Sept.

18, 2013
Constitutional Law I
Transcribed by: Michelle Mae P. Andoy
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Lets continue w/ sec. 4, we already started w/ the first paragraph referring to election of the president and vice
president and their express prohibition.
Second paragraph provides that No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service
for the full term for which he was elected
If you have this voluntary renunciation is not present in the first paragraph, it bolsters the argument that there is no
need to determine that the renunciation of the office of the president is voluntary or involuntary. The fact is he is still
prohibited from any re-election. That is why, that is not the argument because that is not present in the first paragraph.
You talk about renunciation of office for any length of time meaning if he is still allowed to be re-elected for another
term.
Paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 refers to the congress as the national board of canvassers for presidential election as always
provided by law the election of the president and vice president should be held on the second Monday of May where
returns of every election shall be transmitted to the Congress directed to the President of the Senate. So its the
Congress who will canvass, done in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. When it comes to ordinary or regular elections
meanings elections other than the president and the vice president its the COMELEC is the authority of the over-all
canvass of the votes. Now when it comes to the president and the vice president the Constitution put that away from
the COMELEC and gave the authority to canvass to the CONGRESS. So the board of canvassers will be the Congress, now
take note of that because the multiple choice may ask who acts as the board of canvassers of the president or vice
president. Now you may say that maam we now have the automation of the election, so there is no point of counting
because before they will actually canvass/count the votes in a joint session. What they would receive right now is EACH
OF THE RETURNS of each Province. So, there is still subject for canvassing only that they are assisted by the computer.
But, its not just the counting of the votes that is the function of national canvasser. Under the second paragraph, it is
also their function to proclaim the winner and if there is a tie. It is still the national board of canvasser who will break the
tie. In the case, there are two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress
shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. So as national board of canvassers they will canvass the
vote and proclaim the winner. And in case of a tie, it has the authority to break the tie. All its functions are ministerial. It
does not require any discretion.
Last paragraph, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. We call this
as the PET or the presidential electoral tribunal. Their function is more or less same on the SET [senate] or HRET [house
or representatives] only the subject.
Case: Tecson vs. COMELEC
Actually this case was originally filed w/ the COMELEC questioning the qualifications of FPJ, but it was appealed
certiorari w/ the Supreme Court, on certiorari Tecson questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of FPJ citing this last paragraph of Sec. 4 that according to the Constitution it is the SC w/c is the sole judge
of qualifications. Now is it correct? The same principle that we have learned with the SET or HRET meaning that its
jurisdiction will begin only when the candidate is proclaim to be a winner, has taken his oath & has assume the duties
and functions of his office. In other words, when who is involve is still a candidate the jurisdiction is not in the electoral
tribunal. When you say electoral tribunal and electoral protest this would not ordinarily refer to post election contest. So
the same principle, the contention of Tecson is incorrect.
Case: Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos
There was a time that Ramos ran for president among several others including Defensor. It was a hot contested election.
Allegedly Ramos cheated so that Miriam Santiago will not win but the records allegedly showed that it was Santiago who
won. Muntik na tayo nagka president na Miriam Santiago. [lol!] Ramos was called tobacco, Salonga was called super lolo
& Miriam Santiago was called Brenda. Anyway, until now she is still saying that she won that election. After that
election, Ramos won. Santiago filed an election protest before the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal). Three years after
that there is again an election for Senators. She ran for senator. The question is does it affect her electoral protest w/
the PET? The SC said, the fact that she ran for senator will be tantamount to abandonment of her electoral protest
because she has effectively abandon/withdrawn her protest or at least abandon the determination to protect & pursue
public interest in voting matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Also, consistently held even in the
case of Legarda vs De Castro. Legarda also questioned the vice presidential race against Noli De Castro. But in the next
succeeding election she ran for senator. So citing this ruling she also abandoned her interest. Now for me, thats the
proper ruling because they won and the they took their oath of office w/ regards to the senate office.
My question is what is what if they lost in the election, would that still be tantamount to abandonment? The decision
did not say that & I dont think that the decision covers that. Anyway, there is still no case where there is someone who
ran as president placed second questioned the decision and ran as senator then lost.
Case: Poe Jr. vs. Macapagal
Fernando Poe ran against Macapagal Arroyo & there is still a contention that Arroyo cheated & it was Fernando Poe
actually won the election which was later confirmed w/ no less than the COMELEC in a unofficial recount. Anyway, after
the election filed an electoral protest against Arroyo. They have several evidence w/ regards to cheating & massive fraud
in the election. But we know that what happened next, FPJ died. The next question is what happens to the electoral
protest, will it be vacated? Will the SC lose jurisdiction because the complainant died. The answer would be NO.
Although it is personal in the case claimed that he won, it is also a matter of public interest. The public would be
interested would know who actually won in the presidential race. But the next question is that, who may substitute FPJ?
Because in this case, it was Susan Roces, the wife so that the case will continue. Sc said the wife as a widow has no
personal interest on the winner/ who will win because she will not take the seat in case FPJ will be declared as a winner
or in case it is declared that the actual votes for GMA does not really belongs to her. So, she is not the real party interest
so substitute FPJ it would have been more correct if it is the second or third placer died. The second placer died, the
third placer would have that interest to pursue the case. So in this case since public office cannot be transmitted by
inheritance, Susan Roces cannot substitute FPJ. Ultimately, the case was vacated.
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President
or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man,
and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive
during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
Sec. 6 talks about salaries. This is more in testing w/ section 7 & 8. These are the rules on succession in case there is a
vacancy in the office of the president or in the office of the vice president. Sec. 7 will cover the instances where the
vacancy occurred at the beginning of the term.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 7 paragraph 1 states that The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of
their terms. What is that? There is a precise time & date for the assumption/ commencement of office = 12 noon of June
30 next following date of election. They must assume their office. Now there are instances, wherein the president
cannot assume office. So thats in paragraph 2, If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as
President until the President-elect shall have qualified. Paragraph 3, If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice
President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. Paragraph 4, If at the
beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled,
the Vice President-elect shall become President.
So we have3 instances that may happen at the beginning at the term, the first instance maybe that the president elect
to qualify. Example, he has not yet taken his oath of office saying that there is a restraining order for his taking of oath,
so that is a temporary incapacity. So until, he can take his oath of office since the beginning of the term is already
effective the function of the office has already commenced at the precise time and date. And, who will be the president?
The vice president in what capacity? Will the vice president becomes the president? ONLY ACTING PRESIDENT. Why?
The vacancy is only temporary.
Another instance, the president shall not have been chosen. Example, there has still no proclamation. No one has been
proclaimed as the president and it is already June 30. What will happen then? The Vice president will be the president in
what capacity? ACTING CAPACITY because again the vacancy is only temporary.
The third instance, at the beginning of the term the president shall have died or permanently becomes disabled. So this
is an instance where the vacancy is no longer temporary. It is a permanent vacancy. What will happen? Who will succeed
as president? The vice president as president so this is one instance where it is called an answered prayer. (lol!)
Problem, what if we have no president and there is also no vice president? Or the three instances happening to both the
president and the vice president? So there is no vice president to act as a president. The question is who is next in line?
IT IS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OR IN HIS ABSENCE THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. In what capacity? Acting president. If the
president dies and the vice president also dies, what will happen? The senate president will become the president or will
only act as president? The last phrase provides until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The senate president or in his absence the speaker of the house will never be a president because in this instance we
will choose another president, so there is a special election. Unless they will run in the special election, they will become
the president.
Another problem, what if maam they all boarded in the same flight the president, the vice president, the speaker of the
house, the senate president and the plane crashed. Who will act as the president? This time the Constitution left it in the
discretion of the congress. Saying or mandating the congress to enact a law to provide for this kind of situation.
Question, is there already a law? NOT YET. NO LAW. Because they cannot yet imagine that situation. Again, that is about
vacancy at the beginning of the term.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of
the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Now, section 8 would found a vacancy w/c occurs midterm. Congress only refers to permanent vacancy. In case of death
or permanent disability removal from office or resignation of that president, what will happen? RULE ON SUCCESSION.
The vice president will become the president. (answered prayer again.haha) Now second question, what if they boarded
the same plane, they died under the Constitution the senate president or the speaker of the house will act as president.
Again, there is no way that the senate president of house of representative on rule on succession become the president.
Only the vice president will be given w/ that privilege. Another problem they boarded the same plane again, di na sila
natuto. There is no president, vice president, speaker of the house, senate president, who will act as president? The
congress will enact a law to provide for this kind of situation.
Case: Estrada vs. Desierto
If you observe, we have touch on the specific areas in relation to this topic because we have already discussed before
regarding de facto & de jure government then the constitution comparing with the Aquino & arroyo government,
political questions, immunity from suits. This time we are talking about RESIGNATION. There were several scandals
involving Estrada including is the Jueteng scandal where he allegedly resigned. He submitted a resignation letter
immediately at the same day, Gloria Arroyo immediately took her oath of office. Now, Estrada contended that he never
resigned, that he only left his position temporarily & that Arroyo would only be in acting capacity as president. The SC
rule instead in a factual manner, whether or not Erap resigned. SC said lets us look at the prior contemporaneous and
posterior facts & circumstances. Pinalalim pa noh? Before, during & after. Facts & circumstances surrounding his
resignation, among these that was credited by the SC is the diary of Angara, which for the SC serve as a window to the
mind of Estrada. Yun pala yun? If someone is writing about you, his diary to the mind of Estrada. Yun pala yun? If
someone is writing about you, his diary will be a window to my mind. [class laughs.] You have this person claiming that
he has not resigned and you have this diary the you have resigned. Between these two facts, in ordinary setting it would
be the person because he talks about the intention of the mind. For me this case would be the worst nightmare of Erap,
if they will say may all odds be in your favor. In this case, all the odds were against his favor. Because the SC said that he
did resigned. If we apply this ruling in a labor case, it would be a different ruling diba? The SC said the validity of
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement in labor case the resignation has to be accepted right? It can be
oral, written. There is no implied resignation. You can call it abandonment. In fact an ordinary worker submits a
resignation & thereafter comes back to office & claims his salary & claims his statutory benefits under the labor
standards. In this contrary setting, the SC will give weight to the act of the labourer claiming its salary. Meaning it was no
really his intention to really resign. I can understand the reasoning of that because labor is your source of income, your
source of living. But if you will apply it here, you have the president elected at large by the general voting population.
To SC, they are now contradicting the general population in just one finding or holding that he resigned amidst his claim
that he did not resigned. Ganon lang ba kadali? Its just that I sent a letter but i did not intend to resign. Its just as
simple as that. And he made a claim, immediately after sending the resignation letter. SC said that he is resigned
because of the diary of Angara.
Lets go first in an instance where there is a vacancy of office of the vice president, who will be the vice president? Sec. 9
states..
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in theOffice of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
In other words, anyone from the Congress may it be a senator or a member of the house of representative may become
a vice president by President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
It happened in the case of Arroyo assuming the office of the president so the vice president/c she left is vacant. Since
there is vacancy, she nominated Guingona, a senator, and his nomination was confirmed & supported by his peers in the
Congress. ANYONE as long as he is nominated by the president concurred by the congress.
Sec. 10 talks about special election.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven
days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening
of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Question, when shall we have a special election of the president or the vice president? We will only hold therefore
mandatory special election when there is vacancy in both the offices of the president and the vice president. Why? If
there is a vacancy of the president what will happen? The rule on succession will apply so there is no need to hold a
special election. When there is a vacancy in the office of the vice president only? What will happen? The president will
nominate on who will become the vice president. In other words, a special election is only applicable when there is a
vacancy in BOTH offices. Calling a special election is in fact mandatory right? It states that The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Is there an exception? if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next presidential election. Now this is an urgent matter w/c must be acted upon by the
congress. Now we know how laws are created from the time that they become bills. Must they undergo separate or
separate days? There is a provion that states The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified. You can
dispense the reading on 3 separate days w/ the printing of the copies. Another exception, it becomes a law immediately
upon approval of the third reading. Another exception, Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against
any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this
Constitution. They can take the funds anywhere w/o violating the transfer of funds. So this is how crucial& important the
calling of special election is.
Lets got to sec. 11..
