1

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,

Petitioner,


- versus -


ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.

G.R. No. 161793

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x





D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J .:



Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any
definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution
[2]
denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close
friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996,
when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.
[3]


Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat
ticket.
[4]


However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.
[5]

2


On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she,
20.
[6]
The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed
to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.
[7]
At one
point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that
they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would
be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.
[8]


After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then
hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
[9]


In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
[10]


After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
[11]


As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) ofQuezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.
[12]
In the meantime, on July 27,
2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and
assist it in the scheduled hearings.
[13]


On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
[14]


The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself
at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon
City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This
said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be
quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his
luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from
his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with
her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation
of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
3

actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able
to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from
petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out
of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed
behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened
to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every
now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent
of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner
asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea
of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made
to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage
License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should
perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[] and relatives[] houses. Sometime in June of
1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and
they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered
her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent
refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their
own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share
of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these
not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent
refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does
not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
M M P I

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as
to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions
and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and
uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to
be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is
4

seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance
for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder
that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.
[15]



The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision
[16]
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
[17]
The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.
[18]


On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision
[19]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed
and set aside the trial courts ruling.
[20]
It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent.
The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
[21]
needed for
the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[22]
The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.
[23]
The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.
[24]


Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the
Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[25]


In his memorandum,
[26]
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.
[27]


For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,
[28]
that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity
of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina
[29]
were not satisfied.
[30]


The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.
[31]

I.

5

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting
it.

Article 36 of the Family Code
[32]
provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.


As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36
was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[33]


However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code)
that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after
a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this
matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as

a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution
upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition
that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the
enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
6

mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

x x x x x x x x x

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with
Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of
the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes
that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family;
the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman
who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.
[34]



In her separate opinion in Molina,
[35]
she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to
mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is
incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they
7

will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility
that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations,
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable
or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with
a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes
of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil
law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and,
therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind
of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. TheRota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof
8

of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
[36]



Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it
might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.
[37]
The law is then so designed as to
allow some resiliency in its application.
[38]


Yet, as held in Santos,
[39]
the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 68
[40]
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
[41]
This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and
the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and
sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with
positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with
respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which
ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a
grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and
freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the
higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from
the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a
person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these
anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a
person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of
its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In
this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks
freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision
9

made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the
question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that
there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective
for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised
in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may
indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot
deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give
consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such
persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the
difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of
view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the
process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent)
can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac
affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also,
and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in
such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of
those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in
some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that
constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject
incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that
person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long
tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

x x x x

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of
the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a
union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could
be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium,
which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable
to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but
of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such
would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the
financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of
assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means
that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be
factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is
not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially atmatrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision
of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his
irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
10

violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality
disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense
of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is
the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around
the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these
rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume
the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as
an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph
of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does
not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable
to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the
object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause
is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution
of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according
to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to
the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some
freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is
not the fruit of some degree of freedom.
[42]



Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
[43]
ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
[44]


Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the
Court, inTsoi v. Court of Appeals,
[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should
be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards inMolina,
[46]
thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:

11

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
12

submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[47]



Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another three
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
[48]


Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,
[49]
the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without
too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for
the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world.
[50]
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account
of the personality disorders of the said individuals.
[51]


The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
[52]
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
[53]
Let it be
noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.
[54]
To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
13

become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of
the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that,
as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
[55]
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant,
we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
[56]


By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
[57]


Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent
to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation
or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing
and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
14


Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with
the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

x x x x

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does
not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
[58]



Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
[59]
emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos
[60]
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
[61]
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
[62]
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,
[63]
an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the
field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner,
and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or
15

to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or
old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead
to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency
to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal
difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of
causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and
brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability
to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may
be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19
percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can
be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.
[64]



Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner


A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest
for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may
16

allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
[65]



and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows


Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the
rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a
faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19
th
century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The
term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.
[66]



The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null
and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-
hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers
to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
[67]
As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person,
has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.
[68]
Moreover, as shown in this
case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail
and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

17

SO ORDERED.









OEL B. BACCAY,
Petitioner,




- versus -



MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173138

Present:

CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 1, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J .:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the
Decision
[1]
dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution
[2]
dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision
[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which
declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36
[4]
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and
Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one
another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and
the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found
attractive.
[5]

Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that
Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend
family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would
try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel
was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to
Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.
18

Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He
tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long
as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each
other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic
moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him
except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child.
Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed
on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag-
asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to
endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the
familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with
Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her.
He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no
such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she
announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where
her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an
intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo,
wag kayo makialam at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel
called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to
communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his
phone calls.
[6]

On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition
[7]
for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded
after the public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the
case.
[8]

On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto
celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court
in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office are hereby
directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective
marriage registers.
The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be
governed by the property regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
19

SO ORDERED.
[9]

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was
due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist
presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of
emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial
rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her
husband without any provocation.
[10]

On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch
38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby
REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[11]

