The Battle of Adrianople 378AD

A Kings of War Historical supplement.

David Child-Dennis 2012

Introduction
By the time this battle occurred, the Roman Empire had essentially ceased to exist. t !as no lon"er #Roman$ nor
!as it an #empire$, but a collection o% under stren"th "arrisons, lar"ely abandoned to their %ate. &o dire !ere the
circumstances that one "arrison on the Dacian border, 'modern Romania( had lost contact !ith Rome %or at least a
decade, yet, out o% #habit$, continued to man the "arrison, in the name o% Rome. suppose it proves any %orm o%
social order is better than chaos.

)he battle came about primarily throu"h the necessity %or Rome to reduce its borders. *nder +urelian 'assassinated
in 2,-+D(, Rome be"an to !ithdra! %rom its territories in +sia .inor and Eastern Europe. )his !as %orced on
Rome because %e!er citi/ens !ere prepared to serve in the military and be"an to be replaced by #barbarians$ %rom
con0uered territories. +%ter Constantine %ormerly adopted #Christianity$ as a permitted reli"ion !ithin the Empire,
%ollo!in" the Council o% 1icaea in 22-+D, the leadership o% the Empire became dan"erously %actionali/ed bet!een
#Christians$ and #3a"ans$. &o much so, the Roman de%eat at +drianople !as characteri/ed as #an act o% divine
punishment %or the sins o% 4alens and the Empire as a !hole$.

The Roman Arm of 378AD
5hile some commentators o% that time bemoaned the loss o% the %i"htin" pro!ess and s6ill displayed by the le"ions
%rom the old empire, the latter day le"ionaries o% Rome !ere not so uns6illed as some !ould have us believe.
7e"ionary !eapons and e0uipment had certainly chan"ed, !ith the development o% li"hter, oval shields, chain mail
1
replacin" lorica se"mentata and the lon"er spartha replacin" the short "ladius. )he pilum had also made !ay %or the
thrustin" spear, 8avelin and darts. +rchery, includin" crossbo!s, had also become an important component o% the
le"ion. )he Roman +rmy had evolved to %i"ht in the East, !here they encountered mainly mounted opponents in
semi arid conditions. 9aced !ith increasin" numbers o% eastern, horsed opponents, the Romans increased the ratio o%
their horse to %oot, %rom 10:1 to 2:1.

+ continuin" problem !as a lac6 o% ne! recruits. 5hile there !ere numerous attempts to enlist barbarians, usually
those see6in" re%u"e !ithin imperial territories, many Roman citi/ens actively avoided conscription or service at
almost any price. )he days !hen it !as considered an honor to serve in the le"ions had lon" since passed and, as the
middle classes consolidated their !ealth, they pre%erred someone else to do the diein", in the almost endless civil
!ars. + %urther blo! !as dealt the army a%ter universal Roman citi/enship !as "ranted to all !ithin her borders, by
Caracalla in 212+D. )his universal declaration o% citi/enship removed the "reatest motivation %or #barbarian$
recruits, !ho had received citi/enship a%ter 2- years service in the army. )his lac6 o% recruits led to the "radual
shrin6in" o% units, especially a%ter heavy casualties. &ome le"ion stren"ths !ere at 1,000 men, others a lo! as 2-0. n
this respect at least, they !ere only a shado! o% their %ormer selves.
+ccordin" to 3eter Donnlley