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
That is a very long section. When you read the provisions, it like a pingpong. When you read the first paragraph would
be the president would declare itself to be temporarily incapacitated, unable to discharge the powers of his office. So he
will declare this to the senate president & the speaker of the house, what will happen after that? The Vice-President as
acts as the president. Sec. 11 therefore covers situations of temporary incapacity or disability midterm. Hindi siya
kasama sa sec. 8 na permanent vacancy. So paragraph 1 is the president declaring the he is temporarily incapacitated
unable to discharge the powers & duties of his office. What if he will not admit it? There was a time in the history that it
was rumoured that when Marcos got sick & we did not know how critical his sickness was, it was another person who is
running the country. So it seems that there was at the time temporary disability on the part of Marcos to discharge the
powers of his office & he did not admit to it so hindi a-apply yung praragraph 1.

What will apply is paragraph 2. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President. What will happen if they make that declaration? Mga traydor kayo!lol The vice president shall
act as president but because the president is given the benefit of the doubt by the Constitution, he can contradict or
counter the declaration of his cabinet members. So automatically upon saying NO there is no disability echapwera si vice
president. Now is that the end of it? The cabinet members may pursue that declaration. What will happen? The
congress will side. Take note that controversy is w/ the congress & not the courts. The congress will decide the ability or
disability of the president only after the pingpong not immediately. Because in the first instance pwede pa i counter ng
president. Now last paragraph says that the desired vote is two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President.
The vice president shall act as a president only when the congress has already decided that the president is already
unable to discharge his office. Otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. Bakit
mataas ang required vote? 2/3. Because you are declaring a person incapacitated. The presumption remains that he is
capacitated to perform its functions. Lets relate that to Estradas nightmare.
Continuing the Estrada vs. Desierto case. On the same day, Estrada submitted his resignation letter. He left Malacaang,
Arroyo took her oath & on the same day Estrada sent a letter to the Senate president that he is temporarily
incapacitated to temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties & functions in his office. So for him, Arroyo would be
just an acting president. What is the ruling of the SC? I think the question is wrong was he temporarily incapacitated?
Because who has the power to determine that he is temporarily incapacitated is not the SC. Anyway the SC said that is
the president unable to act as president? NO. The house issued resolution supporting the assumption of Arroyo as
president. So it was not denied that they receive the letter. Likewise in Feb. 7 it confirmed the nomination of president
Arroyo of senator Guingona as vice president on the same day the senate also confirmed the nomination xx. So the SC
recognized the domino effect after Erap left. Arroyo became president, Guingona became vice president, the senate has
vacancy. All of these where w/ the support of the congress. When Erap made his declaration & there was no dispute
that it was received. What did the Congress do? Make a resolution supporting Arroyo as president. Ask the COMELEC to
call for a special election supported Guingona as vice president, the question would have been is this within it
authority of the congress? Because the SC in holding against Erap said in the phase of this determination of a co-equal
branch the court is w/o authority to review. It is a political question xx. Sabi ng court sabi ng Congeress eh na tama yun,
president na si Arroyo. Then we cannot review that. After the declaration of the incapacity congress said Arroyo is
already the president. Is this within their authority?
Now you tell me, you read again paragraph 1 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. The congress has no discretion or participation. What did the
congress do in this case? Declared Arroyo to be the president. What did the SC do in this case? It said that it is the
determination of the Congress that it cannot review for it to be a political question. All the odd are against Estrada. It is
supported by the Constitution but co-equal branches in a way that it will fit the situation however they will rule that
Arroyo will be the president & Estrada will be ousted. But my question is, black & white, is this constitutionally correct?
Or was there a violation of the Constituion? By both departments, di naman tayo naririnig diba. Accprding to Atty.
Jumao-as: For me there is a violation, clear naman provision ng constitution, It is not the congress who will determine
the capacity of the president at the first instance that the president himself will declare that he is temporarily
incapacitated. The congress has no authority to declare him incapacitated nor declare the correctness of the assumption
of the vice president as the president & not the acting president. So ika nga naisahan si Erap. Personally I dont agree w/
the decision of the SC. Lets call him a victim of politics. Only to find out that the next president is far worst -> TRUE.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The
members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.
It was added in the 1987 Constitution to address the situation we had w/ Marcos at the time we do not know what
happen to him whether buhay pa ba siya or etc. The mandatory disclosure is with regards to serious illness. There was a
buzz about Arroyos implants, anong paki-alam namin kung nag pasexy siya, that is not covered in this section.
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during
his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Sec. 13 prohibitions, The president or the vice president shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession. Compare this with the congress, they can still practice their profession like being accountants, lawyers
xx. And, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members xx.
Case: Bitonio vs. COA
NAC vs. COA
More or less in situations where the secretaries of the president are ruling ex officio functions. Sometimes they are
called to be a member of this committee or etc. As long as they are holding positions in their ex officio capacity there is
no violation in the Constitutional provision in holding other office. But still, they are prevented in receiving emoluments
in whatever they made thereof. In both this cases, they have delegated the attendance in meetings etc. to their
representatives. The law said that their representatives because secretaries cannot receive honorarium he
representatives are given honorarium. SC said since the principal is prohibited in the constitution so also are their
representatives. So they cannot also receive honorariums.
Case: Public Interest vs. Elma
The ruling of interest here is that the chairman of the PCGG is also a lawyer, cannot also be appointed as chief
presidential legal counsel. Why? Because this chief legal counsel has the function to reviewing all the acts, all the
consumptions of the cabinet secretaries & all offices including the PCGG. In other words, he will be reviewing his own
work. So there is here a conflict of function. So one person cannot hold this two offices even if he waived any
remuneration as he may receive as chief presidential legal counsel.




Section 14 of Article VII of the Constitution states that the Acting President is granted the authority to appoint officers
and other officials mentioned in Section 16 in the same Constitution. These appointments are valid even if the Elected
President assumes his office. The exception, however, is when the Elected President revokes the appointments made
by the Acting President.
The role of the Acting President is performed if the President is temporary unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, as mentioned in Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution.
PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO EXERCISE THE POWERS OF ACTING PRESIDENT:
1. The Vice-President
2. The President of the Senate (if the Vice-President is unable to assume the duty of Acting President)
3. The Speaker of the House of Representatives (If the Senate President is unable to assume the duty of Acting
President)
THE NATURE OF APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
1. The authority to appoint persons in office is an executive function. The appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President.
2. Due to separation of powers of the executive and the legislative bodies, Congress may not usurp such
function, with the following exceptions:
a) Those appointments resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments.
b) The prescription of the qualifications of the person who may hold the office.
SEC.14. APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN
EFFECTIVE, UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS
FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OR REASSUMPTION FROM OFFICE.
IMPORTANT NOTE: The essence of the power to appoint persons for the President is to choose among the various
qualified choices that are best candidates for certain posts.




MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS
Midnight appointments are those done by an outgoing President of the Philippines, at least two (2) months immediately
preceding the presidential elections. The Constitution expressly states in Section 15 of Article VII, wherein a president
or acting president shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments, wherein vacancies will result to
prejudice to public service and danger to public safety. In the case of De Rama versus the Court of Appeals (353 SCRA
94; 2001), Mayor Conrado de Rama of the Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon Province, questioned the appointment of
fourteen (14) local government officers by his predecessor in the final months of the latters term. The Supreme Court
held that the last-minute appointments of local government officers such as mayors, are not included in the
prohibition in Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution. Section 15 refers only to the prohibition of the President of
the Philippines to make midnight appointments.




REGULAR APPOINTMENTS
There are four groups of regular appointees that are mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII, as follows:
a) First Group (needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments)
Heads of the executive departments
Ambassadors
Other public ministers and consuls
Officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain
Other officers whose appointments are vested by the President in this Constitution
b) Second Group (No need for the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)
All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
SEC.16. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, APPOINT THE
HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO
APPOINT. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT
ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER
VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
SEC.15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT
MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE
POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC
SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
c) Third Group (No need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)
Those to whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
d) Fourth Group (No need for the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments)
Other officers lower in rank, and appointed by virtue of the appointing power of the President
alone, as vested by Congress, as follows:
Those lower in rank of the President
The courts/judicial branch of the government (such as the Judicial and Bar Council)
Heads of executive departments (secretaries of departments)
Heads of government agencies (such as the Philippine Information Agency)
Heads of commissions (such as Commission on Elections)
Heads of boards (government boards such as the Board of Election Canvassers)
CASES INVOLVING APPOINTMENTS OF HEADS OF COMMISSIONS
Appointments in the Bureau of Customs (Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549; 1987)
ISSUE: This was the first case decided, which tackled Section 16 of the Philippine Constitution of 1987 the first test
case. The issue here was whether or not the appointment of Mr. Salvador Mison as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs required the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: No, the appointee was not subjected to confirmation of the Commission on Appointments when he was made
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Based on the enumeration of the groups of appointees mentioned in
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, bureau heads are excluded from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The appointment of government bureau heads were once included for confirmation, based on the
Philippine Constitution of 1935, but in the 1987 Constitution, they were no longer included. In addition, the President of
the Philippines is authorized to appoint the chairman and commissioners of the Constitutional Commission, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, without the need for confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. Wrong ! the constitution requires confirmation( The civil service commission)
Appointments in the Commission on Human Rights (Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160; 1989)
FACTS: Then President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights and four other persons designated as her subordinate members. The President,
however, erroneously submitted these appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. These
appointments were rejected; thus, Atty. Bautista was instructed to vacate her position. Hence, there is a petition that
she be retained in office, citing the constitutional provision that the appointments of heads of commissions are
exempted from confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES: If the Commission on Appointments rejects the appointees of the President that are exempted from
confirmation, will these appointments be invalid? Does the appointment of the position of the Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights need the confirmation from the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: The Commission on Human Rights was created by law, particularly under the provisions of the Constitution it is
an organ created by the Constitution itself. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that the Constitution did not have
provisions on how the appointments will be made on the Commission on Human Rights and who will be the officers to
be appointed. The law is silent therefore. However, it was determined that the heads of commissions belong to the
fourth group mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. It is the enabling law which vested the power
upon the President to appoint chairpersons of commissions without the need of confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments. Thus, the Supreme Court granted petitioner Bautistas request to be retained as Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The Enactment of the Labor Code Republic Act No. 6715 (Calderon versus Carale, 208 SCRA 254; 1992)
FACTS: Provided in Article 215 of the Labor Code was a provision creating the Office of the Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Commission and some other officers, and therein provided that the chairman and the members of the
said Commission shall only be appointed by the President if subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. In this case, Congress enacted a law creating an office and vesting the authority of appointment upon
the President, but requiring that his appointments be subjected to confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE: Was the provision provided in Article 215 of the Labor Code constitutional?
HELD: The Commission on Human Rights was created by law, particularly under the provisions of the Constitution it is
an organ created by the Constitution itself. In this case the Supreme Court observed that while this office was created
by the said Constitution, it did not provide on how the appointments will be made and who will be its officers to be
appointed. The Constitution is silent therefore. Nevertheless, heads of commissions belong to the fourth group
mentioned in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Again, it is the enabling law which vested the power upon
the President to appoint the Chairman on the Commission on Human Rights. Hence, there is no reason why such
appointments must be subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court
declared the provision in Article 215 of the Labor Code as unconstitutional.
The Enactment of the Local Government Code (Manalo versus Sistoza, 312 SCRA 329; 1999)
FACTS: In 1990, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975, which is the Local Government Code. It created certain offices
such as the Office of the Chief Superintendent and the Director of the Philippine National Police and therein also
provided that their appointments shall be vested upon the President but subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE: Sections 26 and 31 of the Local Government Code provided that the newly created offices of the Philippine
National Police were subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Was this provision of law
valid?
HELD: It was erroneous for the Congress to expand the list by providing for a law creating an office vesting the power
of appointment to the President and requiring further, that these appointments be subjected to the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. Thus, the Supreme Court struck down Sections 26 and 31 of the Local Government
Code as unconstitutional. Based on the general rule on presidential appointments, there are two doctrines:
1. The President is not given the authority to choose which appointments are to be submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation it is beyond jurisdiction of the President.