The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder
was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were
merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not
amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to
perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of
mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.
[12]

The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find
her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual
relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular
obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.
[13]

Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul the
marriage under Article 45 (3)
[14]
of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated
by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 46
[15]
of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she
was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the
instances enumerated under Article 46.
[16]

On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels personality disorder is
not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be
attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no
connection with Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels alleged
psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
[17]

Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
20

DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
[18]

The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity.
Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was
drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly
refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual
encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through
marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the start of
family life is different from plain, simple and casual sex. He further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her
by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.
[19]

Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and that she consistently
exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during their marriage.
He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels family even if they lived under one
(1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also interpersonally
exploitative as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never
showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before
the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her
to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable with the
root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering
their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote
pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her
adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and
mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-protection of her turned her
into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not
to accept rejection or failure.
[20]

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or
signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was
capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel
and Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to
how Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
21

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals
[21]
that the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68
[22]
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability andsolidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
22

x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after
their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove
the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder
incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even
testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.
[24]
Mere
difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from
a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
[25]
Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
[26]

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581
is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.













23











G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.
1
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.
3
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
4
It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the
criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.
5
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed.
6
Its two essential elements are:
7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency
of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
8
Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at
the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
9

24

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to
invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise,
all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equall y
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the
other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More
specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
11
The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial
question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that
the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."
12
[] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
13
No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled inLandicho v. Relova,
14
he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In
a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question.
15
This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.
16
The
contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
17
The legality of a marriage is a matter of
law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he
entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay
his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of
the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon
the defense,
18
but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed
that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the
criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent
was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he
was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The
obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void.
19
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
20
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.
21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of
Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case
No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.


25










G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death.
1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
2
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules.
3
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.
4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
5
A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
6
the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
7
in relation to Article 58.
8
The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.
9
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."
10
Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
26

protected by the State.
11
This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"
12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76,
14
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.
15
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."
16
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
17
The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,
18
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
19
The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
27

the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void
after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
20
cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place
21
and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
22
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
23
and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
24
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
25
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
26
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage
27
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
28
For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
29
Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
28










G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated
via a petition for review on certiorari
2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.
3
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City.
4
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,
7
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code,
8
in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
9
Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
10
the provision was enacted to
"avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
11

THE PETITION
29

From the RTCs ruling,
12
Gerbert filed the present petition.
13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,
14
both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right
it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void
15
and voidable
16
marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.
17
Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
19
enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
20
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
21
In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the
alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still
subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
23
The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.
24
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;
25
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
30

can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
is valid according to his or her national law.
27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
28
This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
29
The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity,
30
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
31
Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand
the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata
32
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
31

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.
34
We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."
35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present
case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982,
36
and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
37
both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
32

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding
by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
38
that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
39
and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
40
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding
41
by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice























33










G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J .:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia
Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
1
of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.
34

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.





G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PARDO, J .:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago,
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
1
for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to
have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.
2
This case was consolidated with another case
3
filed by Potenciano
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife,
asserting that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
4
for lack of merit, and granted the petition
5
to nullify the
Court of Appeals' ruling
6
giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
7

What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.
8

On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring
the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.
9

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate
steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.
35

On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of October
11, 2000.
10

On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be
produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.
11

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.
12

The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that have
been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her
husband's custody.
13
Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were
illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.
14
She claimed that
her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies
controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club
and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia
were the ones controlling the corporations.
15

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999.
16
Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no
objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental
capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we
could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not.
Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a
separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why
the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts
are conclusive on the Supreme Court.
17
We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.
18
Although
there are exceptions to the rule,
19
Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We
agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.
20
The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
21

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and
board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
22

On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in
peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the
death of subject.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
36











A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
R E S O L U T I O N
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's
consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later
than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te complete facts showing the
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -
37

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on any of
the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute parental authority did
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining
the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent,
guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse
during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason,
has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five
years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the
force, intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapability continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their
property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a
provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration
of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their
property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a
provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification
must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-
fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-
consul or consular agent in said country.
38

(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to
the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the following
rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication
once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such
places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the respondent at his last
known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data: (a) title of the
case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for;
and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or within thirty
days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the
respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor
to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of collusion within ten days
from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the
duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and submit the corresponding
report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever
necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after
the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion
exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner
as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-
trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the
public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons
by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at
his last known address.
39

Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the
desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and
purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear
at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be
dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-
appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and require
the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days
thereafter a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If
there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not
prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the court may
extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on
which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other makers as may aid
in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the
court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the conference, the action taken
thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the
agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may
be necessary or agreed upon by the parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of
evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those stated in
the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
40

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do
not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record that
requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party
psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate
the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be made by
any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of
the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the
action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment
shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the parties the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties have no
properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and In the Civil
Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is
located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice
of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
41

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of
the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the
Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place
where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper
Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree
the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil
Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party shall cause the
registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the
Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this
requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree
once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well
as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any stage
of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to
the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the
parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003.