!The "ature of #om$at
Roman tactics in the late empire !ere very di%%erent %rom those o% the classical a"e. n particular, the cavalry
'includin" bo!men as !ell as heavily armored lancers( played a much more prominent role. ;o!ever, the disaster at
+drianople did not si"nal the triumph o% barbarian cavalry, as some earlier historians thou"ht.<,= By this time, the
Romans had already developed the armored cavalry 6no!n so !ell %rom By/antine times, and could certainly match
anythin" the >oths put into the %ield.<?=
.issiles o% all 6inds !ere more "reatly relied on than in classical times. )he heavy in%antry marched behind a shield
!all bristlin" !ith spears @ not li6e the old hoplite or le"ionary shield !all, but a !all perhaps A %eet hi"h, the
hi"her part bein" made up o% shields held over the shoulders o% the men in %ront by the men in the second ran6.
.ean!hile the ran6s behind them sho!ered the enemy !ith 8avelins, arro!s, and lead-!ei"hted darts. t must have
2
been very %ri"htenin" to see, and somethin" cavalry !ould not readily char"e into.
.uch !or6 has been done in recent decades on the mechanics or actual experience o% battle, and some old ideas
have been overturned. 9or an up-to-date treatment o% ho! men %ou"ht in the later empire, see 3hilip Rance$s
%ascinatin" chapter in )he Cambrid"e ;istory o% >ree6 and Roman 5ar%are.<B=C
%urrounded $ dissension
3robably the sin"le "reatest problem 4alens %aced !as disloyalty and division, not helped by his o!n e"otistic and
autocratic personalityD 5hen 4alens arrived in Constantinople, immediately prior to the battle, he %ound the city in
the "rip o% a riot, !hich inevitably diverted his attention %rom the comin" battle. ;is advisors !ere also deeply
divided as to !hich course o% action to %ollo!. &hould they immediately attac6 the >othic invasion or a!ait the
arrival o% the rein%orcements !ith >ratianE .any o% the opposin" >oths had served in Roman units and !ere !ell-
trained and %amiliar !ith Roman tactics, thus >oths, currently servin" in Roman units, !ere under suspicion as
potential traitors. Roman deserters had in%ormed 9riti"ern, the >oth commander, o% 4alens$ !ea6nesses and the %act
that >ratian !as advancin" on +drianople !ith rein%orcements.

The &othic arm
)he si/e o% the army at +drianople is un6no!n, but most historians a"ree it !as at least as numerous as the Roman,
i% not lar"er. t certainly en8oyed a lar"er cavalry presence. ;o!ever, it !as an alliance o% a number o% barbarian
tribal "roups, >reuthin"i, +lans, ;uns, )ervin"i and others, all o% !ho !ere described as #>oths$ by the Roman
historian, +mmianus. Each o% these "roups !as under the direct control o% their leaders and only accepted 9riti"ern$s
leadership out o% necessity. Fet, had the battle turned a"ainst the >oths, 9riti"ern$s authority !ould have vanished,
endin" in de%eat in detail.
)he Battle
)he actual site o% the battle is un6no!n, althou"h the "eneral location is %airly certain. t be"an in the late a%ternoon
and %inished about ,pm, as dar6ness %ell. 4alens had delayed his deployment !hile ne"otiations !ith 9riti"ern too6
place, in the hope >ratian$s rein%orcements !ould arrive be%ore the >oths attac6ed. 9riti"ern did li6e!ise, a!aitin"
the return o% his %ora"in" cavalry, !hich outnumbered the Roman horse. By late in the mornin", it !as becomin"
2
increasin"ly apparent >ratian had been delayed, by >oth incursions into territory north o% Constantinople. 4alens
!as also a!are the >oths !ere attemptin" to cut his supply lines to Constantinople, !hile at the same time
ne"otiatin". 4alens realised he !as "oin" to be %orced to "ive battle, sooner rather than later. Roman scouts had
located the van"uard o% the >othic %orce, !hich !as smaller, and lac6ed cavalry, !ho !ere scattered %ora"in". 9aced
!ith bein" cut o%% in Constantinople, !ith a potentially rebellious army, he appears to have decided to de%eat the
smaller >oth van"uard, be%ore their cavalry could return %rom %ora"in" and thereby buy enou"h time to allo!
>ratian$s %orces to 8oin him. + victory %or the Romans !ould have improved morale amon" his troops, and 0uelled
the dissent in Constantinople.

;is le"ions !ere ordered to move to!ards the small to!n o% +drianople, some ?-miles %rom Constantinople. )hus,
in the heat o% midday, !ithout ade0uate !ater or %ood, the le"ions advanced to!ards the enemy !a"on la"er,
situated on the hi"h "round near +drianople. By the time they arrived, the le"ions !ere in no %it condition to %i"ht,
let alone assault a !ell prepared de%ense. 4alens ordered the le"ions to attac6 the >oth !a"on la"er, !hich !as
e0uivalent to a Roman %ield camp. + %ormidable tas6, even %or a !ell rested, !ell e0uipped, le"ion at %ull stren"th.
.uch has been made o% this ?-mile march, as a cause %or the Roman de%eat. But it must be remembered in earlier
mperial times, le"ions !ere re0uired to ma6e %orced marches o% up to 12 miles a day, and build a camp be%ore ni"ht
%all. believe it !as this lac6 o% #stamina$ trainin", !hich primarily contributed, to the Roman de%eat.

