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Beach Nourishment As A Dynamic Capital Accumulation Problem
Beach Nourishment As A Dynamic Capital Accumulation Problem
Martin D. Smith
a,
, Jordan M. Slott
b
, Dylan McNamara
c
, A. Brad Murray
d
a
Nicholas School of the Environment, Department of Economics, Box 90328, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
b
Sun Microsystems Laboratories, Sun Microsystems, Inc. 1 Network Drive, Burlington, MA 01803, USA
c
Department of Physics and Physical Oceanography, University of North CarolinaWilmington, 601 South College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403, USA
d
Nicholas School of the Environment and Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Box 90230, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 9 March 2007
Available online 18 January 2009
JEL classication:
Q24
Q54
Keywords:
Beach nourishment
Optimal rotation
Natural capital
Erosion
Shoreline stabilization
Coastal management
a b s t r a c t
Beach nourishment is a common coastal management strategy used to combat
erosion along sandy coastlines. It involves building out a beach with sand dredged
from another location. This paper develops a positive model of beach nourishment
and generates testable hypotheses about how the frequency of nourishment
responds to property values, project costs, erosion rates, and discounting. By treating
the decision to nourish as a dynamic capital accumulation problem, the model produces
new insights about coupled economic geomorphological systems. In particular,
determining whether the frequency of nourishment increases in response to physical
and economic forces depends on whether the decay rate of nourishment sand exceeds
the discount rate.
& 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Most US coastlines are either moderately or severely eroding [14,22]. Both wave-driven alongshore sediment transport
and sea-level rise contribute to coastal erosion, and climate change is likely to intensify both of these forces [30]. At the
same time, more humans are living in the coastal zone [16,31]. Cost estimates of avoiding inundation from a 1m rise in sea
level are between $270 billion and $475 billion [32]. A recent Heinz report suggests that over the next 60 years, erosion will
affect 25% of US structures within 500ft of the coastline, and the lost property value without any further build-out on
vacant lots would be between $3.3 billion and $4.8 billion [14]. These estimates reect diminished property values from
erosion without accounting for any potential damages to structures or lost recreational amenities that are not fully
capitalized into land values.
Trends in the coastal zone point to an inevitable conict between coastal developments and an encroaching shoreline.
As coastal erosion takes place, residential and commercial properties as well as coastal infrastructure are threatened.
Humans can, and do, intervene in the coastal zone to defend against shoreline changes. To address erosion, coastal
managers and engineers can pursue beach nourishment,
1
build hard structures like sea walls, or simply move or abandon
coastal property [17,25].
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jeem
Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0095-0696/$ - see front matter & 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.011
set
0. (10)
Optimal nourishment occurs where T* solves Eq. (10). Two notes are in order. First, by optimal we mean optimal from the
point of view of the coastal manager of a particular location; socially optimal would need to include ecological costs of
nourishment.
7
In a positive sense, one could interpret Eq. (10) to represent narrowly the net benets of nourishment that
are capitalized into property values or values of the surrounding local community. Second, it is possible that no nourishing
is the optimal strategy. To ensure that T* is in fact optimal, one need only check that v4 0 in Eq. (9).
Multiplying Eq. (10) through by (1e
dT
), we see that the optimal nourishment interval occurs where the difference
between marginal benets and marginal costs of a single rotation is exactly offset by the interest payment lost on delaying
all future rotations. This can be seen from the following expression in which the right-hand side is simply the discount rate
multiplied by the present value of all rotations after the rst one:
B
0
T C
0
T dBT CT=e
dT
1. (11)
So far, the intuition generally matches that of the classic Faustmann problem. To clarify interpretation, the Faustmann
rst-order condition can be written (in our notation) as
B
0
T dBT c dBT c=e
dT
1, (12)
where costs in the Faustmann model include only xed costs c. In Faustmann, there are no marginal costs such that the
left-hand side of (12) is different from that of (11), and the right-hand side of (12) has c rather than C(T) as in (11). Another
important difference is that the term d(B(T)c) in (12) does not appear in (11). This reects the fact that Faustmann
generates a lumped benet when the forest is cut, and delaying incurs lost interest on that lumped benet. There are no
such lumped benets in the beach problem; all benets are continuous ows as in Hartmans value of standing forest. The
termd(B(T)c)/(e
dT
1) is interest on future rent and is the opportunity cost of keeping land in forestry [29]. By analogy, for
beaches this term is the opportunity cost of pursuing nourishment as an erosion management strategy.
