PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. AGUIRRE Geluz v. CA to Jalosjos v. COMELEC

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a
physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced,
the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's
daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty
pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave
his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted
certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the
sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in
fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the
case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of
our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera,
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights
and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born
1
alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held
that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and
numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But
such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from
an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did
not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a
large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a
physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and
with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had
filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of
which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's
wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of
the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board
of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action
against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING
and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying
amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in
Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived
child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by
the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the
institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is
3
not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code,
clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el
sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this
decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco
de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and
representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum
of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from
breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and
Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the
maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together
with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court
erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural
child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with
costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties
appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief
sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which
required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of
the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in
Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-
law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant
was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia
Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in
this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous
relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the
home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he
wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to
christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his
departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he
wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had
developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that
"junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to
return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his
friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for
the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila,
where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and
the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived
together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including
gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the
defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second
pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A
point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the
child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused
the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at
first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre,
quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the
mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have
no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a
universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a
5
bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact
that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here
presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from that
presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and
bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the
particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in
the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as
Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of
recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two
constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born
in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came,
and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar
Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is
clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F,
G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as
the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in
her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that
junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before
the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of
junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of
article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made
in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing
father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out
by putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing
the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another.
In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the
padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then
being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the
writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required
that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred
in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the
said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already
stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case
that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must
be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It
is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it
and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation
continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time,
when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no
period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's
resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother
and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal.
With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court
was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed
breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may
add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to
maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the
amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in
this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First
Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension
as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
6

THIRD DIVISION


CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.

G.R. No. 182836


Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.


Promulgated:



October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x



D E C I S I O N



CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave
and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the
death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

x x x x

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE
The Company agrees to grant a bereavement
leave with pay to any employee in case of death
of the employees legitimate dependent (parents,
spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on
the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao,
Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila -
11 days

x x x x

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
7

x x x x

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family
in the following manner:

x x x x

4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependents
(parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with
proper legal document to be presented (e.g.
death certificate).[4]


The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child.
Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006
while she was in the 38
th
week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of
Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity
leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos
claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held,
the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice
to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).[9]
In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental
Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was
entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X,
Section 2


and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably
settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers,

[12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article
X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of
Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan),
an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which
had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union
and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died
before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the
womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel
are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees
unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which
provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed
in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision
of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16]
8
of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence,
the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,
since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be
supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear
and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the
CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted
by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the
employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the
Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the
grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for
the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits,
thus:


This Office declares that for the entitlement of the
benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X,
Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there
is death; (2) such death must be of employees
dependent; and (3) such dependent must be
legitimate.

On the otherhand, for the entitlement
to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph
(4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable
elements must be present: (a) there is death; (b)
such death must be of employees dependent;
(c) such dependent must be legitimate; and (d)
proper legal document to be presented.[18]


Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus
had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her
mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife
were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein
petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P.
Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thi r t y- Ni ne Pesos ( P4, 939. 00) ,
representing his bereavement leave pay and the
amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or
a total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy,
however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED
to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

9

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting
Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits
because no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus,
at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that
of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed
out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified
by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could
only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed
Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
interpreted death to mean as follows:


[Herein petitioner Continental Steels]
exposition on the legal sense in which the term
death is used in the CBA fails to impress the
Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining
the purpose, which the grant of bereavement
leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended
to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on
being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a death as to
be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an
event causing loss and grief to the affected
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term death of a legitimate dependent as
condition for granting bereavement leave and
death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steels] theory, there can be no
experience of death to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus
simply cannot be equated with anything less than
loss of human life, especially for the expectant
parents. In this light, bereavement leave and
death benefits are meant to assuage the
employee and the latters immediate family,
extend to them solace and support, rather than an
act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that
the certificate of fetal death is for statistical
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]


Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution dated November
20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner
Continental Steel].[21]


In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the
CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death
should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus
never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

10
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under
Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death
and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4)
presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental
Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental
argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction
of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management
nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and
other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines
when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article
37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.


We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs
parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant
case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all
a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA.
As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in
relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who
is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
11
emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)


Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child
to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the
various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children -- legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the
rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)



It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the
fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other
death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been
granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted
to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child,
who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is
any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave
and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that
in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such
should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA
provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the
declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment
swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor."
While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in
the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be
resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons.
What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed
policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution,
to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a
policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we
categorically stated that:

W h e n
conflicting interests of
labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of
social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter
s h o u l d b e c o u n t e r -
balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must
a c c o r d t h e
underprivileged worker.

12
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and
Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)], we declared:

A n y d o u b t
concerning the rights of
labor should be resolved
in its favor pursuant to the
social justice policy.


IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27
February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his
unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

13
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibaez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O.
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the
evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted
in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-#) tons in the municipality of San Juan;
that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of
his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the
case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act
No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of
two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice
produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions
therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by
evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and
Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable
opportunity to meet the increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from
its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant.
(Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission
to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for,
which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have
had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final
conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000,
and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he
would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had
he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a
month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The
commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his
estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right
of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which
by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the
assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the
case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the
estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of
March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once
granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate
would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime,
and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
14
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land
and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the
ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have
survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be
the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal
representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar
Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired
certificate of public convenience the evidence established that the public
needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite
citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course,
such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to
failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the
situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the
deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended
"in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or
administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the
possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the
present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the
decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the
property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought
by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death
extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public
convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the
foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by
their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the
assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the
estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of
the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an
unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience
of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the
legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the
right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the
Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which
are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45)
that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not
sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical
purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property
includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad
commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same
volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared
to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie
in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in
the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed
after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument
may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107
Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of
forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his
estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery
15
was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J.,
disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not
regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot
prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word
"person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co.,
4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another
work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a
human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial
persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate
of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from
whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim
against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the
deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is
a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no
difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the
estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of
law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made,
and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the
property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural
persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and
one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a
promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the
decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot
be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of
their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the
estate and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it.
(107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro
O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no
other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment
amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses
and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him
during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased
person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs.
Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the
deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along
with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of
P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law
as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the
first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent
by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2
Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article
661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12
Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of
deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass
of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's
personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood
the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that
the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the
present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal
fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate,
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill
those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the
fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L.
Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection
of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as
for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
16
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of
section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to
corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted
and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty
per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the
legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially
the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State
of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of
said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an
artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of
the assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one
example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed
therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in
section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for
otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the
framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or
juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated
above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered
extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid,
and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,
respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for
the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure
to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner
could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have
done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction
of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and
motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The
fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors
and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to
P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service
Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the
constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal
principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law
indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we
can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of
his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his
death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino
citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
or enjoining them from inheriting it.
17
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both
the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

18
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO,
MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and
LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision
1
and the May 9, 2008
Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed
the October 1, 1998 Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City
(RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the remains
of the decedent.
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio
Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955.
The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their
children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the
United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members
was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses
for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few
days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park.
Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was
contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that
they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot
at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been
separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed
that throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends
and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted that
he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that,
unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty.
Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According
to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino
family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought
by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time,
she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park.
Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time
that he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show
love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the
19
duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably
presumed that he wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.
4

In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the
body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so
he should be spared and respected.
5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to
have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It
likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the
remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife,
was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article
305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the
considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not
only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her
husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latters death,
notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due
to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial
when the wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims for
damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to
the remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Courts Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199
6
of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall
be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
[Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases
supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay
the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
20
exclusion of ones common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,
7
a petition
for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas
against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and
confined her in his residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due
to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction
over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to
be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner
has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,
the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
"Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
"spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction
between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and
another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the
facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her
in her lifetime.
8
[Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and
duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as
having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
9
While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still
alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making
frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could
attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to
know about Atty. Adrianos death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December
20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the
Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail
pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty.
Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It
should be noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished
to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent
that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have
been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with
Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury
her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in
the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate
spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not
be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory
21
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that
end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law
favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosarios keenness to exercise the rights and
obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was
joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in
the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same.
Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of
the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even
if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on
which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr.
Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally
recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary disposition.
10
As Article 307 itself
provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last
remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valinos
claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other
evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect
to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions
concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time
and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
11
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the
appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of
Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro familys mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming
arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila
Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with
the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the
surviving spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in
the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have
been very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact that
husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact and had been
living apart for more than 30 years.
12

As for Valinos contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the
remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place
other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his
family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the
family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-
in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce
of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the
corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also
authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have
it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right.
There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from
third persons.
13

