Resumen de History

Chapter 4: The peace treaties after the First World War.

The Paris Peace Conference.
It was a spectacular occasion as a momentous event. It was signed on 28 June 1919. When the terms were
announced, the Germans complaint that it was too unfair.
The mood in 1919.
When the leaders of Britain !lo"d George#, $rance %lemenceau#, and the &'( Wilson# arrived at )aris to draw up
a *reat", the" were under pressure to deal severel" with German". $rance and Britain felt it had to +e punished for
starting the war, as well as pa"ing for the damage and destruction caused +" the war.
,-cept the &'(, ever" countr" that had fought in the war was e-hausted, their econom" was in a +ad state, and 9
million had died. %ivilians had suffered shortages of food and medicine. .illages had +een devastated.
(lthough no fighting had ta/en place in Britain, the huge casualties had left their mar/ in pu+lic opinion. *he" also
wanted to treat German" harshl" when it +ecame pu+lic how German" had treated 0ussia in the *reat" of Brest1
!itovs/. *he +itterness and hatred remained.
The aims of the leaders at the Paris Peace Conference.
*here was a disagreement a+out what to do with German"2
'ome felt the aim was to punish German".
3thers that the" should cripple German" so that it wouldn4t start another war.
3thers that the" should reward the winning countries.
3thers that the" should esta+lish a 5ust and lasting peace.
Georges Clemenceau (France)
$rance had suffered enormous damage to its land, industr" and people and self1confidence. German"
seemed to man" $rench people as powerful and threatening as ever.
$elt threatened +" German".
'aw the *reat" as an opportunit" to cripple German" so that it could not attac/ $rance again.
Was a realist.
6e demanded a treat" that would wea/en German" as much as possi+le.
Woodro Wilson (!"#)
6e was an idealist.
Wanted to +uild a +etter and more peaceful world from the ruins of the Great War.
German" shouldn4t +e punished too harshl" +ecause someda" it would recover and want revenge.
Wanted to strengthen democrac" in the defeated nation so that its people would not let its soldiers cause
another war.
7ations should cooperate to achieve world peace. In Januar" 1918 he presented his 18 points, the
fourteenth was a !eague of 7ations.
Believed in self1determination and wanted the different ,astern ,urope peoples to rule themselves instead
of forming part of (ustria16ungar"4s empire.
9an" British and $rench people did not agree with the 18 points +ecause the" seemed impractical, li/e self1
determination, it would +e ver" hard for peoples of eastern ,urope to rule themselves since the" were scattered
along man" different countries.
$a%id &lo'd George (Great (ritain)
Was in the middle ground +etween the other two.
Wanted German" to +e 5ustl" punished +ut not too harshl".
Wanted German" to loose its nav" and its colonies since the" threatened the British ,mpire.
6e did not want German" to see/ revenge and possi+l" start another war.
Wanted to start trading with German" again since it meant 5o+s for the British people.
6ad great pressures +ac/ home for a harsh treat".
$isagreements and compromises
It was clear that the o+5ectives of the three wouldn4t +e reached. %lemenceau clashed with Wilson in man" aspects.
*he &'( had practicall" not suffered, so it was generous with German". But it had to give wa" with regards to the
coalfields and the 0hineland. !lo"d George didn4t agree either with %lemenceau, as the first didn4t want to treat
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German" too harshl". Wilson didn4t agree either with !lo"d George, as the second didn4t li/e the 2nd point of the
fourteen points, allowing all nations access to the seas.
The Treat' of )ersailles.
7one of the Big *hree was happ" with the terms. *his can +e divided into : areas2
*he terms of the treat"2
1) War guilt.
*he Germans had to accept the +lame for starting the war. *his was seen as e-tremel" harsh +" the Germans.
*) +eparations.
German" had to pa" reparations to the (llies for the damage of the war. It was of ;;<< million pounds. *he terms
were later changed with the =oung )lan in 1929.
,) German territories and colonies.
German"4s overseas colonies were ta/en awa". $ormer German colonies were controlled +" the !eague as
mandates. It for+id German" to all" with (ustria.
4) German's armed forces.
*he arm" was limited to 1<<<<< men and the" had to +e all volunteers. German" was not allowed to have armored
vehicles, su+marines or aircraft. *he nav" could onl" +uild ; +attleships. *he 0hineland had to +ecome a
demilitari>ed >one.
-) &eague of .ations.
*he !eague was introduced as an international ?police force@.
German reactions to the Treat' of )ersailles.
*he terms of the *reat" were announced on A 9a" to a horrified German nation. German" had to lose2
1<B of its land
all of its overseas colonies
12.:B of its population
1;B if its coalfields and almost half of its iron and steel industr"
Its arm" was reduced to 1<<<<< menC it could have no air force, and a tin" nav". It had to accept the +lame for
having started the war, and should pa" reparations. *he reaction was of horror and outrage. *he" felt the" hadn4t
started or lost the war. *he" +elieved that the" had agreed a ceasefire. (t first the government refused to sign the
treat", and the nav" san/ its ships as a protest. (t one point war almost +ro/e out again, +ut, reluctantl", ,+ert
agreed to accept the terms of the *reat".
/ War guilt and reparations.
*he war guilt clause was particularl" hated. *he" thought that the +lame should +e shared, +ut if not, this meant that
German" was also e-pected to pa" for all the damage caused +" it. *he German econom" was alread" in tatters.
*he" feared the reparation pa"ments would cripple them.
/ $isarmament.
(n arm" of 1<<<<< men was too little for a countr" as +ig as German"C it was a pride for them. 7one of the (llies
disarmed li/e German" did in the 192<s, despite Wilsons $ourteen points calling for disarmament.
/ German territories.
It had lost a lot of its territories. It was a +low for their pride and econom". *he" had lost important industrial areas
'aar, &pper 'ilesia#. While German" was loosing territories, $rance and Britain were gaining territories.
/ The Fourteen Points and the &eague of .ations.
*he" felt that the treatment was not /eeping with Wilson4s $ourteen )oints. It felt insulted for not +eing invited to the
!eague of 7ations.
/ 0$ou1le standards23
German complaints a+out the *reat" felt in deaf ear, +ut man" people thought their treatment was much +etter
comparing to the one that the" had treated 0ussia in the Brest1!itovs/. *he pro+lems with their economies were +ad,
+ut it was partl" self1inflicted.
The impact of the Treat' on German'.
In 1919, ,+ert4s government was pushed into chaos and his right1wing opponents could not +ear the *reat" and
made a revolution against him, +ut failed. *he stri/e that stopped the revolution paral">ed services li/e power and
transport. It was called the Dapp )utsch. When German" fell +ehind the pa"ment of reparations in 1922, in 192E
$rench and Belgium soldiers entered the 0uhr region and simpl" too/ what was owed to them as raw materials and
goods. *his was legal according to the *reat". *he government told the wor/ers to go on stri/e. 1<< were /illed and
1<<<<< protestors e-pelled, +ut the worst was that now German" didn4t have an" goods to sell, therefore no income.
*he government solved the pro+lem +" printing e-tra mone", which too/ them to another pro+lem, h"perinflation.
*his mone" was virtuall" worthless so prices shot up. Wages were paid dail".
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)erdicts on the Treat' of )ersailles.
In 1919, the *reat" was not onl" critici>ed +" the Germans, none of the +ig three were satisfied.
%lemenceau said it was not harsh enough.
!lo"d George received a hero4s welcome when he returned to Britain, +ut he felt another war would
happen.
Wilson was ver" disappointed with the treat". *he (merican congress did not approve the *reat".
'oFcould it +e 5ustifiedG
6istor" has shown that it helped to create a cruel regime in German" and eventuall" a second world war. But at that
time, for the people outside German", it was seen as fair. ( more generous treat" would have +een totall"
unaccepta+le to the pu+lic opinion. (nd the *reat" was the +est that could +e hoped for in the circumstances.
Chapter -: +ussia and the !""+ (1914/1945)
The ne Tsar.
When 7icholas II was crowned *sar of 0ussia in 1988, man" people favored him, and even called him ?the little
father of 0ussia@, +ut twent"1three "ears later, he had +een removed from power and he and his famil" were
prisoners. *he *sar ma" have as/ed himself how, +ut commentators were e-pecting collapse wa" +efore191A.
The Tsar6s 7mpire
0ussia was a vast empire rather than a single countr", and the *sar was its supreme ruler.
.ationalities
*he *sar4s empire included man" different nationalities. 3nl" 8<B of the *sar4s su+5ects spo/e 0ussian as a first
language. *he %ossac/s were lo"al to the *sar, while the )oles and $inns were not. Jews often suffered vicious
attac/s called pogroms.
Peasants and countr'side
*he" were a+out 8<B of 0ussia4s population, the" lived in communes. *he wealthier peasants were called /ula/s.
!iving and wor/ing conditions were dreadful. $amine and starvation were common and the life e-pectanc" was a+out
8<. 9ost land was unsuita+le for farming and since the population was growing it was in short suppl". *he" still used
ancient farming techniHues. *he land was divided into large fields, organi>ed +" the 9ir. ,ach famil" was given a part
of that land called a plot. *he" had no +asic education +ut were lo"al to the *sar since the" were ver" religious and
the priest tal/ed well of the *sar. But some favored the social revolutionaries. *he main discontent was over land,
the" thought unfair that the aristocrac", the %hurch, and the *sar had so much land and them so little.
Wor8ing classes
'ome peasants left the land to wor/ on the newl" developing factories. *his too/ place in the capital cities, and here
the population was growing as peasants arrived loo/ing for a +etter wa" of life. *he wor/ers lived in filth and sHualor.
3vercrowding, terri+le food, disease and alcoholism were ever"da" facts of life. *here were no government
regulations to child la+or, hours, safet", or education. *rade unions were illegal. !ow pa", 1211: hour da"s,
unguarded machiner" and +rutal discipline were some of the horri+le wor/ing conditions.
9iddle classes
Iue to industriali>ation, the capitalists emerged. *he" were landowners, industrialists, traders and +usinessmen. *he
capitalists increased 0ussia4s middle class. *heir main concerns were the management of the econom", although the
capitalists were also concerned a+out controlling their wor/force.
#ristocrac'.
*he" were onl" the 1.:B of societ" +ut owned 2:B of the land. *he had vast estates, town and countr" houses and
elegant lifest"les. *he" usuall" acted as local officers. In the countr"side the" dominated the local assem+lies or
>emstva. 9an" lived in glamorous cities and their main fear was that the peasants would rise up and ta/e their lands.
The Tsar and his go%ernment
*he vast empire was ruled +" an (utocrac". *he *sar had a+solute power to rule 0ussia. 6e +elieved that God had
placed him in that position and the church supported him. 6e could appoint or sac/ ministers or ma/e an" decisions
without consulting an"one. (lthough he had some good Hualities, he was not an a+le, forceful and imaginative
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monarch lie his predecessors. 6e tended to avoid ma/ing important decisions. 7icholas handled his officials poorl".
6e would sac/ or encourage conflict +etween an"one that he felt threatened +". 6e even appointed famil" mem+ers
and friends to the court to important positions. 9an" were incompetent and corrupt.
Control
Iespite ever"thing the *sar4s regime was ver" strong in some wa"s.
)easants were controlled +" the 9ir.
*he 9ir could +e overruled +" the land captains minor landlords chosen +" the *sar as his officials in local
areas#.
*he >emstva local assem+lies# helped control 0ussia. *he" were dominated +" land captains in the
countr"side and +" professional people in the towns.
!ocal governors were appointed +" the *sar from the aristocrac". *here were special emergenc" laws that
allowed them to2
o 3rder the police to arrest suspected opponents of the regime.
o Ban individuals from the >emstva, courts or an" government organi>ation.
o 9a/e suspects pa" heav" fines.
o Introduce censorship of +oo/s or leaflets or newspapers.
!ocal governors controlled the police. *he police had 1<,<<< officers and had to concentrate on political
opponents of the regime.
*he 3/hrana was the *sar4s secret police.
*he arm" was used for re+ellions.
:pposition to the tsar
9iddle class people (cadets; li1erals): wanted greater democrac" in 0ussia and a strong parliament, 5ust
li/e Britain.
"ocial +e%olutionaries: *he" were a radical movement, the" wanted to carve up the huge estates of the
no+ilit" and hand them over to the peasants. *he" +elieved in violence and revolution. *he" had wide
support in the towns and countr"side.
"ocial $emocratic Part': were a smaller +ut more disciplined group led +" Darl 9ar-. *he" split +etween
Bolshevi/s and 9enshevi/s. *he Bolshevi/s led +" !enin# wanted to create a revolution whereas the
9enshevi/s +elieved 0ussia was not read" for revolution. Both were illegal and man" of its mem+ers were
e-iled.