To generate results from the model, we take derivatives of the benet and cost functions to nd expressions
for the pieces of (10). Applying Liebnizs rule to the benets function in (6), the marginal benet of extending the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
(footnote continued)
beaches ultimately affects the alongshore sediment transport within the nourished region. We treat m and y as xed parameters for analytical tractability
and to develop some insights about the nourishment problem, but we acknowledge this caveat as a limitation of our model.
7
Socially optimal nourishment would also need to include spatial externalities of nourishment (both positive and negative) especially given the
emerging evidence that shoreline perturbations can propagate over large spatial scales [1].
M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 63
rotation is
B
0
T e
dT
dGxT e
dT
dG1 mx
0
me
yT
x
0
gT. (13)
Thus, the marginal benet of extending a single rotation is decreasing. The corresponding marginal cost of delaying a
rotation is
C
0
T fg fmyx
0
e
yT
. (14)
By inspection of (14), the marginal cost of delaying is decreasing. The cost of additional sand is constant, but the
additional sand required is decreasing over time because the total erosion rate decreases and approaches the baseline rate
as the beach returns to equilibrium prole (in both prole- and plan-view senses).
4. Comparative statics of beach nourishment rotations
We cannot analytically sign most of the comparative statics from the model described above because there are two
countervailing forces in the rst-order condition (10). The optimal rotation length (T*) balances the difference between
marginal benets and marginal costs of a single rotation with the interest lost on delaying all future rotations. While this
property characterizes the original Faustmann formula as well, the simple form of the benets function combined with the
assumption of only xed costs in Faustmann leads to cancellations and signable comparative statics.
For the cost parameters, however, it is possible to sign comparative statics by assuming that the second-order condition
holds at the maximum. Because the xed cost c is neither in the benets function nor the marginal cost function, the
comparative static result is relatively simple.
Proposition 1. The optimal rotation length increases if the xed cost of nourishment increases.
Proof.
dT
n
dc
de
dT
n
1 e
dT
n
2
,
@
2
vT
n
@T
2
!
.
The numerator is positive, and the denominator is negative by the second-order condition. Hence, dT
n
=dc40. &
In the next proposition, we explore the importance of the variable cost of nourishment on the optimal rotation length T*.
Here, the sign will neither be strictly positive nor negative, but we can sign the parts and determine the geomorphological
and economic drivers.
Proposition 2. The optimal rotation length can increase or decrease if the variable cost of nourishment increases. The sign
depends on whether the nourishment sand decay rate is higher than the discount rate, the fraction of beach width that decays
exponentially, and the baseline erosion rate g.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that signfdT
=dfg signf@
2
vT
n
=@f@Tg. Dene G 1 e
dT
n
2
f@
2
vT
n
=@f@Tg, such
that signfdT
=dfg signfGg. We can then write G as the sum of two terms that have known signs:
G y dmx
0
e
ydT
n
de
dT
n
ye
yT
n
mx
0
|{z}
A
gde
dT
n
T
n
e
dT
n
1
|{z}
B
.
We will show that the sign{A} depends only on whether y4d. First, by inspection, we see that when y d, the A term is
zero. Factoring out mx
0
, A40 if y de
ydT
n
de
dT
n
ye
yT
n
40. We now use second-order Taylor approximations to
sign this expression, noting that e
kT
1 kT k
2
T
2
=2. Thus,
A y y
2
T
n
y
3
2
T
n
2
d d
2
T
n
d
3
2
T
n
2
y y
2
T
n
ydT
n
y
3
2
T
n
yd
2
2
T
n
2
y
2
dT
n
2
d dy d
2
T
n
y
2
d
2
T
n
d
3
2
T
n
2
yd
2
T
n
dy
2
T
n
2
y d .
