Policy (ENP) has failed in its goal of creating a ring of well-governed states around the EUs borders. Instability, authoritarianism, civil strife, sectarianism, and international confict characterize much of the EUs hinterland to the east and to the south. Intolerance and archaic forms of nationalism are obstacles to political and economic development. The EU cannot impose democracy and the rule of law through political conditionality without an offer of membership. It must fnd new ways to advance its values and interests in adjoining countries. Policy Recommendation: The EUs new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy should propose to the member states a thorough overhaul of the ENP. Security, energy, and trade should be at the heart of the EUs relations with its neighbors. A more strategic approach is needed, including dialogue with interested third countries, especially Russia, Turkey, the Gulf countries, and the United States. A New Strategy for Europes Neighborhood by Michael Leigh 1744 R Street NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org Europe Program Policy Brief September 2014 Vol. 1, No. 1 Introduction A thorough overhaul of the European Neighbourhood Policy should be the top priority of the EUs new foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, who was nominated in late August. If the EU can expect to have an infuence on world politics, it is frst and foremost in its own neighborhood. Europe faces security threats from violence and war in Ukraine and the Middle East, state failure and dysfunctional democracy in North Africa, returning European jihadists intent on terrorist acts in their countries of origin, and severe energy shortages if Russia cuts of supplies this coming winter. Russias intervention in Ukraine, which amounts to acts of war, openly faunts the principles on which the post-Cold War order in Europe is based, posing a challenge both to the European Union and the United States. A winner-take-all approach undermines the prospect of estab- lishing functioning liberal democra- cies around the EUs periphery. Te EUs prolonged economic crisis and preoccupation with its own future has dimmed its appeal as a model to many in neighboring countries. Tey are increasingly subject to other infuences including intolerant forms of religion and archaic appeals to nationalism. Strengthening peace and security in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Basin is an interest the EU shares with the United States. Te new high representative for foreign afairs and security policy should take a lead in overhauling the policy in close consultation with the United States and other interested third countries. Challenges in the East Te ENP was introduced a decade ago, as the EU prepared to take in ten new member states. Te ENPs goal was to create a ring of well-governed states to the east and the south of the enlarged EU. Te policy covers Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan countries that, since 2008, have been included in the EUs Eastern Partnership as well as all the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and the Palestinian Authority. Ten years afer its launch, the European Neighbourhood Policy has run out of steam. Russias objection to the conclusion of an ambitious EU association agree- ment with Ukraine, negotiated under the ENP banner, was the proximate cause for the outbreak of violent civil strife and international confict over 2 Policy Brief Europe Program the countrys future. Te failure of the Vilnius summit in November 2013, Russias annexation of Crimea, and the destabilization of Ukraine and of the region, put paid to the notion that the ENP could provide the EU with a stable hinterland in Eastern Europe. Frozen conficts involving Georgia, Armenia, Azer- baijan, and Moldova, which fare up at times and carry the constant risk of escalation, have proved intractable, and Ukraine may well witness another such situation. Tere is a feeling of anxiety in Estonia and Latvia, with their large Russian-speaking minorities. Putins doctrine of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states with Russian-speaking minorities could, they fear, one day be applied to them, putting NATOs security guarantee to the test. Poles are troubled by the risk that Ukraine, its immediate neighbor, might again fall under Russian domination. Te persistence of authoritarian rule in several former Soviet states covered by the ENP shows that it has not generated a consensus there in favor of European values. Failure in the South Te repercussions of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, violent sectarian confict in Syria with its fallout in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as a new outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas indicate that the ENP has been no more successful to the south. Te winner-take- all approach that prevails afer elections in many of these countries has intensifed underlying political, economic, social, and religious tensions. It has become a barrier to transition toward a more inclusive form of liberal democ- racy. Only Tunisia and Morocco show possible signs of evolving toward more open societies. Regions covered by the ENP now pose security risks to the EU itself, not least in the form of returning European jihadists ofen tran- siting through Turkey. The Neighbors of the Neighbors Developments in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Levant are strongly infuenced by contiguous countries not covered by the ENP, including Russia, Iraq, and Iran as well as Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan; this puts the geographic logic of the policy into question. Russia remains the major point of reference for the countries of the Southern Caucasus that would become neighbors of the EU only in the increasingly unlikely event of Turkish accession. Armenia has been pressured by Russia into joining the Eurasian customs union, President Vladimir Putins framework for ingathering former Soviet states. Te very existence of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in their present forms depends largely on what happens in Iraq, which, in turn, is infuenced by Iran and the Gulf. Te Islamic State pursues its violent course in Iraq and Syria, without heed to the boundaries of policies made in Brus- sels. Europes security environment needs to