CRIMINAL LAW CASES

SELF- DEFENSE
ALEXANDER P. RUGAS, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
January14, 2004
Facts:
At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol was conversing
with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in barangay Taclobo, San Fernando,
Romblon, when the accused Alexander P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to
know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his stomach. He ran and shouted for help. Somebody
helped him in boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital where he was treated. His medical
certificate showed that he had a stab wound which was fatal on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen.
Rafol could have died of severe hemorrhage if no surgical operation was done. He also had a second stab
wound at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh but it was not fatal. He spent a total of P25,390.00 as a
result of these injuries he sustained.
Crime Committed: Frustrated Homicide
Contention of the Accused:
He was just trying to defend himself and that there wasunlawful aggression on the part of Rafol when the latter
him on the eyebrow.
Held:
Self-defense cannot be availed of because there was no unlawful aggression onthe part of Rafol. Rugas, not
Rafol was the unlawful aggressor. The essential requisitesof self- defense are:(a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim;(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it;(c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Rugas reliance on the Supreme Courts ruling in People v. Sabio, is misplaced. In thatcase, the Court ruled
that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression since the facerepresents a person and his dignity. Slapping
the face of a person is a serious personalattack; it is a physical assault, coupled with a willful disgrace, nay, a
defiance, of an individuals personality;and it may, therefore, be frequently regarded as placing in real danger
a persons dignity, rights and safety.In this case, there is no evidence thatthe victim slapped the petitioner. The
petitioner merely claimed that he was hit on hiseyebrow which the trial court and the Court of Appeals found to
be baseless. . Thisreliance on People v. Sabio to sustain the claim that the petitioner intended to defendhis
honor, is inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himselffrom an imminent physical
assault when the latter pulled out a knife. This is alsoinconsistent with the fact that the victim was stabbed
three times.
The accused never suffered even a slight injury thus, the physical facts in the instant case reveals
thataccused did not act in self-defense.

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice
mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if
they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher
and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and
to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his
person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed
a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the
courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of
the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership
of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is
accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before
time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation
at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion
and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to
kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.
249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to
the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has
already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.


battered woman syndrome
People v. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000


FACTS:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing his legitimate husband Ben Genosa and with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted the penalty of death. The case was elevated to the SC
for automatic review.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by expert
psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim of self-defense on the
theory of battered woman syndrome.

The SC remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological/psychiatric
opinion on the plea of battered woman syndrome.

Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, who testified that
Marivic "fits the profile of a battered woman" and by Dr. Alfredo Parajillo, a psychiatrist, who "explained that
with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
beaten at that time" and that at the time Marivic killed her husband, her "mental condition was that she was
"re-experiencing the trauma.' That the "re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes x x x."

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not appelant acted in self-defense.
2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

HELD:

1) The SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit:

a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner.

b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force
in order to save her life.

c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily immediate and actual--grave harm
to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.

2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that
preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant's aggression.


FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. DELIMA [46 Phil. 738 (1922)]
Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in thehouse of Jorge Alegria,
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance.Delima ordered his surrender but Napoleon
answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didnt hit Napoleon. The
criminal tried to ranaway, not throwing his weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima was tried
andconvicted for homicide; he appealed.Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held
that the killing wasdone in performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and
hisdisobedience with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action was justified bythe circumstances.
People vs. Oanis
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, defendant-
appellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:
Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary
Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene,
and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada
Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour.
Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door, they simultaneously fired at him.
Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.
It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue:
Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in
making an arrest.
o Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in
the fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity.