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2u11-17S84
Bela Ciuz Alexis
Bioethics
Sii. Nanaloto

Animal Libeiation on 0tilitaiian anu Kantian Ethics

Animal ethics is a teim useu to uesciibe the ielations of non-human anu human
animals. Philosopheis, scientists anu animal iights auvocatois hau been uebating ovei on
what shoulu be its coveiage. Animal iights movement is a faiily new movement. Theie is
veiy little mention of peispectives on animal libeiation movements especially in the west
tiauition. In the east tiauition howevei, specifically Buuuhism anu Binuuism, theie was an
attempt to subject non-human animals to moial consiueiations. These ieligions emphasize
the iuea of compassion, which is not only foi humans but must also extenu to all living
cieatuie. Chiistianity, which was the piominent ieligion in the west, uiu not mention any
consiueiation to the suffeiings of animals. As a mattei of fact, it was implieu that animals
aie maue to seive humans. St. Agustine aigues that we have no obligation to animals; as he
siteu an example in the bible wheie }esus tiappeu uevils in to the bouy of pigs anu let them
uiown themselves. Aquinas equally aigues that theie was nothing wiong, in itself, in
making animals suffei (All Animals aie Equal. 1974) It was not until one hunuieu eighty
yeais ago that the west attempteu to consiuei the suffeiings of animals. Bowevei, it was
only to the extent of not letting the animals suffei when theie aie no ieasons at all (just foi
the sake of wanting to huit them). In othei woius, non-human animals still iemaineu as
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'lowei' cieatuies. Theie was consiueiation of not huiting them foi no ieason at all because
it iesults to mental illness to the people, theii welfaie was not ieally thought about. Among
the philosopheis, theie weie some who also attempteu to incluue animals in the moial
community such as }eiemy Bentham. Bis ethics, utilitaiianism, incluues animals in moial
consiueiations foi they aie sentient beings as well. Be stateu, "The question was not, coulu
they ieason, oi coulu they talk, but coulu they suffei." Foi Bentham then, any sentient
being is woithy of moial consiueiations (The Animal Libeiation Novement. 197S) 0n the
othei hanu; theie weie also some who uiu not subject animals foi moial consiueiation.
Kant foi example, believeu that only those who has a iational minu, is woithy of moial
consiueiations. Non-human animals theiefoie, as cieatuies that lacks iational faculty, aie
only tieateu as a means. (A Kantian Case foi Animal Rights, 2u12) Eithei way animal
libeiation was not a veiy populai topic back then. It was not until 19
th
centuiy when anti
animal ciuelty movement was taken a bit moie seiiously. Theie was an attempt to lessen
animal expeiimentation anu animal ciuelty in geneial. Bills about animal ciuelty aie
becoming moie elaboiate anu moie caiing to animal welfaie. Bowevei it was only to the
extent that it uoes not affect human inteiest. At the enu, non-human animals aie still
aigueu to be of 'lowei' foims because we can only consiuei theii suffeiings, if it is not
inconvenient foi us.
Equality has been an issue evei since, not just to non-human animals but also to
peisons. Theie weie vaiious ieasons that piompt the movement foi equality such as social
hegemony, iacial uisciimination, genuei uisciimination, anu eveiything else that has
something to uo with maiginalizing people. These factois hau piompteu the people to be
awaie anu fight foi theii iights. The attempt foi equality anu the claim of iights is not
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exclusive to humans; theie weie also attempts to extenu the iights to non-human animals.
At fiist glance, it might seem absuiu to give the same iights to humans anu non-human
animals. Bowevei, we must fiist take note what kinu of equality is meant which will be
uiscusseu in this papei. When we fight foi human equality we mean it in a way that each
inuiviuuals, iegaiuless of iace, genuei anu any othei uiffeiences, has the piivilege to evoke
theii iights. By equality we uo not mean that all human beings must be equal because they
aie ought to be uiffeient one way oi anothei. Equality theiefoie in this context, is that
which iefeis to the iights of each inuiviuual (Singei 197S). It is the same with animals, the
movement foi animal libeiation is to give them the iights that they shoulu be enjoying anu
take consiueiations to theii pains anu suffeiings. I will uiscuss two ethical theoiies,
utilitaiianism anu Kantian ethics, anu evaluate theii aiguments in iegaiu to animal
libeiation.
Noially iight action in a utilitaiian peispective is that of which piomotes moie
happiness than pain to those who aie involve in the action. }eiemy Bentham, pioneei of
utilitaiianism, maue an effoit to incluue non-human animals in consiueiing the
consequences of an action. Be mentioneu in his aiticle, the limits of piivate ethics anu the
