TORTS CASE DIGESTS

1. Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana

G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
FACTS:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of
difculty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her
to be sufering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil performed an
anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid
area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit
Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be fawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation
dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks: "sponge count lacking
2 and "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the
natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an
oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the
operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United
States to seek further treatment and was told that she was free of cancer. On August 31,
1984, Natividad few back to the Philippines, still sufering from pains. Two weeks
thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being
informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by
hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains
would soon vanish. The pains intensifed, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While confned there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fstula had formed
in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another
surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad
underwent another surgery. A complaint for damages was then fled by Natividad and
her husband against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence
for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing
their acts of negligence. On February 16, 1986, Natividad died and was duly substituted
by her children.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes are liable for negligence andmalpractice
2. Whether PSI may be held liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
HELD:
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence,
the elements of which are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the
lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from
Natividads body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to
inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to
Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another
surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury could be
traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending
nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from
Natividads vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the
injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the
missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
Dr. Fuentes is absolved of any liability. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the
operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. Dr. Ampil, being
the lead surgeon, was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident
from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2)
examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and fnding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes
permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. It was this act of
ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr.
Fuentes
In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City
Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical
services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. It is worthy to note
that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical
City Hospitals staf, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or
constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the
attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. The failure of PSI, despite
the attending nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing
gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or
supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an
active step in fxing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also
directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.

2. Orlando Garcia, Jr. (Community Diagnostics Center) vs. Ranida and Ramon Salvador
G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Ranida Salvador underwent a medical examination at the
Community Diagnostics Center (CDC) as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia,
a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test. On
October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag:
Reactive. The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber
stamp signature of Dr. Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the test result to
Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the fndings
indicated that she is sufering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the
medical report submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas
employment for failing the physical examination. It was later determined that there was
an error in the previous examination and that the respondent was not sufering from
Hepatitis B. Respondent was rehired by the company.
ISSUE:
Whether Garcia (CDC) is liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result.
HELD:
The Court held that CDC was negligent because there was no licensed
physician in CDC as required by law. CDC is not administered, directed and supervised
by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed
Medical Technologist. In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the
years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D., Undersecretary for Health
Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head
of CDC. However, defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic
Center nor an employee of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant
pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is
referred to him. Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifes as an
efective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory.
"Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specifc function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate ofcials or units. Moreover, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent
Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appellee Castro. Lastly, the disputed
HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.
3. DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE v SPOUSES JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA
S. GO
G.R. No. 160889, April 27, 2007
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in OB- Gyne at the Dr. Jesus Delgado
Memorial Hospital and was the attending physician of Nora Go who gave birth to her
fourth child on April 20, 1992. After giving birth, Nora sufered profuse bleeding inside
her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled after
delivery. Nora sufered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure and
remained unconscious. To stop the bleeding, Dr. Cantre massaged Noras uterus and
ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. John David Go, Noras husband,
noticed 2 by three 3 inches burn (as confmed by the nurses) in the inner portion of
Noras left arm.

2 days later, John fled with the hospital a request for investigation as to cause of Noras
injury. The Hospitals medical director Dr Abad called Dr. Cantera who explained that the
blood pressure cuf caused the injury. Dissatisfed, John brought wife Nora to the NBI for
a physical examination by a medico-legal ofcer who later on testifed that the injury is a
burn caused by a droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes and that it
cannot be caused by the blood pressure cuf since the scar was not around the arm, but
just on one side of the arm. Consequently, the hospital shouldered all the expenses for
Noras afected arm skin grafting (in 1992) and another scar revision (in 1993).
Unfortunately, the incident left an unsightly mark and pain in her left arm. When
sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her children cannot play with the left side
of her body as the injured arm aches at the slightest touch. Spouses Go then fled a
complaint for damages against Dr. Cantera, Dr. Abad, and the hospital.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?

Held:
Yes, the petitioners are liable for damages. In cases involving medical negligence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing
the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: (a)the accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintif responsible is
eliminated.

In this case, all the requisites are present: (a)the injury is not an ordinary occurrence in
the act of delivering a baby; ( b)both the droplight and the blood pressure cuf are
instruments within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of
the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the
negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the
surgeons control; and (c)the injury could only be caused by something external and
outside Noras control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock.

Hence, the petitioner is obliged to pay Nora moral damages. Article 2217 of the Civil
Code provides that moral damages include physical sufering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission.
4. FILINVEST LAND, INC. V. FLOOD-AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS OF
MERITVILLE ALLIANCE, Represented by GABRIEL DELIM and VICTOR RAQUIPISO
G.R. No. 165955, August 10, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:
Facts:
Filinvest Land, Inc. (FILINVEST) is a domestic corporation engaged in realty
development business One of its ventures is the Meritville Townhouse Subdivision
(Meritville), the frst low-cost townhouse project in Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, having
its project site near Naga River. 54 homeowners, respondents , purchased their Meritville
housing units from Filinvest. Subsequently, the Filinvest developed the Meritville area
and built new subdivisions built with elevations higher than that of Meritville causing
Meritville to become a rains catch basin during the wet season especially everytime the
Naga River overfows.

Due to perennial food, the 54 homeowners townhouses sufered severe damages. As
such, they sent letters demanding Filinvest to address the problem. In response,
Filinvest installed in the area a pumping station with a capacity of 6,000 gallons per
minute and improved the drainage system but these measures were not enough.

Homeowners then fled with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
complaint against Filinvest praying that Filinvest be ordered to upgrade the elevation of
the afected areas and repair the units from Block 17 to 25. In the alternative, they asked
Filinvest to transfer them to its other food-free housing projects so that they could
allowing them to "sell-back" their afected units.

Filinvest contends, however, that they already took appropriate measures to prevent
fooding of Meritville, as approved by Las Pias City local government. HLURB decided
in favor of the homeowners, ordering Filinvest to upgrade the area and pay P25,000
damages to each afected homeowner.

Issue:
Whether or not Filinvest is liable for damages?

Held:
No. Filinvest is NOT liable for damages. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages. Further, negligence is defned as "the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human afairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would do." In this case, there was no showing that fooding was due to the negligence of
Filinvest.

In addition, prior to developments, there was no fooding in the subdivision. The fooding
was caused by Naga river, a public property, hence, it is the it is the Las Pias City
government which has the duty to control the food in Meritville Townhouse Subdivision
and should address the problem and not Filinvest. Republic Act No. 7924 (An Act
creating MMDA) also provides that Flood control and sewerage management is one of
the services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising
Metropolitan Manila.

5. Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco
556 SCRA 154
June 27, 2008
Facts:
The Tanjangcos owns lots located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision managed by
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. On the other hand, the Cuasos own lot adjacent to
the lots of the Tanjangcos. Thereafter, Cuasos began the construction of their house over
their lot. Before, during and after the construction of the house, Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual Rules and Regulations of the Association. Unfortunately, the
perimeter fence encroached on the lot of the Tanjangcos.
Issue:
Whether or not Corinthian is liable to the Tanjangcos.
Held:
Yes. It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision association of any liability arising
from the erection of a perimeter fence which encroached upon another person's lot when
by very its own Manual, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that no
construction can be started unless the plans are approved by thr Association.
6. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Noble Casiano
572 SCRA 71
November 27, 2008
Facts:
Noble is a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. A trail leading to Sangilo,
Itogon existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of the community.
NPC installed high tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually,
some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the
ground to only about eight to ten feet. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a
curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high
tension wires. Then he died.
Issue:
Whether or not NPC is liable.
Held:
Yes. NPC cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing
negligence to the victim. It was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought his injuries in disregard
of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. In this case, the trail
where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There
were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should
they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way
from Dalicno to Hogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was
ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

7. Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., and Contech
Construction Technology Development Corporation
G.R. No. 170596, November 28, 2008
Facts:

Petitioner decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building on their lot in Binondo, the
NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction
Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to
their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building),
owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS
Building, the respondent received complaints from their tenants about defects in the
building. There were cracks appearing on the foors, the steel door was bent, and
concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.

An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on
petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG
Building. Petitioners had undertaken and completed the repairs on the LSG Building.
However, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted foors, cracks in the
columns and beams, distorted window frames. Apparently, the LSG Building was
continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the
building. Thereafter, petitioners and Contech were sued by respondents. The trial court
found defendants negligent but plaintif also with contributory negligence because the
LSG Building was originally a 2-storey building that added 2 more foors without the
proper reinforcements for its structural integrity. The CA afrmed the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the liability of petitioner be mitigated due to the contributory negligence of
respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Co.
Held:
Yes. There is contributory negligence on the part of LSG. The building was supposed to
be only 2 storeys. Verily, the foundation of the LSG Building, which was good to support
only two foors, remained the same and could not support the weight of the present 4-
storey building more so when the adjacent lot was excavated by petitioners. Thus,
considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the
sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted.


8. Norman Gaid v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009

Facts:
Norman Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located. During that time, several students were
coming out of the school premises so Gaid drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the
school. Michael Dayata (Dayata), a student, attempted to board the jeepney from behild
the left side of the road but was not noticed by Gaid and his conductor Mellalos. Dayata
was pinned to the rear wheel of Gaids jeepney and was seen lying and caught in
between the rear tires. Dayata was brought to the hospital but was later on pronounced
dead. Consequently, Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Issue:
Whether petitioner should be held liable for damages resulting from the death of Dayata.
Held:
No. The petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching
the vicinity of the school and he cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who
came from behind on the left side.
Negligence has been defned as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person sufers injury. The elements of simple
negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the ofender; and (2)
that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to
guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Thus, lacking the
frst element of simple negligence, petitioner should not be held liable.




9. Spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La Hotel
and Resort, Inc.,
G.R. No. 190601, February 7, 2011
Facts:
For their wedding, Sps Guanio booked at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel. They claimed that
during the reception, the guests complained of delay in service of the food, the salmon
were small and didnt correspond to the ones in the food tasting, the hotel waiters were
ruled and unapologetic, and that they were compelled to pay for their drinks despite the
open bar agreement. Thus, petitioners fled a complaint for breach of contract and
damages before the RTC Makati. In their answer, the hotel alleged that the reason for
the delay was the sudden increase of the guest list from 370 max to 480. The RTC found
for the Sps Guanio, relying on the apology letter that said that the hotel disappointed the
spouses. CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the injury
was the unexpected increase in the guests, entirely attributable to the Sps Guanio.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of proximate is applicable in the case at bar.
Held:
No. The Court fnds that since petitioners complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine
of proximate cause fnds no application to it. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created.
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.

10.FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS. DE LOS SANTOS, et al
G.R. No. 152033 March 6, 2011

FACTS:
On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos, the wife of respondent
Wilfredo de los Santos was fetched by Armando, from Rizal Theater after Teresas
theater performance. Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a company car
assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena
in the Galant Sigma. While traveling along the Katipunan Road, the Galant Sigma
collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia),
an employee of petitioner Filipinas Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged
about 12 meters from the point of impact, the Galant Sigma burst into fames and burned
to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia (shuttle driver).
The families of the deceased against Mejia fled a consolidated civil case. The RTC ruled
in favor of herein respondents. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the CA and the CA afrmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los Santos made a turn along White
Plains Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the
accident from happening. According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by
the victims should also be considered as negligence on the part of the driver of that
same vehicle, thus, mitigating, if not absolving petitioners liability.
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed
required by law, specifcally Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the New
Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc
regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejias violation of the trafc rules does not
erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even
apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all
the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and,
whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the
highway. A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the
sketch of the accident would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such
a reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased.
11.REGALA VS. CARIN
G.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6, 2011
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las
Pias City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by
constructing a second foor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his
residence, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would
clean the area afected by the work.

In the course of the construction of the second foor, respondent and his wife
Marietta sufered from the dust and dirt, which fell on their property. As petitioner failed
to address the problem to respondents satisfaction, respondent fled a letter-complaint.
In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the lack of a building permit for
the construction of a second foor, petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to
clean the debris falling there from, allowed his laborers to come in and out of his
(respondents) property without permission by simply jumping over the wall, and
trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner persisted
in proceeding with the construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall.

In fnding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner
knowingly commenced the renovation of his house without the requisite building permit
from the City Engineers Ofce, he misrepresented to respondent his true intent of
introducing renovations. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals afrmed the trial
courts decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent?

HELD:
No. In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the injuries he sustained were the proximate efect of petitioners act or omission. It
bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to
introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and
may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent,
the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to
administrative sanctions or penalties.

