Chinas Foreign Strategy

MITSURU KITANO
This article introduces four trends of Chinas foreign strategy. Analysis of
Chinas diplomacy since the 1980s based on these concepts demonstrates
Chinas intent to become a great power and its aspirations for a China-
centric order.
Introduction
W
here is China headed?
This question has been asked with increasing frequency since around 2009. In
December 2009, China took a stubborn stance at the 15th Conference of the
Parties of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15), which was
held in Copenhagen, while September 2010 saw the collision incident between
Japans coast guard patrol vessels and a Chinese shing trawler off the Senkaku
Islands. Moreover, we have witnessed tension and disputes between China and
various ASEAN nations over the South China Sea.
1
In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident and the collapse of the socialist
regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Deng Xiao-ping directed that
China should pursue a foreign policy course of hiding its talents and biding its
time, and seeking concrete achievements. In the context of Deng Xiao-
pings foreign policy directives, this has been interpreted as a call for a low-
prole foreign policy, with the emphasis on the rst of these two phrases,
hiding ones talents and biding ones time. However, as China has come to
aspire to a great-power foreign policy, this appears to have morphed into stead-
fastly continue to hide ones talents and bide ones time, and actively seek con-
crete achievementswith the emphasis on the latter phrase.
2
In line with this
process, conicts between Chinas own values and those of the international com-
munity seem to be becoming more frequent.
Although the Chinese leadership re-emphasizes, both at home and abroad,
that Chinese foreign policy is peaceful in nature and is trying to curb this kind
of friction, it appears to be putting expansion ahead of resolving the issues.
ISSN 1343-9006 print; 1469-2937 online/11/02003723
Routledge Publishing, Taylor and Francis,http//www.tandfonline.com/. 37
#Institute for International Policy Studies,http://www.iips.org/.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2011.630855
Asia-Pacic Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011
This is linked to the fact that China is increasingly augmenting its national
strength. However, this is not the whole storyit is also related to the expanding
scope of values which China is seeking to achieve through its foreign policy, the
greater diversity of the players involved in foreign policy, and the increasing dif-
culty involved in coordinating foreign policy in such an environment.
3
In this context, it seems increasingly necessary to view Chinas foreign strat-
egy from multiple angles, and to regard it as the product of reconciliation, compe-
tition, and conict between multiple policy trends, instead of simply trying to
explain it in terms of a single unifying principle. Although attempts to understand
China have hitherto encompassed a widespread view of the nation as a monolithic
existence founded on a unied purposewhose every sectors actions are coordi-
nated with a view to the achievement of this purposein reality China is appear-
ing to become multipolar and pluralistic to a signicant degree. (Naturally, it must
be recalled that, regarding important matters, discussions held and decisions taken
at the leadership level will be acted on accordingly.)
Under this understanding, this article will look at the changes in Chinas
foreign strategy in the period since the era of open and reform, and will attempt
to examine prospects for the future. In this context, the expression foreign strat-
egy has the same meaning it has in Tatsumi Okabes Chinas Foreign Strat-
egythat is, it denotes an external policy with a long-term perspective
4
and
which forms the basis for the conduct of day-to-day foreign policy and foreign
relations.
This article is structured as follows: The rst section explains the four trends
in foreign strategy that form the theoretical framework for this article, while the
next three sections analyze the changes in Chinas foreign strategy in the period
from the 1980s to the 2000s. The next two sections consist of analysis of the
players involved in foreign relations, and that conducted in accordance with the-
ories of international relations, while the nal section presents conclusions based
on the discussion in the earlier sections.
Two axesfour trends
When attempting to look at Chinas foreign strategy as the product of reconcilia-
tion, competition, and conict between multiple policy trends, the rst issue pre-
sented is the question of the best type of coordinate axes against which the strategy
should be viewed.
One point of reference in this regard is the four trends in US foreign policy
identied by Walter Russell Mead in his book, Special Providence.
5
As is well-
known, in this book Walter Russell Mead identies four trends in US foreign
policy: the Wilsonian, the Hamiltonian, the Jeffersonian, and the Jacksonian. In
schematic terms, these are as follows:
6
38 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
.
Wilsonian: pursuing to spread American democratic and social values through-
out the world
.
Hamiltonian: aiming to become a maritime nation, with active foreign engage-
ment
.
Jeffersonian: aiming to become a continental nation, with selective foreign
engagement
.
Jacksonian: emphasizing the physical security and the economic well-being of
the American people
A number of axes of conict are evident among Meads four trends, such as
outward-looking (Hamiltonian) versus inward-looking (Jeffersonian), and realis-
tic (Hamiltonian and Jacksonian) versus idealistic (Wilsonian and Jeffersonian).
With this as a point of reference, Chinas foreign strategy might well be viewed
against an X-axis of Emphasis on domestic revitalizationEmphasis on
increased foreign inuence, and a Y-axis of InternationalismNationalism.
If these are correlated with the directives of Deng Xiao-ping mentioned at the
start of this article, a course emphasizing hiding ones talents and biding ones
time would equate to emphasis on domestic revitalization on the X-axis,
while a course emphasizing seeking concrete achievements would equate to
emphasis on increased foreign inuence. Meanwhile, a tendency to respect the
values of the international community would equate to internationalism on the
Y-axis, while a tendency for China to accentuate its own values would equate to
nationalism. The conventional wisdom tends to regard that those emphasizing
seeking concrete achievements are hard-liners, and those emphasizing hiding
ones talents and biding ones time favor international harmony. However, as
Shin Kawashima has pointed out, the faction that emphasizes hiding ones
talents and biding ones time set great store by the fact that China is a developing
country and is inclined to take a cautious attitude to shouldering the weight of an
international role, such as through participation in frameworks for resolving inter-
national issues.
7
In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish between the two axes.
If the two axes cross, four quadrants are produced (see Figure 1). These four
quadrants thus represent the four trends in Chinas foreign strategy, which may be
described in more detail as follows:
.
One-nation course (nationalism in the context of emphasizing domestic revita-
lization)
.
Opening course (internationalism in the context of emphasizing domestic revitalization)
.
Responsible-great-power course (internationalism in the context of emphasis
on increased foreign inuence)
.
