Samuel

To what extent and in what ways did 'secularisation' erode the power of
churches or religion 1815-1914?


Secularisation, while being a relatively nebulous concept, should largely be assessed in this period in
three broad concepts: the extent to which there was a decline in the religious activity of the general
population, the changing role of the churches in public affairs and the involvement of religious
language and ideals in political debate and conflict. Overall, while we see a marked trend towards
secularisation in Europe over the nineteenth century and a fragmentation of established religion, the
overall power and significance of religion in this period was not fatally undermined.

One of the most obvious ways in which secularisation was promoted during this period was as a
result of a growing feeling of anticlericalism among intellectuals and the common people. Especially
during times of reactionary conservative government, such as after the Napoleonic Wars or the 1830
revolutions or the repression of the 1850s, traditional religion was associated with such government
because it largely supported the establishment on principle and for practical reasons. Conservative
religion saw revolution as undermining the natural order and moral foundation of society and setting
a precedent for dangerous liberal thinking. Pope Pius IX, after his deposition and exile in November
1849, became virulently opposed to any democratic developments (both within and without the
Catholic Church) such as universal male suffrage. Anticlericalism therefore arose out of a feeling that
established religion was actually morally wrong in its precepts and political allegiances. This rejection
of religion in the political and intellectual spheres became more significant as the century wore on.
Even when not using explicitly anti-religious language, German liberals began to express themselves
mostly in secular, anti-authoritarian terms, with Goethe and Schiller replacing the Bible as their
proof-text of choice. Obviously, this varied from country to country and from religion to religion
there were radical movements which had their basis in Christian Leftism, but the overwhelming
picture is that the political right became associated with religion, and so religions credibility as a
moral and social force was eroded. In being linked to repression, traditionalism and injustice, religion
was sucked into a polarisation of European politics, predominantly in France, which undermined it.
This was, however, not a decisively destructive factor, as other sources of religious authority and
legitimacy arose, such as the diversification of mainstream religious opinion.

Secularisation during this period was promoted by a growing lack of uniformity of belief amongst the
religious groups, and while this division did reduce the power and effectiveness of previously-
established churches and state religions, it actually increased the relevance and support of religion
as a whole through specialisation. After the Napoleonic Wars and the restoration of the various
anciens regimes there was a return to conservative, authoritarian religion as a reaction to the liberal
religion and religious scepticism which was seen as a major cause of the revolutionary upheaval.
However, at the same time there was a general revival of religious behaviour and popular
participation across the denomination and across the nations. In general, overlooking regional and
national variations, nobles and aristocrats tended to be loyal to the established Church, while urban
proletariats leaned more towards non-conformist religion as inspired by leaders like Robert Owen,
amongst others, and intellectuals such as Thomas Paine. The bourgeoisie was more influenced by
religious liberalism or scepticism- for instance, the Protestant German group The Friends of Light or
Samuel
the German Catholic movement emerging in the 1840s appealed to upper middle class desires for
more democracy and a more rationalistic theology. A greater toleration of dissent, as enshrined in
Norways Dissenter Law of 1845 and the 1850 Constitution in Germany, removed the obligation to
be a member of the established church and allowed the diversification of mainstream religion. In
1851 in England, 51% of church attendees belonged to the established Church, while an
unprecedented 44% were considered to be Protestant Dissenters
1
. Some areas of England were
dominated by new movements, such as Methodism, and there the Church of England was
supplanted and replaced entirely. This increased competition between different brands of religion
led to a greater vibrancy and legitimacy for the religions which were favoured by the people.
Although religious scepticism also became a more influential philosophy, mainly affecting the
educated bourgeoisie and the radical working class, it did not gain enough support to lead to serious
change. Often, rejection of religion on intellectual grounds was not so much a rational decision as a
corollary of aligning oneself with radical politics, and therefore did not represent serious damage to
the credibility of the religions.

One item which then must be considered is the issue of personal religious conviction. Did ordinary
Europeans become more secular in their beliefs and worldviews, and did that erode the power of
religious groups? For obvious reasons this is a difficult thing to measure it has been suggested that
we can use popular culture to gauge public opinion, in which case a vast range of religious opinions
are represented. Doubt in Dostoyevsky, Ibsens sensationalist moral turpitude in Ghosts, scepticism
in Stendhal, and so on. This is an interesting yet perhaps unproductive exercise. We can be more
certain that socialism increasingly came to replace or modify religious belief in the later nineteenth
century. Intellectual challenges to religion are very plausibly an important factor in the erosion of
religious credibility and power, especially with regard to the more educated sectors of European
society. Stauss and other academics at Tubingen University along with intellectuals such as
Feuerbach were critically examining the Christian Scriptures and the claims of Christian philosophy
during the two decades from 1830-50, thus influencing both the ideologies of intellectual radicals
and the educated upper middle class. The continued development of naturalistic science, in
particular the espousal of the theory of evolution in Darwins The Origin of Species and the works
of materialists such as Buchner and Vogt lent intellectual ammunition to opponents of orthodox
religion who sought to undermine it and therefore remove a pillar of support for established political
regimes. However, such intellectual radicalism did not penetrate through to the masses in European
society, who sought to accommodate the developments which they did come across within their old
worldview instead of rejecting traditional beliefs outright. Another approach in trying to evaluate
religious trends over this period is to measure levels of religious observance and church attendance
while there are flaws in this method because there are often large discrepancies between
professed belief and actual practice, it at least gives us some sense of change over time. What we
see is a long-term decrease in working class religiosity from even before the development of
intellectual innovation and a decrease as well in middle class religious activity towards the end of the
period. Having said that, these trends fluctuated too sharply (with religious revivals and human
agency playing a role) for us to decide that they were due to any one factor, and as a result the
impact of this decline of religiosity on the power of religion in our period is very difficult to