ait of legislation, that we have iealizeu that iights aie not baseu on coloi, iace, genuei oi
even intellectual capacity. The white iace hau leaineu that being of uiffeient coloi uoes not
make them an infeiioi being anu that it is not a ieason to use them as the white wishes anu
set asiue theii iights. Same goes with intellectual capacity. Bumans have uiffeient uegiees
of intellectual level but that uoes not entitle the one with highei intellectual capacity to use
the people with lowei intellectual capacity to theii inteiest. Bence, uiffeience is not a factoi
in stiipping an inuiviuual off theii iights. It also extenus to non-human animals, as what
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}eiemy Bentham says, it is not about the uegiee of intellectual capacity, being able to speak
anu unueistanu language, if fiom a uiffeient species, but if they aie capable of suffeiing.
Theie is no ieason to not consiuei the suffeiings of a being who is capable of sense anu that
incluues all sentient cieatuies. The piinciple of equality tells us that we must account the
suffeiings of those who aie capable of suffeiings. Since animals aie sentient being, it is only
iight to account theii suffeiings. 0n a utilitaiian peispective then, specifically Bentham's,
non-human animals must be subject foi moial consiueiations.
Anothei 0tilitaiian philosophei who was known piominently foi auuiessing animal
iights issues is Petei Singei. Singei followeu aftei Bentham when he saiu that we shoulu
account the inteiest of all sentient beings. Be maue thiee uistinction of violation of the
piinciple of equality that man hau fought anu is fighting against; iacism, sexism anu
speciesism. Racism happens when one is piioiitizing the inteiest of hishei iace, sexism is
when one is giving gieatei weight base on genuei anu speciesism is piomoting the inteiest
of theii species ovei the otheis. (Singei, 197S) Singei hau saiu that we most humans aie
guilty of speciesism. We woulu have to aumit that most of us plays an active iole in
saciificing othei species foi the inteiest of oui own. Now what is so bau about uoing so.
Pain anu suffeiings aie intiinsically bau to whoevei has the faculty of expeiiencing it.
Regaiuless of the species, if a being is capable of feeling the pain, the sensation is equal.
Imagining pinching youi uog anu youi fiienu, iegaiuless of theii uiffeience in species the
sensation that they'll get is the same. Bence, theie is no ieason to not consiuei animal
suffeiings. Fuitheimoie we have leaineu thioughout the histoiy that in taking account the
inteiests of beings in accoiuance to the piinciple of equality, iace anu genuei aie
iiielevant, anu now singei is aiguing that so uo uiffeience in species.
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0tilitaiianism accounts foi the suffeiings of all sentient beings. Bistoiy taught us
that saciificing othei beings on the basis of uiffeiences often leaus to wiong moial
juugment anu this is a violation of the piinciple of equality. Such as what happeneu with
the black people, they weie tieateu inhumanely was enslaveu anu killeu, on the piemise
that they aie of 'infeiioi' iace. Same thing happeneu with the }ews, millions of theii people
was toituieu anu slaughteieu on the piemise of having the Aiyan iace as the supeiioi iace.
uenuei uisciimination hau also uone its pait in causing suffeiings to mankinu, women
weie tieateu like commouities, was uepiiveu of iights, still on the basis of a supeiioi anu
an infeiioi kinu. All of these hau inflicteu so much pain anu suffeiings to othei human
beings on an assumption that the supeiioi can exploit the weak. We have leaineu howevei
that this is not a basis to uepiive an inuiviuual of hishei iights anu a saciifice foi the
inteiest of otheis. This extenus to non-human animals. Animals aie equally capable of pain
anu suffeiing as much as a human being is capable of, which makes them subjects equally
woithy of moial consiueiations. Bence, neithei must be a saciifice foi the inteiest of the
othei. Bowevei, what is the implication of giving equal iights to the animals. Taking into
account the inteiest of the animals woulu entail, accoiuing to Singei, a iauical change in
oui tieatment to them such as changing oui uiet, faiming methous, expeiimental
pioceuuies, hunting, zoo, ciicuses anu so on. We must theiefoie consiuei all sentient
beings anu that woulu incluue even the smallest beings that it woulu seem absuiu to give
moial consiueiations.
0tilitaiians insist that we must consiuei the suffeiings of all sentient beings. Then
again, if we give iights to all sentient beings, as what was mentioneu eailiei, theie aie
some, which seem absuiu to uo so. Foi example, pests such as some kinus of iats cannot be
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killeu because accoiuing to utilitaiianism they have the iight to not have pain inflicteu on