2. Congress cannot expand the list of appointees of the President by creating a law providing for such
appointments of newly created offices to be submitted for confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments in the Philippine Coast Guard (Soriano v. Lista, 399 SCRA 437; 2004)
FACTS: In 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed the respondents in this case to various positions
in the Philippine Coast Guard. Their ranks range from naval captain, commodore, rear admiral and vice admiral of the
Coast Guard. There was a petition assailing the constitutionality of those appointments and prohibiting the
disbursement of salaries and emoluments to the appointees.
ISSUES:
1. Considering that their appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, were the
appointees authorized to assume their positions without violating the constitution?
2. Were their appointments subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: The Supreme Court stated that they must distinguish whether or not the Philippine Coast Guard is part of the
military. Indeed, up to now, it is a civilian office not a part of the Philippine Navy or any branch of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. Nor is it under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Defense. It is under the authority of the
Department of Transportation and Communications. Since Philippine Coast Guard personnel are not part of the
military, their appointments need not be subjected to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that since the said appointments were constitutional, the petition assailing the illegality of
the appointments was denied.





THE NATURE OF RECESS AND AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
The second paragraph of Section 16 is about ad interim appointments, in which, the President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress.
The characteristics of ad interim appointments are as follows:
1. Ad interim appointments, therefore, are those requiring confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
that are made while Congress is in recess, whether the recess is compulsory or voluntary in their part. Not all
appointments made during the recess of Congress would be considered as ad interim. Based on the general
rule, appointments are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the President without the participation of Congress,
with a few exceptions. So when we say ad interim, in relation to recess, this would only cover appointments
which require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
2. As for other appointments that do not require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it is
irrelevant, whether if Congress is in session or not. Ad interim appointments refer only to appointments which
require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. So such appointments, because the Congress is
SEC.16. (LAST PARAGRAPH)
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE
RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH
APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE
CONGRESS.
not in session, shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
CASES INVOLVING AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
Appointments in the Commission on Elections (Matibag v. Benipayo 380 SCRA 49; 2002)
FACTS: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed ad interim Mr. Alfredo Benipayo as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections as well as Ms. Resurreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason, Jr. as commissioners. The
appointment was made when the Congress was in session, so it was ad interim. Unfortunately, when President Arroyo
submitted these appointments to the Commission on Appointments, the Commission on Appointments did not act on
the same until the time came when Congress declared a recess. Meanwhile, Petitioner Maria Angelina Matibag was
Director IV of the COMELEC when Benipayo was appointed as Chairman. Petitioner was reassigned to a lower position;
thus, she filed administrative complaints against Benipayo. She questioned her reassignment as well as the latters
appointment as COMELEC Chairman, citing the provision in the Constitution particularly the Constitutional Commission,
which prohibits the appointment of any member of the Commission on Elections with a temporary or acting capacity.
ISSUES:
1. Is an ad interim appointment a temporary one, so that it is invalid for being in violation of this constitutional
prohibition with regards to Constitutional Commissions?
2. Can the President reappoint somebody whose appointment has been bypassed by the Commission on
Appointments?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court said that an ad interim appointment is a regular appointment. A regular appointment is
one that is already valid and the appointee can be only removed for valid causes: Either his appointment will
be disapproved or rejected by the Commission on Appointments, or if Congress adjourned without acting on the
appointment of the President. Meaning, the appointee is bypassed. These are the only valid causes for the
termination of appointments. In the meantime, the appointment was considered a regular appointment, not in
violation of the Constitutional prohibition on temporary appointments for the chairman and commissioners of
the Constitutional Commissions. Hence, the Supreme Court validated Benipayos appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
2. The reassignment of petitioner Matibag is valid because the COMELEC Chairman was vested with the power
to make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance of the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and Section 7 of the Revised Administrative Code.
3. Yes, the President can reappoint a person whose appointment has been bypassed by the Commission on
Appointments. The Supreme Court said that bypass is different from disapproval. Disapproval means that
the Commission on Appointments has disapproved the appointment made by the President, in which the issue is
decided with finality, and they have decided to reject the appointment. Bypass, means that the Commission
on Appointments failed to act on it for some reason or another; such as lack of time to act or that they were not
able to constitute themselves or convene. There would be several reasons. Ultimately, however, when an
appointment is bypassed, there is yet no decision, unlike disapproval, which means that if the appointee is
rejected, he can no longer be appointed.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Usually, confirmation of appointments is a political maneuver. Sometimes, it is some sort of
compromise between the President and the Congress. There are some situations, wherein the members of the
Commission on Appointments do not like the appointee but they do not want to disappoint the President. So instead
of acting on the appointment and rejecting it outright, the Commission on Appointments would just fail to act on it
bypass it. Anyway, the appointment may be terminated in the next adjournment. Actually, the President may still
reappoint the appointee, just like what happened in the case of Benipayo.
Appointments in Temporary or Acting Capacity (Pimentel Jr. v. Ermita 472 SRA 587; 2005)
FACTS: When the Congress was in session, and after the Commission on Appointments had been constituted, then
President Arroyo appointed eight (8) individuals as secretaries of various departments. Up to now, it is mandated in the
Constitution that secretaries of various executive departments require confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. What the President did here was that she extended the appointments only in acting capacities. For
your information, appointees are primarily dependent on the preference of the President. Hence, President Arroyo,
instead of extending regular appointments for secretaries, she preferred appointments in acting capacities. The
relevance was that appointments of acting capacities did not require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. So in order to prevent from being caught up in the highly politicized manner of the Commission on
Appointments as far as appointee confirmation was concerned, the President appointed acting or temporary
secretaries. Thus, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and eight (8) other senators filed a writ of preliminary injunction to
declare the appointments of then President Arroyo as unconstitutional.
ISSUES: Were the actions of President Arroyo proper, or was there a need to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments?
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing wrong with appointing secretaries in acting capacities.
Secretaries of the Executive Departments had to sit there as alter egos of President Arroyo and they had the
confidence of the President. If there was a vacancy, an urgent need to fill up those seats, the President filled
that vacancy without approval from the Commission on Appointments. There was no violation of the
Constitution because she just extended those appointments in acting capacity. So, just like in the case of
Benipayo, President Arroyo appointed secretaries ad interim, were bypassed, and then reappointed them, and
was bypassed again by the Commission on Appointments. These were the instances wherein the Arroyo
administration had been testing the limits of the Constitution. The president discerned that her appointee
would most likely be rejected by the Commission on Appointments that was why she decided to appoint
secretaries in acting capacities.
2. The Supreme Court also ruled that there was no violation of the Constitution. There was nothing wrong with
the actions of President Arroyo because there was no final determination about the status of those
appointments made by her.
3. Based on the grounds mentioned above, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Senator Pimentel, Jr.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Temporary appointments characterized the administration of President Arroyo. She tested the
Commission on Appointments: If her appointees were confirmed, then she made permanent their positions. If
bypassed, she assigned them to temporary or in acting capacities. So far, she had succeeded in her strategy. This was a
common ground for such appointments: If the President felt that one of the cabinet members was not be given favor by
the Commission on Appointments, the said member was appointed in a temporary or acting capacity. Thus, the time
frame or tenure of the appointee was irrelevant, for as long as the latter was performing the functions of an acting
secretary.
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF CONTROL
1. The President is given control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
2. The power of control has been defined as the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment from the former to that of
the latter.
3. The President is not expected to exercise all his powers in person. He is expected to delegate some of his
powers to men of his confidence, particularly to the members of his Cabinet. This goes from the Executive Secretary,
down to the department secretaries and their subordinates. He can modify, nullify, or alter the decisions of the latter.
4. The principle of the power of control remained unchanged from the Philippine Constitution of 1935 up to the
1987 Constitution.
5. The President may reverse the decision of a department head.
CASES INVOLVING THE POWER OF CONTROL
The authority of the President vested on the Executive Secretary over the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as well as the Director of Lands (Lacson-Magallanes Co, Inc. v. Jose Pano, 21 SCRA 895; 1967)
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a pioneering occupant of a 1,103 hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality
of Bansalan, Province of Davao (now Davao del Sur Province) in the year 1932. On January 9, 1953, he ceded his rights
and interests of the portion of the above public land/pasture land to petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company,
Incorporated. This land was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land on
April 13, 1954. Jose Pano and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety (90) hectares of the released
area on January 26, 1955. Petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc., in turn, filed its own sales application covering
the entire released area on March 29, 1955, and this was protested by Jose Pano and his companions upon the
averment that they are the actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. In resolving the
conflict, the Director of Lands rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 in favor of the application of the petitioner
corporation, and dismissed the claim of Jose Pano et.al. He and his claimant companions thereafter appealed their case
in the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now known as the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources). The appeal was dismissed. The case was elevated to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
In 1958, Presidential Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President, decided on the controversy and
modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
order allocated the portion of the disputed land to where Mr. Pano and his companions had actually settled and had
already made improvements. It also ordered that the said portion be subdivided into lots and that petitioner
corporation be reimbursed for the lots allocated to Mr. Pano et al. Petitioner Lacson-Magallanes Company therefore
filed a case in the Court of First Instance praying that (1) judgment be rendered annulling the decision of the Executive
Secretary, asserting that he had no authority to make such a decision; thus, contrary to law and (2) the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources had the sole authority to decide matters in settling land issues.
ISSUE: Did the Executive Secretary have legal authority to intervene in agrarian matters, which belong to the jurisdiction
of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the decision of the Executive Secretary, who was acting by the
authority of the President, in modifying the previous decision of the Director of Lands, due to the following reasons:
1. The Executive Secretary was the alter ego of the President; therefore, he acted by the authority of the President,
and his decision was that of the Presidents. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary was to be accepted, for
only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary was not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the
action taken is disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and
cannot be successfully assailed.
2. The President was authorized to supersede the decision of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Lands at that time was under the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the latter, in turn, was under the authority of the President.
In the light of the reasons mentioned above, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of Lacson-Magallanes Company,
and upheld the decision of the Executive Secretary in allocating portions of the disputed property in Bansalan, Davao
Province to Jose Pano and nineteen other settlers.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation disobeyed an order of the Secretary of Justice (De Leon v. Carpio,
178 SCRA 457; 1989)
FACTS: Petitioners Cesar R. de Leon and Francisco R. Estavillo were employees of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), being Head Agent and Agent III, respectively. They were terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A.
Gonzales in separate orders both dated January 27, 1987. Estavillo was notified of his dismissal on March 6, 1987, and
De Leon on February 6, 1987. They appealed to the Review Committee for reconsideration of their termination so that
they will be reinstated to their former jobs, but their appeal was declined by the said Committee due to the reason that
it had lost jurisdiction because at that time, the newly ratified 1987 Constitution was in effect. Therefore, petitioners De
Leon and Estavillo were advised to ask for help in the Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of
the Civil Service Commission declared that the termination of services/dismissal of petitioners were invalid and
unconstitutional. It ordered that De Leon and Estavillo be reinstated and to be paid back salaries. The Undersecretary
of Justice repeatedly sent orders to Antonio Carpio, then Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to comply with
orders to reinstate petitioners to their jobs, but it was disregarded by Carpio again and again. Finally, the new Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez issued an order to NBI Director Carpio to reinstate petitioners, and was also disregarded.
Hence, De Leon and Estavillo petitioned the Supreme Court that they be reinstated, considering the fact that the
Secretary of Justice and the Undersecretary of Justice had approved and already ordered their reinstatement. NBI
Director Carpio contended that (1) The order of the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission was
illegal and void, (2) The Supreme Court should not have required the additional pleadings of the petitioners and (3) The
Secretary of Justice cannot ignore the final decision of the former Minister of Justice in terminating the employment of
petitioners in the NBI.
ISSUE: Was the contention of NBI Director Antonio Carpio tenable?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the contention of NBI Director Carpio. The reasons are as
follows:
1. The Secretary of Justice found no valid reasons why the orders of the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil
Service Commission regarding the reinstatement of petitioners De Leon and Estavillo should not be implemented. The
dismissal of the petitioners from their jobs in the NBI did not conform to the requirements of due process consistent
with the security of tenure clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect during the time of the
petitioners termination of services in the NBI.
2. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not strictly required in this case for petitioners were
raising a pure question of law. Even though the petitioners should have exercised administrative remedies so that they
can go back to their jobs, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide on the controversy because it involved a question
of law, on whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners in the NBI and the reinstatement issue were valid considering
the existing laws.
3. The Presidents power of control was directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn
and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. This authority is delegated to his subordinates in the Executive Department. Hence, the acts performed by
the heads of the executive departments are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter. In this case, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez was already the incumbent head of the
Justice Department. He was the alter ego of the President, and was acting under the authority of the latter when he
directed NBI Director Carpio to reinstate petitioners to their jobs. Former Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales no longer
had jurisdiction over the issue regarding the termination of employment of the petitioners.
The Supreme Court plainly said that NBI Director Carpio should have dutifully obeyed the orders of Justice Secretary
Ordonez as his immediate superior in the Department of Justice. The former should have humbly recognized the limits
of his authority. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered respondent NBI Director Carpio to immediately reinstate petitioners
De Leon and Estavillo to their former posts in the National Bureau of Investigation.
The Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac refused to vacate his post after the appointment of the new Provincial
Prosecutor by the President (Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SCRA 733; 1999)
FACTS: Attys. Oscar Bermudez, Arturo A. Llobrera, and Claudio L. Dayaon were then Acting Provincial Prosecutor,
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor respectively of the Province of Tarlac.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was vacant at that time, and Atty. Bermudez was recommended by then Justice
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, while Atty. Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second
Legislative District of Tarlac. On June 30, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Conrado Quiaoit as the
Provincial Prosecutor, and the latter took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of Branch 65 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. However, even if Quiaoit had already been performing the functions and duties of his
office, Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor due to his reason that the original copy of
Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary of Justice. Thus, the two contesting parties were
summoned by Justice Secretary Guingona to have a conference in Manila to settle the issue, and Bermudez was ordered
to finish his remaining tasks up to October 15, 1997 and to turn-over his post to Quiaoit the following day. The original
copy of Quiaoits appointment was forwarded to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor based on San Fernando,
Pampanga. In spite of these developments, Bermudez, with his co-petitioners Llobrera and Dayaon, filed a petition in
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac challenging the appointment of Quiaoit. The court dismissed the petition; hence, it
was elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that the appointment of Quiaoit lacked the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice based on the provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which
states that All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary.
ISSUE: Did the act of the President in appointing Atty. Quiaoit as Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac violated the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987?
HELD: No, the Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of Atty. Quiaoit was in accordance with the law, due to the
following reasons:
1) The Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate office, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is the prerogative of the President.
2) The recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointment of the President are acts of the Executive
Department itself. There is no sharing of power to speak of, the President or the Secretary of Justice. The President
exercises higher authority than the latter.
The Supreme Court denied the petition of Atty. Bermudez and upheld that the appointment of Atty. Quiaoit as valid.
The Metro Manila Development Authority had been tasked directly by the President to start a major traffic mitigating
project instead of the Department of Transportation and Communications (MMDA v. Viron, 530 SCRA 341; 2007)
FACTS: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 on February 10, 2003, Providing
for the establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System. This order authorized the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and
efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction. The order specifically mentioned in its 5th Paragraph that, the
MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public. It
proposed the construction of integrated terminals for provincial bound buses in the north and south of Manila. Viron
Transport Company, Incorporated (a public utility bus company) filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila questioning the validity of E.O. No. 179, since it would mean the closure of its bus terminals in
Sampaloc, Manila and Quezon City. Mencorp Transportation System, Incorporated, which is another bus company filed
for declaratory relief in the same court. It also asked the court to declare the same order as unconstitutional and illegal
for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective
terminals. It also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to restrain the impending closure of its bus
terminals in Quezon City. The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the Executive Order No. 179.
Both bus companies filed separate motions for reconsideration, and these were granted by the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, petitioners Executive Secretary and the MMDA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
court. Subsequently, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Petitioners filed for declaratory relief and contended
that (1) There was no justiciable controversy of the cases and (2) That Executive Order No. 179 was only an
administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along Epifanio de Los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and South Expressway corridor, and (3) That the only
relation created by the Executive Order was that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
third persons.
ISSUES:
1) Was the issue justiciable, and was the filing of declaratory relief an appropriate action by the petitioners?
2) Was the Executive Order in violation of Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act, which was to furnish safe,
adequate, and proper service as well as to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its
existing facilities such as bus terminals?
3) Was the Executive Order done beyond the scope of authority granted to the President?
HELD: The Supreme Court held the following:
1) The issue was justiciable because there was controversy between persons whose interests were adverse. The
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination. In this case, the bus companies had legal interest in the controversy because the closure of their
bus terminals may adversely affect their business operations.
2) The Executive Order was in violation of the Public Service Act because the maintenance of the bus terminals was
considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators. These bus companies have put so much
investment in the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. The closure of these facilities would counter with the
provisions of the said Act.
3) The Executive Order was done beyond the scope of authority granted to the President. The government
instrumentality authorized to establish and implement such a project should have been the Department of
Transportation and Communications. The DOTC, by law, (is up to now) the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation.
Based on the following premises, the Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 179 as null and void.
CASES INVOLVING THE POWER TO REMOVE
Personnel in the Bureau of Customs (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 895; 1963)
FACTS: Isidro Ang-Angco was the Collector of the Customs. He was tasked to have custody of concentrates of Pepsi-
Cola products, which were found to have been imported and were not covered by proper documents from the Central
Bank of the Philippines. When these documents were already prepared, it was discovered that only a negligible portion
of the products were left. After an investigation conducted by the Office of the President, he was found guilty of
conduct prejudicial of the best interest of the service and was considered resigned effective from the date of notice.
Upon learning of the decision, Ang-Angco wrote a letter to then President Ramon Magsaysay, calling attention to the
fact that the decision deprived him of the statutory Civil Service right to have his case originally decided by the
Commissioner of Civil Service. He also wrote to Hon. Natalio Castillo, the Acting Central Bank Governor, that the
decision also deprived him of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. According to him, the decision
allegedly violated the constitutional mandate which said that an officer or employee in the Civil Service cannot be
removed without cause as provided for by law. The Office of the President stated that provisions of the Civil Service Law
applicable to employees in the competitive service did not apply to the particular case of Ang-Angco because if it was so,
it would deprive the power of the President to have control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of
the government.
ISSUE: Can the President remove employees without violating the Civil Service Law mentioned in the Constitution?
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the petition of Ang-Angco. It held that since, it was not the President who appointed
him, but the Secretary of Finance, pursuant to the rules, laws and regulations of the Civil Service Commission, the
President cannot remove him from office. The decision was tough because the Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of reconciling the Presidents power of control with the guarantee of security of tenure found in the
constitutional provisions on the Civil Service. Nevertheless, the Ang-Angco case provided important jurisprudence, as
follows:
1) The power of control is the power to alter, modify or annul the acts of a subordinate officer. Its focus is on the
act and not on the actor. So the power of control does not carry with it the removal of an erring officer. Rather the
effect would be the annulment of his decision, the modification of his decision or the substitution of the decision of the
President for that of his decision. The President may set aside a judgment or action taken by a subordinate officer. In
other words, the power of control is not the source of the power to remove.
2) The power of control is not the source of the Chief Executives disciplinary power over persons of his
subordinates. Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint. The power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint. In this case, the officer belongs to the classified Civil Service and his appointment is subject to the
civil service laws, rules and regulations. So is also his discipline his suspension, removal, and termination is subject to
civil service rules, laws and regulations. The power to remove is inherent to the power to appoint, but not with regard
to those officers or employees who belong to the classified serve for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. Classified public employees are those which have a more permanent designation and function, and not
appointed by the President.
3) The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong only to the Executive Department if they are presidential appointees. An example is a
department secretary. Since it is the President who appoints the department secretary, he may remove him. Since his
stay in the office is at the pleasure and confidence of the President, if that pleasure and confidence of the President is
already gone, the President may remove him because precisely this person is supposed to be his alter ego. If they no
longer have one vision, he cannot be the alter ego of the President. So it is true, therefore, that the power to remove is
sourced from the power to appoint.
Personnel in the Bureau of Customs (Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710; 1965)
FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office and was a presidential appointee occupying a non-
competitive position. In 1965, this office was among those that needed nomination and appointment required
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and he was confirmed. Due to allegations of wrongdoing, he was
investigated and removed by the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Was the act of the President in investigating and removing Villaluz lawful?
HELD: Yes, the act of the President was lawful. The Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
charges against petitioner Ruben Villaluz. The authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension,
separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified
service to which classification of petitioner did not belong.
2. Since petitioner Villaluz was an appointee of the President, the latter was authorized to subject the former for
disciplinary action, suspension and removal in case of wrongdoing.
THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF REORGANIZATION
The nature of the power of reorganization is based on the second sentence of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
which says that the President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Just like in American jurisprudence,
the power of the President of the Philippines includes the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself,
our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution.
The following are rules regarding the power of reorganization vested on the President:
1. The power of reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices or abolition thereof, by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. The President may alter it, including the rights to control the authority
and responsibility in them.
2. The power to abolish an office generally is sourced from the power to create offices, and it is vested on the
Legislative Department alone.
3. Pursuant to Section 31 of the Administrative Code of the Philippines, the President is vested the authority to
regularly reorganize the Executive Department for purposes of simplicity, efficiency and economy, based on the
following premises:
a. The President has that continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Executive
Department. So the President, subject to the policies of the Executive Office, can do that in order to achieve simplicity,
economy, and efficiency.
b. The power to reorganize the Executive Department is a statutory grant under the Administrative Code of the
Philippines. As explained by the Supreme Court, the Congress may grant the President this power and it is not
usurpation of legislation because the power is delegated to him. This is in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office for economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
executive branch, and in order to keep it effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped in the manner to
carry out his directives and policies.
c. The President is authorized to reorganize the Executive Department in order to address the conflicting needs of
the country. He must have that leeway of freedom to shape and reshape his administrative office every now and then
so that he can respond to the needs of the country. After all, he is the Chief Executive Officer after all and he cannot do
that if he is limited by the present structure of the Executive Department.
CASES INVOLVING THE POWER TO REORGANIZE
Transfer of agencies under the Office of the President to certain Executive Departments (Anak Mindanao v. Executive
Secretary, 530 SCRA 583; 2007)
FACTS: Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo transferred the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP for
brevity) and the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) from the Office of the President to the office under
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
ISSUE: Can she do that without usurping the legislative authority to create office?
HELD: According to the Supreme Court, she had under that continuing authority to reorganize the Executive
Department. She can transfer agencies from the Office of the President to other departments as she may see fit. Take
note that this is only a transfer of an agency, and the agency itself is already in existence.
Organizational changes made by the President within the Department of Health (Malaria Employees v. Executive
Secretary, 528 SCRA 673; 2001)
FACTS: Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102 on May 24, 1999. This was pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Republic Act No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. E.O. No.
102 provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health (DOH).
President Estrada also made changes in the Executive Branch by creating the Presidential Committee on Executive
Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) as co-chair. The PCEG issued Memorandum Circular No. 62 implementing Executive Order No. 102
in redefining the functions and operations of the Department of Health, and directed the rationalization and
streamlining of the said Department. The Secretary of Health issued orders which were 1) Directed all employees in the
DOH to accomplish and submit Personal Information Sheet due for DOH approval for rationalization of streamlining plan
2) Initiated the process of selection, placement or matching of personnel to the approved organizational chart and 3) Set
the guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel selection, placement, retirement and resignation. Lastly, the
Secretary of Health issued Notice of Organization Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA) directing employees to
report to their new assignments and facilitate the transfer of personnel, properties and documents. The Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP), a union of affected employees of the Malaria
Control Service of the Department of Health, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify
the Department Memorandum, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other
issuances implementing Executive Order No. 102. Petitioner MEWAP also filed a petition for certiorari at the Supreme
Court of Manila and sought to nullify the said Executive Order. It questioned the authority of the President to
reorganize a department, bureau or office within the Executive Department.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the President had authority under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution in reorganizing a
department under the executive branch.