1
Mcleod 24
Samuel
determine. It seems likely that such a decline corresponds with a decrease in church power, but this
is not necessarily the case.

The overall context for religious change in this period is one where churches and states were closely
linked, and while developments varied in different countries, overall a small level of secularisation
took place and the power of the church was not undermined too significantly. Revolutionary
upheaval in England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively had led to
first the overthrow of the established church and then in both cases a compromise agreed which
partially restored the Church but made the position of religious minorities more secure. The first half
of our period was one of institutional reconstruction, both in terms of the church regenerating itself
and consolidating its influence on the community, so that by the 1840s churches played a central
role in areas such as education and social welfare for example, the Church of England was the
biggest provider of primary education in England at that time. In general, the second half of the
nineteenth century was one of a general trend towards secularisation (with the exception of
Frances dramatic republican separation of church and state) which actually was slower than the rate
of secularisation of ordinary life. From 1852 until the end of the century, a church tax was
introduced into virtually all the German states being collected along with income tax and then
distributed to the religious community which the taxpayer was a part of. The income derived from
this tax allowed German religious institutions to undertake new building works and also extend their
involvement in social welfare. By way of contrast, after 1879, French republicans began to carry out
a programme of institutional secularisation and anticlerical separation of Church and State. Not only
were religious privileges and freedoms of expression clamped down on, but Catholics were actively
discriminated against through legislation which indirectly targeted them. However, Catholics still
played an uncomfortably (for the Republicans, at least) large role in education and more and more
religiously segregated institutions were developed to fight back against the threat of secularisation.
Despite the transformation of the religious landscape of France during our period from being
overwhelmingly Catholic in most areas to a country where practising Catholics had become a
minority, these institutions were able to maintain the strength of Catholicism in the face of hostile
anticlericalism.

In the form of Bismarcks Kulturkampf, Germany experienced a version of radical secularisation, but
in reality it was less extreme and less aimed at eroding religious power than it was in France.
Bismarcks attempt to attack the Catholic Church backfired by encouraging and promoting Catholic
unity, which led the way for the Centre party to become a dominant force in German politics. Less
aggressive secularisation also was fairly ineffective. Germany already had a long-established
tradition of state-funded yet confessional schools, inspected by members of the clergy of the
denomination to which the school was affiliated. Until 1918, the ties between the churches and the
state were actually quite close and what secularisation there was continually lagged behind the
growing secularisation of the everyday life of ordinary Germans. While the abolishing of sectarian
education was promoted by Left Liberals and Social Democrats, there was sufficient opposition from
Conservative Protestants and the Catholic Centre Party that, even in 1906, 95% of Protestant
children and 91% of Catholic children were being taught in schools specific to their own confession
2
.
Like Germany, the Scandinavian countries were another area where institutional secularism had

2
Mcleod 78
Samuel
little effect. While religious exclusivism was removed in Denmark, allowing freedom of expression
and assembly to minorities such as the Catholics, Jews and Reformed Protestants, during the 1840s
there was an establishment of a state-funded-and-backed Church with a Protestant constitution.
Sweden followed this a decade or so later with increased foreign-influenced evangelism and
Protestant revival which led to the abolition of religious uniformity in 1860, in the face of
conservative opposition. Overall, the extent of institutional secularisation was fairly minimal in
Scandinavia during this period - even if there was a degree of urban cultural radicalism in Sweden
and Denmark, it was not significant enough to develop into the polarisation that we see in France in
the same period. The role of religious groups in the public sphere was weakened but not significantly
eroded by secularisation during this period.

In conclusion, this period was one of a general tendency towards secularisation, which did
undermine religious power. However, the extent of this should not be over-exaggerated. Churches
and religion still played a central role in public life and in the personal sphere as well, even if they
were forced to cope with increased competition from other worldviews and challenge from new
ideologies such as materialism and socialism. While individual religions increasingly found
themselves unable or unwilling to bridge the political divide between Right and Left, and so unable
to command a monopoly on legitimacy or authority, as a concept religion was not fatally
undermined in this period.

Bibliography
Owen Chadwick, Secularisation of the European Mind
Hugh Mcleod, Secularisation in Western Europe 1848-1914
Liedtke and Wendehorst (ed.), The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews and Protestants
Nicholas Hope, German and Scandinavian Protestantism
Hugh Mcleod (ed.) European Religion in the Age of Great Cities
Edward Berenson, Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France