K outweighs and turns the case the 1AC is an advocacy of more inclusive education

their education stems from a pedagogy that ignores non-human forms of life that
results in the worst commodification of the environment and makes their war impacts
inevitable resources will be taken because their education necessitates keeping
them away from the evil European colonialists
Humans cannot be saved and we control the root cause the impacts they outline are
the result of humanitys capability to enact uniquely organized forms of violence and
destruction
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 9-
10)

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an
exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of evil, a moment of hatred,
madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of evil given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through
which humanity might comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such
actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the
Holocaust was evil, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of
genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of
the human heritage, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures
across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the
people of the West generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds
us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and
culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to
the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride
themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial
violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of
colonialism highlights the central function of race war that often underlies human social organisation
and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003).
This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust
are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity.
After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous
inhabitants were racially inferior and in some instances that they were closer to apes than to
humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of race is in many ways merely an
extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of
non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of
differing human races) and inter- species violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singers comment that whereas humans consider
themselves the crown of creation, for animals all people are Nazis and animal life is an eternal Treblinka (Singer, 1968, p.750).
Certainly many organisms use force to survive and thrive at the expense of their others. Humans are
not special in this regard. However humans, due a particular form of self-awareness and ability to plan
for the future, have the capacity to carry out highly organised forms of violence and destruction (i.e. the
Holocaust; the massacre and enslavement of indigenous peoples by Europeans) and the capacity to develop forms of social
organisation and communal life in which harm and violence are organised and regulated. It is perhaps this
capacity for reflection upon the merits of harm and violence (the moral reflection upon the good and bad of violence) which gives humans a
special place within the food chain. Nonetheless, with these capacities come responsibility and our proposal of global suicide is directed at
bringing into full view the issue of human moral responsibility.
The prioritization of human survival is a cultural construction and irrelevant consider
the fish people
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 6-
7)

One method of approaching these questions is by considering the hypothetical example of the fish
people. Imagine that as a result of global warming sea levels rise to such an extent that the majority
of our current terrestrial habitat begins to be covered by water. One consequence is that only species
who already live in a watery environment or can adapt to live in water will survive. Scientists respond to
this change in habitat by genetically engineering some humans so that they have the capacity to live
in water, or, by selecting human candidates who might already have the genetic constitution to
survive in water and enhancing their capacity by selective breeding. Within a few generations these
new fish people are the only survivors of the species homo sapiens. They survive as a new sub-species
or even as a new species. In a general sense one might argue that humanity has successfully adapted to
a new environment and has survived. But, how much of what we consider to be human would in such
a case survive? In what way are the fish people representatives of humanity?
The example is important because it helps to draw the distinction between the differing notions of the
survival of a preferred species and the survival of life in general. If the fish people were to mutate via
natural selection enhanced by genetic technology into a new species, then while they would share
many of their genes with our own species they would also in many ways be radically and
fundamentally different. What would over time survive would genetically not be us but something like
a genetic cousin, akin perhaps in many ways to our present close genetic cousins, the higher apes a
species with high levels of cognition, degrees of self-awareness and intricate communal forms of
behaviour. What investment would we as humans have in the survival of another species which was
not our own? If the question of survival is genetic it should not really matter whether the fish people
of the future or the apes of the present inherit this earth.
If only some of our genes but not our species has survived, maybe the emphasis we place upon the
notion of survival is more cultural than simply genetic. Such an emphasis stems not only from our
higher cognitive powers of self-consciousness or self-awareness, but also from our conscious
celebration of this fact: the image we create for ourselves of humanity, which is produced by via
language, collective memory and historical narrative. The notion of the human involves an
identification of our species with particular characteristics with and upon which we ascribe certain
notions of value. Amongst others such characteristics and values might be seen to include: the notion of
an inherent human dignity, the virtue of ethical behaviour, the capacities of creative and aesthetic
thought, and for some, the notion of an eternal soul. Humans are conscious of themselves as humans
and value the characteristics that make us distinctly human.