4alens launched his in%antry at the !a"on la"er, !ith his cavalry actin" as %lan6 "uard. Both cavalry units on the %lan6
!ere routed by the returnin" >oth cavalry, leavin" the in%antry stranded in the centre. )he >oths immediately
attac6ed the remainin" in%antry %rom %ront and %lan6s, pinnin" them in position. )he le"ionaries, %aced !ith certain
death, %ormed themselves into de%ensive 6nots and sold their lives as dearly as they could. 5hile some G o% the
Roman in%antry perished, casualties amon" the >oths !ere also severe. )he main cause o% casualties, on both sides
appears to have been bo! %ire. )he later claim that >oth H probably ;un H cavalry rode do!n the Roman in%antry
is almost certainly an #urban le"end$. )ests carried out a %e! years a"o, demonstrated that horses !ould not char"e a
%ormed line o% trained in%antry. t !as only once in%antry units bro6e and scattered, then, they !ere more easily
destroyed by the cavalry.

I
)he terrain !as open dry "rassland, !ith a scatterin" o% vineyards and olive "roves. t !as early +u"ust, and almost
certainly dry and hotD )he avera"e daytime temperature in +u"ust is 21.A
0
C !ith only I.? days o% rain. % you
chec6 Edirne, )ur6ey, on >oo"le earth, you !ill see ho! dry and %lat the area is.


%cenario specific rules
)he ;our o% 5olves supplement H Rome$s Rise and 9all, is used. Each side has a maximum points value o% 1,-00
points.

-
Roman forces use the '(ate Imperial Roman Armies) list *p7+.
&oth forces use a com$ination of three arm lists,-
Early 4isi"othic +rmy 'p1,( H-00 points- !ith the exception that Cata%racts must be replaced by .edium Cavalry.
Early Jstro"oth +rmy 'p1?( H -00 points- !ith the exception that Cata%racts must be replaced !ith .edium
Cavalry.
;unic +rmy 'p21( H -00 points.
The &oth .agon lager,
Jbtainin" !a"on models %or this scenario can be an expensive challen"e, even usin" 20mm plastic %i"ures. !ould
recommend ma6in" heavy card !a"ons, %itted !ith hobby store !ooden !heels.