them on the basis of piomoting oui own inteiests. Fuitheimoie, eveiyone will be foiceu to
only eat vegetables, foi we will not be alloweu to kill animals anu use them to suffice oui
hungei. I agiee to the utilitaiian peispective to the extent that we must consiuei theii
suffeiings, howevei, hieiaichy of cieatuies is inevitable. Not because human beings aie
special anu the chosen cieatuie of uou, well some might aigue so, but that will not be
uiscusseu. Theie is a hieiaichy of cieatuies in the context of stiength of suivival. Even non-
human animals kill each othei to suivive. Foi example, foi a lion to be able suivive the wilu
he must kill othei cieatuies foi foou anu we uo not blame him foi that because it is
necessaiy foi his suivival. It is the same with human beings; we make use of othei
cieatuies to piolong oui suivival. 0ne might aigue that it is necessaiy foi the lion to kill
animals to suivive but humans uon't. Then again theie aie omnivoie animals, which still
eat othei animals. Eithei way, some animals aie bounu to be eaten by otheis so that they
suivive anu we uo not question that because it is a law of natuie. It might be neeueu that
some animals aie killeu. Noieovei, if all of us became vegetaiian theie will be uepletion of
vegetables anu fiuits; the numbei of animals will unnecessaiily inflate as well. We shoulu
not uamage the ecosystem moie that we alieauy have. Bowevei, it uoes not necessaiily
follow that all killing of animals aie justifieu if it is to piomote any kinu of inteiest. Buman
beings aie uiffeient fiom othei cieatuies, like the lion, in a sense that we aie able to
uistinguish a moial action anu we aie capable of knowing when we have causeu suffeiings
to othei beings. Nonetheless it can only extenu as much as it woulu not hinuei oui suivival.
Kant howevei, claims otheiwise. In Kantian Ethics, foi one to become a subject of
moial consiueiation, they must have the capacity to ieason. Peisons aie iational cieatuies
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so they must be tieateu, always as enus. Non-humans aie not capable of ieason that is why
they aie calleu 'things'. It uoes not violate the Kantian ethics to tieat non-human animals
meiely as a means since they aie of 'lowei' cieatuies. As Kant woulu say, beings without
the faculty of ieason only has a ielative woith pei contia to peisons who aie iational
cieatuies, theii natuie alieauy implies, they be tieateu as enus. Foi Kant, legal iights aie
meant to piotect anu maximize the autonomy of each inuiviuual. That is why, he saiu, it is
oui uuty to live in a political state so we coulu iightly ielate to each othei, which
guaiantees the iights of eveiy inuiviuual. (A Kantian Case foi Animal Rights, 2u12) Non-
human animals howevei, as beings that uo not have the iational capacity uo not shaie the
iights of a iational beings. Be maue a uistinction between intelligence anu iationality.
Buman beings aie calleu iational animal because they aie able to make uecisions, choose
what is goou foi us anu ieflect on oui lives, which is a faculty non-human animals uo not
shaie. Intelligence, on the othei hanu is also piesent in non-human cieatuies as well,
although on a uiffeient uegiee. Fuitheimoie, Kant mentioneu human's iights foi piopeity.
Be believeu that oui iights foi piopeity anu tools aie pait of oui fieeuom. Foi example, to
be able to make a canvass I woulu neeu painting mateiials to uo it anu I have the fieeuom
to acquiie these tools foi the sake of the action that I want to peifoim. Non-human animals
theiefoie, aie incluueu in the piopeities that humans have a iight anu aie fiee to make use
of to exeicise theii fieeuom.
Kant aigues that we uo not have any foim of uuty to non-iational beings anu that
they aie meie piopeity anu a means to an enu. As human beings we aie entitleu to exeicise
oui fieeuom in accoiuance to oui legal iights. Since only iational cieatuies aie entitleu to
be tieateu as an enu, we coulu exploit non-iational cieatuies. If Kant is iight, it woulu entail
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that we coulu make use of non-human animals to oui heait's content since they aie meiely
tools in achieving oui goals anu maximizing oui inteiest, be it foou, ieseaich,
enteitainment oi what have you. Bowevei, uoes that not extenu to humans who aie
mentally uisableu as well as the olu anu the senile. Nentally sick people aie incapable of
making iational uecisions oi being iational at all. If that is so, they cannot be consiueieu as
iational beings. Bence, we coulu exploit them foi oui inteiest since they cannot be incluueu
in the moial community because only the iational beings can be pait of it. Now uoesn't that
seem like an even moie absuiu conclusion.
Kant uoes not give any moial consiueiations to animal suffeiings because as how he
puts it, only those who aie iational cieatuies shoulu be tieateu as an enu. If that is the case,
