STRATEGIC

EDITION
CLS guidance on ethics in operations
DUTY with
DISCERNMENT:
STRATEGI C
EDI TI ON
Copyright 2009 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented
by the Minister of National Defence. This official document is published on the
authority of the Commander, Land Forces Command.
Walker, Richard J.
Duty With Discernment: CLS Guidance on Ethics in Operations /
Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Walker, CD, Ph.D., Army Ethics Officer.
Directorate of Land Concepts and Design
Kingston, Ontario
2009
Publication Data:
Directorate Army Public Affairs,
Ottawa, (September 2009)
Government of Canada Catalogue Number: D2-244/2009E
NDID Number: B-GL-347-001/FP-000
ISBN: 978-1-100-11857-4
Layout and Cover Design
Directorate Army Public Affairs
CLS Foreword
Duty with discernment
(Good judgment with insight)
PART A
Command authority (Officers):
Ensuring ethical certainty and moral resilience
PART B
Respect the dignity of all persons
and you will respect yourself
PART C
Control authority (NCMs): Living our ethos
APPENDIX 1
Army ethos
APPENDIX 2
The soldiers card
APPENDIX 3
The Canadian soldiers code of conduct
5
7
15
21
29
31
33
3
Table of contents
4
Duty with discernment
(Good judgment with insight)
Members of the Army,
Recent global events caution us that the veneer of civilization can
be very thin and the humanitarian need to protect the weak and the inno-
cent from a ruthless and implacable foe confirms to us that being a force for
good in the world is a uniquely human enterprise. While the emphasis of past
conflicts has been on combat power and strategic terrain, the operational
imperative of asymmetrical warfare is now focused on the human dimension
as the key force multiplier in the fight for values and ideas. While it was once
sufficient for a soldier to have a good tactical eye for ground, we now need
soldiers who have a strategically discerning eye for people. Where once only
physical courage defined heroism, the need for moral courage throughout
the breadth of our Army is now a key institutional goal in shaping our culture.
Similarly, while always ensuring that we have the right tools for the job, we
must also acknowledge that the moral component of the conventional Laws
of Armed Conflict has polarized. The threat forces may in their blatant disre-
gard for the sanctity of human life, target the moral centre of our Army as a
medium through which to degrade our will and sap our national resolve.
This Commanders guidance is published in a Strategic Edition and
a Soldier Edition. The former is intended to affirm the Army Command vision,
while the latter is intended to resonate at a tactical level. The aim of this book-
let is to clearly articulate both our expectations of you in our jus in bello
(how we fight) conduct of operations and to assert to you that our conduct as
professional citizen soldiers will serve to define our specific mission narrative
to both national and international audiences. The former is intended to affirm
the Army Command vision, while the latter is intended to resonate at a tacti-
cal level. As in the finest traditions of the Canadian Army, we expect an ethical
warrior, as a protector and a defender, to reflect the best of Canadian values
within an increasingly dangerous and complex operating environment. Yet,
even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support.
5
If we do not confront the soft relativism
that is now disguised as virtue, we will find
ourselves morally and intellectually disarmed.
William Bennett, The Death of Outrage
6
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie
CMM, MSC, MSM, CD
Chief of Land Staff / Army Commander
Notwithstanding the moral outrages that may be perpetrated by the enemy,
that support will erode or reverse rapidly, no matter how worthy the politi-
cal objective, if Canadian society believes that we conduct ourselves in an
unethical, inhumane, or iniquitous manner. Our ethical and moral compass
is values-based. Though we function within codes of military laws which
dictate acceptable conduct, in operations we are challenged by a myriad of
harm-based decisions. Each has a moral component, and each demands that
a discerning and insightful judgment be made.
