduction in heroin in Helmand this year by 37 per cent – a fact that was
announced by the United Nations earlier this week – was Governor Mangal’s ‘food zone’ programme. With the
support of the British military and civilian experts, wheat seed was delivered to 32,000 Afghan farmers –
combining an alternative to poppy with protection from Taleban intimidation in a secured area of Central
Helmand. The independent study carried out by Cranfield University confirms that the results in the food zone
are much better than outside. And we will help Governor Mangal to extend this programme next year; we will
also help set up agricultural training college. Over time we want to see Central Helmand restored to its former
position, known as the ‘breadbasket’ of Afghanistan.
As we look beyond the elections, there are changes we want to encourage with our coalition allies at a national
level too. Clearly the priority is for the new government of Afghanistan to retain the trust and support of its
people. This means action against corruption – but it also means reaching out, including to other candidates in
the election. And as in every other comparable conflict in history, lasting peace and stability will involve all
sides reaching out and engaging in dialogue. This process must be led by the Afghans themselves, and as
President Obama has said: ‘there is an uncompromising core of the Taleban. They must be met with force, and
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they must be defeated. But there are also those who have taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a
price. And these Afghans must have the option to choose a different course.’ Our military efforts are essential to
this process of reconciliation and reintegration of former fighters, because it must take place from a position of
strength: the insurgents must come to believe they will not win, but that all those that can be reconciled, they
must see an alternative way forward founded on the renunciation of violence, acceptance of the democratic
process, and the severing of any links with terrorists. Political progress must then be backed by a far stronger
economy. In a country where over half of Afghans live below the poverty line and 40 per cent remain
unemployed – around three quarters of which are men under the age of 35 – poverty and lack of opportunity is a
problem that must be addressed. And that’s why we are committing £36 million over the next four years to a
national Afghan programme for employment, which will create 20,000 permanent jobs and boost incomes for
200,000 Afghans. As well as increasing our civilian assistance to Helmand to back the work of our forces there,
our Department of International Development will also continue to work at a national level on longer term
objectives – continuing to support, as we have since 2002, improvements to health and access to education –
sometimes forgotten at times like these.
It is a truly remarkable achievement that thanks to the help of the whole international community, basic
healthcare now covers more than four-fifths of the Afghan people. 40,000 more Afghan children will see their
fifth birthdays this year compared to 2002. And we should remember again that when the Taleban ran the
country, only a million children were in school, all boys. Today there are 6.6 million children at school – 2
million of them are girls. With the help of our development funding, 10,000 new teachers were recruited from
2007, with more expected in 2009. And this is an investment in the future of Afghanistan and its stability, and its
resilience against extremism – and therefore in our security. Our work on education in Afghanistan – together
with the increasing focus on education in Pakistan – brings me to a final point.
I have described the courageous and skilful work of our forces, rightly the focus of so much of our attention and
our concern; and, behind that work, our coordinated, military-civilian counter-insurgency strategy, aimed with
our coalition allies at securing the population and building up the Afghan authorities to a point where they can
defeat the insurgency and the terrorists themselves, and our forces can return home. I have set out today the
challenges facing us as we put this strategy into effect, the work we are doing to improve it, and the broader
national and regional context.
But returning from Afghanistan again I also reflected that while our objective is to advance justice, tolerance,
and opportunity – underpinned by security – that of our enemies is an ideology of violence, intolerance and
resistance to modernity, as alien to the Islam religion as it is to the West. And so, as in the Cold War, achieving
our objective depends not just on armies and treaties – it depends on us winning hearts and minds. The task of
winning hearts and minds in Southern Afghanistan is not primarily ours – it is for the elected Afghan
government, the leaders of Afghan civic society. But we can and must support them in this, just as we must
support them in security, governance and development. Encouraging new links with Muslim thinkers and with
young people; using all modern means of communication to engage with moderates and all who espouse a
peaceful interpretation of Islam; co-operation between institutions of learning; multi-faith dialogue – showing at
every stage that we are not in a struggle against Islam, but against extremists who abuse the name of Islam for
their own purposes. So Britain will continue our proud tradition of supporting education, a free media, the
exchange of ideas and learning in Afghanistan, as we do in the rest of the world. And this is more than soft
power, or even smart power: this is about people power – empowering individuals and communities to stand up
against extremism.
This has been the most difficult of summers. The situation in Afghanistan is serious – nowhere more so than in
Helmand. And when I meet young people who have suffered at the hands of the Taleban, and who are in
hospital, and when I meet the families of those people who have been bereaved, I have to keep asking myself,
‘Are we taking the right decisions for them and for the conduct of the action in Afghanistan? Are we doing what
is right both by our forces and by the population of this country?’ And every time I ask myself, as I do, these
questions, my answer is, ‘Yes, we are taking the right action, the action that is necessary to safeguard both our
country and promote security in the world.’ It is at times like this when we must strengthen not weaken our
resolve. We must stand up to those who would threaten our way of life. We must take heart from progress that
has been made since 2001. And we must take actions to deal with the changing and new tactics of the Taleban.
And I know we are asking a great deal of our armed forces. I can assure them that the government will continue
to give them every support. But just as important, so too, I know, will the people and the communities of our
country. And in return we are setting credible and deliverable objectives for their work - above all for the
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advance of Afghan responsibility and autonomy. I repeat, the more Afghans can take responsibility in the short
term, the less our coalition forces will be needed in the long term. And this, of course, must be accompanied by
credible, deliverable and specific objectives in Pakistan, especially on action against terrorist networks based in
their country.
So: continuing the enhancement of security for our forces; expanding the vital work that has discovered and
dismantled 1,000 IEDs this summer; a radical step-up in the training of Afghan forces, through partnering not
mentoring; Britain ready to work with our allies to train around 10,000 new forces in Helmand alone; stronger
district governors in Helmand and across Afghanistan’s 400 districts; local communities given greater power to
run their own affairs, backed up by a civilian strategy to provide clean policing and services as well as security;
through our development work, securing for Afghans a greater economic stake in the future of their country; and
pressure on the new Afghan government for an anti-corruption drive throughout the country.
These are objectives that are clear and justified – and also realistic and achievable. It remains my judgement that
a safer Britain requires a safer Afghanistan. In Afghanistan last week, I was further convinced that, despite the
challenges we face, a nation emerging from three decades of violence can be healed and strengthened; and that
our country and the whole world can be safer; because together we have the values, the strategy and, I believe,
the resolve to complete our vital and important task.
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Chris Coverdale

Make Wars History 83 Priory Gardens, London N6 5QU.

Tel: 020 8374 0742

www.makewarshistory.org.uk
 46

“As a citizen I regard it not only as a right but as a

moral duty to help shape the destiny of my country,
to uncover and oppose manifest evils. What I
aimed to do was to rouse my students to an ethical
understanding of the grave evils of our present
political life; a return to definite ethical principles, to
the rule of law, to mutual trust between man and
man. This is not illegal rather it is the re-
establishment of legality.”

Professor Huber, Munich University 1943

Shortly before he was condemned to death with five of his students for spreading
sedition

From ‘Humanising Hell’ by George Delf