2) Whether there had been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
President in issuing Executive Order No. 102, which redirected the functions and operations of the Department of
Health.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition of MEWAP due to the following grounds:
1) The President had the authority to reorganize a department under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
This authority is an adjunct of his power of control mentioned in the same Section of the Constitution.
2) There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the President in issuing Executive Order No. 102 because he
exercised good faith in carrying out the reorganization of the Department of Health. It was done in good faith for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
Transfer of agencies under the Office of the President to certain Executive Departments (DENR v. DENR Employees, 360
SCRA 718; 2001)
FACTS: The provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani were moved from Region 11 to Region 12 after the plebiscite for
the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). As a result, the Regional Office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in Region 12 was transferred from Cotabato City to Koronadal City. The
employees were affected by the transfer because, they will be transferred. In this case in particular, among their qualms
were that their children will have to be transferred to other schools. These were just among their complaints. The said
transfer of the Regional Office was implemented by the Secretary of the DENR.
ISSUE: Did the Secretary of DENR himself have the authority to transfer offices?
HELD: The power to organize is within the power of the President. According to the doctrine of qualified political
agency, secretaries of executive departments may perform acts which the President can perform himself. So long as
these actions are not reprobated or disapproved by the President, these acts are valid. The Supreme held that the
Secretary of the DENR had the authority to transfer the regional offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal City since these
were within his jurisdiction.
Change of functions of agencies under the Office of the President (Buklod v. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718; 2001)
FACTS: Then President Corazon C. Aquino established the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau under the
Office of the President. When Joseph E. Estrada came in to power, he deactivated that office on the ground that its
functions will also be performed by the other agencies of the government, and instead, created the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force. The result of the abolition of these offices created unemployment termination of employment
of those who were in service. Some employees were not absorbed in the new office.
ISSUE: Can the President do this reorganization?
HELD: Regardless of the effects of such reorganization, the Constitution had granted the President of that authority. The
law had given him that continuing authority, and the Supreme Court had supported the power to regularly revamp the
Office of the President. So in this case, his act was valid.
Change of functions of agencies under the Office of the President (Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Secretary, G.R. No.
196425; July 24, 2012)
FACTS: In this case, Prospero Pichay, Jr. was being investigated by the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, which is ODESLA. This agency was formerly the known as the
Office of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) under the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Its
purpose was to investigate alleged graft and corruption involving the officers under the Office of the President. When
President Benigno Aquino III came into power, he abolished PAGC and then transferred this power to ODESLA. This
agency was transferred under the Office of the Executive Secretary, and under this office, he created another division,
the Adjudicatory Division. Pichay, who was the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), was alleged to have committed corruption involving funds of the said office. Pichay questioned
the jurisdiction of the ODESLA, the abolishment of the PAGC and the creating of the office of ODESLA. First, according to
him, the President usurped the powers of the Congress to create office. The reorganization of the Office of the Executive
Department did not mention of creation of office. In only mentioned transfer of office as well as abolishment of office.
ISSUE: Was Pichays contention correct?
HELD: According to the Supreme Court under Section 31 of the Administrative Code, it is within the power of the
President to transfer and particularly in Paragraph 1 of Section 31, the Presidents power to reorganize includes the
power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices within the Office of the President proper. With regards to these offices,
he has the power to abolish, merge and consolidate offices. PAGC and ODESLA are both under the Office of the
President proper; thus, he may abolish one and transfer its duties and functions to the other one. There is in fact no
creation of a new office because the Office of the Executive Secretary was already in existence. It was not as if, a new
office was created out of nowhere. What happens here is merely the granting of additional functions to the Executive
Secretary, which now includes the authority to investigate graft and corruption charges against officers in the Executive
Department. The Supreme Court stated that:
1) The President had continuing authority to reorganize and this included the power to abolish.
2) There was no creation of a new office here. It was merely the transfer of existing functions to an office which is
already in existence. What about the creation of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division under the ODESLA? It was
merely an alteration of the administrative structure through the establishment of a 3rd Division, through which the
ODELSA can take on the additional functions which it has been tasked to discharge. There was another allegation that
there was usurpation of the power of the Legislative Department (Congress) to appropriate funds, because the President
used the funds of the Office of the President for this purpose. The Supreme Court said that there was no appropriation,
but mere allocation. The funds were already being appropriated in the Office of the President; he had been using that in
his office. The ODESLA again was under his office.

Change of functions of agencies under the Office of the President (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No.
192935, December 7, 2010)
FACTS: In the case, the order that the President Benigno Aquino III issued when he came into power, immediately June
30, 2010, was Executive Order No. 1 which was the creation of the Philippine Truth Commission. The function of the
commission was to investigations of allegations of graft and corruption. He first created the Philippine Truth Commission
and the ODESLA. They had the same functions. Its function was to investigate allegations of graft and corruptions of
administrative officers in the previous administration. Petitioner Louis Biraogo, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer
alleged here that the Philippine Truth Commission, although an ad hoc body, was a public office. And therefore, he had
no authority to create that office.
ISSUES:
1) Was the Philippine Truth Commission a valid creation of the President?
2) Was the said commission constitutional?
HELD: The Supreme Court stated that:
1) The Philippine Truth Commission was not valid under the power to reorganize and under the power of control in
Section 17, which was to alter or nullify, and did not include the power to create an office.
2) The Philippine Truth Commission was valid, not under the power of control, but still under Section 17, second
sentence which states that He shall ensure that the laws would be faithfully executed. Therefore it is within the power
of the President to conduct investigations in order to ensure the faithful execution of fundamental laws of public
accountability and transparency. The powers of President are not limited to those which are specified in the
Constitution. What are not inherently legislative or judicial are deemed as executive powers. So this is within the
residual power of the President. Furthermore, one of the recognized powers of the President is the power to create ad
hoc committees.
3) The Philippine Truth Commission was found to be unconstitutional because it was in violation of unequal
protection. The investigation was limited only in coverage to the officers of the Arroyo administration. They were the
target respondents of this commission, so there was unequal or biased treatment. Investigations regarding graft and
corruption must be conducted for all public employees.
Constitutional Law 1 Transcription
October 03, 2013 9 (Thursday)
A continuation of the previous discussion on the
POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY (Section 19)
RECAP ON SECTION 19 (Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.)
It is more convenient to grant them such kind of clemency rather than to prosecute them one by one. This is a
grant of general pardon to a class or groups either political offenders or sometimes used in the grant of general pardon
or intentional overlooking of the States authority to impose taxes (example: tax amnesties). General pardon is not just
granted to an individual but to a class or a group of people. The group would usually be political offenders like rebels
and sometimes, tax offenders. However, this is not to say that such political offenders may not be reach by pardon, as
pardon may also be available to them individually.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive in his individual capacity. To distinguish that from amnesty, the latter is granted
by the Chief Executive with the concurrence of the Congress. The act of amnesty is usually done through a presidential
proclamation which now comes to the next distinction that, pardon is a binding act known only by the party and the
President. This must be pleaded and proved before the courts since the Courts of Justice do not have the knowledge to
the grant of pardon. As distinguished from amnesty, it is a public act usually granted pursuant to the presidential
proclamation. A public act that the courts must take judicial notice of its existence.
Another distinction is that, pardon is granted after a conviction while amnesty may be granted before or after the
conviction.
Question: Why?
Answer: If we take a look at the nature of these two (pardon and amnesty): Pardon is said to look forward which only
releases the offender of the consequences of the crime to which he is convicted. The effect of which is that, he is free
from the punishment it being abolished by the fact that he was forgiven; Amnesty look backwards, it abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense as if the offender never committed it. For example, you are a rebel and by the virtue of the
amnesty granted to you, you are no longer considered a rebel.
Pardon condones infractions of the peace of the State which usually are in the form of ordinary crimes. But when it
comes to amnesty, this is usually addressed to crimes that are against the State (for example, political offenses).
Forgiveness is more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution or punishment. Finally, pardon is being
addressed to individuals while amnesty is addressed to classes or even communities of persons.
Now to emphasize, reprieves, commutations, pardons and remissions of fines and forfeitures, it can only be given or
granted after a final conviction.
Introductory Question to the Case: So what is the effect of a pending Appeal when pardon is granted? Say you have a
pending conviction, you appealed your conviction but in the meantime you applied for pardon and the pardon is
granted, what is the effect? Is the pardon valid?
In the case of People vs Casido, 269 Scra 360 (1997)
When their appeal was pending their file for petition was granted so that later on they filed a motion to withdraw the
appeal.
Question: What is the status of the pardon?
Answer: The pardon was, according to the Supreme Court VOID for having been extended during the pendency of the
instant appeal of before final conviction. Any application for pardon should not be acted upon unless the appeal is
withdrawn.
One must first withdraw the appeal before applying for pardon or even before the application for pardon is even acted
upon. In this case it was the other way around.
Case Digest for People vs Casido
Facts:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for
amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-
building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court
ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during
the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of
accused-appellants.
Issue:
Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid
Held:
The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamationof the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction
by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of
amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
Recall the case of Monsanto vs Factoran where the pardon was granted while their case was on appeal. The
Supreme Court said that the appeal was effectively abandoned. In this case (People vs Casido) the Supreme Court said
that that specific portion on the Monsanto ruling is a mere obiter, that the pronouncement pertaining to the
acceptance of pardon is an obiter dictum. So in this case, it reminded the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail
Release or Pardon who were admonished to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their duty to save the
President from embarrassment. But in this case, in order to save their faces there is another set of fact akin to the
petition of the respondents because, they also applied for amnesty at the same time and the amnesty was also granted.
The pardon was VOID, their amnesty was VALID.
In People vs Patriarca, 341 Scra 464 (2000)
This case pertains to a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA) convicted of murder and the penalty was reclusion
perpetua. When his appeal was pending he applied for amnesty while it was pending, the amnesty was granted.
Question: What is the status of the appeal? Was the amnesty valid?
Answer: Yes, because amnesty may be granted before or after conviction. So here, the proper ruling is to effectively
abandon the appeal by the grant of amnesty.
Case Digest for People vs Patriarca
Facts:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for
the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed
the decision of the RTC.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably granted by the
National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which
completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime of murder.
The Constitution limits the executive clemency as provided in the following:
It cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment
Reprieves, commutations, pardons, remissions of fines and forfeitures can only be granted after the final conviction.
A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Congress.
Also. in Article 9c Section 5 it is provided that no pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission on Elections (this is a limitation placed in another provision).
Borrowing Powers:
Section 20. the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary
Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete
report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
Diplomatic Powers:
1. Foreign Affairs Power
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
We have here a requirement that treaties and international agreements need the concurrence of at least two-thirds of
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE (take note that it is only the Senate and not the entire Congress).
Section 21 is just one of the several diplomatic powers of the President. It is the power to make treaties and
international agreements.
Question: What other foreign affairs power does the President have?
Answer: The power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; the power to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited by the Philippines; the power to recognize governments and
withdraw recognition; the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Philippines is part of the
foreign affairs power of the Chief Executive and; the power to deport aliens. What we are talking about is the foreign
affairs power of the President.
2. Treaty and Executive Agreements
Question: What is a treaty?
Answer: A treaty is an international instrument concluded between states and reconfirm and govern by the
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whether it is
called by any designations. As long as there is an agreement between states (two or more), whether the agreement is in
a single instrument or more related instruments it is, as far as the international law is concerned or the international
community, called a TREATY. It is a treaty no matter what given name it has as an instrument (some may call it as, a
protocol, an agreement, concorda, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, act, statute, charteror modus Vivendi),
whatever they call it as long as there exists an agreement between two or more states, the international law or
international community calls it as a treaty.
In our case, we will distinguish between treaties from executive agreements. The latter (executive agreements)
are less formal type of agreements between states (example, by the Philippines and the other state). When it comes to
the international agreements or treaties, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate. In an executive agreement, there is no need for the concurrence of the Senate.
It is important to distinguish between the two, international agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and that involving international agreements of a permanent character usually takes the form of treaties.