The theme of this CLS guidance is that the nature of operations, as
with nature itself, abhors a vacuum. If you fail to assert positive leadership,
someone or some idea will inevitably lead your troops astray. Should you fail
to properly inform, train, or prepare your soldiers, they will be neither posi-
tioned for success nor empowered with the requisite insight to make the dis-
cerning judgements required of the strategic corporal, captain, and colonel
of today. Similarly, if you fail to inculcate, demonstrate, and police the values
and beliefs inherent in our Army ethos, your soldiers will be denied the ethical
certainty they require to know what right looks like and to do their duty
with discernment.
Ensuring ethical certainty within the asymmetrical battlespace and
developing our moral centre demands a healthy ethical climate, free from re-
prisal, which inspires the moral courage to speak truth to power in fixing the
problem and not the blame. Akin to physical fitness, ethical combat fitness is
a command responsibility, which is inextricably linked to operational effec-
tiveness we ignore it at our peril.
Chief Warrant Officer Wayne Ford
MMM, MSC, CD
Land Force Command / Army Sergeant-Major
Command authority
(Ofcers):
Ensuring ethical
certainty and
moral resilience
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A
PART A - Command authority
(Ofcers):
Ensuring ethical certainty
and moral resilience
1. Asymmetrical warfare presents on a spatial, functional, temporal,
and moral plane. Within an information warfare construct, the moral com-
ponent of asymmetrical warfare has proven to be an operational imperative.
Achieving the ethical certainty of acceptable norms of conduct is an all-ranks
function. It is analogous to a tug-of-war team whereby ethics and leadership
are two strands of the same rope. A failure in either leads to both failing the
mission and failing our soldiers.
2. Asymmetrical warfare is a struggle whereby the legal distinction be-
tween civilian, combatant, criminal and soldier can be problematic within an
environment where the moral component of our operations defines our abil-
ity to transform tactical victory into a desirable strategic outcome. Actively
shaping the ethical character of the conflict is now a vital element in shaping
the battlefield. Driving all other considerations is that we have an absolute
moral and ethical imperative to prepare our soldiers to conduct and succeed
in combat, and to do their duty with discernment.
3. It is the responsibility of senior Army leadership to anticipate the
ethical uncertainty inherent in asymmetrical warfare and to arm our junior of-
ficers and younger soldiers with the basic moral principles they can rely on to
make the discerning moral choice when facing ambiguity. While general rules
such as our Code of Conduct are helpful, they can never replace or address
the innumerable values-based judgments required by the fluidity of opera-
tions.
9
It is exceptional and difficult to find in one man all the qualities
necessary for a great general. What is most desirable, and which
instantly sets a man apart, is that his intelligence or talent are [sic]
balanced by his character or courage.
Napoleon l: Maxims of War, 1831
10
On the other hand, your commitment to the Army Ethics Programme (AEP)
serves to insulate your soldiers from moral angst and provides the ethical cer-
tainty inherent in an Army ethos (values and beliefs) whereby the immutable
values of loyalty, duty, courage and integrity are demonstrably professed and
practiced. Our ethos constitutes our moral compass and our shield
against ethical uncertainty. Yet, it is insufficient that the compass
exists metaphorically as a technology. To influence his deci-
sion-making, the soldier must know the compass, understand
it, be convinced of its value, know how to use it, use it properly
and trust it.
4. Zero tolerance for ethical failings should not be con-
fused with a zero defect mentality. Notwithstanding our best in-
tentions, the fog of war makes operational mistakes or miscalculations
inevitable. There is a clear distinction between a mistake and doing wrong. A
mistake is simply a judgement leading to an undesirable result, while doing
wrong is an individual choice that violates our integrity. Mistakes illustrate
important lessons from which we learn, and serve to test the fidelity of our
trust in our subordinates and mission command.
Command authority delegates mission authority but never responsibility.
The strategic corporal, captain or colonel is empowered to do their duty with
discernment based solely on your delegated authority; while you, the com-
mander in trust of their judgment, retain full responsibility. Mistakes under
delegated authority will occur and demonstrable acceptance of commander
responsibility must be seen to take place or the credibility of mission com-
mand will be lost. Wrong-doing, on the other hand, is always an individual
choice leading to individual culpability. Those who know of the wrong-doing
and fail in their obligations to act under QR&O 4.02, 5.01 are, by individual
choice, culpable.