Their reasons for why we should prioritize survival proves that they only want a
specific aspect of humanity to survive this creates a distinction between good life and
bare life
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 7-
8)

When many, like Hawing, typically think of the notion of the survival of the human race, it is perhaps
this cultural-cognitive aspect of homo sapiens, made possible and produced by human self-
consciousness, which they are thinking of. If one is to make the normative argument that the human
race should survive, then one needs to argue it is these cultural-cognitive aspects of humanity, and
not merely a portion of our genes, that is worth saving. However, it remains an open question as to
what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity would survive in the future when placed under radical
environmental and evolutionary pressures. We can consider that perhaps the fish people, having the
capacity for self-awareness, would consider themselves as the continuation or next step of humanity.
Yet, who is to say that a leap in the process of evolution would not prompt a change in self awareness,
a different form of abstract reasoning about the species, a different self-narrative, in which case the
descendents of humans would look upon their biological and genetic ancestors in a similar manner to
the way humans look upon the apes today. Conceivably the fish people might even forget or suppress
their evolutionary human heritage. While such a future cannot be predicted, it also cannot be controlled
from our graves.
In something of a sense similar to the point made by Giorgio Agamben (1998), revising ideas found
within the writings of Michel Foucault and Aristotle, the question of survival can be thought to involve
a distinction between the good life and bare life. In this instance, arguments in favour of human
survival rest upon a certain belief in a distinctly human good life, as opposed to bare biological life,
the life of the gene pool. It is thus such a good life, or at least a form of life considered to be of value,
that is held up by a particular species to be worth saving. When considering the hypothetical example
of the fish people, what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanitys good life would survive?

That turns case
Foucault 72 (Michael, Professor of the History of Systems of Thought College De France, The Foucault
Reader, pg. 258) LD
Since the classical age, the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of
power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite,
reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating
forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making
them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with
the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now
manifested as simply the reverse of the right , of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life . Yet wars were never as
bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did
regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations . But this formidable power of death-and this is
perhaps what accounts for part of its
force and the cynicism with which it has greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself a s the
counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize,
and multiply it, subjecting to precise controls and comprehensive regulations . Wars are no longer
waged in the name of a sovereign who must be de fended; they are waged on behalf of the existence
of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life
necessity: massacres have become vital . It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that
so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a
turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates
them and the one that terminates the are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is
now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the
underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of
battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the
existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is
indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill;
it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-
scale phenomena of population.
___
We control root cause their impacts are just the extension of anthropocentric logic
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other
species, it becomes clear that the human heritage and the propagation of itself as a thing of value
has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide.
While this cannot be verified, perhaps human history and progress begins with the genocide of the
Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the
sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue
into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals
in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries;
damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of
natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from
killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively.

History flows neg everything that has been said to have good intentions results in
destruction they are too narrow minded
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 8)

When thinking about whether the human species is worth saving the nave view sees these good and
bad aspects as distinct. However, when thinking about human nature as a whole, or even the
operation of human reason as a characteristic of the Enlightenment and modernity, it is not so easy to
draw clear lines of separation. As suggested by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1997), within
what they call the dialectic of enlightenment, it is sometimes the very things which we draw upon to
escape from evil, poverty and harm (reason, science, technology) which bring about a situation which
is infinitely more destructive (for example the atom bomb). Indeed, it has often been precisely those
actions motivated by a desire to do good that have created profound degrees of destruction and
harm. One just has to think of all the genocides, massacres and wars within history justified by moral
notions such as civilisation, progress and freedom, and carried out by numerous peoples acting
with misguided, but genuine intentions. When considering whether humanity is worth saving, one
cannot turn a blind eye to the violence of human history.
This is not to discount the many positive aspects of the human heritage such as art, medicine, the
recognition of individual autonomy and the development of forms of social organisation that promote
social welfare. Rather, what we are questioning is whether a holistic view of the human heritage
considered in its relation to the natural environment merits the continuation of the human species or
not. Far too often the positive aspects of the human heritage are viewed in an abstract way, cut off
from humanitys destructive relation with the natural environment. Such an abstract or one-sided
picture glorifies and reifies human life and is used as a tool that perpetually redeems the otherwise
evil acts of humanity.