B" 19<E the ideas of these opposition parties and the appalling conditions led to a ware of stri/es, demonstrations
and protests. 0ussia was getting close to a revolution.
The 195- +e%olution
*he government4s attempts to deal with the pro+lems failed. When it rela-ed censorship, there were anti1government
pamphlets, +oo/s and newspapers ever"where. It tried to set up government1approved trade unions, +ut this lead to
stri/es and demands for free unions. *he *sar tried to get the countr" +ehind him +" em+ar/ing on a war against
Japan +ut suffered humiliating defeats.
(lood' "unda'
( crowd of 2<<.<<< protesters, led +" priest $ather Gapon, came to the winter palace to give a petition to the *sar.
*he" too/ pictures of the *sar to show that the" respected him and went in peace. But the tsar wasn4t there, he had
left when signs of trou+led appeared. *he crowd was met +" a regiment of soldiers and %ossa/s. Without warning
the soldiers opened fire and the %ossa/s charged. *he *sar lost the respect of $ather Gapon and the ordinar"
people of 0ussia.
*he *sar did not notice the seriousness of the situation. It seemed that he was going to lose control of
0ussia. In 'eptem+er a general stri/e +egan and paral">ed 0ussian industr". *he revolutionaries such as !enin and
*rots/" came +ac/ from e-ile to 5oin the revolution. Wor/ers councilsJs soviets# were formed in the towns and, while
in the countr"side peasants murdered landlords and too/ over their lands.
"o ho did the Tsar sur%i%e2
In his 3cto+er 9anifesto, the *sar offered a Iuma parliament#, freedom of speech, right to form political parties and
financial help for peasants. But the *sar made peace with Japan and his +est troops were +ac/. *hese troops
crushed the revolt. B" 9arch 19<; the revolution had +een completel" crushed and the revolutionar" leaders were
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either /illed, e-iled or hiding a+road. 7o revolution would succeed as long as the arm" sta"ed lo"al to the tsar. (fter
crushing the revolt the *sar created the fundamental laws, this agreed with the e-istence of a Iuma, +ut had so
man" limitations that it could do nothing.
The trou1led 'ears; 195-/1914
In order to avoid another revolution, the *sar needed to reform 0ussia to satisf" at least one of the unhapp" groups.
*he *sar continued to rule without pa"ing much attention to the Iuma. *he first and second were ver" critical of him
so were sent off. But later the *sar changed the voting rules and a less critical Iuma was elected. B" 1912 even this
?lo"al@ Iuma was +ecoming critical +ut the *sar continued as criticism was not a serious threat.
"tol'pin
6e was the prime minister elected +" the *sar in 19<;. 6e used a carrot and a stic/ approach to the pro+lems of
0ussia.
The stic8: he came down hard on the opposition to the regime. 3ver 2<,<<< were e-iled and over 1<<< hanged.
*his effectivel" /illed off opposition to the regime.
The carrot: he tried to win the peasants +" giving what the" wanted the most, land. Dula/s were allowed to opt out of
the 9ir communes and +u" up land. *hese /ula/s prospered, and production also. 3n the other hand 9<B of land in
fertile west 0ussia was still run +" inefficient communes.
'tol"pin also tried to +oost 0ussia4s industr". *here was an impressive economic growth although far +ehind modern
industrial powers. Wages were still low and the cost of food and housing high. !iving and wor/ing conditions were still
appalling. (ll of the profits were going to the capitalists or $rench +an/s that had loaned 0ussia mone" in order to
grow industries. 'tol"pin was assassinated in 1911 +ut the *sar was going to sac/ him an"wa", he feared that he
was tr"ing to change 0ussia too much with education plans and regulations for wor/ers, the" saw these reforms as a
threat to 0ussian traditional societ", in which ever"one /new their place.
0elations +etween the people and the *sar +ecame worse as econom" too/ a downturn in 1912, causing
unemplo"ment and hunger.
*he government tried things such as discrimination to Jews, 9uslims and other minorities to get the people +ehind
them +ut discontent grew especiall" in the wor/ing class. 'tri/es were on the rise, however the arm" and police dealt
with these pro+lems and the government seemed strong to its opponents.
+asputin
*he *sar4s son (le-is was ver" ill with +lood disease, through h"pnosis, it appeared that 0asputin could control it. 6e
was considered a miracle wor/er +" the *sarina. Before long he was giving the *sar advice on how to run the
countr". )eople suspected of him, he was said to +e a drin/er and a womani>er. *he *sar4s opponents sei>ed on
0asputin as a sign of the *sar4s wea/ness and unfitness to rue 0ussia.
War and re%olution
When 0ussia entered the WW1, tensions seemed to disappear. *he *sar seemed popular and stri/es were
a+andoned, he was applauded. *he good feeling however, was ver" short, +ecause as the war continued, the *sar
+egan to lose the support of the /e" sectors of 0ussian societ".
The arm'
*he soldiers felt good a+out fighting +ut fought more to protect their countr" than to show lo"alt" to the *sar. *he"
fought +ravel" +ut were no match for the German arm". *he" were +adl" lead and were treated horri+l" +" the
aristocrat commanders. *he" were short rifles, ammunition, artiller" and shells. When the *sar too/ personal
command of the arm" it made little difference since he wasn4t an a+le commander +ut he was held responsi+le for
the shameful defeats. B" 191A, the arm" was a supporter of the revolutionar" Bolshevi/ part".
Peasants; or8ers and the ethnic minorities
In the countr"side the war had /illed man" peasants and this left orphans needing state war pensions that the" did
not alwa"s receive. *he government did not have mone" to pa" the peasants for food so planned to ta/e it awa" +"
force +ut stopped in fear of creating a revolt.
*he industrial wor/ers were unhapp" due to the fact that war contracts had created an e-tra E.: million 5o+s, and the
wages were still horri+le, overcrowding was even worse and there were fuel and food shortages. *he pro+lem was
that the railwa"s could not cope with the needs of the arm" and the factories, so the" didn4t deliver these things to
them. 9an" wor/ing men cursed the *sar in 191A.
The middle classes
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*he" did not suffer li/e the peasant and wor/ers +ut were appalled when the" were revealed of the living conditions
of the war and the lac/ of supplies that the" had, and the" tried to set up committees to help. *his made them
unhapp" with the *sar.
The aristocrac'
Junior officers died in war, and these men were the future aristocrat class. 9an" aristocrats were appalled at the
influence of 0asputin over 0ussia. (lso the" were angr" +ecause when the *sar went to war, he left his wife in
charge, and the fact that she was German +egan rumors in the capital. *here were also rumors of an affair +etween
her and 0asputin. It got so serious that a group of leading aristocrats murdered 0asputin in Iecem+er 191;.
The 9arch re%olution
In Januar" 191A stri/es +ro/e out all over 0ussia. *he" were supported and 5oined +" the arm". *he *sar4s +est
troops were dead on the +attlefields. 3n A 9arch wor/ers at the )utilov steelwor/s went on stri/e. *he" 5oined with
thousands of women and demanded +read. *he stri/ers rose to 2:<,<<< and the industr" came to a standstill. *he
Iuma set up a provisional committee to ta/e over the government. When the *sar told them to stop and the arm" to
put down the revolt, the" +oth refused. *he" marched to the Iuma demanding the" ta/e over the government and
the" accepted. 3n the same da" revolutionaries set up the )etrograd 'oviet again, and too/ control of food supplies
to the cit". *he *sar issued a statement that he was a+dicating, he wanted his +rother 9ichael to ta/e over, +ut he
refused2 0ussia had finished with *sars.
The pro%isional go%ernment
*he provisional government faced three overwhelmingl" urgent decisions2
*o continue war or ma/e peace.
*o distri+ute land to the peasants or as/ them to wait until elections had +een held.
6ow +est to get food to the starving wor/ers in the cities.
*he provisional government was a mi-ed group, the" had law"ers and also angr" revolutionaries who had no
e-perience at government at all. *he" promised 0ussia4s allies that it would continue the war and it also urged the
peasants to +e restrained and wait for elections +efore ta/ing an" land. *he idea was that the )rovisional
Government could then stand down and allow free elections to elect a new constituent assem+l" that would fairl" and
democraticall" rule 0ussia.
But on the other side was the )etrograd 'oviet, who had the support of the wor/ers and arm", during the crisis
months, the 'oviet and )rovisional Government wor/ed together.
!enin wanted to drive the revolution even further, !enin, the leader of the Bolshevi/s. 6e returned from e-ile and set
out the Bolshevi/ program in his (pril *hesis, urging people to support the Bolshevi/s in a second revolution. 6is
slogans were ?)eace, !and and Bread@ and ?(ll power to the soviets@, which contrasted with the message of the
)rovisional Government. *here support increased Huic/l" in the soviets and in the arm".
The pro%isional go%ernment6s authorit' collapsed
In the second half of 191A, the )rovisional Government lost power and collapsed for man" reasons. *he war effort
was failing. 'oldiers were dropping out of the arm" and Derens/" +ecame 9inister for War. It was a disaster, the
arm" +egan to fall apart in the face of the German counter1attac/. *he peasants ignored the orders from the
government to wait. *he" were simpl" ta/ing control of the countr"side. *he soldiers, who were mostl" peasants, did
not want to miss their turn when land was shard out and that made man" desert the war and drop out. *he pro+lems
got worse when Bolshevi/1led protests turned into a re+ellion. When Derens/" proved that !enin had +een helped +"
the German4s, support for the re+ellion fell, !enin fled to $inland and Derens/" too/ over the government after using
troops to crush the re+ellion.
<erens8' loses his poer
*he real power la" in the hands of the soviets, especiall" the )etrograd 'oviet. It had a Bolshevi/ ma5orit" and a
Bolshevi/ chairman K !eon *rots/" and had the support of much of the arm" and industrial wor/ers.
When, in 'eptem+er 191A, Dornilov marched into 9oscow intending to get rid of the Bolshevi/s and restore order,
Derens/" had troops that were no match for Dornilov4s and so he turned to his Bolshevi/ opponents, who organi>ed
themselves in an arm" called the 0ed Guards. Dornilov4s troops refused to fight mem+ers of the 'oviet so his plans
collapsed.
*his was hardl" a victor" and Derens/"4s government was doomed. 6e had tried to carr" on the war and failed, and
therefore lost the arm"4s support. It had tried to stop the peasants from ta/ing land and lost their support too, and
therefore failed to +ring food into the towns. *herefore losing also the support of the ur+an wor/ers.
Bolshevi/s were promising what people wanted most +read, peace, land#. *he" had removed the threat of Dornilov.
*he Bolshevi/s had most of 0ussia favoring them +" the end of 'eptem+er 191A.
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(olshe%i8 re%olution
B" the end of 3cto+er 191A, !enin was convinced that the time was right for the Bolshevi/s to rise and ta/e power.
6e convinced all the Bolshevi/s to act swiftl". Iuring the night of ; 7ovem+er, the 0ed Guards, lead +" !eon
*rots/", too/ control of post offices, the +ridges and the state +an/. *he" had ta/en control of almost all )etrograd
when Derens/" wo/e up ne-t morning. Iuring the da", with almost no opposition, the" too/ over railwa" stations and
important targets. 3n the night of 7ovem+er A, the" stormed the winter palace and arrested ministers of the
)rovisional Government. Derens/" fled into e-ile and on 8 7ovem+er and announcement was made to the 0ussian
people that the )rovisional Government had +een overthrown.
#n anal'sis of the (olshe%i8 +e%olution
*he Bolshevi/s did not have the support of the ma5orit" of the 0ussian people, +ut were a+le to ta/e control +ecause
the )rovisional Government was ver" unpopular and there were no massive demonstrations wanting Derens/" +ac/.
*he" were a disciplined part" dedicated to revolution and had supporters in all the right places. 6alf the arm"
supported them as well as the sailors in the important naval +ases. *he ma5or industrial centers were also pro1
Bolshevi/. *he" also had outstanding personalities such as *rots/" and there leader !enin. $or all of these reasons
the" were a+le to carr" out their ta/eover in 7ovem+er 191A.
&enin in poer
*he Bolshevi/s had promised the people +read, peace and land and /new that if he failed to deliver he would have
the same fate as Derens/" and the )rovisional Government. !enin immediatel" set up the %ouncil of )eople4s
%ommissars 'ovnar/on#. It issued man" decrees aiming to strengthen Bolshevi/s4 hold on power. It announced that
0ussia was as/ing for peace with German", the peasants were given the *sar4s and the %hurch4s lands. *he
factories and industries were put in the hands of the wor/ers. *he" were given the power to treat ruthlessl" with their
opponents and did.
