A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities De nni s A. ~' " ' ~ J l o l a
ABSTRACT. This article details the personal involvement of the author in the early stages of the infamous Pinto fire case. The paper first presents an insider account of the context and decision envi ronment within whi ch he failed to initiate an early recall of defective vehicles. A cognitive script analysis of the personal experience is then offered as an explanation of factors that led to a decision that now is commonl y seen as a definitive study in uuethicaI corporate behavior. The main analytical thesis is that script schemas that were guiding cognition and action at the time pre- cluded consideration of issues in ethical terms because the scripts did not include ethical dimensions. I n t he s u mme r o f 1972 I ma de one o f t hose i mp o r - t ant t ransi t i ons i n life, t he si gni fi cance o f wh i c h becomes obvi ous onl y i n ret rospect . I l eft academe wi t h a BS i n Engi neer i ng Science and an MBA t o ent er t he wor l d o f bi g business. I j o i n e d For d Mot or Co mp a n y at Wo r l d Headquar t er s i n De a r bor n Mi chi gan, ful fi l l i ng a l ong- s t andi ng dr e a m t o wo r k i n t he hear t o f t he aut o i ndust ry. I fel t conf i dent t hat I was i n t he r i ght pl ace at t he r i ght t i me t o ma ke a Dennis A. Gioia is Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior in the Department of Management and Organization, The Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University. Professor Gioia's primary research and writing focus of the nature and uses of complex cognitive processes by organiza- tion members and the ways that these processes affect sensemak- ing, communication, influence and organizational change. His most recent research interests have to do with the less rational, more intuitive, emotional, and political aspects of organizational life - those fascinating arenas where people in organizations tend to subvert management scholars' heartfelt attempts to have them behave more rationally. Prior to this ivory tower career, he worked in the real world as an engineering aide for Boeing Aerospace at Kennedy Space Center and as vehicle recall coordinator for Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Michigan. di fference. My i ni t i al j o b title was "Pr obl em Analyst" - a catchall label t hat superfi ci al l y descri bed wha t I wo u l d be t hi nki ng about and doi ng i n t he c omi ng years. On some deeper level, however , t he title paradoxi cal l y came t o c onnot e t he ma n y critical t hi ngs t hat I wo u l d not be t hi nki ng about and act i ng u p o n . By t hat s u mme r o f 1972 I was very. ful l o f myself. I had me t my life' s goals t o t hat poi nt wi t h some not abl e success. I had vi r t ual l y ever yt hi ng I want ed, i ncl udi ng a s t r ongl y- hel d val ue syst em t hat had l ed me t o quest i on ma n y o f t he perspect i ves and pr ac- tices I observed i n t he wor l d a r ound me. No t t he least of t hese was a p r o f o u n d distaste for t he Vi e t na m war, a distaste t hat had f ound me par t i ci - pat i ng i n vari ous demons t r at i ons against its c onduc t and speaki ng as a par t of a col l ect i ve voi ce on t he mor al and et hi cal fai l ure o f a democr at i c gover n- me n t t hat wo u l d a t t e mpt t o j us t i f y it. I also f ound mys el f i n MBA classes rai l i ng agai nst t he c onduc t o f businesses o f t he era, whose actions s t r uck :me as r angi ng f r o m i nconsi der at e t o i ndi f f er ent t o si mpl y unet hi cal . To me t he typical stance o f business s eemed t o be one of di sdai n for, r at her t han r es pon- sibility t owar d, t he society o f wh i c h t hey wer e p r o mi n e n t member s . I wa nt e d s ome t hi ng t o change. Accordi ngl y, I cul t i vat ed my social awareness; I hel d my pri nci pl es hi gh; I espoused my i nt e nt i on t o hel p a t r oubl ed wor l d; and I wor e my hai r long. By any meas ur e I was a pr ot ot ypi cal "Chi l d o f t he '60s." Ther ef or e, i t st r uck qui t e a f ew o f my fri ends i n t he MBA pr ogr a m as r at her st range t hat i was i n t he pr ogr a m at all. ("If you are so di s appoi nt ed i n business, wh y st udy business?"). Subsequent l y, t hey wer e pract i cal l y d u mb s t r u c k wh e n I accept ed t]he j o b offer f r o m Ford, appar ent l y one o f t he great p u r - veyors o f t he ver y act i ons t reviled. I c ount e r e d t hat i t was an ideal strategy, ar gui ng t hat I woul d have a Journal of Business Ethics 11: 379--389, 1992. 1992 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 380 Dennis A. Gioia greater chance o f i nfl uenci ng social change i n busi - ness i f I wor ked behi nd t he scenes on t he inside, rat her t han as a st ri dent voice on t he outside. It was clear to me t hat somebody needed t o pr od these staid compani es i nt o socially responsible action. I certainly ai med to do my part. Besides, I l i ked cars. Into the fray: setting the personal stage Predictably enough, I f ound mysel f on t he fast track at Ford, participating i n a "t our nament " type o f socialization (Van Maanen, 1978), engaged i n a compet i t i on for recogni t i on wi t h ot her MBA' s who had recent l y j oi ned t he company. And I qui ckl y became caught up i n t he game. The compa W itself was dynamic; t he envi r onment of business, especially t he auto industry, was intriguing; t he j ob was challenging and t he pay was great. The psychic rewards of wor ki ng and succeeding i n a maj or corporat i on proved unexpect edl y seductive. I really became i nvol ved i n t he j ob. Market forces (international compet i t i on) and gover nment regul at i on (vehicle safety and emissions) wer e affecting t he auto i ndust ry i n disruptive ways t hat onl y later woul d be c ommon to t he wi der business and social arena. They also pr oduced an i ndust ry and a company t hat felt buffeted, belea- guered, and t hreat ened by t he changes. The threats wer e most l y external, o f course, and l ed to a strong feeling o f we- vs- t hem, wher e we (Ford