5. The strength of our Army in meeting the complexity, ambiguity, and
ethical uncertainty of asymmetrical operations rest in our uncompromising
adherence to an Army ethos (our values and beliefs) based on our expecta-
tions of Army service, Army values, and Canadian societal expectations. Op-
erational success demands qualities such as emotional intelligence, empathy,
subtlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness. An ethical warrior
is a more skilful and adaptive warrior. Put simply, an ethical warrior reflects
empathy when empathy works and lethal aggression when such is required.
Ethical warriors are protectors and defenders trained to close with and de-
stroy the enemy if and when required. Enshrining this self-image within our
Army ethos safeguards our humanity, defines us to others, and empowers the
Canadian soldier to make the discerning judgements needed in addressing
full spectrum operations.
6. The Army ethos is the identity card of the values of the Canadian
Army. It underlies every action performed by any Canadian soldier, anywhere
in the world. It reflects the ethical code by which we act and is reinforced
by the inculcation of those values through the chain of command, with no
separation between what we profess and what we practice. Our ethos guides
our moral behaviour that individual behaviour as seen by, and which influ-
ences others. It is the habit of the heart, mind and character of the citizen
soldier. It is what we do when no one is watching. Yet, in informational war-
fare, the world is watching. Therefore any real, falsely perceived, or fabricated
incidental breakdown in ethics, discipline, or leadership may be amplified by
the media, the public, or the enemy as a symptom of moral degradation.
7. Since war is hell, you have a moral obligation to insulate your sol-
diers from the psychological scarring associated with combat and to provide
them with an emotional road map to get home safely. You must arm your
soldiers with a meaningful warriors code that both motivates and restrains
them. That warriors code is reflected in the Army ethos of duty, loyalty, integrity
and courage. It mirrors how we fight and it preserves our moral character.
8. The concept of a few bad apples is never an excuse for ethical
failings within an Army. While neither military discipline nor the Army Eth-
ics Programme (AEP) is about making inherently bad people good, the AEP
is, on the other hand, about practicing an ethos-based culture that rewards
and recognizes ethical leadership while simultaneously negating any vacuum
within which bad soldiers can prosper. The AEP, through LFCO 21-18, provides
the operational tools to position your soldiers for ethical certainty, moral
resiliency and operational success. As directed, you must appoint a Unit Ethics
11
12
Coordinator (UEC) and have established a Unit Ethics Plan based on an ethi-
cal risk assessment. This structured ethics community is supplemented by
the Human Dimensions in Operations (HDO) survey regimen, which informs
you on the health of the unit ethical climate and the Lamplighter initiative,
which provides a recourse for any Canadian soldier to meet their legal and
moral obligations to act in accordance with QR&O 4.02 (Officers) and 5.01
(NCMs). Yet no tools can exceed the power of personal dialogue in providing
soldiers a genuine mechanism of voice. That need for voice and your need
to listen increases in direct proportion to the intensity of combat operations.
9. Ethical leaders talk with and not to soldiers. While command respon-
sibility is your legal authority in war, soldiers will only follow your ethical
leadership by your personal example. If ambiguity and uncertainty are the hall-
marks of asymmetrical warfare, then your task is to instil ethical clarity through
the inculcation, demonstration, and policing of the Army values: duty, loyalty,
integrity and courage. Remember soldiers always know!
10. Within Command Responsibility resides the three-way command
harm dilemma: the mission v. risk to our soldiers v. risk to innocent civilians.
The decision process may start with: Is it legal? And if legal, is it moral or eth-
ical? The resolution resides in the morally justified Doctrine of Double-
Effect, which holds that there is a morally-relevant difference between
intending evil and foreseeing that it may occur as an unintended conse-
quence of a legal and ethical act of war.
