Consti Cases Jimenez To Guingona - WLC

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery,
by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon
being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question
is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been
granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of
dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if
not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the
Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this
provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His
Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of
engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to
focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my
solemn duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The
first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the
sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense,
and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to adequately finance a
political campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS
(5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief
of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also
sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.
Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the
intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only"
to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in
1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key
positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the
feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further
than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and
gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed
Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a
professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be
asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the
letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano",
and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8)
that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to
the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano
should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to
as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as
"planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not
prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their
complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of
the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the
"planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their
part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),
petitioners,
vs.
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents.

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and
respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992,
said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following
grounds:

Senator Taada alleges that:

1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;

2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and
spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;

3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;

4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the
Commission on Appointments.

In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:

1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng
vs. Mitra, Jr. 1 and Daza vs. Singson. 2

2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to
function as a constitutional body.

3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political
parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.

4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the
Commission.

On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its
separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7,
1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.

Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the
reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the
following grounds:

1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of
the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:

LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
NPC 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5

It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application
than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so
doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the
Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties.
The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.

xxx xxx xxx

We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement
that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a
representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check
on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim
more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of
members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a
diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3

The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the year
alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former
Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the
following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from
the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within
their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other
members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in
the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the
question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never
reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be
considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his
Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner
of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party
with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party. 5 Senator Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in
1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest
candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got
re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party
coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from
1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late
Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional
representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and
avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in
1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the
Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional
representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the
Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada
filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in
the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect
any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of
the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No
practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a
doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the
constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation
of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6

2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of
the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and
including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however,
accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political
party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each
political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate.
7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld
the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the
Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission
on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.

3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the
party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN.
It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect
respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and
LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously
nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in
the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved:

Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the
Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera,
Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for
NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9

4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-
party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires
a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the
effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the
members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the
political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean
that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by
Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the
subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each
house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a
party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.

5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12
Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its
functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive
of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the
membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to
constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional
representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the
case at bar.

Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation .
. . .

The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of
the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of
Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court
held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators
to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter
mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and
rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the
Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof.

The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only
while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of
the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting
the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by
the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required
quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can
validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.
Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of
the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the
Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan
Ponce Enrile.

Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the
impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:

. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with
another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15

The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the
case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have
explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may
join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition
to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-
memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the
LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete
the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada
and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional
representation.

Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as
members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed
by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on
proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional
representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.

The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse
concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the
Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court.

Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before
this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The
framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in
the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental
law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to
silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers.

The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional
provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion. We quote from our decision:

. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in
numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution,
and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to
abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16

For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 187 SCRA 377 (1990).

2 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

3 Decision, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 270-274.

4 See Taada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

5 Ibid.

6 See Board of Trustees of Lawrence University vs. Outagame County, 136 N.W. 619 (1912); Amos
vs. Moseley, 77 So. 619 (1917), 11 AM JUR 700.

7 See Comment to Petition filed by respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales, Senators
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Taada, p. 10; Rollo,
p. 131.

8 Supra, note 2.

9 TSN, Session of August 27, 1992, Annex "E" of Petition, p. 29; Rollo, p. 111.

10 Supra, note 1.

11 Supra, note 7.

12 Supra, note 1.

13 Supra, note 4.

14 RULES OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Chapter 3, Sec. 10.

15 Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 276.

16 Decision, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 276-277.

EN BANC

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466
Petitioner,
Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------- x

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506
PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:
JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to
pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters,
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was
not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.
She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in
the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed
the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers,
women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also
claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for
quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of
Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was
Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its
nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of
Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo
but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.[1] The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting Abayon to file the
present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that
won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents
Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito
Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET
a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040.
Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross
human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason
that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.*3+ Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET
denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this
petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who
took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System
Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to
inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her
qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is so
inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the
quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,*5+ identifies who the members of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This means that, from the
Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list
system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast
their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the
same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as
members of the House of Representatives, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,[6] a party-list
representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the
vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they
ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent.*7+

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for
him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of
the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications
of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.[8] But where an allegation is made
that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution[9] provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party
or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.*10+

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16,
2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated
September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 189466), pp. 147-148.
[2] Id. at 25-26, Resolution 09-183.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 189506), pp. 53-54.
[4] Id. at 83-84.
[5] Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
[6] G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1, 16-17.
[7] Republic Act 7941, Section 9.
[8] Republic Act 7941, Section 13.
[9] Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
[10] Seeres v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009.

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------- x
LOUIS C. BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------x
OLIVIA P. PARAS,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO
NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA
SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------- x
RENALD F. VILLANDO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 178831-32

G.R. No. 179120

G.R. Nos. 179132-33

G.R. Nos. 179240-41

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 1, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal begins

over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the
invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution[1] of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. Sy
Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the First District of Negros
Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution[2] dated June 29, 2007, affirming her disqualification; and
(3) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution[3] dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents
relating to her qualifications should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy[4] (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the
COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a
registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground
that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The petition,
which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006,[5] alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because
her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a
registered voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship,
docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-007.[6] He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were
still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of
Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of qualified candidates for
the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino
since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had
reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on
November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on
October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. She
contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing
Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an election,
questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78,[9] in relation to Section
74[10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in relation
to Section 1,[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[14] and Section 5,[15] paragraph C (3.a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.[16] She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on the
ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her fathers citizenships, in
contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a
direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-247[17]
and 07-248,[18] entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG
FROM HER CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to as
the disqualification cases), which remained pending on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local
Elections were conducted.

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged as
the winner with 65,708 votes[19] or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional candidate,
Olivia Paras[20] (Paras), who obtained 57,962.

On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of
Negros Oriental.[21]

In a Joint Resolution[22] dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the
petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her
name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend
her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division made the following
ratiocination:

On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for
the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a natural-
born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown with
pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong,
failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which he underwent for the said
purpose.

An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the
Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as
required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530,
An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.

x x x

The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two
material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting his
petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a
Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined that
the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its
issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of Julio
Ong Sy, and prevented the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is Republic v. Hon.
Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan was
conducted without the required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, that Fiscal
Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the hearing of the
application for naturalization. That authority, however, does not extend to Fiscal *Veluzs+ right to
appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking. Private respondent Tan was therefore
under legal obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a Filipino
citizen for all intents and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case of
Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any way legalize
the proceedings relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these
irregularities is the fact that Tan was allowed to take his oath even before the expiration of the thirty
(30)-day period within which an appeal may be made thus making the said oath not only highly
improper but also illegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Court added:

To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. The
grant of naturalization under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any
time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar from instituting the necessary
proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of
Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a naturalized
Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one day
short of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could make
known his objections and to appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a
naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a copy of the petitioners motion to take his oath
of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the whole
world.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same.
The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could
be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the
same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipino
citizenship through the naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, he was only able to
transmit to his offspring, Chinese citizenship.

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and having been born on
November 9, 1959, under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinese national, and is disqualified to
run as First District Representative of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED
from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike
out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and
the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of
JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening of May
17, 2007, and accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.[24]

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062[25] adopting
the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases.

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending Proclamation.[26]

On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive suspending her
proclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional race pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.[27] On same date, Villando, one of the petitioners in the
disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying COMELEC Resolution No. 8062 with
Motion,*28+ praying that the COMELEC should not lift the suspension of Limkaichongs proclamation.

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and
proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First
District of Negros Oriental.[29]

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the
Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros Oriental in relation to
the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,[30] stating, among others, that
Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending her
proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPC No. 07-211, was dismissed by the COMELEC First
Division,[31] ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final when Limkaichong was
proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over the cases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this wise:

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that there shall be no
suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases involving, among
others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending
reconsideration by the en banc, the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the Resolution:
to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning
congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution.[32]

Meanwhile, in a Resolution[33] dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equally divided vote
of 3:3, denied Limkaichongs motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division in the disqualification cases. The pertinent portions of the Resolution denying her motion
reads:

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on
Respondent Limkaichongs Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation as it is only
this Commission, and not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has jurisdiction
to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. As stated
by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002,
respondent herself seasonably challenged the validity of the resolution of the Second Division in her
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the issue of respondents disqualification was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET cannot assume jurisdiction on the
matter, to wit:

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been
made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election
contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.
This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
issued by a division or en banc.

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for
Reconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for First District Representative, suffice it to say that in the same case of Codilla v. De Venecia,
supra, the Supreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration
and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into
office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one
can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.:

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and
imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could
not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.

x x x

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails
entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated
loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained
a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To
allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by
the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission (Second Division) in
its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for the First District
Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[34]

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestation and Motion
for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[35] She contended that, with her proclamation, her having taken her
oath of office and her assumption of the position, the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the
disqualification cases. She further contended that, following Section 6,[36] Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the disqualification cases would have to be reheard, and if on rehearing, no decision
would be reached, the action or proceedings should be dismissed, because the COMELEC En Banc was
equally divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.