Thus, sign{A} sign{yd}. To determine the sign{B}, we note that at T* 0, B 0. @B=@T
n
j
T
n
0
gd
2
e
dT
n
o0. Hence, B is
strictly non-positive. Putting together the pieces, whenever yod, both terms are negative, and increasing the variable cost
increases nourishment frequency. When y4d, increasing variable cost increases nourishment frequency if this difference
(between y and d) is small, baseline erosion is high, or the share of beach width that erodes exponentially (m) is small. &
One explanation for Proposition 2 is that the variable cost inuences the relative importance of xed cost of
nourishment in determining T*. When variable costs increase, the relative importance of xed costs decrease, reducing the
incentive to delay. Consider for simplicity that there was only baseline erosion. Then the total variable cost (undiscounted)
would be the same whether nourishment intervals were high or low because the beach is always returned to x
0
. In this
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M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 64
simplied setting, total undiscounted xed costs increase as T* decreases, whereas total undiscounted variable costs do not
change with T*. If there were no xed costs, we would simply nourish continuously and always maintain the beach at x
0
for
maximum benets. When we introduce exponential decay of nourishment sand, more sand is lost quickly, and the variable
costs of nourishing frequently are substantially higher.
The discount rate and exponential decay of nourishment sand play important roles in Proposition 2. In essence, the
manager endogenizes the depreciation rate of beach capital. Depreciation here is a mixture of exponential decay of
nourishment sand and linear sand loss from baseline erosion. Nourishment frequency determines the net rate of
depreciation. Consider rst the effect of discounting in isolation. When the discount rate is high, the weight placed on the
marginal net benets in the short run is high relative to the weight placed on the discounted stream of future rotations. An
increase in the variable cost of sand increases the marginal cost of a rotation that must be offset by increasing the marginal
benets. Since marginal benets are decreasing in T, T* must decrease. When the discount rate is low, the weight on all
future rotations is high. This, in turn, is based on the difference between total benets and total costs of a rotation. With a
low discount rate, total benets of a rotation must increase to compensate for an increase in the total cost of a rotation due
to the variable cost increase. This requires increasing T*.
Nowconsider the exponential decay of sand together with the discount rate. An increase in variable cost of nourishment
will increase the implicit undiscounted cost of maintaining the capital stock. When sand decays rapidly, marginal cost of a
rotation is high but decreasing in T. So, one can lower the marginal cost by increasing T*. If the discount rate is relatively
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Marginals from a Single Rotation - phi = 1,
gamma = 0.5
Rotation Length
MB
MC
MNB
NB Rent
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Marginals from a Single Rotation - phi = 2,
gamma = 0.5
Rotation Length
MB
MC
MNB
NB Rent
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Marginals from a Single Rotation - phi = 1,
gamma = 2
Rotation Length
MB
MC
MNB
NB Rent
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Marginals from a Single Rotation - phi = 2,
gamma = 2
Rotation Length
MB
MC
MNB
NB Rent
Fig. 4. (a) Illustration of Proposition 2low erosion, low sand cost. (b) Illustration of Proposition 2low erosion, high sand cost. (c) Illustration of
Proposition 2high erosion, low sand cost. (d) Illustration of Proposition 2high erosion, high sand cost.
M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 65
low, we saw above that there is also an incentive to increase T*. When sand decays slowly, marginal cost of a rotation is low
and declining more slowly in T. This dampens the incentive to increase T*, while a high discount rate provides an incentive
to decrease T*.
In the Faustmann model, Eq. (12) shows that optimal rotation balances future rents against marginal net benets of a
single rotation. The beach problem has a similar feature. But in Faustmann, costs are only xed and do not affect the
marginal net benet of the single rotation. As such, a cost increase reduces rents, so marginal net benets must also go
down to compensate. That can only be accomplished by extending the rotation. In our case, a variable cost increase affects
both sides of the rst-order condition (11) such that both terms shift down. When background erosion is high, the shift
down in marginal net benets overshoots the reduction that is required to balance marginal net benets and future rents.