Alt Solvency
Only a complete rejection of all that is human can solve the impacts and is morally
justified
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 16-
17)

How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which
does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the
plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence? While this
question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought
experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question the question of modern action itself as
residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem. In a sense perhaps the only way to
understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to
terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself. The point operates then not as the end,
but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-
value, and harm.
For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the
appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided
by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to
abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to
invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally
conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies
(think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical
modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and
destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of non- participation
rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the
individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or
electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others.
One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to
take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be
non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the
modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion the global
suicide of humanity as a free-willed and final solution.
While we are not interested in the discussion of the method of the global suicide of humanity per se,
one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The
case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity
out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything non-
human. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which
is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of
altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of
the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other
species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human
act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming
humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future.
Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others.
Not being anthropocentric is comparatively better + uniqueness for the alt
Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University
associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University,
Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, Beyond Human, Beyond Words:
Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-
bell.pdf, p. 198-99)

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological
contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The
gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ- mental thought,
particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson
(1993) contends that our ina- bility to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our
failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others
and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature
of environ- mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence,
premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no- tions as empowerment.
Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with
critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal
notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind (Giroux, 1991, p.
24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal
discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro,
1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science
(Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an emerging discourse of the body that looks
at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the
work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan.
A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators
critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be
mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create
space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to
education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody,
1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a
critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in
culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within
discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other
emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad
life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each
stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights.
Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to
greatly enhance a revisioning of environ- mental education. A growing number of environmental
educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects
of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches,
these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that
mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political
dimensions of the problems being considered (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching
about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner
is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough,
1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993).
AT: Perm
Every individual is complicit in speciesist violence only a complete rejection solves
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 13-
14)

What helps to render a certain type of action problematic is each individuals complicity in the
practice of speciesist violence. That is, even if one is aware of the ways in which modern life destroys
or adversely affects the environment and inflicts suffering upon non- human animals, one cannot
completely subtract ones self from a certain responsibility for and complicity in this. Even if you are
conscious of the problem you cannot but take part in doing evil by the mere fact of participating
within modern life. Take for example the problematic position of environmental activists who
courageously sacrifice personal wealth and leisure time in their fight against environmental destruction.
While activists assume a sense of historical responsibly for the violence of the human species and act
so as to stop the continuation of this violence, these actors are still somewhat complicit in a modern
system of violence due to fact that they live in modern, industrial societies. The activist consumes,
acquires and spends capital, uses electricity, pays taxes, and accepts the legitimacy of particular
governments within the state even if they campaign against government policies. The bottom line is that
all of these actions contribute in some way to the perpetuation of a larger process that moves
humanity in a particular direction even if the individual personally, or collectively with others, tries to
act to counter this direction. Despite peoples good intentions, damage is encapsulated in nearly every
human action in industrial societies, whether we are aware of it or not.
In one sense, the human individuals modern complicity in environmental violence represents
something of a bizarre symmetry to Hannah Arendts notion of the banality of evil (Arendt, 1994). For
Arendt, the Nazi regime was an emblem of modernity, being a collection of official institutions
(scientific, educational, military etc.) in which citizens and soldiers alike served as clerks in a bureaucratic
mechanism run by the state. These individuals committed evil, but they did so in a very banal manner:
fitting into the state mechanism, following orders, filling in paperwork, working in factories, driving
trucks and generally respecting the rule of law. In this way perhaps all individuals within the modern
industrial world carry out a banal evil against the environment simply by going to work, sitting in their
offices and living in homes attached to a power grid. Conversely, those individuals who are driven by a
moral intention to not do evil and act so as to save the environment, are drawn back into a banality of
the good. By their ability to effect change in only very small aspects of their daily life, or in political-
social life more generally, modern individuals are forced to participate in the active destruction of the
environment even if they are the voices of contrary intention. What is banal in this sense is not the
lack of a definite moral intention but, rather, the way in which the individuals or institutions
participation in everyday modern life, and the unintentional contribution to environmental destruction
therein, contradicts and counteracts the smaller acts of good intention.