11. In following the Laws of War, you need to ensure that the orders
that you give your soldiers are devoid of revenge or the get even factor, and
align with our Army group values so that they can do their duty and live reas-
sured with the aftermath. Your soldiers should and will recognize and chal-
lenge manifestly unlawful or unethical orders.
12. Moral courage means taking personal responsibility and is the pri-
mary challenge to all ranks who must display the moral courage to speak
truth to power in an honest reporting of often bad news. In fostering that
moral courage, a commander must listen and must act. Speaking truth to
power provides a genuine mechanism of voice from those who know the
situation. Command humility recognizes that while rank denotes responsi-
bility, it does not always connote intelligence, creativity, or combat smarts.
Trust your subordinates. Trust your soldiers. Listen to them very carefully be-
cause it is their lives that are on the line.
13. We are professional soldiers to whom ethics are not, repeat not, an
optional extra. Ethics are the absolute core of what defines us as professional
warriors. It is ethical restraint that makes the distinction between a warrior
and a barbarian. We are charged to live and sometimes die by a warrior code
of honour reflected in our stringent obedience to the ethical code of restraint
inherent in our Army ethos. Command authority resides in an officer corps
that can differentiate between command (Officer) and control (NCM) func-
tions.
14. Yet we face an enemy in the war on terror that neither observes the
fundamental rules of international humanitarian law, nor respects the code of
the warriors honour. We face a terrorist strategy in which casualties civilian
and non-combatant are intrinsic to their object of war. The ethical com-
mand dilemma is how we remain true to a warrior code of honour that the
enemy does not share; or how do we observe ethical restraint when the other
side will not?
15. The tactical and operational dilemma we may face is that our op-
ponents could come to believe that they gain an advantage in breaking the
Laws of War by engaging in perfidy, subterfuge, and a blatant disregard for
human life yours, theirs, and everyone elses. Yet our professional Army can
only prosper and retain our legitimacy, self-respect, confidence and public
support through Laws of War restraint, and by refusing to stain our warrior
honour.
13
16. As a commander, you may face five unique moral dilemmas:
a. Moral numbing The ethical implications of stand-off weapons systems
generating a hubris in technical performance that may mask reality, by mak-
ing us forget or become numb to the fact that we are killing.
b. Moral frustration The temptation of vengeance, revenge, or the gratu-
itous use of force against those who display no warriors honour, who have
defiled our comrades, and who degrade their claim to combatant respect.
c. Perverse consequences of doing good The more ethically pure your
conduct is, the more likely this observance may be exploited by the enemy as
a potential weakness or vulnerability. This includes the insuperable dilemma
of hostage taking, the use of human shields, or the siting of enemy military
objectives near hospitals and schools.
d. Perverse consequences in risk aversion Casualty avoidance is a primary
concern in Western military cultures. We face an enemy who is prepared to die,
not in the cause of victory, but simply as a contribution to perpetual conflict.
With no hope of tactical victory, they choose martyrdom in a vainglorious but
failing attempt to make us look weak, inept and unprepared; targeting the
moral centre of our Army and our democratic process in an attempt to exhaust
our national resolve.
e. The legalization of ethical reasoning While legal review is a funda-
mental construct in the operational planning process, beware
of the false premise that legal coverage equates to sufficient
ethical coverage. While acting in accordance with Canadian
law is deemed to be ethical, societal values hold the Canadian
soldier to the highest possible ethical standards. Therefore,
fidelity in maintaining the expectation of public trust is
an operational imperative. Operational ethics is a com-
mand responsibility. The international Laws of War are
the friend of civilized societies and the military forces
they field. The Laws of War help, and do not hinder, the
conduct of operations. It is important that the letter and
spirit of each tenet of international law be thoroughly
understood so that neither the success of the mission
nor the welfare of the soldier is compromised.