be analyzed as a whole and policy responses developed accordingly. Neighborhood is too confning a concept for cali- brating policies to advance EU values and interests in such unstable, diverse, and interdependent regions. Dialogue and engagement with the neighbors of the neighbors is an essential condition for the success of any future eforts to stabilize regions adjoining the EU. When designing future initiatives, the EU should take a more integrated approach, responding to various trans-boundary threats and challenges. It should coordinate closely on objectives and initiatives with the United States and other like-minded countries. A New Security Strategy Te ENP does not have a well-thought-out strategic dimen- sion. Its long-term goals remain unclear beyond a general yearning for a peaceful and well-governed hinterland. Its basic design, modelled on the enlargement process but without the perspective of EU membership, is uncon- vincing. Te ENP is ill-equipped to address transnational phenomena, including terrorist groups, organized crime, The persistence of authoritarian rule in several former Soviet states covered by the ENP shows that it has not generated a consensus there in favor of European values. 3 Policy Brief Europe Program and international migration fows, which are among the main sources of tension and human sufering around the Mediterranean Sea. Te new high representative should mainstream these issues as part of a new European security strategy and coordinate closely with the intelligence, secu- rity, and border management services of member states. No Leverage Without Incentives In the absence of an ofer of membership, the EU lacks the incentives and the political standing to impose on third countries respect for the rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights or the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of borders. Tese are among the core principles upon which the EU and, indeed, the liberal international order are based, but they are not the top priority in most neighboring countries. Te putative benefciaries of the ENP are increasingly subject to other non-western models and ideologies, including authoritari- anism, intolerant forms of religion, and archaic forms of nationalism. Some, like Libya, face the risk of state failure. Te fnancial resources at the disposal of the ENP pale by comparison with those mobilized by the Gulf States, for example to prop up Egypt. Tese states clearly do not share the European approach to fundamental rights and free- doms. Te scale of their aid renders inefective EU eforts to reward supposed political reforms by marginal incre- ments of EU assistance (known in EU jargon as more for more). In any event, member states themselves generally ignore ENP political conditionality in their bilateral dealings with the countries concerned and are infuenced rather by traditional links as well as commercial and energy inter- ests. Under these circumstances, EU institutions, especially the Commission, lack credibility when seeking to impose political conditionality. A Test Case for European Foreign Policy Te success or failure of the EUs overall eforts to create a foreign and security policy will largely be determined in the EUs own neighborhood; this is the part of the world where the EU could most expect to exercise an infuence. Te ENP has been adjusted several times to take into account the difculties that have arisen and the changed circumstances. Tese adjustments include diferent modules for countries to the east (the Eastern Partner- ship promoted by Poland and Sweden) and for Mediter- ranean countries. But such variants have failed to convince; indeed, the Eastern Partnership contributed to a dramatic escalation of regional tensions in the case of Ukraine. In light of the fast deteriorating situation in the EUs neigh- borhood, a fundamental rethink of the overall approach is urgently needed. Another minor adjustment will not be enough to enable the EU to make a real contribution to security, stability, and economic development in neigh- boring regions. Te ENP label coexists with a plethora of policy frame- works with similar goals including Black Sea Synergy, Eastern Partnership, the Barcelona Process, the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership, and the Union for the Mediter- ranean. Te earlier term Wider Europe is still current. All this creates confusion and obscures political messages. Te new high representative should make a clean sweep of these overlapping initiatives and put into place a dedicated strategy for each country, or group of countries, based on their specifc needs and capacities. Tere is a strong case for dropping the ENP branding altogether. Vested interests in the member states will be reluctant to depart from the status quo, however inefective it has proved. Southern member states may resist any perceived downgrading of certain dysfunctional Mediterranean states with which they have traditional links. Tey tend to demand equal funding for states to the south and the east, regardless of their respective merits. Nordic countries may object to a high level of engagement, for example on energy security, with authoritarian states like Azerbaijan that are far from meeting EU human rights standards. Te high representative will need to mobilize considerable reserves of political capital and powers of persuasion to alter an EU institutions, especially the Commission, lack credibility when seeking to impose political conditionality. 