China-centric order course (nationalism in the context of emphasis on
increased foreign inuence)
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 39
Chinas Foreign Strategy
Among these four trends, it is tempting to conate the responsible-great-power
course and the China-centric order course under the name great-power course.
However, although they both have a tendency to emphasize expansion of Chinas
foreign inuence, the responsible-great-power course (which entails respect for inter-
national values) is designed to maintain the status quo, while the China-centric order
course (which entails respect for Chinas own values) has a revisionist slant.
These four trends can be used as tools for understanding inclinations in
specic periods, for perceiving changes in chronological fashion, for understand-
ing tendencies in specic elds and specic cases, and for understanding the pro-
clivities of the various players involved in foreign policy. In this article, they will
be used to analyze Chinas foreign strategy since the time of open and reform. The
next three sections deal with the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s.
The 1980sthe opening course as mainstream
It appears that it was the opening course that represented the mainstream of
Chinas foreign policy in the 1980s, although it included elements of the one-
nation course. The China-centric order course and the responsible-great-power
course did not emerge in any prominent fashion. This can be expressed schema-
tically as follows:
By way of comparison with the previous period, the most signicant change was
the adoption of the open and reform policy after the Third Plenary Session of the
Figure 1 The four trends in Chinas foreign strategy
40 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
Communist Party Central Committee, which was held at the end of 1978. This led
to the adoption in earnest of the opening course as foreign strategy, which then
became mainstream.
The Mao Zedong era was an era of war and revolution.
8
In the 1970s, China
adopted a single-front foreign strategy under which it drew closer to the USA and
prepared for confrontation with the Soviet Union. Preaching the theory of the
three worlds, China still ranked itself as a developing country and an oppressed
nation, and thus the notion of expanding its inuence abroad carried little weight.
It could be argued that elements of aiming at the China-centric order course were
present: China envisaged the Soviet Union as its principal adversary, pursued to
highlight the rivalrous relationship among the USA, the Soviet Union, and
China, and was involved with the international communist movement. Overall,
however, Chinas participation in the global system was extremely limited, and,
in this sense, this was an era in which the one-nation course was predominant.
Although tentative moves were also afoot to initiate the opening course, these
did not rise to the level of full-scale expansion.
On the contrary, once Deng Xiao-ping had assumed supreme power, there
was a realistic awareness that Chinas capabilities fell far short of those of the
superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. China brought in capital and technol-
ogy from the advanced nations of the West, adopted a course of attempting to
build up its national strength, and set great store by a stable international environ-
ment in which it could concentrate on building up its economy. That is, the devel-
opment and mainstreaming of the opening course is evident in the sense that China
was attempting to adopt the values of the international community while empha-
sizing domestic revitalization.
This is not to say, however, that China attempted to adopt the values of the
international community in all areas; this was mainly conned to the economic
sphere. By contrast, in the political realmthat is, as regards democracy and
human rightsChina consistently took a cautious attitude to the international
communitys values.
In its relations with the major powers, China switched from a foreign policy
of treating the Soviet Union as its main enemy and concluding a quasi-strategic
relationship with the USA, to a foreign policy of autonomy and independence
in which it did not maintain a strategic relationship with any great power. Essen-
tially, the US-China relationship changed for the better as the opening course
developed and became mainstream. After President Richard Nixons visit to
China in 1972, diplomatic relations between the USA and China were normalized
in 1979, and the two nations concluded a joint communique in 1982. Until the Tia-
nanmen Square incident in 1989, US-China relations enjoyed a honeymoon
period. Japan-China relations were also essentially friendly. Japan commenced
ofcial development assistance (ODA) to China in 1979, and China attached
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 41
Chinas Foreign Strategy
great importance to its relationship with Japan which provided capital and technol-
ogy. China focused its attention on Japan as a model of modernization. The more
important the opening course became, the more important Chinas relationship
was with Japan. Although problems did arisesuch as Chinas trade decit
with Japan, textbook issues, and the Kokaryo dormitory issuegiven the impor-
tance of Chinas relationship with Japan to the success of the opening course, these
were not problems that would irreparably harm the bilateral relationship.
9
The 1990sthe seeds of great-power diplomacy
To summarize, during the 1990s China maintained the opening course as the cor-
nerstone of its foreign strategy (although there was some evidence of a shift
towards the one-nation course during the rst half of the decade, the opening
course remained the basis of its policy). In the latter half of the decade, the
seeds of the great-power course (the China-centric order course plus the respon-
sible-great-power course) became evident. In schematic terms, this can be rep-
resented as follows:
The events that rst jolted Chinas foreign strategy during this period were the
Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and the collapse of the socialist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Deng Xiao-ping tried to bolster Chinas
foreign policy by directing that the nation should watch dispassionately, act
calmly, hide its talents, bide its time, and seek concrete achievements.
10
These
pronouncements were seen as emphasizing that China should guard against
peaceful evolution inspired by the West and keep a low prole in its foreign
policy. During this period, we witnessed emphasis on the national interest and
one-nation aspirationsas a result of the greater tension in relations between
China and the international community this can be seen as a shift towards the
one-nation course. Although there was some dispute about the appropriateness
of the open and reform policy as it related to the danger of peaceful evolution,
in 1992 Deng Xiao-ping used the speeches on his southern tour to issue the
command to speed up open and reform. As Ryosei Kokubun has pointed out,
this represented a means of attempting to secure Chinas own survival by
instead joining in wholeheartedly with the international community.
11
This can
be interpreted as further strengthening of the opening course, although it was
restricted to the economic area.
12
In the early 1990s, China embarked on activating diplomacy with neighboring
countries, beginning by normalizing diplomatic relations and demarcating borders
with them. As Rumi Aoyama has pointed out, this entailed Chinas escape from its
international isolation against the backdrop of the hostile international environ-
ment produced by the Western nations criticism and sanctions after the Tianan-
42 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
men Square incident and the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union.
13
In light of Chinas international awareness, the multipolar
structure that already existed in the Asia-Pacic region within the prevailing inter-
national power structure (which Seiichiro Takagi has analyzed as consisting of
one superpower and several major powers) probably represented an environ-
ment that was more conducive for breaking out of Chinas post-Tiananmen
Square incident isolation.