members) needed to def end ourselves against t hem (all t he out si de parties and voices demandi ng t hat we change our ways). Even at this time, an i nt ri gui ng quest i on for me was whet her I was a "we" or a "them." It was becomi ng apparent to me t hat my perspective was changing. I had l ong since cut my hair. By t he s ummer o f 1973 I was pi t ched i nt o t he t hi ck o f t he battle. I became Ford's Field Recall Coor di nat or - not a posi t i on t hat was particularly hi gh i n t he hierarchy, but one t hat wi el ded i nfl uence for beyond its level. I was i n charge of t he opera- tional coordi nat i on o f all o f t he recall campaigns current l y under way and also i n charge o f t racki ng i ncomi ng i nf or mat i on to i dent i fy devel opi ng pr ob- lems. Therefore, I was i n a posi t i on to make initial r ecommendat i ons about possible furore recalls. The most critical type of recalls wer e labeled "safety campaigns" - those t hat dealt wi t h t he possibility o f cust omer i nj ury or death. These ranged f r om straight-forward occurrences such as brake faiture and wheel s failing of f vehicles, to mor e exotic and f a i n t l y humor ous failure modes such as det achi ng axles t hat announced t hei r presence by spi nni ng forward and sl ammi ng i nt o t he startled driver' s door and speed cont rol units t hat l ocked on, and refused to disengage, as t he care accelerated wi l dl y whi l e t he spooked driver futilely t ri ed to shut i t off. Safety recall campaigns, however, also encompassed t he mor e sobering possibility o f on- boar d gasoline fires and explosions . . . . The Pi nt o case: setti ng the corporate stage In 1970 Ford i nt r oduced t he Pinto, a small car t hat was i nt ended to compet e wi t h t he t hen current challenge f r om European cars and t he omi nous presence on t he hor i zon o f Japanese manufacturers. The Pi nt o was br ought f r om i ncept i on to pr oduc- t i on i n t he record t i me o f approximately 25 mont hs (compared to t he i ndust ry average o f 43 months), a t i me frame t hat suggested t he necessity for doi ng things expediently. In addi t i on t o t he t i me pressure, t he engi neeri ng and devel opment teams were r e- qui red to adhere to t he pr oduct i on "limits of 2 000" for t he di mi nut i ve car: it was not to exceed ei t her $2 000 i n cost or 2 000 pounds i n weight. Any decisions t hat t hreat ened these targets or t he t i mi ng of t he car's i nt r oduct i on wer e discouraged. Unde r normal condi t i ons design, styling, product planning, engi neeri ng, etc., wer e compl et ed pri or to pr oduc- t i on tooling. Because o f t he foreshort ened t i me frame, however, some o f these usually sequential processes wer e execut ed i n parallel. As a consequence, t ool i ng was already wel l under way (thus "freezing" t he basic design) whe n rout i ne crash testing revealed t hat t he Pluto' s fuel t ank oft en r upt ur ed whe n struck f r om t he rear at a relatively l ow speed (31 mp h i n crash tests). Reports (revealed muc h later) showed t hat t he fuel t ank failures were t he result o f some rather marginal desi gn features. The t ank was posi t i oned bet ween t he rear bumper and t he rear axle ( a standard i ndust ry practice for t he time). Dur i ng impact, however, several studs pr ot r udi ng f r om t he rear o f t he axle housi ng woul d punct ur e holes i n t he tank; t he fuel filler neck also was likely to rip away. Spilled gasoline t hen coul d be Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics 381 ignited by sparks. Ford had in fact crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially cata- strophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank. These crash tests, however, were conducted under the guidelines of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301 which had been proposed in 1968 and strenuously opposed by the auto industry. FMVSS 301 was not actually adopted until 1976; thus, at the time of the tests, Ford was not in violation of the law. There were several possibilities for fixing the problem, including the option of redesigning the tank and its location, which would have produced tank integrity in a high-speed crash. That solution, however, was not only time consuming and expen- sive, but also usurped trunk space, which was seen as a critical competitive sales factor. One of the pro- duction modifications to the tank, however, would have cost only $11 to install, but given the tight margins and restrictions of the "limits of 2 000," there was reluctance to make even this relatively minor change. There were other reasons for not approving the change, as well, including a wide- spread industry belief that all small cars were inherently unsafe solely because of their size and weight. Another more prominent reason was a corporate belief that "safety doesn't sell." This obser- vation was attributed to Lee Iacocca and stemmed from Ford's earlier attempt to make safety a sales theme, an attempt that failed rather dismally in the marketplace. Perhaps the most controversial reason for reject- ing the production change to the gas tank, however, was Ford's use of cost-benefit analysis to justify the decision. The National Highway Traffic Safety Asso- ciation (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards. The controversial aspect in making such calculations was that they required the assignment of some specific value for a human life. In 1970, that value was deemed to be approximately $200 000 as a "cost to society" for each fatality. Ford used NHTSA's figures in estimating the costs and benefits of altering the tank production design. An internal memo, later revealed in court, indicates the follow- ing tabulations concerning potential fires (Dowie, 1977): Costs: $137 000 000 (Estimated as the costs of a production fix to all similarly designed cars and trucks with the gas tank aft of the axle (12 500 000 vehicles $11/vehicle)) Benefits: 849 530 000 (Estimated as the savings from preventing (180 projected deaths x $200 000/death) + (180 projected burn injuries x $67 000/injury) + (2 100 burned cars $700/car)) The