The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifcally Architect Punzalan,
demonstrates that they had actually taken measures to prevent, or at the very least,
minimize the damage to respondents property occasioned by the construction work.
Architect Punzalan details how upon reaching an agreement with petitioner for the
construction of the second foor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioners property and found
that the perimeter wall was within the confnes of petitioners property; that he, together
with petitioner, secured the consent of the neighbors (including respondent) prior to the
start of the renovation as refected in a neighbors consent before the construction
began, he undertook measures to prevent debris from falling into respondents property
such as the installation of GI sheet strainers, the construction of scafoldings on
respondents property, the instructions to his workers to clean the area before leaving at
5:00 p.m; and that the workers conducted daily clean-up of respondents property with
his consent, until animosity developed between the parties.


12. Dr Rubi Li v Spouses Soliman
G.R. No. 165279
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass
located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed
that Angelica was sufering4 a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which
usually aficts teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention,
Angelicas right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor.
As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the
chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the
patients body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo
referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical
oncologist.
However, she died, just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the frst
cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a death
certifcate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of
Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for
post-mortem examination.
The Certifcate of Death6 issued by SLMC stated the cause of death as follows:
Immediate cause : a. Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA
Antecedent cause : b. (above knee amputation)
Underlying cause : c. Status Post Chemotherapy
respondents fled a damage suit7 against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose
Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence
and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of
the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting
early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the
chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely
demise. Further, it was specifcally averred that petitioner assured the respondents that
Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy ("Magiging
normal na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo. 95% ang healing") and when asked regarding
the side efects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness
("Magsusuka ng kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina"). Respondents thus claimed
that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely
assured them of its side efects.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages
as she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and
knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all
eforts said patient died
Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial courts fnding
that there was no negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of
chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner as her attending physician
failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side efects of chemotherapy.
ISSUE:
whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side efects to
the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the
absence of fnding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to
redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In
order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care
provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.51
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general
line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualifed physicians stems from the formers realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.52
There are four essential elements a plaintif must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintif was injured by the proposed
treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintif to "point to
signifcant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it.64
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of
material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of
Angelicas parents.
When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side efects of
chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in
blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable
expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the
severity of these side efects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the
procedure.
On the other hand, it is difcult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told
them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like
petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured
patients of chemotherapys success rate.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment
cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a
medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintif must prove
both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.66Such expert
testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice
as that of the defendant doctor.67
the legal standard of disclosure is not subject to construction as a categorical imperative
Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a
patient are inevitably guided by what they perceive as the common expectation of the
medical consumer"a reasonable person in the patients position when deciding to
accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."68(Emphasis supplied.)

13. Tison v Spouses Pomasin
G.R. No. 173180
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney,1 fgured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin
(Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-
trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards
Naga City.2
The opposing parties gave two diferent versions of the incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney and seated on the
passengers side. He testifed that while the jitney was passing through a curve going
downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching
on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further
causing death and injuries to its passengers.3
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he
noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling of the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it
began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To
avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a
tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer
before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.4
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
respondents fled a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for
indemnifcation for the heirs of those who perished in the accident
, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the
acciden
the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the
complaint for damages, t
The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing
and reliable than that of Gregorios, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention
to the road is not as focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni
caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of
Jabon caused the vehicular collision.
ISSUE:
Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
RULING:
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this fnding
greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the
tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.
One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his
concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger
So that as between the respective versions of the plaintifs thru their passenger and that
of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the
vehicular collision in this case, the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be
more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintifs vehicle, simply because
the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the
driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter
testifed to which is the precise point of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident ---
is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the passengers vision is not as good as that of
the driver from the vantage point of the drivers seat especially in nighttime, thus
rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of the
collision lesser than that of the driver.
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of
evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the
weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney
which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent
the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited
from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his drivers license,
The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a trafc regulation at
the time of the collision.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of trafc regulation. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a
person was violating any trafc regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,27 we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the trafc regulation. It must be proven that the violation of
the trafc regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer
drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able
to sufciently explain that the Land Transportation Ofce merely erred in not including
restriction code 8 in his license.
14) SPOUSES FERNANDO & LOURDES VILORIA vs. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
(CAI), GR No. 188288 (16 January 2012)


FACTS

Fernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after Margaret Mager of Holiday
Travel (HT) agency informed him that there were no available seats at Amtrak.
Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their fight. Mager informed him
that fights to Newark, New Jersey, USA via CAI were fully booked and ofered the
alternative fight via Frontier Air. Since alternative fight would be more costly and would
mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager denied his
request as said tickets were non-refundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station
nearby, he made inquiries and was told that there were seats available anytime.
Fernando confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them
into buying CAI tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked.
Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager denied it.

Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a refund. Continental Micronesia denied his
request and advised him that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for re-
issuance of new tickets. When Fernando went to CAIs ticketing ofce to have the tickets
replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles under his name, he was informed
that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a
ticket in his favor.

Sps. Viloria fled a complaint against CAI. CAI interposed, among other things, that it
should not be liable for Magers acts because she was not a CAI employee. Citing
Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, RTC-Antipolo City ruled that Mager was CAIs
agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed RTC-Antipolo Citys decision and ruled
that CAI cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of any proof that a
principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and HT, as the contract was not an
agency but that of a sale. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

assuming that an agency relationship existed between the two, would CAI be bound by
the acts of HTs agents and employees such as Mager?


HELD
Yes. SC mentioned that an examination of its pronouncements in China Air Lines, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. [264 Phil 15 (1990)] will reveal that an airline company is not
completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agents employees.
A prior determination of the nature of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the
passengers cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline companys agent, there
must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or
has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its
agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline companys agent has committed a
tort is not sufcient to hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between
the airline company and its agents employees and the contractual relationship between
the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the
airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make
the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agents employees and the
principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort;
hence, the need to prove the principals own fault or negligence.

On the other hand, if the passengers cause of action for damages against the airline
company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that
there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence. As SC stated in China Air
Lines, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does
not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has
to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the
carrier."

SC denied the petition.

15) NOGALES vs CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER Case Digest
ROGELIO NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER et al.
G.R. No. 142625
December 19, 2006

Facts: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then 37
years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada")
beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. Around
midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting
Corazon and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After
examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical
Center ("CMC"). t 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsionsAt 6:22 a.m., Dr.
Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villafor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the
process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon
began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon
died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum.

Issue: Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

Ruling: Private hospitals, hire, fre and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staf. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the
former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if
the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as
the "doctrine of apparent authority.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintif must show
that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or
agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority,
the plaintif must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them;
and (3) the plaintif acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out
Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staf. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr.
Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr.
Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC.


16) Teoderico Manzanares v. People of the Philippines
gr nos. 153760-61 oct. 12, 2006
Facts: At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision
took place along MacArthur Highway in Bulacan nvolving an Isuzu six-wheeler truck and
a passenger jeepney. The Isuzu truck was owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises,
Inc. and was then driven by petitioner Teodorico Manzanares. The passenger jeepney,
on the other hand, was registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was established
during the trial that the passenger jeepney was heading southwards in the direction of
Manila while the Isuzu truck was heading the opposite way. The incident resulted in the
deaths of the driver of the passenger jeepney Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand
Exaltacion, and Antonio Pasco. It also inficted serious physical injuries to some of the
passengers. The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion[2] and Miguel Anas[3]
instituted separate civil cases for damages against petitioners Manzanares, Manhattan
Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner, Eduardo Yang, and the operator of the
passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo. The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to fle a
complaint against petitioners Manhattan Enterprises Co. and Teodorico Manzanares.
Two of those who sustained injuries also fled their respective complaints against
petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint,[6] Felicidad Tomaquin claimed that
because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her work in a factory for more
than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded that she be paid her salary for the
two-month period that she was unable to perform her job as a secretary in a law frm in
Bulacan. Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as he
was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney. Teodoro Basallo alleged that while
he owned the passenger jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his
brother and the jeepneysdriver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a
contract of carriage with anyone.
ISSUE: whether respondent Basallo is presumed negligent having contributory
negligence in this case.
Held: no. As to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed negligent
because he was driving with an expired license and the passenger jeepney owned by his
brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate, we hold that the same fails to
convince. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the efects of his own negligence.

17. Universal Aquarius, Inc. and Conchita Tan v. Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corp.

FACTS
Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
chemical products in Metro Manila. It operates a chemical plant in Antipolo City.
Conchita Tan (Tan), as a proprietor under the name and style of Marman Trading
(Marman), is engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution of chemical products in
Metro Manila, with a depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's chemical plant. Q.C.
Human Resources Management Corporation (Resources) is engaged in supplying
manpower to various establishments. It supplied Universal with about seventy-four (74)
temporary workers to assist Universal in the operation of its chemical plant in Antipolo
City.

Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to be the general counsel/national president of the labor
organization called Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter) sent a Notice of Strike
to Universal. Resources informed the Regional Ofce of DOLE that the ofcers and
members of Obrero Pilipino are its employees and not employees of Universal. Five days
later, however, Copocyan and 36 other union members of Obrero picketed, barricaded
and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's Antipolo City chemical plant and
intercepted Universal's delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations.
Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, sufered a similar fate.

Universal and Tan fled a Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC
of Antipolo for breach of contract and damages sufered due to the disruption of their
respective business operations. The strike ended after the forging of an agreement
between Universal and Obrero.

ISSUE
WON Universal and Tan has a cause of action against Resources

HELD
Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defnes a cause of
action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict
or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
right of the plaintif. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintif by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintif or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintif for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintif the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or
other appropriate relief.

The Complaint sufciently states a cause of action against Resources. The Complaint
alleged that Universal had a contract of employment of temporary workers with
Resources; and that Resources violated said contract by supplying it with unft,
maladjusted individuals who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations. Given
these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the exercise of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction, could have rendered judgment over the dispute.
However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court fnds that she has no cause
of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint
reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike efected by the
employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its employees
attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of,
his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or injury, the
employee is engaged in the afairs or concerns of the employer or, independently, in that
of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or omission
is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably, when Resources' employees
staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of their employment.
Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its
employees.
18. Cayao-Lasam v. Sps. Ramolete

FACTS
Three months pregnant Editha Ramolete, respondent, was brought to the Lorma Medical
Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of
petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the same day. A
pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to
undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." Petitioner performed
the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.

Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was sufering from vomiting and
severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. de la Cruz, Dr. Mayo and Dr.
Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latters
womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-
abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure
for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.

Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) fled a Complaint for Gross
Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC). Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by
petitioners unmitigated negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the
D&C procedure and the petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb.
Petitioner contended that it was respondents negligence and omission in insisting to be
discharged against doctors advice and her unjustifed failure to return for check-up that
contributed to her life-threatening condition.

Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a Decision,14 exonerating petitioner
from the charges fled against her. The case was then elevated to the CA.


ISSUE
WON respondent can claim damages against petitioner

HELD
No. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of
a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in
like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.

Respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have
done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo,
who was clearly an expert on the subject. Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and
obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the subject, and is a
professor at the University of the Philippines. According to him, his diagnosis of Edithas
case was "Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also referred to as Cornual), Ruptured." In
stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas
uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. It is evident from his testimony that the D&C
procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus. the D&C
procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level
of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt
with Editha. In the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there
was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectifed if Editha followed the
petitioners order to return for a check-up.
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no
negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident
resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up
check up, in defance of petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was
her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.

19. CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ vs.
ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS
G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Respondents fled a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of
Arnulfo Ramos in a vehicular accident that happened along Barangay Tablac, Candon,
Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep driven
by Benigno Valdez (Valdez), which was involved in the vehicular accident.

Respondents alleged that Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a reckless, careless,
and negligent manner when he tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger
jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo
Ramos. Petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that Valdez was driving
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south
and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the
road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the
road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western
lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was
Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very
well knew had a mechanical defect.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be held liable for the collision.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way
that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but defnite class of risks.

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it
travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Valdez was made aware of the danger
ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road. The court fnds that Valdez is
guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a
reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and
which proximately caused injury to another.

However, the court also believes that Arnulfo Ramos is guilty of gross negligence for
knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent man would know
that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the road at
risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle. Under the circumstances, a prudent
man would have had the owner-type jeep repaired or would have stopped using it until it
was repaired. Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property.