14
In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident, improvements in US-China
relations did not come easily. Initially, the Clinton administration, which was
inaugurated in 1993, adopted an attitude that emphasized the importance of
improving human rights conditions and attempted to link this with the granting
of most-favored-nation status to China. It subsequently reviewed its policy
towards China, however, and in September 1993 switched to a policy of compre-
hensive engagement with China.
15
As Emi Mifune has pointed out, cooperation
with China had become a necessity even for the USAbecause it had to take
into account the strength of the Chinese economy (fast becoming an epicenter
of growth), because it had an increasing need for Chinese cooperation on regional
security and weapons proliferation issues, and because the role of the United
Nations had increased in the post-Cold War era.
16
Despite the occasional are-up of short-lived tension, as Chinas strength as a
nation became more palpable, the need for Chinese cooperation came to serve as a
corrective force. As was evident from the delinking of most-favored-nation status
from human rights issues, this clearly gave China greater room to maneuver and
enabled it to deal from a position of greater strength.
In the mid-1990s, Japan-China relations began to change signicantly. After
reection on the Tiananmen Square incident, China intensied its patriotic edu-
cation.
17
Although this was not a policy that was specically targeted at Japan,
the effect that it had on the sentiments of the Chinese people towards Japan did sub-
sequently serve to cast a shadow over Chinas relations with Japan. Furthermore,
the investment boom in China sparked by the intensication of the open and
reform policy in the wake of Deng Xiao-pings southern tour in 1992, and the pro-
gressive improvement in Chinas relations with Western nations meant that China
no longer needed to rely on Japan alone. Under these circumstances, there was an
eruption of historical issues, such as that of civilian reparations. In the 1980s and
early 1990s, it would not have done for China to allow its relationship with
Japana relationship pivotal to the opening courseto deteriorate. Now,
however, China had more room to maneuver.
Starting in the late 1990s, China actively developed its diplomacy with neigh-
boring countries.
18
To Chinas eyes, the strategic environment in East Asia had
changed, in light of events on the international stage such as the Taiwan Strait
Crisis and the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996. In this context,
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 43
Chinas Foreign Strategy
it appears that Chinas aims in actively developing its diplomacy with neighboring
countries included attempting to avoid US-led containment and securing a base of
support and space to operate in neighboring countries.
19
The establishment of the
Shanghai Five in 1996 and Chinas active participation in the ASEAN Regional
Forum in the latter half of the 1990s can be seen as concrete indications of this.
In 1996, China also began developing partnership diplomacy,
20
establish-
ing partnership relationship with Russia in 1996,
21
the USA in 1997, and Japan
in 1998. This can be seen as a move towards the pro-active exercise of its
foreign inuence, in that China was conducting active diplomacy in which it
treated each case on its merits even vis-a`-vis great powers.
This partnership diplomacy and active development of diplomacy with neigh-
boring countries represented the seeds of great-power diplomacy. In light of
Chinas international awareness, it is evident that, on the one hand, China was
trying to increase its national strength while cooperating with the USA (in recog-
nition of the reality of one superpower and several major powers), while, on the
other hand, it was securing a base of support and space to operate in neighboring
countries, and trying to exercise its foreign inuence with a view to promoting
multipolarity.
The 2000sthe development of great-power
diplomacy
In the 2000s, the great-power course (the China-centric order course plus the
responsible-great-power course) came into its own, with the opening course
also in evidence and serving as a conservative counterweight to the great-power
course. The one-nation course, however, was on the wane. Using the same type
of diagram as before, this can be shown schematically as follows:
Chinas condence had been boosted by its handling of the Asian Currency Crisis
of 1997, and, in the China of the 2000s, there were frequent expressions of interest
in, and allusions to, the great power and great-power diplomacy concepts.
China was aware that it was now a great power, and the need grew for it to con-
sider ways to counter the notion of a menacing China in cases where it was con-
ducting itself as a great power. To meet this requirement, the concepts of Chinas
peaceful rise
22
advanced by Zheng Bijian, President Hu Jintaos foreign policy
expert, as well as the concept of Chinas peaceful development.
23
President
Hu Jintaos argument regarding a harmonious worldan expression he began
emphasizing in 2005was also partly intended to counter the notion of China
as a threat. These arguments included the notion that China should aim for the
establishment of what it perceives as a more appropriate world order, rather
than play its role to the full within the existing order.
24
As Chinas awareness
44 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
that it was a great power became more entrenched, the expression one super-
power and several major powers, which had been used frequently after the end
of the Cold War to describe the global power structure, fell into disuse.
25
As this awareness of the nation as a great power grew more established, China
actively developed its diplomacy with neighboring countries.
26
Chinas diplo-
macy with neighboring countries has produced noteworthy developments in
three regions: Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. In
Central Asia, the former Shanghai Five was enlarged to become the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, and it went on to undertake its activities
with renewed vigor.
27
In Southeast Asia, Chinas specic focus on its relationship
with ASEAN is actively shaping the regional architecture of East Asia.
28
On the
Korean Peninsula, the Six-Party Talks were started in August 2003, with China as
the chair.
29
This contrasted most clearly with the passive attitude that China had
demonstrated at the time of the rst North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994.
The USA had made known its expectations that China display a positive attitude,
and China followed through on its commitment to the USA to play a role
internationally.
Satoshi Amako has pointed out that Chinas active diplomacy with neighbor-
ing countries was not simply geared to expanding its inuence but was also linked to
Chinas own grand strategy for forming a new global order.
30
Thus, it bore the
hallmark of the China-centric order course as well as that of the responsible-
great-power course. As Akio Takahara has pointed out, this will encompass
frameworks both from which the USA is excluded and to which the USA is
included.
31
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is an example of the former,
while the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Six-Party Talks are examples of the
latter. In the former instance, China was expandingits own base of support and oper-
ational space in an area where the inuence of the USA was weak.
32
In the latter
instances, in the case of the ASEAN Regional Forum, China was dispelling the
fear among neighboring countries that it represented a threat, having maintained
its partnership with the USA,
33
while in the case of the Six-Party Talks, China
was taking its own initiative on an issue in which the involvement of the USA
was inevitable, so as to ensure that there would not be an outcome that was undesir-
able to China.