So, the rotation must shrink to increase marginal net benets and balance the rst-order condition.
To clarify Proposition 2 further, consider Fig. 4. The four panels represent two values of baseline erosion (high and low)
and two values of variable cost (high and low). In the rst two panels, background erosion is low (g 0.5). The increase in
variable cost (from f 1 to 2) shifts both the total net benets of future rotations (NB rent) and the marginal net benet
(MNB) down. The shifts are such that the optimal rotation length increases with the increased variable cost (as intuition
suggests). When variable cost increases, it decreases the rent on all future rotations. The rotation increases to reduce
marginal net benets to compensate. This is the same process that governs the Faustmann rotation when xed costs
increase. In the second two panels, background erosion is high (g 2.0). The increase in variable cost still shifts both
curves, but the shifts have different consequences. Here, the shift in marginal net benets with the higher variable cost
overcompensates for the lost rent from the cost increase. Thus, the rotation length must shrink to increase marginal net
benets and compensate for the change in rent. The input demand for sand thus slopes upward in this case. We will see
below that this case is a consequence of xing the extensive margin (the initial beach width x
0
). An analogous
counterintuitive result comes out of the basic Faustmann model. When the extensive margin (i.e. the amount of land in
forestry) is xed in Faustmann, a timber price increase shortens the rotation length; in doing so, the average supply of
timber decreases and output supply slopes downward.
The remaining comparative static results are problematic because they involve integrals that do not have closed-form
expressions. To see this, substitute Eqs. (5), (6), (13), and (14) into Eq. (10):
@v
@T
e
dT
dG1 mx
0
me
yT
x
0
gT fg fmyx
0
e
yT
=1 e
dT
de
dT
Z
T
o
e
dt
dG1 mx
0
me
yt
x
0
gtdt c fmx
0
1 e
yT
gT
1 e
dT
set
0. (15)
Note that the parameters m, x
0
, y, g, and d all enter in both the rst line and the second line, the latter being subtracted
from the former. Moreover, these parameters are all in the integrand of the integral that is being subtracted. By Liebnizs
rule, the integral will appear in all comparative statics for these parameters. We thus resort to numerical simulations to
explore the model further. To this end, we introduce a two-parameter functional form for benets:
BT
Z
T
o
e
dt
daxt
b
dt. (16)
Eq. (16) conforms to our assumptions about the benets function above (strictly positive rst derivative and negative
second derivative). The parameter a can be interpreted as a base value of the beachfront property, while the parameter b
controls the hedonic price of beach width, conditional on having a beachfront property. As before, d converts the capital
value into a ow. A particular advantage of this functional form is that static hedonic pricing models actually estimate the
beach width parameter. For example, Pompe and Rinehart [28] nd b 0.2632 in a constant-elasticity hedonic model.
In the following simulations, we use the same numerical values for parameters that generated Fig. 2. For each set of
simulations, we x all but two parameters and vary the others together. The base parameters are: b 0.25, a 200,
d 0.06, c 10, and f 1. These parameters are illustrative and used to generate testable hypotheses; they do not
represent any particular community. For each combination of parameters, we numerically solve for T* in two different
ways. First, we minimize (v) in Eq. (9) using Matlabs constrained minimization procedure (FMINCON) to obtain
^
T. We use
FMINCON to constrain
^
T to fall between 0 and T
max
, where T
max
is dened implicitly:
xT
max
1 mx
0
me
yT
max
x
0
gT
max
0. (17)
We nest a numerical quadrature (Matlabs QUAD function) within the objective function to evaluate the integral in
Eq. (16). We then evaluate Eq. (9) at
^
T and compare with the value of abandoning the property, which is zero by
construction:
T
n
^
T if v
^
T40;
1 else:
(
(18)
Second, we solve the rst-order condition in Eq. (10) directly to obtain
^
^
T using Matlabs FSOLVE procedure. Again we use
numerical quadrature to evaluate Eq. (16). We compute T* as in Eq. (16), substituting
^
^
T for
^
T and check that the two
numerical solutions for T* are close, i.e. verify that the absolute value of the difference is less than 0.001.
