Samuel Taylor

What problems did Augustus face in establishing his political

position? How, and how successfully, did he tackle them?


In discussing this question, we need to draw a distinction between the simple power in absolute
terms which Augustus possessed, and his political position, +which carries with it connotations of
legitimacy and justification. The overall challenge for Octavian was translating the power which he
certainly held into widely-accepted political legitimacy which would last for some time. To this end,
therefore, while it is important to discuss the way in which Octavian achieved unequalled power in
Rome at the time, it is more important to look primarily at the political situations after the battle of
Actium especially. The late 30s and 20s BC represent Augustus trying to parley the power which he
had achieved into legitimate authority, and as such should form the bulk of the discussion.

So, although it was actually not such a major factor in Augustus consolidation of power, we do need
to discuss how Octavian managed to remove any significant military opposition to himself. The
battle of Actium was not the turning point which later mythologizing made it out to be, it merely
confirmed the already established dominance of Octavian. In reality Octavian had faced a much
bigger issue when power had nominally been shared among the Second Triumvirate. He was
powerful by that point, but it was his conquest of Sextus and then Lepidus which really allowed
Octavian to move towards full establishment of his political power in a despotic manner. Mark
Anthony was certainly a serious threat, but by the battle of Actium he had not only been weakened
militarily but had been outmanoeuvred politically by Octavian as well. At this point, Anthonys
marriage to Cleopatra proved to be a public relations mistake, and being characterised as a
foreigner, among other things, did not increase his support among the Roman people. Even though
during the constitutional crisis of 32 BC the consuls and the sense of legality was on Anthonys side,
Octavians control of Italy meant that he was able to use the Senate to advance his cause in a way in
which Anthony could not hope to do. The Romans under the early rule of Augustus saw Actium as
the decisive point at which Octavian seized control, but actually the battle was fairly meaningless.
Anthony had been a serious threat to Octavian, but by the time they actually fought the outcome
was much more likely to go Octavians way. The battles in the west against Lepidus and Sextus were
actually more important in terms of Octavians pursuit of power, and Octavians forces were
significantly damaged by them. While perhaps slightly irrelevant to the question of Augustus
political position, Octavians military rivalries with the other Triumvirs did represent a serious check
on his absolute power. On the whole, he did tackle these problems effectively, but it should be
noted that his success was by no means an easy task. Yet after the campaign in 32, Octavians
victories had not only removed this direct opposition, but lent him credibility as a general and as a
protector of Italy, and so had enhanced his political position.

However, in a sense, legitimising his victory both legally and morally was more important for
Augustus in terms of establishing his political position than winning the battles. Without
legitimisation, he could never be more than an insecure military tyrant. Octavian was aiming at
absolute power, where his rule would not be challenged and ultimately his heirs would be able to sit
on the throne after him. Openly and explicitly pursuing this aim would have been political suicide, so
Octavian had to frame such a political position in terms of the precedents of the Republic. His
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opponents did not have the power to prevent him from achieving his aims, but he still had to use the
correct language and procedure in negotiating the realities of republican political life. Therefore, the
establishment of Augustus political position as an absolute ruler was one of increments. The 32 BC
consensus universorum was certainly helpful for Octavian in this regard in two senses. Firstly, it
conferred on Octavian a sense of there being a mandate for his politics. While it is nave to think that
the plebiscite was a voluntary affair, the sheer number of senators who went over to Octavians side
and the lack of support for Mark Anthony from even his own veterans suggests that there was a
popular element involved as well. In addition, the vote began to create a sense of national identity,
which then lent authority to Augustus later as the ruler of the nation. Yet Augustus didnt just seek
to justify his past actions, he also sought to reinvent himself, and effectively try to erase the memory
of Octavian as a public figure. This projection and control of his own image was manifested
particularly in his melting down of all statues of himself and reissuing them as religious icons. His
partisans had become more ambitious in their public works over the 30s, having built the first public
stone amphitheatre in Rome and, under Agrippa, cleaned the streets of rubbish and improved the
water aquaduct systems. The Mausoleum of Augustus and the Temple of Apollo, both built after
Actium, are further ways in which Augustus sought to stamp a new portrayal of himself as more
legitimate than a mere military dictator.