4 Policy Brief Europe Program existing policy that is essentially a package deal based on the lowest common denominator among member states. Te European External Action Service should continue to provide political analysis and guidance. But the new high representative should work much more closely with the Commission, including the commissioner with a dedi- cated neighborhood or wider Europe portfolio. Most of the EU instruments that could have an impact in neigh- boring countries are managed by the Commission. She should make full use of the authority that comes with her simultaneous role as vice-president of the Commission for external relations to coordinate the work of her colleagues with a bearing on external relations. Closer coordination on political priorities, not merely projects, should be undertaken with the European Invest- ment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as other international fnancial institutions and bilateral donors. Dialogue with the Gulf States and with Russia, if political circumstances eventually permit this, should aim to improve understanding of each others priorities and to focus eforts on areas of greatest need. To be sure, worrying developments in the EUs neighbor- hood cannot principally be ascribed to the inadequacies of a policy framework devised in Brussels. Such developments are the product of internal dynamics within the societies themselves precipitated, at times, by external interven- tion. Te EU is not the only external actor that could help bring order to troubled regions. Coordination with other multilateral and bilateral actors is essential. Still, the EU can make a signifcant contribution to international eforts to bring better political and economic prospects to Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Levant, provided it adopts practical and attainable objectives and develops efective policy instruments. Values and Interests A thorough strategic evaluation of EU interests in each of the countries and regions concerned should precede any further adjustments in EU policy toward neighboring countries. Tis analysis should be wide-ranging and realistic, taking fully into account spillover from adjoining regions. Te high representative should be ready to propose that the ENP be replaced by dedicated policies addressing the specifc needs and capacities of each of the countries concerned. Te review should question the assumption that shared values are the basis for European polices toward neigh- boring countries. It should acknowledge the growing prevalence of values and practices in a number of these countries that are very diferent from those prevailing in the EU itself. However the prudent promotion of Western values, in societies that are receptive to them, should remain part of the EUs approach. A Differentiated Approach A diferentiated country-by-country approach is required. It should combine the EUs security, energy, and commer- cial interests with support for better governance, the rule of law, and democracy in societies that themselves have opted for these. Member states must summon the political will to support those in neighboring countries who seem genuinely committed to Western values, while maintaining a greater political distance from corrupt, authoritarian, or dysfunctional regimes. Nonetheless the EU will ofen need to do business with regimes that are not to its liking, in line with the practice of member states. In the future, the EU should design policies to address the specifc needs and capacities of individual countries, or, where they share policy-relevant characteristics, groups of countries. Tis implies, for example, that Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia might qualify for a deeper form of engagement than Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. None- theless, in the case of Azerbaijan, the EU should be ready to develop relations in areas of common interest, notably energy. The EU is not the only external actor that could help bring order to troubled regions. Coordination with other multilateral and bilateral actors is essential. 5 Policy Brief Europe Program No Over-Ambitious Agreements Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), requiring the adoption and implementation of vast swathes of EU laws and rules (the acquis), are not necessarily the most appropriate instrument for countries facing fundamental political and economic development challenges. Such agreements should be limited to rather few countries that have demonstrated the will and capacity to adapt their societies to the standards and practices prevailing in the EU. Even where such agreements are already on the table, the EU should replace them with more limited forms of engagement adapted to the specifc situa- tion of the countries concerned. At present in North Africa and the Levant, beyond Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia, there is little scope for concluding ambitious and demanding DCFTAs. Te EU should take initiatives toward Jordan and Lebanon designed principally to reinforce their fragile political foundations and help them cope with the huge infux of refugees. Te EU needs to develop political, security, and humanitarian initia- tives covering Iraq and Syria, in close liaison with Turkey. Turkish cooperation should be sought in preventing the transit of European jihadists. Any ofces in Turkey servicing jihadists should be closed. Despite the rise of xenophobia within the EU, as mani- fested in the 2014 European Parliament elections, EU leaders must be resolute in pushing through incentives, in the form of trade openings and easier migration facilities for legitimate travelers, if they wish to wield infuence in the few countries that have chosen the path of political and economic reform. Partners Crucial to Success Te top priority of the EUs new high representative should be a thorough review of the ENP in close liaison with the Commission and member states. Te high representative should consult with the United States, Turkey, Israel, the Gulf countries, and other interested states in preparing this analysis. Te United States is supportive of a renewed EU commitment to strengthen security and stability in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, in line with Washing- tons wish to see Europe assume greater responsibilities in these areas. When political conditions permit, a dialogue should be opened with Russia. Te new high representative will need to make full use of her prerogatives as Commission vice-president to mobilize such policy instruments as trade, fnancial and development assistance, institution building, training, and mobility partnerships in support of new EU initiatives toward neighboring countries. Recommendations to the High Representative 1. Given the urgency of the situation, a thorough prag- matic, policy-oriented review of the ENP should be the high representatives top priority. 2. Within 100 days of taking ofce, the high represen- tative should present an assessment of the ENPs efectiveness and recommendations for modifying or replacing it. 3. Te geographical scope of the ENP, its goals, meth- odology, and branding, should be included in the analysis. Te option of dissolving the ENP and replacing it with dedicated policies addressed to individual countries or groups of countries should be considered. 