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M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 66
Fig. 5 numerically illustrates Proposition 2 by showing that increasing the variable cost will increase T* when baseline
erosion is low but will decrease T* when baseline erosion is high. Contour labels represent different values of T*. Following
along the horizontal axis, T* increases for low values of g but increases for high values of g. This raises the possibility that
beach nourishment as a coastal management strategy will accelerate in response to climate change-driven sea-level rise
even if the scarcity of nourishment sand drives up the variable cost.
We next present six numerical results that are shown to hold with accompanying contour plots for the optimal
nourishment rotation length. There are four accompanying gures in an online appendix (Figs. A1A4), and Fig. 6 depicts
the less intuitive Numerical Result 6.
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6
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
1
0
10
10
11
11
1
1
12
12
1
2
13
13
1
3
14
14
15
15 16
17
Cost of Nourishment Sand
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
E
r
o
s
i
o
n
R
a
t
e
Countour Plot of Optimal Rotation Length
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.5
1
1.5
2
Fig. 5. Increasing variable cost of sand can accelerate or decelerate nourishment.
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
1
0
1
0
1
0
11
1
1 12
1
2
13
1
3
14
Exponential Decay Rate of Nourishment Sand
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
R
a
t
e
Countour Plot of Optimal Rotation Length
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
Fig. 6. A higher exponential decay of nourishment sand increases (decreases) frequency of nourishment if the decay rate is lower (higher) than the
discount rate.
M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 67
Numerical Result 1. The optimal rotation length decreases as the value of beach width increases.
Nourishment occurs more frequently when the hedonic price of beach width (b) is higher. This result is intuitive because,
ceteris paribus, a high-b community would prefer a wide beach. A higher b increases both the total and marginal benets
of beach width, and more frequent nourishment increases the average beach width.
Numerical Result 2. The optimal rotation length decreases as the base property value increases.
Communities will nourish more frequently when the base property value (a) is higher. As population pressure in the
coastal zone drives up coastal property values, holding other features of the problem constant, our model predicts that
more beach nourishment will occur.
Numerical Result 3. The optimal rotation length decreases as the baseline erosion rate increases.
When the beach erodes faster, communities must nourish more often to keep up.
Numerical Result 4. The optimal rotation length decreases as the share of beach width subject to exponential decay increases.
When more of the beach is subject to exponential decay (m is big), a larger fraction of beach width addition from
nourishment is lost quickly, and communities must nourish more often to keep up. Keeping up with erosion sounds
intuitive, but high-m communities are getting less bang for their buck, and this suggests that Numerical Result 4 is
somewhat counterintuitive. The former effect dominates because all communities will keep up with erosion as long as the
present value of beach nourishment for some T is positive. Communities that lose a lot of nourishment sand in the
adjustment to equilibrium prole essentially become addicted to nourishment as a beach stabilization strategy.
The present value of nourishment exceeds the present value of abandoning the beach for all parameter value combinations,
even though the total present value of the optimal programthe solution to Eq. (9), v (T*)is lower for high-m
communities than for low-m communities. This is no different than suggesting that two otherwise identical properties with
different depreciation rates will be priced differently in the market.
Numerical Result 5. The optimal rotation length decreases as the discount rate increases.
The intuition ows directly from that standard thinking in resource economics; a higher discount rate places more
weight on the near term. In rotation problems, this implies that the marginal net benets of a single rotation receive more
weight than the present value of future rotations. The manager shrinks the rotation length to trade more net benets in the
short run for less net benets in the long run. Note that Figs. A1A4 all illustrate Numerical Result 5.
Numerical Result 6. The optimal rotation length increases (decreases) as the exponential decay rate of nourishment sand
increases if the decay rate is higher (lower) than the discount rate.