Involving political issues or changes of national policy (for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT and
World Trade Organization WTO) which more or less involved political issues or changes of national policies. Pertinently,
our Filipino First Policy though nothing has changed but a treaty wherein we are now welcoming products and goods
from other countries.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of details carry out well established national policies
involving a more or less a temporary nature, usually take the form of executive agreements. They cover such subjects
such for example, inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income taxes, shipping profits, admission of civil aircrafts,
customs matters, commercial relations, international claims, postal matters, registration of trademarks and etc. These
usually are the mere adjustments of details of the already well established national policies. As to these matters, there is
no need for the concurrence of the two-thirds Members of the Senate.
Example of executive agreements that do not require the concurrence of the Senate is in the case of USAFFE vs
Treasurer, 10 Phil 1030 (1959) which involved the Romulos-Snyder Agreement whereby the Philippine Government
undertook to return to the United States yung sobra in ten annual installments a total of about 35 million dollars
advanced by the United States but unexpanded by the National Defense of the Philippines. Apparently, we were given
the budget for the war and there were some 35 million dollars that were not spent so, it must be returned. There was an
agreement to return them in installments in ten years.
Question: Is it a treaty or is it just a mere executive agreement?
The issue here was that, there was no concurrence by the two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The Supreme
Court said that, this is merely an agreement, no political issue involved as well as no change in the political policy.
Hence, there is no need for the concurrence by the two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Case Digest for USAFFE vs Treasurer
Facts:
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of
about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Natl Defense Forces of the RP.
Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled;
that payments there under be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of RP be restrained from disbursing any
funds in the Natl Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.
Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of being remitted to the US, should be turned over to
the Finance Service of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.
3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds to be returned under the Agreement were funds
appropriated by the US Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually owned by the said
Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt; 3)
The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money
through the Agreement.
The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff appealed.
July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt, called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for the
duration of the emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order was published here by Proc No 740
of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army
units including Phil Constabulary.
Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353): For all expenses necessary for
the mobilization, operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses connected w/ calling into the service RP
mil forces$269,000.00; to remain available til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for payment to the Commonwealth
upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as
authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses for the purposes aforesaid.
Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: 2(a) Necessary expenditures
from funds in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be made by disbursing officers of the
RP Army on the approval of authority of the Commanding General, USAFFE, & such purposes as he may deem proper
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of vouchers w/c stated Advance of Funds under Public
Law 353 & EO 9011 This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary obligations assumed by the US as a result of
the induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Because the RP
Govt then badly needed funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials the retention of the
$35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in
Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
PRESENT ACTION: Usaffes arguments 1) the money delivered by the US to the AFP were straight payments for mil
services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to
consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void because there was no loan to be repaid & because it was not binding on
the RP Govt for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
Issues:
Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement Court cant pass judgment
1. Whether or not there is obligation to repay -
2. Whether or not there the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Government
Held:
Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded. Petition DENIED.
1. YES
Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the money is to be handed to
the RP Govt either in advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, & credited
if approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later. Congressional law itself required
accounting in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced
funds shall be accounted for.
It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE Commanding
Gen.
These ideas of funds advanced to meet expenditures of the Phil Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen,
in connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellants thesis that the moneys represented
straight payments to RP Govt for its armed services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept arranged for its repayment in 10 annual
installments. Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract budgetary loans under RA
213, amending RA 16.
The most important argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it
binding on the Govt.
The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the Court
The agreement is not a treaty as that term is used in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the only form that an intl
& the Senate does not exhaust the
power of the govt over intl relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.
In intl law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction between executive agreements & treaties is purely a constitutional one & has not intl legal significance.
Altman v
the contracting parties & dealing w/ important commercial relations between the 2 countries, is a treaty both
internationally although as an executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the
Senate

independent of or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as presidential agreements; 2) agreements entered
into in pursuance of acts of Congress w/c have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the

Even granting theres no leg authorization, the Agreement was legally & validly entered into to conform to the 2nd
category, namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization, w/c usually includes
money agreements.
The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the Phil Senates Resolution No. 15 practically admits
the validity & binding force of such Agreement.
Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement
constitute a ratification thereof, w/c places the question of validity out of the courts reach, no constitutional principle
having been invoked to restrict congress plenary power to appropriate funds loan or no loan.
In Commissioner vs Gotamco, 148 Scra 36 (1987), this involves the host agreement of the World Health Organization
(WHO) where, we have been the country host. Part of the agreement is to exempt the World Health organization from
certain taxes.
Question: Is this agreement a form of treaty or an executive agreement?
Because if it is a treaty, then there is a need for the concurrence of the Senate.
In this case the Supreme Court said, This is a less formal type of agreement between the Philippines and the
World Health Organization. Thus, it is a mere executive agreement which does not need for the concurrence of the
Senate.
Case Digest for Commissioner vs Gotamco
Facts:
The World Health Organization (WHO for short) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. An
agreement was entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the said Organization on July 22, 1951. Section
11 of that Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the Organization, its assets, income and other properties shall be: (a)
exempt from all direct andindirect taxes. The WHO decided to construct a building to house its own offices, as well as
the other United Nations offices stationedin Manila. A bidding was held for the building construction. The WHO
informed the bidders that the building to be constructed belonged to an international organization exempted from the
payment of all fees, licenses, and taxes, and that therefore their bids "must take this into account and should not include
items for such taxes, licenses and other payments to Government agencies." Thereafter, the construction contract was
awarded to John Gotamco & Sons, Inc. (Gotamco for short). Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent a
letter of demand to Gotamco demanding payment of for the 3% contractor's tax plus surcharges on the gross receipts it
received from the WHO in the construction of the latter's building. WHO. The WHO issued a certification that the bid of
John Gotamco & Sons, should be exempted from any taxes in connection with the construction of the World Health
Organization office building because such can be considered as an indirect tax to WHO. However, The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue contends that the 3% contractor's tax is not a direct nor an indirect tax on the WHO, but a tax that is
primarily due from the contractor, and thus not covered by the tax exemption agreement
Issue:
Whether or not, the said 3% contractors tax imposed upon petitioner is covered by the direct and indirect tax
exemption granted to WHO by the government.
Held:
Yes. The 3% contractors tax imposed upon petitioner is covered by the direct and indirect tax exemption granted to
WHO. Hence, petitioner cannot be held liable for such contractors tax. The Supreme Court explained that direct taxes
are those that are demanded from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay them; while indirect taxes
are those that are demanded in the first instance from one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the
burden to someone else. While it is true that the contractor's tax is payable by the contractor, However in the last
analysis it is the owner of the building that shoulders the burden of the tax because the same is shifted by the contractor
to the owner as a matter of self-preservation. Thus, it is an indirect tax against the WHO because, although it is payable
by the petitioner, the latter can shift its burden on the WHO.
In Bayan vs Executive, 342 Scra 449 (2000), this involves the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The issue in this case is to
know Which of the provisions in the Constitution are applicable: Article 7 Section 21 (which we are talking about) or
another section, Section 25, Article 18 of the Constitution? Visiting Forces Agreement is an agreement between two
states which means that Section 21 can also be applicable.
But Section 25 of Article 18 is more specific as it provides that; After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. This is because, according to herein
petitioners that it was submitted for concurrence to the Senate pursuant to Section 21 which is a wrong provision having
Section 25 as the proper recourse to the said case. On the other hand, the Supreme Court said that there exists no
contradiction between the two Sections or Provisions.
Section 25 Article 18 is the more specific requirement when it comes to military bases, troops or facilities which
shall only be allowed when there is a treaty. Well it was given that the treaty exists which brings us now to Section 21
(which says that, there is a need for the concurrence of the Senate). Because Section 25 states that it has to be
concurred by the Senate but it does not mention the specific number of votes so we go again to Section 21. With this, it
only means that both of the provisions refer to each other. There is an additional requirement that it should be pursuant
to a treaty and if the Congress will require, it has to be submitted for ratification to the people and lastly, the recognition
of that agreement as a treaty by the other country. It is which that the Supreme Court interpreted as mere
acknowledgement in the agreement.
Case Digest for Bayan vs Executive
Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the
use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, both countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. In view of the expiration of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement both countries negotiated for its possible extension. On September 16, 1991, the
Philippine Senate rejected the extension of the US military bases which was now called RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security. During the term of Pres. Ramos, he approved the VFA which was the result of a negotiation
on the complementing strategic interests of the US and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 5, 1998,
Pres. Joseph Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon, ratified the VFA. The Instrument
of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA were then transmitted to the Philippine Senate for concurrence
pursuant to Sec 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The necessary 2/3 votes of the members of the Senate were
gathered thus concurring with the ratification of the VFA under Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999 the VFA officially
entered into force. The petitioners argue that the VFA is governed by the provision of Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Held:
Sec. 25, Article XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities should
apply in the instant case. Being a special provision, Sec. 25, Article XVIII will prevail over the general provision of Sec 21,
Article VII of the Constitution. Also, the argument that Sec 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military
bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA is untenable. The clause found in Sec 25 does not
refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects as
evidenced by the use of comma and the disjunctive word or. This interpretation which contemplates three different
situations a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities and any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Sec 25 is also manifested in the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the said section. Moreover, the establishment of military bases
within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by the new weapons of
warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for
months and years without returning to their home country. Therefore first requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII already satisfied
by considering the VFA as a treaty. The second condition of Sec 25 requires that the treaty must be duly concurred in by
the Senate should be viewed in light of Sec 21 Art. VII of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 votes for treaties or
international agreements in general. The 2/3 votes is again satisfied after the approval of the VFA by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18. The third requisite of Sec 25, Art XVIII is that the other contracting party acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. The records of the US Government, through the US Ambassador to the Philippines, show that the
US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. Under international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers. Also, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that,
through the words of Fr. Bernas, ...we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to make
it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.. Also through Article 26 of the Declaration of
Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International law Commission in 1949 provides that Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. This is also known as the principle of pacta
sunt servanda. Therefore, the third requisite is also satisfied.
3. Deportation Powers
Looking at the Constitution, there is no specific provision there that grants the power of deportation.
Question: Upon whom is this power given?
Answer: Based on jurisprudence, the State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive.
Question: What is the qualification and when can it be exercised?
Answer: When he deems that such action is necessary for the domestic peace and tranquility of the nation. When he
finds that there are aliens whose continued stay in the country are injurious to the public interest he may, even in the
absence of the law may deport them because, the authority to protect the State is with the Chief Executive.
Deportation power is decreed in the case of Tang Tong vs Deportation Board G.R. No. L-7680 (this is not found in the
cases enumerated in the syllabus for the cases related to Deportation Powers). Deportation power is exclusively
launched to the President of the Republic of the Philippines subject only to the regulations prescribed in the Revised
Administrative Code and other future legislation.
Question: What do we mean by this?
Answer: Deportation proceedings are not within the jurisdiction of the courts. It is within the jurisdiction of the Chief
Executive through the Bureau of Immigration. The President has the full discretion to determine whether alien residents
in the country are undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare and interest of the State. The adjudication of
tax upon which the deportation is also delegated also devolves upon the Chief Executive whose decision is final and
executor.
There is no legal and constitutional definition defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to
grant the Chief Executive full discretion. Other than the expanded power of the Supreme Court, it is now the power to
determine grave abuse of discretion. So if you are deported just because the President does not like your face, then it
could be a piece of grave abuse of discretion.
The bottom line is, the discretion is with the President, deportation proceedings are not with the courts.
Overview of the Case: Tang Tong vs Deportation Board
Tan Tong was originally charged before the Bureau of Immigration with being a communist, subject to deportation. The
Board of Commissioners found that Tan Tong was engaged in communistic activities & in smuggling, and so it
recommended that Tan Tong be deported to China & that his smuggling activities be referred to the OP under Section 69
RAC.
Special Prosecutor Galang charged Tan Tong before the Bureau of Deportation with affiliation with the communist party
& having fraudulently engaged in unlawful importation, American cigarettes.
Tan Tong filed MTQ because charges were already investigated by BoI & that insofar as smuggling charge is concerned,
the proceedings are beyond the Boards jurisdiction because no deportation proceedings for smuggling can be instituted
before conviction by a competent court
there is no need to conduct investigations by the Deportation Board if there has been final conviction but if there is no
final conviction, the Board can investigate
Question: Is there a specific law that gives the Executive power to deport?