The development of relations with the USA served to boost the great-power
course. As China made the transition to a great power, US-China relations became
tense and then ease, alternately. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy
during the military intervention by NATO in Yugoslavia in 1999 caused the
relationship between the two nations to deteriorate, and there was further
tension due to the perception by the Bush administration (which was inaugurated
in 2001) of China as a strategic rival. On the other hand, the need for the USA
to have China as a partner in ghting terrorism in the wake of the terror attacks
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 45
Chinas Foreign Strategy
of 9/11 and the fact that even the USA had no choice but to develop its economic
relations with China led to improved US-China relations and upgraded mechan-
isms for dialogue and consultation.
34
Specically, the U.S.-China Strategic Dialo-
gue began in 2005 (which the USA dubbed the US-China Senior Dialogue), and
then in 2009 the two nations commenced the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue, in addition to the economic discussions which they were holding. These
represent cooperation mechanisms between great powers. During this period, the
moves by the USA to encourage China to play a role and increase its awareness
within the international community (in line with Robert Zoellicks 2005 notion
of China as a responsible stakeholder)
35
have been remarkable.
In the latter half of the 2000s, as Chinas presence on the global stage has been
felt ever more keenly, the idea of a G2 has been proposed, which would assume
the USA and China to play leading roles in the management of global issues.
36
The
Chinese response to this has been wary. The Chinese appear to have concluded
that, given the burdens that accompany an international role and the perception
of China as a threat that exists among neighboring countries, there is no advantage
to engaging in these kinds of discussions head on.
There have also been vicissitudes in Chinas relationship with Japan. There
were anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, and Japan-China relations grew
chilly. However, in the October 2006 talks between Prime Minister Shintaro
Abe and President Hu Jintao, the bilateral relationship was characterized as a
mutually benecial relationship based on common strategic interest, and the
relationship was back on the road to recovery. Japan and China stand side-by-
side as great powers in East Asia. By being aware that the relationship encom-
passes various unresolved issues that could are up easily, the two nations had
arrived at a point where they could sustain an amicable relationship only by mana-
ging the relationship with great care. The characterization of the bilateral relation-
ship as a mutually benecial relationship based on common strategic interest
expressed such perception of both countries.
37
Starting in around 2006, China embarked on an effort to redene its national
interests.
38
Since the adoption of the policy of open and reform, the main objective
of Chinas foreign policy had been to create conditions that were advantageous for
economic development. Since around 2006, however, China has added its national
sovereignty and security to the equation, and has come to exhibit the belief that its
foreign policy should be geared to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and
development interests.
39
The concept of core interests is also mentioned fre-
quently in this connection. Since 2007, the expression core interests has been
used in bilateral summit documents, attracting interest and attention when it
appeared in the US-China joint statement on the occasion of President Barack
Obamas visit to China in November 2009. This expression is used to convey
the concept of Chinas assertions that there is no room for compromise on
46 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, and there has also been debate on whether or not
China perceives the South China Sea as a core interest.
40
These tendencies indicate that, as China makes the transition to a foreign strat-
egy predicated on the notion of itself as a great power, there is a possibility that it is
inclining towards the China-centric order course, which emphasizes Chinas own
set of inalienable values, rather than towards the responsible-great-power course,
with its respect for international values.
Where, then, is China headed? The following two sections will consider this
question from two different perspectivesa description of the players involved
in foreign relations and an analysis using theoretical international-relations
frameworks.
The players involved in foreign relations
When considering the question of where Chinas foreign strategy is headed, one
important perspective focuses on who the players involved in foreign relations are.
In fact, a striking trend in China in recent times has been the remarkable
diversication in the players involved in foreign relations. Akira Asano points
out that, while there were three principal actors in the Mao Zedong era (the Com-
munist Party, the State Council, and the Peoples Liberation Army), as open and
reform progressed the roles of regional administrations, companies, journalism,
and public opinion grew in importance.
41
While pointing out that the various
players power is compartmentalized, Jacobson and Knox focus on the media,
netizens, and the business community as the new players.
42
The important consideration in this context is which of the foreign strategy
courses the players will opt for.
In any country, public opinion tends to be fairly hard-line regarding foreign
policy; this tendency is particularly pronounced in the opinions expressed on the
Internet, and China is no exception in this regard. It has been pointed out that the
nationalistic opinions of netizens inuence the actions of the authorities,
43
and
this tendency has also been in evidence in connection with Chinas relations with
Japan at the time of the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 and of the collision
incident off the Senkaku Islands of 2010. It has also been pointed out that, since
freedomof speech is restricted, in spheres such as patriotism, where it is more per-
missible to publish ones opinions, such opinions tend to be voiced forcefully. Thus,
public opinion would seem to support the China-centric order course.
With regard to another of the new players, the business community, it would
seem that sectors which have interests abroad (including large state-owned com-
panies, nancial institutions, and energy-sector companies) do exert inuence on
foreign policy.
44
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 47
Chinas Foreign Strategy
For example, it has been pointed out that when the state-owned oil companies
make company investments overseas, because they then require the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to protect their foreign interests, they effectively become an
interest group which exerts inuence on foreign policy.
45
In such a business
community with foreign interests, the majority would also seem to be advocates
of the China-centric order course.
In addition to these players, the Chinese military appears to be involved in an
increasing number of aspects of foreign relations (although it has long been a
player in this sphere), given the redenition of state interests that has led to the
emphasis on state sovereignty and security alongside economic development.
46
It has been pointed out that an uncompromising foreign-affairs course will be
replete with organizational benets for the military, in that it will then be in a
stronger position to request increased defense spending, improved working con-
ditions, and better equipment from the Chinese leadership.
47
The majority in
the military would also seem to be advocates of the China-centric order course.
There are some in the academic sphere who advocate the responsible-great-
power course. For example, Wang Yizhou,
48
who cites responsibility as a basic
pillar of foreign policy alongside development and sovereignty, could probably
be described as the standard-bearer for the responsible-great-power course.
Among the players involved in foreign relations, there are also some who take a cau-
tious attitude to the great-power course. For example, it has been pointed out that,
among others, former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and former Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army Xiong Guangkai have insisted that China is
still a developing country and must concentrate on economic development.