Augustus emphasis on image and values was partly to please the people, but much more crucially,
he had to at least create the sense that, on the surface, he was obeying and submitting to the
constitution and values of the aristocratic Senate. To make them more amenable to his rule, he
projected simple, traditional, Roman qualities, those of virtus, clementia, iustitia and pietas. His
appropriation of traditional Roman symbols of rule was also important. The laurel trees, corona
civica and clipeus virtutis all were carefully picked to suggest that he had earned or been given
power rather than having seized it by force. It was impossible for Augustus to achieve his goal of
absolute power outside of the established political system of the Senate, and so he had to make
these autocratic changes as palatable as possible to the senators. In a way, he actually did this by
making the Senate more republican in the traditional Roman sense than it had been for some years.
The old aristocracy had been replaced by a dramatic influx of new men, and while Augustus certainly
used new men when they supported him, the purges of the Senate actually reorientated the
privileges of the Senatorial and consular classes back towards the nobiles. He also had to disband his
armies, going from 70 legions to 26 an impressive feat in itself, given that it had the potential to
create violent social upheaval. Augustus could not just be a despot, he had to compromise with the
Senate and create the appearance that the res publica was still the state. As a result, he
spectacularly resigned powers, although these were never quite as far-reaching as they might have
been. For example, he became a magistrate before the law rather than commander in chief of the
army. Overall, despite the theatre, his power, which was effectively consular, was pretty much
unprecedented. The settlements of 27 and 23 BC represented the legalisation of his despotic power
as a result, even if it was not stated in such explicit terms. As Ronald Syme says, the precise
formulation of the powers of the military leader in the res publica which he sought to "establish
upon a lasting basis" is not a matter of paramount importance. Overall, Augustus political
manoeuvring was highly successful. He managed to negate the potential threat of any military noble
or consular legates who could challenge him, and his practically unchallenged authority attests to
the effectiveness of this process of reform. It is tempting to point to one particular instance as the
point at which he has decisively seized power, and I would suggest that that moment is perhaps in
Samuel Taylor
24 BC, when the Senate released Augustus from all compulsion of the laws. This telling phrase
perhaps marks the official realisation of what had been the case for some time, that Augustus
power was unmatched and only remained to be translated into law.

Lastly, it appears that the feebleness of his own health made the firm establishment of his own
dynasty a crucial aim of Augustus. Without it, the power structures which he had manipulated could
not survive, and the fact that at several points Augustus is supposed to have been close to death lent
a pressing sense of urgency to the undertaking. Yet subtlety was also needed, since while families
played a very significant role in the politics of the Republic, any move to make Augustus power
explicitly inheritable would have been reacted against very strongly. Since his successor would not
be able to claim the excuse that he was restoring the res publica, Augustus instead to have potential
heirs recognised in the political sphere as exceptional individuals on whom power would naturally
fall after Augustus death. With regards to this, Augustus was actually not particularly successful. He
married his nephew Marcellus to his own daughter, Julia, and gave him every opportunity for
advancement. Marcellus and Tiberius ran for office around five years before the age limits which
tradition dictated, and while Tiberius eventually became a consul at 29 years old in 13BC, Marcellus
actually died relatively early on. Julia remarried, and her children by Agrippa were adopted by
Augustus as his heirs, yet they too died in the first few years AD. Had Augustus been the victim of a
more serious illness or assassination plot at any point before Tiberius became his final heir in the
first decade AD, there could well have been succession problems which probably would have torn
about the monarchy because of its fragility which stemmed from its overdependence on the person
of Augustus for its power and authority. Overall, though, it is clear that Augustus actively and, on the
whole, successfully pursued a dynastic policy to solve the problem of his succession. In a sense, his
political position would only be established once he had died and his crown had peacefully passed to
his heir. Taking into account Augustus sometimes-debilitating medical state and misfortune where
his heirs were concerned, his establishment of the Caesar family as the imperial family was actually
rather effective. Partly because of the legacy of his adopted father and partly because of his own
efforts, Augustus was able to ensure that Tiberius became the imperator in 14AD and as such he was
successful in establishing his political position.

In conclusion, Augustuss political position was solely within the context of a Republic system. The
challenges he faced were overcome with, by and large, Republican solutions, and overall he was
successful in implementing them. The sheer power that he had made it extremely difficult for his
opponents to challenge him effectively, so as long as he was seen to be acting legitimately, he was
able to move towards a more absolute political position with relative ease.