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Respect the dignity
of all persons
and you will respect
yourself
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B
PART B - Respect the dignity
of all persons
and you will respect yourself
1. Threat forces now represent 4th generation strategic factions. They
cover the full spectrum from criminal elements to religious extremists that
choose to wage terrorism on or amongst the people. Terrorists believe they
have a certain strategic advantage over democratic governments because
they are prepared to commit suicide or take hostages in the murder of in-
nocents. This can place democratic governments, which value human life, in
an insuperable moral dilemma. These non-state actors are not deterred by
the threat of punishment under international law. The enemys targeting of
innocents is an explicit psychological strategy designed to turn our respect
for the legal status of non-combatants, our limits of moral perseverance, and
our revulsion over overt violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict, into an
exploitable vulnerability. They view our social respect for the rule of
law and our belief in the sanctity of human life as our centre
of gravity or as a weakness, instead of the fact that in a
war of ideas and human ideals our compassion and
respect for the dignity of all persons serves as
our manifestly greatest strength.
17
All soldiers taken must be cared for with
magnanimity and sincerity so that they
may be used by us.
Chang Y
18
2. The enemy has adopted the doctrine of persistent combat based on
the components of unlimited time, a full disregard for the sanctity of human
life, and no shortage of martyrs. It is as they express metaphorically: The West
has all the watches; we have all the time. Subsequently, the enemy targets
non-combatants in ever-increasing acts of barbarism aimed at: triggering our
rage from their outrages, eroding the moral centre of our society and impos-
ing a moral and political dilemma on governments.
3. Expectations of reciprocity in treatment will be problematic. Con-
ventional norms give us conditional hope that if we treat the enemy well, the
enemy will reciprocate. Of primary concern is that our restraint may dissolve
if adversaries act dishonourably, abuse non-combatants, or commit atrocities
against captive forces. Correspondingly, we cannot assume any reciprocity of
expectations regarding the well-being of Canadian soldiers kidnapped or cap-
tured by threat forces. While we will unquestionably meet the spirit and letter
of duty-of-care of unlawful combatants, bona fide Prisoners of War and all
other detainees, commanders at all levels need to be aware that this is a uni-
lateral guarantee - whereby we play operate in accordance with by the rules of
war and that the enemy may not.
4. Commanders must understand that the most compelling reason
for our soldiers to accept restraint is the internal moral damage that they risk
in failing to do so. The ethical ambiguity and uncertainty of the asymmetrical
battlespace can place the Canadian soldier in moral peril. Our soldiers are a
product of a society which values human life and prohibits unlawful killing.
Within the mandate and the power to kill lies the potential to corrupt char-
acter and promote hubris a destructive individual or group arrogance. Our
Army ethos provides the warriors code which keeps our soldiers from losing
their humanity and their ability to enjoy a life worth living outside the realm
of combat.
5. Our work on Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) confirms that
catastrophic war experiences not only cause disabling psychiatric symptoms
but they can also ruin good character, based not solely on exposure to vio-
lence but also on a personal betrayal of failing to do the right thing. Allied
experience shows us that veterans who were directly or indirectly party to
immoral or dishonourable behaviour perpetuated by themselves, their com-
rades, or their commanders, have the hardest time reclaiming their lives.
What happens in the field does not stay in the field; both the perpetrator
and the witnesses to an unethical or criminal situation will be emotionally
19
scarred for the rest of their lives and none can ever return home with their
personal or corps/regimental honour intact. The tragic paradox is that fight-
ing for ones country may render one unable to enjoy the quality of life of the
society that one is fighting for.
6. Hating the enemy is not a precondition for combat effectiveness.
Hatred of the enemy may prove to be irrational and self-destructive. If sol-
diers abandon restraint and allow themselves to be overcome by hatred in
revulsion to a heinous act, they risk losing their humanity; a consequence
which serves to undermine the moral authority of our troops in theatre. Yes,
hate the act but not the man. An act of retaliation is a crime and we dont
do that. In accordance with the CF Code of Conduct (Appendix 3) we treat
all detainees humanely, and any mistreatment of de-
tainees or non-combatants is illegal, immoral, and
will not be tolerated because we dont do that.