cost-benefit decision was then construed as straightforward: No production fix would be under- taken. The philosophical and ethical implications of assigning a financial value for hmnan life or dis- figurement do not seem to have been a major consideration in reaching this decision. Pintos and personal experience When I took over the Recall Coordinator's .job in 1973 I inherited the oversight of about 100 active recall campaigns, more than half of which were safety-related. These ranged from minimal in size (replacing front wheels that were likely to break on 12 heavy trucks) to maximal (repairing the power steering pump on millions of cars). In addition, there were quite a number of safety problems that were under consideration as candidates for addition to the recall list. (Actually, "problem" was a word whose public use was forbidden by the legal office at the time, even in service bulletins, because it suggested corporate admission of culpability. "Condition" was the sanctioned catchword.) In addition to these potential recall candidates, there were ma W files containing field reports of alleged component failure (another forbidden word) that had led to accidents, and in some cases, passenger injury. Beyond these existing files, I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low speed accidents. Was there a problem? Not as far as I was concerned. My cue for labeling a case as a problem either required high frequencies of occurrence or directly- traceable causes. I had little time for speculative 382 De n n i s A . Gi oi a cont empl at i on on pot ent i al probl ems t hat di d not fit a pat t er n t hat suggested known courses of act i on l eadi ng to possible r ecal l I do, however, r e me mbe r bei ng di squi et ed by a field r epor t accompani ed by graphic, det ai l ed phot os of t he remai ns of a bur ned- out Pi nt o i n whi ch several peopl e had died. Al - t hough t hat r epor t became part o f my file, I di d not flag it as any special case. It is difficult to convey t he over whel mi ng c om- plexity and pace of t he j ob of keepi ng t rack of so many active or pot ent i al recall campaigns. It remai ns t he busiest, most i nf or mat i on- f i l l ed j ob I have ever hel d or woul d want to hold. Each case r equi r ed a myr i ad o f i nf or mat i on- gat her i ng and execut i on stages. I di st i nct l y r emember t hat t he i nf or mat i on- processing demands led me to confuse t he facts o f one pr obl em case wi t h anot her on several occasions because t he t el l -t al e signs o f recall candi dat e cases wer e so similar. I t hought o f mysel f as a f i r eman - a f i r eman who perfect l y fit t he descri pt i on by one o f my colleagues: "In this office everyt hi ng is a crisis. You onl y have t i me to put out t he big fires and spit on t he little ones." By those standards t he Pi nt o pr obl em was distinctly a little one. It is also i mpor t ant to convey t he mut i ng of emot i on i nvol ved i n t he Recall Coordi nat or' s j ob. I r emember cont empl at i ng t he fact t hat my j ob literally i nvol ved l i f e- and- deat h matters. I was some- times responsible for fi ndi ng and fixing cars NOW, because somebody' s life mi ght depend on it. I t ook i t very seriously. Earl y i n t he j ob, I somet i mes woke up at ni ght wonder i ng whet her I had covered all t he bases. Had I left some u n k n o wn person at risk because I had not t hought o f somet hi ng? That soon faded, however, and o f necessity t he consi derat i on o f people' s lives became a fairly r emoved, dispassionate process. To do t he .job "well" t here was little r oom for emot i on. Al l owi ng it t o surface was pot ent i al l y paralyzing and pr event ed rational decisions about whi c h cases t o r e c omme nd for recall. On mor al grounds I kne w I coul d r e c omme nd most of t he vehicles on my safety t racki ng list for recall (and risk earni ng t he label of a "bl eedi ng heart"). On practical grounds, I recogni zed t hat people i mpl i ci t l y accept risks i n cars. We coul d not recall all cars wi t h pot e nt i al probl ems and stay i n business. I l earned to be responsive to those cases t hat suggested an i mmi - nent , dangerous probl em. I shoul d also note, t hat t he count r y was i n t he mi dst o f its first, and worst, oil crisis at this di ne. The effects of t he crisis had cast a pall over Ford and t he rest o f t he aut omobi l e industry. Ford' s pr oduct line, wi t h t he perhaps not abl e except i on o f t he Pi nt o and Maveri ck small cars, was not wel l -sui t ed to deal i ng wi t h t he crisis. Layoffs wer e i mmi ne nt for many people. Recalling t he Pi nt o i n this cont ext woul d have damaged one of t he few t r ump cards t he company had (although, qui t e f r an~y, I do not r e me mbe r overt l y t hi nki ng about t hat issue). Pi nt o reports cont i nued to t ri ckl e in, but at such a slow rate t hat t hey really di d not capt ure part i cul ar at t ent i on relative to ot her, mor e pressing safety problems. However, I later saw a cr umpl ed, bur ned car at a Ford depot wher e alleged pr obl em c om- ponent s and vehicles wer e del i vered for i nspect i on and analysis (a place known as t he "Chamber o f Horrors" by some o f t he peopl e who wor ked there). The revul si on on seeing this i nci nerat ed hul k was i mmedi at e and pr of ound. Soon afterwards, and despite t he fact t hat t he file was ver y sparse, I r ecom- me nde d t he Pi nt o case for pr el i mi nar y depar t ment - level revi ew concer ni ng possible recall. Aft er t he usual r ound o f discussion about criteria and j ust i f i - cat i on for recall, everyone vot ed against r ecom- mendi ng recall - i ncl udi ng me. It di d not fit t he pat t er n o f recallable standards; t he evi dence was not over whel mi ng t hat t he car was defective i n some way, so t he case was actually fairly straightforward. It was a good business decision, even i f people mi ght be dying. ( We di d not t hen know about t he pr e- pr oduct i on crash test data t hat suggested a hi gh rate of t ank failures i n "normal " accidents (c, Perrow, 1984) or an abnor mal