Doesnt matter if you leave the distinction unquestioned only the alt solves
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity," p. 5-
6)

There continues to be a debate over the extent to which humans have caused environmental problems
such as global warming (as opposed to natural, cyclical theories of the earths temperature change) and
over whether phenomena such as global warming can be halted or reversed. Our position is that
regardless of where one stands within these debates it is clear that humans have inflicted degrees of
harm upon non-human animals and the natural environment. And from this point we suggest that it is
the operation of speciesism as colonialism which must be addressed. One approach is of course to
adopt the approach taken by Singer and many within the animal rights movement and remove our
species, homo sapiens, from the centre of all moral discourse. Such an approach would thereby take
into account not only human life, but also the lives of other species, to the extent that the living
environment as a whole can come to be considered the proper subject of morality. We would suggest,
however, that this philosophical approach can be taken a number of steps further. If the standpoint
that we have a moral responsibility towards the environment in which all sentient creatures live is to
be taken seriously, then we perhaps have reason to question whether there remains any strong
ethical grounds to justify the further existence of humanity.
For example, if one considers the modern scientific practice of experimenting on animals, both the
notions of progress and speciesism are implicitly drawn upon within the moral reasoning of scientists in
their justification of committing violence against non- human animals. The typical line of thinking here
is that because animals are valued less than humans they can be sacrificed for the purpose of
expanding scientific knowledge focussed upon improving human life. Certainly some within the
scientific community, such as physiologist Colin Blakemore, contest aspects of this claim and argue
that experimentation on animals is beneficial to both human and non- human animals (e.g. Grasson,
2000, p.30). Such claims are disingenuous, however, in that they hide the relative distinctions of
value that underlie a moral justification for sacrifice within the practice of experimentation (cf.
LaFollette & Shanks, 1997, p.255). If there is a benefit to non-human animals this is only incidental,
what remains central is a practice of sacrificing the lives of other species for the benefit of humans.
Rather than reject this common reasoning of modern science we argue that it should be reconsidered
upon the basis of species equality. That is, modern science needs to ask the question of: Who is the
best candidate for sacrifice for the good of the environment and all species concerned? The moral
response to the violence, suffering and damage humans have inflicted upon this earth and its
inhabitants might then be to argue for the sacrifice of the human species. The moral act would be the
global suicide of humanity.
This notion of global human suicide clearly goes against commonly celebrated and deeply held views of
the inherent value of humanity and perhaps contradicts an instinctive or biological desire for survival.
Indeed the picture painted by Hawking presents a modern humanity which, through its own
intellectual, technical and moral action, colonises another planet or finds some other way to survive.
His idea is driven by the desire for the modern human, as we know it, to survive. Yet, what exact
aspect of our species would survive, let alone progress, in such a future? In the example of the
colonisation of another planet, would human survival be merely genetic or would it also be cultural?
Further, even if we can pinpoint what would survive is there a strong moral argument that the human
species should survive?

Link debate
Expanding the debate space to include more perspectives of human education that
links harder to the kritik that involves an exclusion of non-human life their
discourse of indigenous PEOPLE not indigenous life forms is a reason why their focus is
solely centered on humans their rejection of racism is a reason why their own
pedagogy is flawed the exclusion of non-human life forms is a form of racism
Their calls for widespread change fall into the same logic of progress that has resulted
in speciesist violence and the destruction of the environment
Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and
Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