49
Although there is now greater diversity in the players involved in foreign
relations, in general the majority of the newly inuential players tend to favor
the China-centric order course. As Jacobsen and Knox have pointed out, it is
now the case that among those engaged in foreign relationsboth veterans
and newcomers alikethe mainstream view is that the calls from the advanced
industrialized nations for China to contribute to the global public good represent
an attempt to delay the rise of China,
50
and it appears that there is widespread
agreementparticularly among those newly involved in foreign policythat, in
order to protect these interests, China must aggressively draw up rules regarding
international commitments.
51
Analysis using theoretical international-relations
frameworks
As is well-known, there are three main theoretical frameworks for understanding
international relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
52
Realism empha-
sizes the role of the sovereign state, the pursuit of national interests, and the
48 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
exercise of national strength; it focuses on international relations in terms of power
struggles. Liberalism emphasizes international interdependence and functional
cooperation; it focuses on cooperative international relations. Constructivism
focuses on the notion that international relations are driven by the subjective rec-
ognition of norms and identities.
In 2005, an article appeared in the journal International Security titled, The
Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conict Inevitable?, Aaron Friedberg dis-
cusses the grounds for optimism and for pessimism from the perspective of
each of these three theoretical frameworks.
53
As a matter of fact, each of the
three frameworks produces a different picture of both China and its engagement
with the rest of the world.
Which of these three theoretical frameworks can best be used to explain the
changes in Chinas foreign strategy, as described in this article? Might this examin-
ationalsoprovide some suggestionas tothe kindof pathChina will adopt inthe future?
To state the conclusion at the outset, realism appears to be best able to explain
the changes in Chinas foreign strategy, as described in this article.
Specically, the mainstreaming of the opening course from the 1970s until
the 1980s was a means of increasing its national strength by adoption of a
policy of introducing technology and expertise from the advanced nations.
Chinas shift to the great-power course from the 1990s to the 2000s represented
its intent to play a role as a great power, in keeping with its enhancement of its
national strength. The rise of the China-centric order course, which occurred in
the process, indicated that, as Chinas relative importance within the international
community grew, it sought to exercise its national strength and advance its inter-
ests by trying to form an international order that was more desirable in its own
view, rather than simply adhering to the existing international order. All these
phenomena are most easily explained from the perspective of realism.
They can also be partly explained in terms of liberalism and constructivism.
For example, since the development of cooperation under the opening course
served to advance functional cooperation, it can also be explained in terms of lib-
eralism. The responsible-great-power-course component within the shift to the
great-power course can also be explained in terms of liberalism, in that greater
international interdependence led to a larger role for China. This can also be
understood from the perspective of constructivism, if the focus is placed on the
enormous amount of activity that took place. In light of this viewpoint, some advo-
cates of liberalism believe China to be a status-quo power.
54
On the other hand, it is difcult to explain the rise of the China-centric order
course in terms of liberalism or constructivism. Liberalism has it that participation
in international organizations and increased interdependence presage conciliation
with international values, while constructivism sees an enormous amount of
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 49
Chinas Foreign Strategy
activity as foreshadowing this same conciliation. In other words, despite the fact
that these two theories predict the opposite, in reality China seems to be accentuat-
ing its own values in an increasing number of areas.
55
Since realism thus offers the best explanation, what is Chinas likely path in
the future from that perspective?
Given that inuencing the formation of an international order is conducive to
Chinas national interests, it can be predicted that China will step up its pursuit of
the China-centric order course. Furthermore, this suggests that as long as China
does not feel that the friction engendered by this path is disadvantageous to its
national interests, it will continue to proceed on this course.
Conclusion
Continuing the investigations of Samuel Kim, Kazuko Mouri has analyzed
changes in the attitude of Chinas international systems as follows: selective
system changes (1970s), followed by maintenance and active use of the systems
(1980s and rst half of the 1990s), followed by attempts to create systems
(since the latter half of the 1990s).
56
However, if these are classied using the
four trends dened in this article, the fulcrum of Chinas international strategy
shifted from the one-nation course to the opening course; with the adoption of
the policy of open and reform from the 1990s to the 2000s, it further shifted to
the great-power course (see Figure 2). As for the shift to the great-power
course, the following features are noteworthy.
Figure 2 The shift of fulcrum of Chinas international strategy
50 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
First, while the switch to the great-power course can be seen to include
aspects of both a shift to the responsible-great-power course and a shift to the
China-centric order course, a predominant trend in favor of the China-centric
order course (in line with Chinas increased national strength) is evident. In the
arena of diplomacy with neighboring countries, China has intensied its efforts
to expand its own base of support and operational space in areas where the inu-
ence of the USA is weak, as exemplied by the 2001 transformation of the Shang-
hai Five (which had been established in 1996) into the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and by the renewed vigor with which this new organization has sub-
sequently undertaken its activities. On the doctrinal front, too, China has come to
make frequent use of the concept of core interestsan expression which
denotes issues on which China has no room for compromiseas it has been rede-
ning its national interests. In terms of specic incidents as well, since around
2009 there have been frequent cases of friction with other nations, as mentioned
at the beginning of this article.
These can be categorized as follows:
.
Pending issues of territorial claims and cases involving maritime activities (for
example, the collision incident off the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea
issue)
.
Cases involving the establishment of international rules (for example, Chinas
handling of COP15)
.
Cases involving Chinas own economic policies and economic activities (for
example, the rare-earth issue)
.
Human rights issues (for example, Chinas handling of the award of the Nobel
Prize to Liu Xiaobo)
In each category, however, it appears that the friction occurred and became serious
because, rather than respecting the values of the international community, China
stubbornly asserted its own values and then took action on this basis. Thus, these
cases appear to be a consequence of the predominance of the trend towards the
China-centric order course.
Second, the switch to the great-power course did not take place in stages, with
a shift to the responsible-great-power course as the rst stage, followed by a shift
to the China-centric order course in line with Chinas increased national strength.
The move to make the transition to the China-centric order course could be seen
right from the outset in the mid-1990s, when the seeds of the great-power course
were evident. For example, both the Shanghai Five, which appeared to be geared
towards avoiding US-led containment and securing Chinas own base of support
and operational space in neighboring countries, and Chinas strategic partnership
with Russia (its rst partnership relationship) were established in 1996.