The (olshe%i8 dictatorship
!enin had promised free elections to the %onstituent (ssem+l" and did not gain the ma5orit" of the votes, the rivals,
the 'ocialist 0evolutionaries, were in ma5orit", so he sent the 0ed Guards to close down the (ssem+l". *his was
easil" forgotten and !enin used the %ongress of 'oviets to pass his laws, as the" were a Bolshevi/ ma5orit". 0ussia4s
democratic e-periment lasted less than 28 hours, +ut !enin +elieved that he was esta+lishing a dictatorship of the
proletariat that would, in time, give wa" to true communism.
9a8ing peace
!enin had to ma/e good his promise of peace so he told *rots/" to negotiate a peace treat", +ut to tr" to wait as long
as possi+le. 6e hoped a socialist revolution would +rea/ out in German", +ut +" $e+ruar" 1918 nothing had
happened and the Germans were starting to advance again. !enin had to accept the *reat" of Brest1!itovs/. It was a
severe +low to 0ussiaC the" lost E8B of its population, E2B of its agricultural land, :8B of its industr", 2;B of its
railwa"s and 89B of its coalmines. *he" also imposed a fine of E<< million gold rou+les. !enin felt that he would get
this +ac/ when German" lost.
:pposition and Ci%il War
!enin was +ound to ma/e enemies. In Iecem+er he set up the %he/a, a secret police to crush his opponents after
+eing shot three times +ut escaping. ( collection of anti1Bolshevi/ elements united in an attempt to crush the
Bolshevi/s, the" called themselves the Whites. In 9arch 1918 the %>ech !egion sei>ed control of a large section of
the *rans1'i+erian railwa" and prett" soon three separate White armies were marching into Bolshevi/1controlled
western 0ussia Bolshevi/ >one, stronghold#.
!eon *rots/" created a new 0ed (rm" of E<<,<<< men, led +" former *sarist officers. 6e made sure that the" sta"ed
lo"al +" holding their famil"4s hostage. *he %he/a made sure that no+od" cooperated with the Whites in Bolshevi/
territories. *he" treated suspects +rutall" and it +ecame /nown as the 0ed *error.
!enin ordered the *sar and his famil" to +e /illed since the Whites were advancing into the place where he was
sta"ing. 6e could not ris/ the *sar +eing recued and made leader of the Whites. Both sides did horri+le things and
the most suffering was in the ordinar" people who lived in areas where the fighting too/ place.
*hrough harsh discipline and +rilliant leadership, *rots/" +egan to turn +ac/ the White forces. *he Whites were not
reall" a strong alliance and their armies were una+le to wor/ together, *rots/" defeated them one +" one until the last
in 192<. (lthough there were scattered out+rea/s, the Bolshevi/s were securel" in control of 0ussia.
Wh' did the (olshe%i8s in the Ci%il War2
#d%antages of the +eds
*he 0ed arm" was united, disciplined, and +rilliantl" lead +" *rots/". *he also /ept control over their heartlands in
western 0ussia +"2
- 7 -
9ade sure that the towns and armies were well fed, +" forcing peasant to hand over food +" rationing
supplies.
*oo/ over factories of 9oscow and )etrograd so that the" could suppl" their arm" with eHuipment and
ammunition.
*he 0ed *error /ept the population under strict control.
*he" also made good use of atrocities committed +" the Whites and raised fears a+out the possi+le
return of the *sar and landlords with effective propaganda.
(nother advantage was that the 0eds had territorial advantages. *heir enemies were spread around the edge of
0ussia while the" had internal lines of communication that allowed them to move troops Huic/l" +" railwa"s.
$isad%antages of the hites
*he" were not united and were made up of different groups with different aims. *he" were also widel" spread so
could not meet to coordinate attac/s. *he" had limited support from the 0ussian population and the peasants
preferred the 0eds since the Whites would +ring the landlords +ac/ and the" caused more suffering to the peasants
than the 0eds did.
War communism
It was the name given to the harsh economic measures that the Bolshevi/s too/ during the %ivil War. Its aims were to
put theories in practice +" redistri+uting wealth among the 0ussian people and to help the %ivil War +" /eeping the
towns and the 0ed (rm" supplied with food and weapons.
(ll large factories were ta/en over +" the government.
)roduction was planned and organi>ed +" the government.
Iiscipline for wor/ers was strict and stri/ers could +e shot.
)easant had to hand over surplus food to the government, if not the" could +e shot.
$ood was rationed.
$ree enterprise +ecame illegal1all production and trade was controlled +" the state.
*his achieved its goal of winning the war +ut caused terri+le hardship. *he peasants stopped producing food since
the government 5ust too/ it awa". *his lead to a terri+le famine and A million 0ussians died, canni+alism was
reported.
In $e+ruar" 1921 these policies created an uprising at Dronstadt naval +ase. It was put down +" troops +ut had a
deep impact on !enin. 6e a+andoned these policies since he found it strange that these sailors had supported him in
the +eginning.
The .e 7conomic Polic'
!enin recogni>ed that change was necessar" and announced the 7ew ,conomic )olic". It +rought +ac/ capitalism
for some sections of 0ussian societ". )easants were allowed to sell surplus grain for profit +ut would pa" ta- on what
the" produced rather than giving some of it up to the government. 'mall factories were handed +ac/ into private
ownership and private trading of small goods was legal. !enin made it clear that the 7,) was temporar" and that the
vital heav" industries would remain in state hands. Bolshevi/s were against it seeing as it +etra"ed %ommunism, +ut
!enin won and +" 192: there seemed to +e a rise in food production +ut these increases did not necessaril" improve
the situation of the industrial wor/ers.
The death of &enin and the creation of the !""+
!enin did not lived to see the recover" of the 0ussian econom". (fter several stro/es he died in Januar" 1928. 6e led
0ussia through revolution and civil war and supervised the drawing up of a new constitution that turned the 0ussian
,mpire into the &nion of 'oviet 'ocialist 0epu+lics &''0#.
"talin or Trots8'2
*here were man" possi+ilities to ta/e !enin4s place, +ut the real fight was +etween two leading figures and +itter
rivals in the %ommunist )art", 'talin and *rots/". In 1929 'talin made himself secure as the supreme leader of the
&''0. 6e achieved this through a com+ination of political scheming, the mista/es of his opponents and the clever
wa" in which he +uilt up his power +ase.
Wh' did Trots8' lose the leadership contest2
*rots/" was a +rilliant spea/er and writer, as well as the part"4s +est political thin/er. 6e had organi>ed the Bolshevi/
revolution and was the hero of the civil war as leader of the 0eds and he had negotiated peace with German". 'o
wh" did he loseG
6e was arrogant and often offended the senior part" mem+ers.
6e failed to ta/e the opposition seriousl".
- 8 -
6e made little effort to +uild up an" support in the ran/s of the part".
6e underestimated 'talin.
6e unfortunatel" got sic/ with malaria when he needed to +e at his most active.
6e was also the victim of a tric/ +" 'talin, who told him that !enin4s funeral was to +e one da", and it was reall"
another, and since *rots/" was awa" in the south of 0ussia, he couldn4t go to the funeral whereas 'talin appeared as
chief mourner and !enin4s closest friend.
=o did "talin in2
(s we saw, he was a clever politician. 6e associated himself with !enin and too/ on +oring +ut important 5o+s in the
part" in order to transfer supporters to important posts and even lowering those who were against him. 6e was
ruthless with his opponents and even too/ Bu/harin4s side in a de+ate in order to help get rid a *rots/", and then
opposed Bu/harin with *rots/"4s e-act argument. 6is policies were more normal than *rots/"4s plan, he wanted to
esta+lish %ommunism in 0ussia instead of spreading revolution worldwide. (nd he also appeared to +e a Georgian1
peasant, much more a man of the people than his rivals, and he seemed to understand the people4s feelings.
9oderni>ing the !""+
'talin was determined to moderni>e the &''0 so that it would +e a+le to meet the challenges that were to come.
(lmost all the industr" was concentrated in 5ust a few cities and the wor/ers were uns/illed and poorl" educated.
9an" regions of the &''0 were in the same +ac/ward state as the" had +een 1<< ago.
?ndustr' and the Fi%e/@ear Plans
'talin ended !enin4s 7,), and started with the $ive1=ear )lans. *he" were drawn up +" a G3')!(7, which set
am+itious targets for production in the vital heav" industries, the" were comple- +ut set out in a wa" that ever"one
/new what the" had to achieve.
*he first $ive1=ear )lan focused on ma5or industries and although most targets were not met, the production dou+led
or even tre+led in some cases. *he &''0 increased production and created a foundation on which to create the
second $ive1=ear )lan. *he" were rich in natural resources +ut the" were in remote places, so new cities were +uilt
from nothing and wor/ers ta/en to /new industrial cities. *he" created industries from scratch in previousl"
undeveloped areas such as 9agnitogors/ or 'verdlovs/ or in 9uslim 0epu+lics.
*he second $ive1=ear )lan was +uilt on the achievements of the first, heav" industr" was still a priorit" +ut other
areas were developed such as mining for lead, tin, >inc and other minerals found in 'i+eria. *ransport and
communications improved as new railwa"s and canals were +uilt. *he 9oscow underground railwa" was spectacular.
'talin also wanted this industriali>ation to help the agriculture so the production of tractors and far machiner"
increased dramaticall".
In the third $ive1=ear )lan, some factories were going to switch to the production of consumer goods +ut this was
disrupted +" the 'econd World War.
Were the Fi%e/@ear Plans a success2
*here is much that was critici>ed of the $ive1=ear )lans, such as there +eing a great deal of inefficienc" and
duplication of effort and waste, although the 'oviets learned from there mista/es in the second and third $ive1=ear
)lans. *here was an enormous human cost. But +" 19EA the &''0 was a modern state and it was this that saved it
from defeat when 6itler invaded in 1981.
=o as industriali>ation achie%ed2
(n" plan of these was +ound to carr" a cost, and here, the cost was pa"ed +" the wor/ers. *he" were +om+arded
with propaganda and had strict targets to meet and were fined if the" didn4t. *he" were told to +e li/e 'ta/hanov, a
wor/er that cut 1<2 tons of coal in one shift. *he first $ive1=ear )lan was short of wor/ers so women were drafted
into the industr", the" +uilt da"1care centers to ma/e this possi+le.
B" the late 19E<4s, man" 'oviet wor/ers had improved their conditions +" acHuiring well1paid s/illed 5o+s and earning
+onuses for meeting targets. ,ducation +ecame free and almost no+od" was unemplo"ed.
3n the other hand life was harsh under 'talin. $actor" discipline was strict and punishments severe. Being late or
a+sent meant losing "our 5o+ and pro+a+l" house also. 'ome wor/ers tried to escape this +" moving to other 5o+s
+ut the secret police introduced internal passports that prevented the free movement of wor/ers inside the &''0.
Dula/s and Jews and suspects of +eing political opponents of 'talin wor/ed on the great engineering pro5ects such
as dams and canals. 3thers were unfortunate wor/ers that had had accidents or made mista/es in their wor/s +ut
had +een found guilt of ?sa+otage@. 3n these pro5ects conditions were appalling, there were man" deaths and
accidents and a+out 1<<,<<< wor/ers died during the construction of the Belomor %anal.
*he concentration of heav" industr" meant that there were few consumer goods, overcrowding was a pro+lem and
wages actuall" fell +etween 1928 and 19EA. In 19E2 +oth hus+and and wife earned onl" as much mone" as one man
in 1928.
- 9 -
'talin was read" to destro" the wa" of life of the 'oviet in order to help industriali>ation.
9odernising agriculture: collecti%isation
$or the $ive1=ear )lans to +e successful 'talin needed to moderni>e the agriculture +ecause in 1928 the countr"
was alread" 2 million tons short of the grain it needed to feed the wor/ers. 6e also wanted to tr" to raise mone" for
his industriali>ation plan +" selling surplus food a+road.
*he pro+lem was that farming was organi>ed under the 7,), the lots of land were divided in ver" small pieces and
this was not +ig enough to give efficient use to the tractors and fertili>ers, and the peasants had enough to eat and
saw little point in increasing production to feed the towns.
*he government tried to sell these ideas +" offering the peasants free seeds and other per/s, +ut soon there were
pro+lems. *he peasants disli/ed the fact that the farms were under the control of the local %ommunist leader. *he"
were +eing as/ed to grow crops for the industr" rather than for feeding themselves. 'talin was as/ing them to
a+andon a wa" of life that the" and their ancestors had led for centuries.