In another sense the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction
runs onto and in many ways intensifies the question of radical or revolutionary change which confronted the
socialist tradition within the 19th and 20th centuries. As environmental concerns have increasingly since the 1970s come into greater
prominence, the pressing issue for many within the 21st century is that of social-environmental revolution. [9] Social- environmental
revolution involves the creation of new social, political and economic forms of human and
environmental organisation which can overcome the deficiencies and latent oppression of global
capitalism and safeguard both human and non-human dignity. Putting aside the old, false
assumptions of a teleological account of history, social-environmental revolution is dependent upon
widespread political action which short-circuits and tears apart current legal, political and economic
regimes. This action is itself dependent upon a widespread change in awareness, a revolutionary
change in consciousness, across enough of the populace to spark radical social and political
transformation. Thought of in this sense, however, such a response to environmental destruction is
caught by many of the old problems which have troubled the tradition of revolutionary socialism. Namely, how might a
significant number of human individuals come to obtain such a radically enlightened perspective or awareness of human social reality (i.e. a
dialectical, utopian anti-humanist revolutionary consciousnesse) so that they might bring about with minimal violence the overthrow of the
practices and institutions of late capitalism and colonial-speciesism? Further, how might an individual attain such a radical perspective when
their life, behaviours and attitudes (or their subjectivity itself) are so moulded and shaped by the individuals immersion within and active self-
realisation through, the networks, systems and habits constitutive of global capitalism? (Hardt & Negri, 2001). While the demand for
social-environmental revolution grows stronger, both theoretical and practical answers to these
pressing questions remain unanswered. Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to
run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of
sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a
future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to
environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by
reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either
deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the
bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the
human species, exemplified by Hawkings cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension.
This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-
humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the
basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though,
getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may
be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in
such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest
value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-
human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands
itself as a part of the latter.

CP
Extend our first Atchison and Panetta that instead of in a competitive atmosphere, at
debate tournaments, there should be an open forum run by the Tournament Director
where we discuss the role of whiteness in the debate community.

AND, an open discussion solves best-having an open communal forum free from the
competition of debate allows for open conversation-this is a prerequisite to real change.
Reitman 08, Maxwell Reitman, Published by Guilford College, The Color of Fear: Students, Community Discuss
Racism, http://www.guilfordian.com/2.3199/the-color-of-fear-students-community-discuss-racism-1.326959
"This is going to be a powerful experience for those of you who haven't seen it," said Latino Community Program
Coordinator and anti-racism team member Jorge Zeballos as he introduced guests Victor Louis and Hugh Vasquez
of the film "The Color of Fear." Louis and Vasquez briefly spoke about their experience in making the film, but
were ultimately more focused on creating an open and accepting place for discussion on the film itself. "We have
been taught from birth, and some of us from conception, to be divided against one another," Louis said,
prepping the audience for the film. He invited the members of the audience to "provide a space of
amnesty" for their peers as they began to dig into the complicated topic of race. "There is an unknown
with what we're going to dig in with," Vasquez said, echoing Louis. Vasquez continued to emphasize the
importance of being open and honest during the conversation, so that genuine change could take
place.

AND, only we get spillover-a discussion among the entire debate community lets
everyone talk about their personal beliefs in an open format instead of just four
debaters being able to talk, we let everyone take part in the discussion.

AND, only we solve by fostering responsibility-discussions on Eurocentric racism end with
participants working to change the way they interact in their own lives and accepting
responsibility-best internal link to solvency-and solves for civic engagement.
Reitman 08, Maxwell Reitman, Published by Guilford College, The Color of Fear: Students, Community Discuss
Racism, http://www.guilfordian.com/2.3199/the-color-of-fear-students-community-discuss-racism-1.326959
After the film, the audience broke into pairs and told each other how they felt about the experience,
what it meant to them, what conflicts they had with the differing views expressed, and how they felt the film
reflected the world around them, before moving into a larger group discussion. Strangely enough, the
conversation remained either very abstract, or grounded in the individual's experience. No one talked
much about the state of race relations in Greensboro, or even at Guilford. Mostly the group was accepting of
each other's faults, but there were a couple of times that people tensed or felt the need to respond directly to
something which they disagreed with. "I don't want to be the clich where I sit around and complain," said Audrey
Henneman, a first-year who was fairly vocal during the post-movie discussion, "I feel like this is something
I need to (act on)."

AND, cross-apply Verba 95 from the case flow that civic engagement by groups
opposed to Eurocentric racism is a necessary check against takeover by racist
extremists because political participation by concerned groups ensures that their
interests are expressed-this is a whole new internal link to solvency that only we
access.

AND, were an ethical side constraint, a just anti-racist society must foster the acceptance
of all, we have an obligation to make the discussion of racism one with all involved.
Memmi 2k (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve
Martinot, p. 163-165 JD)
It is an ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the
refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end.
The ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by
all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will
be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes
are irresistible.

