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Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
- Future value F of an annual equivalent value A:
i
i
A F
n
1 ) 1 (
- Annual value A of a future value F:
1 ) 1 (
n
i
i
F A
- Present value P of an annuity A:
n
n
i i
i
A P
) 1 (
1 ) 1 (
EECE 670 S. H. Karaki 1 Introduction 8
A simplified notation is often used to represent the ratio factor on right hand side of the
above equations: for example the factor in the second equation multiplying a future value to
obtain a present value is denoted by (P/F, i, n), and the factor multiplying an annuity A to
obtain a present value P is denoted by (P/A, i, n).
Net Present Value Method: This method maximizes the profits or the difference between
revenues and costs converted to the present. For m mutually exclusive schemes, we
normally select the scheme to maximize the NPV:
m j n i F P O C R NPV
n
t
jt jt jt j
... 1 ) , , / ( ) ( : max
0
R
jt
: Revenue of scheme j in year t
C
jt
: Capital cost of scheme j in year t
O
jt
: Operating cost of scheme j in year t
Minimum Cost Method: When the expected revenues does not vary from one scheme to
another the NPV method simplifies to a minimum cost method illustrated in the following
example.
m j t i F P O C PVC
n
t
jt jt j
... 1 ) , , / ( ) ( : min
0
Example 1.2: Two schemes of an engineering project are shown in the table below. Which
scheme is more economical if the discount rate is 6% and the depreciation in investment is
linear?
1 2
Investment (M$) 3 5
Salvage (M$) 0 1
Life (years) 6 8
Depreciation cost (M$/year) 0.75 0.55
Solution:
The present value cost of the first project is given by:
EECE 670 S. H. Karaki 1 Introduction 9
917 . 4 75 . 0 3
) 06 . 0 1 ( 06 . 0
1 ) 06 . 0 1 (
75 . 0 3
6
6
1
PVC
= 6.688 M$
This should be compared to the cost of operating the second project for 6 years. The salvage
value of the investment after 6 years is given by (assuming linear depreciation):
I d S 6
6
where 5 . 0
8
1 5
d
$ 2 5 6 5 . 0
6
M S
M$ 29 . 6 917 . 4 55 . 0
) 06 . 1 (
2
5
6
2
PVC
So select scheme 2!
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Method or Investment Recovery Method: One should
note that the NPV diminishes as the discount rate i increases. In this method it is required to
determine the special value i
*
such that:
m j n i F P O C R NPV
n
t
jt jt jt j
... 1 0 ) , , / ( ) (
0
*
This may be solved by a trial and error method. According to this method a scheme j is
viable if i
*
is larger than i the standard discount rate. The method is graphically illustrated
in Figure 7.
i
*
NPV
i
5 10 15 20 25
Figure 7: Illustration of the internal rate of return method
EECE 670 S. H. Karaki 1 Introduction 10
1.6 Planning in a Classical Environment
Power system planning is conducted under national guidelines and energy resources policy.
Figure 8 shows the structure of power system planning. Energy resource planning
evaluates the effective use and coordination of various available primary energy resources,
such as fuel oil, gas oil, natural gas, and hydro-energy. As shown in Figure 8 power system
planning consists of a load forecast, generation planning, and network planning. Generation
and network planning exert influence on each other and on the load curve.
The objective of generation planning to seek the most economical system that supplies the
demand forecast within some established reliability environmental constraints. The
following questions should be addressed:
- When and where to invest in new units?
- What capacity and type of new units should be installed?
Figure 8: Structure of power system planning
Given the existing generation structure and cost of primary energy resources, the following
quantitative analysis is normally done by planning models to determine and justify a given
plan:
- Cost of investment and annual operation
- Reliability indices
Electrical Generation Planning
Electrical Network Planning
Electrical Load Forecast
Energy Plan
State Planning & Energy Policy
EECE 670 S. H. Karaki 1 Introduction 11
- Sensitivity to price changes
- Effect of delaying certain key projects
So generation planning is a complicated task. Many types of units are involved and
therefore, the number of decision variables can be very large (number of units added per
year). This is a discrete optimization problem involving nonlinear reliability constraints
and non-linear generation investment and operation costs. The data required for generation
planning involve essentially load forecasting, fuel and equipment costs, and discount rates,
which contain uncertainties. So the complexity of problem increases because sensitivity
analysis may be needed to cater for these uncertainties. So, when carrying out generation
planning, suitable simplifications are normally made in practice:
- Heuristic algorithms are used instead of rigorous operations research.
- Simplifying assumptions are adopted like linearization of generation unit investment.
- All generation units are considered to be a on a single node as far as generation planning
is considered.
1.7 Planning in Competitive Electricity Markets
In competitive electricity markets, generation companies invest in new plant where it is
profitable to do so. The profitability measure in a market setup is return on investment. A
generating company evaluating a new plant will forecast its expected revenues and
operating cost to deduce a stream of net future revenues that will be compared to the net
investment in the plant. If the resulting rate of return is higher than a companys handle
rate the project may be carried out, else it may be deferred.
In a competitive market, a generation companys success is motivated usually by financial
rewards for good performance and penalties for a poor one. This performance is facilitated
first by the existence of a spot market purchases or sales, which allows producers and
consumers to resolve imbalances between contracted and actual production and
consumption. In addition, long-term contracts may be used by producers and large
consumers to buy and sell energy to help ease the difficulty associated with high prices of a
spot market. Whereas a regulated monopoly had to maintain a 25% reserve margin, in a
competitive market this reliability rate is replaced by The failure to produce the promised
EECE 670 S. H. Karaki 1 Introduction 12
energy is penalized at $1000/MWh. So the cost and risk of the penalty will now be
balanced against the cost of investing new plant to avoid the penalty. So the decision to
build a new plant is now made by a generating company based on purely on economic,
financial and other commercial issues.
The art of evaluating generation investment in a competitive market is new and relatively
little quantitative data are available. Tools such as portfolio analysis, decision analysis, and
asset valuation have been used but should be applied prudently as electric energy is not
stable and can only be transported on dedicated electric networks that obey physical laws.
A competitive generating company may not always base its decision on rigorous financial
and economic analysis. Consideration such as regional market share, early entry
opportunity, energy with other projects and corporate prestige will affect the evaluation of
an individual generation project.
Electric energy requires a unique and dedicated set of physical facilities for transporting it
from the producers to the consumers. Such a transmission system in a competitive
electricity market functions as a market place to impartially enable competing transactions
to take place. The transmission function must now (1) provide enough transmission
capacity to allow competitive transactions in a competitive electric energy market, (2) allow
impartial access to and use of that transmission capacity, and (3) charge the producers and
consumers using the transmission system prices that reflect such usage and recover the cost
of constructing and operating such a system. The latter point is particularly important since
transmission services are paid separately from energy production.
The challenge in transmission pricing is in developing a mechanism that both (1) promote
efficient use and expansion of the grid, and (2) facilitate effective competition in
generation. These objectives are conflicting by their nature: By definition efficient
transmission pricing means that differently situated users (producers and consumers) pay
different prices depending on their usage of the grid. Thus some generators will be at a
competitive disadvantage relative to others located at more favorable sites. The art of
designing transmission prices to meet these two conflicting objectives is still being
developed.