The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous
when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of
its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the
road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. The doctrine of last clear chance
applies to a situation where the plaintif was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but
the defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to
do so is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintif. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.


The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be
said that it was Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap, Valdez no longer
had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Considering that the time the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds, he
no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.

20. LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

FACTS: A vehicular accident took place along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City, between
a Toyota Altis owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
(Aquilino), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by
Rodel Ilustrisimo (Rodel). A passenger of the Altis, Estela Maliwat (Estela) sustained
injuries and was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.

C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis along
Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when
the Ford Expedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. On the
other hand, Ramos maintained that the Altis crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street despite the MMDA order prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
intersection and the concrete barriers placed thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos may be held liable for the negligence of his employee
Rodel.

HELD: There is no doubt that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
accident. His negligence is established by the fact that he violated a trafc regulation.
This fnds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code which states that: "Unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation. Moreover, it
was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any
damages sufered by respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defned as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efcient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting frst and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the fnal event in the chain immediately
efecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which frst acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the frst event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specifc untoward event is exactly
what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who
resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed
Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy
nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. According to the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintifs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court
fnds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
*Causation
21)
G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009
AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO)
vs.
ANGELITA BALEN and SPOUSES HERCULES and RHEA LARIOSA
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner ANECO is a duly organized and registered consumers cooperative, engaged
in supplying electricity in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City. In 1981,
ANECO installed an electric post traversing Balens residence which was ptotested by
Miguel Balen with the District Engineers Ofce and with ANECO, but his protest just fell
on deaf ears. On July 25, 1992, Balen, Lariosa and Exclamado were electrocuted while
removing the TV antenna from Balens residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs
main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. Exclamado died instantly,
while Balen and Lariosa sufered extensive third degree burns. Respondents Balen and
Lariosa then lodged a complaint for damages against ANECO. ANECO, however, denied
liability, arguing that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in
removing the TV antenna and in allowing the pole to touch the high-tension wires.
Issue:
WON ANECO's negligence is the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
respondents
Held:
The SC ruled in the afrmative. It held that it is in fact ANECO which provided the
proximate cause of the injuries of respondents. One of the tests for determining the
existence of proximate cause is the foreseeability test, which provides that where the
particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct,
his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
the law of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in
such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of
certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but defnite class of risk which
made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be
held legally responsible. Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably
foreseen that, even if it complied with the clearance requirements under the Philippine
Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension wires above MIGUEL BALENs
house, still a potential risk existed that people would get electrocuted, considering that
the wires were not insulated.
*Human Relation: Intentional Torts
22)
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA
vs.
EMMA M. ROSQUETA
ABAD, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation from that
post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Arroyo assumed ofce. But on June 5,
2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that
she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. Meantime, on July 13, 2001
President Arroyo appointed Valera to Rosquetas position. Challenging such
appointment, Rosqueta fled a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against petitioner Villanueva, then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance,
and Valera. Subsequently, the RTC issued a TRO, enjoining defendants from
implementing Valeras appointment. While the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto
case was again in force, Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order authorizing
Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner, prompting
Rosqueta fled a complaint for damages against Villanueva.
Issue:
WON petitioner Villanueva is liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the
preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case
Held:
The SC ruled in the afrmative. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of
the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith.
He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil Code which grant
the latter indemnity for the injury he sufers because of such abuse of right or duty. It
held that Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government ofcial of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right
to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner
Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who
remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
*Human Dignity
(guys pasensya na pero ako din naguguluhan at nalilito kung bakit andito ang kasong ito,
ilang beses kung binasa pero di ko talaga marelate sa Torts and Damagaes subject
natin)
23)
G.R. No. 186496 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
DANTE GRAGASIN y PAR
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Accused-appellant Gragasin was convicted by the RTC of the crime of Rape as defned
and penalized under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In giving full weight and credit to victim AAAs
testimony, the trial court applied the doctrine that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman,
especially of tender age, would concoct a story of deforation, allow an examination of
her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her. The CA afrmed the fndings of the RTC, but modifed the penalty and award of
damages. acquittal. The accused appealed contending that his guilt was not proven
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
WON accused-appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
The SC ruled in the afrmative. In rape cases, the gravamen of the ofense is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. If the woman is under
12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force
is not an element of statutory rape, but because the absence of free consent is
presumed. In this case, considering that AAA was barely nine years old at that time, no
proof of involuntariness on her part is necessary. AAA, being a minor at the time the act
was committed against her, is considered by law to be incapable of consenting to the
sexual act. Moreover, not only did AAA identify accused-appellant as her rapist; she also
recounted the rape in detail, particularly how the sexual intercourse took place. A rape
victim, who testifes in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
and remains consistent, is a credible witness. With respect to the absence of hymenal
lacerations on AAAs genitalia, it is well settled that what is essential is that there was
penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond
doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA. In sum, the prosecution was able to
discharge its burden of proving accused-appellants guilt. On the award of damages, civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a fnding of the fact of rape. Moral damages are
automatically awarded upon such fnding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually sufered moral injuries entitling the victim to
such award. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if
there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. There being no
aggravating circumstance that can be considered, the award of exemplary damages
would have to be deleted.
24.) ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC.,
and EMMA J. DATUIN
G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin and Sansio Philippines, Inc. fled an afdavit of
complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio a proprietor
of Alvi Marketing. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently
arrested while visiting her family house in Quezon City. On the other hand, Gregorio
alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn; the signature on the
bounced checks were radically and patently diferent from her own signature. Gregorio
then fled a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin, that as a result of her
wrongful arrest and arraignment, she sufered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and
being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile fled a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious
prosecution.
ISSUES: Is Gregorio entitled to damages arising from her wrongful? (yes)
Is the complaint, a civil suit fled by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution?
HELD:
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Gregorios civil
complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Gregorio
claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she sufered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family. She
was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored
her civil complaint on Articles 26,[21] 2176,[22] and 2180[23] of the Civil Code.
Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
YES. Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and
other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal ofense, of
the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to
family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace
of mind.
It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace
of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufciently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to
ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Although she was
never found at the ofce address in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently
arrested by armed operatives in Quezon City, while she was visiting family. She
sufered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she
had to spend time, efort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation,
considering that she had held several honorable positions in diferent organizations and
ofces in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time
of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the
other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.


25.) PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175528 September 30, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: AAA, a ffteen (15)-year old minor, was investigated by the appellant, P03
Sombilon in connection with a complaint for Theft . AAA alleged that Appellant, in
conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked it. The Appellant pointed
a gun at her, and asked her: Did you steal the necklace?. AAAs fngers were then
electrocuted. Subsequently, she was asked: Dalaga ka na ba? (Are you a woman
now?), and was told: I am single too. Simultaneously, she was touched all over her
body including her breasts, her belly, and her private parts. She was also kissed on her
cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual advances but Appellant prevailed.
Thereafter, AAA was allowed to go home, but because of AAAs condition, her mother
brought her to be examined by a doctor. The medical Certifcate disclosed injuries on
the occiput region, forehead, fngers of bilateral hands, bilateral breast areas and there
was slight body tremors, and thus, with the diagnosis of slight physical injuries.
.
ISSUE: Is the accused is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as defned under
the RPC?
Is the victim entitled to damages?
HELD: YES. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the
foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confuence of the following
essential elements: (1) that the ofender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; (b) when the ofended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) when the ofended party is under twelve (12) years of age.
Lewd is defned as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifes that form of
immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner. The evidence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against AAA when he
touched her all over her body. The appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a
prelude for things to come, Dalaga ka na ba? and thereafter conveyed to her that he is
single too. Appellant employed force and intimidation, he pointed a gun at the forehead.
Further,the medical Certifcate shows that AAA sufered slight physical injuries which
include multiple slight contusion of bilateral breast areas.
As to the damages awarded, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in criminal
ofenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In the case at bar,
although relationship has not been alleged in the information, the ofense having been
committed, however, prior to the efectivity of the new rules, the civil liability already
incurred by appellant remains unafected thereby. A The Court declined retroactive
application of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: The retroactive application of
procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely afect the rights of the private ofended
party that have become vested prior to the efectivity of said rules
Also, the Court declared that upon a fnding of guilt of the accused for acts of
lasciviousness, moral damages may be further awarded to the victim in the same way
that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because
it is assumed that they sufered moral injury. Considering the immeasurable pain and
anguish that the victim had to sufer in the hands of the petitioner; the trauma that she
had to endure even after the incident; and the sexual perversity of petitioner, who is a
police ofcer.



26. GMA Network, Inc. vs. Jesus Bustos
G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006
Facts:
In the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations conducted by the Board of
Medicine of the PRC, a total of 941 failed out of the 2835 examinees. On February 10,
1998, over 200 unsuccessful examinees fled a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of
Manila to compel PRC to re-evaluate the test papers alleging that there were mistakes in
the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking.
Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc., was assigned to gather
news about said fling of mandamus and after securing a copy of the petition, narrated
the news coverage for GMAs Headline News which aired on February 10, 1988. The
respondents then fled a damage suit against Vidal and GMA contending that what was
reported were false, malicious and one-sided. They further stated that as a measure to
make a forceful impact on the latters audience, the former were made use of an
unrelated and old footage to make it appear that the doctors were supporting and
sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. On the other hand, the
GMA contended that the report was contextually a concise and objective narration of a
matter of public concern and that the press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in
question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing public on the
conduct of public ofcials.
The RTC found for GMA on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in question is
privileged. The respondents fled for a motion of reconsideration which was denied and
thus, went on appeal to the CA. The CA reversed the decision and ordered GMA to pay,
in solidum, damages to the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the insertion of the old flm footage constitutes malice to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents.
Held:
The award of damages is untenable.
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act
amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is
the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. On the other
hand, malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the ofender is prompted by personal
ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of
the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifable harm. It is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the
same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity
thereof.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualifed. Absolutely privileged matters are not
actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. On the other hand, in qualifedly
or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact.
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of
privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set
forth in the mandamus petition of examinees devoid of any comment or remark. Both the
CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying distortive or
defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners then did was simply to
inform the public of the mandamus petition fled against the respondent doctors who
were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly
within petitioner Vidals job as news writer and reporter assigned to cover government
institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be
reiterated that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be
qualifedly privileged communication protected under the 1987 Constitution. Likewise, the
video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices,
it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.

27. Joseph Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University
G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008
Facts:
Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University
when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school
premises on August 18, 1996. Saluduga was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical
Foundation due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police
station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released
considering that no formal complaint was fled against him.
Saludaga fled a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they
breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an
atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, fled a complaint against
Galaxy Management and Development Corp., the agency contracted by respondent
FEU to provide security services within its premises and Imperial, Galaxy's President, to
indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Saludaga, ordering FEU and de Jesus,
President of FEU, to pay jointly and severally Saladuga the damages and Galaxy and
Mariano to indemnify jointly and severally FEU and de Jesus. The respondents appealed
to the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are liable.
Held:
The respondent FEU is held liable.
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student in respondent
FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation between the two parties. On
petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school.
On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart
knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to
maintain peace and order within the campus.
In the instant case, we fnd that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less
the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a
prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students. After a thorough review of the records, we fnd
that respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove
that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements
stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about Galaxy
were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to the qualifcations of Rosete as a
security guard for the university was ofered. Respondents also failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confrm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifcations required in the Security Service Agreement. A
learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security
matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to
contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with respondent FEU.
However, respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed
by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its
security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be
construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.
For the acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualifed
security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper
to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-
mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for
being grossly negligent in directing the afairs of the security agency. It was Imperial who
assured petitioner that his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said
representations were not fulflled because they presumed that petitioner and his family
were no longer interested in fling a formal Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate
their respective claims and defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint.
Evidence duly supports the fndings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in
the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative
sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he was
even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to his disappearance
Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medical
expenses.

28. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE v. BITHUEL MACAS MAGSAYSAY
[G.R. NO. 161946 : November 14, 2008]
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

FACTS:
At the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, Bithuel Macas,
was standing on the shoulder of the road. Macas was bumped and run over by a Ford
Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao
Medical Center.
Macas sufered severe muscular and major vessel injuries, open bone fractures in both
thighs and other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon had to amputate
both legs up to the groins.
Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of Atty. Medardo Ag.
Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was no
longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio
Jalipa and turned over the Certifcate of Registration and Ofcial Receipt to Jalipa
The victim's father, Samuel Macas, fled a complaint for torts and damages against
Cimafranca and Cadiente. Cadiente later fled a third-party complaint against Jalipa.
RTC: judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintif declaring Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente
and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintif for their
own negligence.
CA: fndings of the trial court were in accordance with the established facts and was
supported by the evidence on record. RTC Decision AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim;
(2) whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable
to the victim.
HELD:
we fnd the petition without merit.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintif's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintif
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintif who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must
proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus
held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or
identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than
by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Ofce to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the
registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identifcation of the owner who can be
held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so
as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot
be secured.
Therefore, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time
when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent
injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to
face life with nary but two remaining limbs.
29. FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION VS. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS,
BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS AND CARMINA
VDA. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 152033, March 16 : 201
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of Wilfredo de los Santos
(Wilfredo), performed at the Rizal Theater as a member of the cast for the musical play,
Woman of the Year.
Wilfredos brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of Carmina Vda. de los
Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He
drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma (Galant Sigma), company car assigned to
Wilfredo.
At Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned
by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The
Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, across the White
Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant
Sigma burst into fames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the
car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia.

RTC: decided in favor of respondents. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court
fnds Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation and Alfredo S. Mejia, defendants in both
cases, jointly and severally, to pay the herein plaintifs damages.

CA: Decision of RTC AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not SFC exercise the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees;
(2) Whether or not Mejia was negligent and therefore liable for damages
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
benefcial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufcient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufcient to overcome such presumption.
30. Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City
G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011
SERENO, J.:
Facts:
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land in (EDSA),
Quezon City. Sometime in 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904,
entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings
to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon
City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.
An arcade is defned as any portion of a building above the frst foor projecting over the
sidewalk beyond the frst storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or
sun.
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a
width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00
Under this particular ordinance, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up
to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the frst foor.
In efect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for
pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times and as a result some properties were
exempted from the construction of arcades. The ordinance covered the property of
Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application
of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and
issued a Resolution subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the
owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own
expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along
the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils Resolution.
The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all
illegal structures and obstructions.
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging
that a portion of his building violated the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No.
2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco ffteen (15) days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the ffteen (15)
days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the
wing walls, of the ground foor structure. At the time of the demolition, the afected
portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco fled a Petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of
Quezon City from demolishing his property.
In his Petition he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property
without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an
arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition,
he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and
application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San
Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at
their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the
payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation
should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out
that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullifcation of an
ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption
of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance
impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.
The RTC rendered tis decision in favor of Gancayo by holding the assailed ordinance as
unconstitutional. Upon appeal, The CA, partly granting the appeal, upheld the validity of
Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and
implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its
constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance
established a valid classifcation of property owners with regard to the construction of
arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated
that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the benefcial
ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its
powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-
28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the
CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate
nuisances.
Issue:
WON the wing wall of justice Gancaycos Building is a public nuisance.
HELD:
The wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in 1966 the City
Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an
indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely afect the safety of persons and property. The fact
that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that
structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct
the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its
demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone
should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law
have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.
31. Santos vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006
GARCIA, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Ariel Santos y Cadiente, then the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga,
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
That on March 11, 1993 and June 15, 1993 respectively, in San Fernando, Pampanga,
the above-named accused, being then the Labor Arbiter of the [NLRC], Regional
Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga, while in the performance of his
quasi-judicial functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the ofense in
relation to his ofce, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality towards Abraham Mose, complainant in NLRC-RAB
Case No. RO3-198-79 captioned Abraham Mose vs. Plaza Hotel/Apartments, cause
undue injury to Conrado L. Tiu, the owner of the Plaza Hotel/Apartments, in the following
manner: accused despite the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of his Order
dated October 21, 1992 directing the issuance of a writ of execution and the opposition
to the motion for execution as well as the motion to quash writ of execution, issued frst a
writ of execution dated March 11, 1993 followed by an alias writ of execution dated June
15, 1993, without acting on the said motions and opposition anymore, and as a
consequence thereof, undue injury was caused to Conrado L. Tiu while giving
unwarranted beneft and advantage to Abraham Mose.
In the same decision, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) adjudged petitioner guilty as
charged and, accordingly, sentenced him.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of petitioner was tainted with or attended by evident partiality
causing undue injury to private complainant Conrado L. Tiu.


Held:
The case was dismissed. According to the court the term undue injury in the context of
Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of "causing
undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of actual
damage. The Court said so inLlorente vs. Sandiganbayan, thus:
In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage. Undue
has been defned as more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal; and injury as any
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [;
that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another. Actual damage, in the
context of these defnitions, is akin to that in civil law.
In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defned by Article 2199 as, "Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss sufered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Fundamental in the law on damages is
that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or
omissionshall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as
a consequence of the defendants act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a
general rule, . Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace
the loss caused by the wrong.
Petitioner admitted issuing the two writs of execution without frst resolving Plaza Hotel's
motion for reconsideration of his October 21, 1992 Order. He argued, however, that it
was his ministerial duty to issue the writs aforementioned, the fnality of the decision
sought to be enforced, i.e., the decision of Labor Arbiter Palumbarit, having set in upon
the dismissal, with fnality, by this Court of Plaza Hotels petition for certiorari in G.R.
No. 77105 assailing said decision.

From the foregoing narration of events, it is fairly clear that Plaza Hotels motion for
reconsideration immediately referred to above was directed against petitioners order of
October 21, 1992 directing the issuance of a writ of execution for the amount stated
therein. Be this as it may, petitioners pose respecting his ministerial duty to order the
execution of a fnal and executory decision of Andres Palumbarit is as simplistic as it is
misleading.

As it were, petitioner failed to resolve said motion for reconsideration and instead issued
on March 11, 1993 a writ of execution. Worse still, he proceeded to issue an alias writ of
execution despite the issuance by the NLRC Proper of a TRO enjoining the
implementation of the underlying writ. Under the circumstances, Plaza Hotel was within
its right to secure the services of counsel - for a fee of P68,500.00 - and, to apply for
injunctive relief and then pay P11,800.00 for the supersedeasbond to stay the
implementation of the writ of execution in question. In net efect, Plaza Hotel incurred
damages rendered necessary by the illegal or improper acts of petitioner.

Petitioner, being a labor arbiter of the NLRC, discharges quasi-judicial functions. His act
of issuing the two writs of execution without frst resolving the pending motion for
reconsideration of his October 21, 1992 Order, and despite the existence of a TRO was
clearly tainted with or attended by evident partiality causing undue injury to private
complainant Conrado L. Tiu.


32.
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31
Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is
the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its
employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus. At around 2:00 p.m. on October
3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned
by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon demanded payment of
P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. The bus company and
Suelto ofered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.Valdellon fled a criminal
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto.
Valdellon also fled a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for
damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted
on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a
passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into
the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v.
Court of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly fnds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon refection may
appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he fnds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Trafc Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles
on the right side of the road or highway. Moreover Section 35 of the law provides for the
restriction as to speed.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof
to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if
at the time of mishap, he was violating any trafc regulation." By his own admission,
petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Trafc Code when he suddenly
swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private
respondent.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have
resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused
was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to
swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintif because he could not
make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the
crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
33.
BANKARD, INC (PETITIONER) VS. DR. ANTONIO NOVAK FELICIANO
(RESPONDENT)
FACTS:
Dr. Feliciano owns to PCIbank MasterCard. One of which is an extent of his own card
given to his wife. On june 19, 1995 Dr. Feliciano used his card to pay breakfast bill in
Toronto Canada. The card was dishonored for payment. Respondents guests and other
Filipino doctors in Canada paid for the bill because of the incident. On june 20,1995,
respondent reimbursed the cost of the breakfast to dr. bumanlag who was there when
the card was dishonored. After payment, dr. Feliciano asked dr. bumanlag to accompany
him to buy some clothes in eddie Fairview mall in Toronto. However, when dr. Feliciano
presented his card as payment. The card was dishonored again. On October 5, 1995,
respondent fled a complaint against bankard and mastercard international for breach of
breach of contractual rights and damages before the RTC. Respondent alleged that he is
a holder in good standing for more than ten years of PCIBank Mastercard. and that
petitioner and Mastercard International reneged on their agreement by suspending the
services of the card without notice to him.
As a result of the suspension and confscation of his card in Toronto, Canada,
respondent sufered social humiliation, embarrassment. The Canadian-based doctors,
who were his guests during the breakfast meeting in Toronto and whom he expected to
donate at least ffty thousand Canadian dollars to his charitable clinic in Makati, withdrew
their contributions because of the incidents. Respondent prayed for P1,000,000.00 in
actual damages representing the peso equivalent of the aborted contributions,
P1,000,000.00 for moral damages, P200,000.00 for exemplary damages, and
P100,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs of suit. Petitioner claims that it suspended
respondent's card to protect him from fraudulent transactions.
Issue:
Whether or not the claims for damages should be awarded?
Held:
Yes. Considering the widespread use of access devices in commercial and other
transactions, petitioner and other issuers of credit cards should not only guard against
fraudulent uses of credit cards but should also be protective of genuine uses thereof by
the true cardholders. In the case at bar, the duty is much more demanding for the
evidence shows that respondent is a credit cardholder for more than ten (10) years in
good standing, and has not been shown to have violated any of the provisions of his
credit card agreement with petitioner. Considering the attendant circumstances, we fnd
petitioner to have been grossly negligent in suspending respondent's credit card. To
reiterate, moral damages may be awarded in a breach of contract when the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
With respect to the amount of moral damages to be awarded, the well-entrenched
principle is that the grant thereof depends upon the discretion of the court considering
the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent's
PCIBank Mastercard was dishonored in a foreign country where the respondent was not
expected to have family members or close friends nearby to lend him a helping hand. It
was twice dishonored in public places. However, since moral damages are patently not
meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant and should only be
commensurate with the actual loss or injury sufered,we reduce the amount awarded by
the Court of Appeals from P800,000.00 to P500,000.00. The award for attorney's fees is
likewise afrmed. Plaintif was compelled to litigate to protect his interest, as the lower
courts deemed it just and equitable to award him attorney's fees.The respondent had to
vindicate his rights up to the highest court of the land.
34.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs
COMFAC CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163915
October 12, 2006

FACTS: ASIAKONSTRUCT awarded respondent COMFAC Corporation a contract for
raised fooring system for the PNOC-EDC, LGPP HVAC Marshalling Station Building, in
Leyte and another contract for airconditioning and ventilation system for the PNOC-EDC
Marshalling and Relay Building of Leyte HVAC Switchyard Project, costing P1,698,635
and P4,000,000, respectively. In November 1996, COMFAC turned over the project to
PNOC, and issued the Certifcates of Completion, which were confrmed by Rene T.
Soriao, Group Manager of ASIAKONSTRUCT. COMFAC then sent ASIAKONSTRUCT
demand letters for the unpaid balance of P1,969,863.50. However, ASIAKONSTRUCT
failed to pay the amount, prompting COMFAC to fle a complaint for collection. It also
prayed for attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the amount demanded, plus P2,000
attorneys fee per appearance, and exemplary damages of P500,000.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the COMFAC. ASIAKONSTRUCT elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals with certain modifcations on the amount of damages to
be awarded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to attorneys fees

HELD:. Attorneys fees cannot be awarded. Attorneys fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justifcations for the award of attorneys fees and its basis cannot be left to
speculation and conjecture. Attorney's fee is allowed when a claimant is compelled to
litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustifed act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought. Indeed,
COMFAC was forced to litigate to collect payments, but due to lack of fndings on the
amount to be awarded, and since there is no sufcient showing of bad faith in
ASIAKONSTRUCTs refusal to pay, other than an erroneous assertion of the
righteousness of its cause, the attorneys fee cannot be awarded against it.





35.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS
vs.
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA
G.R. No. 169891
November 2, 2006

FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together
with her Filipino host Juan Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a sedan, driven by
Mercelita around midnight. Driving at approximately 70 km/hr, and unaware of the
railroad track up ahead, they collided with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly
killed when the sedan smashed into the train; the two other passengers sufered serious
physical injuries. Rhonda Brunty was brought to a Hospital in Tarlac, where she was
pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had sufered severe head
injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital but then was transferred to two
other hospitals for further treatment.
Ethel Brunty then sent a demand letter to the PNR demanding payment of actual,
compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of her daughters death. When PNR did
not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, fled a complaint for damages against the PNR.
They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical
injuries sufered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and
reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing. Plaintifs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the
performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator
of the train. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of plaintifs. The CA afrmed the
decision but with partial modifcations increasing the death indemnity award from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages sustained by the sedan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in awarding the damages
HELD: No but a modifcation of the same is in order, specifcally on the award of actual
and moral damages in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for
an injury or loss he sufered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at
repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have
sufered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Respondents, however, failed to
present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be
sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the
wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate
in some way the physical sufering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must
nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the sufering inficted.
In the instant case, the moral sufering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufciently
established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition,
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we fnd that an award of
P500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of
recent jurisprudence, indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and
attorneys fees amounting to P50,000.00 is likewise proper.





36. CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-TABORADA v PILAR S.
JUNSAY ( G.R. No. 132659, February 12, 2007 )

FACTS: Rosemarie Magbanua was a housemaid of Pilar Junsay. Rosemarie was
charged as a co-accused for the crime of robbery that transpired to Pilar's house. The
case for the prosecution relied on an alleged confession made by petitioner Rosemarie,
admitting her participation in the crime of Robbery. However, Rosemarie was acquitted
due to that fact that her testimony was held to be inadmissible because it was procured
through physical maltreatment by the investigating ofcers. So together with her father,
they instituted a Complaint for Damages. Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie sufered
physical pain and mental torture due to the fling of the false criminal charge against her.
Respondent Pilar fled a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by the Statute of Limitations which was opposed by the petitioners contending
that their cause of action is for the malicious prosecution of Rosemarie. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss by respondent. Pilar fled an answer disclaiming petitioners
allegation that she maltreated petitioner Rosemarie while the latter was being
investigated by the police authorities. She posited that she was not present during the
investigation. Petitioners fled a Reply reiterating that Pilar actually participated in the
maltreatment of Rosemarie and she cannot deny her participation as she was always
present in the police station during the investigation. RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the Complaint. In sustaining the respondents, the RTC said that the fling of
the criminal complaint against petitioner Rosemarie was not prompted with a sinister
design to vex, or humiliate her. The Court of Appeals afrmed the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.

RULING: Petitioners are NOT entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.

This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover
damages for malicious prosecution. For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the
plaintif must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was
himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action
fnally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a
sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the fling of a complaint
based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the
knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.

It is not disputed that the frst and second elements are present. The prosecution of
petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery did occur, and respondents Pilar, Ibarra
and Juanito instigated its commencement. The trial court acquitted Rosemarie on the
ground of insufciency of evidence. On the question of probable cause, the Court has
ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted. Thus, a fnding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufcient evidence to procure a conviction. RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that there was no probable cause. During the investigation,
Rosemarie admitted her participation to the robbery complained of. However, her
admission was inadmissible because it was extracted under duress, which does not
detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemaries admission, there was reason
for the respondents to believe that the suit was not unfounded. Finally, in an action to
recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the
prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was
so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21,of the
Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. Moreover, it is a doctrine
well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The Court found that there was
no proof of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner
Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her co-accused. Respondent
Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings can only be expected to bring the
matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to one,
who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings. There was no other
explanation or motive as to why respondents would institute baseless prosecution of
petitioner Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood between
respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the supposed robbery.

37. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v Ma. Victoria Jose
(GR No. 152769, February 14, 2007)

FACTS: Victoria has been a MERALCO customer since 1987 with service address
Quezon City. On July 14, 1995, Meralco Polyphase Inspector Santiago Inoferio visited
the residence of Victoria to conduct an inspection. After inspection, Inoferio issued a
Service Inspection Report where he stated that there was a burned out insulation.
Inoferio recommended that Victorias billing be adjusted and her record updated. On
October 3, 1995, Meralco issued to Victoria a diferential adjustment billing for
P232,385.20. According to MERALCO, this defect caused the meter not to register the
correct KWH consumption registering only 50% of the consumption. Victoria requested
Meralco to reconsider its fnding on the ground that the defect was a fortuitous event and
that it was due to the negligence of Meralco personnel that the defects were not earlier
detected and repaired. Meralco did not accede to her request but ofered an installment
payment scheme. Victoria refused to pay the billing adjustment. On November 21, 1995,
she received from Meralco an Overdue Account Notice which contains a reminder that if
she fails settle her account, they will disconnect her from their electric services. Victoria
fled with RTC, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction with Damages and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. After trial, Victoria prevailed with an award Moral and Exemplary
damages for P500,000.00 each and attorney's fees. Meralco appealed to CA which
afrmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in holding that MERALCO is liable for Moral and Exemplary
damages And attorney's fees.

RULING: The Court ruled that the awarded moral and exemplary damages were
excessive. It was reduced to P100,000.00 and P50,000.00.

Meralcos gross negligence* in the maintenance of its devices and equipment and its
arbitrary issuance of a diferential billing to Victoria brought upon the latter much anxiety
and aggravation. It should therefore be liable to her for moral damages. It should also be
liable for exemplary damages to curb similar arbitrary practices. However, the Court
found that the award of both damages to be excessive. Moral damages and exemplary
damages are not intended to enrich the complainant in order to punish the defendant.
Moral damages are for reparation of the spiritual status quo ante; a means to assuage
the moral sufering of the complainant brought about by the culpable action of the
defendant. The award of moral damages must then be commensurate to the sufering or
proportionate to the wrong committed. An award of P100,000.00 approximates the
anxiety sufered by Victoria. As to exemplary damages, the purpose in holding a
defendant liable for it is deterrence. Meralco must curb its callousness toward its
customers and its inattention to its duty of keeping its facilities and equipment well
maintained. The Court hold that the award of P50,000.00 would sufce.

(*Meralco acknowledged that the standard precaution it should take in the maintenance
of its electric meters is to subject the same to polyphase meter test twice every year. It
appears, however, that with reference to Meter No. 31D551-57, the same was subjected
to polyphase meter test for the frst time in 1995, or seven years from its installation in
1987. Such delay in inspection constitutes gross negligence on the part of Meralco in
the maintenance of said electric meter; thus, it should bear sole liability for any loss
arising from the defects in said meter, including any unregistered and unbilled electric
consumption.)

38. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ROLANDO CABINAN
G.R. No. 176158, March 27, 2007
FACTS:
On December 13, 2000, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in the evening, victim
Eleuterio Lucas was having a drinking spree at his residence in upper Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan with a group that included his brother, his bestfriend and Orlando Cabinan,
brother of the accused-appellant. A commotion broke out after an altercation ensued
between Eleuterios bestfriend and Orlando Cabinan. Eleuterio tried to pacify them.
Orlando then left the place and went to a nearby billiard hall where his brother, accused-
appellant Rolando Cabinan, was playing billiards. Orlando told the accused-appellant
about the fght and immediately, the two (2) brothers proceeded to the house of
Eleuterio. When the Cabinan brothers reached Eleuterios house, Orlando had a fstfght
with one of the guests of victim Eleuterio. Eleuterio again tried to difuse the fght, but
accused-appellant Rolando threw the bottle of gin he was holding, hitting Eleuterio on
the head. The bottle exploded due to the impact. Accused-appellant ran away after the
explosion. Victim Eleuterio, on the other hand, was rushed to the hospital, but because
of the injuries he sustained, he died at the East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City.
Only the accused-appellant testifed for his defense. He alleged that when he threw the
bottle, it exploded to his own surprise. He then ran away from the scene of the fght. He
also claims he had no intention of killing the victim when he threw the gin bottle at him;
that he wanted to difuse the fght between Roberto and Eleuterio hence he threw the
bottle, unaware that it contained explosives. The prosecution, along with the victims
family, adamantly prays for damages and other civil indemnities. The lower courts found
him guilty of Murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages
HELD:
Accused-appellants claim that he did not know that the bottle of gin was
actually an explosive fails to persuade. He admitted having been at the scene of the
crime because his brother sought his help after a mauling incident in Liwasan,
Norzagaray. Evidently, he went to the crime scene purposely to take vengeance for his
brother. If he really wanted to stop a duel he witnessed when he arrived there, then he
could have resorted to peaceful and reasonable means to achieve this purpose. The
circumstances that, frst, the bottle of gin thrown against the victim turned out to be an
explosive, and second, the victim was hit exactly in the head are clear indicators of the
malicious intent of the accused-appellant. We agree with the trial court that appellant is
guilty of murder. Appellants attack was treacherous; it was sudden and made from
behind, catching the victim unaware and unable to defend himself.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, which
is mandatory and is granted without need of any evidence or proof of damages other
than the commission of the crime. They are likewise entitled to the award of moral
damages in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of his family.
The award of actual damages was without basis as the heirs of the victim failed to
submit documentary evidence to substantiate their claim. In lieu thereof, temperate
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, must be awarded considering that it was
established that Eleuterios family incurred expenses for his hospitalization and burial.
Finally, exemplary damages should also have been awarded to the heirs of the victim
since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established by the prosecution. If a
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justifed under Article 2230 of the New
Civil Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue suferings and wanton invasion of the rights
of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.

39. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR V. CITIBANK N.A. PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007
FACTS:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred
Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by
Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take
their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a
total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his
credit limit toP635,000.00. With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets
to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and
grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination. Aznar claims that when he presented his
Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same
was dishonored and when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency
(Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored
for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy
the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card
was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.
Aznar fled a motion to re-rafe the case alleging impartiality of the president judge. The
new judge ruled in favor of Aznar. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
CITIBANK and held that Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card
and only presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments; that
such dishonor is not sufcient to prove that his card was blacklisted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aznar has established his claim against CITIBANK in the case at
bar
HELD:
Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that CITIBANK blacklisted his
card or place the same on the hot list. Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that his card was blacklisted by CITIBANK and only presumed such
fact from the dishonor of his card. It is settled that in order that a plaintif may maintain an
action for damages of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintif a concurrence of injury
to the plaintif and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation
of law; thus there must frst be a breach before damages may be awarded and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. It is not enough that one
merely sufered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was
factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the
case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and
2220 of the Civil Code.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. While the
Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he sufered when
his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agencys
personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the
Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of
evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said
sufering. Petition denied.
40. PCIB v. Alejandro
GR No. 175587
September 21, 2007
Facts:
Respondent, a resident of Hong Kong, executed a promissory note in favor of petitioner.
In view of the fuctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the
insufciency of deposits assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner
requested the latter to put up additional security for the loan. Respondent, however,
sought a reconsideration of said request pointing out petitioner's alleged mishandling of
his account due to its failure to carry out his instructions. Subsequently, petitioner fled a
Complaint for Sum of Money with prayer for issuance of a writ for preliminary
attachment. The trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte.
Respondent fled a motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of his
unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by the petitioner. The trial
court issued an order quashing the writ.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment against respondent.
Held:
Petitioner is liable for damages.
Anent the actual damages, the CA is correct in not awarding the same inasmuch as the
respondent failed to establish the amount garnished by the petitioner. Nevertheless,
nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintif whose right has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and for
indemnifying the plaintif for any loss sufered by him. In this case, the award of nominal
damages is proper considering that the right of respondent to use his money has been
violated by its garnishment.
41. Manelco v. TEAM electronics corporation
GR No. 131723
December 13, 2007
Facts:
Respondent TEAM enetered into a Contract of lease with respondent Ultra for the use of
the former's DCIM building until September 1991. A year thereafter, a team of petitioner's
inspectors conducted a surprise inspection of the electric meters installed in the DCIM
building and found the same to be tampered with and did not register the actual power
consumption of the building. Petitioner informed TEAM ofthe results and demanded for
payment. TEAM referred the demand letter to ULtra which, in turn, informed TEAM that
its Executive Vice President had already met with petitioner's representative. For failure
to pay the diferential billing, petitioner disconnected the electricity of DCIM building.
TEAM demanded for reconnection but petitioner refused to heed the demand.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages.
Held:
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the
position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Basic is the rule that to recover
actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be
actually proven with a teasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable. Despite the appellate court's conclusion that no tampering
was committed, it held ultra solidarily liable with petitioner only because the former, as
occupant of the building, promised to settle the claims of the latter. This ruling is
erroneous.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. In this case, to
serve as an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be efected
by a public utility, the requisites of the law must be complied with -- we afrm the award
of 200,000 as exemplary damages.
42. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. MATILDE MACABAGDAL RAMOY
G.R. No. 158991, March 04, 2008
Facts:
National Power Corporation (NPC) fled with the MTC Quezon City a case for ejectment
against several persons allegedly illegally occupying its properties in Baesa, Quezon
City. Among the defendants in the ejectment case was Leoncio Ramoy, one of the
plaintifs in the case at bar. The court rendered judgment for the plaintif [MERALCO]
and ordering the defendants to demolish or remove the building and structures they built
on the land of the plaintif and to vacate the premises."
NPC wrote Meralco requesting for the immediate disconnection of electric power supply
to all residential and commercial establishments beneath the NPC transmission lines
along Baesa, Quezon City. Hence, the electric service connection of the herein
respondents was disconnected.
During the ocular inspection ordered by the Court and attended by the parties, it was
found out that the residence of Leoncio and Matilde Ramoy was indeed outside the NPC
property. The record also shows that at the request of NPC, defendant Meralco re-
connected the electric service of four customers previously disconnected none of whom
was any of the plaintifs.
The RTC decided in favor of MERALCO by dismissing herein respondents' claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, the RTC ordered
MERALCO to restore the electric power supply of respondents.