AND, working in a confrontational atmosphere takes out solvency-
Extend our first Atchison and Panetta evidence that there is no communal memory in
the debate community or any sort of written record of rounds-means that their
performance will still be isolated to small rounds.
AND, extend our second Atchison and Panetta evidence that keeping performative
issues in rounds makes other teams collateral damage for the faults of the
community. This only reifies a competitive atmosphere where other competitors
wont embrace the affirmatives ideology when it stands in a way of their competitive
success, theyll write blocks to it.
AND, even if they win the Counter Plan, using debate as an activist forum turns
solvency-

J udging performance backfires. It presumes a counterproductive juridical model of power
that trivializes their message and makes it an object to be assessed-dooms solvency.
Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity
and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 204
That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should
be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power
to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we accept the notion
that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical
constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what
is lost from the political analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical
requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of
political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. How is the analysis of the
discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of departure for such
an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the performative
act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the
name itself is generative.


AND, the juridical methodology of ballot solvency mirrors the act of giving control to a
sovereign power-independantly-this turns racism.
David Campbell 98, (Yes The Same Campbell,) Professor of International Politics at the
University of Newcastle in England.
http://calliope.jhu.edu/journals/theory_&_event/v002/2.1r_campbell.html, 98
With her own rhetorical virtuosity and acute philosophical acumen, Butler sets out to interrogate the assumptions
behind key arguments concerned with hate speech and the strategies to counter it. In so doing, she begins from a
particular position sympathetic to those worried by hate speech in order to make a specific point that diverges from
their normal position: That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic
speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech
derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we
accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical
constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the
political analysis of injury? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of
political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution (50). The collapse into juridical
discourse, backed by the power of the state or specific agents of the state, is obvious in the scenes above, and
Butler's anxiety about the minimalization of political opposition - particularly in the first case, where the dubious
nature of the 'offence' diverts attention from racism more generally - appears fully justified. The
question is, however, whether the nonjuridical and nonstate forms of agency and resistance Butler places her faith in
are up to the task set for them. Let's leave that concern to hang for a bit. Let us first ask how it is that the dominant
modes of dealing with hate speech appear universally juridical? In answering that question, Butler demonstrates well
the way in which critically interpretative thought can combine a series of theoretical assumptions to demonstrate the
limitations of prevalent discourses and alternative possibilities. In so doing, Excitable Speech is a powerful
statement in response to those who would maintain that arguments imbued with the idea of a "modernity without
foundations" (161) evacuate ethico-political concerns from our horizon. Those who argue that hate speech
demands juridical responses assert that not only does the speech communicate, but that it constitutes an
injurious act. This presumes that not only does speech act, but that "it acts upon the addressee in
an injurious way" (16). This argumentation is, in Butler's eyes, based upon a "sovereign conceit"
whereby speech wields a sovereign power, acts as an imperative, and embodies a causative understanding of
representation. In this manner, hate speech constitutes its subjects as injured victims unable to respond themselves
and in need of the law's intervention to restrict if not censor the offending words, and punish the speaker: This
idealization of the speech act as a sovereign action (whether positive or negative) appears linked with the
idealization of sovereign state power or, rather, with the imagined and forceful voice of that power. It is as if the
proper power of the state has been expropriated, delegated to its citizens, and the state then rememerges as a neutral
instrument to which we seek recourse to protects as from other citizens, who have become revived emblems of a
(lost) sovereign power (82). Two elements of this are paradoxical. First, the sovereign conceit embedded in
conventional renderings of hate speech comes at a time when understanding power in sovereign terms is becoming
(if at all ever possible) even more difficult. Thus the juridical response to hate speech helps deal with an onto-
political problem: "The constraints of legal language emerge to put an end to this particular historical anxiety [the
problematisation of sovereignty], for the law requires that we resituate power in the language of injury, that we
accord injury the status of an act and trace that act to the specific conduct of a subject" (78). The second, which
stems from this, is that (to use Butler's own admittedly hyperbolic formulation) "the state produces hate speech." By
this she means not that the state is the sovereign subject from which the various slurs emanate, but that within the
frame of the juridical account of hate speech "the category cannot exist without the state's ratification, and this
power of the state's judicial language to establish and maintain the domain of what will be publicly speakable
suggests that the state plays much more than a limiting function in such decisions; in fact, the state actively produces
the domain of publicly acceptable speech, demarcating the line between the domains of the speakable and the
unspeakable, and retaining the power to make and sustain the line of consequential demarcation" (77). The
sovereign conceit of the juridical argument thus linguistically resurrects the sovereign subject at
the very moment it seems most vulnerable, and reaffirms the sovereign state and its power in
relation to that subject at the very moment its phantasmatic condition is most apparent. The
danger is that the resultant extension of state power will be turned against the social movements
that sought legal redress in the first place (24)