All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of
Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her
sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her.
As aptly explained by the CA:
22
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee
Fe Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact
from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano
Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains when he had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages.
Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the
remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the
United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be
recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at bench, there was no iota of
evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages.1wphi1
Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove
the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with
the acts complained of because moral damages although incapable of pecuniary
estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-
appellants, nor was any intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on
the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of
the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to
have been adequately established by plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award
thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's
fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual,
legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case,
we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the
award of attorney's fees.
14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for
the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family
and disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for
the purpose of preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it
best to include the provisions on "Funerals."
15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
23
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having
been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of
First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of
the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were
killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945.
The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st.
The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro,
Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of
Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his
mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by
the petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro
died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects
the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis
Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells
were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying
to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance;
and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a
safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them;
and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of
the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by
a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in
front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including
Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to
reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February
10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it
open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela
Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was
two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez,
who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals
opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin
24
Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the
statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its
conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by
proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate
proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before
us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his
father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after
the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela
Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to
her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is
that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German
Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes.
She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by
splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is
available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son
left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance
alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus
compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said
that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30,
must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly
above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the
question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the
deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A
second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to
be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety
of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During
the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It
is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall
cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the
Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro,
Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act
No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article
33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the
contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is
total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same
time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration
when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is
that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set
forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or
conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular
circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons
who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of
either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be
that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other
shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for
lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference
to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts
are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence
as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. .
25
. . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of
fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on
Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the
applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our
rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred"
that one died before the other it means that there are circumstances from which the
fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from
the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or
which would tend to show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge
A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence
alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption,
the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as
are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil
cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or
conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to
probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may
be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco
Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better
appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony,
which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by
the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? A. We were out 15
meters away from the building but I could see what was going on.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events,
that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club?
A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are
confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? A.
Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? A. Well, a
few minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning,
collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence
to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
died, you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin
also died? A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when
the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come
out of that building so I presumed she died there.
x x x x x x x x x
26
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? A. Because the Japanese
had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of
running away rather than be roasted.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro
girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? A. to my
knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? A. On the ground near the entrance,
because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were
trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes
before you left the place? A. That is what I think, because those Japanese
soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A . There
were many people shot because they were trying to escape.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can
you explain that? A. They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to
solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the
light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be
arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it
must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters
from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that
distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he
dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife
started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she
did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these,
according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and
were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband
and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an
idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove
that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so
imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the
clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in
the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela
Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death
and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer
than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin
was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the
building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative ,
and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading
Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only
remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away form
protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside,
and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon
those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been
killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse,
more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous
death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's
departure and his death.
27
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section
69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from
which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by
the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State
of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.)
As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it
is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient
when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate,
supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities,
drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in
such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely,
according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary
facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where
"a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing
a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about
an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not
airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room
for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son
is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory that the mother outlived her
son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience,
engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought
to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice
Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was
suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot,
but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts,
63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant
impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be
disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular
circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions
are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries
on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and
contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such
because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is purely
documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the
construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue
is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence
refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is
meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may
disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures
come within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the
question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that
Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
28
FIRST DIVISION


CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,
FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.


- versus -
Promulgated:

JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,
LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN,
Respondents. July 31, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was
discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due
to his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of
flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce
(sic) and pointless speech.[1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.[2]
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed
of Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay
Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the
North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by
Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo
Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa.
Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801)
square meters, more or less.

The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof,
issued Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters
donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos name
under Tax Declaration No. 18081.[5]
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special
Proceedings No. 4563[6] before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its
Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and
Fixing Allowance[7] of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed
Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and
Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1
and 3 of their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her
children Delia and Jesus Basa.[10] The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration
No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex
Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano
and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920
to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.[12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,[13] as
29
well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of
Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the
property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly
intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was
not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it
claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent
Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for
Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts
about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the
death of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for
incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint
was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No.
17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence
presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in
favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or
competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of
the donation in question must be upheld.[14] It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, i n vi ew of t he
foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus
Basa and Delia Basa the lawful
owners of the land in question
which is now declared in their
names under Tax Declaration
No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendants Attorneys fees of
P10,000.00, and to pay the
Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]

Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of
Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[16] The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did
not commit a reversible error in disposing that
plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or
mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at
the precise moment when the property in dispute
was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of
contracts having been present in the 1951
donation coupled with compliance with certain
solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation
inter vivos of real property under Article 749,
which provides:
x x x
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title
of ownership over the property in dispute. By
virtue of her ownership, the property is completely
subjected to her will in everything not prohibited
by law of the concurrence with the rights of others
(Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale
dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder
of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan
to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa
must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which
allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much
less apparent in the deed itself or from the
evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the
RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered only in 1992, after the death of
Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab
initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the
deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon such public document with
respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236
SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it
that documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity, and to contradict the same, there must
be evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA
256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999
30
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following
issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO.
66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE
ERROR I N DI SPOSI NG THAT
P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T S
(PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE
T HE I NS ANI T Y OR ME NTAL
I NCAPACI TY OF THE LATE
FELI CI ANO CATALAN AT THE
PRECI SE MOMENT WHEN THE
PROPERTY I N DI SPUTE WAS
DONATED;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE
CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR
DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND THE
REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS
C O N V E N E D U N D E R T H E
P R O V I S I O N S O F A R M Y
REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS S-1 AND
S - 2 ) AR E ADMI S S I B L E I N
EVIDENCE;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO.
66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
H O N O R A B L E C O U R T I N
UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT
SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE
B Y T HE DONE E ME R CE DE S
CATALAN TO HER CHI LDREN
RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA
BASA; AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO.
17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
AND LACHES.[18]

Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to
donate property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more
than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate
of Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by
the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they
proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI.
Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had
been suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from
entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997.
Petitioners contend that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28,
1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the time he made the questioned
donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his
successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency
because these donations were approved and confirmed in the guardianship
proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia
Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the
document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after
Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew
that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be
innocent purchasers of the property in question.[20] Lastly, petitioners assert that
their case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New
Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four
year period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.[22] Like any other
31
contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes
the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.[23]
The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like
any contract, renders the donation voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the
donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.[25] However, the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.[26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows
that the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as
1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the
allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could
still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was
brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a
German psychiatrist, combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain
paranoid states and called the condition dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a
Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to include
cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition schizophrenia.
According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual
onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease
progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens
(relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other
patients in remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have
odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have
ideas of reference. The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are
directed against the sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the administration of the
correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring
biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce
delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances
of relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many
aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over many
years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering
from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower
courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.[30]
Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established
when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on
December 22, 1953.[31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity
at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or
when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The
presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his
illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and
freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or
contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right
to sell the property to whomever she chose.[33] Not a shred of evidence has been
presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her children
was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was
registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the
property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution.
Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and
laches for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to
note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still
a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled
in a proper action in court within four years.[34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the
petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
32
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu,
defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.

TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the
judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial
District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep
perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as
the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed
against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the
deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion
and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897,
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in
the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as
described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had
since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father
Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said
Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting
the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left
by their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two
plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said
land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in
question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-
fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters
Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could
produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to
P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until
the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in
plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver
and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the
partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with
the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per
annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned
complaint, denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special
defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of
only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased
Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her
husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of
P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen
cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y
Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of
his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375
the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to
meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this
amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu
other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910,
the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters
Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in
the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under
pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu,
effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of
P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration
of P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they
acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-
complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was
unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of
P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He
therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep
33
perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said
intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be
charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein
set forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the
deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that
since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of
said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from
the defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the
judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved
for a reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception
was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having been
presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by
them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed
it, the questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in determining
whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of
selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case
they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and,
notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed
and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him,
because of some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law
(Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land
sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained
title by composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in
the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an
area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit
D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four
children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said
decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing
forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and
Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y
Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death
of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land
described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to
them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the
land described in the complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares,
86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the
land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21
cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs'
mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother
Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually
covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the
original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis
Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers
of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado
y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at
the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1,
of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and those of his minor children Maria
Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it
was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned
wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the
widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2,
pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area
covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this vendor's
deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in
question a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain
funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs'
father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa
Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be
of legal age and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed
and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which
referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the
sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold
absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of
the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument and situated in
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with
21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the
34
heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on
the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-
Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on
the ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal
capacity to contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis
Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the
execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit
(plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish
pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo
Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she testified had
been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages
396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was
born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this
witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal
registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by
which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also be
appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May
17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the
plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her
brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo
used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of
the property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got
for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910,
where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not
know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the
deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death
had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was
Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony
was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the
plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just how long, under
the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to
his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares
less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita
produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507
cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared
with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two
sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a
witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the
request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured
him that they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by the plaintiffs
and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been
translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand
Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of
age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then
a young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings,
and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was then
[at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties
owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes,
and after its owner's death, was under witness' administration during to harvest two
harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area
such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis
Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita
Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another
portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been
left by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to
Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu,
testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of
his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth
between his father's house and those of his other relatives. He denied that his
father had at any time administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother
and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs,
testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land
35
belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and sale
Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This same witness
also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado
and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the
latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of
the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he
did not do so, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification.
The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale
of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge
of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to
Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the
plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco
for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated
that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis
Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said document was
being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose
names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had
sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them.
Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu
in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the
execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to
effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In
this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo, Maria del
Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of
the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said
purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao
Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the
said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of
the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in
perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights they
may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of
sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice
made by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle,
and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the
remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an
increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000,
decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors'
father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita
Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1,
and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged the
remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu,
in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was
assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the
totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was
sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more;
and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and
simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or
deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of
previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship
between the contracting parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many
provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the
price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without
proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts
hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any
need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he
has held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land
of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of
mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of
21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or
intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot
that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership
of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of pledge
or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the
remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land,
as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of
purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could
have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum
36
which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received
as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the
document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of
said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this
latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the
deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made
therein, is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which
gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a third person
and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that
his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her
father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by
means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 an instrument that
disappeared or was burned and likewise recognizing that the protocols and
register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of
the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no
objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the
truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs'
legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had
personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized
said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest
and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said
real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as
authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no
evidence whatever that this document is false, and it does not appear to have been
assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal
ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly
admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists
in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they
were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No.
1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and
Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of
their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental
evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of
age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the
copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo
Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said
Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date
referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that
they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and on that account
the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid a sale that is
considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by
the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan
from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes
had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of
real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are
not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment
that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property,
nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)
itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that
it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration
certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in
order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same
year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order
to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on
February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date
23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced
against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial
instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were already of
legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no
supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
37
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it
cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they
executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses
and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said
document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita
Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not
occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated
in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said
remaining portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by
Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for
certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff;
and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself, they
received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed
into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have
accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the
execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided
between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received
by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado,
widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of
P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21
cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and,
consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the
true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed
from have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law
and the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