)his is an o%%erin" %rom KR .odels !hich is cast resin and sho!s ho! crude the >oth !a"ons !ere. )he cart !ould
have been pulled by a team o% at least %our oxen. )here !as probably a %abric 'possibly linen( tilt, supported by
!ooden hoops, coverin" the !a"on. )he important thin" to remember is they !ere not hi"hly decorated !or6s o%
art, but !ar machines, expected to o%%er "ood de%ensive cover and security. $m reminded o% the axiomL measured
!ith a micrometer, mar6ed !ith chal6, cut !ith a chainsa!D
Arm #ommanders and their retinue
4alensM '+rmy >eneral( and 9riti"ernMs '5arlord in Chariot( commands should consist o% three or %our mounted
%i"ures, pre%erably !ith an individual %i"ure to represent each commander. Jne %i"ure !ill be e0uipped !ith an
+rmy &tandard. )hese bases are !ithout points cost. Each barbarian !arband !ill be commanded by a chie%tain, and
retinue !ith standard '%our %i"ures on a base( at no points cost.
A
Roman (egionar $ases and unit si/e
use late mperial 7e"ionary %i"ures by taleri 'A12,( %itted %ive %i"ures to a 100mm !ide by I0mm deep base.
use each one o% these as a 7e"ionary vexillum'troop( !ith t!o bases ma6in" a cohort're"iment(. tMs important that,
re"ardless o% the ori"inal rules supplement base to %i"ure ratio,'p2( the %ollo!in" ratios are used. Jne base is
e0uivalent to a troop, as described on pa"e 2 o% the rules supplement, and t!o bases are e0uivalent to a Re"iment.
)his is re"ardless o% the number o% %i"ures sho!n in the rules. )he Mn%antry ;ordeM classi%ication is converted to
represent a 7e"ion !hich !ill consist o% bet!een ei"ht to ten bases o% in%antry, re"ardless o% the total number o%
%i"ures.
The 0Tortoise0 *testudo+
1reparing to recei2e a charge or missile fire
,
)his !as an extremely common le"ionary %ormation used to approach de%ensive positions or de%end a"ainst bo! %ire.
+ testudo can be %ormed by t!o in%antry bases bein" placed bac6 to bac6, as a %ull move option. *nless attac6in" a
de%ensive position, it cannot be moved. % it is used to attac6 de%enses, all movement is halved. *nits in testudo
%ormation "ain an extra N1 De 'brin"in" le"ionaries to DEA(. + testudo has no %lan6s or rear.
#a2alr
Cavalry .+F 1J) char"e an unsha6en le"ionary unit, %rom its %ront arc. )hey may, ho!ever, ta6e their chances
and attac6 a M!averin"M unit.
Testing "er2e
)his is a critical part o% the scenario. +ll le"ionary troops !ill su%%er a N1 penalty to their dice roll, !hen ma6in" their
%irst Mnerve testM. Jnce they have passed the %irst test, they !ill revert to their ori"inal "e value. % a Roman le"ionary
unit su%%ers a M!averin"M result %rom a nerve test, it must immediately %orm a MtestudoM and remain stationary until it is
no lon"er under attac6. Jnce in testudo %ormation it cannot su%%er a %urther M!averin"M result in a nerve test, it may
only be destroyed by %ailin" a Mroutin"M test.
>oth units su%%erin" a M!averin" M result %rom a 1erve )est, must remain halted %or the next "ame turn, to re%lect the
command con%usion resultin" %rom casualties amon" its leaders. % 9riti"ern is routed %rom the table every allied
!arband must immediately ta6e a nerve test !ith a N2 penalty added to the dice roll.
(eadership 3ualities 4 or lac5 thereof6
7alens
;istory has not treated 4alens 6indly, due mainly to the anta"onism bet!een the reli"ious %actions !ithin his
?
command. ;e is portrayed as autocratic and arro"ant, yet stran"ely indecisive. )here is little doubt he %aced many
political opponents, both %rom !ithin the army and the &enate. )he constant ris6 o% assassination must have been
upper most in his thou"hts. ;e must have realised %ailure on the %ield o% battle, !ould see him s!i%tly removed and
the army and &enate install another contender. ;is %amily could have been slau"htered or sold as slaves, i% luc6y. n
the end, it !as probably %ortunate he died in battle. .ost historians rate 4alens as MindecisiveM, at best, Mco!ardlyM at
!orst. Mll "ive him the bene%it o% the doubt and call him MindecisiveM. 4alens does not inspire anyone, there%ore loses
the command bonus allo!in" units !ithin A inches a re-roll %or %ailed Mnerve testsM. % 4alensM +rmy Command base
su%%ers a M!averin"M result %rom a Mnerve testM, his body "uard, and +rmy &tandard Bearer, immediate desert him, and
his pro%ile %alls %rom Arm &eneral to 8unior 9fficer.
:ritigern
4ery little is 6no!n o% 9riti"ern other than he !as considered by +mmianus to be a "reat leader, exhibitin" much
cunnin" and "uile. ;e !as su%%iciently capable o% or"ani/in" a coalition o% disparate >erman and ;un tribal "roups H
!hom +mmianus terms M>othiM, into a cohesive %orce, under his command. Because he is mounted in a chariot, any
nerve test resultin" in M!averin"M does not reduce his next "ame turn movement options. ;e may move as normal.
&hould 9riti"ern be driven %rom the %ield or 6illed, every command unit must ta6e an immediate nerve test !ith a N1
added to the dice roll. % any command unit %ails their Mnerve testM, their entire contin"ent deserts the %ield and is
immediately removed %rom the "ame.
B