Fig. 6 illustrates this result. The thick solid line is the 451 line along which y d. Recall that in the traditional Faustmann
problemand the interpretation due to Samuelson [29]the second term in the rst-order condition is the foregone
interest payment by delaying land rent, where land rent is the discounted present value of all future rotations. A higher
discount rate means that the difference between marginal costs and marginal benets of a single rotation must be greater
to compensate. To the left of the 451 line in Fig. 6, the discount rate is higher than the decay rate of nourishment sand. In
other words, the depreciation of nancial capital (foregone interest) dominates the depreciation of sand capital. To balance
interest lost on land rent with marginal net benets, the rotation length must decrease as the exponential decay rate of
sand increases. The opposite is true to the right of the 451 line where depreciation of sand capital dominates. In essence, if
the discount rate exceeds the decay rate, an increase in decay rate is relatively more costly to the short run because one
places more weight on the short run with a high discount rate, and rotation length is shortened to adjust.
5. Endogenous initial widthallowing the extensive margin to change
We now consider whether our most surprising resultthat input demand for sand can slope upwards or
downwardscontinues to hold if initial beach width (x
0
) is a choice variable. The analytical approach to this extension
is straightforward; we now have an additional choice variable in (9) and a second rst-order condition. However, x
0
enters
both the benet and cost functions, making analytical propositions problematic and requiring numerical analysis.
Numerical Result 7. With endogenous initial beach width, input demand for sand can slope upwards for low variable costs but
turns downwards for high variable costs.
For the same parameter values used above, we nd that with endogenous x
0
an increase in variable cost still decreases
the nourishment interval. However, it also decreases x
0
. Communities are nourishing more often but building the beach out
less when costs increase. When initial beach width is unconstrained, the net result is that sand use decreases when variable
cost of sand increases. That is, input demand slopes downwards. Fig. A5 (available in the online appendix) illustrates this
result for a range of values of baseline erosion. Conditional on baseline erosion (xing a particular level on the y-axis), a
variable cost increase (moving along the x-axis) leads to less sand use (a lower sand use contour).
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M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 68
The generality of downward-sloping sand demand is far from clear because there are physical limits on x
0
, i.e. feasibility
constraints on how far out a beach can be built. When these physical constraints are put in the problem, there is a range over
which managers always choose the maximum x
0
. The desired (unconstrained) x
0
is essentially greater than the physical
maximum. As a consequence, a variable cost increase shrinks the desired x
0
but not necessarily enough to be below the
maximum feasible x
0
. Because rotation length also shrinks with the increased variable cost, the amount of sand used increases.
That is, input demand can slope upwards. Fig. 7(a) illustrates this result for the case of high erosion and lowcost of nourishment
sand. We nd that upward-sloping input demand cannot be sustained at high costs of nourishment sand; eventually sand
demand turns downwards. Fig. 7(b) illustrates this result for the case of high erosion and high cost of nourishment sand.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
4.8494 4.8494
4.8494
4.9907 4.9907 4.9907
5.132 5.132 5.132
5.2733 5.2733
5.2733
5.4146
5.4146
5.4146
5.556
5.556
5.556
5.6973
5.6973
5.6973
5.8386
5.8386
5.8386
5.9799
5.9799
5.9799
6.1212
6.1212
6.1212
Cost of Nourishment Sand
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
E
r
o
s
i
o
n
R
a
t
e
Sand Use
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
3
.
1
5
6
6
3
.
3
7
1
1
3
.
3
7
1
1
3
.
5
8
5
7
3
.
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Cost of Nourishment Sand
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1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
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Fig. 7. (a) Sand use with endogenous but physically constrained x
0
high erosion, lowsand cost. (b) Sand use with endogenous but physically constrained
x
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high erosion, high sand cost.
M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 69
To summarize, when the background erosion rate is high, greater nourishment activity will increase the scarcity of
nourishment-quality sand and likely raise its price. For communities that are already building out their beaches to the
maximum feasible width, this will lead to an acceleration of nourishment (increased sand use) in the short run. If the price
of sand continues to rise, eventually communities will nd it in their interest to reduce the initial beach width as they
reduce the nourishment interval. As in the case with exogenous x
0
, eventually sand becomes so expensive that abandoning
the shoreline defense is optimal.