Answer: The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of State, it is vested in the Executive by virtue
of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future
legislation as may be promulgated on the subject
Section 69 of the RAC does not define the cases in which the Chief Executive may exercise his power to deport; neither
does it limit or curtail. What it does prescribe is the procedure necessary for the exercise of that power that the alien
may have his day in court.
If a competent court has found the alien guilty of a violation of law, it is no longer necessary that the proceedings
outlined in Section 69 be resorted to before his deportation may be ordered by the Chief Executive for that would be a
mere duplicity
Section 69 RAC vis-s-vis Section 2702 RAC which punishes illegal importation and imposes, in addition to the penalty
prescribed, the liability to deportation if the person found guilty is an alien grounds should not be whimsical, etc. (go
back to In re Patterson)
Question: What are the grounds for being undesirable? Will there be a limitation to the power to deport?
Answer: Based on threat to national security, inimical to public health; grounds should not be whimsical.
Question: In In Re Patterson, whats the basis of the power of deportation?
Answer: Self-preservation by the State against the undesirable alien
Question: Whats a petition for habeas corpus?
Answer: Special proceeding directed to an officer in the custody of a person to produce the body & explain why he is
being detained.
Question: Who has the power to deport?
Answer: President and those persons whom he authorizes
Question: Is there a law which gives the President the power to deport?
Answer: None, its inherent.
Question: What are the grounds for being undesirable? Will there be a limitation to the power to deport?
Answer: Based on threat to national security, inimical to public health; grounds should not be whimsical.
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
The above-stated provision talks about the budgetary process which starts from the President and later on
submits the budget to the Congress. The said budget will become the basis for the General Appropriations Bill.
The budgetary process has four major phases:
Budget Preparation-the estimate government revenues and the termination of budgetary priorities
Legislative Authorization-this is through the enactment of the General Appropriations Bill
Budget Execution and;
Budget Accountability-(which is now the case where Napoles and the rest of the Senators are being made accountable
for)
Article VIII: Judicial Department
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Before, the only scope of the judicial power is to settle controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. The second phrase of the provision is the expanded authority of the judicial department
particularly, the Supreme Court; to determine whether there exists a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Question: Why do we call it as expanded authority?
Answer: Before, when the authority is fully discretionary (say for example, the Legislative Department) what law
to enact?-it is fully discretionary on the part of the Congress so we cannot dictate what law to enact. If you question
that, it is usually dismissed as a political question on the ground of separation of powers as each government branch
cannot encroach on the power of the other branches of the government (So why would the Supreme Court encroach
upon the power of the legislative department?)
Question: But now for example, acts of the President can it be questioned when it is fully discretionary?
Answer: The general answer would be, No because we have separation of powers. But there is just expanded authority
of the Supreme Court to determine whether or not there is abuse of discretion.
Question: What is a judicial power?
Answer: It is the right to determine actual controversies between adverse litigants during instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction.
Question: What would be considered now as justiciable questions as against political question?
Answer: Justiciable questions are those enumerated in Section 1, those issues, actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and of course, the expanded jurisdiction of grave abuse of discretion. A
purely justiciable question therefore implies that there is a right, that such right is legally demandable or enforceable,
there is an act or omission violative of such right and there is a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for the said
breach of right.
(Atty. Jumao-as asked the following questions Did I mention to you when we have begun our Constitutional Law I
course about softdrinks? What if you are served with a bottle of softdrink and you find Iggy inside (Iggy is an Ipis)? Can
you file a case because you find an Ipis inside your softdrink?)
You have to ask these questions: Is there a right? Is there an act violative of the right? Is there a relief available?
Question: What is your right in that case?
Answer: Return the bottle because you already found Iggy inside.
Question: Was there any damage to you?
Answer: None, because you did not drink the contents of the bottle.
In that case, there is no actual violation of your right. If you file a case immediately in the court because you are
served with this bottle (with Iggy inside), the case would be dismissed on the ground that it is not a justiciable question.
After that, we go to the part of the damage (Nagkasakit ka ba?) by which you have to prove the damages for it
to become justiciable. For example is the case of Buac vs Comelec, 421 Scra 92 (2004). The case involved a plebiscite -
that portion of which, whether or not they are for the cityhood of Taguig? When the result came out, they found out
that the constituents said, No and the majority also said, NO which made herein petitioner to question the result.
But ultimately, the subject of his question is the decision of the voting population.
Question: Is this a justiciable question? Or is this a political question?
Answer: In this case, the people have decided. They said NO to the cityhood of Taguig.
Question: Was there a right violated? Was the petitioners right violated? Was it is right to have Taguig as a City?
Was there a respondent in this petition if you are questioning the decision of the majority?
Answer: No, none.
Case Digest for: Buac vs COMELEC
Facts:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality
into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were asked this question:
Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as
the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487?
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other
election returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a
city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite
returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the
COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and
recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was
raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an
election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion and dismissing the petition to annul the
results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting the
committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees on Revision
submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by petitioner, the
parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of the will of
the electorate because the revision is incomplete. He claims that:
Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the revision of
ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602 votes for No. The revision committee thus
canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final Canvassing
Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of
the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all summed up and tallied as follows:
Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024
Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0
(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460
issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

Held:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so
because the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and
not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion.
So in this case, the courts cannot take give due course to the petition because evidently, the case is not
justiciable. He is questioning the decision of the majority which is no to the cityhood of Taguig. He cannot question that
as it is the discretion of the people. By now, you already have an understanding that, if it is not a justiciable question
then it is a political question.
Another case is that of Velarde vs Social Justice Society, 432 Scra 269, (2004). In this case, the Social Justice
Society filed for a Declaratory Relief (meaning, magpa-explain siya kung tama ba itong ginagawa nila Jaime Cardinal
Sin, Executive Minister Manalo, Brother Eddie Vilalnueva and Brother Soriano) who according to him, are endorsing
candidates for the elective office or requiring the members of the flock to vote for a specific candidate-this according to
him, is violative of the Constitution (by virtue of the separation of the Church and the State).
Question: What is the relief that he is asking?
Answer: He is asking for the court to determine if these acts or the alleged acts are violative of the Constitution.
But if you read his petition, there is no specific indication or a manifest intention on the part of the respondents to
champion an electoral candidate. What the petitioner is merely asking is the opinion of the court (What if they will
endorse? Is it violative?), which does not pose a justiciable question. What is present in his petition are merely
conjectural or anticipatory questions asking for opinions.
Case Digest for: Velarde vs Social Justice Society
Facts:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-
respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano.
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the
separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders
endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified
candidate.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS
Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions
imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a
question of law.
2. t then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even
tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some
point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."
The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.
The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.
Issues:
In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and divided it into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3. Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollary, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)
Held:
Procedural Issues:
1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these
religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.
b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated
by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
constitution,
c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an
opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making
laws, remember the questionability of Justice Panganibans guidelines for article 36 of the family code)
It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to
have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal
Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intention the part of any of the
respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular
candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing
injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
The court held that the complaints failure to state a cause of action became a ground for its outright dismissal. Why?
The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to
protect. (trigger for the cause of action)
In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly
apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising there under. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be
impending, imminent or at least threatened.
The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of its (SJS) thousands of members who
are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact that this general averment
did not constitute a legal right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and speculative in character. Rules
require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.
To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment
action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the
parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment
action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to
sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the
asserted rights will be invaded.
During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or
intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was
filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of
those respondents.
Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by
the said respondents.
3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a
mere incidental interest in the question involved.
SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question
would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate that they have
been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as
registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of
votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too
general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest
impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or importance to the people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue
raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS
Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the transcendental issue.
Substantive Issues
1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefore.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing,
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed
by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the constitution. This was evinced in Yao
v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to
inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts
findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision
proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly
stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision
with the clause SO ORDERED.

A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that,
in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.
It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express
clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision
as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?).
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision. Stating
Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.
The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of
the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it
grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court on a given
issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor thatdetermines
and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or
declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the
opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the
opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.
Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must
be struck down as void.
2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional
principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to
state a cause of action.
Estrada vs Desierto 353, Scra 452 (2002), this is the case where the Supreme Court determined whether or not
Estrada resigned or whether or not there was a proper succession by Arroyo. Estrada prays that the court declare Arroyo
as acting President, considering that President Arroyo was installed through People Power.
Recall the case of Aquino wherein she was also installed through People Power, in Aquinos case it was a political
question, we cannot find any reference from the Constitution, jurisprudence or any law to base our decision of whether
the decision of the people were right.
But in the case of Arroyo, the Supreme Court said that it is a justiciable question, Arroyos government is not the
revolutionary kind same as to Aquinos government. She was installed to power pursuant to the provision of the 1987
Constitution. It was pursuant to this provision of succession that she came into power. It was an exercise of the freedom
of expression and the freedom to peaceably assemble by the people as well as the freedom to petition to the
government (rights actually found in the Constitution). What happened in that case is the act of unsubscribing from the
constitutional framework-it is not a political question which the Supreme Court can determine.
Question: What is a political question?
Answer: These refer to questions which according to the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom and not upon the legality of a particular measure. If the people
voted for a notoriously corrupt candidate, can you question that decision of the people? No. That pertains to their
wisdom, if they have no wisdom so be it. Thats a political question.
If the Congress for example, in the case of DENR vs DENR Employee, 409 Scra 359 (2003)-if the DENR decided to transfer
the regional office from Region XI to Region XII notwithstanding that there is no building yet in Region XII,
Questions: Can you question that decision to transfer? What would be your legal basis for questioning that? Is there a
law saying that such transfer is unlawful?
Answer: No, none.
What you have merely here is the wisdom of the transfer which is fully discretionary on the part of this particular office,
the Executive Department. So this is an example of a political question
Another is the case of, Garcia vs Corona, 321 Scra 218 (1999) which is all about the deregulation of the oil industry. That
law which provides deregulation for the oil industry provided for a period when the deregulation would take effect. They
are questioning the wisdom of the measure (para sa kanila kulang pa ang time). So this is now a political question.
For example, we did not agree with the RH Bill because we do not like the provisions, can we question that? The
enactment of law, what subject matter to enact is fully discretionary on the part of the Congress. If we question that
law, we question it on the basis for example, its violation on the constitutional provisions in the enactment of laws. But
if we talk about the wisdom of that law then, it is truly a political question.
When Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declares a state of emergency, can we question her authority to do that? Since
this is fully discretionary on her part then it is a political question not justiciable so the judiciary has no jurisdiction over
these questions. If you can remember, there was a case in the 1960s wherein the Senate was in a dilemma on who was
the duly elected Senate President. Normally, the Supreme Court would have no authority to come in and judge (kung
sino ang nanalo sa kabila) because the election of the Senate President is fully discretionary on the Senate. But in that
case, the Supreme Court stepped in because there was a question on, What a quorum is? Ordinarily, the Supreme
Court would not step in because of the fact that it is purely a political question.
In that case, facts of the circumstances would say that chaos in the Senate is already affecting the general population.
Before, it was highly difficult for the Supreme Court to justify itself but now, under the 1987 Constitution, its
intervention can easily be justified because of the expanded powers of its jurisdiction in determining grave abuse of
discretion. But we have to know as early as now that, there is no clear and distinct pattern on when and how the
Supreme Court will exercise this jurisdiction.
In the case of Pormento vs Estrada, Supra wherein the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether or not
Estrada can run again-which is actually a judicial controversy but they evaded the question by saying that it is moot and
academic. So sometimes, if it is addressed on the other department, the Supreme Court may take that fact because you
cannot also mandate the Supreme Court to determine grave abuse of discretion if it says that there is no reason to do
that.
Case Digest for Pormento vs Estrada
Private respondent was not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation
of the phrase any reelection in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a persons second
(whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the
Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the Court
may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case
before it. When a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the Court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
In the case of Marcos vs Manglapus, 177 Scra 160 (1989) wherein the Supreme Court came in to determine the validity
of the exercise and to determine whether or not to ban the Marcos-sometimes, it can be said that it is fully
discretionary on the part of the President but in this case, it entertained the petition. Nonetheless, at the end of the day
it validated the action of President Corazon Aquino saying that it is within her residual powers.
Case Digest for Marcos vs Manglapus
Facts:
It is a case of a dictator President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines forced out of office and into exile after causing
twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks
to return to the Philippines to die.