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 51
Chinas Foreign Strategy
Third, China has been alternating between the responsible-great-power course
and the China-centric order course, depending on the country or region with which
it is dealing, or the eld in which it is operating. In general, it is evident that China
tends to act in a conciliatory manner by touting the responsible-great-power course
when it is dealing with the might of the USA, and to adopt the China-centric order
course in regions where the USAhas little interest, or in regions to which US power
does not extend. In this sense, Chinas dealings vary even in its diplomacy with
neighboring countries, depending on whether the forum is one in which the USA
participates (the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Six-Party Talks) or one in
which the USA does not participate (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation).
What is important in the future is the direction that the great-power course
will takespecically, whether the China-centric order course will predominate
even further or whether the brakes will be applied.
To judge from the dynamics of Chinas international relations at the present
time, it seems that the China-centric order course will become more dominant as
Chinas national strength increases and its relative importance in the international
community grows. This is a structure in which a countrys tendency to accentuate
its own values acts as a strong lure (like a powerful magnet): If the possibility
arises for a country to increase its national power and gravitate towards this ten-
dency, it will get pulled into it. Chinas recent redenition of its national interests
would seem to be a renewed example of this trend.
Supporting evidence for this kind of forecast is available, both in terms of the
players involved in international relations and the theoretical frameworks for
understanding international relations. Among each of the individual categories
of players whose importance has grown (public opinion, the business community,
and the military), advocates of the China-centric order course are in the majority.
Looking back at the changes in Chinas international strategy up to this point, it
appears that among the theoretical frameworks for understanding international
relations, realism provides a better explanation than liberalism or constructivism.
Analysis from the perspective of realism suggests the possibility that, as long as
China does not feel that the friction engendered by following the China-centric
order course is disadvantageous to its national interests, it will plow on with it.
In this connection, it was notable that in his address at the 11th Conference of
Chinese Ambassadors in July 2009, President Hu Jintao spoke of actively
seeking concrete achievements, while steadfastly continuing to hide ones
talents and bide ones time.
57
This trend probably needs to be interpreted in
the context of Chinas aforementioned redenition of its national interests. In
other words, the notion of China attempting to safeguard its national interests
(national sovereignty, security, and development interests) while actively enga-
ging in the tasks of seeking concrete achievement can surely be understood as a
clear statement that China is adopting the China-centric order course.
52 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
This is not the end of the matter, however. In the face of reality, China is con-
stantly receiving feedback regarding its foreign strategy in the form of unresolved
issues that arise, reaction from other countries, and domestic reaction, and it has to
make re-adjustments accordingly.
The Chinese leadership has been re-emphasizing the peaceful nature of
Chinas foreign policy since around the end of 2010. This is understood to be
in reaction to the frequent instances of friction that have occurred as the results
of a series of uncompromising foreign policy stances taken by China. Specically,
while Dai Bingguo, the state councilor responsible for diplomacy, states in his
article We Must Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development
58
that no develop-
ment can be made at the cost of the important interests of the state, in particular its
core interests, he then goes on to say that the ideas of hiding ones talents and
biding ones time and seeking concrete achievements are in accord with peace-
ful development. This would seem to be an attempt to re-adjust Chinese foreign-
strategy thinking by re-emphasizingboth at home and abroadthe peaceful
nature of China.
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether this attempt at re-adjustment
is serving as an effective brake on the aforementioned trend towards the China-
centric order course and the cases of friction that have arisen as a consequence.
This will depend on whether or not the players involved in Chinas foreign
relations share the view that the friction engendered by following the China-
centric order course is disadvantageous to Chinas national interests, and
whether or not decisions are then made in accordance with this view.
The aforementioned transitions in Chinas foreign strategy, from one-nation
course to liberalization course to great-power course (comprising the China-
centric order course and the responsible-great-power course), in some ways call
to mind the path followed by Japan, particularly pre-war Japan. When shown
the above conceptual diagram by the author, an eminent international political
scientist from China wrote just course by responsible-great-power course
and military course by China-centric order course. The author continues to
hope that China will earnestly consider the risks inherent in the China-centric
order course and the signicance of the responsible-great-power course.
Supplementary note
The author served as deputy director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan when this article was
written. Although in writing this article he has drawn on his experiences during
the performance of his duties, the views and opinions expressed in the article
are the authors own and not those of the organization to which he belongs.
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 53
Chinas Foreign Strategy
This article is based on an article published in Japanese in the September 2011
electronic edition of International Affairs, the monthly journal published by the
Japan Institute of International Affairs.
Notes
1
For a description of the various types of friction that China has been
encountering in its foreign policy since the end of 2009, see Thomas
J. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China, Foreign Affairs,
2011, March/April, and Yoshikazu Shimizu, The Domestic Politics
behind Chinas Stubborn Attitude towards Other Countries, in Ryosei
Kokubun (ed.), China Now (Iwanami Shoten, 2011).
2
For example, see Ryoichi Hamamoto, Trends in ChinaThe
Transformation of Hiding Ones Talents and Biding Ones Time That Lies
behind Chinas Unyielding Foreign Policy, East Asia, No. 522, December
2010; Yoshikazu Shimizu op. cit.; and Akira Asano, Changes in the
Course of Chinas Foreign Policythe Process and the Decision-Making
Mechanism, International Affairs, No. 602, June 2011.
3
Akira Asano, The Structure and Determination of Foreign Relations, in
Satoshi Amako and Akira Asano (eds.), China and Taiwan (Minerva
Shobo, 2008); Linda Jacobson and Dean Knox, Chinas New Foreign
PolicyWho is Determining It and How? (Iwanami Modern Library,
2011).
4
Tatsumi Okabe, Chinas Foreign Strategy (University of Tokyo Press,
2002), p. 1.
5
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and
How It Changed the World (Routledge, 2002).
6
Koji Murata, US Foreign PolicyAnguish and Aspiration (Kodansha
Modern Writers, 2005), pp. 3541.
7
Shin Kawashima, Chinas Foreign Policy and Japan in the Year 2010
East Asia, No. 526 (April 2011).