Control
authority (NCMs):
Living our ethos
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C
PART C - Control authority (NCMs):
Living our ethos
1. As NCMs you have intimate contact with your soldiers. Your function
as immediate role models for ethical behaviour increases in direct propor-
tion to the intensity of operational exposure. It is through you that we live
our ethos by: inculcating our values, demonstrating our values, and polic-
ing our values through a fully transparent intolerance for any behaviour
which stains our warrior honour.
2. Within a climate of ambiguity and uncertainty, there is a premium
on demonstrated (not simply professed) leadership. In asserting ethical cer-
tainty, leaders at all levels insulate their soldiers within the Army ethos (duty,
loyalty, integrity and courage) and set the tone and conditions for subordi-
nate actions. Leaders set the Unit moral compass to align with our group val-
ues and to steer away from any misplaced group loyalty or insidious Band
of Brothers claims of supporting buddies whether right or wrong. Turning a
blind eye to wrongdoing is an ethical failing and a criminal act; and we dont
do that.
3. Of particular concern is the tendency to defend the good soldier
euphemism whereby we may tolerate particular soldiers, supported by oth-
ers, for being good in the field, but who are, in fact, simply soldiers of bad
character pursuing an alternate ethos based on the values of cruelty, abuse of
power and disrespect for the law. These may be the miscreants who fill a lead-
ership vacuum and lead others astray. The aim of the Army Ethics Programme
(AEP) is not to make bad people good, but to provide the leadership, group
structure and the requisite supervision to deny the opportunity for those sol-
diers of dubious personal character to violate the Army ethos.
23
You must know that it is no easy thing for a principle
to become a mans own, unless each day he maintain it
and hear it maintained, as well as work it out in life.
Epictetus
4. Be aware of the Tour-Term Syndrome, which can affect soldiers be-
haviour and attitudes towards the latter part of an operational tour. The tour-
term stage whereby everything may become suspect by that point in time
can be identified by soldier boredom, fatigue, mission disillusion, or the
increasing fear of becoming a casualty as tour end looms. This survival angst
may stimulate negative behaviours such as modifications of ROEs, risk aver-
sion, or whatever it takes, in the soldiers view, to get home safely.
5. As a combat leader, your background or career aspirations are irrel-
evant to your soldiers. They are concerned that you are competent, that you
care about their welfare, and that you will foster a safe and ethical command
environment. Remember the soldier always knows.
6. The ethical climate is the pervasive characteristic of our Army that
affects how decisions are made. The health of the ethical climate is based on a
soldiers perception of how leadership does business and constitutes a shared
perception of right behaviour. If we permit a vacuum between what we pro-
fess and what we practice, the soldier will identify and fill the incongruence
between the normative (the way things are right now) compared to the way
things should be. We permit no vacuum to occur and amplify the group (sec-
tion, platoon, company, battalion, or brigade) assertion of our ethos with our
credo we dont do that.
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25
7. Leaders supervise, oversee, check, train to standard, uphold stan-
dards and ensure the safety of troops. They never allow a leadership vacuum
to form. Your soldiers are aware of and are personally committed to your ex-
pectations because you communicate those expectations. They exude con-
fidence, ethical certainty, and uncompromising discipline because you
inculcate, demonstrate and police the Army ethos.
8. Leaders respond quickly and aggressively to signs of illegal or un-
ethical behaviour. Ethical violations are not just mistakes, they are fundamen-
tal failings in our profession of arms Canadian values and our Army values
are not negotiable. If we lose our moral purchase and our operational legiti-
macy, we will lose public trust.
9. Emotional stress disablers, such as seeing a comrade killed or de-
filed by a barbaric act, can spark frustrations, anger, and a desire for revenge.
As hard as it may be, do not let emotions lead soldiers to commit hasty and
illegal actions. If you witness or hear of such acts, you must not let misplaced
group loyalty prevent you from taking proper action. Our ethos insulates our
moral centre against such acts as we encourage our soldiers to hate the act
but not the man.