4. A commissioner should be appointed with specifc responsibility for relations with non-EU Euro- pean countries and those in adjoining regions. Tis commissioner should work together with the high representative to mobilize initiatives in areas such as trade, competition policy, development assistance, humanitarian aid, human rights, energy, transport, environment policy, and migration to enable the EU to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. 5. Te goal of EU policies toward its neighbors should be to reinforce European security, stability, and pros- perity through carefully calibrated engagement with each partner country. Turkish cooperation should be sought in preventing the transit of European jihadists. 6 Policy Brief Europe Program 6. Te EU should promote good governance in coun- tries open to advice and support from the EU. It should further develop existing institution-building and training programs as well as eforts to improve the investment climate in countries with a genuine political will to move forward in these areas. 7. Te EU should work with partners to strengthen the efectiveness and independence of the judiciary and the transparency of public procurement and should share its experience in the fght against corruption. 8. Te EU should be ready to respond to requests from governments and civil society representatives to provide support for institutional building and other reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law, democracy, and the protection of human rights. Commitments in these areas should not, however, be conditions for working together in mutually advanta- geous areas such as security, trade, energy, environ- mental protection, and migration. 9. Efective capacities for confict prevention, confict management, and confict resolution should be devel- oped by the EU, in close liaison with relevant agencies in the member states. 10. Te EU and partner countries should work together to limit illegal cross-border fows of people; at the same time the EU should promote mobility for busi- ness people, professionals, university faculty and students, skilled workers, and other bona fde trav- elers. 11. Te EU should propose a range of strategic partner- ships, trade and cooperation agreements, or associa- tion agreements adapted to the needs and capacities of each partner country. 12. Te EU should be ready to conclude DCFTAs with countries that demonstrate the will and the capacity to implement them. Such agreements should not be proposed to countries whose level of development and administrative capacity present obstacles to their implementation. At present, DCFTAs are not appro- priate frameworks for relations with most Mediterra- nean countries, beyond Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia. 13. Te EU should provide carefully targeted fnancial assistance to partner countries to help them achieve mutually agreed objectives; this assistance should be coordinated with the member states, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruc- tion and Development, other international fnancial institutions, and bilateral donors. Te EU should encourage these institutions to expand their lending programs for viable projects of common interest. 14. Partner countries should be invited to cooperate with the EU in the framework of relevant international conventions, including those covering environmental protection and individual rights. 15. Te EU should support regional cooperation among partner countries if they request it to do so. Regional cooperation should be based on mutual interests in concrete felds such as environmental protection and the security and stability of energy installations. Te EU should promote regional cooperation only among countries that see added value from it and ask to beneft from Europes experience. 16. Te EU should set up dedicated dialogues respec- tively with the United States, Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf States to share assessments and coordinate initia- tives toward the countries concerned. On the EU side, these dialogues should be led by the high representa- tive with the participation of the relevant commis- sioner and member state representatives. 17. A successful neighborhood policy requires the EU and Russia to develop a sound framework for bilat- eral relations, including a dialogue on their common The EU should promote regional cooperation only among countries that see added value from it and ask to beneft from Europes experience. 7 Policy Brief Europe Program Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone. About the Author Sir Michael Leigh is senior adviser to the German Marshall Fund of the United States. About the Europe Program Te Europe Program aims to enhance understanding of the challeng- es facing the European Union and the potential implications for the transatlantic relationship. Analysis, research, and policy recommen- dations are designed to understand the dichotomy of disintegration and deepening of the EU and to help improve the political, economic, fnancial, and social stability of the EU and its member states. In 2014, the Europe Program focuses on integration and disintegration in the EU, the deepening of the euro area, the changing role of Germany in Europe and the world, as well as challenges in the EUs neighborhood. About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF sup- ports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. neighborhood. When circumstances permit, EU leaders should signal their willingness to overcome tensions and to engage with Russia. Te unsuccessful pursuit of common spaces that has dominated EU-Russia interactions for much of the past decade should be set aside in favor of a more operational framework in which common interests, including trade, energy, and relations with neighboring coun- tries, can be handled efectively. Te EU needs both to uphold the principles that have generally ensured peace and stability in post-cold war Europe and to be pragmatic in taking Russian perceptions of its own interests, and of the shifing balance of power in Europe, into account. In the long run, the ques- tion of working toward a common economic space throughout Europe should be considered.
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