On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated
May 17, 2007, which disqualified Limkaichong as a congressional candidate.[37]

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia)
allowed Limkaichong to officially assume the office as a Member of the House of Representatives on July
23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of Representatives.[38]

Despite Limkaichongs repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for
clarification,[39] the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari[40] under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform
her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has
jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichongs manifestation and motion for
clarification,[41] with the following disquisition:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30,
2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong
should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the
above-quoted provision of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of
Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order[42] under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. No. 179120,
seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from allowing Limkaichong to sit in the
House of Representatives and participate in all its official activities; and (b) Limkaichong from holding
office as its Member.[43]

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo
Warranto, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[44] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster of Limkaichong from the House of
Representatives on account of her disqualification and for the holding of special elections to fill the
vacancy created by such.[45]

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution[46] denying Villando's
motion to suspend the proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by the COMELEC En
Banc in a Resolution[47] dated February 1, 2008.

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction
with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order[48] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179240-41, contending, among others, that the COMELEC En
Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the August 16, 2007 Resolution[49] because it still acted on
Limchaikongs manifestation and motion for clarification, notwithstanding that the same was not set for
hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007 Resolution had already become final and executory.
As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in its Resolutions
dated September 4 and 11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the following issues
were tackled:

1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental
is valid;

2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to resolve the issue
of Limkaichong's citizenship;

3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of the
COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that Limkaichong is
disqualified from running as a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground that she is not a
natural-born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong
from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days their
respective memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, with or
without the memoranda.

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a Member of the
House of Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
was not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a
Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and
Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros
Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation
was ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the
elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC
En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her functions as a
Member of the House of Representatives.

I

Whether Limkaichongs proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc
her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.[50] Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section
2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.
Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,
order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen who was
disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the COMELEC. With that,
her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in open defiance of the Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She also stressed that Limkaichong's
proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that one of the PBOC members was not present
on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not at the provincial capitol. Finally, she
argued that Limkaichongs proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the
case of Codilla v. De Venecia.[51]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressing its
support for the position taken by the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule against the
validity of Limkaichongs proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has sustained the
validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the petition
filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. The COMELEC First Division has also adopted
Limkaichongs argument that following her valid proclamation, the COMELECs jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings
filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its
Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.

In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En Banc
Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a result of her
timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however, maintained that
Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to validate Limkaichong's
proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a policy-guideline in the exercise of the
COMELECs rule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Joint Resolution of the Second
Division which was rendered pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial power.

His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- guideline. It is also an
administrative interpretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i) Section
17,[52] Article VI (ii); Section 2(2),[53] Article IX-C; Section 6[54] of R.A. 6646; and Sections 241[55] and
243,[56] Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with the due process requirement.
The term administrative connotes or pertains to administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and
a decision or resolution thereon.*57+ This is to be distinguished from quasi-judicial function, a term
which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[58]

Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections.[59] In adopting such
policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the
objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair play.
Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the elections,
should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the
involved cases. Whereas, in this case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the
disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct of the elections, with her obtaining the
highest number of votes from the electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOC
pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.

The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,[60] that at the time of the proclamation of
Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution
invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as
he had at that point in time remained qualified. Limkaichongs situation is no different from that of
Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a
natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the
elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution
disqualifying her has not yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration.

II

Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25, 2007 by
the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her qualifications, and that
jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.

Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the issue
concerning Limkaichongs disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En
Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still
pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.

We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.[61] It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving
a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
250[62] of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.[63]

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which

Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, had given paramount consideration to
the two (2) aforementioned provisions when it stated that:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30,
2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong
should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the
above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of
Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELEC First Division when it dismissed the petition
of Paras seeking the nullity of Limkaichong's proclamation, thus:

The present situation is similar not to the factual circumstances of Codilla, which Paras invokes, but
rather to that in Planas which adheres to the general rule giving jurisdiction to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. As at the time of Limkaichong's proclamation, her disqualification
was not yet final, her proclamation was valid or legal. This Commission no longer has jurisdiction over
the case. This, notwithstanding the Second Division's directive suspending Limkaichong's proclamation.

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that
there shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases,
involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were
still pending reconsideration by the En Banc, the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the
resolution: to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the
winning Congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that
Limkaichongs proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from
acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.[64] The Court has shed light on this
in the case of Vinzons-Chato,[65] to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his
oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC
correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by
petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent
Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion
of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings
and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against
respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from
assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House of
Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 16. Election protest. -- A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy
and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The
party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as
the protestee.

x x x

Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The
party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as
the respondent.

x x x

Rule 19. Periods Non-Extendible. -- The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16 and 17 is
jurisdictional and cannot be extended.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the
remedy of those who may assail ones eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before
the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by
the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,[66] we ruled that where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an
electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R. Nos.
179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or petition for quo
warranto within ten days from May 25, 2007. But they did not. In fact, to date, no petition of protest or
petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily, the ten-day prescriptive period for
initiating a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.

However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of
Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their
entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may
still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[67] the Court held that:

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office as governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she
have the right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may not longer be made
within ten days from her proclamation? x x x
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks
to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country alone, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty to any other state.

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued: - Upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his
native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall
be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high schools recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum,
through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to
another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be
forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the
Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation
of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[68] where the Court of First Instance judge motu proprio
and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of
naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of
naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization
were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The
jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must

be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner
fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, upon motion made in
the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial
fiscal. In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

III

Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly disqualified Limkaichong on
the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries in the
docket book of the OSG,[69] the only remaining record of the naturalization proceedings,[70] and ruled
on the basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichongs father, in Special
Case No. 1043, were null and void. The COMELEC Second Division adopted Villando and Cameros
arguments that the OSG was deprived of its participation in the said case for it was not furnished copies
of the following: (a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) granting the petition for
naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959 Order of the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen.
Thus, when the latter took his oath of allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days after his
declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required under
Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal to the naturalization
proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from gaining finality. The COMELEC Second
Division concluded that since Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through the said
naturalization proceedings, it follows that Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is disqualified to
run as candidate and be elected as a Member of the House of Representatives.

We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichongs citizenship as the same should have been
challenged in appropriate proceedings as earlier stated.

IV

Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong
is final and executory.

In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. x x x

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.

In his Memorandum dated June 27, 2008, Biraogo stated that the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in the disqualification cases became final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
and that the same was not restrained by this Court pursuant to Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He averred that since Limkaichong received a copy of the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 on July 3, 2007, she had until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a
restraining order from the Court to prevent the same from becoming final and executory. However, she
did not do anything to that effect. Biraogo also averred that Limkaichong is guilty of forum shopping;
hence, her petition must be dismissed by the Court.

Instead of asking the Court for what Biraogo opined as a restraining order, Limkaichong filed with
this Court, on August 1, 2007, her petition for certiorari assailing the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution
pursuant to Section 2,[71] Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, postulating that
she had thirty (30) days from July 4, 2007 within which to file the petition, or until August 3, 2007. She
cited Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which prescribes the power of this Court to review
decisions of the COMELEC,[72] thus:

SEC. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

In his Comment on the petition, Villando prayed for the outright dismissal of Limkaichongs
petition as (a) it was filed beyond the reglementary period; (b) Limkaichong engaged in prohibited forum
shopping; and (c) Limkaichong admitted that the issues raised have become moot and academic. He
also sought to declare Limkaichong in contempt of court for forum shopping.

The COMELEC, through the OSG, also filed its Comment, praying for the denial of Limkaichong's
petition and its dismissal for being moot, contending that: (a) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
August 16, 2007 has rendered the instant petition moot and academic; and (b) Limkaichong knowingly
and intentionally engaged in forum shopping. The OSG argued that, without waiting for the resolution
of her Motion for Clarification and two (2) successive motions to resolve said motions which are pending
before the COMELEC En Banc, Limkaichong filed the present petition to question the Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, which issues were pending before the COMELEC
En Banc. Her act of seeking relief from this Court while there were several other incidents pending
before the COMELEC, the final resolution in either one of which will amount to res judicata in the other,
clearly showed forum shopping on her part.

In her Reply to the above Comments, Limkaichong countered that she did not engage in forum
shopping, for had she waited for the COMELEC to rule on her manifestation and other motions, it would
have resulted in the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court.

The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying Limkaichong and
suspending her proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering that she timely filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet attained finality for it to be implemented.

Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated June 29, 2007
has since been remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, recognizing that
it no longer has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of the House of Representatives.

V
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong from
assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia[73] should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives because he has no power to allow an
alien to sit and continue to sit therein as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of his legal authority.
Moreover, Biraogo opposes Limkaichongs assumption of office in the House of Representatives since
she is not qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus, disqualified by virtue of a final and
executory judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
June 29, 2007, which affirmed the COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007
disqualifying Limkaichong from holding public office. He contended that the said Resolution dated June
29, 2007 is already final and executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res
judicata.

De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for honoring the
proclamation of Limkaichong, because it had the hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power to
exclude any Member of the House of Representatives motu proprio. In their Comment on the petition,
respondents De Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a Member in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives and his/her recognition as such becomes the ministerial duty of the
Secretary General and the House of Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid
Certificate of Proclamation and Oath of Office.

Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's, substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16, 2008 stating
that under the circumstances, the House of Representatives, and its officials, are without recourse
except to honor the validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same is
canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental until it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla, to recognize
somebody else. He went on to state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a
presumptively valid title to the office, the House of Representatives cannot, motu proprio, cancel,
revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a sitting Member or to remove his name from its roll, as
such would amount to a removal of such Member from his office without due process of law. Verily, it
is only after a determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final
and executory order, that the Member does not have a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly elected
Member), that the House of Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.

Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives
should be exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly
completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the
elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings determining ones qualification or
disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.[74]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED and the Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Original Signed
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

On leave
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 24-36.
[2] Id. at 53-66.
[3] Id. at 181-183.
[4] Id. at 74.
[5] Id. at 75-77.
[6] Id. at 82-87.
[7] Id. at 100-144.
[8] G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447. The Court held that in order to justify the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is essential
that: (1) the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter on the contents of the
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 74 (or the qualification for elective office as provided in
the Constitution); and (2) the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
[9] Section 78 of the OEC reads:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
[10] Section 74 of the OEC pertains to the contents of a certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a candidate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized,
or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his
Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or
more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made
aware of such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may
continue to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected.
He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the
locality. The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred
words, if he so desires.
[11] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, approved on December 3, 1985.
[12] Section 68 of OEC provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
[13] Section 1, Rule 25, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads:
SEC. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
[14] Approved on February 15, 1993.
[15] Section 5, paragraph C (3.a), COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 states:
3.a. Disqualification under existing election laws.
(a) For not being a citizen of the Philippines;
(b) For being a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country;
(c) For lack of the required age;
(d) For lack of residence;
(e) For not being a registered voter;
(f) For not being able to read and write;
(g) In case of a party-list nominee, for not being a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days immediately preceding the day of the election.
*16+ Entitled Rules Delegating to the COMELEC Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive
Evidence in Disqualification Cases filed in connection with the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections dated January 5, 2007.
[17] Entitled Napoleon Camero, Petitioner, versus Jocelyn S. Limkaichong, Respondent.
[18] Entitled Renald F. Villando, Petitioner, versus Jocelyn S. Limkaichong, Respondent.
[19] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), p. 152.
[20] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179132-33), p. 103.
[21] Id. at 135-141.
[22] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 24-35. The per curiam Joint Resolution was unanimously
signed by Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (ret.), Rene V. Sarmiento and Nicodemo T.
Ferrer.
[23] Id. at 30-35. (Emphasis ours).
[24] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179132-33), pp. 168-169, 201.
[25] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 145-146. The resolution is entitled In the Matter of
Adopting the Following Policy-Guidelines on: 1) the Proclamation of Winning Candidates with Pending
Disqualification Cases; 2) Suspension of Canvassing and/or Proclamation; and 3) Transfer of Canvassing
Venue, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
The Commission, in upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and
fair play, RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the following policy-guidelines in connection with
the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections:

1. No suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases

There shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification
cases before or after elections, involving issues of citizenship, non-residency, not being a registered
voter, nuisance candidate, and/or violation of the election laws under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, Fair Elections Act and other related election laws.

This policy however shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of
the involved cases.

[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 179132-33), pp. 37-52
[27] Id. at 147-149.
[28] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179132-33), pp. 158-162.
[29] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), p. 152.
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 179132-33), pp. 165-192.
[31] Id at 328-334. The Resolution was penned by the late Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner and
concurred in by Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra (ret.).
[32] Id. at 215-236. The COMELEC First Division denied Paras motion on January 28, 2008
through an Omnibus Order. (Rollo [G.R. Nos. 178831-32], pp. 463-467.)
[33] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 53-66. In the per curiam Resolution, then COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin A. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Nicodemo T. Ferrer voted for
the denial of Limkaichongs motion. The late Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner (also a former
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) wrote a dissenting opinion, which was concurred with by
retired Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., to the effect that
Limkaichongs motion should be dismissed by the COMELEC for lack of jurisdiction.
[34] Id. at 61-63. (Emphasis ours).
[35] Id. at 159-163.
[36] Section 6, Rule 18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in
the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
[37] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179132-33), pp. 213-214.
[38] Id. at 238-256.
[39] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 166-171. On July 5, 2007, Limkaichong filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve the Manifestation and Motion for Clarification. On July 11, 2007, she filed a Second
Motion to Resolve said manifestation and motion.
[40] Id. at 3-20.
[41] Id. at 181-183.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 179120), pp. 3-21.
[43] Id. at 19-20.
[44] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179132-33), pp. 3-70.
[45] Id. at 69-70.
[46] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), pp. 468-470.
[47] Id. at 471-481.
[48] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 179240-41), pp. 3-28.
[49] Supra note 41.
[50] COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sec. 2.
[51] 442 Phil. 139 (2002).
[52] Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral Tribunal
[53] Section 2(2), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective, regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders,
or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
*54+ Section 6, RA 6646, otherwise known as An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the
Electoral System and for other Purposes, states:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
[55] Section 241 of the OEC provides:
SEC. 241. Definition. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly
with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns.
[56] Section 243 of the OEC provides:
SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers.
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code.
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When the substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
[57] Villarosa v. Commission on Elections and Atty. Dan Restor, 377 Phil. 497, 506 (1999), citing
the Concurring Opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres v. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148
(1974).
[58] Id. at 507, citing Midland Insurance Corporation, 143 SCRA 458 (1986).
[59] Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
[60] G.R. No. 167594, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 529, 537.

[61] Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 166,
179, citing Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405 (2005); Guerrero v. Commission
on Elections, 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).
[62] SEC. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. - A
sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional,
provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation
of the results of the election.
[63] Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, supra note 61, at 178, citing Rasul v. Commission
on Elections, 371 Phil. 760, 766 (1999).
[64] Lazatin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-80007, January 25, 1988, 157 SCRA 337, 338.
[65] Supra note 61, at 180.
[66] G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 36, 44.
[67] G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245. (Emphasis supplied)
[68] G.R. Nos. L-25204 & L-25219, January 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 52, 58.
[69] Rollo p. 97.
[70] Id. at 172 and 175.
[71] Section 2. Mode of review. - A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
[72] Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 80,
107, citing Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, 313 Phil. 727, 734 (1995).

[73] When Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr. was replaced by Speaker Prospero Nograles, petitioner
Biraogo filed with the Court a Respectful Manifestation with Motion to Replace Respondent Jose De
Venecia, Jr. with Prospero C. Nograles, praying that the latter will replace the former as party-
respondent in G.R. No. 179120, which the Court granted in its Resolution dated April 1, 2008.
[74] See Codilla v. De Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]

TEODORO Q. PEA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ALFREDO E.
ABUEG, JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution[1] of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea in HRET Case No. 95-014.
Petitioner questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the
House of Representatives representing the Second District of the province of Palawan.

Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the May 8,
1995 elections. On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant,
averred that:

7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud,
widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before,
during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and
certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed
were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioners known
supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in
excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestants
ballots and other irregularities.

8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained
52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A
copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex B.

9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities not
been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would have
been different and the protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office
Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which was the true
expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.

10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the
protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second
District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province
of Palawan.*2+

Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and
Counter-Protest[3] on June 5, 1995, to which Pea filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequent to the
filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the Petition on June 22, 1995, averring that the
HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance.
In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the
precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point out how
many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[5] on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary
of Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred.

In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over
the petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action,
and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

The HRET states pertinently:

There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto
Princesa City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon, and
Marcos (Ordinance appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed to specify which are the
700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to allege the
municipalities where the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even
mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent
Protestee from being apprised of the issues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for
the Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.

The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et. al. (No.
46099, 66 Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, *w+hile the election law does not say so
directly, it is clearly inferred from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of contest are that legal
votes were rejected and illegal votes received, the motion of protest should state in what precincts such
irregularities occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts
where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in order to apprise the contestee of the issues
which he has to meet. xxx

In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May
26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein could have been dismissed
outright as deficient in form and substance, being couched in general terms only, without precise
indication of the time, place and manner of the commission of the alleged irregularities. xxx

Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the protest, in general language,
impugns, contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent electoral practices, acts and deeds
of the protestee and impugns and contests all the election returns in the lone district of Catanduanes.
The tribunal held that this scattershot allegation is not allowed in election contests and that it is
necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed
offenses to have been committed by the parties. (Alberto vs. Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23,
1989)

While Protestant has attached as Annex A to his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July
1995, a Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the
Summary was submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. The Opposition and the
attached Summary do not amend the original Petition. There is not even a prayer in the Opposition
suggesting such amendment.

Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission on Elections en banc
(COMELEC) dismissed herein Petitioners Petition (SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of elections
in the second district of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peas Petition Ad
Cautelam was thus converted into a regular protest (not Ad Cautelam) effective upon the finality of the
official COMELEC resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to cure the defects cited
above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.

Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts he
contests in his Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders Protestees Counter-Protest defective for
insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to state a cause of action. It does not cure the fatal
defects in Protestants Petition.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of action because it is fatally
insufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestees Motion to Dismiss and to
DISMISS, as it hereby DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logical consequence thereof and
also for the same reason, Protestees Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.*6+

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on
November 14, 1995.

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995, petitioner argues that the respondent HRET
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the election protest of petitioner considering that:

I

THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY
THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF
THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.

It is the Petitioners view that the instant election protest is sufficient in form and substance even while
failing to specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the
specification of the precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order that an
election protest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission, petitioner cites the cases of
Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil 362,
the latter stating that:

From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that frauds, irregularities and violations
of the law are alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.

The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor of the protestant after the
judicial counting is not specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being known that said
omission is a defect of the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new grounds for those already alleged by
the protestant.

Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in the instant case, the defect in the petition
should have been cured by the opposition to the private respondents Motion to Dismiss.

Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead,
required the private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a prior determination
that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.

We do not agree.

In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on
the formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a matter of
course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided that:

RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring
him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.

As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the
same.

A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the
very substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency
in form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must
be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the
faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition,
otherwise, the assumptions of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of
this sort by the losing candidate.

Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious inadequacy than a mere failure to
specify the number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs.
Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra,
both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to
allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities, without specification, and substantiation, of where and how
these occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based on
such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless
stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water.

On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already ruled in
Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,[7] that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the
same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten
(10) days after proclamation of the winner.

While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
questions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon
the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory
period for filing of the protest.[8]

Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the
greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of
fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton
disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any
other step.[9] xxx This is as it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many although
abhorred by a few.

In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon
a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunals judgment. There is such
showing in the present petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of
merit. The resolution of the respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12,
1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., took no part (Chairman of HRET).
Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo, JJ., took no part (Members of HRET).
Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relation to one party.

*1+ Petition, Attachment A, p. 20, Rollo.

*2+ Petition, Attachment C, p. 31-32, Rollo.

*3+ Petition, Attachment D, p. 38, Rollo.

*4+ Petition, Attachment F, p. 58, Rollo.

*5+ Petition, Attachment G, p. 65, Rollo.

[6] PP. 22-25, Rollo.

[7] G.R. No. 118597, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 384.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Idem.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that
said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas,
or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards
the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and
obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6
of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as
under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of
any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of
the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry
out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of
the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did
not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December
9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23,
1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said
commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that
neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution
and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
united States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader
aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so
far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls
the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies.
If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the
entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and
judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the
contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to
be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter
shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in
the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to
its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral
instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

x x x x x x x x x

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged;
that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election
of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is
not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The
municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council
proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is
no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another
who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to
give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz.
This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-
thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the
eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that
question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

x x x x x x x x x

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo
que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the
amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para
dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

x x x x x x x x x

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives
a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition
of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the
petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the
standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee
they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence,
together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same
manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open
one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required
to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they
pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted
elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse
vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted
under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the
same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the
existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious
that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met
with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was
the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it
"was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of
the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading
statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr.
Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England,
vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of
June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As
the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member
of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States
and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte
Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power
claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in
such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse
is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must
be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to
it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies
might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In
the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations
of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record
of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members
of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of
any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return
of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases
of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons,
and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the
same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue
of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the
particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment
of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in
the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time.
This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members
not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
[Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs.
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to
have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation
of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am,
however, constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature.
(Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the
time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle vs.
Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally
the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is
vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear constitutional provision
to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given,
must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section
4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate
the time in which notice of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United
States Code Annotated prescribes:

Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of
the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been
determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice,
in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in
such notice, shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the
effect that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this provision, the
Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest
which may be paid from their respective funds.

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body
that would be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of political to
that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the reach of the law,
but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV,
section 2, of which provides that

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of
government, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative even
after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the
Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the government and corresponding officials under
the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter of the
Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be
construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge election contests
is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime.
It is important to observe in this connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power
to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the
Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the
authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the
Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such
contests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe
the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in
the Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could
not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the
petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt its resolution of
December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed with the
commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to
hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A.
Angara.

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,
in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN,
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM
ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,

- versus -

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 196271

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 18, 2011

G.R. No. 196305

G.R. No. 197221

G.R. No. 197280

G.R. No. 197282

G.R. No. 197392

G.R. No. 197454

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011,
to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys
regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against
their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this
Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these
autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts
shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X
of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The
initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed.
This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic
act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the
first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the
plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi
City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd
Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No.
9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),
on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA
No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R.
No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the
validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of
Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis
Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R.
No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM,
with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM
regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9]
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro
Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the
same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality
of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were
instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to
perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30,
2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend
RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as
grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure
to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of
the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013
regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article
X of the Constitution.

The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in
the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under
paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.[11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three
years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have
been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under
Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that
they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed,
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,*16+ *a+s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be
understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the
needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional
elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will
serve within the limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also
reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include
the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of
our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this
case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to
comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by
either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate
days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,*19+ explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections.*20+ Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since
there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in
Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because
basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can
justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action.
Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and
respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution,
caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]

In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement
for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and
other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2)
to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.[23]

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents
of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason
exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved
by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than
sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of
these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does
not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No.
10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered
amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix
the specific date of the first ARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA
No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did
not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter
law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the
first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9140[30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled
the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the
ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date
of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority
(2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down
for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires
for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal
the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS*33+ on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the
ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress
and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well
the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the
supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of
the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included
in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to
comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the
matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the
Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every
statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that
only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to
the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction;
and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority
votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed
as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that
Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an
existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional
elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and
is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in
reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular
elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of
the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a
hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to
authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected
in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood.
The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate
for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[39] The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.[42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations
are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2)
and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide
their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in
view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision
as a part of organic law.*43+

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the
Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to
legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed
basic structure of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a
legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article
X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted
by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must
observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of
these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-
government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative
matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty
and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections
are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If
their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower
regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on
RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to
synchronize the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the
Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of
autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the
old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned,
the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired
under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough,
particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the
present problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required.
In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the
President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
although these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until
a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint
is provided in the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province.[51]

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that
does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations,
the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in
our discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the
synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is
under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional
objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the
adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions
in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in
Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office
the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution. *Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land
dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the
matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none
of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the
Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing;
this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and
called for.[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness
that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence,
holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was
brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs
significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.
Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that the elective officials could
hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office
are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local
elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension
beyond the term for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and
exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:
xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided
by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and
is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary
to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with
the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC
has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections
to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms
and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall
postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism,
(c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous
causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible.

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been
scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e)
other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the
elections do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy
and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no
stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct
the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither
Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal
basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special
elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office
only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least
votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize
elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly
not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM
elections instead of acting on their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely
abuse their discretion if they do so.

E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.[74]

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is
an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the
legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for
Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In
more concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint
for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a
government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders
to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance
requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No.
10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.
To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full
effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a
situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been
adopted and used in the creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to
the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the
synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of
the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of
the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by
the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the
elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153
significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that
is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as
well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to
cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for
Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited
purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the
synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are
likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation
of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon
the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections,
the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months
or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired
and the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao
history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can
transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past.*78+
Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-
Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily.
To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to
our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any
vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays
in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context,
allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint
OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to
defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner,
one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction
ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate
should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear.*82+ We refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are
interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No.
10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected
instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,
except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the
national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own
electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves
us far from convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional
entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the
national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the
Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather
an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see
this as an effective partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the
nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X,
believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the
autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national
government*.+*85+ Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre*86+ which we
quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the
ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the
region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of
national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by
which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite
our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a
legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court
will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court
to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking
us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles
of a republican and democratic government the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given
an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of
the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of
any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit
to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule
that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of
rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis
ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA
No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment
of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on the power of the Pres. to appoint OIC-Governor of ARMM
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of Justice Velasco
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Velasco
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

*1+ Entitled An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the amendments to Republic Act
No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao on the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose Republic Act No.
9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and for other purposes.
*2+ Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for
the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended
[3] Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of
Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman, John
Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar
Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.
[4] Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed against Sixto Brillantes, as
Chairperson of COMELEC, to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been submitted to a
plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it is also null and void.
[5] With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.
[6] With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
[7] With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated July 12, 2011.
[8] With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order dated July 11,
2011.
[9] With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction,
Both Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
[10] Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis ours]
[11] To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of office of elective local
officials at three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials
who were elected in January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed to expire
at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the terms of the incumbent President and Vice President
who were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in
order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the twelve Senators who
obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections were made to serve only half the time of their
terms.
[12] Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996
ed.), p. 1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.
[13] MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily
indicate as Section 14. It reads: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT
NOON OF JUNE 1992.
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action
taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows:
THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST
ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to
the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the
Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an
election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992.
We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we
should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be
able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first
election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12
Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their
election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later
election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and the Members of the Lower
House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years, therefore
defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President
and another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to
effect the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the
Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who
proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved the
first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same
thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that
the term of the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will
again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term
until 1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995,
and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election
every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our
elections every three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and
Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and
local officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the
provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would
really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3,
1986)
[14] G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.
[15] J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
413; Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
[16] 271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95
SCRA 755.
*17+ Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).
[18] Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
[19] G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[20] A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the
House of Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
of the Philippines
Malacaang

14 March 2011
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City

Dear Speaker Belmonte:

Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the
necessity of the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled:

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF
THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333,
ENTITLED AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen ARMMs autonomy by synchronizing its elections
with the regular elections of national and other local officials, to ensure that the on-going peace talks in
the region will not be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to institutionalize electoral reforms in the
interim, all for the development, peace and security of the region.

Best wishes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Senate President
Philippine Senate
Pasay City
Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-031611.pdf. Last
accessed on September 26, 2011.
[21] See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
[22] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.
[23] Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 10.04, p. 282 (1972).
*24+ Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: The first regular elections of the Regional Governor,
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic Act shall be held not earlier
than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the ratification of this Act. The Commission on
Elections shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said
election.
*25+ Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao and for other purposes, which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on the second Monday
after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.
*26+ Entitled An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region
for Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Section One of Republic Act Numbered Seventy-Six
Hundred and Forty-Seven Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections for Regional
Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, which changed the date of the
ARMM elections to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three (3) years thereafter.
*27+ Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) Further Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled An Act Providing
for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes,
As Amended, and for other purposes, which moved the regional elections to the second Monday of
September and every three (3) years thereafter.
*28+ Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes, which reset the
regional elections, scheduled on September 13, 1999, to the second Monday of September 2000.
*29+ Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao to the Second Monday of September 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 8953, which reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September 2001.
*30+ Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the Approval of the Amendments to Republic
Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last Monday of November 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and For Other Purposes.
*31+ Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended, which rescheduled the ARMM regional elections scheduled for the last
Monday of November 2004 to the second Monday of August 2005.
[32] Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
[33] G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.
[34] Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36 (1915); LEWIS SOUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, Vol. 1, Section 244, pp. 456-457.
[35] This has been established by the following exchange during the Constitutional Commission debates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What segment of
the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it
passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore,
of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend
this organic act, what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the region should be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by Congress,
not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic act will still be
subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman has
another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.];
III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-183; August 11, 1986.
[36] Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.
[37] See discussions at pp. 14-15.
[38] Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a
period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day
of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and
qualified. [emphasis ours]
[39] Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176 (1974).
[40] Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63
Phil. 249, 266 (1936).
[41] Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
[42]Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in
Schneckenburger v. Moran, supra note 40, at 266.
[43] State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1
(2000 ed.)
[44] Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
[45] An empire within an empire.
[46] Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005
ed., p. 1249.
[47] Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives (paragraph 2,
Section 5, of Article VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover
orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section 26 of the Transitory Provisions.
[48] RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province was rejected by the voters of
Quezon Province in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.
[49] RA No. 9355.
[50] Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.
[51] Section 462, RA No. 7160.
[52] Supra note 14.
[53] In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798 (1970)] the Court held that, "The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to *the Constitutions+ commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[54] In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.
[55] Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.
[56] Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (1996 ed.) 768.
[57] 481 Phil. 661 (2004).
[58] G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.
[59] G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.
[60] Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly shall
be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following
the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent
elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and
qualified.
[61] Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
[62]Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356.
[63] Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-25349, December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.
[64] See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
[65] See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
[66] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006,
505 SCRA 654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales
v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
[67] CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
[68] Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
[69] Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon
of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1992.
[70] Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.
[71] Ponencia, p. 21.
[72] See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100
Phil. 683, 694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.
[73] Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro,
et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987,
156 SCRA 549.
[74] Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.
[75] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812 (2003).
[76] Supra notes 47 and 48.
[77] Supra note 50.
[78] The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where the Ampatuans stand charged, the
insurrection by the MILF and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations, among others,
are immediately past and present events that the nation has to vigilant about.
[79] 274 Phil. 523 (1991).
[80] Id. at 532.
[81] Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
[82] As noted under footnote 37.
[83] 118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
[84]Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August 11, 1986, p. 179.

[85] Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.
[86] 391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
[87] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[88] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya,
225 SCRA 511 (1993).
[89] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574
SCRA 468, 581.
[90] Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315.
[91] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827, March 11,
1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92] See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon.
Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[93] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, supra.
[94] G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
[95] Id. at 523.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.

R E S O L U T I O N

In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny
the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
the principal grounds for the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada and
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges
against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution
submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and
carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and
Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United
States, all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and
his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege
speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but
this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the
above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead
on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any
senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the
actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of
order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At
about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by
petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session
hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by
those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when
the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded
it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting
President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.

By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial
points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were
alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not
in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the
temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves
to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial
deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such,
(as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To
their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves into another
Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the
same one Philippines Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes
it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of
similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice
Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on
those sub-questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by
leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten
or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs.
Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator
Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that
office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all
concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their
acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, C.J., concurring:

I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.

Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate
because the legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by
petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726; 23
L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then its
proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its
proceedings should be voided.

The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a political
question the determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue involves a
constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by the Avelino
group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly less. And for
obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the Avelino group,
possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent believing as they do
that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group believing itself as possessing
the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of admission to the contrary, does
not find it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the Avelino group. Then the question
arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups? This anomalous situation will continue
while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain unsettled while this Court refuses to
intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures which may be
passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body
which authored them. This doubt may extend, in diverse forms, to the House of Representative and to
the other agencies of the government such as the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of
uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to
the nation. This situation may, to a large extent, be stopped and constitutional processes may be
restored in the Senate if only this Court, as the guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the
final word on the constitutional mandate governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And,
in my opinion, under the present circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet
challenge of the situation which demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As
hereinbefore stated, the present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of
this Court.

As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate,2I firmly believe that
although petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be
countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting President of the
Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll was
called, only twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and
therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter are clear.

The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum. the house
of representative consist of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a majority or quorum are
present, the house can do business; not otherwise. A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole
body, a majority of which quorum must, of course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19
L.R.A., 519.)

Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house shall constitute
a quorum to do business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than the majority of the whole
number of which the house may be composed. Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect
cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion of Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)

The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this majority may
legislate and do the work of the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S. E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A.,
532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)

. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot transact business,
this view being in keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting a smaller number than a
quorum to adjourn from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40
OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)

The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do business." In
other words, when a majority are present the House is in a position to do business. Its capacity to
transact business is then established, created by the mere presence of a majority, and depend upon the
disposition or assent or action of any single member or faction of the majority present. All that the
Constitution required is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present, the power of
the House arises. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)

If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all have been
duly notified, and the minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority of those present
may act, provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number. In other words, in such
case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may
act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in general,
considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th ed., sec. 283.)3

Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that respondent
Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is true that
respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he represent the majority of the
members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the present senatorial
alignment, he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of the situation, he must
win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is absolutely essential in the adolescent life of our
Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic principles consecrated in our
Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our political life as a republican form of
government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a mockery.

The situation now in this Court is this there are four members who believe that there was no quorum
in respondent's election as against four other member who believe that there was such quorum. Two
members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal to assume jurisdiction.
And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of whether or not respondent has
been legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under the present conditions. This doubt,
which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures that the Cuenco group has passed
and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by them by convening a session wherein thirteen
senators are present and by reiterating therein all that has been previously done by them. This is a
suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is watching with a happy heart the movement of this
gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning for a clean and honest government in this dear country
of ours.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the
position of President of the Senate is in issue.

There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents took
place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen because of
the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as acting President of
the Senate, on February 21, 1949.

Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of the
Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been properly adjourned, and the
twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump session, and said
rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which was opened by
petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators who remained in the session hall had only
continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the President of the Senate
was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President of Senate, to fill the vacate
position.

Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February 21,
1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two
Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona,
Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin,
Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima
Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the
petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session was being read the crowd of more
than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness the session, became unruly, the repeated
efforts of petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and other peace officers to maintain peace and
order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued and several shots were fired among the
audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard because the spectators would either shout to
drown their voices or would demeans that some other Senator should take the floor and be recognized
by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible for the Senate to proceed with its
deliberations free from undue pressure and without grave danger to its integrity as a body and to the
personal safety of the members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment until
Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February
24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine other Senator namely, Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez,
Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos
Tan, and Olegario Clarin left the session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of
Senate, went up the rostrum and, assuming the presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining
twelve Senators into a rump session, in which a resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and electing respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent
pretended to assume the office of president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said
office.

Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of
the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full power
to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the Rules of the
Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be called in the
Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the presidency except
in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none of the conditions
therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that convened in the
rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and the rule of the
Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the Senate.

Respondent's version of the events as follows:

(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Taada announced and reserved in open
session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour privilege,
it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President, petitioner in this
case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February 21, 1949, Senators
Lorenzo M. Taada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the secretary of the Senates a
resolution in which serious charges were preferred against the herein petitioner. A certified copy of said
resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an integral part hereof:

(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the petitioner
was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session hall until
about 11:35 A.M.;

(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Taada and Sanidad
and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he
called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;

(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that the
session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order;

(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges their
functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, evidently in
pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make use of all sorts
of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech on the charges filed
against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following 22 Senators; Vicente
J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon
Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon
Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose Avelino;

(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute, but
this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the
above-mentioned conspiracy;

(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly
took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against
petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and when after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he
would being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics of his follower, Senator
Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order! Out of order!
Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to recognized the right of Senator
Taada to speak.

(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement,
but the police officers present were able to maintain order. No shots were fired among the audience, as
alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of
petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of the session,
evidently again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to prevent Senator Taada from
speaking;

(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote;

(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote;

(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.

(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and
Clarin followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in
sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner, whereupon
Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record
as it was in so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;

(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.

(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;

(p) Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges against the petitioner contained in the Resolution,
attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval ofsaid
Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete text of
said Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously approved;

(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yield
edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting
President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral part hereof as
Exhibit "2". Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent having abstained
from voting;

(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his
oath of Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since then,
has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said office;

(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in his
favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there was no
opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;

(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was evidently
and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive Senator Taada of his right to take the floor and
to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all means to deprive
the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and that
when the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in the said session was
ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;

(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked and
made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair while
the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate President in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had
the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by
petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by
anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at 4:40
P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the Chair in
the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the Senate
President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of Senator
Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill and confined
in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum; that, despite
petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he did not count
with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the specialinvestigation
committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner deliberately did not appear
at the session hall on said date.

Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (b) No
cause of action as there are only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against twelve
Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his out ouster;
and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group of ten
Senators to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the Senate, to
entrench petitionerin power.

In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political question, the determination of which by the Senate is
binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of the
Philippines and said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil., 87;
Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the Senate is the only body that can determine from time
to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said body; and this Court's action
in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an encroachment upon the powers, rights
and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.

Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events, it is
only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by respondent.

In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the present
controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it does, a purely political question, the
determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and conclusive on the
courts.

The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the question
has been determined by the Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of them
represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled, it would
be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the Senate.

The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve the
enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the Senate.
Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not only
expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the Constitution, it
cannot be divested.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various court, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of the court may provide,
final judgment and decrees of inferior courts in

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or regulations is in
question.

(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the truth
on the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reached the
settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.

Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting President
of the Senate and that executive recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The contention is
erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme Court of the
jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which the Legislature
power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide questions of law, much
less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive power, which in the
philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the Legislative power, do so.
The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.

The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from
time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a litigation likein the
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them. To
shirk that responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.

Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the powers,
rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of which the
Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to thelegality of the adjournment
declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring vacant the position
of President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the Senate, and as to whether
or not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could continue holding session and if they
constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of justice have jurisdiction and the
SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.

From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the resolution
of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to vote, Senator
Taada voted,Senator Taada voted in the negative, alleging as ground damaging facts, supported by
several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of petitioner. At the same time,
Senator Taada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to be held on Monday, February
21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of delivering during the so-called privilege hour a speech
in support of said charges.

On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Taada and
Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a Committee of
three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructed to proceed
immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.

Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:

RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE
AVELINO.

WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the Philippines
Government and leaders of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacaang palace on January 15, 1949, delivered a
speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least, tolerance, of graft and corruption in the
government, and placed the interest of grafters and corrupt officials as supreme and above the welfare
of the people, doctrine under which it is impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;

WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the press, especially
the Chronicle Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as follows:

The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the investigations
of the surplus property commission irregularities and the immigration quota scadal as acts of injustice
he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed the National Bureau of Investigation agents
for persecuting Liberal party leaders.

"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because in that
place are no investigations, no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after us."

Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his actuations
which, he claimed, were mainly responsible for the division of the party into two hostile camps.

Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in power,
because why should we be saints when in reality we are not?

He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the surplus property
scandal and the immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the Liberal Party in the eyes of
the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the late President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against
the Liberal Party", Avelino said.

Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the government,
Avelino maintained that the Liberal Party men are entitled to more considerations and should be given
allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse their power as all humans are prone to do, they
will be given a certain measure of tolerance, Avelino said, adding, "What are we in power for?"

Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of Presidential
Roxas. As a result of these investigations, the members of Congress are subjected to unjust and
embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is worse is the fact that these senators and
representatives are being pilloried in public without formal charges filed against them. (Manila Chronicle
issue of Jan. 16, 1949).

At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to President Quirino on
Liberal Party discipline. At the same time he demanded "tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by
the party in power.

The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing specific has teen filed
against atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of Investigation agents have persecuted top
leader of the LiberalParty. That is not justice. That is injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.

Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot permit abuses, you
must at leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend
to be saints when in realitywe are not? We are not angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell.
Anyway, it is preferable to go to hell wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no
Secretary of Interior to go after us.

When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the bad crooks. We can
prepare to be good crooks.

Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St. Francis' convent. When
thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the
soldiers that thehunted man had gone the other way.

Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.

x x x x x x x x x

The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of the memory of the
late President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and
its leader in the eyes of the public.

If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it, because Quirino's
administration is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.

Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members are stockholders.
Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit. The Liberal Party, he said, has
practically no dividends at all. It has lost even its original capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments
to the government of Nacionalistas like: Lino Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General Manager of the National
Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January 18, 1949.).

WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of January 16,
1949, the Senate President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously distorted presentation
of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and threatened that "unless the proper
redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to take the necessary steps to protect my
reputation and good name";

WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification demanded by
the Senate President, but on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949, challenged him to take his
threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished the truth, we are inviting the Senate President
to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further repeated the publication of their reports on the
Senate President speech in the same issue of January 18, 1949 as quoted above;

WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate President
has not carried out his threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication, thereby confirming, in
effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and corruption;

WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were exhibited
photostatic copies of four checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have come into the possession
and control of the Senate President, after he had assumed his office;

WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the National City
Bank of the National City Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who
deposited it in her current account with the Philippine National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the Nederlands
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate President in the amount of
P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino, Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;

WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch Indische
Handelsbank, drawn on October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a Chinese concern, in
favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the Senate President to his wife, Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving Account No. 63436 with the Philippines National
Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the Nederlandsch Indische
Handelsbank, drawn by the aforementioned Chinese concern, Chiung Liu Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the
amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta
C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippines National Bank on October 26,
1946;

WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the Senate
President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other checks totalling
P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her
saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946, P325,000.00 were
withdraw by her on same day;

WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the Senate on
February 18, 1946, in an attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to be interpolated on the
same, and his explanation lacked such details and definiteness that it left many doubts unsettled;

WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that the same
represented proceeds from the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is directly contradicted by
the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath before the Horilleno Investigating
Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been loaned byhim to the Senate President, who
repaid the same within ten days;

WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948, deposits
totalling P803,865.45 were made in the current account of the Senate President's wife Mrs. Enriqueta C.
Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86 were deposited before his election
to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after his election;

WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his speech of
February 18, 1949 to the effect that he and his wife had made substantial amounts in commercial
transaction in shoes and liquor;

WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en politica todo vale",
and that inasmuch as the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it was right for the Liberals to
commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds committed by the opposition;

WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President justified the
commission of electoral frauds, which justification is a direct attack on the sovereignty of the people and
may be a cause of unrest or resolution;

WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments which
passes upon all Presidential appointment, including thoseto the judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of
his office by seeking in several instances to interfere with and influence some judge in decidingcase
pending before, thereby imperilling the independence of the judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial
administration of justice;

WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate demand a
through, impartial and immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,

1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed
2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning at
and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not then
opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time petitioner ascended
the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the resolution
introduced by the Senators Taada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to his side
Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.

Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that
petitioner called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.

Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and the
roll call showed the presence of the following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona,
Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada,
Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili,
Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.

Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was
again opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the
reading of the minutes proceeded.

Senator Taada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the
session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes. he
wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator who
speak without having been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair to
recognized the right of Senator Taada to speak, and every time he would make the request, Senator
Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.

Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from
individuals of the audience, where two fist fight took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard
from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of the
session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe motion be
submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged the gavel and
declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and, thereupon, left the session
hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo
Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin),
supporting him. Twelve SEnator, respondent and his eleven supporters, remained in the session hall.
Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the SEnate, ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators
present to order. Senator Mabanag raised the question of quorum and the question of quorum and the
President Pro-tempore ordered a roll call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall
answered.

The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to continue
transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of record that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore and those
remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the Chair.

Senator Taada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against petitioner
contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval of
said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by Senator Sanidad, and
the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to the President Pro-tempore
and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which read as follows:

RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND DESIGNATING
THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE.

Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable Jose Avelino,
President of the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby declared vacant; and that,
the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated Acting President of the SEnate, until further
orders from this Body.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz and
has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting President of theSenate.

The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we
believe the following conclusions are unavoidable.

1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the Senate
could not continue holding session and transact business for lack of quorum.

In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.

ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT

A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain
restriction, it has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even
questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made after
the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the journal. The
motion is not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an appeal may
intervene before the taking of the vote.

The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too
tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity
to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing
the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.
Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything other than placing the
legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.

There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree
motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in thiscountry
and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of
such a provision.

Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to said
effect was properly made and met with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it was right
for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection, provided the motion
was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the motion, did not
object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence, however, fails to
support petitioner's claim.

We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of
opinion that the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator Taada was bent on delivering a
speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by Senator
Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation of
said charges had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, when he
showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In said Friday
session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of confidence fathered by
Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of Senators, believing themselves to
constitute the majority, did not want to waste any time to give a showing of said majority and must have
decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to wrestfrom him the Senate leadership that upon
democratic principles rightly belongs to them.

As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the
Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and had
been requesting that Senator Taada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Taada himself made
attempts to deliver his speech.

Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process that
would give due course to the investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68, Exhibit 1,
and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.

This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session hall
and petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the Taada
and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators Angeles David
and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's Cuenco and Sanidad
began urging that the session beopened.

Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session under
the rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner
such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to take measures
to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.

The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the petitioner
and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on
the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his impedingouster, by the decisive
votes of respondent's group of Senators.

The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

QUORUM

There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only twelve
Senators, those composing respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll call
ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had raised the question of quorum.

The Constitution provides:

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article VI.)

The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual
members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of
each chamber of Congress.

The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than
thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the
majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact
that the above constitutional provision does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of the
amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments that
can validly change the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution. "Majority
of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of said
members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context of the
Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.

For all the foregoing, we conclude that:

1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their political
nature and implications, are justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme
Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should there be
analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the Philippines,
according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional question. Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent was elected acting
President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an
express and specific provision of the Constitution. Should the two absent Senators comeand attend the
session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the Senate will be kept at a stand still,
because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each group supporting petitioner's and
respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the Senate. Admitting that pressure of
public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested from respondent's side that it may
invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and revolution, there
is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance with the Constitution, which is complete
enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong committed within the framework of democracy it
established in this country. Should this Supreme Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction in this case,such
refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such shirking of official responsibility cannot
expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the issues involved in this case, affecting not
only the upper branch of Congress, but also the presidential succession as provided by Republic Act No.
181, is a challenge to our sense of duty which we should not fail to meet.

2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the Senate,
was illegal and, therefore, null and void.

3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner and his
nine supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact
business.

4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing respondent
as acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution for lack of
quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the Senate, a position
not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential succession, so much so
that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not entitle respondent to
Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes the invalidity of respondent's
election.

Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would not
be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a
mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point of view of
laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great
importance, such as who will wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the questions that this Court must
answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective supporters in the
Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive business and should not
be minded for the purposes of our decision.

The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of their
own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the polls, and
to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the Senate and
the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the Constitution and by the
rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step beyond said legal bounds
may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of justice, the latter cannot simply
wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent
attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of the wind may causea live wire to ignite
a neighboring house.

When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the President of
the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and above objections
voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the majority, we cannot
close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion: Otherwise, we would be
disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would be printing the stamp of
our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny imposed upon the upper
chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the functioning and actuations of the
Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving the country of the benefits of
legislation.

When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and
prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because twelve
Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him and to elect
another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous importance which we
should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us. Such complaint constitutes,
in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve Senators, in utter violation of the
fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother agency of government can offer that
remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint has been filed.

The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective
action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent individual units, it
cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can onlyact in organized form.
Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the organizing element without
which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The importance of such organizing
element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional Convention, and that is the reason
why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the existence of quorum for the former
National Assembly to transact official business and that requirement was also imposed by the National
Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral
Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of the Constitution and in the amendment, had
been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.

When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty
reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less than
the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to allow
the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution provides for
only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact official business,
what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into a quorum to
transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend the session, even
if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with petitioner's group.
Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the Supreme Court will
have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public opinion or, in its failure,
revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:

Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to
displease the powerful.

Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to
continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the
orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago, he
impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground the injustice then
committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero now being more generally
recognized petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.

The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this sharing
the conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people, the final
arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That conviction
and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively nowadays when the
majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of humanity springing fromthe
golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold onslaughts from many elements of
society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing their will through fraud or violence.
The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently demand a more complete respect and
faith in the effectiveness of our system of administration of justice.

For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a
philosophy and social order based on constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all
conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this Court to
refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail and
by experience we know that it had suffered many failures than revolution. This immeasurable
responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the performance of its plain duty and should
dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of wind.

The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility, should
not be understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as enunciated by
Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in practice the system of
check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make absolute that principle is to
open the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate governments within a government
and three independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid such a teratologiccreature that the
Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles embodied in the fundamental law.

Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts. The
Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power of
courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the silence, when the
proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice Marshall,
had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional provisions.
The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and outstanding
evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.

To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been advanced
that, the President of the Philippines having recognized respondent as a duly elected acting President of
the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory sprouts from the same
ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how the latter should dispose of
a pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge by saying that nothing should
guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our official functions, disregarding
completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about it.

As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may split
into two groups after a presidential election and each group may proclaim a different candidate as the
duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the principle of
separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our
hands and let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?

There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77
Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The more
said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the escutcheon of the
post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.

We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments or
otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed to
continue transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free
expressionof the will of the majority.

BRIONES, M., dissente:

Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito adelantar
las siguientes observaciones:

(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en los
asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La cuestion
constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido de que esta Corte
deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la cuestion de si el grupo
de senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se
alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha facultad, puesto que cuando dicho grupo se reunio no habia un
quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la Constitucion y de los reglamentos del Senado.
Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que
la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros en demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las manos
en un ademan de inhibicion pilatista; no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-
del-desierto estilo aveztruz. El issue constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy importante.
Tiene repercusiones directas y vitalisimas en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio
supremo de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica el
tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional es lo
esencial e importante.

Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto surgido en
el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una tremenda crisis
nacional, preada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras instituciones politicas, para el orden
publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la nacion.

Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de
America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del ao 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La analogia
es completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos Senadores, cada cual pretendiendo
ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la genuina representacion
popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers Senate", por los nombres de los
presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte Suprema de New Jersey no podia asumir
jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion eminentemente politica, por tanto no justiciable.
La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso y, por boca de su Presidente el eminente jurisconsulto Mr.
Beasley, hizo el siguiente categorico pronunciamiento:

. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by this record, we
have no doubt; and we are further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to conceive of any crisis in public
affairs that would more imperatively than the present one call for the intervention of such judicial
authority. (supra, p. 758.)

Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas por
la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema necesidad de
resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la estabilidad del gobierno y
ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto: no existe la misma razon de extrema necesidad
en el presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre las dos facciones en nuestro Senado esta
afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda cabe de que la normalidad constitucional esta
rota, con grave preocupacion de todo el mundo y con grave dao de la tranquilidad publica?

(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. Estimo
que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion frente a
la oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el. En vista de esta oposicion, el
deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de levantamiento de la sesion presentada por el
Senador Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar levantada la sesion.
Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando rutinariamente el presiding officer puede
dar por aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad de levantar la sesion no
estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma sumamente peligrosa en manos de
un presidente despotico y arbitrario.

La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus facultades
inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y tumulto en la
sala de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no justifican semejante
pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos. Lo que debia haber hecho el Senador Avelino era
tratar de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden. Tenia medios para hacerlo. No lo
hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una
desercion y los senadores del otro grupo tenian perfecto derecho a proceder como procedieron,
quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la sesion. Esta sesion venia a ser una tacita
reconduccion una simple prolongacion de la sesion que habia sido declarada abierta por el presidente
Avelino con un quorum presente de 22 miembros.

(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de quorum. Es cosa establecida y
admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12 miembros del grupo
llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado "Senado de Avelino". En esta
coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion del quorum, de cuyas resultas
se ordeno por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa
establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes que al comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres
senadores del grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y solamente respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores
del grupo de Cuenco.

Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el Senado de
24 miembros debidamente elegidos y cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe ser de 13
miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la Union americana esta repleta de
decisiones en las que se ha sentado firmemente la doctrina de que la base para determinar el quorum
legislativo es el numero total de miembros elegidos y debidamente cualificados de cada camara.1 En el
presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por tanto, el grupo Cuenco no podia seguir
celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta de quorum. De acuerdo con la Constitucion y los
reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos caminos para actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en
dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o compeler la asistencia de suficientes senadores del otro
grupo para constituir dicho quorum, pudiendo a dicho efecto ordenar inclusive el arresto de los
huelguistas. (Constitucion de Filipinas, art. VI, sec. 10, ap. 2;2 Reglamento del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y
24.3) Asi que todos los procedimientos efectuados por el grupo Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e
ilegales.

Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto constitucional sobre quorum es
significativo. Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute a quorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en el texto enmendado de 1940
se dice: "A majority of each House shall constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se quiere
deducir la consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso sea la posibilidad de
una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la existencia de un quorum. El argumento,
a mi juicio, es insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la enmienda no han hecho mas que
copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion federal americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha
interpretado en el sentido de que seala, como base para determinar el quorum, la totalidad de los
miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar
cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido tradicional de que la base para la determinacion del
quorum la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es elemental
en hermeneutica legal que una misma cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.

Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas racional para
el quorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero incluyendo al Senador
Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar gravemente enfermo,
hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento de ser llamado por el Senado. El
fundamento de esta opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no debe ser contado un miembro
que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es igualmente inaceptable. No solo
no tiene ningun precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el
quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en
cuenta que el precepto constitucional y la regla pertinente no establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley
no distingue, no debemos distinguir.

(4) Cual es el remedio. No cabe duda de que una mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a reorganizar el
Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas prescritas por la Constitucion,
las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo Cuenco que al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo
menos hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos constitucionales y legales para efectuar una
reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler la asistencia de un numero suficiente de
Senadores para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si fuese necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el
supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo sigan boicoteando las sesiones del Senado para impedir
la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el grupo Avelino acude voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos
grupos pueden buenamente restaurar la normalidad constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la
reorganizacion que desee y dicte la mayoria.

Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y facultad
para ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de sus
adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos concierne
son sus repercusiones juridicas.

Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la republica, el que
mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de un
clima politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de mano y de
estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) eso que caracteriza la historia azarosa de las llamadas "banana
republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo rigor, sin blandas
transigencias, la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que la implementan.

Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his election
was illegal.

It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.

Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a member
of the Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or permanently. There is
no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session be the criterion, then serious illness
or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of communication should operate
to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the purpose of determining the presence
of a majority.