10. In a war on values and ideas rather than terrain and resources, the
natural justice you demonstrate in your tactical contact with non-combat-
ants and detainees negates enemy intent and will be the key to victory the
ultimate reason for an army to fight justly.
11. Remember we have a zero tolerance for failure in our legal and
moral obligation to act under QR&O 4.02 (Officers) and 5.01 (NCMs). This, in
concert with our commitment to true, honest, complete and precise reporting,
negates the possibility of any staff or command cover-up. Once this is known
to all, attempted cover-ups based on perceptions of divided loyalty (Army,
corps or mission) fail because all who collude are legally culpable.

12. Leaders educate and train subordinates about the nature of combat
stress and routinely check for indicators such as revenge motivators or troop
lack of human respect. While fear is the natural state of the soldier in opera-
tions, combat stress can be a key threat to ethical conduct. Combat stress can
be generated by enemy action, mission demands, or by an unhealthy ethical
climate that is not free from reprisal. Allied research indicates that combat
stress has been linked to criminal misconduct, abuse of detainees, desecration
of bodies, looting, alcohol abuse, malingering, desertion and the unlawful in-
jury and murder of non-combatants. Hyper-alertness, irrational fear, impaired
performance and soldier apathy are well-known consequences of combat
stress. Yet while we are warriors, we are also human beings within whom stress
is not a sign of weakness but a sign that we are human.
13. The stressors of combat, or the barbarity of the enemy, are never ex-
cuses for committing egregious offences which violate our Army ethos. Abuse
only supports the enemy and does their work for them. All issues of cruelty or
mistreatment must be viewed through the prism of our ethos and national
interests. We emphasize the issue of cruelty and not torture because there is a
legal distinction between the two. As the lower level of abuse, cruelty can be
as effective as torture in the violation of our ethos through the destruction of
human dignity. To the Canadian soldier there is no moral distinction between
either as we abolish cruelty in our Army, so we abolish torture we dont
do that.
26
14. Beware of your soldiers attempting to rationalize incremental abuse
of others based on the end justifies the means benefit excuse- as in- just
softening them up for interrogation. While any form of direct physical assault
is obviously wrong, other forms of indirect abuse such as sleep deprivation
are equally wrong. Abuse by degrees is always abuse and since we know what
right looks like, you must always report and intervene by personal example in
any such case because- we dont do that.
15. Little things mean a lot extreme physical abuse occurs after
milder forms of abuse are tolerated. Mild physical abuse appears after verbal
abuse is tolerated. Never allow the tolerated sequence to begin. For exam-
ple, do not dehumanize or vilify the enemy or non-combatants by labelling
them. Demeaning labels diminish individual identity and emphasize ethnic,
cultural, social or religious identity instead. You must tell troops how they are
to refer to the enemy and the civilian population. Otherwise, soldier creativity
for dehumanizing labels will tend to fill the vacuum and we dont do that.
16. In the stress of combat, be aware that the absence of a demonstra-
ble and positive leadership presence may permit pernicious authority figures
to dominate the group. Soldiers who find themselves socially isolated cannot
then challenge these negative group norms if no one supports them. In this
toxic environment, the phenomena of bystander apathy or the likelihood of
bystander intervention (stepping up to do the right thing), may decrease
with increasing group size.
17. The concept of compassion for wounded enemy soldiers or dis-
tressed civilians should be viewed explicitly rather than assumed to be im-
plicit within our values. Compassion is a requisite humanizing quality that
soldiers should be encouraged to express. Genuine compassion and empathy
for the non-combatant population provides an effective weapon against ter-
rorist insurgents. Our victory comes when the enemy loses legitimacy in the
society it targets and thus loses their recuperative power.