It was ver" hard to convince the /ula/s, who did not want to hand over their land and produce. 'oviet propaganda
tried to turn the people against the /ula/s and violence was Huic/l" implemented. 0eHuisition parties came and too/
the food that the" needed and left the /ula/s to starve. *he /ula/s were arrested and sent to la+or camps of forced
on to poor1Hualit" land. In revenge man" /ula/s +urnt their crops and slaughtered their animals so that the
%ommunists could not have them.
*he countr"side was in chaos, in the places that collectivi>ation had +een introduced successfull"C the peasants were
unfamiliar with the new ideas and methods. )easants starved and +itterness was present as the" saw how
%ommunist officials too/ food for e-port.
$ood production fell under these conditions and there was a famine in 19E2119EE. When the Germans invaded
&/raine, the" were at first made welcome for driving out the communists.
Iespite the famine 'talin continued and +" 19E8 there were no /ula/s left. B" 1981 almost all the agricultural land
was organi>ed under the collective s"stem. 'talin had achieved his aim of collectivi>ation.
=o poerful as "talin2
It was impossi+le to do what 'talin did without ma/ing enemies, +ut one of his aims was to control his people to such
an e-tent that the" would +e afraid even to thin/ of opposing him, *hroughout his time in power he used the secret
police, at first called 3G)& and the 7D.I, to crush an" opponents of his policies.
The purges
Was the most terrif"ing period in 'talin4s rule, the purges +egan in 19E8 as a conseHuence of the death of Dirov, the
leader of the !eningrad new name for )etrograd# %ommunist )art". 'talin used this as an e-cuse to purge his
opponents inside the part". !o"al Bolshevi/s such as Damenev, Bu/harin, etc. all confessed to +eing traitors of the
state. (round :<<,<<< part" mem+ers were purged. In 198<, 'talin4s agents murdered *rots/" while +eing in e-ile in
9e-ico.
!ater 'talin turned to the arm". 6e removed a+out 2:,<<< including the 'upreme %ommander.
(s these continued, universit" lecturers and teachers, miners and engineers, factor" managers and ordinar" wor/ers
all disappeared. It is said that ever" famil" in the &''0 lost someone in the purges. *he" were unpredicta+le, arrests
could ta/e place in the middle of the night and victims were not even told wh" the" were accused. )h"sical and
mental torture would ma/e them confess to an"thing after a couple of da"s. If that failed, the 7D.I would threaten
the families of those arrested.
B" 19EA an estimated 18 million people had +een sent to la+or camps, 1< million died. 'talin wea/ened the &''0
with the purges. When 6itler invaded the &''0 in 1981, one of the /e" pro+lems of the 0ed (rm" was the lac/ of
good a+le soldiers. 6e also destro"ed an" independent thin/ing, since those that were spared /new that their lives
depended on thin/ing e-actl" as 'talin did.
The ne constitution
In 19E; 'talin created a new constitution. It gave freedom of speech and free elections. But onl" mem+ers of the
communist part" could +e elected and newspapers had to +e approved
The Cult of "talin
'talin was admired +" the average 'oviet citi>en in the 19E<4s, he and his lifest"le of government were popular, the
%ommunist )art" saw him as a winner and 'oviet citi>ens saw him as a Ldictator of the people4. *he histor" of the
&''0 was rewritten so that !enin and 'talin were the onl" heroes of the 0evolution.
*he 'oviet education s"stem was geared not to independent thin/ing +ut to 'talinist propaganda.
*he 'oviet people were deluged with portraits, photographs and statues of 'talin. 6e was worshiped ever"where. (ll
music and other arts in the &''0 were carefull" monitored +" the 7D.I. 0egular processions were organi>ed on
the streets of 0ussian towns and cities praising 'talin and all that he had achieved.
- 10 -
0eligious worship of an" /ind was +anned. 'talin did not want the people to have lo"alt" to an"one else +ut him.
Belief in God and the words of the priests had to +e replaced +" +elief in %ommunism and the words of its leaders.
Chapter A: German' 1914/194-
The Impact of the First World War
In 1918 there was great optimism of German"4s actual power and prosperit". )eople were proud of their countr", their
arm" and of their Daiser K virtuall" a dictator. But in 1918 ever"thing was destro"ed and people were suffering
hunger and epidemic diseases.
German" was +an/rupt2 man" wor/ing men died, national income decreased A<B and industries
decrease EEB
German 'ociet" divided deepl"2 women were ta/en to wor/ in factories and the richer people made
fortunes while poor people died of hunger
German" +ecame an unsta+le democratic repu+lic2 a revolution too/ place and man" people hated the
new democratic leader
The birth of the Weimar Republic
(fter German defeat in the WW I, the Daiser refused to +ecome democratic. *hese +rought mutinies and revolts
which finall" ended with the Daiser4s a+dication. *he 'ocialist $riedrich ,+ert +ecome the new leader. 6e made
peace with the (llies and passed a new %onstitution freedom of speech and worship and +etter wor/ing conditions#.
6owever, other politicians were not enthusiastic. *he" restricted what the new gov4t could do and man" wanted the
Daiser +ac/. 6owever, in 1919, he +ecame the )resident of the Weimar 0epu+lic after elections.
The Republic in danger, 1919 1924
The threat from the Left: a %ommunist 0evolution too/ place. *he ')(0*(%I'*' wanted to organi>e
German" with soviets as well as 0ussia. *he" tried to do so in some towns +ut the $0,ID30)' K anti1
communist soldiers who 5oined ,+ert K stopped them and /illed their leaders. (nother revolution too/ place
in Bavaria +ut it had the same end as the other one. B" the 192<s there was a powerful communist anti1
government force.
Treaty of Versailles: the in5ustice of the *reat" appalled most Germans. *hese thought that ,+ert was to
+lame so a great source of +itterness was created.
The threat from the Right: people from the right had +een proud of the Daiser4s power. In 192<, the Dapp
)utsch re+ellion too/ place. :<<< $rei/orps re+elled and there was no wa" of stopping them. But Berlin
wor/ers gave a general stri/e and the re+els suffered food and water shortage, so it failed. )olitical
assassinations were freHuent. In 192E 6itler led the 9unich )utsch +ut failed. 7evertheless he received a
light sentence +ecause he had friends in the gov4t.
Economic Disaster: the *reat" wea/ened German econom". German" had to pa" reparations to the (llies,
and then the $rench occupied the 0uhr K industrial areas. *he solution was to print mone", +ut this caused
h"perinflation as a chain reaction.
In 192E a new gov4t too/ over with Gustav 'tesemann. 6e crated a new currenc" K 0entenmar/. 6e received loans
from the &'( and solved the economic crisis.
The Weimar Republic under Stresemann
(chievements2
Economy: he +uilt up German"4s prosperit" again. !oans were as/ed to the &'( and industr" recovered. In
1928, production was the same as +efore the war and reparations were paid and e-ports increased.
Culture: a cultural revival too/ place. Writers, poets and architects developed as well as cinema.
%ensorship was removed.
Politics: the 0epu+lic was +eginning to settle and Germans were reconciling.
Foreign Policy: 'tresemann signed the !ocarno *reaties and German" was accepted in the !7. 6e also
negotiated the =oung )lan and too/ awa" all foreign troops from German".
)ro+lems2
Economy: the economic +oom was precarious and for a short time. )easants and middle classes felt the
gov4t offered them little. *he" had +een +enefited with the Daiser and the war. $armers found
overproduction.
- 11 -
Culture: a moral decline seemed to lead that cultural change. In addition, man" (mericans and Jews
immigrated to German". %ountr" values were lost.
Politics: 7a>is and %ommunist +uilt powerful part" oppositions.
Foreign Policy: 7ationalists and %ommunists attac/ed 'tresemann after he had signed the !ocarno
*reaties and accepted the *reat" of .ersailles.
itler and the !a"is
*he 7a>is +egan as German Wor/er4s )art" led +" (nton Ire-ler. *hen 6itler 5oined and created the 7a>i )art"
where he stirred nationalist passions.
The Munich Putsch: B" 192E, 6itler hi5ac/ed a gov4t meeting and announced he was ta/ing over Bavaria. *his
+rought chaos. 6e didn4t receive people support and was arrestedC although he got off ver" lightl".
The Nais in the !ilderness" #$%& ' #$%$: In prison, 6itler wrote a +oo/ to e-press his ideas. 6is plan was to gain
power in the democratic government so as then to destro" it. When he left prison, he tried to recruit mem+ers to his
part" and created several organi>ations such as '' and '(. But the" had not much support. 'o he aimed to the
peasants, farmers, middle classes and shop/eepers, where he found support. 6e appointed Goe++les to ta/e charge
of 7a>i propaganda. ,ven tough, the" were the smallest minorit" part".
Mein (am)f:
7ational 'ocialism2 lo"alt" to German", racial purit" M centrali>ed state
0acism2 (r"ans were the 9aster 0ace
(rmed $orce2 war was essential for the 7a>is
!iving 'pace or !e+ensraum2 German e-pansion to the east
*he $Nhrer2 strength la" in lo"alt" to the leader 6itler
o# successful #ere the !a"is b$ 192%
o Wor/ers2 $(I!&0, K supported the %ommunist )art"
o )easants, farmers and middle1classes2 '&%%,'' K the" hated the Weimar gov4t econom".
7a>is said peasants were real Germans and promised things.
o %onservatives2 '&%%,'' K wanted moral values +ac/, which were lost during the Weimar
0epu+lic
The &epression and rise of the !a"is
In 1929, &'(4s crash affected German" +adl" which too/ to collapse. 9eanwhile, the 7a>is tried to loo/ for support
in unemplo"ed, elderl" and middle classes. $inall", the" +ecame the +iggest single part".
Wh" did 7a>is succeed in electionsG
o Nai cam)aigning: 9odern, generali>ed slogans, posters and pamphlets were used to defend traditional
values and to show that Jews, %ommunists, Weimar politicians and the *reat" of .ersailles were the
causes of German decline. 7a>is gave food and shelter to the unemplo"ed and put emphasis in discipline.
In addition, 6itler was a powerful spea/er and seemed to +e the governor of the people. 'upport roc/eted.
o *Negati+e cohesion,: people 5oined the 7a>is not +ecause the" shared 7a>is4 views +ut +ecause the"
shared 7a>is fears and disli/es.
o Disillusionment !ith democracy: democrac" was not capa+le of solving the Iepression4s issues. 'o man"
people lost support to the democrats, speciall" the poorer classes.
o The Communist Threat: %ommunist support was increasing, so 7a>is used this to gain support of anti1
communist civilians, speciall" middle classes, industrial leaders and farmers, who were afraid of ending li/e
0ussia under communism.
o Moral Decadence: 7a>is gained support from all those who felt that traditional values where under thread.
o# did itler become 'hancellor in 19(()
6itler demand the post of %hancellor to 6inden+urg K the )resident 1 , +ut he him. 3n the other hand, he gave it to
the old %hancellor von )apen. (s a conseHuence, 7a>is lost a lot of support. 6itler threatened suicide as the 7a>is
started running out of funds. 6is appeal was again refused and von 'chleicher too/ the charge. But he was wea/
and was forced to resign. ( powerful man was needed. 'o 6inden+urg and von )apen then chose 6itler as
%hancellor after some meetings with aristocrats with the idea of limiting his power and 5ust having him to gain
support. But the" were ver" wrong. It was almost impossi+le for them to control 6itler.
=itler6s German'
itler*s &ictatorship
6ow could 6itler +ecome the supreme dictatorG
- 12 -
The Reichstag Fire: In 19EE, the 0eichstag +uilding +urnt down. *he 7a>is +lamed the %ommunists for it
although it was not confirmed so as to have an e-cuse to /ill communists.
In an election, 7a>is won their largest share of votes and intimidated the 0eichstag to pass the 7na1ling #ct K
allowed 6itler to pass laws without the participation of the 0eichstag. (fter it, %ommunists were +anned, and the
%atholic part" 5oined 6itler. 6inden+urg had ver" little power.
The Night of the Long (ni+es: 6itler tried to /ill off opposition. *he leader of the '' K ,rnst 0Ohm K was
gaining too much power, so he decided to murder him as well as other 8<< oppositors.
Der F-hrer: 6itler +ecame the 'upreme !eader $Nhrer# of German"
!a"i control of +erman$, 19(( 194,
*he 7a>is had a powerful range of organi>ations and weapons that the" used to control German" and terrori>e
Germans into su+mission.
*he "" was formed and led +" 6immler was in charge of /illing off opposition to 7a>ism and carr"ing out
the racial policies.
*he Gestapo secret state police# was in charge of arresting citi>ens on suspicion and sending them to
concentration camps.