The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the theoretical
and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to fulfill their missions. If we
test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become more apparent. The
interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to transact business so long
as it is a majority of the legislators present in the country. Nothing in my opinion could have been
farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit, under circumstances, less than
a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people to approve measures that might
vitally affect their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The necessity of arresting absent members
to complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the necessity of the attendance of an absolute
majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for ruling out absentees who are beyond the
legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a law-making body and is little concerned with
jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is an emergency measure and is rarely resorted
to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy
even in the cases of members who were inside the Philippines territory. This is especially true in the
United States of America, after whose form of government ours is patterned and whose territorial
possession extend to the other side of the globe.

This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78
Phil., 1).

In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising authority
within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a senate that, it is
alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other reasons alleged, there was not
quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate branch of the government so
much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.

Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:

An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a franchise, or
an office in a corporation created by authority of law;

x x x x x x x x x

This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by the
legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can only
be raised by the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures. (Luther vs. Border,
48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the Senate appointed by different
faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would not be the Senate by the Court
which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more reason for the Court to intervene
when the office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are being greatly
imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy determination of the same is imperatively demanded,
in the interest of good government and public order.

Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers' Reports,
annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent on the
question of this Court's jurisdiction.

March 14, 1949

R E S O L U T I O N

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose Avelino vs.
Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has resolved, by a
majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events whichjustify its
intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the
grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in their separate
opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was
elected acting Senate President.

The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has become
a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum wouldresult in
the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the
dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against
senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the latter's persistent effortsto block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the group has done enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is in conformity with
substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.

The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction but
concurs on the question of quorum.

Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.

Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the question of
quorum.

Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.

FERIA, J., concurring:

In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether this
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners Vera,
Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and compel the
respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of Sec. 11,
Article VI, of the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating to the
election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et al., who were
represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the jurisdiction of this
Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case on the ground that the question therein involved
was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno,
who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends that this Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court had jurisdiction.

And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was
whether it was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the
respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment to
the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the
United states of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was not
passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, voting
separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of Congress who
were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents maintained
the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the exclusive
province of the Legislature.

The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State Constitution of
the United States of American, after which our owns is patterned, has given rise to the distinction
between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and politicalquestions
which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under the Constitution, by
the People in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government, except to the extent that the power
to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or statutory provision.
Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a justiceable one, it has
been generally held that the first involves political rights which consist in the power to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the government of the government, while
justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights accorded to every member
of the community or nation.

Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate case and controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the
jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which comeswithin
the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to decide, the judicial
department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act of the Legislative or
Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of thecourts is the issue
involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied. Divorced from the remedy
sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
alegislative or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a coercive force.

Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood, 45
Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of said
respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and therefore this Court had
no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and dissented
from the decision of the majority.

When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling of
the Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the present
case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim of stare decisis, and in
order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said that "The
Supreme Court has changed its color i.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time according to the
political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally from the habits of
though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the sympathy they could not but
feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The ANNALS of the American Academyof
Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).

Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino case,
supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide whether or
not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing to abide by the
decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of the Justices, who
have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the jurisdiction of this Court, I
gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the
present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases, so as to establish in this country the
judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.

But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was a quorum
in the session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in
the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority, not on the
number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make attendance of
the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment
was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for considering the use of the
words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original
Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to
expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitutional, so as to require
"the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was
in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the SEnate at
its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the
Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the case of
Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1, Article XV
of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not disqualified.
And in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2, of Act No. 3104,
which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in imposing death excepted from the court those
members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this Court held that the absence of
the Chief Justice Avancea, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a legal disqualification, and his
vote was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the decision imposing death penalty.

PABLO, J., concurrente:

Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia
jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin embargo,
nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar resoluciones. Desde
luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La huelga en el Senado continua. Los recientes
acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones dentro y fuera del pais.
Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia pueden desbordase y causar fatales
consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es necesario, impedirlo.

El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles en
varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la solitud
original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto a mi voto
sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una parte, ni por la
anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.

La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben importante las consecuencias; pero como
ciudadano, me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico. Al pueblo
interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza es transigir, pues, para que haya
seis votos que sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion anterior, fracasara
todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la crisis en el Senado.

El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que hubo quorum
en la continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del Senador Avelino y compaeros. Con ellos, ya
hay siete votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce senadores son legales y validas.
pero para dar fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion.
Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un conflicto que esta minando el interes publico:
voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce
senadores formaban quorum.

De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or
hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit which seen
to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide in
judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for the
study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the teaching
may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-being and
collective happiness.

The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from many
quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We intended to
settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left hanging in the air the
important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment and reasonable
and just in a quandary.

We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of
the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like mere
scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent persons with
well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and
photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking
conflicts which invite bloodshed.

It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of
political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been
shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the
upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It has
already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot
be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other than this
Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.

The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous in
belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one way or
another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe it to be
right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several Senators who in
not remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) have shown
their conviction that in cases analogous to the present the Supreme Court has and should exercise
jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at present abroad, we will find out
that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another recognized the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous controversies as the one now challenging our
judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in democracy, the role of this Court as the last bulwark
of the Constitution.

In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of the
eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the merits.

Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.

It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial
Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring inconsistencies.

Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
(78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political emancipation of our
Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role as spokesman of the
collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.

For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution. Refusal
to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital
constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. It
would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional
Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the organization of Philippine
democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to decide such constitutional
questions.

Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike to
attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the legislative
powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful than a laborers'
strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily stop to work.
Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is menaced with
dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy and chaos are its
alternatives.

There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor officials
and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of quorum should not be leftunanswered.

Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the Senate quorum is
absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the constitutional amendment, upon the creation
of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the substance of the constitutional
concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The words "all the members" used in the
original, for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the
amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this
opinion, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee
on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of
each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of
all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical meaning. A
majority means more than one-half (). It can neverbe identified with one-half () or less than one-half
(). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less is etched in the
background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all opposites, and in the
same way that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the creation with nothingness,
existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.

The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than
thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24) units.
This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton
and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.

No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two equal
number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one hand
cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatiblewith
equality. It implies the idea of superiority.

Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning great.
Majority means the greater of two numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number greater
than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It presupposes the existence
of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators composing the Senate.

The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum
created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the session of
February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.

The Constitution provides:

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under
such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)

The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one
among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to
"compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such House may
provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller
number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a
temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.

As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the
picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings
us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.

At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator Mariano J.
Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for petitioner,
manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting President of the
Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions. He would only make
of record his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner from presiding over said
sessions.

The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent under
oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so that,
instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure, is inadmissible as
incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about respondent's
testimony, because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's counsel,
Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.

Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to
refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from the
historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.

If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he has
sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment made
under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been not only failing but
refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his group of
Senators have given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue warrants of
arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions of the Senate? Why is it that
the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping him, have to be hunting for
the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical endeavor to compel them to attend
the sessions?

The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in all
newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered,
weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday sessions, February 18
and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command the
position of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the sessions of the
Senate, the most characteristic and important function of President of the Senate.

His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
(Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p. 980-981;
Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).

What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's reason?
They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the motion for
reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to exercise
jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of the majority
has only increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to sabotage the
sessions of the Senate.

If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt that
the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it, the present national crisis
hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .

The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest are
highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that they can
simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers entrusted with the execution.
Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that demand remedial
legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife would have ended if, for
the reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court would have ordered
petitioner's reposition.

Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would certainly
have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the sessions with senators of the Avelino
group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The twelve senators of the
Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all the disputed
actuations of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they would have
succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of President of the Senate.

Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.

Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy, by
quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken the
same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's action in
adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of the
Cuenco group would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for immediate
execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing the session hall.

The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious
charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot
demand less.

Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result will
not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position by attending the sessions of
the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.

The motion for reconsideration should be denied.

Footnotes

1 On this matter, the vote is 6 to 4 in favor of lack of jurisdiction.

2 On this matter, the vote is 4 to 4.

3 Quoted with approval in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed., 321, 325.

BRIONES, M., disidente:

1 ". . . . Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

"Each House shall be the judge of the elections. . . . and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to
do business."

"Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court of that country held in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 L.
Ed. 321, 325:

"The Constitution provides that 'a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do business.' In
other words, when a majority are present, the House is in a position to do business. Its capacity to
transact business is then established, created by the mere presence of a majority, and does not depend
upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction of the majority present. All
that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present, the
power of the House arises."

"The same decision quoted with approval from Dillon, Mun. Corp., the following rule:

". . . If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all tha agents are assembled, or if all have
been duly notified, and the minority refuse or neglect to meet with the others, a majority of those
present may act, provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number. In other words, in
such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum
may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in
general, considered to cease."

"Quorum as used in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house shall constitute
a quorum to do business, is, of the purposes of the Assembly, not less than the majority of the whole
number of which the house may be composed.

Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum."
(Opinion of Justices, 12 Fla. 653)

2 A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide.

3 CHAPTER VI The house Sec. 23. A majority of the Senators shall constitute a quorum to do
business.

"SEC. 24. Whenever the question of quorum is raised by any Senator in any session, the Chair shall
immediately order a roll call and announce forthwith the result.

"This shall be done without debate. If after the roll call it appears that there is no quorum, a majority of
the Senators present may other the Sergeant-at-arms to summon the attendance of absent Senators,
and, if necessary, to compel their attendance, in which case the order that that effect shall not be
subject to debate.

"SEC. 25. Only for a just cause may a Senator be excused from atttending the session."

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