failure mode.) Later, t he existence o f t he crash test data di d become known wi t hi n Ford, whi c h suggested t hat t he Pi nt o mi ght actually have a recallable probl em. Thi s i nf or mat i on l ed to a reconsi derat i on of t he case wi t hi n our office. The data, however, pr ompt ed a compar i son o f t he Pinto' s survivability i n a rear end acci dent wi t h t hat o f ot her compet i t ors' small cars. These compari sons revealed t hat al t hough ma ny cars i n this subcompact class suffered appalling def or ma- t i on i n r dat i vel y l ow speed collisions, t he Pi nt o was mer el y t he worst of a bad lot. Fur t her mor e, t he gap bet ween t he Pi nt o and t he compet i t i on was not dramat i c i n t erms of t he speed at whi c h fuel t ank r upt ur e was l i kel y to occur. On t hat basis i t woul d be difficult to j ust i fy t he recall o f cars t hat wer e Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics 383 comparable with others on the market. In the face of even more compelling evidence that people were probably going to die in this car, I again included myself in a group of decision makers who voted not to recommend recall to the higher levels of the organization. Coda to the corporate case Subsequent to my departure from Ford in 1975, reports of Pinto fires escalated, attracting increasing media attention, almost all of it critical of Ford. Anderson and Wbitten (1976) revealed the internal memos concerning the gas tank problem and ques- tioned how the few dollars saved per car could be justified when human lives were at stake. Shortly thereafter, a scathing article by Dowie (1977) at- tacked not only the Pinto's design, but also accused Ford of gross negligence, stonewalling, and unethical corporate conduct by alleging that Ford knowingly sold "firetraps" after willfully calculating the cost of lives against profits (see also Gatewood and Carrolt, 1983). Dowie's provocative quote speculating on "how long the Ford Motor Company would con- tinue to market lethal cars were Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca serving 20 year terms in Leavenworth for consumer homicide" (1977, p. 32) was particu- larly effective in focusing attention on the case. Public sentiment edged toward labeling Ford as socially deviant because management was seen as knowing that the car was defecfve, choosing profit over lives, resisting demands to fix the car, and apparently showing no public remorse (S~adgert and Farrell, 1980-8 I). Shortly after Dowie's (1977) expose, NHTSA initiated its own investigation. Then, early in 1978 a jury awarded a Pinto burn victim $125 million in punitive damages (later reduced to $6.6 million , a j udgment upheld on an appeal that prompted the judge to assert that "Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety" (quoted in Culten et al., 1987, p. 164)). A siege atmosphere emerged at Ford. Insiders characterized the mounting media campaign as "hysterical" and "a crusade against us" (personal communications). The crisis deepened. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA issued a formal determination that the Pinto was defective. Ford then launched a reluctant recall of att 1971--1976 cars (those built for the 1977 model year were equipped with a production ~'ix prompted by the adoption of the FMVSS 301 gas tank standard). Ford hoped that the issue would then recede, but worse was yet to come. The culmination of the case and the demise of the Pinto itself began in Indiana on August 10, 1978, when three teenage girls died in a fire triggered after their 1973 Pinto was hit from behind by a van. A grand jury took the unheard of step of indicting Ford on charges of reckless homicide (Cullen et aL, 1987). Because of the precedent-setting possibilities for all manufacturing industries, Ford assembled a formidable legal team headed by Watergate prose- cutor James Neal to defend itself at the trial The trial was a media event; it was the first time that a corporation was tried for atleged criminal behavior. After a protracted, acrimonious courtroom battle that included vivid clashes among the opposing attorneys, surprise witnesses, etc., the jury uldmately found in favor of Ford. Ford had dodged a buI1et in the form of a consequential legal precedent, but because of the negative publicity of the case and the charges of corporate crime and ethical deviance, the conduct of manufacturing businesses was altered, probably forever. As a relatively minor footnote to the case, Ford ceased production of the Pinto. Coda to the personal case In the intervening years since my early involvement with the Pinto fire case, I have given repeated consideration to my role in it. Although most of tile ethically questionable actions that have been cited in the press are associated with Ford's intentional stonewalling after it was clear that the Pinto was defective (see Cullen eta[., 1986; Dowie, 1977; Gatewood and Carroll, 1983) - and thus postdate my involvement with the case and the company - I still nonetheless wonder about my own culpability. Why" didn' t I see the gravity of the problem and its ethical overtones? What happened to the value system I carried with me into Ford? Should I have acted differently, given what I knew then? The experience with mysdf has sometimes not been pleasant. Somehow, it seems I should have done something different that might have made a differ- ence. 384 De n n i s A . Gi oi a As a consequence o f this l i ne of t hi nki ng and feeling, some years ago I deci ded to const ruct a "living case" out of my experi ence wi t h t he Pi nt o fire pr obl em for use i n my MBA classes. The wr i t t en case descri pt i on contains ma ny o f t he facts det ai l ed above; t he analytical task o f t he class is to ask appropri at e questions o f me as a figure i n t he case to reveal t he cent ral issues involved. It is somewhat of a t ryi ng experi ence to get t hr ough these classes. Aft er get t i ng to know me for most of t he semester, and t hen fi ndi ng out t hat I di d not vot e to r e c omme nd recall, st udent s are oft en i ncredul ous, even angry at me for apparent l y not