Concentration camps were the 7a>is4 sanction against people. )risoners were forced to do hard la+or,
food was limited and deaths +ecame common.
The police and courts were all controlled +" 7a>is
-pposition to !a"is
*here were four main opponents to the 7a>i )art"2
I. Trade .nionists2 sindicates were a+olished so the" were dis+anded. *his +rought revolts that were stopped
+" the '', '( and Gestapo
II. Political /))onents2 other parties had different +eliefs and critici>ed the 7a>i policies. But the 7a>i
disrupted the others meetings, frightened voters, etc. *hus, the 7a>i )art" +ecame the +iggest one +"
1928.
III. Church2 it was against the idea of /illing and doing e-periments with mentall" handicapped. *here were
protests and the protestant church was created. But 7a>i stopped e-perimenting and finall" stuc/ the
%hurch out of policies.
I.. 0rmy /fficers2 0Ohm was getting to much power in the arm". ,ver"thing was solved in the 7ight of the
!ong Dnives.
6owever, opposition was little +ecause2
Germans admired and trusted 6itler
Germans had fears /eep "our head down#
*he )ropaganda machine
The .ul$ /omb 0lot1 In 1988 some arm" officers came close to ta/e 6itler from power. 3n Jul" von 'tuffer+ers left
a +om+ in 6itler4s conference room to tr" to /ill him. But it failed. 6itler survived and the 7a>is too/ terri+le revenge
/illing :<<< people.
0ropaganda, culture and mass media
7ewsreels and movies
0adio
)osters
Boo/s
7ewspapers
9usic
Indoctrination1 6itler appointed to the children to indoctrinate and teach them 7a>i views. 6e was a+le to do this +"
hard ph"sical training, =outh %amps, the German *eacher4s !eague, )erformance +oo/s and 3rder %astles where
students were taught endurance. 7urem+erg 0allies.
2outh opposition to !a"is
?'WI7G@ 9ovement2 accepted Jews and tal/ed a+out se-. !istened to 5a>>.
?,I,!W,I'' )I0(*,'@2 wor/ing1class teens who attac/ed 6itler =outh4s +ands. Included +o"s and girls,
arm" deserters and escaped prisoners.
- 13 -
6owever, 6itler did little to stop this movements as he /new he would need their support as wor/ers or soldiers in a
near future.
The role of #omen
*he 7a>is had clear ideas of what the" wanted from women.
Women were e-pected to sta" at home and loo/ after the famil". Women doctors, teachers and civil servants were
forced to give up their careers. ,ven at the end of the war, women were never as/ed to serve in the armed forces.
*heir 5o+ was to /eep the home nice for their hus+and and famil" 1 their life should revolve round the three PDsP2
church
children
coo/ing
Goe++els said2 Q*he mission of women is to +e +eautiful and to +ring children into the world.Q
6itler wanted a high +irth rate, so the population would grow. *he 7a>is even considered ma/ing it law that families
should have at least four children. Girls did /eep fit in the ($9 to ma/e themselves health" for child+irth, +ut the"
were discouraged from sta"ing slim, +ecause it was thought that thin women had trou+le giving +irth.
*he !aw for the ,ncouragement of 9arriage gave newl" wed couples a loan of 1,<<< mar/s, and allowed them to
/eep 2:< mar/s for each child the" had. 9others who had more than eight children were given a gold medal.
&nmarried women could volunteer to have a +a+" for an #r'an mem+er of the "".
Rearmament
6itler came to power in 19EE. 3ne of his first steps was rearming. *housands of unemplo"ed wor/ers were drafted
into the arm", reducing unemplo"ment. German people supported rearmament, +ut 6itler /new it would alarm other
countries, +ut he handled it carefull", +ecause at first he did it secretl", and made a demonstration sa"ing he didn4t
want to rearm.
3conomic Reco4er$
7ational !a+our 'ervice2 unemplo"ment decreased
)u+lic Wor/s2 0ailwa"s, houses, motorwa"s, etc were +uilt from scratch
0earmament R %onscription2 also created 5o+s in factories
$our =ear )lan2 prepared German" to war
6itler also encouraged wor/ers improving wor/ing conditions, giving them prices, etc.
0olicies and benefits
6itlerPs economic polic" had four main ideas2
1 Full em)loyment 1 the idea that ever"one should have a 5o+. B" 19E9, there was virtuall" no unemplo"ment in
German".
2 1eauty of 2or3 1 the 7a>is set up the 'd( Beaut" of Wor/# to help Germans see that wor/ was good, and that
ever"one who could wor/ should. In fact 1 +ecause the 7a>is had a+olished the trade unions, +anned stri/es,
and given more power to the industrialists 1 real wages fell and hours were longer under 6itler.
3 Re4armament +egun in 19E: 1 the idea of Pguns +efore +utterP.
8 (utar/" 1 there was an unsuccessful attempt at ma/ing German" self1sufficient.
!a"is and the Farming 'ommunities
*he 0eich $ood 'tate2 gave farmers a guaranteed mar/et +ut most efficient farmers were not treated as
such.
0eich ,ntailed $arm !aw2 Ban/s couldn4t ta/e over the peasants lands. (s a conseHuence +an/s stopped
lending loans to these farmers.
?Blood and 'oil@2 )easants were real Germans and were the +ac/+one of German ,mpire. 6owever some
policies made farmers leave their lands. *his caused rural depopulation.
Who did the !a"is persecute)
*he 7a>is +elieved that onl" Germans could +e citi>ens and that non1Germans did not have an" right to the rights of
citi>enship.
*he 7a>is racial philosoph" taught that some races were untermensch su+1human#. 9an" scientists at this time
+elieved that people with disa+ilities or social pro+lems were genetic degenerates whose genes needed to +e
eliminated from the human +loodline.
*he 7a>is, therefore2
*ried to eliminate the Jews.
- 14 -
Dilled 8: per cent of German"Ps G"psies.
'terilised +lac/ people.
Dilled mentall" disa+led +a+ies.
Dilled mentall" ill patients. ,uthanasia )rogramme.
'terilised ph"sicall" disa+led people and people with hereditar" diseases.
'terilised deaf people.
)ut homose-uals, prostitutes, JehovahPs Witnesses, alcoholics, pacifists, +eggars, hooligans and criminals
1 anti1social 1 into concentration camps.
o# the !a"is persecuted the .e#s1 5e$ dates
Bo"cott of Jewish +usinesses.
Jewish civil servants, law"ers and teachers sac/ed.
0ace 'cience lessons to teach that Jews are untermensch.
PJews not wanted hereP signs put up at swimming pools etc.
7urem+erg laws 1: 'eptem+er# Jews could not +e citi>ens. *he" were not allowed to vote or to marr" a
German.
Jews could not +e doctors.
Jews had to add the name Israel men# or 'arah women# to their name.
Jewish children for+idden to go to school.
<ristallnacht 1 attac/s on Jewish homes, +usinesses and s'nagogues.
Jews were for+idden to own a +usiness, or own a radio.
Jews were forced to live in ghettoes.
(rm" ,insat>gruppen sHuads in 0ussia started mass1shootings of Jews.
(ll Jews were forced to wear a "ellow star of Iavid.
Resistance
3. 'chlinder2 )rotected Jews +" getting them as wor/ers
0. Wallen+erg2 )rovided Jews with foreign passports as the" could escape
'ome Jews groups such as 9arsaw ghetto and Gree/ Jews rose up against the 7a>is.
itler*s actions
I(*, (%*I37
19EE
War
*oo/ German" out of the !eague of 7ations
Began rearming German"
19E8 *ried to ta/e over (ustria +ut was stopped +" 9ussolini
19E: 6eld a massive rearmament rall" in German"
19E;
0eintroduced conscription in German"
'ent German troops into the 0hineland
9ade an anti1%ommunist alliance with Japan
19EA
*ried out German"4s new weapons in the 'panish %ivil War
9ade an anti1%ommunist alliance with Ital"
19E8
*oo/ over (ustria
*oo/ over the 'udetenland area of %>echoslova/ia
19E9
Invaded the rest of %>echoslova/ia
Invaded )oland
- 15 -
Chapter 4: The &eague of .ations
*he +irth of the !eague
When the WW1 ended, ever"one wanted to avoid repeating the mass slaughter of the war, and a !eague of 7ations
would help achieve this, +ut there was disagreement as to what /ind of organi>ation it should +e.
Wilson said that it should +e li/e a world parliament, where representatives of the entire world could meet to decide
on matters that affected them all.
*he British thought it was a simple organi>ation that would 5ust get together in emergencies. $rance proposed it to
have its own arm".
Wilson won. B" $e+ruar" 1919 he had a plan for it. (ll the ma5or countries should 5oin it, and accept the decisions
ta/en +" the !eague. *he" also promised to protect each other if the" were invaded. If an" mem+er +ro/e the laws of
it, there were certain measures ta/en against it for e-ample stop trading or send troops.
But there were man" critics to Wilson, +ecause he acted as if he had the solution to all of the pro+lems, even though,
the" were read" to ma/e a tr". In 1919, hopes were high, especiall" with the &'( in the driving seat.
# 1od' 1lo to the &eague
Before the &'( could 5oin the !eague, the" needed the approval of the %ongress, and the idea of the !eague was
not popular in the &'(.
9an" (mericans thought that the !37 suggested the &'( was promising to send its troops to settle
ever" conflict, +ut after the deaths of the WW1, the" didn4t want this.
3ther (mericans opposed it +ecause the" were anti1$rench or anti1British, and didn4t understand wh"
the" had to fight for the British or $rench ,mpire. (mericans +elieved in freedom the" opposed the idea
of colonies and empires.
3thers worried a+out the economic cost of 5oining the !eague. *he" thought it was li/e signing a +lan/
chec/. *he" had reached such prestige +" isolationism sta"ing out of ,uropean affairs, and should
continue to do so.
*here were millions of German immigrants in &'( who had never accepted the &'( 5oining the war.
*he *reat" was ver" united with the !eague, as the !eague was the one responsi+le to enforce it, so
the" did not want an" more harm done to German".
*hese four groups and Wilson4s political opponents 5oined together against the !eague. Wilson4s democratic part"
has run for 8 trou+led "ears and his opponents saw the league as a wa" to crush him. (fter touring the countr", the
%ongress did not approve the !eague in 1919 or in 192<. Wilson could not run for the Iemocratic )art" in 192< due
to +eing ill, +ut his representative favored it, +ut the repu+licans stood for isolationism and how life had +een +efore.
*he repu+licans won and &'( never 5oined the !eague of 7ations. 7ot onl" did this harm Wilson and the Iemocratic
)art", +ut also it was a +od" +low to the !eague.
=o did the &eague of .ations or82
*he aims of the !eague
*o discourage aggression from an" nation
*o encourage countries to co1operate, especiall" in +usiness and trade
*o encourage nations to disarm
*o improve the living and wor/ing conditions of people in all parts of the world.
9em1ership of the &eague
Britain and $rance were the most powerful mem+ers in the !eague. Ital" and Japan were also permanent mem+ers,
+ut the" didn4t have a leading polic". (n" action +" the !eague needed the support of Britain and $rance. But +oth
countries were poorl" placed to ta/e on this role as the" had suffered a lot in the war. 7either of them had the
resources to fill the gap left +" the &'(. 'ome said that if the" /new that &'( wouldn4t 5oin the" wouldn4t have
5oined either. &'( was the onl" one with resources and influence to ma/e the !eague wor/. *he" felt that trade
sanctions wouldn4t wor/ if the (mericans didn4t appl" them.
$or the leaders in Britain and $rance the !eague was a pro+lem, the" had to ma/e it wor/. Both had different
priorities. Britain preferred to re+uild trade and loo/ after the British ,mpire than +eing an international police force.
$rance4s main concern was German" and that without and arm" of its own, the !eague could not protect $rance from
German".
- 16 -
The &eague and the 1order disputes in the 19*5s
*he treaties signed had created some new states and changed the +orders of the e-isting states, and this might split
communities, putting some people in one side and others in the other. It was the 5o+ of the !eague to sort out the
+order disputes. 'ome pro+lems were given to the %onference of (m+assadors, which had +een set up to sort out
pro+lems arising from the post1war treaties, it was not part of the !eague, +ut was ver" close to it.
)ilna; 19*5 F#?&!+7
)oland and !ithuania were two states created +" the post1war treaties. .ilna was the capital of !ithuania, +ut its
population was mainl" )olish, so in 192<, the )olish arm" simpl" too/ it. !ithuania appealed for help. )oland was the
clear aggressor, and the !eague protested to )oland, which didn4t care what the !eague was sa"ing. $rance did not
want to send troops as )oland was a possi+le German all", and Britain did not want to act alone. In the end the
!eague did nothing.