8
Shin Kawashima and Kazuko Mouri, 150 Years of Foreign Policy, The Path
to a Global China (Iwanami Shoten, 2009), pp. 111137.
9
Chisako Masuo, Chinas Modernization and the Japanese Model
Japan-China Relations in the Deng Xiao-ping Era, Chou Koui, Rumi
Aoyama, Chisako Masuo, and Emi Mifune, The Global Strategy in Chinas
Foreign Policy (Akashi Shoten, 2011).
10
For more details on Deng Xiao-pings foreign-policy directives, see
Yoshifumi Nakai, A Rising China and the USARhetoric as a Vehicle for
Economic Development, Yoshifumi Nakai (ed.), The Foreign Relations of
a Rising China (Ochanomizu Shobo, 2009).
11
Ryosei Kokubun, Preface: Chinas Political Diplomacythe Tiananmen
Square Incident and its Aftermath, International Politics, No. 145
(August 2006).
12
Outside the economic sphere, during the 1990s China acceded to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and signed the
54 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the United Nations
Human Rights Covenant A in 1997, and the United Nations Human Rights
Covenant B in 1998. On the other hand, given that China continued to
maintain an independent stance regarding issues of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and issues of human rights, in these two
areas China cannot really be adjudged to have changed course very much
in compliance with the values of the international community. Junichi
Abe, Issues of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in US-China
Relations, Seiichiro Takagi (ed.), The Structure and Evolution of Post-
Cold War US-China Relations (Japan Institute of International Affairs,
2007), and Mao Asukata, Human Rights Issues in US-China Relations, in
Seiichiro Takagi (ed.) op. cit.
13
Rumi Aoyama, Chinas Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries, Chou
Koui, Rumi Aoyama, Chisako Masuo, and Emi Mifune, The Global
Strategy in Chinas Foreign Policy (Akashi Shoten, 2011).
14
Seiichiro Takagi, Chinas International Awareness in the Post-Cold War
Periodfrom the Theory of Peaceful Evolution to the Theory of the End
of the Transition Period, Seichiiro Takagi (ed.) Chinas Post-Cold War
Foreign Policy and the Asia-Pacic Region (Japan Institute of
International Affairs, 2000), pp. 810.
15
This switch in policy was initiated by Anthony Lake, the presidents
national security advisor. As part of the policy switch, President Clinton
and President Jiang Zemin held their rst summit conference at the APEC
(Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation) Economic Leaders Meeting, which
was held in Seattle in November 1993. For a description of the
background to this summit conference, see James Mann, About Face: A
History of Americas Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to
Clinton (Kyodo News, 1999), pp. 412438.
16
Emi Mifune, Chinas Transition into a Rich and Mighty Great Power and
US-China Relations, Satoshi Amako and Emi Mifune (eds.), Chinas
Expanding Foreign RelationsNeighboring Nations and the Pax Sinica
(Keiso Shobo, 2011) pp. 239241.
17
Yoshikazu Shimizu, Why China Turned Anti-Japanese (Bunshun
Shinsho, 2003), pp. 154178.
18
In an article titled, Act in Good Faith towards Neighboring Countries and
Become Partners with Them, in Qiushi Q4, (16 February 2003), Vice
Foreign Minister Wang Yi recalls how Chinas diplomacy with
neighboring countries entered a new phase of full-scale development in
the mid-1990s.
19
A New View of Security, compiled in July 1996, has been identied as
being behind this active development of diplomacy with neighboring
countries. For discussion of this, see Rumi Aoyama op. cit., Akio Takahara,
Chinas New View of Security and Its Regional Strategy, Akio Igarashi,
Hiroshi Sasaki, and Akio Takahara, New Developments in East Asian
Security (Akashi Shoten, 2005), and Seiichiro Takagi, Chinas New View
of Security, National Institute for Defense Studies Bulletin (March
2003).
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 55
Chinas Foreign Strategy
20
For a discussion of partnership diplomacy, see Akira Asano op. cit. (2008).
21
It is worth noting that Russia was the rst nation with which China
formed a partnership. According to Yasuhiro Matsudas analysis, As far
as China was concerned, Russia shared its multipolar world view, had a
common interest in containing the USA, and represented its potentially
closest and most solid partner. Yasuhiro Matsuda, Chinas Military
Diplomacy: a Combination of Military Security and Regional Strategy,
Shin Kawashima (ed.), Chinas Foreign PolicySelf-Awareness and
Challenges (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2007), p. 97.
22
Zheng Bijians peaceful rise concept was presented in the form of a
speech at the Boao Forum for Asia (Zheng Bijian, Chinas Peaceful Rise
a New Path to a Peaceful Asian Future) (April 5, 2004) (,http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/24/content_1195240.htm.), and
was subsequently published as an article (Zheng Bijian, Chinas Peaceful
Rise to Great Power Status, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005,
pp. 1824). See also Seiichiro Takagi, The Current Stage of Chinas
Peaceful Rise Doctrine, International Affairs, No. 540 (March 2005).
23
The term rise in the context of the peaceful rise doctrine attracted
some criticism on the grounds that it instead carried overtones of
menace. Thus, in 2004, the phrase peaceful development was adopted
in its place.
24
In a speech in August 2001, Jiang Zemin called for the establishment of a
fair and reasonable global political order, Harmonious Development
with Neighboring States and Amicable Neighborly Relations (August 6,
2001), Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 3, (Peoples Publishing
House, 2006), pp. 314317. Wang Yi op. cit. (2003) makes clear that
China is aiming to democratize international relations while not
destroying or disavowing the current order. Although it is not entirely
clear exactly what these phrases mean or to what extent they encompass
revisionist assertions, it must be noted that they include nuances that
transcend the notion of the existing international order as being
immutable.
25
Akira Asano op. cit. (2008), pp. 199 & 200.
26
At the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the
expression Conclude Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries and
Become Partners with Them was used for the rst time in government
reports. The previously cited 2003 article by Vice Foreign Minister Wang
Yi makes the comment, The local area surrounding China represents the
lynchpin vital to Chinas ability to protect its sovereignty and interests,
and to demonstrate its international role.
27
Akira Ishii, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Shin
Kawashima (ed.), Chinas Foreign PolicySelf-Awareness and Challenges
(Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2007).