38
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint
wherein it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens
title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir
of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This
being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document
Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he
signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula
Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with
imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisively
support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent
of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time
he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not
appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's
second husband Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of
a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200
and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong
having learned later that the land within which was included that described in said
Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the
latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all
of the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the
provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds
to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity
to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1
alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into
consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and
Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped
from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not
applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of
age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one
who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the
document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the
plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of
evidence shows that no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged
vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the document
Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado
and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent
annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the
sate of Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because
the witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony
was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover,
asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore,
not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So
ordered.
39

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,
vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons
Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27,
1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso,
attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a
minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw
Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose
Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale.
On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In
the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio
Azores inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his
undivided share in the two parcels of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751
and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao,
Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being,
respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of
Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the
deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the
date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon
Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of
his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint),
and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot
originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit.
From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by
certiorari.
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On
August 3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of
legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did
not believe and rely on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and very
obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on
the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when
informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to
protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the
sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority
when the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently
negative by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well
in said resolution as in the decision.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the
appellees were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction
was completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect
their interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of
appellant's minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that
appellant was a minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing
appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the
contract was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to
bar it unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing
of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel
for the appellants invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37
Phil., 215), wherein this court held:
40
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of
real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are
not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment
that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor
the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the
appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore
did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that
the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father,
Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first
place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-
existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who
represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually
part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since
appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-
existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its
full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the
same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground
other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious
as a contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the
appellee informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellee's previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing
the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that the
appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of the
contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind
that no sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon
receiving from the appellants the sum of P500.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as
to the real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary
investigation. The suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously
unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals
do not show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.
The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the
appellee informing the appellants of his minority constituted an effective
disaffirmance of the sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself
avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice
shielded the appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position is
untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the
promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
appellants absolved from the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon
Alcantara. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Tuason, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.

41
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.
R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of
the Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay
Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30,
1944.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October
30, 1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in
writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after
the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has
been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have
received P40,000 only instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred
that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note
Exhibit A. After hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered
judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza
because the minority of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a
personal defense of the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the
extent of the shares for which such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil
Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo
Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found
them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they
were not yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have
appraised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information
relative to their age, parted with his money, then he should be contended with the
consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their
desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and willingly signed the
promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo
and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in
fact they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled.
(Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their
minority in the same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal
proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no
juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum,
43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a
contract as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of
an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the
basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of,
and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of liability for such
misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the
contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not
constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to
age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit.
(Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in
the belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of
the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
The Mecado case
1
cited in the decision under review is different because the
document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here
42
Exhibit A contained no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the
minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors
were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive)
misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the
scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the
very minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them
from the results of misrepresentation.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could
not be legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was
interposed only in 1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in
1947, it was too late to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed after he
had become emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of
Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a
contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has
reached majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth.
It is undenied, however, that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of
such datum, it should be held that in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in
October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was interposed in
June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by
Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an
action, without the minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one
thing, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment.
2
They merely
interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary
responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written
contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is
testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their
support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold
that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has
been authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October
1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they
should now return P1,166.67.
3
Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency,
(Exhibit A) can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable
of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard
of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario
Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33
4
plus 2% interest from October
1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly
5
to the same creditor
the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the
complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

43
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION


SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL,
Petitioners,



-versus -



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 173822

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


BERSAMIN, J.:


On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon,
convicted the petitioners of murder.[1] On December 13, 2005, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified
the awarded damages.[2]

The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this
appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on
Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority
at the time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate release from
prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add
to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord
with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Antecedents

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor
formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder
through the following information, to wit:

That on or about the 18
th
day of April
1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery
and evident premeditation, and without any
justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill,
armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one
Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan
member of Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal and serious wounds which
directly caused his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information
on November 7, 1994,[4] the trial ensued.

44
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major
Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona
(Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio
Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay
Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the
house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose
Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of
Desders house, she heard thundering steps as if people were running and then
two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate
body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop,
thats enough!; that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and,
turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at
her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his
gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she rushed to the
house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting;
and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was
pronounced dead.[5]

Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on
May 18, 1994,[6] based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino,
Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in
the back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.[7]

Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00
for the funeral expenses of Llona.[8]

Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses
for the Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph
Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.

The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime,
Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had
been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon
drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the
crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been
implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the
alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.

As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but
acquitted Danilo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and
Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court
hereby sentences each of the accused to an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Phi l i ppi nes
currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of
P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the
cost.

Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable
doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged
and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate
release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered,
unless he is charged of other lawful cause or
causes.

Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador
Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in
the service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant to
People v. Mateo.[10]

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

45
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction
is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador
Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered
to suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of
Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual damages;
and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[11]


After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,[12] the
petitioners now appeal.

Issue

The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them
guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of
Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some circumstances
rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify
them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them
shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the assailants
from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the
autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range,
contrary to Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human
experience; and (e) Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.

Ruling

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in
the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil
liability.




I.
Factual ndings of the RTC and CA
are accorded respect

The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive
identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the
acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March 6, 1995,[13] viz:

q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was
letting my 5 years old
child to sleep.

q Can you demonstrate or described before
this Honorable Court the size of the sala
and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3
meters.

q Now, please show to this Honorable Court
t he rel at i ve posi t i on, t he si t t i ng
arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and
Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child
was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was
infront of me, I was at the right side of
Kdg. Llona

q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and
Kgd. Llona was facing the door in
otherwords, the door was at his back.

q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.

q Was the door immediately found Rather
was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch
of the house.

q And from the porch is the main stairs
already?
a Yes, sir.

46
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner
as you said you have finished assisting
the persons in Bongga about the
program, ... after that, what were you
doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd.
Llona was fanning my child.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva?
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his
drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you
were on that situation, if there was any
incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if
they were running and there were
successive shots.

q Simultaneously with these two (2)
successive shots can you see the origin
or who was responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head
and saw Salvador Atizado.

q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.

q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when
asked of his name answered Salvador
Atizado.)

q So when you heard the shots, who was
actually shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3)
persons I saw Kgd. Ll ona sl i di ng
downward.

q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the
persons responsible stop thats enough,
and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.

q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up
but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger
of the gun.

q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly
then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at
that time I do not know his name.

q Then what did you see of him?
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping
backward and he was adjusting the
cylinder of the gun.

q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three
(3) clicks of the gun, can you see where
the gun was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not
actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.

q So when you said that you saw this man
Monreal, can you still recognize this
man?
a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is
in Court?
a Yes, sir.

q Kindly please go down and tap his
shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the
first bench and tap the shoulder of the
47
person, the person tapped by the witness
answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)

q You said, when you stood up and face with
him while he was adjusting his revolver
and he was moving backward, did you
see other persons as his companion, if
any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back,
I saw this Atizado he was already on the
process of leaving the place.

q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado

q And did they actually leave the place at that
moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.



Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA.
Indeed, Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her
declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden
deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to
kill and had done so with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial
judges evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness testimony is
accorded the highest respect because the trial judges unique opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine whether
the witness is telling the truth or not.[14] Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA,
is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would
materially affect the disposition of the case.[15] We thus apply the rule,
considering that the petitioners have not called attention to and proved any
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the
application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive declarations on the identities of
the assailants prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi.[16]

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[17]
Yet, the State did not have to prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit
the murder,[18] because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner
in which they had perpetrated their criminal act.[19] They had acted in concert in
assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and
design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are liable as
co-principals.[20] Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-
principals in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

Article 248. Murder. Any person who,
not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or
promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the
use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities
enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.
48

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which offended party might make.[21] For treachery to be
attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offenders.[22] Moreover, treachery must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.[23]

The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative sufficiently
established that treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim because Atizados
shooting the victim at the latters back had been intended to ensure the execution
of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals conspiracy to kill the victim was
proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that
they had fired except that Monreals handgun did not fire.[24]

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners
mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware
of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had
preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The
assailants had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to
deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend himself.[25] Such manner
constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their
unhampered execution of the crime.

II.
Modication of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages


Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.[26] But reclusion
perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15
but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals
minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of
age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit
executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.[27] Secondly, the
police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of
his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28] Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994
averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.[29] Fourthly, as RTCs
minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,[30] Monreal was 22 years old
when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,[31] which meant that he
was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla
described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.[32]

The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it
conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - The
child in conict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all
the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or
older. The age of a child may be determined
from the childs birth certicate, baptismal
certicate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/
herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the
age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor.

Any person contesting the age of the
child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of
the information in any appropriate court may file a
case i n a summar y proceedi ng f or t he
determination of age before the Family Court
which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
49
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.

If a case has been filed against the child
in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court
where the case is pending. Pending hearing on
the said motion, proceedings on the main case
shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement
of f i cer s, prosecut or s, j udges and ot her
government officials concerned shall exert all
efforts at determining the age of the child in
conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,[34] when the offender is over 15
and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is
imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next
lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment
imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum
period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period.
Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of
prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of
his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of
Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to
Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,[35] the revision of the penalty now warrants
his immediate release from the penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as
granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor
offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their
development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his
sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been
Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons
who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benet from
the retroactive application of this Act. They
shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall
be adj usted accordi ngl y. They shal l be
immediately released if they are so qualied
under this Act or other applicable laws.


Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the
surviving heirs of Llona. Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of
the crime stands,[36] despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must
reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The
CA granted only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and
moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with prevailing case
law;[37] and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of
treachery should be further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement in
People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:

The commission of an offense has two-
pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however is likewise, if not primarily,
50
intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qual i f yi ng nat ur e of an aggr avat i ng
circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil liability of the offender. In ne, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award
of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being
supported by the record.

WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13,
2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following
modifications:

(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years,
eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;

(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to
immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty
imposed on him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes; and

(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the
heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation
to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has
taken on this decision within five days from service.

SO ORDERED.

51
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
William J. Rohde for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with
parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his
daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the
accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this
judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in
the manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The
commission of these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several
witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to
them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. they also
testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to
the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness
for the prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise,
and that he refused into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter;
that he was cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys
and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between
the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that
the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated
that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the
time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as
he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed
his family his wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin
capture the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he
had felt pains in the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting
those people " he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at
random without paying any attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache
and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that
"he looked very sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued
me;" and that "he must have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant,
testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes
"his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent
for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes
back he does not say anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he
does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries
aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you
are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties
found that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides
several other wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through
and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight
examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether
defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering
from any mental derangement or not.
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself
up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what
he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during
the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The
fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane,"
"non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before
indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me
he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That
52
witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a
person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing. Another
witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut
everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a
passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The
appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because he cut me." This is
another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus
used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow
prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and
remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by
the appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of
people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such
conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the
deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated
for an assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental
condition which would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this
decision distinguished between passion and insanity as follows:
But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law
may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from
criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental
unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are
liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far
as to make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to
keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season.
There would be no safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves
into fury, and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from
undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure
and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued
with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by
motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the
act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of
homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' "
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the
subject of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the
following concise statement:
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere
mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of
mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is
mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed
under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity
or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was
convicted of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising
any question as to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that
the accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his
client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of
his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his
wife and the other members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the
decision in that case this court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude
that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the
ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of
criminal actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am.
Rep., 262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the
accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State
vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this
presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support
a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof.
This presumption however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the
accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed.
This being exceptional is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out by
53
the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and kind
of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established
homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob.,
506.)
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient
merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a
denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it
seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the
presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of
passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment
control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by
the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when
it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that
the offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts
of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of
unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each
information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance
with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

54
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill and
treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to
handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the
back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.
1

Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed
weapon, locally known as pisao, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab
wounds on the different parts of his body, which wounds resulted to his
instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.
2

After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued.
3

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about
6:30 p.m., prosecution witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his
house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting side by side
with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying
on a bench.
4

Moments later, Jason barged into Bambis house, shouting: "Theres a long-haired
man!" Bambi stood up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant
Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter appeared to be
trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on
different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambis house,
with Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to
prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by
thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a short
while, Anacito left.
5

With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could
bring Allan to the hospital. He saw Anacitos two brothers and asked for their
assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind because he [referring to
Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."
6
As nobody from among his neighbors
responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged
him to the lower portion of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a
drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died
about fifteen minutes later.
7

At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of
Barangay San Pablo, Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio,
Sr., seeking medical advice from the latters wife. While there, Tomas heard a
commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people running. He
learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.
8

55
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio
Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called "lovers lane," Anacito
emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three
to four times.
9

Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he
had just witnessed. He then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents house,
but the latter did not make it because he collapsed near the fence. Tomas also
caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans.
Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial
Hospital, where he died the following day.
10

Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an
autopsy on the cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on
Allans body, one of which was fatal because it affected the upper lobe of the right
lung and bronchial vessel.
11
Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and died of
pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.
12

For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself,
Anacito Opuran. He declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was
resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He
never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight
policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was
brought to the police station and detained there until the following morning. He
denied being present at the place and time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted
knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom he had not quarreled
with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with
prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him
were fabricated because he was envied and lowly regarded by his accusers.
13

Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the
defense to present witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for
the suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000,
upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the
psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito
underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P.
Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that
Anacito had a "normal" mental status on that date but was "suffering from some
degree of Mental Aberration," which required further psychiatric evaluation at
Tacloban City.
14

The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for
the psychiatric examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.
15

On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona,
physician-psychiatrist of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted
on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona
testified that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her
interview with Anacitos sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacitos
psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that
Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory
hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic
before and during the commission of the crime and even up to the present so that
he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.
16

Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito
had difficulty sleeping and was talking "irrelevantly."
17
Anacito was treated as an
out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne.
18
They stayed in Manila for
one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the
same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up
treatments, Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr.
Belmonte of the NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990,
Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra.
Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the
NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year.
Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he
subjected to examination or treatment.
19

Anacitos other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19
November 1998, he heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the
loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went out to verify, he did not see
anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying a
knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him.
Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios house.
56
Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting,
and uttering bad words, and sometimes silent."
20