!pper "ilesia; 19*1 "!CC7""
It was an industrial region on the +order of German" and )oland. Both of them wanted it, so a ple+iscite was
organi>ed for the people to decide. *he industrial areas voted for German" and the rural areas mainl" for )oland.
*he region was divided along these lines. Both countries accepted it.
#aland ?slands; 19*1 "!CC7""
Both 'weden and $inland wanted the control of these islands, and were read" to fight for them. (fter stud"ing the
matter closel", the !eague decided the islands should go to $inland. 'weden accepted.
Corfu; 19*, F#?&!+7
3ne of the +oundaries that had to +e sorted out was the one +etween Greece and (l+ania. *he Italian *ellini was
called to supervise it. 3n 2A (ugust, while supervising in Greece, the" were am+ushed and /illed. 9ussolini was
furious and +lamed the Gree/ government for it. 3n E1 (ugust 9ussolini +om+arded and occupied the Gree/ island
of %orfu. 1: people were /illed. *he !eague condemned 9ussolini4s actions. It suggested Greece to pa"
compensation and the mone" to +e held +" the !eague until *elliniSs /illers were found. !ater 9ussolini convinced
the %onference of (m+assadors, and the Gree/s apologi>ed and pa"ed compensation directl" to Ital". 9ussolini
withdrew %orfu +oasting of his triumph, and the %onference of (m+assadors had overruled the !eague
The Gene%a Protocol F#?&!+7
*he %orfu incident showed how the !eague could +e undermined +" its own mem+ers. Britain and $rance drew up
the Geneva )rotocol, which said that if two mem+ers were in dispute, the" would accept the !eagues decision. But
the new conservative government in Britain refused to sign it worried that Britain ma" have to sign something that did
not favor them, so something that was supposed to strengthen the league actuall" wea/ened it.
(ulgaria; 19*- "!CC7""
In 3cto+er 192:, Gree/ troops invaded Bulgaria after an incident in the +order where Gree/ soldiers were /illed.
Bulgaria appealed for help and the !eague condemned the Gree/ action. It ordered Greece to pull out and pa"
compensations to Bulgaria. *he Gree/s o+e"ed, +ut protested that there was one rule for large states such as Ital"#
and another for smaller such as them#.
=o did the &eague of .ations or8 for a 1etter orld2
It had a wider tas/ than 5ust to solve disputes. *hrough commissions and committees, the !eague aimed to fight
povert", disease and in5ustice all over the world.
+efugees. It did tremendous wor/ in getting refugees and former prisoners of war +ac/ to their
homelands. (+out 8<<,<<< prisoners were returned in the first few "ears after the war.
Wor8ing conditions. *he International !a+or 3rgani>ation was successful in +anning poisonous
white lead from paint and limiting the wor/ing hours of children and adults. Improved wor/ing
conditions and it introduced a resolution for a 881hour wee/, and 81hour da"s, +ut few adopted it as it
would raise industrial costs.
=ealth. *he World 6ealth %ommittees wor/ed hard to defeat lepros", as well as a glo+al campaign to
e-terminate mosHuitoes, which reduced cases of malaria and "ellow fever for decades.
Transport. 9ade recommendations on mar/ing shipping lanes and produced an international highwa"
code for road users.
"ocial pro1lems. It +lac/listed 8 large ,uropean companies that were involved in the illegal drug
trade. It freed 2<<,<<< British1owned slaves, and fought against slaver" and forced la+or, prostitution
and drug traffic/ing.
- 17 -
=o did international agreements help the or8 of the &eague2
$isarmament in the 19*5s F#?&!+7
In the 192<s, the !eague failed to +ring disarmament, although, at the Washington %onference in 1921, the &'(,
Japan, Britain and $rance agreed to limit the si>e of their navies +ut that is as far as the" got. In 192E a disarmament
treat" +" the !eague was accepted +" $rance and other nations, +ut re5ected +" Britain. In 192;, plans were made
for a disarmament conference, +ut too/ : "ears to ma/e a draft and in 19EE German" re5ected it. *hese pro+lems
were damaging for the !eague4s reputation in German", +ecause it had +een forced to disarm and no+od" else had
done it, although this failure didn4t seem too serious due to some other agreements seemed to promise world peace.
The &ocarno Treaties "!CC7""
In 3cto+er 192: representatives of $rance, Britain, German", Ital", Belgium, )oland and %>echoslova/ia met in
!ocarno 'wit>erland. *he" agreed2
German" finall" accepted the +orders with $rance and Belgium, and Britain and Ital" guaranteed to
protect them if German" violated this +order.
German" accepted the 0hineland had to +e a demilitari>ed >one.
$rance and German" agreed to settle their disputes through the !eague.
*he !ocarno treaties were received with great enthusiasm, especiall" in $rance, which was finall" guaranteed +order
protection against German". *he *reat" solved some of the pro+lems that were left over from WW1 and paved the
wa" for German" to 5oin the !eagueC now the onl" ,uropean )ower out of it was the 'oviet &nion.
The <ellogg/(riand Pact; 19*4 "!CC7""
*his pact mar/ed the highest point of international relations in the 192<s. *he states agreed to have their armies onl"
in self1defense. *he people now thought the world was a much safer place. ,ver" dispute should +e solved +"
peaceful means, and the" condemned war as a mean of solving international disputes and re5ect it as an instrument
of polic".
=o did economic reco%er' help2
3ne reason for the optimism in 1928 was that the ,uropean economies were once again recovering. *he Iawes
)lan of 1928 had helped to sort out German"s economic pro+lems and helped to start the economies of $rance and
Britain to move again. *his helped to reduce tensions. 3ne of the aims of the !eague was to encourage trading lin/s
+etween the countries, +ecause if the" were trading with one another it was less li/el" that the" would confront in a
war.
Pro1lems ith agreements
*he period 192:11929 was called the ?!ocarno 6one"moon@, though man" historians sa" that the real attitude was of
+itterness and frightens. But there were a couple of pro+lems, since the !ocarno treaties had made German" accept
its +orders in the west, )oland and %>echoslova/ia to the east of German"# wondered whether this meant that
German" might feel free to change its eastern +orders in the future.
Wh' did the league fail in the 19,56s2
(lmost ever" historian agrees that the !eague was a complete failure in the 19E<4s, +ut this failure had man"
reasons.
=o did the economic depression harm the or8 of the &eague2
In the late 192<s there was a +oom in world trade. &'( was the engine of the world econom" and ever"one was
trading with it. In 1929 economic disaster struc/. *here was a huge depression in the &'(, which Huic/l" caused
economic pro+lems throughout the world, which affected relations +etween countries. It also lead to important
political changes within countries and much of the goodwill and the optimism of the late 192<4s evaporated.
Wh' did the Bapanese in%ade 9anchuria2 F#?&!+7
It was the first ma5or test for the !eague, in 19E1, with the Japanese invasion of 9anchuria. 'ince 19<< Japan was
growing economicall" and in population. B" the 192<s it was a ma5or power.
It had a ver" powerful arm" and nav".
'trong industries, which products were e-ported to %hina mainl", and the &'(.
It had a growing empire.
*he Iepression hit Japan +adl", as %hina and the &'( had put their tariffs up to Japanese goods, which4s econom"
was in crisis due to this. *he solution to this was +uilding a Japanese empire +" the force. *he Japanese arm"
- 18 -
controlled the 'outh 9anchurian 0ailwa", and an incident in 19E1 gave them the chance to e-pand their empire, the"
claimed %hinese soldiers had sa+otaged the railwa". Iue to this the" entered 9anchuria and in 19E2 the" set up a
puppet government in 9anchuria that did e-actl" as the Japanese arm" told them. !ater in 19E2, the" +om+arded
'hanghai. *he Japanese government told the arm" to withdraw +ut the instructions were ignored. It was clear that
the arm" leaded Japan. %hina appealed to the !eague and Japan argued that it invaded in self1defense to %hina4s
state of anarch". *here was a long and frustrating dela", as one "ear later the !eague4s officials presented their
report, and showed that Japan had acted unlawfull" and that 9anchuria should +e returned to %hina. 6owever Japan
announced that it would invade more of %hina as self1defense, and later did it. In 9arch 19EE it resigned from the
!eague after losing 82 to 1 in a vote, in which onl" Japan voted for itself. *he !eague was powerless, economic
sanctions were useless sine &'(, Japans main trading partner were not mem+ers of the !eague. (lso Britain wanted
to /eep good relations and the mem+er countries were worried that sanctions would escalate the war. 3nl" the
&''0 and the &'( would have +een the onl" ones that could have +een a+le to remove Japan from 9anchuria, +ut
neither were mem+ers of the !eague.
(ll sorts of e-cuses were offered for the failure of the !eague, that Japan was far awa", that Japan was a special
case, which Japan had a point when it said that %hina itself was in the grip of anarch". *his onl" showed that the
league was powerless if a strong nation wanted to invade others.
Wh' did disarmament fail in the 19,5s2 F#?&!+7
*he ne-t +ig failure was disarmament. In the 19E<s there was an increased pressure for the !eague to do something
a+out disarmament. *he Germans were angr" +ecause the" had +een forced to disarm, while other nations hadn4t
done the same. In $e+ruar" 19E2, the long1promised Iisarmament %onference got under wa". B" Jul", it had
produced resolutions to prevent +om+ing on civilian populations, limit the si>e of artiller", limit the tonnage of tan/s,
and prohi+it chemical warfare, +ut none of these resolutions were ta/en into action, for e-ample, the attempts to
agree to a+olish planes capa+le of +om+ing were defeated. It was not a promising start. But the" didn4t /now what to
do with German", +ecause it had +een in the !eague for si- "ears, and most people accepted the" should +e treated
more eHuall". *he Huestion was if ever"+od" had to disarm or letting German" arm up to an e-tent. *his is what
happened ne-t2
1 Jul" 19E2
German" ta+led a proposal telling ever"+od" to disarm as them, +ut was re5ected, so the" left the !eague
1 'eptem+er 19E2
*he British sent a note sa"ing that the" agreed to the principle of eHualit", +ut the superior tone of the letter made
German" even angrier.
1 Iecem+er 19E2
(n agreement was finall" reached to treat German" eHuall".
1 Januar" 19EE
German" announced it was coming +ac/
1 $e+ruar" 19EE
6itler +ecame chancellor of German", and started to rearm it, +ut secretl".
1 9a" 19EE
6itler promised to rearm German" if in five "ears ever" nation hadn4t destro"ed their arms.
1 June 19EE
Britain produced an am+itious disarmament plan
1 3cto+er 19EE
6itler left the Iisarmament %onference and soon after too/ German" out of the !eague altogether.
B" this stage ever"+od" /new that 6itler was secretl" rearming, so the" +egan to rearm too. Iue to this the
Iisarmament %onference struggled on for another "ear +ut finall" ended in 1918. Britain and $rance were divided on
this issue. B" 19EE British people felt that the *reat" of .ersailles was unfair and the British even signed an
agreement with German" in 19E: that allowed German" to +uild up its nav" as long as it sta"ed under E:B of the
si>e of the British nav". Britain did not consult its allies or the !eague a+out this, it seemed that each countr" was
loo/ing after itself and ignoring the !eague.
- 19 -
=o did 9ussolini6s in%asion of #1'ssinia damage the &eague2 F#?&!+7
*he fatal +low to the league came when 9ussolini invaded (+"ssinia in 19E:. *here were similarities with 9anchuria
such as the fact that Ital", li/e Japan, was a leading mem+er of the !eague, and wanted to e-pand its empire +"
invading another countr". 6owever, this dispute was on the !eagues doorstep. &nli/e 9anchuria, this dispute was
ne-t door to the !eague, so it couldn4t claim it was too far awa".
(ac8ground
In 189; Italian troops had tried to invade (+"ssinia +ut were defeated +" a poorl" armed arm" of tri+esmen, so
9ussolini wanted revenge for this humiliating defeat. 6e also wanted the fertile lands and mineral wealth of the
countr", as well as glor" and conHuest. 6e spo/e of restoring the glor" of the 0oman ,mpire. In Iecem+er 19E8
there was a dispute +etween Italian and ,thiopian soldiers 8< /m inside (+"ssinia, so 9ussolini used this to claim
that it was Italian territor". 6e demanded an apolog" and started to prepare his arm" to invade. *he (+"ssinian
emperor 6aile 'elassie appealed to the !eague for help.