Issues:
(1) WON MERALCO is liable for damages;
(2) WON respondents are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees
Held:
(1) LIABILITY OF MERALCO
Clearly, respondents' cause of action against MERALCO is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract for the latter's discontinuance of its service to
respondents under Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
MERALCO failed to exercise the utmost degree of care and diligence required of
it. It was not enough for MERALCO to merely rely on the Decision of the MTC without
ascertaining whether it had become fnal and executory. Verily, only upon fnality of said
Decision can it be said with conclusiveness that respondents have no right or proper
interest over the subject property, thus, are not entitled to the services of MERALCO.
(2) MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof
of moral sufering, mental anguish, fright and the like. Mere allegations do not sufce;
they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have
proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to
him. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the
anguish and other forms of mental sufering. Thus, if the plaintif fails to take the witness
stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral
damages cannot be awarded.
Thus, only respondent Leoncio Ramoy, who testifed as to his wounded feelings,
may be awarded moral damages. His co-respondents did not present any evidence of
damages they sufered.
With regard to exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that
in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant, in this case MERALCO, acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner, while Article 2233 of the same Code provides that such damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the adjudication of the same is within the
discretion of the court.
The Court fnds that MERALCO fell short of exercising the due diligence
required, but its actions cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
or malevolent. Records show that MERALCO did take some measures, i.e., coordinating
with NPC ofcials and conducting a joint survey of the subject area, to verify which
electric meters should be disconnected although these measures are not sufcient,
considering the degree of diligence required of it. Thus, in this case, exemplary
damages should not be awarded.
Since the Court does not deem it proper to award exemplary damages in this
case, then the CA's award for attorney's fees should likewise be deleted, as Article 2208
of the Civil Code states that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees cannot be
recovered except in cases provided for in said Article.
43. B.F. METAL v. LOMOTAN
G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008
Facts:
In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon was driving the owner-
type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Rolando and Linafor Lomotan. Suddenly, at
the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car
by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was
a total wreck while Umuyon sufered injuries, which entailed his hospitalization for 19
days. Also in view of the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing
his daily income from P150.00 to P100.00.
Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages
against petitioner BF Metal Corporation and Rivera before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal.
The complaint essentially alleged that defendant Riveras gross negligence and
recklessness was the immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that
petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
Rivera. The complaint prayed for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages
and attorneys fees in favor of respondents
Among the documentary evidence presented were the 1989 cost estimate of
Pagawaan Motors, Inc., an auto-repair shop, which pegged the repair cost of the jeep at
P96,000.00, and the cost estimate of Fajardo Motor Works done in 1993, which refected
an increased repair cost at P130,655.00.
The trial court rendered its decision, holding the defendants negligent and
ordering them to pay the plaintifs P96,700.00 for cost of the owner-type jeep ,
P15,000.00 for medical expenses, P50,000.00 for loss of earnings as actual damages,
plus moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner and Rivera appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
afrmed such decision but modifed the amount of damages awarded to respondents,
increasing the award for actual damages to P130,655.00, for cost of repairing the owner-
type jeep. Petitioner now assails the damages awarded by the appellate court. It argues
that the best evidence obtainable to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty the
value of the jeep is the acquisition cost or the purchase price of the jeep minus
depreciation for one year of use equivalent to 10% of the purchase price.
Issues:
(1) whether the amount of actual damages based only on a job estimate should be
lowered;
(2) whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages; and
(3) whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted
Held:
To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual
amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts. In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually
spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented
two diferent cost estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep.
However, neither estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the best evidence to prove the value of
the wrecked jeep is refected in the Deed of Sale showing the jeeps acquisition cost at
P72,000.00.
An award of moral damages would require, frstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological sufering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a
culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries,
or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be
recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or
defamation.
Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages sufered by respondent Umuyon.
Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and selection
of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon.
Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on either culpa
criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal case, which found Rivera guilty
of criminal negligence, did not award moral damages, the same may be awarded in the
instant civil action for damages.
However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan
whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the
negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral
damages in case of a criminal ofense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for
moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral
damages where there is injury to property, but the injury must be willful and the
circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being no proof that the
accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may
be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. While the amount of the
exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintif must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled to compensatory damages while
respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral damages. To serve as
an example for the public good, the Court afrms the award of exemplary damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because exemplary damages are awarded,
attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1). The Court
afrms the appellate courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
44. SESBRENO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161390, April 16, 2008
Facts:
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the
petitioner to prosecute certain civil cases, evidenced by an Agreement, whereby they
agreed to pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries,
damages, etc. that they may recover in the mandamus and other cases that were fled,
whether or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by fnal
judgment.
The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First Instance
(now RTC) of Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their original positions with back
salaries, together with all privileges and salary adjustments or increases. Aggrieved, the
Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer fled certiorari cases before
this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal assistance and
represented the camineros.
The camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu,
through then Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement, whereby the
camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the
province agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims.
Instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province
of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Thus, petitioner fled the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract) and
Attorneys Fees against the Province of Cebu, the provincial governor, treasurer, auditor,
and engineer in their ofcial and personal capacities, as well as against his former clients
(the camineros). He alleged that by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them,
the respondents induced the camineros to violate their written contract for attorneys
fees. He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the
Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the
national wage rate which, consequently, yielded a lower amount.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent province of Cebu, awarding damages to the former. On appeal, the CA
reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract.
Held:
In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his
clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the
complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his
diferences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because, according
to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been based on the
national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents
should be made liable for the diference.
While the respondents may have impaired the petitioners charging lien by
satisfying the judgment without regard for the lawyers right to attorneys fees, we cannot
apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v. Judge de Borja, because of the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the judgment
debtor may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of attorneys fees in
accordance with the duly registered charging lien. However, there is a disparity between
the two cases, because, in this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against
the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal services. The withdrawal was
premised on a settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their
obligations. Having been paid by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim
against the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on.
45. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TORIBIO JABINIAO, JR. and JOHN DOE
GR No. 179499; April 30, 2009

FACTS:

Private complainant Maria Divina Pasilang testifed that at around 1:00 a.m. of 27 August
1998, she and her husband, the deceased Ruben Pasilang, were sleeping in their house
in Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City. They were awakened when Maria Divina felt someone
kick her thighs. When she opened her eyes, she saw appellant Jabiniao, who was short
and muscular, wearing a pair of short pants but without any shirt on, with a holster on his
shoulder and a bonnet or ski mask on his face. He had a masked companion who stayed
at the door outside their house, acting as a lookout. Appellant Jabiniao pointed his gun at
Maria Divina and Ruben and demanded money from them. They were not able to say a
word as they were both trembling in fear. Appellant Jabiniao ransacked the drawer for
money and other belongings and took P2,000.00 and Maria Divina's shoulder bag.
Appellant Jabiniao removed his mask, revealing his face. Jabiniano started touching the
thighs of Maria Divina and when he was about to tie Rubens feet, the latter was able to
resist the same. Jabiniano ran towards the door and gunshots rang out hitting Ruben in
the chest causing his death.
The lower court awarded in their favour moral damages in the sum of 75, 000 Pesos and
to pay actual damages of 2, 000 Pesos and 12, 000 Pesos for funeral expenses and
temperate damages for wake and 9 days prayer in the sum of 6, 000 Pesos and to pay
the cost. The Court of Appeals likewise found him guilty but modifed the damages to be
awarded: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P14,000.00 as
actual damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P6,000.00 as temperate
damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liabilities adjudged against Jabiliano were proper.
HELD:
The amount of P75,000.00 for civil indemnity awarded by the trial court as afrmed by
the Court of Appeals, is sustained. The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is awarded only if the crime is
qualifed by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Though the
penalty imposed on appellant was reduced to reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity to
be awarded remains at P75,000.00.
The decrease in the award of moral damages from 75,000 to 50,000 Pesos was proper
in accordance with jurisprudence. As held by the Court of Appeals, moral damages are
awarded in cases of violent deaths even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
sufering of the victim's heirs, because the violent and sudden death of a loved one
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim's family.
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was also proper.
Exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. As held above, appellant Jabiniao's crime was aggravated
by (1) the use of an unlicensed frearm; (2) commission of the crime in the dwelling of the
victims; and (3) treachery.
The Court of Appeals, however, should have added an award for loss of earning
capacity. Maria Divina testifed that Ruben was earning P200.00 a day prior to his death.
The daily income of P200.00 is equivalent to a gross annual income P48,000.00. The
formula for unearned income is as follows:
Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (G.A.I.) less Living expenses (50% G.A.I.)]
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased )
Thus, the unearned income of Ruben, who was 29 years old at the time of his death, is
computed as follows:
Unearned income
=
2/3 (80-29) (P48,000.00-P24,000.00)
=
2/3 (51) (P24,000.00)
=
P816,000.00
In lieu of actual damages for funeral and burial expenses, we award the amount of
P25,000 as temperate damages.
46. Heirs of PURISIMA NALA v. ARTEMIO CABANSAG
GR No. 161188, June 13, 2008

FACTS:

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) fled an action for damages in October 1991. According
to respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter
lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a
demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima
Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the
premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will
be fled against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such
demands, respondent sufered damages and was constrained to fle the case against
Nala and Atty. Del Prado.

The lower court ordered Nala and Atty. Del Prado to pay Cabansag P150,000.00 by way
of moral damages, P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 for
reasonable attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The Court of Appeals, still found in
favour of Cabansag but ordered the defendants to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way
of moral damages. It further ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nala and Atty. Del Prado must be held liable for the payment of
damages.

HELD:
No, they are not liable. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her
counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to
respondent. In the frst place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that
the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally
occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to
respondent. It was only after respondent fled the case for damages against Nala that
she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by
Nala was done in bad faith. Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed
Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps
to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who
makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are sufered
by respondent should be borne solely by him.


47.
City Government of Tagaytay v. Hon Guerrero
G.R. Nos140743 &140745
September 17, 2009

Nachura, J.:

Facts: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner
of two parcels of land situated at Tagaytay City. TTTDC incurred real estate delinquency
which prompted City Government of Tagaytay to sold at public auction the said
properties. Being the sole bidder, a certifcate of sale was issued in favor of City of
Tagaytay. Later on, a new certifcate of title was entered in the name of petitioner.
Subsequently, the two parcels of land was sold to Ameurfna Melencio-Herrera and
Emilina Melencio-Fernando. Petitioner sought for the nullifcation of the public auction on
the ground that City of Tagaytay did not acquire jurisdiction over the properties thus
outside its taxing power. The Melencios,as purchasers fled motion for intervention but
was denied as it was fled beyond the period allowed by law. RTC Cavite ruled in favor of
TTTDC and the public auction was nullifed. Hence, the Melencios claimed for damages
against petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the Melencios are entitled with damages consequent to the
deprivation of their properties.


Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the afrmative. The City of Tagaytay is liable to return
the full amount paid by the Melencios during the auction sale of the subject properties by
way of actual damages. Also,the gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying
taxes and auctioning properties to answer for real property tax defciencies outside its
territorial jurisdiction amounts to bad faith that calls for the award of moral damages.
Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical sufering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused. Moral damages are awarded to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral sufering the person has undergone, by reason of defendant's
culpable action. The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the
determination of the proper amount of the award. The Melencios are likewise entitled to
exemplary damages. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages.62 Article 2229 of the Civil Code grants the award of exemplary
or corrective damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future and
to allow the courts to mould behavior that can have grave and deleterious consequences
to society.63 In the instant case, the gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in
erroneously exacting taxes and selling properties outside its jurisdiction, despite the
clear mandate of statutory law, must be rectifed.