havi ng lived what I have been teaching. To be fair and even- handed here, ma ny students under st and my actions i n t he cont ext o f t he t i mes and t he attitudes preval ent t hen. Ot hers, however, are ver y di sappoi nt ed t hat I appear to have failed dur i ng a t i me o f trial. Consequent l y, I am accused of bei ng a charl at an and ot herwi se vilified by those who mai nt ai n t hat et hi cal and mor al pr i n- ciples shoul d have prevai l ed i n this case no mat t er what t he mi t i gat i ng circumstances. Those are t he ones t hat hurt . Those are also t he ones, however, t hat keep t he case and its lessons alive i n my mi n d and cause me to have an on- goi ng di al ogue wi t h mys el f about it. It is fascinating to me t hat for several years after I first conduct ed t he living case wi t h mysel f as t he focus, I r emai ned convi nced t hat I had made t he "right" deci si on i n not r e c omme ndi ng recall o f t he cars. In l i ght of t he times and t he evi dence available, I t hought I had pur sued a reasonable course of action. Mor e recently, however, I have come to t hi nk t hat I really shoul d have done ever yt hi ng I coul d t o get those cars of f t he road. In ret rospect I know t hat i n t he cont ext of t he t i mes my actions wer e legal (they wer e all wel t wi t hi n t he f r amewor k o f t he law); t hey probabl y also wer e et hi cal accordi ng to most prevailing definitions (they wer e i n accord wi t h accept ed professional standards and codes of conduct); t he maj or concer n for me is whe t he r t hey we r e moral (in t he sense o f adher i ng to some hi gher standards of i nner con- science and convi ct i on about t he "right" actions to take). Thi s si mpl e t ypol ogy implies t hat I had passed at least t wo hurdl es on a personal c ont i nuum t hat ranged f r om mor e rigorous, but arguabl y less signifi- cant criteria, to less rigorous, but mor e personally, organizationally, and perhaps societally significant standards: x x ? Legal Ethical Moral It is t hat last cr i t er i on t hat remai ns t roubl esome. Perhaps these reflections are all j us t personal revisionist history. Aft er all, I am still st uck in. my cognitive structures, as everyone is. I do not t hi nk these concerns are all retrospective reconst ruct i on, however. Anot her telling pi ece o f i nf or mat i on is this: The ent i re t i me I was dealing wi t h t he Pi nt o fire probl em, I owned a Pi nt o (!). I even sold it to my sister. Wh a t does t hat say? What happened here? I, o f course, have some t hought s about my experi - ence wi t h this damni ngl y visible case. At t he risk of breaki ng some o f t he accepted rules of scholarly analysis, rat her t han engagi ng i n t he usual compr e- hensive, dense, ar ms- l engt h critique, I woul d instead like to offer a r at her selective and subjective focus on cert ai n characteristics of h u ma n i nf or mat i on pr o- cessing rel evant to this ki nd o f situation, o f whi c h I was my own unwi t t i ng victim. I make no cl ai m t hat my analysis necessarily "explains mor e variance" t han ot her possible explanations. I do t hi nk t hat this selective vi ew is enl i ght eni ng i n t hat it offers an alternative expl anat i on for some et hi cal l y quest i on- able actions i n business. The subjective stance adopt ed i n t he analysis is i nt ent i onal also. Thi s case obviously stems f r om a series of personal experiences, accounts, and i nt r o- spections. The analytical style is i nt ended to be consistent wi t h t he self-based case example; t her e- fore, it appears to be less "formal" t han t he typical obj ecf vi st mode of explanation. I suspect t hat my chosen focus wi l l be fairly non- obvi ous to t he r eader fami l i ar wi t h t he ethical l i t erat ure (as i t typically is to t he ethical actor). Al t hough this analysis mi ght be j udge d as somewhat self-serving, I nonet hel ess believe t hat it provides an i nformat i ve expl anat i on for some o f t he et hi cal foibles we see enact ed ar ound US. Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics 385 To me, there are two major issues to address. First, how could my value system apparently have flip-flopped in the relatively short space of 1-2 years? Secondly, how could I have failed to take action on a retrospectively obvious safety problem when I was in. the perfect position to do so? To begin, I would like to consider several possible explanations for my thoughts and actions (or lack (hereof) during the early stages of the Pinto fire case. One explanation is that I was simply revealed as a phony when the chips were down; that my previous values were not strongly inculcated; that I was all bluster, not particularly ethical, and as a result acted expediently when confronted with a reality test of those values. In other words, I turned traitor to my own expressed values. Another explanation is that I was simply iwfimidated; in the face of strong pres- sure to heal to company preferences, I folded - put ethical concerns aside, or at least traded them for a monumental guilt trip and did what anybody would do to keep a good job. A third explanation is that I was following a strictly utilitarian set of decision criteria (Valasquez et aI., 1983) and, predictably enough, opted for a personal form of Ford's own cost-benefit analysis, with similar disappointing re- suits. Another explanation might suggest that the interaction of my stage of moral development (Kohlberg, 1969) and the culture and decision environment at Ford led me to think about and act upon an ethical dilemma in a fashion that reflected a lower level of actual moral development than i espoused for myself (Trevino, t986 and this issue). Yet another explanation is that t was co-opted; rather than working from the inside to change a lumbering system as I had intended, the tables were turned and the system beat me at my own game. More charitably, perhaps, it is possible that I simply was a good person making bad ethical choices because of the corporate milieu (Gellerman, 1986). I doubt tha~ this list is exhaustive. I am quite sure that cynics could match