28
Kazushi Shimizu, China and ASEAN, Shin Kawashima (ed.), Chinas
Foreign PolicySelf-Awareness and Challenges (Yamakawa Shuppansha,
2007).
29
Hideya Kurata, The Korean Peninsula Six-Party Talks as Great-Power
56 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
Cooperation between the USA and China, Satoshi Amako and Emi
Mifune (eds.), Chinas Expanding Foreign RelationsNeighboring
Nations and the Pax Sinica (Keiso Shobo, 2011), pp. 239241.
30
Satoshi Amako, The Foreign Strategy of a Rising of China, Satoshi
Amako and Emi Mifune (eds.), Chinas Expanding Foreign Relations
Neighboring Nations and the Pax Sinica (Keiso Shobo, 2011), p. 11.
31
Akio Takahara, op. cit., pp. 211 & 212.
32
Akio Takahara, op. cit., p. 206.
33
Hideya Kurata, op. cit.
34
Emi Mifune, op. cit., pp. 244248.
35
Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?
Remarks to National Commission on U.S.-China Relations, 21 September
2005 ,http://ncuscr.org/articlesandsspeeches/Zoellick.htm..
36
It was C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, who sparked the G2 debate. For his arguments, see A
Partnership of Equals, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, Issue 4, July/August
2008, pp. 5769. For more on the behavior of the USA and China with
regard to the notion of a G2, see Satoshi Amako op. cit., pp. 18 & 19 and
Emi Mifune op. cit., pp. 272274.
37
For discussion of the implications of a strategic reciprocal relationship,
see Yuji Miyamoto, How Japan Will Get Along with China in the Future
(Nikkei Inc., 2011), pp. 136145.
38
Rumi Aoyama op. cit., p. 101.
39
This phrase was used by President Hu Jintao in a meeting of the Central
Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 2006 (keynote address by Hu
Jintao to the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs in Beijing, 23 August
2008 ,http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_
4999294.htm.), and was re-iterated in political action reports at the
17th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2007.
40
It is rumored that, in March 2010, China may well have given notice to the
USA that the South China Sea is also a core interest. On the other hand, in
his December 2010 article, Holding Fast to the Path of Peaceful
Development, Dai Bingguo, the state councilor responsible for
diplomacy, classies core interests into three basic categories for
safeguarding: (1) the stability of Chinas national polity, system of
government, and political affairsin other words, the leading role of the
Communist Party, the socialist system, and the path of socialism with
Chinese characteristics; (2) the unity of the state, territorial integrity, and
the safety of Chinese sovereignty; and (3) the sustainable development of
China as an economic society (although he does preface this denition by
stating that this is his own personal understanding of the expression). In
this instance, the fact that the stability of Chinas national polity, system
of government, and political affairsin other words, the leading role of
the Communist Party, the socialist system, and the path of socialism with
Chinese characteristics are cited as the rst category is important in that
it indicated the perspective of the Communist Party leadership. The article
was published on 6 December 2010 on the website of the Chinese
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 57
Chinas Foreign Strategy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ,http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/12-07/
2704984.shtml..
41
Akira Asano op. cit. (2008), pp. 189196.
42
Jacobson and Knox op. cit. Also, comparing Japan-China relations in 1972
and 2005, Kazuko Mori points out that in 2005 the business community
and public opinion in China had nowbecome actors who exerted a major
inuence on Japan-China relations. (Kazuko Mori, Japan-China
RelationsFrom the Post-War Period to the New Era, Iwanami Shoten,
2006, pp. 205 & 206.)
43
Jacobson and Knox op. cit., p. 85.
44
Jacobson and Knox op. cit., pp. 4860.
45
Yoshikazu Shimizu, The Domestic Politics behind the Stubborn Attitude
towards Other Countries, Ryosei Kokubun (ed.), China Now (Iwanami
Shoten, 2011), pp. 812.
46
It has recently been pointed out that the military may have an expanded
foreign policy role as the ultimate guarantors of state interests. Jacobson
and Knox op. cit., pp. 2532.
47
Yoshikazu Shimizu op. cit., p. 15.
48
Wang Yizhou, New Thinking regarding Chinese Foreign Policy
(University of Tokyo Press, 2007).
49
Wang Jisi, Chinas Search for a Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, 2011,
March/April.
50
Jacobson and Knox op. cit., p. 101.
51
Jacobson and Knox op. cit., pp. 100103.
52
For a description of these three theories, see Naoto Yoshikawa and
Kazuhiko Noguchi (eds.), Theories of International Relations (Keiso
Shobo, 2006) and International Politics, No. 124 (May 2005).
53
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conict
Inevitable?, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005).
54
For example, Alastair Iain Johnston, Is China a Status-Quo Power?,
International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003).
55
It must be noted that the most appropriate theory (realism, liberalism, or
constructivism) will vary according to the eld under consideration. To
summarize, in some aspects of functional cooperation, liberalism or
constructivism will be the most appropriate theory, while in most aspects
of the security eld, realism is the most suitable theory.
56
Kazuko Mouri, China within the International System, International
Affairs, No. 418 (January 1995); Shin Kawashima and Kazuko Mouri op.
cit., pp. 106 & 107.
57
Ryoichi Hamamoto op. cit., Akira Asano op. cit. (2011); Yoshikazu
Shimizu op. cit.
58
For more details on this article by Dai Bingguo, see footnote 40.
58 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
Mitsuru Kitano
About the author
Mitsuru Kitano is currently Assistant Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan. He served as Deputy Director-General of Asia and Pacic
Bureau of the Ministry, covering China, from April 2010 to August 2010. It was
during that period that this article was written. After joining the Ministry in 1980,
he served in France, China, Switzerland (Geneva), Vietnam, and the U.S. He gradu-
ated from University of Tokyo in 1980, and earned a masters degree from Univer-
sity of Geneva (Graduate Institute of International Studies) in 1996. He was a
lecturer at Soa University from 2001 to 2002. He is co-editor/author of Public
Diplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion (PHP Institute,
2007). This book was translated into Chinese in 2010. His earlier work also includes
The New China: Dynamism and Vulnerability published in The Pacic Review,
Routledge, 1994, Vol.7, No. 2.
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2 59
Chinas Foreign Strategy
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