But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Issue:
1 .Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines has international precedents?
2. Whether or not the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the Marcoses?
Held:
NO, The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."
[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2.NO.The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Petition is Dismissed
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
There are two views:
1. General view (orthodox view) if it is not unconstitutional, then it is not a law; it does not confer any right nor
impose any duty nor accord any protection. However it will take some period of time before the Supreme Court can
finally determine the unconstitutionality of a law. Only the Supreme Court can determine the unconstitutionality of a
law. We cannot declare it to be unconstitutional; there is no force in our personal determination. This view disregards
the fact that before a law is declared unconstitutional it has for some period of time been effective has been given effect
and the people were called to obey it. In other words, rights have already been affected.
2. Modern view (doctrine of operative fact)because you cannot blame someone who is implementing the law;
he cannot judge whether the law is constitutional or not. So for sometime the law has been an operative fact. The
Supreme Court recognizes the view that the actual existence of a statute prior to such xxx of constitutionality is an
operative fact that it is indisputable that the statute, treaty, executive order, or ordinance was in actual existence
therefore may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a judicial declaration. The effect of subsequent
ruling as to its invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects.
Planters vs. Fertiphil
Planters Products Inc. is a private corporation involved in fertilizers. President Marcos enacted a proclamation or a
letter of instruction imposing capital recovery component on the domestic sale of fertilizers in the Philippines. The
beneficiary of this is Planters Products. One of the corporations to pay is Fertiphil. LOI was later declared
unconstitutional. Fertiphil can recover the amount from Planters. Using the orthodox view, the Supreme Court said yes.
The LOI is unconstitutional; it is not a law and therefore it imposes no duty and confers no right and accords no
protection.
Planters cannot apply the modern view. The modern view is a rule on equity. The doctrine of operative fact as an
exception to the general rule only applies in matters of equity or fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing the existence of statute prior the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact. The
doctrine is applicable when the declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law.
The Supreme Court cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must
refund the amount paid by Fertiphil. This is in relation to unjust enrichment.
Flores vs. Drilon
The law creating the Subic Bay authority provides that in the first year of its operation the mayor of the city of Olongapo
will be appointed chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic bay authority. By virtue of this provision, Gordon was
the mayor of Olongapo and also served as the chairman and chief executive officer of the subic bay authority.
In the constitution and in the Local Government Code, the mayor is prohibited from being engaged in another position.
This provision was later on declared unconstitutional. What happens now to the salaries emoluments per diem received
by Gordon? The Supreme Court applied the modern view. He was at that time a de facto officer. Theres no question
that he has rendered his service and for this he must be compensated. So he gets to keep the salary. His issuances or
enactments as long as they are legitimate, remain to be valid.
Tan vs. Barrios
The Olaguer doctrine means that military tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians. Some were already imprisoned;
some were still currently being prosecuted. There were already those who have served sentencesentenced by the
military tribunals. There were those who have been acquitted by the military tribunals. And there were also those who
have availed of the amnesty despite their being prosecuted before the military tribunals.
How do we apply now the Olaguer doctrine? The military tribunals have no authority to hear or to try civilians. What
happens to those who are currently serving sentence? Supreme Court said set them free, DOJ, try to investigate if there
are proper criminal charges filed against them with the civil courts. What about those who were convicted and have
served their sentences?
SC applied the modern view. For this category of persons who have served sentence, double jeopardy applies
notwithstanding that military tribunals have no jurisdiction. They have already served their sentence. So it is unfair!
(With feelings) So, fair play and equity. It is unfair if the civil laws will now be applied all over again and they will be
subjected to another prosecution before the civil courts.
What about those who have been acquitted by the military tribunals? Double jeopardy still applies because it will also be
unfair.
In some instances, only the provisions of a law will be declared unconstitutional. What happens to the rest of the law
that were not declared unconstitutional?
Tatad vs. Secretary
The SC said that the general rule is that when part of a statute is unconstitutional, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
However, when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as to warrant the belief that the
legislature intended them to be whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In other words if only one provision
has been nullified as unconstitutional but it affects the entire law then the entire law in invalid.
Concept of relative constitutionality
A statute that is valid at one time, constitutional at one time, will become void at another time because of altered
circumstances without amending the constitution.
Central bank vs Bangko
The concept of relative constitutionality was applied in the case of central bank employees vs. bangko central. Bangko
central is a GFI, Government Financing Institution. They have a category or class of their own separate from ordinary
government agencies. Before, under the central bank act those with salary grades 10 below are under the salary
standardization law with the rest of the government public servants. While those with the higher xxx they were given
the authority to be exempted from the salary standardization law.
Later on, the laws governing the GFIs were amended to the point that all employees in all these institutions are now
exempted from the salary standardization law. Their offices can determine their own salaries. Central bank was not
included; their employees with salary grades 10 below are still covered by the salary standardization law.
The constitutional issue is equal protection. Before, the statute, central bank act, was valid. But then because of altered
circumstances, it becomes unconstitutional.
May inferior courts exercise the power of judicial review?
The power of judicial review is the power to determine constitutionality of a law an enactment, etc. Yes, lower courts
may exercise the power if judicial review. Courts of general jurisdiction are the RTC and the CA. The power of judicial
review flows from judicial power and since inferior courts possess judicial power it may be xxx that the power of judicial
review is not an exclusive power of the Supreme Court.
Constitutionality of treaties, international agreements laws, in must be heard en banc. Considering that the constitution
requires that in the declaration of unconstitutionality of treaties, international agreements, laws, etc the SC is required
to sit en banc. Lower courts must keep in mind that a xxx of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Summary:
Effects of declaration of unconstitutionality:
1. General viewif it is not unconstitutional, then it is not a law; it does not confer any right nor impose any duty
nor accord any protection
2. Modern viewThe Supreme Court recognizes the view that the actual existence of a statute prior to its
unconstitutionality is an operative fact
3. When part of a statute is unconstitutional, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. But when the parts of the statute are so connected the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest
4. Concept of relative constitutionalityA statute that is valid at one time, constitutional at one time, will become
void at another time because of altered circumstances without amending the constitution
Section 5 paragraph d of Article 8 states that All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher. It does not state automatic review nonetheless, the constitutional mandate is that it exercises appellate
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Jurisprudence and the
rules of court provides that it be an automatic review when it comes to death penalty
People vs. Esparas
The accused became a fugitive from justice from the moment the trial began up to his arraignment. So the trial
proceeded up to his conviction and the penalty was death. She was not around. She was in hiding.
Should there be an automatic review? The SC said yes. The life of the accused is at stake. All death penalty cases should
be automatically reviewed by the SC regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Any
court decision authorizing the state to take life must be as error free as possible. The power is sacred. The crime in this
case is a violation of the drugs act RA 6425.
Powers of the SC
1. Exercise of original jurisdiction
2. Exercise of appellate jurisdiction
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The venue is jurisdictional. It depends on the residence of parties. In criminal cases; where the crime was committed.
Accused is a politician, only the SC can order the transfer of venue.
Usually the venue is jurisdictional because all the evidence are there, all the witnesses are there, therefore it is for
convenience.
5. Rule making power of SC
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The 1987 constitution molded a stronger and a more independent judiciary. It has been given the rule making authority
or power. For the first time it was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of constitutional
rights. SC promulgated its rules on writ of habeas data, writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus. These are rules which
would implement of enforce constitutional rights. Normally this would have been the authority of the legislature.
They were also given the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi judicial bodies. Special
courts are created by congress. But the SC can disapprove the rules of procedure of these special courts and quasi
judicial courts. The power to promulgate rules on pleadings practice and procedure is no longer shared by the court with
the congress and executive.
Re: Petition for Recognition
Under the rules of court, GOCCSs are not exempt from the payment of legal fees. GSIS ACT, enacted by legislature, GSIS
is exempt from payment of legal fees. Which will prevail? The GSIS act or rules of court? Based on the exclusive rule
making authority of rules governing pleadings, practice, and procedure in court, the rules of SC will prevail. The
exemption made by the congress will now be an encroachment of SCs rule making authority.
There is another violation. SC enjoys fiscal autonomy. It includes the authority to levy assess fees. If the congress will
exempt GSIS then it violates the independence of the SC particularly its authority to have fiscal autonomy.
SC is the body that governs the admission to the practice of law. Usually it is the professional regulations commission or
the PRC which regulates but the practice of law and admission to the bar is being governed and regulated by the SC.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Under the constitution the SC has the authority over the Integrated Bar up to the point that it may regulate or review
the acts of its officers.
Garcia vs. De Vera
De Vera was supposed to be a member of Integrated Bar chapter somewhere in Paranaque. But he cannot get elected as
president of that chapter. He transferred himself in the southern part in Agusan del sur chapter and he was elected
president. If you are a president of a chapter, you can be elected as president of the IBP national and that was his aim. It
was the time of Agusan chapter to be the president. There was an issue as to his qualification.
Can the SC come in? Yes. The SC has the authority over the Integrated Bar up to the point that it may regulate or review
the acts of its officers. So they have jurisdiction to determine qualifications of their officers.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
If you want to apply as clerk of court, you will apply to the SC. If you apply as clerk in bislig where will you apply? In the
SC. The SC has this sole authority to appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with civil service
laws.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In other words, if there are administrative cases against officers and employees of the court from the highest presiding
officer of the CA down to lowest municipal trial clerk or janitor, only the SC will have administrative jurisdiction over
these cases because only the SC has administrative supervision over these employees.
Maceda vs. Vasquez
SC explains that section 6 exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel from
the presiding justice of the CA down to lowest municipal trial court by virtue of its power. It is only the Sc that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws and take proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of the government may intrude into this power without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Dolalas vs. Ombusdman
Dolalas was a judge. He was charged with dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and an unnecessary delay in the
administration of justice before the office of the ombudsman. These are administrative cases. The ombudsman justifies
taking cognizance of the case because according to the ombudsman, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and an
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice is in relation to her failure to dispose a criminal case for alarms and
scandals for 5 years. This is a violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices act. This is a criminal case and not an
administrative matter. SC said notwithstanding the case, we have to go back to the rules of court. Thereby you have to
determine administrative liability of a judge before you can go on trying the criminal case of anti-graft and corrupt
practices. The proper way to do it is to refer the case first to the SC before the ombudsman can file the criminal case.
De Vera vs. Pelayo
The issue here is whether or not the ombudsman has the jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against a judge
of RTC in connection to his handling of cases before the court. The criminal cases were violation of article 204 and 205 of
RPC knowingly rendering unjust judgment. The ombudsman cannot take cognizance of the case. Before criminal case for
violation of 204 against the judge can be entertained there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that
the decision of the judge was indeed unjust. The SC has the power to review the order or decision rendered by the
judge. The proper way is to refer it first to the SC.
Fuentes vs. Ombudsman
Judge Fuentes of Davao city is facing criminal charges for violation of anti graft and corrupt practices before the
ombudsman in relation to his issuance of writ if execution against the DPWH. Suability is different from liability. Here
DPWH is supposed to pay just compensation to the litigants there was a judgment but PWH failed to pay immediately so
they asked for the writ. Judge Fuentes issued the write of execution against DPWH attaching the bulldozers, etc.
forgetting the doctrine of state immunity. The SC said because this was in relation to the discharge of his function as a
judge it must still be referred first to the SC.
Caoibes vs. Ombudsman
Two judges in the same hall of justice. Magkaaway sila, nagkita sila sa hall, nagsumbagay na sila. The SC said that it
happened within the premises of the court so it is still with the SC.
Garcia vs. Miro
Garcia is a MCTC judge. He was involved in a vehicular accident. The case filed was reckless imprudence. The complaint
was a crime for murder and was changed to reckless imprudence. It was not committed in relation to his function as a
judge. In this case he is treated as an ordinary citizen. It will be within the jurisdiction of the ombudsman and the
sandiganbayan.
CSC vs. Andal
Andal here was a security guard. It was found out later on that when he took the civil service examination there was
another person who took it for him. He was charged administratively by the civil service commission because he took
the exam of the civil service commission. The SC has authority of the administrative case. The civil service commission
has no jurisdiction and it would tantamount to an encroachment of the administrative supervision power of the SC.