my own MBA students' labels, which in the worst case include phrases like "moral failure" and "doubly reprehensible because you were in a position to make a difference." I believe, however, on the basis of a number of years of work on social cognition in organizations that a viable explanation is one that is not quite so melo- dramatic. It is an explanation that rests on a recogni- tion that even the best-intentioned organization members organize information into cognitive struc- tures or schemas that serve as (fallible) mental templates for handling incoming information and as guides for acting upon it. Of the ma W schemas that have been hypothesized to exist, the one that is most relevant to my experience at Ford is the notion of a script (Abelson, 1976, I98I). My central thesis is this: My own sckematized (scripted) knowledge influenced me to perceive recall issues in terms of the prevailing decision environment and to unconsciously overlook key~atures tithe Pinto case, mainly because they did not f i t an existing script. Altho,gh the outcomes of the case carry retrospectively obvious ethical overtones, the schemas driving my perceptions and actions precluded consideration of the issues in ethical terms because the scripts did not include ethical dimensions. Script schemas A schema is a cognitive framework that people use to impose structure upon information, situations, and expectations to facilitate understanding (Gioia and Poole, 1984; Taylor and Crocker, 1981). Schemas derive from consideration of prior experiei~-ce or vicarious learning that results in the formation of "organized" knowledge - knowledge that, once formed, precludes the necessity for further active cognition. As a consequence, such structured knowl- edge allows virtually effortless interpretation of information and events (c, Canter and Mischel, 1979). A script is a specialized type of schema that retains knowledge of actions appropriate for specific situations and contexts (Abelson, 1976, 1981). One of the most important characteristics of scripts !is that they simultaneously provide a cognitive framework for understanding information and events as we.ll as a guide to appropriate behavior to deal with the situa- don faced. They thus seree as linkages between cognition and action (Gioia and Manz, 1985). The structuring of knowledge in scripted fi~rm is a fundamental human information processing te>_d- ency that in malay ways results in a relatively closed cognitive system that influences both perception and action. Scripts, like all schemas, operate on the basis of prototypes, which are abstract representations that contain the main features or characteristics; of a 386 Denni s A. Gi oi a gi ven knowl edge category (e.g., "safety problems"). Protoscripts (Gioia and Poole, 1984) s e r v e as t em- plates against whi ch i ncomi ng i nf or mat i on can be assessed. A pat t ern i n cur r ent i nf or mat i on t hat general l y mat ches t he t empl at e associated wi t h a given script signals t hat active t hought and analysis is not required. Unde r these condi t i ons t he ent i re existing script can be called fort h and enact ed aut omat i cal l y and unconsciously, usually wi t hout adj ust ment for subtle differences i n i nf or mat i on patterns t hat mi ght be i mport ant . Gi ven t he compl exi t y o f t he organizational world, i t is obvious t hat t he schemat i zi ng or scripting o f knowl edge i mpl i es a great i nf or mat i on processing advantage - a deci si on maker need not actively t hi nk about each new present at i on o f i nformat i on, situations, or problems; t he mode o f handl i ng such probl ems has already been wor ked out i n advance and r emanded to a wor ki ng stock of knowl edge hel d i n i ndi vi dual (or organizational) memor y. Scripted knowl edge saves a significant amount o f ment al work, a savings t hat i n fact prevents t he cogni t i ve paralysis t hat woul d inevitably come f r om t ryi ng to treat each specific instance o f a class o f probl ems as a uni que case t hat requires cont empl at i on. Scripted decision maki ng is t hus efficient decision maki ng but not necessarily good decision maki ng (Gioia and Poole, 1984). Of course, every advantage comes wi t h its own set of bui l t - i n disadvantages. Ther e is a price to pay for scripted knowl edge. On t he one hand, existing scripts lead peopl e to selectively perceive i nf or ma- t i on t hat is consistent wi t h a script and thus to i gnor e anomal ous i nformat i on. Conversely, i f t here is missing i nformat i on, t he gaps i n knowl edge are filled wi t h expected features supplied by t he script (Bower et al., 1979; Graesser et al., 1980). In some cases, a pat t ern t hat mat ches an existing script, except for some key differences, can be "tagged" as a distinctive case (Graesser et al., 1979) and thus be made mor e memorabl e. In t he worst case scenario, however, a situation t hat does not fit t he characteris- tics o f t he scripted perspective for handl i ng pr obl em cases of t en is si mpl y not noticed. Scripts thus offer a viable expl anat i on for why experi enced decision makers (perhaps especially experi enced deci si on ma k- ers) t end to overl ook what others woul d construe as obvious factors i n maki ng a decision. Gi ven t he relatively rare o c c u r r e n c e o f t rul y novel i nformat i on, t he nat ure o f script processing implies that it is a default mode o f organizational cognition. That is, instead o f spendi ng t he pr edomi nance o f t hei r ment al energy t hi nki ng i n some active fashion, decision makers mi ght bet t er be characterized as typically not t hi nki ng, i.e., dealing wi t h i nf or mat i on i n a mode t hat is akin to "cruising on aut omat i c pilot" (cf., Gioia, 1986). The scripted vi ew casts decision makers as needi ng some sort of pr od i n t he f or m o f novel or unexpect ed i nf or mat i on to ki ck t hem i nt o a t hi nki ng mode - a prod that oft en does not come because o f the weal t h o f similar data t hat t hey must process. Therefore, instead o f focusing what peopl e pay at t ent i on to, i t mi ght be mor e enl