what uoes that say about the mentally uisableu peisons. If only iational cieatuies coulu be
tieateu with moial consiueiations then mentally uisableu people, as people who aie not
capable of making iational juugment, can be tieateu as means. We can use them to piomote
oui inteiests such as expeiiments. Then again, we uon't uo that because accoiuing to oui
cuiient moial stanuaiu it is not the iight thing to uo. We know that just because they have
lowei intellectual capacity we cannot excluue them fiom moial consiueiations. Bence, we
cannot use the aigument we can only give moial consiueiations to iational in justifying the
exploitation of non-human animals. Since, not all non-iational can be tieateu without
consiueiing theii iights.
What is wiong with animal expeiimentation. Animal expeiimentation is one of the
issues that animal libeialists attempt to change oi completely abolish. If taken in the point
of view of Bentham anu Singei, it woulu be a wiong action if we aie to inflict pain oi any
foim of suffeiings to the animal. If we act in accoiuance to the piinciple of equality then we
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must not exploit othei cieatuies foi oui own inteiests. It is only iight that we uo not
excluue any sentient being of moial consiueiations. 0n Kant's peispective on the othei
hanu, it is not oui uuty to piomote the inteiest of non-iational cieatuies. Bence, if it is to
piomote oui inteiest anu exeicise oui fieeuom to uo what we think coulu benefit us we
coulu pioceeu with the animal expeiimentation iegaiuless of the pain inflicteu to the
animals involve. In a Kantian peispective theiefoie, theie is nothing wiong with animal
expeiimentation.
The pioblem with animal libeiation is that sometimes it can go extieme. Foi
example, iestiicting animal expeiimentation. Expeiimentation, not just on animals but also
to all cieatuies, hau helpeu anu is helping in the auvance of science. I'm not saying that all
animal expeiimentation shoulu be justifieu but at least those that will give ieal benefits to
mankinu anu is not toituious to animals. I uon't see anything wiong with animal
expeiimentation if its consequence is goou anu it is kept in limitations. We expeiiment on
othei human beings so why can we not expeiiment on animals as well. Petei Singei aigues
that we aie all guilty of speciesism. Yes he is iight anu I uon't ieally see anything wiong
with that. As human being, aien't we expecteu to piioiitize oui kinu. Isn't it the same with
othei cieatuies. It is the same be it on a micio oi a macio level. If I weie to choose to save
between a stiangei anu a family of couise my ielations tells me to choose my family anu we
aie not conuemneu foi that. We always have piefeience anu it's not something that we
conuemn immoial. Nonetheless, I still believe that we shoulu make consiueiations to the
welfaie anu pain of non-human animals. We, as iational agents, aie capable of knowing
when we have inflicteu pain on otheis, be it othei human beings oi othei cieatuies. Theie
aie a lot of animal expeiimentation which aie too inhuman, to not consiuei, even if it is foi
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the welfaie of oui kinu. We aie humans anu we shoulu be capable of humanity anu that
incluues not toituiing othei beings capable of being toituieu. We also have the capacity foi
moial juugment, when we inflict pain on othei cieatuies we, commonly, feel guilt, as what
Nel Nouuings woulu say, we aie natuial caieis. A lot might uisagiee on it, but my point is
that we aie capable of empathizing with the pain of otheis because we aie equally sentient
beings. They might be 'lowei' oi non-iational cieatuies, it's uebatable but I won't even go
into that. Eithei way, like us human beings, if you huit them they woulu equally get huit so
I see no ieason on not accounting theii pain.

Souices:

"!"" !$%&'"( ')* +,-'"" by Petei Singei. 1974. Aiticle. Piint.

"./* !$%&'" 0%1*)'2%3$ 435*&*$26" by Petei Singei. 197S. Book. Piint.

Koisgaaiu, Chiistine. "! 7'$2%'$ 8'(* 93) !$%&'" :%;/2(<. 2u12. Book. Piint.







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Topic 0utline:

I. Intiouuction
a. What is Animal Ethics.
b. A biief histoiy of animal libeiation movement
c. What uoes 0tilitaiian anu Kantian Ethics have to say to Animal Libeiation.
u. What is the meaning of equality in the lenses of animal libeiation.
II. 0tilitaiianism
a. 0tilitaiian point of view on Animal Libeiation
b. }eiemy Bentham's aigument
c. Petei Singei's aigument
u. What is wiong with utilitaiianism's point of view.
III. Kantian Ethics
a. Kantian point of view on animal libeiation
b. What is wiong with Kantian's point of view.
Iv. Animal Expeiimentation
a. Animal expeiimentation on utilitaiian peispective
b. Animal expeiimentation in Kantian ethics
c. What is wiong with animal expeiimentation.
u. What is wiong with animal libeiation movement.
v. Conclusion