AT: Perm
Frame the counterplan as a counter-advocacy this way we bypass their eurocentrism
arguments. Their permutation is an abdication of the primacy of the 1AC ie this is a
debate of competing advocacies 1AC vs 1NC this was established in the cross-
examination of the 1AC. The permutation says their aff was inherently insufficient. Its
also a hegemonic move for co-option which links to their arguments about debate
over Eurocentric modes of thinking. This is the same thing the USFG does to co-opt
movements and political dissent when they say we can incorporate you say its a
good think while dismissing the urgency of your ideas.
It also links to the waterdown disad the perm both waters down the aff and out
counter-advocacy. Its like attaching a tax cuts rider to anti-hate crime legislation. The
subsequent attention to tax cuts waters down the anti-hate crime message.
Also justifies aff conditionality IV for fairness and education.

Backlash
Working in hostile situations dooms cooperation and entrenches us-them dichotomies
means nobody will change their mind. Only the Counter Advocacy solves.
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and
Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor
University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication,
Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication:
Issues for the Future, The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)
If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a
traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the
community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the
community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable
with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our
perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where
participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for
wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try me
method of public argument that we reach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community
changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community
change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas
addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great
number of people. The "debate as innovation" perspective views each debate in a vacuum with little to no
consequences on any other community. The "debate as activism" perspective views each debate as a site of
resistance where the debate community can confront problems in an effort to change. Both extremes replicate the
education versus competition tension that has been a part of the debate community ever since the move away from
the literary societies. In the final section of this chapter, we outline a potential solution to the divergent
perspectives that is based on tournament experimentation. Our goal is to outline a blueprint for a
community dialogue that could be replicated week in and week out at regional and national tournaments throughout
the country.

Turns racism
The use of claims of racism as a tool to achieve victory degrades civil society and destroys a
unified front against racism-a communal discussion solves best.
Hallowell 10, Billy, The Left Should Think Twice Before Charging Racism, BA in
Communications from College of Mount St. Vincent in Riverdale, Big Journalism,
http://bigjournalism.com/author/bhallowell/
Undoubtedly, any and all political parties can have racist adherents, as racism crosses cultural and ideological
boundaries. That in mind, both recent and historical events should, at the least, cause liberals to think twice before
making hypocritical claims. Furthermore, Blumenthal and his minions would do well to build arguments based on
fact and ideological flow, rather than resorting to base and inflammatory accusations. Utilizing race as a tool to
disarm the opposing partys micro-arguments is a weak-minded and dangerous strategy. In terms
of contemporary analysis, this piece in no way attempts to support the notion that racism no longer exists; thats just
silly. American society, both past and present, has been gravely stained by horrific acts of hate and
racially-motivated suppression. That said, the lefts shameful tactics constitute an assault on civility,
racial unity and the practice of practical discussion and debate. Shameful, inappropriate and
counterproductive.

And crushing civil society undoes all checks on the worst forms of racism-genocide.
Rummel 95 (Rudolph Rummel, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Univ. of Hawaii, 95 [Journal of Conflict Resolution
March, Democide Power, Genocide, p. 23])
From 1900 to 1987, state, quasi-state, and stateless groups have killed in democide (genocide, massacres,
extrajudicial executions, and the like) nearly 170,000,000 people. Case studies and quantitative analysis
show that ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, economic development, levels of education, and cultural differences
do not account for this killing. Rather, democide is best explained by the degree to which a regime is
empowered along a democratic to totalitarian dimension and, second, the extent to which it is
characteristically involved in war or rebellion.