)hase 11 Januar" 19E: to 3cto+er 19E:2 the !eague pla"s for time
9ussolini was supposedl" negotiating with the !eague to settle the dispute, while at the same time he was shipping
the arm" to (frica and creating war fever in Ital". *he British and the $rench failed to ta/e it seriousl" as the" were
pla"ing for time. *he" did not want to harm their relationship with 9ussolini as the" wanted him as an all" against
6itler, and the" signed the 'tresa )act, which formali>ed a protest at German rearmament and a committee to stand
united against German". 9ost of the people in Britain wanted the use of militar" force if necessar" to defend
(+"ssinia, so the politicians had to ?get tough@. ( British $oreign 9inister, 6oare, gave a speech on collective
securit", there was much tal/ing and negotiating +ut the league never did an"thing to discourage 9ussolini. (fter 8
months, a committee informed the league that neither side could +e +lamed for the Wal1Wal incident and so the
league put forward a plan that would give 9ussolini some of (+"ssinia, which 9ussolini re5ected.
)hase 213cto+er 19E: to 9a" 19E;2 sanctions or notG
In 3cto+er 19E: 9ussolini launched a full1scale invasion on (+"ssinia, who were no match for the modern Italian
arm". *here was no dou+t a+out the seriousness of the issue. *he %ovenant made it clear that sanctions should +e
applied to the aggressor, +ut would onl" wor/ if the" acted Huic/l" and decisivel". ( committee was immediatel" set
up to agree the sanctions. *here was an immediate +an of arms sales to Ital" while allowing them to (+"ssinia, no
loans to Ital", no imports from Ital" and e-ports to Ital" of ru++er, tin and metals. But the" couldn4t decide on the oil
since the" were afraid that the &'( would not support the sanctions, and that its mem+er4s economic interests would
+e harmed. In Britain, E<,<<< coal miners were a+out to lose their 5o+s due to the +an of these e-ports to Ital". *he
'ue> %anal, which was Ital"4s main suppl" route and was owned +" the British and the $rench, was not closed to
9ussolini4s suppl" ships, as the" were afraid that Ital" would declare a war on them. *his was fatal for (+"ssinia and
would have ended the (+"ssinian campaign ver" Huic/l". ,Huall" damaging to the league was the secret dealing
+etween the British and the $rench $oreign 9inisters, 6oare and !aval. While sanctions discussions were ta/ing
place, the" were ma/ing a plan that would give 9ussolini two1thirds of (+"ssinia in return for calling off the invasion.
!aval told the British that if the" did not agree, the $rench would not support the sanctions against Ital". *his news
reached the $rench press and was seen as treacher" towards the league, the" were +oth sac/ed. 6aile 'elassie
demanded and immediate league de+ate. *he real damage was to the sanctions discussions, the" lost all
momentum. *he oil Huestion was dela"ed and when the" decided to +an it, it was too late. (merica were disgusted
+" the British and $rench actions and sold even more oil to Ital".
9ussolini 0o1tains3 #1'ssinia
3n A 9arch 19E; the fatal +low was delivered. 6itler marched his troops into the 0hineland. *he $rench were
desperate to get the support of Ital" and were read" to pa" the price of giving (+"ssinia for it. Ital" continued to
march into (+"ssinia and later on anne-ed the entire countr" as the league watched helplessl". %ollective securit"
has failed. (nd the British and $rench didn4t even achieve what the wanted, as 9ussolini and 6itler later signed an
agreement of their own called the 0ome1Berlin (-is.
Wh' did the &eague of .ations fail2
The self/interest of leading mem1ers. It depended on Britain and $rance, +ut the" were not
prepared to a+andon their own self1interest to support the !eague
The !"# and other important countries ere a1sent. Without such ma5or powers the !eague
lac/ed authorit" and sanctions were not effective. 'uch as German", the &''0, Japan and the &'(,
who never 5oined.
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&ac8 of troops. If sanctions failed, militar" force was the ne-t option, +ut the !eague had no arm" of
its own. Britain and $rance were not willing to commit troops and troops never fought on +ehalf of the
!eague.
7conomic sanctions didn6t or8. *he" were supposed to +e its main weapon, +ut the" were not
used +ecause mem+ers thought that without the &'( the" wouldn4t wor/. (nd when the" were
enforced the" were easil" +ro/en
The treaties it had to uphold ere seen as unfair. It +ecame apparent that some of the terms of
those peace treaties were harsh and unfair, and the !eague was supposed to uphold them.
$ecisions ere slo. When a crisis occurred, the !eague met too infreHuentl", and too/ too long to
ma/e decisions.
Chapter 9: Causes of the "econd World War
From foot/soldier to FChrer
Between 1918 and 19EE 6itler rose from +eing an o+scure and demorali>ed mem+er of the defeated German arm"
to +ecome the all1powerful $Nhrer, dictator of German", with almost unlimited power and an overwhelming am+ition
to ma/e German" great once again.
=itler6s plans
6e was never secret on his plans, as in 1928 he said in his +oo/ 9ein Dampf what he would do if the 7a>is ever
achieved power in German".
6bolish the Treat$ of 7ersailles8
6e +elieved it was un5ust and called the German leaders who had signed it the ?7ovem+er %riminals@. It was a
humiliation +" the (llies. 6e promised that if he +ecame leader of German" he would reverse it.
39pand +erman territor$8
*he *reat" had ta/en German" territor", and he wanted it +ac/. 6e also wanted to unite with (ustria. 6e wanted the
minorities in other countries to 5oin German" +ac/.
&efeat 'ommunism8
( German empire carved out of the 'oviet &nion would also help 6itler in one of his other o+5ectives, defeat
%ommunism. 6e thought the Bolshevi/s had helped German" lose the WW1 and the" wanted to ta/e over German".
=itler6s actions

I(*, (%*I37
19EE
War
*oo/ German" out of the !eague of 7ations
Began rearming German"
19E8 *ried to ta/e over (ustria +ut was stopped +" 9ussolini
19E: 6eld a massive rearmament rall" in German"
19E;
0eintroduced conscription in German"
'ent German troops into the 0hineland
9ade an anti1%ommunist alliance with Japan
19EA
*ried out German"4s new weapons in the 'panish %ivil War
9ade an anti1%ommunist alliance with Ital"
19E8
*oo/ over (ustria
*oo/ over the 'udetenland area of %>echoslova/ia
19E9
Invaded the rest of %>echoslova/ia
Invaded )oland
It seems as if 6itler had planed it step +" step. But there was a new interpretation that sa"s that he was a gam+ler
rather than a planner. 6e 5ust too/ the ne-t logical step, and he was +old, he /ept his nerve. ,ver" countr" gave wa"
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to him, so ever" time he ris/ed more and +ecame +older. 'ome sa" the !eague was responsi+le for not standing up
to him.
+earmament
6itler came to power in 19EE. 3ne of his first steps was rearming. *housands of unemplo"ed wor/ers were drafted
into the arm", reducing unemplo"ment. German people supported rearmament, +ut 6itler /new it would alarm other
countries, +ut he handled it carefull", +ecause at first he did it secretl", and made a demonstration sa"ing he didn4t
want to rearm. 6e then got out of the !eague. In 19E:, 6itler openl" staged a massive militaril" rall". In 19E; he
reintroduced conscription. 9an" other countries were using rearmament as a wa" to fight unemplo"ment, and other
nations were not read" to disarm.
0earmament +oosted 7a>i support. 6itler /new that Britain didn4t li/e much the idea of disarmament, as it was a wa"
to stop %ommunism, and the" thought it was too tight. *he" signed an agreement in 19E: with 6itler, allowing him
increase its nav" up to E:B of Britain4s.
The "aar ple1iscite
'ince 1919, the 'aar region had +een controlled +" the !eague, and in 19E: the" held a ple+iscite to /now if the"
wanted to continue under the !eague or under 6itler. 9<B voted the" wanted to return to German rule.
+emilitari>ation of the +hineland
In 9arch 19E;, 6itler too/ a ver" ris/" move, +" sending troops into the 0hineland, which was supposed to +e
demilitari>ed. $rance had 5ust signed a treat" with the &''0 to protect each other against an" attac/ from German",
and 6itler used this in order to sa" that he felt threatened. 6e /new man" people in Britain felt he had the right to
position troops there. 6is gam+le was over $rance. 6itler and his generals sweated nervousl", as their arm" was no
match with the $rench4s. In the end, 6itler4s luc/ held. 6itler was also luc/", as the attention of the !eague was at the
(+"ssinian crisis that was happening at the same time. It onl" condemned 6itler4s actions.
The "panish Ci%il War
6itler started to gain confidence with earl" successes. In 19E;, a civil war +ro/e out in 'pain +etween %ommunists
and right1wing re+els commanded +" General $ranco. 6itler saw this as an opportunit" to fight against %ommunism
and tr" out the new armed forces. In 19EA, German aircraft made devastating +om+ing raids on civilian populations
in various 'panish cities. *he most famous was Guernica.
The #nti/Comintern Pact; 19,A/,D
9ussolini was also heavil" involved at the 'panish %ivil War, and 6itler saw that the" had much in common, also with
the militar" dictatorship in Japan. In 19E;, Japan and German" signed the (nti1%omintern )act. In 19EA, 6itler did
the same with Ital". *he aim was to limit the %ommunist influence around the world, particularl" aimed at the &''0.
It was called the (-is alliance.
#nschluss ith #ustria; 19,4
7ow 6itler turned his attention to his homeland of (ustria, whose people were mainl" German. In the 9ein Dampf,
he made it clear that he wanted the two nations to +elong to the German nation, and this idea was supported +"
man" in (ustria, as their econom" was ver" poor. 6e had tried to do it in 19E8, +ut 9ussolini had stopped him, +ut
now it was different. *here was a strong 7a>i part" in (ustria, and 6itler told them to stir up things and cause riots.
6itler told (ustrians chancellor 'chuschnigg that onl" their union would solve this pro+lems, so the chancellor called
for help to Britain and $rance, +ut the" denied it, so he called a ple+iscite to see what the (ustrian people wanted.
6itler was not prepared to lose, so he sent troops to guarantee peace, and 6itler won +i 99,A:B. German" won
(ustrians soldiers, weapons and its rich deposits of gold and iron ore. 6itler was +rea/ing another point of the *reat".
Wh' did (ritain and France follo a polic' of #ppeasement in the 19,5s2
Britain signed the naval agreement with German" in 19E:. $or the ne-t E "ears Britain did what 6itler said. *his is
/nown as appeasement.
#t least =itler is standing up to Communism. *he" were more concerned a+out the spread of
%ommunism. 9an" saw 6itler as a +uffer to the threat of spreading %ommunism.
The !"# ill not support us if e stand up to =itler. (merican leaders were determined not to +e
dragged into another war.
The attitude of (ritain6s 7mpire. It was not clear if all the British ,mpire would support a war against
German".
=itler is right/the Treat' is unfair. 9an" felt it was unfair for German".
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We must not repeat the horrors of the Great War. British and $rench leaders remem+ered the horrific
e-periences of the WW1.
(ritain is not read' for ar. *he" +elieved the armed forces were not read" to go to war.
:ur on economic pro1lems are a higher priorit'. *he" were still suffering from the Iepression.
What as rong ith #ppeasement2
British leaders ma" have felt there was no option, +ut there were o+vious ris/s to such a polic".
?t encouraged =itler to 1e aggressi%e. When his gam+le succeeded, he made a greater one.
?t put too much trust in =itler6s promises. 6itler went +ac/ on his promises.
?t alloed German' to gro too strong. It was not onl" recovering ground, +ut +ecoming more
powerful.
?t scared the !""+. It sent a message to the &''0 that Britain or $rance would stand in 6itler4s wa".
The "udetenland; 19,4.
*he leader of %>echoslova/ia, Benes, was horrified +" the (nschluss, as he reali>ed he would +e the ne-t countr" to
+e ta/en1over. 6e as/ed for help to $rance, as the" had a treat", and Britain %ham+erlain# said it would support it
too, +ut +efore he as/ed 6itler what he was going to do, and this answered %>echoslova/ia had nothing to fear. But
he reall" had. In the area of the 'udetenland, there were man" Germans, and 6itler told the 7a>i part" in that area to
stir up things, and demand to +e part of German". In 9a" 19E8, 6itler said he would fight if necessar", +ut the
%>echs wouldn4t let 6itler do what he want. In 'eptem+er this pro+lem was at it highest point, and %ham+erlain flew
to meet 6itler, who gave moderate demands, sa"ing he onl" wanted parts of the 'udetenland. *hree da"s later,
6itler said that now he wanted all of it, +" sa"ing that the %>ech government was mistreating the Germans and that
the" would +e rescued. 3n 29 'eptem+er, the" met at the ?9unich #greement@ Britain, German", $rance and Ital"#
and decided on the fate of %>echoslova/ia. *he" agreed to give 6itler all the 'udetenland. *he %>echs had +een
+etra"ed, and Benes resigned.