18. Alternatively, in pursuit of cultural sensitivity in the battle for hearts
and minds, you need to positively align soldier exchanges with the populace
with the natural use of schemas (a script in our head which defines acceptable
or predictable civilian behaviour). Since soldiers under stress will attempt to
reduce complex situations to basic reciprocal ethical premises- (we are here
risking our lives defending you; ergo, you should appreciate or like us), you
need to ensure that there is no mismatch between our schema as liberator
and the local population, which may have adopted a counter-schema that
views us as occupiers.
27
19. You need to be aware of the basic psychological relationship between
the qualitative nature of our behaviour (positive/negative) and the consisten-
cy of the attitudes we communicate to others. Our attitudes dont determine
our behaviour the reverse is true. If we act respectfully towards others,
our attitudes will improve. If we act disrespectfully or cruelly, our attitudes
will become more negative because as humans, we attempt to eliminate con-
tradictions. Therefore, if we abuse the enemy, it must be that they deserve it.
And since they are bad it is difficult to hold anything other than a negative
attitude. This results in a destructive feedback-loop; a slippery slope of treat-
ment versus attitude.
20. If you dehumanize your enemy, you dehumanize yourself. Without
restraint, you will do things that you will regret and you wont go home with
honour.
21. We are a professional Army which follows an Army ethos. We pursue
an enemy relentlessly and as violently as required, but what sets us apart from
our enemies is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the stan-
dards and values that dictate we treat non-combatants and detainees with
dignity and respect.
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How can we improve behaviour?
- All our actions should be ethically acceptable.
- We recognize manifestly unlawful or inappropriate orders.
- Whether a witness to, or victim of, unethical behaviour,
we have an obligation to speak out.
How do leaders foster an ethical climate?
- Leaders make ethical expectations clear.
- Leaders discuss ethical concerns.
- Leaders deal with ethical risks.
- Leaders ensure a reprisal-free
environment.
How do you decide what to
do?
- Ethics is about right and
wrong, and doing what is
right.
- Consider your obligation
to act.
- What are the issues?
What are the facts?
- If unsure, talk to your Unit
Ethics Coordinator (UEC).
- Though you must always
take responsibility for your
actions, inaction is never
an option.
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A soldiers primer on military ethics
Empowering the Canadian soldier to know
What right looks like
Helpline:
The Army Ethics Programme (AEP) covers Canadian soldiers anywhere in the
world. To report an ethical violation or concern, contact the Army Ethics Officer
at 613-541-5010 extension 2467.
Obligation to act!
Canadian soldiers are expected to display the moral courage to act do the
right thing for the right reason. QR&Os state the legal obligation to report
to the proper authority any infringement of the orders and instructions gov-
erning the conduct of any person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.
Turning a blind eye to wrongdoing is not an option.
Be a Lamplighter!
When something just isnt right, we, as soldiers, have both an ethical and legal
obligation to act. Under the Lamplighter program, all you have to do is light
the lamp by advising your Unit Ethics Coordinator (UEC) who will identify the
proper authority.
Doing the right thing is not always easy, but it is a lot easier under the
Lamplighter program.
The Code of conduct applies to all CF personnel carrying out military opera-
tions other than Canadian domestic operations. These 11 rules are designed
to allow our soldiers to successfully complete any military
mission according to a standard of conduct demanded
by our Army Ethos, our fellow Canadian citizens, and
the international community in accordance with the
Law of Armed Conflict.
1. Engage only opposing forces and military objec-
tives.
2. In accomplishing your mission, use only the
necessary force that causes the least amount
of collateral civilian damage.
3. Do not alter your weapons or ammunition
to increase suffering, or use unauthorized
weapons or ammunition.
4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect
civilian property.
5. Do not attack those who surrender.
Disarm them and detain them.
6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accor-
dance with the standard set by the Third Geneva
Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is
prohibited.
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7. Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment
required by their condition, whether friend or foe.
8. Looting is prohibited.
9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc.) and places of
worship.
10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and
other recognized symbols of humanitarian agencies.
11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed
Conflict. Disobedience of the Law of Armed Conflict is a crime.
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Code of conduct
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