6. Discussion
Resource economics fundamentally deals with connections between natural capital and nancial capital. Optimal
mineral extraction hinges on whether capital in the bank grows faster than the value of capital in the ground. In sheries
and forestry, optimal management entails balancing growth of the biological resource with growth of the nancial
resource. Viewing a managed beach as a renewable natural resource, one sees again this deep capital-theoretic connection.
Optimal management from a beach communitys perspective depends on the rates of decay of sand and nancial capital.
When nourishment sand decays slower than the rate of foregone interest, an increase in variable cost or increased
nourishment sand decay could accelerate beach nourishment. This result is more nuanced when initial beach width is
made endogenous, but it does not disappear entirely.
By focusing on a representative community, our model produces testable hypotheses about real coastal communities in
general. For empirical work, one would need cross-community variation in erosion rates, base property values and
values of beach width (from hedonic studies), and records of nourishment activities. Such empirical work is especially
important for future research because actions of individual communities could have consequences at the spatial scale of an
entire coastline. That is, the effects of small bumps in an otherwise uniform coastline can propagate over large spatial
scales in economically meaningful time scales [1]. If our positive model describes real behavior, spatially heterogeneous
property values and erosion rates will lead to spatially heterogeneous nourishment interventions. Whether this
process would then lead to a more or less spatially uniform coastline than one that has not been altered by humans is an
open question.
A complementary approach to analyzing beach nourishment would be to use numerical dynamic programming [19].
This approach allows for a more general description of the dynamics such that the state variable evolves as a function of
absolute time, rather than time since the last nourishment event. It also permits the choice of initial beach width for each
rotation. The drawbacks include increased computational burden and the difculty of generalizing comparative static or
dynamic results. In our model, we are able to obtain some analytical results before relying on numerical methods.
Nevertheless, with no previous literature on beach nourishment as a dynamic capital accumulation problem and with
increasing development pressure in the coastal zone, we submit that our Faustmann-style rotation and numerical dynamic
programming are both worthwhile to pursue.
Although most of our model results conform to basic intuition, the possibility that nourishment could increase in
frequency as the variable costs increase is unsettling. As sea level rises or storm patterns change in response to climate
change, an increase in the baseline erosion rate is not unlikely. At the same time, more people are living in the coastal zone,
and property values continue to rise. Nourishment sand that can be recovered through dredging may eventually become
scarce [10,15], and one would expect variable costs to increase. If communities respond by nourishing more often, this
effect could feed back on itself and further accelerate nourishment. Beaches then become increasingly articial, and the
ecological costs of nourishment would grow substantially. In the current policy regime, environmental impacts of
nourishment are cataloged but not counted as costs to weigh against nourishment benets. In a future of accelerated
nourishment activity, policy-makers could begin to require these non-market costs to be counted.
Our model does not address the funding mechanism for beach nourishment. We implicitly assume that a dynamically
optimal nourishment projectfrom the communitys perspectivecan be funded in some manner. Real projects receive
funding from federal, state, and local governments as well as private sources. Both the William J. Clinton and George W.
Bush administrations have supported reducing the federal share of nourishment, though Congress passed the 2002 Water
Appropriations Bill with $47.1 million more for beach nourishment than the $87.6 million that President Bush requested
[23]. An important question for future research is how a change in the availability of federal funds for nourishment will
affect the prevalence and frequency of nourishment. Conventional wisdom suggests that there would simply be less
nourishment, but our capital-theoretic model suggests that outcomes could be more complicated. Whether a reduction in
the federal share will increase or decrease nourishment activity could depend on the allocation of federal funds across xed
and variable costs.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the NSF Biocomplexity Program (Grant #DEB0507987). We thank Sathya Gopalakrishnan
for valuable research assistance and Tom Crowley, Ling Huang, Mike Orbach, Joe Ramus, Jim Wilen, Junjie Zhang, and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
M.D. Smith et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009) 5871 70
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.07.011.
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