# triumph or a sell out2
9ost people in Britain said it had averted war, +ut man" were Huestioning the polic" of (ppeasement, +ecause this
would not stop 6itler, or prevent a war, it 5ust dela"ed it.
The end of #ppeasement
C>echoslo%a8ia; 19,9
*he British people welcomed the 9unich (greement, +ut the" didn4t trust 6itler. 3n 1: 9arch, German troops too/
over the rest of %>echoslova/ia, without an" /ind of resistance. *his showed 6itler couldn4t +e trusted, +ecause this
was an invasion. If no+od" stopped 6itler, his ne-t step would +e )oland, and $rance and Britain said that if he
invaded )oland, the" would declare the war on German". *he polic" of (ppeasement was ended, although 6itler
didn4t +elieve the" would ris/ themselves.
The .a>i/"o%iet Pact
*he ne-t step would +e invading the strip of land in )oland /nown as the )olish %orridor. 6itler was sure that Britain
or $rance would ris/ on this land, +ut he wasn4t sure a+out 'talin.
(ac8ground
'talin had +een alwa"s ver" worried a+out the German threat to the 'oviet &nion ever since 6itler had came to
power in 19EE, as he had said he would conHuer 0ussian land, denounced %ommunism and /illed %ommunists in
German". 'talin4s fears had grown in the 19E<s, so he signed a treat" with $rance in 19E: sa"ing mutual help if one
was invaded +" German". *he 9unich (greement of 19E8 increased 'talin4s concerns, as he was not consulted.
'talin concluded that Britain and $rance were happ" of 6itler ta/ing over ,astern ,urope. In 9arch 19E9, Britain,
$rance and the &''0, +ut none of the two first were reluctant to commit themselves. But +efore the" could reach an
agreement, 'talin met with the 7a>i foreign minister to discuss a 7a>i1'oviet pact, which was signed +" 6itler and
'talin on 28 (ugust 19E9. *he" agreed not to attac/ one another and divide )oland +etween them. 'talin signed this
+ecause he didn4t /now if Britain and $rance would +e strong enough so as to stand up to 6itler, he wanted to ta/e
control of the Baltic states, and he hoped to have some time so as to re+uild his forces.
War
*he pact cleared the wa" for German"4s invasion to )oland. 3n 1 'eptem+er 19E9, the 7a>i forces invaded )oland
from the West, and on 1A 'eptem+er 19E9 the 'oviets invaded from the east. 3n 2 'eptem+er Britain and $rance
declared the war to German". 6itler had made a +et too man".
- 23 -
Was #ppeasement the right polic'2
%ham+erlain +elieved in (ppeasement. 6owever, it was a controversial polic" at the time. *here are two main views2
?t as the rong polic' 1ecause it encouraged =itler. %ham+erlains critics sa" it
encouraged 6itlers gam+ling.
?t as the right polic' 1ecause (ritain as not read' for ar. %ham+erlains defenders sa"
it was the onl" wa" a+aila+le to him.
Chapter 11:The 1eginnings of the Cold War: 194-/1949
The @alta Conference; Fe1ruar' 194-
In $e+ruar" 198: the (llied leaders met at =alta in the &/raine to plan what would happen to ,urope after German"4s
defeat. Iespite their differences, the Big *hree, 'talinC 0ooseveltC %hurchill, agreed on some important matters2
'talin agreed to enter the war against Japan once German" had surrendered.
German" would +e divided in four >ones2 the $rench, British and 'oviet. (lso Berlin would +e divided into
the four >ones.
(s (llied soldiers were revealing the horrors of the 7a>i German", the" agreed to hunt down and punish
war criminals that were responsi+le for the genocide.
(ll li+erated countries would +e allowed to have free elections to decide the t"pe of government.
*he Big *hree agreed to 5oin the new &nited 7ations 3rgani>ation to /eep peace
*he Big *hree agreed that ,astern ,urope should +e a ?'oviet sphere of influence@ as the" had lost lots of
things with the war.
*he onl" pro+lem came with )oland. 'talin said that the +order of the &''0 to move westwards, and
)oland could do the same with German". %hurchill didn4t li/e the idea +ut he /new that the 0ed (rm" was
in control of )oland and eastern German". 0oosevelt didn4t li/e it either +ut was persuaded +" %hurchill, as
long as the &''0 didn4t interfere with Greece. 'talin agreed.

The Potsdam Conference Bul'/#ugust 194-
In ma" 198:, the allied troops reached Berlin. 6itler commited suicide. *he war was over in ,urope. ( second
conference was arranged in Jul" 198:. In the months +etween this and =alta lots of things had changed.
1 Stalin*s armies #ere occup$ing most of eastern 3urope
!ots of countries in ,astern ,urope had +een li+erated +" 'oviet troops. B" Jul", 'talinSs troops controlled $inland,
)oland, %>echoslova/ia, 6ungar", Bulgaria and 0omania. 'talin put a communist government in )oland and said
that it was 5ust to ta/e measures for future attac/s.
2 6merica had a ne# president
3n (pril 198:, 0oosevelt died. *ruman replaced him. 6e was much more anti1%ommunist and suspicious of 'talin.
6e and his advisors saw 'oviet actions in ,astern ,urope as preparations for a 'oviet ta/e1over of the rest of
,urope.
( The 6llies had tested an atomic bomb
3n Jul" 198: the (mericans successfull" tested an atomic +om+ at a desert site in the &'(.
$isagreements at Potsdam.
It finall" got under wa" on 1A Jul" 198:. It didn4t go as smoothl" as =alta. In the middle of the %onference, %hurchill
had +een succeeded. In the a+sence of %hurchill, the conference was dominated +" rivalr" and suspicion +etween
'talin and *ruman.
The' disagreed o%er hat to do ith German'. 'talin wanted to cripple German", +ut *ruman didn4t
want to repeat he mista/e of the *reat" of .ersailles.
The' disagreed o%er reparations. 2< million 0ussians had died and 'talin wanted compensation for that,
+ut *ruman was determined not to repeat the mista/es of the 1
st
World War. 0esisted this demand.
The' disagreed o%er "o%iet polic' in eastern 7urope. (t =alta, 'talin had said he would set up pro1
'oviet governments in eastern ,urope. *ruman didn4t li/e this and too/ a ?get tough@ attitude towards
'talin.
The 0?ron curtain3
- 24 -
*he )otsdam conference ended without complete agreement a+out this issues. 3n the ne-t months, 'talin achieved
the domination of eastern ,urope he was see/ing. B" 198;, )oland, 6ungar", 0omania, Bulgaria and (l+ania all had
%ommunist governments. %hurchill descri+ed the line that divided the 'oviet1controlled countries and the West as an
iron curtain.
"talin tightens his control.
'talin graduall" tightened his control in each countr". *he secret police emprisioned an"one who opposed %ommunis
rule, or might later oppose it. In 3cto+er 198A, 'talin set up the %ominform, to co1ordinate the wor/ of the
%ommunist )arties of eastern ,urope. *his also allowed 'talin /eep a close e"e on them. 6e spotted single minded
leaders and replaced them with ones lo"al to him. *he e-ception was General *ito in =ugoslavia.
The Cold War.
It was clear +" 198; that the wartime friendship +etween the (llies had +ro/en. It had +een replaced +" suspicion
and accusation. *he distrust +etween the &'( and the &''0, was said to +e soon li+erated in a war. Both of them
increased their stoc/ of weapons. *he" too/ ever" opportunit" the" had to denounce each other. It was an
atmosphere of tension and recrimination.
Wh' as the !"# so orried a1out Communism2
It was onl" the war which had made them sta" together. *heir leaders had ver" different ideas and +eliefs. Before the
war, the" had mistrusted each other a lot. !ots of 0ussians remem+ered &' troops fighting in their %ivil War. *he"
trusted %ommunists less than 7a>is.
*he &'( *he &''0
It was a democrac", and the president was chosen in
free elections.
It was capitalist.
*here was a ver" +ig difference +etween the rich
and the poor.
9an" were +itterl" opposed to %ommunism.
It was a %ommunist state.
It was a one1part" dictatorship. (ll candidates
were %ommunist.
(lmost ever"one was eHual, although the"
were not ver" rich.
9an" were +itterl" opposed to capitalism.
*he &'( and the &''0 had +oth emerged from the war as superpowers. In the 19E<s the &'( had had a polic" of
isolationism, +ut in the 198<s it had learned a lesson. *he" didn4t want to repeat the mista/es the" had made +efore
the WW2. 0oosevelt set them firml" against a polic" of isolationism. *here would +e no appeasement for dictators,
ever" %ommunist action would meet an (merican reaction.
The reaction of the West
*he leaders of the western powers were alarmed +" 'talin4s ta/e1over of eastern ,urope. %hurchill, 0oosevelt and
their successors had agreed that 'oviet securit" needed friendl" go+ernments in eastern ,urope. It was called
?sphere of influence@. *he" had not e-pected a complete %ommunist domination. B" 1988, Greece and
%>echoslova/ia were the onl" eastern ,uropean countries not controlled +" communist governments. Ital" and
$rance were vulnera+le to %ommunist attac/s.
Greece
When the Germans retreated from Greece in 1988, there were two rival groups, the monarchists and the
%ommunists, who wanted a 'oviet repu+lic, and the firsts wanted the return of the /ing of Greece. In 198:, %hurchill
sent British troops to restore order, +ut it was reall" to support the /ing, who was elected. ( %ivil War Huic/l"
developed. *he British troops were +egginig to retreat, +ecause the cost was to high, +ut *ruman told them that he
would pa" for them.
The Truman $octrine
- 25 -
(merican intervention mar/ed a new era in the &'(Ss attitude, /nown as the *ruman Ioctrine. &nder this, it was
prepared to send mone", eHuipment and advice to an" countr" that was threatened +" a %ommunist ta/e1over. 6is
aim was to stop %ommunism. %ontainment. If it e-panded an" further, militar" action needed.
9arshal #id
*ruman +elieved that %ommunism succeeded when there was povert" and hardship. General 9arshall was sent to
asses the economic state of ,urope. 6e said the" owed T11.: +illion to the &'(, and suggested that a+out T1A
+illion would +e needed to re+uild ,uropeSs prosperit". In 198A, *ruman put his plan to %ongress.
C>echoslo%a8ia
(mericansS attitude changed when the %ommunists too/ over the government of %>echoslova/ia. *he %ommunists
came down hard in 9arch 1988. (nti1soviet leaders were purged. Immediatel", %ongress accepted the 9arshall (id
and made T1A+illion availa+le over a period of 8 "ears. It was an e-tremel" generous act +" the (merican people,
and it was also motivated +" their self1interest. *he" wanted to create new mar/ets for their goods. 'talin viewed the
9arshall (id with suspicion, and he refused to have an"thing more to do with it, and for+ade an" eastern ,uropean
countr" to appl". 6e felt it was to ma/e the countries dependant on dollars.
Wh' did the !""+ 1loc8ade (erlin2
*he two sides never fired each other, +ut in 1988, the" came close to war. German" +ecame a headache for the
Western (llies. (fter the war, their >ones were in complete destruction. *he &''0 wanted it to sta" crippled. But the
(llies wanted it to recover its industries so as to let them feed their people. In 198;, the &'(, Britain and $rance
com+ined their >ones and made it all one. *he" reformed the currenc", and within months the" were recovering.
'talin +elieved that the &'(sS attitude was provocative. 6e could stamp his authorit" in Berlin, as it was deep inside
the 'oviet >one. In 1988, he cut ever" possi+le rute, which left more than 2 million people without supplies. It was a
clever plan, and it was a test for the West. *he onl" wa" into Berlin was +" air, so the" decided air1lift supplies. *he
planes arrived ever" E minutes for the ne-t 1< months +ringing from clothes, food and oil. But there were great
shortages. 'talin reali>ed it would not ma/e the (llies give up, so he stoped.
Wh' as .#T: set up2
Iuring the Berlin Bloc/ade, war seemed pro+a+le. *he Western powers met at Washington and signed an
agreement. It was formed in 1989, and the" would wor/ together.
# di%ided German'
(s a result of the Bloc/ade, German" was firml" divided into two nations. *he $ederal 0epu+lic of German" and the
German Iemocratic 0epu+lic in 1989.
# poerful s'm1ol
German would sta" divided for 81 "ears.
# pattern for the Cold War
*he Bloc/ade set out a pattern for %old War confrontations. *he two superpowers and their allies had shown how
suspicious the" were of each otherC how the" would o+struct each other in almost an" wa" the" could.
- 26 -