i ght eni ng to focus on what t hey do not pay at t ent i on to. Pinto problem perception and scripts It is illustrative to consider my situation i n handl i ng t he early stages of t he Pi nt o fire case i n l i ght of script theory. Wh e n I was deal i ng wi t h t he first t ri ckl i ng- i n of" field reports t hat mi ght have suggested a significant pr obl em wi t h t he Pinto, t he reports wer e essentially similar to many others t hat I was dealing wi t h (and dismissing) all t he time. The sort o f i nfor- mat i on t hey contained, whi ch di d not convey en- ough prototypical features to capture my attention, never got past my screening script. I had seen this type of i nf or mat i on pat t ern before (hundreds o f times!); I was maki ng this ki nd of deci si on aut omat i - cally every day. I had trained mysel f to respond to prototypical cues, and these di dn' t fit t he relevant prot ot ype for crisis cases. (Yes, t he Pi nt o reports fit a prot ot ype - but i t was a prot ot ype for "normal accidents" t hat di d not deviate significantly f r om expected problems). The frequency of t he reports relative to other, mor e serious probl ems (i.e., those t hat displayed mor e characteristic features of safety problems) also di d not pass my scripted criteria for singling out t he Pi nt o case. Consequent l y, I l ooked ri ght past t hem. Over l ooki ng uncharacteristic cues also was exac- erbated by t he nat ure o f t he j ob. The over whel mi ng i nf or mat i on overl oad t hat characterized t he role as wel l as its hect i c pace actually forced a greater reliance on scripted responses. It was impossible to handl e t he job requi rement s wi t hout relying on some Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics 387 sort o f aut omat i c way o f assessing whe t he r a case deserved active at t ent i on. Ther e was so mu c h to do and so mu c h i nf or mat i on to at t end to t hat t he onl y way to deal wi t h it was by means of schemat i c processing. In fact, t he one anomal y i n t he case t hat mi ght have cued me to gravity of t he pr obl em (the field r epor t accompani ed by graphi c phot ographs) still di d not di st i ngui sh t he pr obl em as one t hat was distinctive enough to snap me out o f my standard response mode and tag i t as a failure t hat deserved closer moni t or i ng. Even t he presence of an emot i onal component t hat mi ght have shor t - ci r cui t ed standard script pr o- cessing instead became part of t he script itself. Mont hs o f squel chi ng t he di st urbi ng emot i ons asso- ciated wi t h serious safety probl ems soon made muf f l ed emot i ons a standard (and not ver y salient) c ompone nt o f t he script for handl i ng any safety probl em. Thi s observation, t hat emot i on was mut e d by experience, and t herefore de- emphasi zed i n t he script, differs f r om Fiske's (1982) wi del y accepted posi t i on t hat emot i on is tied to t he top o f a schema (i.e., is t he most salient and i ni t i al l y-t apped aspect of schemat i c processing). On t he basis o f my experi - en.ce, I woul d argue t hat for organi zat i on member s t rai ned to cont rol emot i ons to per f or m t he j ob rote (cf., Pitre, 1990), emot i on is ei t her not a part o f t he i nt ernal i zed script, or at best becomes a di f f i cul t - t o- access part of any script for j ob performance. The one i nst ance o f emot i on penet r at i ng t he operat i ng script was t he revul si on t hat swept over me at t he sight o f t he bur ned vehi cl e at t he r et ur n depot. Tha t event was so st rong t hat it pr ompt ed me to put t he case up for preliminary- consi derat i on (in t heoret i cal terms, it pr ompt ed me cogni t i vel y to "tag" t he Pi nt o case as a pot ent i al l y distinctive one). I soon "came to my senses," however, wh e n rational consi derat i on of t he pr obl em characteristics sug- gested t hat t hey di d not meet t he scripted criteria t hat wer e consensually shared among member s o f t he Field Recall Office. At t he pr el i mi nar y revi ew ot her member s o f t he deci si on team, enact i ng t hei r own scripts i n t he absence o f my emot i onal experi - ence, wonder ed why I had even br ought t he case up. To me this meet i ng demonst r at ed t hat even wh e n cont rol l ed analytic i nf or mat i on processing occurred, i t was nonet hel ess based on pri or schemat i zat i on o f i nformat i on. In ot her words, even wh e n i nf or mat i on processing was not aut omat i cal l y executed, i t still depended upon schemas (cf., Gioia, 1986). As a result o f t he social const r uct i on o f t he situation, I ended up agreei ng wi t h my colleagues and vot i ng not to recall. The r emai ni ng maj or issue to be deal t wi t h, o f course, concerns t he apparent shift i n my values. In a per i od of less t han t wo years I appeared to change my stripes and adopt t he cul t ural values o f t he organization. Ho w di d t hat apparent shift occur? Again, scripts are relevant. I woul d argue t hat my pr e- For d values for changi ng corporat e &ne r i c a wer e bona fide. I had i nt ernal i zed values for doi ng what was ri ght as I t hen under st ood "righmess" i n grand terms. They" key is, however, t hat I had not i nt ernal i zed a script for enact i ng those values i n any specific cont ext outside my- l i mi t ed experience. The insider' s vi ew at Ford, o f course, provi ded me wi t h a specific and i mmedi at e cont ext for devel opi ng such a script. Scripts are f or med f r om salient experi ence and t here was no mor e salient experience i n my relatively young life t han j oi ni ng a maj or corpora- t i on and movi ng qui ckl y i nt o a position o f clear and present responsibility. The strongest possible par am- eters for script f or mat i on wer e all there, not onl y because o f t he j ob rol e specifications, but also f r om t he corporat e cul t ure. Organi zat i onal cul t ure, i n one very power f ul sense, amount s to a col l ect i on o f scripts wr i t large, Di d I sell out? No. We r e my cognitive st ruct ures altered by salient experience? Wi t h o u t question. Scripts for under st andi ng