48.
Engr. Dueas vs. Guce-Africa
G.R. No. 165679
October 5, 2009



Del Castillo, J.:

Facts: Anticipating a reunion for the forthcoming wedding of her sister, respondent
entered into a contract with petitioner fort he renovation of an ancestral house located in
Lipa City Batangas into four-bedroom house. The contract is supposed to be completed
on or before April 18, 1998, wedding day of her sister. However, on the said date, the
renovation was not completed which prompted respondent to fle breach of contract
against petitioner. To his defense, petitioner claimed that the delay in the construction of
the house was due to circumstances beyond his control, namely heavy rains,
observance of Holy Week, and celebration of barangay festa. Ultimately, he was not
able to complete the project because on May 27, 1998, respondent went to his house
and told him to stop the work. The trial court awarded actual damages of P100,000.00
for the necessary repair of the structure and 200,000.00 for the completion of the
construction. Petitioner claimed that the award is improper for want of evidentiary proof.

Issue: Whether or not evidentiary proof is necessary before actual damages be granted.

Held: The Supreme court agreed with petitioner.Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides
that "one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss sufered
by him as he has duly proved." To be recoverable, actual damages must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. There
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, and credence can be given only
to claims which are duly supported by receipts. In this case the trial court merely relied
on the testimonies of respondent and her witness. However, respondent is entitled to
temperate damages. Temperate or moderate damage are more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages which may be recovered when the court fnds that some
pecuniary loss has been sufered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. In this case, respondent sustained damages due to the breach
committed by the petitioner. The transfer of the venue of the wedding, the repair of the
substandard work, and the completion of the house necessarily entailed expenses. The
Supreme Court deemed it proper that an award of temperate damages equivalent to
20% of the original contract price of P500,000.00, or P100,000.00 is just and
reasonable.


49. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., etc. v. BA Finance Corp. and Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc.

FACTS: Petitioner Bitanga obtained from respondent BA Finance Corporation a
P329,280 loan to secure which, he mortgaged his car to respondent BA Finance. The
mortgage provides that the mortgagor agrees to insure the said car against loss or
damage with an insurance company acceptable to the mortgagee and that it will make all
loss payable to the mortgagee or its assigns. Bitanga thus had the mortgaged car
insured by respondent Malayan Insurance which issued a policy stipulating that the loss
will be payable to BA Finance Corp.

The car was stolen. On Bitangas claim, Malayan Insurance issued a check payable to
the order of B.A. Finance Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga for P224,500, drawn
against China Bank. Without the indorsement of his co-payee BA Finance, Bitanga
deposited the check to his account with the Metrobank. Bitanga subsequently withdrew
the entire proceeds of the check.

Upon due of Bitangas loan, he failed to settle it despite demands. When BA Finance
learned of the loss of the car and the issuance of check by Malayan Insurance, it
demanded the payment of the check from Metrobank but to no avail. It then fled a
complaint before the RTC for sum of money and damages against Metrobank and
Bitanga alleging that it is entitled to the entire proceeds of the check.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable for the full amount of the check.

HELD: Yes. Clearly, petitioner, through its employee, was negligent when it allowed the
deposit of the crossed check, despite the lone endorsement of Bitanga, ostensibly
ignoring the fact that the check did not, it bears repeating, carry the indorsement of BA
Finance. As has been repeatedly emphasized, the banking business is imbued with
public interest such that the highest degree of diligence and highest standards of
integrity and performance are expected of banks in order to maintain the trust and
confdence of the public in general in the banking sector. Undoubtedly, BA Finance has a
cause of action against petitioner.

The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law and underlying jurisprudential
teachings on the black-letter law provide defnitive justifcation for petitioners full liability
on the value of the check. To be sure, a collecting bank, Metrobank in this case, where a
check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee
bank, is an indorser. This is because in indorsing a check to the drawee bank, a
collecting bank stamps the back of the check with the phrase all prior endorsements
and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed and, for all intents and purposes, treats the
check as a negotiable instrument, hence, assumes the warranty of an indorser. Without
Metrobanks warranty, the drawee China Bank would not have paid the value of the
subject check.
Petitioner, as the collecting bank or last indorser, generally sufers the loss because it
has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that the
act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party
making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of prior
indorsements.
Accordingly, one who credits the proceeds of a check to the account of the indorsing
payee is liable in conversion to the non-indorsing payee for the entire amount of the
check.

50. SUNBANUN vs. GO GR NO. 163280

FACTS: Respondent Aurora B. Go leased the entire ground foor of petitioners
residential house for one year which was to expire on 7 July 1996. As required under
the lease contract, respondent paid a deposit of P16,000 to answer for damages and
unpaid rent. To earn extra income, respondent accepted lodgers, mostly her relatives,
from whom she received a monthly income of P15,000. Respondent paid the monthly
rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove away respondents lodgers by telling them
that they could stay on the rented premises only until 15 April 1996 since she was
terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented premises by 15 April 1996, and
petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated by respondents lodgers.
Respondent fled an action for damages against petitioner. Respondent
alleged that she lost her income from her lodgers for the months of April, May, and June
1996 totaling P45,000. Respondent, who worked in Hongkong, also incurred expenses
for plane fares and other travel expenses in coming to the Philippines and returning to
Hongkong.

On the other hand, petitioner argued that respondent violated the lease contract when
she subleased the rented premises. Besides, the lease contract was not renewed after
its expiration on 7 July 1996; thus, respondent had no more right to stay in the rented
premises.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable for damages to respondent.

HELD: Yes. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner ejected respondents lodgers
three months before the expiration of the lease contract on 7 July 1996. Petitioner
maintains that she had the right to terminate the contract prior to its expiration because
respondent allegedly violated the terms of the lease contract by subleasing the rented
premises. Petitioners assertion is belied by the provision in the lease contract which
states that the lessee can use the premises as a dwelling or as lodging house.
Furthermore the lease contract clearly provides that petitioner leased to respondent the
ground foor of her residential house for a term of one year commencing from 7 July
1995. Thus, the lease contract would expire only on 7 July 1996.

However, petitioner started ejecting respondents lodgers in March 1996 by informing
them that the lease contract was only until 15 April 1996. Clearly, petitioners act of
ejecting respondents lodgers resulted in respondent losing income from her lodgers.
Hence, it was proper for the trial court and the appellate court to order petitioner to pay
respondent actual damages in the amount of P45,000.










51. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Sps. Heshan

FACTS: Respondent Edward Heshan purchased three (3) roundtrip tickets from
petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for their trip from Manila to St. Louis, Missouri, USA
and back to attend an ice skating competition where then seven year old daughter, Dara
was to participate.

After the ice skating event ended, the Heshans proceeded to the airport to take the
connecting fight from St. Louis to Memphis on their way to Los Angeles. At the airport,
the Heshans frst checked-in their luggage at the airports curbside check-in near the
entrance. When the check-in counter opened, Edward took to the line where he was
second in the queue but he was asked to step aside and wait to be called again.

After all the other departing passengers were given their boarding passes, the Heshans
were told to board the plane without any boarding pass given to them and to just occupy
open seats therein. Inside the plane, there was only one seat available which was
occupied by Dara, and the spouses Heshans were directed to occupy two folding
seats. To respondents, the two folding seats were crew seats intended for the
stewardesses.

Upset that there were not enough passenger seats for them, the Heshans complained to
the cabin crew about the matter but were told that if they did not like to occupy the seats,
they were free to disembark from the plane which they did. The Heshans were later
endorsed to and carried by Trans World Airways to Los Angeles. Respondents sent a
letter to petitioner to demand indemnifcation for the breach of contract of carriage.
Petitioner replied that respondents were prohibited to board the fight for verbally
abusing the fight crew. As their demand remained unheeded, respondents fled a
complaint for breach of contract with damages at the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. is liable for moral and exemplary
damages to respondent.

HELD: Yes. The petition fails. An examination of the evidence presented by petitioner
shows that it consisted only of depositions of its witnesses. It had in its possession and
disposition pertinent documents such as the fight manifest and the planes actual
seating capacity and layout which could have clearly refuted respondents claims that
there were not enough passenger seats available for them. It inexplicably failed to ofer
even a single piece of documentary evidence. The Court thus believes that if at least the
cited documentary evidence had been produced, it would have been adverse to
petitioners case.

Petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain why it did not issue boarding passes to
respondents who were confrmed passengers, even after they had checked-in their
luggage three hours earlier. That respondents did not reserve seats prior to checking-in
did not excuse the non-issuance of boarding passes.

Nonetheless, the petition is in part meritorious. There is a need to substantially reduce
the moral damages awarded by the appellate court. While courts are given discretion to
determine the amount of damages to be awarded, it is limited by the principle that the
amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
52. Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.) Inc. V. Barreto
G.R. No. 184215
February 9, 2011
PEREZ, J.:

Facts: Nestor N. Barretto (Barretto), doing business under the name and style of N.N. B.
Lighterage,) entered into a Time Charter Agreement with petitioner Oceaneering
Contractors (Phils.), Inc whereby the latter hired the barge of petitioner for the purpose of
transporting construction. On 5 December 1997, Barrettos Bargeman, Eddie La Chica,
executed a Marine Protest,reporting that the barge capsized in the vicinity of Cape
Santiago, Batangas.
Barretto fled a complaint for damages against Oceaneering contending that the accident
was attributable to the incompetence and negligence. Oceaneering, on the other hand,
averred that the accident was caused by the negligence of Barrettos employees and the
dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy. Oceaneering prayed for the
grant of its counterclaims for the value of its cargo in the sum of P4,055,700.00,
salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. The RTC rendered a decision, dismissing both Barrettos complaint
and Oceaneerings counterclaims for lack of merit.
On appeal, CA held that the agreement executed by the parties, by its express terms,
was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by
Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him; and, that the sinking of the
vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which Barretto
failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for Oceaneerings lost cargo despite the
latters failure to insure the same. Applying the rule, however, that actual damages
should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, the CA denied Oceaneerings
claim for the value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the P306,000.00 it
paid for the time charter, with indemnity for attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.

ISSUES:
(1)WON THE CA ERRED IN DENYING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR
ACTUAL DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO (A) P3,704,700.00 REPRESENTING THE
VALUE OF THE MATERIALS IT LOST DUE TO THE SINKING OF [BARRETOS]
BARGE; AND (b) P125,000.00 REPRESENTING THE EXPENSES IT INCURRED FOR
SALVAGING ITS CARGO.

(2)WON THE CA ERRED IN AWARDING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIM FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF P30,000.00 ONLY.

HELD:
In fnding Oceaneerings petition impressed with partial merit, uppermost in our mind is
the fact that actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured
party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were
intended. Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement, they are intended to put the injured party in the position in
which he was before he was injured. Insofar as actual or compensatory damages are
concerned, Article 2199 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss sufered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Conformably with the foregoing provision, the rule is long and well settled that
there must be pleading and proof of actual damages sufered for the same to be
recovered.In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must
also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage sufered is,
consequently, imposed on the party claiming the same who should adduce the best
evidence available in support thereof, like sales and delivery receipts, cash and check
vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature

Applying the just discussed principles to the case at bench, we fnd that
Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages. The
court inclined to grant only the items which were duly proved by the vouchers and
receipts on record which sums all add up to of P2,577,620.00 from which should be
deducted the sum of P351,000.00 representing the value of the nine steel pipes
salvaged by Oceaneering, or a total of P2,226,620.00 in actual damages representing
the value of the latters lost cargo. Although included in its demand letters as aforesaid
and pleaded in its answer, Oceaneerings claim for salvaging expenses in the sum of
P125,000.00 cannot, likewise, be granted for lack of credible evidence to support the
same.

The Court also fnd that the CA erred in awarding the full amount of P306,000.00 in favor
of Oceaneering, as and by way of refund of the consideration it paid Barretto for the
Time Charter Agreement. Aside from not being clearly pleaded in the answer it fled a
quo, said refund was claimed in Oceaneerings demand letters only to the extent of the
unused charter payment in the reduced sum of P224,400.00 which, to our mind, should
be the correct measure of the award.

For lack of sufcient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we fnd that the CA,
fnally, erred in granting Oceaneerings claim for attorneys fees. The rule is settled that
there can be no recovery of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial
costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Being the
exception rather than the rule,attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails
in a suit,in view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
53. G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 170125
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs.HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa rode a taxicab, driven by Bibiano Padilla Jr. and owned
by defendant coporation. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fy-over, it overtook
another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because
of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fy-over and the ten-wheeler truck,
the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, Padilla was unable to control
it. Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself
of the fy-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. Ochoa was declared dead
on arrival from the accident.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the heirs. Padilla
failed to employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care needed to exempt G & S from
liability for Jose Marcials death. The CA found insufcient the evidence adduced by G &
S to support its claim that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees.
However, with respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials loss of earning
capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It found the Certifcation22 issued by
Jose Marcials employer, as self-serving, unreliable, and biased. The CA noted that
same is unsupported by competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipts.
Anent moral damages, the CA found the award of P300,000.00 excessive and thus
reduced the same to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of exemplary
damages which is P50,000.00.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in declaring that the award of the heirs claim for lost earning
is unwarranted and whether the award of moral damages is proper.
HELD: The CA in this case deleted the award for lost income after it found the USAID
Certifcation to be self-serving and unreliable. The Court disagrees. A research on
USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to
countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic
reforms."48 It is an "independent federal government agency that receives over-all
foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]."49 Given
this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certifcation
containing unreliable information regarding an employees income. Besides, there exists
a presumption that ofcial duty has been regularly performed.50 Absent any showing to
the contrary, it is presumed that the Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has
regularly performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certifcation and therefore,
the correctness of its contents can be relied upon.
Verily, the USAID certifcation cannot be said to be self-serving because it does not refer
to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs themselves as parties to this
case.1awphi1
While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to determine net
earning capacity, we, however, fnd incorrect the amount of P6,537, 244.96 arrived at.
The award should be P6,611,634.59.
As to the award of Moral damages, it should be noted that Moral and exemplary
damages are based on diferent jural foundations.57 They are diferent in nature and
require separate determination.58 The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the
other. Under this circumstance, we thus fnd as sufcient and "somehow proportional to
and in approximation of the sufering inficted"61 an award of moral damages in an
amount of P100,000.00.
54. RICARDO B. BANGAYAN vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
AND PHILIP SARIA
G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011
Ponente: SERENO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account with one of
the branches of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Bangayan
purportedly signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement with respondent RCBC in favor
of nine corporations. Under the Surety Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayans
accounts with RCBC would be used as security to guarantee any existing and future loan
obligations, advances, credits/increases and other obligations, including any and all
expenses that these corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan contests
the veracity and due authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that his signature
thereon was not genuine, and that the agreement was not notarized. Respondent RCBC
refutes this claim.

Then occurred diferent transactions between RCBC with other entities in relation to the
Surety Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in favor of diferent
corporations. Mr. Lao, of RCBC, claimed that the bank would not have extended the
letters of credit in favor of the three corporations without petitioner Bangayan acting as
surety. After all the transactions in relation to the letters of credit issued by RCBC in
relation to the Surety Agreement, Bangayans account was depleted.

Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayans Current Account
were presented for payment to respondent RCBC were returned by respondent RCBC
with the notation "REFER TO DRAWER. Five other checks of petitioner Bangayan were
presented for payment to respondent RCBC. These fve checks were dishonored by
respondent RCBC on the ground that they had been drawn against insufcient funds
("DAIF") and were likewise returned.

Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his account
and indemnify him for damages. Bangayan fled a complaint for damages against
respondent RCBC. In its defense, RCBC claims that Bangayan signed a Surety
Agreement in favor of several companies that defaulted in their payment of customs
duties that resulted in the imposition of a lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a letter of
credit of Lotec Marketing with the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to
guarantee Lotec Marketings obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank
applied Bangayans deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketings obligation which resulted
in the depletion of the bank accounts.

ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justifed in dishonoring the checks, and,
consequently, whether petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising from the
dishonor.

HELD: Yes. RCBC was justifed in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not entitled to
damages.

Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayans interest or reputation from the dishonor of the
seven checks was a consequence of his agreement to act as surety for the corporations
and their failure to pay their loan obligations, advances and other expenses.

First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the dishonor of
the checks, since its actions were justifed by petitioner Bangayans obligations under the
Surety Agreement. Both the trial and the appellate courts gave credence to the Surety
Agreement, which categorically guaranteed the four corporations obligations to
respondent RCBC under the letters of credit. As petitioner failed to discharge his burden
of demonstrating that his signature was forged, there being no positive and convincing
evidence to prove such fact, there is no reason to overturn the factual fndings of the
lower courts with respect to the genuineness and due execution of the Surety
Agreement. Second, the mere absence of notarization does not necessarily render the
Surety Agreement invalid. Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement does not bear
petitioner Bangayans signature is not a sufcient ground to invalidate the main
agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never contested the existence of the
Surety Agreement prior to the fling of the Complaint. It must be also be emphasized that
petitioner Bangayan did not complain against the four corporations which had beneftted
from his bank account.

With respect to the frst two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already put on
hold petitioner Bangayans account to answer for the customs duties being demanded
from the bank by the BOC. On the other hand, the fve other checks were subsequently
dishonored because petitioner Bangayans account was by that time already depleted
due to the partial payment of Lotec Marketings loan obligation.
Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They
proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has
been done.

In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right as a
creditor under the Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayans funds in his
accounts as security for the obligations of the four corporations under the letters of
credit. Thus, petitioner Bangayan cannot attribute any wrong or misconduct to
respondent RCBC since there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent in
dishonoring the checks. Any damage to petitioner arising from the dishonor of those
checks was brought about, not by the banks actions, but by the corporations that
defaulted on their obligations that petitioner had guaranteed to pay. The trial and the
appellate courts, therefore, committed no reversible error in disallowing the award of
damages to petitioner.
55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., GILBERTO
VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, AND RICKY VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals (CA) found Gilberto Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry
Ramentos, and Ricky Villarico guilty of murder for the killing of Haide Cagatan, and
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of them, thereby modifying the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Tangub City that had
pronounced them guilty of homicide aggravated by dwelling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of the respondents has been properly set forth.
HELD: No. The civil liability must be modifed to accord with pertinent law and
jurisprudence.
There is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, and punished them with reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, considering the absence of any generic aggravating circumstance.
However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of
civil liability in the amount of only P50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly
reversible error for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which
prescribes a death indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of the
Civil Code, which requires exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there
is at least one aggravating circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence.
Plain oversight might have caused both the RTC and the CA to lapse into the serious
omissions. Nonetheless, a rectifcation should now be made, for, indeed, gross
omissions, intended or not, should be eschewed.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as
death indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. As clarifed in People v. Arbalate, damages in such amounts are to be granted
whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659,
like the murder charged and proved herein.
Indeed, the Court, observed in numerous cases it has previously decided that the
"principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or
imposable for the ofense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually
imposed on the ofender. The litmus test, therefore, in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
56. Phil. Savings Bank v. Sps. Castillo (G.R. No. 193178, May 30,2011)
FACTS: Respondent spouses Alfredo Castillo and Elizabeth Capati-Castillo and Romeo
Capati and Aquilina Lobo obtained a loan with real estate mortgage over their respective
properties from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank, as evidenced by a Promissory Note.
From the release of the loan in May 1997 until December 1999, petitioner had increased
and decreased the rate of interest with notifcation of such in writing to the respondents.
While the respondents neither gave their confrmation thereto nor did they formally
question the changes, respondent Alfredo Castillo nevertheless requested petitioner in
writing for the reduction of the interest rates to which the latter denied.
When respondents defaulted in their payment in December 1999 due to fnancial
constraints, petitioner initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties with the latter as the only bidder. Thereafter, the respondents failed to redeem
the property within the redemption period.
As such, the respondents fled a case for Reformation of Instruments, Declaration of
Nullity of Notarial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certifcate of Sale, Cancellation of
Annotations on TCT Nos. 233242 and 227858, and Damages. The CA afrmed with
modifcations the ruling of the RTC in favor of the respondents. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to an award of damages.
HELD: NO. Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been
breached. They are recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed acted
fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive.
Likewise, a breach of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the guilty
party acted in a fraudulent or malevolent manner.

In this case, the Court is not sufciently convinced that fraud, bad faith, or wanton
disregard of contractual obligations can be imputed to petitioner simply because it
unilaterally imposed the changes in interest rates, which can be attributed merely to bad
business judgment or attendant negligence. Bad faith pertains to a dishonest purpose,
to some moral obliquity, or to the conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
attributable to a motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Respondents failed to sufciently establish this requirement. Thus, the award of moral
and exemplary damages is unwarranted.

57. People of the Phils. v. Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin (G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan was charged with the crime of double
murder for allegedly assaulting Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis with the use of a long
bolo, thereby inficting upon the latter wounds which caused their death.

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of the crime of double murder and
awarded damages to the heirs of the victims. On appeal, in addition to the damages that
were reduced by the CA, exemplary damages were also awarded. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages by the lower court is proper.

HELD: YES. Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime. Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by
the court for the mental anguish sufered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the
latters death. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the
victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. The award of exemplary
damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code.

Thus, the Court afrms the Court of Appeals award of damages. In lieu of actual or
compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award of P25,000.00 temperate
damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. Such award of damages in homicide
or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented
in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim sufered pecuniary loss,
although the exact amount was not proven.
58. People vs evangelio gallo G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999
Facts : Gallo and three others entered the house of bbb and ccc without consent and
against the will of the occupants. At that time bbb and ccc are out of their house, only the
household helper aaa and eveyn tutoring her niece were present. The 4 accused tied the
housemates. The household helper aaa was brought to the comfort room and the
aggressors tried to have carnal knowledge of her. As she tried to evade the rape her
head was slammed over the concrete wall causing her to lose consciousness. When
she regained consciousness she was already in pain and her vagina bleeding as a result
of the rape committed when she was unconscious.
a case of robbery with rape was fled against gallo and conspirators . the trial
court found them guilty and sentenced them to death and ordered to pay damages.
Court of appeals modifed the sentence to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of
death penalty

ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES TO THE OWNER OF THE
HOUSE WHO WERE NOT AROUND THE HOUSE WHEN CRIME COMMITTED IS
PROPER

HELD the owners of house bbb and ccc are entitled frst to restitution of the things stolen
under restitution, only when it is impossible that the appellants shall pay the value of the
things stolen. They are also not entitled to moral damages as there is no showing that
they sufered moral shock, moral anguish, moral sufering, social humiliation, besmirch
reputation or wounded feelings.
AAA as rape victim shall be entitled as under existing jurisprudence for civil damages of
75,000, and moral damages of 75,000 and exemplary damages of 30,000 without her
being required to prove it as in ordinary cases provided the case of rape is established
against the accused
Evelyn shall not be entitled to award because she was not included as a party in the
criminal complaint and it would be violative of the due process as to the accused if it be
allowed

59 Development bank vs traverse development corporation G.R. No. 169293
Facts: traverse obtained a real estate mortgage from dbp amounting to p910,000 which
amount traverse would use for the construction of a three story building in a lot it owned
in tarlac. To secure the loan traverse mortgaged the land upon which the building is to be
constructed. DCP also required traverse to acquire fre insurance which it did. The
property was insured under FGU insurance but was later changed to Central for the
same amount of 1 million upon nearing of the expiration allegedly for the convenience of
DBP.
Fire razed the property. Traverse reported it, requested necessary
investigation and claimed the proceeds of the insurance policy but central refused and
answered that there was no total destruction instead asserts to pay only expenses for
repair.
Due to the refusal and delay of Central, Traverse fled a case for damages against
central. Traverse also impleaded as co-defendant DBP allegedly for latters act or
omission that compelled traverse to litigate. Accordingly, the RTC and CA
sustained the case in favour of traverse and ordered central to pay the amount of 1
million to DBP and latter to extinguish the obligation under loan of traverse. It further
ordered Central to pay nominal damages and for Central and DBP to be solidarily liable
for attys fee and cost of litigation.
DBP now, thru special civil action of certiorari, claims that the judge committed grave
abuse of discretion for making DBP soidarily liable for attys fee and cost of litigation
because evidence does not show that its acts and omissions compelled traverse to
litigate

Issue: whether DBP shall be solidarily liable for attys fee and cost of litigation

Held: No. Liability for attys fees and cost of litigation remains to be exception and cannot
be awarded absent clear facts and legal and equitable justifcation that indeed there was
and act or omission on part of a party attended with bad faith that compelled the other
party to litigate for the protection of his interest

Evidence does not show that there was an act/ omission of DBP that was accompanied
by bad faith that in efect compelled traverse to litigate. Contrary to what traverse allege,
DBP exerted reasonable efort by arranging meetings between the insurer and traverse
and also blacklisted central.