and act i on wer e f or med and r ef or med i n a relatively short t i me i n a way t hat not onl y al t ered percept i ons o f issues but also t he likely" actions associated wi t h those al t ered perceptions. I mi ght charact eri ze t he differing cognitive struc--- tures as "outsider" versus "insider" scripts. I vi ew t he m also as "idealist" versus "realist" scripts. I mi ght f ur t her not e t hat t he out si der/ i deal i st script was one t hat was mor e i ndi vi dual l y-based t han t he in.sider/ realist script, whi c h was mor e collective and subject to t he i nfl uence of t he corporat e mi l i eu and culture. Personal i dent i t y as capt ured i n t he revised script became mu c h mor e corporat e t han individual. Given t hat scripts are socially const ruct ed and r econ- st ruct ed cognitive structures, it is underst andabl e t hat t hei r cont ent and process woul d be mu c h mor e responsive to t he corporat e cul t ure, because of its saliency and i mmedi acy. The recall coordi nat or' s j ob was serious business. The scripts associated wi t h i t i nf l uenced me :much 388 De n n i s A . Gi oi a mor e t han I i nf l uenced it. Before I went to Ford I woul d have argued st rongl y t hat Ford had an ethical obl i gat i on to recall. After I left Ford I now argue and t each t hat Ford had an ethical obl i gat i on to recall. But , wh i l e I was there, I percei ved no st rong obligation to recall and I r e me mbe r no strong ethical overtones to t he case whatsoever. It was a very st rai ght forward decision, dr i ven by domi na nt scripts for t he t i me, place, and context. Whi ther ethics and scripts? Most model s o f ethical deci si on maki ng i n organi za- tions i mpl i ci t l y assume t hat peopl e recogni ze and t hi nk about a mor al or et hi cal di l emma wh e n t hey are conf r ont ed wi t h one (cf., Kohl berg, 1969 and Trevi no' s revi ew i n this issue). I call this seemi ngl y f undament al assumpt i on i nt o question. The unex- pl or ed ethical issue for me is t he arguabl y preval ent case whe r e organizational representatives are not aware t hat t hey are deal i ng wi t h a pr obl em t hat mi ght have ethical overtones. I f t he case involves a familiar class o f probl ems or issues, it is l i kel y t o be handl ed via existing cognitive structures or scripts - scripts t hat typically i ncl ude no ethical component i n t hei r cognitive content. Al t hough we mi ght hope t hat peopl e i n charge of i mpor t ant decisions like vehi cl e safety recalls mi ght engage i n active, logical analysis and consi der t he subtleties i n t he ma ny di fferent situations t hey face, t he cont ext of t he decisions and t hei r necessary rel i ance on schemat i c processing tends to pr ecl ude such consi derat i on (cf., Gioia, 1989). Account i ng for t he subtleties o f ethical consi der at i on i n wor k situa- tions t hat are typically handl ed by schema-based processing is very di ffi cul t i ndeed. Scripts are bui l t out o f situations t hat are nor mal , not those t hat are abnormal , i l l -st ruct ured, or unusual ( whi ch of t en can charact eri ze ethical domains). The ambi gui t i es associated wi t h most ethical di l emmas i mpl y t hat such situations demand a "cust om" decision, whi c h means t hat t he i ncl usi on of an. ethical di mens i on as a c ompone nt o f an evolving script is not easy to accomplish. Ho w mi ght ethical considerations be i nt ernal i zed as part of t he script for under st andi ng and action? It is easier to say what wi l l not be likely to wor k t han wha t will. Clearly, mer e ment i on of ethics i n pol i cy or t rai ni ng manual s wi l l not do t he j ob. Even ex- hort at i ons to be concer ned wi t h ethics i n decision maki ng are sel dom likely to mi grat e i nt o t he script. Just as clearly, codes of ethics typically wi l l not work. They are t oo oft en cast at a level of general i t y t hat can not be associated wi t h any specific script. Fur - t her mor e, for all practical purposes, codes of ethics oft en are stated i n a way t hat makes t he m "cont ext - free," whi ch makes t he m vi rt ual l y impossible to associate wi t h active scripts, whi c h always are con- t ext -bound. Tactics for script devel opment t hat have mor e pot ent i al involve l earni ng or t rai ni ng t hat con- centrates on exposure to i nf or mat i on or model s t hat explicitly display a focus on ethical considerations. Thi s i mpl i es t hat ethics be i ncl uded i n j ob descri p- tions, management devel opment training, me nt or - ing, etc. Tactics for script revision i nvol ve l earni ng or t rai ni ng t hat concent r at e on "script-breaking" exam- pies. Or gani zat i on member s mus t be exposed ei t her t o vicarious or personal experiences t hat i nt er r upt tacit knowl edge o f "appropriate" act i on so t hat script revision can be initiated. Tr ai ni ng scenarios, and especially role playing, t hat por t r ay expected se- quences t hat are t hen i nt er r upt ed to call explicit at t ent i on to ethical issues can be tagged by t he percei ver as requi ri ng attention. This tactic amount s to installing a decision node i n t he revised scripts t hat tells t he act or " Now t hi nk" (Abelson, 1981). Onl y by means of similar scri pt -breaki ng strategies can existing cognitive structures be modi f i ed to accommodat e t he necessary cycles of aut omat i c and cont r ol l ed processing (cf., Louis and Sutton, 1991). The upshot o f t he scripted vi ew o f organizational under st andi ng and behavi or is bot h an encour age- me nt and an i ndi ct ment o f peopl e facing situations laced wi t h ethical overtones. It is encour agi ng because i t suggests t hat organizational decision makers are not necessarily l acki ng i n ethical st and- ards; t hey are si mpl y fallible i nf or mat i on processors who fail t o not i ce t he ethical i mpl i cat i ons o f a usual way o f handl i ng issues. It is an i ndi ct ment because ethical di mensi ons are not usually a cent ral feature of t he cogni t i ve structures t hat drive deci si on ma k - ing. 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