In its decision
21
of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder
for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan
Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of
P50,000.00 plus P43,500.00 by way of actual damages, and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amount of
P50,000.00 plus P10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court
grave error in disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity.
22
He contends
that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely
deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis
argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since treachery
was not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying circumstance, he
cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to
establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as
testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents.
Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was
uncertain that Anacito was "unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims.
The OSG also argues that treachery was duly alleged and proved by the
prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a qualifying circumstance in the
killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial courts judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an
essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human
mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is
dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A
mans act is presumed voluntary.
23
It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that
acts were done unconsciously,
24
for the moral and legal presumption is that every
person is presumed to be of sound mind,
25
or that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person.
26
Thus, the presumption under Article
800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal
Code exempts a person from criminal liability.
27

He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving
it,
28
for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.
29
An
accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is
not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity
must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.
30
It is, therefore, incumbent
upon accuseds counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was
under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or at the time
he executed the act attributed to him.
31

Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
32

Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of
which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
33

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language and conduct.
34
However, not every aberration of
the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.
35
As consistently held by us, "A
man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is
legally so."
36
Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof
of insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough
syrup and consuming three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim;
37
slurping
57
the victims blood and attempting to commit suicide after stabbing him;
38
crying,
swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney.
39

The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones
40
requires that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused
acted without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power
to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,
41
we analyzed the Formigones standard into two
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition whether there was a "complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act" and (b) the test of
volition whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather
than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is
exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the
will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is
expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased
or healthy.
42

Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational
basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
43

Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacitos defense of insanity. The
appellant points to the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that
Anacito was a silent man who would sharply stare at the lady boarders a few days
before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants when
there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that
the testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute
time interval between the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree
was without any known motive.
44

The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged
behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister
Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry with her.
45
His
brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself,
laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet.
46
Also relied
upon by the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and
the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only
Bambis personal perception that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to
wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of
laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-
minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at
the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as
mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability.
47

Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established
by case law. What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne,
and later an injectable medicine to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the
trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that
deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH,
EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she
requested the confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the
fact remains that Anacito was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr.
Verona testified that there was a recommendation for Anacitos confinement, there
was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who
made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation.
48

At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,
49
we discarded the confinement of the accused at
the NCMH prior to the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity,
there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by the institute. Applying this
principle to Anacitos case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of
insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from
1991 until 1999. While Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito
ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the
medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the
medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in
April 2000 because he was "again noisy in the jail."
50
It seems that it was only after
the stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
58
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on
Anacito were based on incomplete or insufficient facts.
51
For one thing, she
admitted to have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two hours
each.
52
Her one-page medical report
53
reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in
appearance, wearing blue shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with
earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory hallucination,
"kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and
complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight
fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient
has a psychiatric disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and
during the commission of the crime. He is presently psychotic and cannot stand
trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Veronas conclusions have no supporting medical bases or
data. She failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to
show her method of testing.
54
Further, she did not have Anacitos complete
behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that
Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was
not conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a
diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not
grossly insane.
55

Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Veronas short psychiatric
evaluation report and her testimony that Anacitos judgment and mental faculties
were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his mental condition in 1998
when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically
examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period
after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacitos mental condition
only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined
by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could have been contracted during the
period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and
relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the
realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him.
The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of
the act which is the subject of the inquiry.
56
His mental condition after that crucial
period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal
liability.
57

Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked
it for the first time in the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his
defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi
as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties.
58

Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was
attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus,
the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after
the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that
insanity is a mere concoction
59
or an afterthought.
60
In any event, Anacito failed to
establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio
Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.
61

We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited
this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was clear from the
records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that
affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the
commission of the act he was being held for.
62
The situation does not exist in the
cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito was diagnosed as "psychotic" with
flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found to be schizophrenic. There
is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the time
he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of
schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the
killing of Allan is concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the
commencement of the assault.
63
For treachery to be considered, it must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars
are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be
supposed.
64

59
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying
in wait for his victim in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr.
reached the "lovers lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed the
former several times. Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
opportunity to resist or defend himself.
65

We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of
murder for the death of Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with
"specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is
belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the
attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not
be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly
qualify an offense.
66

We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the
crime of murder, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was
correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible
penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by
reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the
range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying
circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent
P43,500 for the wake and burial of his son, only P11,945
67
is substantiated by
receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall award to Demetrio Jr.s heirs
temperate damages
68
of P25,000
69
conformably with current jurisprudence.
70

As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent
P10,000. However, he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim.
Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the amount of P10,000 on the
ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of P50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and
Allan is affirmed in line with recent jurisprudence.
71
Civil indemnity is mandatory
and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.
72

Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 consistent with controlling case law.
73

Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victims family.
74

We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
75

Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the
total amount of P161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of
P110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito
Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in
Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively.
Apart from the P50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b)
P25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total
of P150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as
moral damages; and (b) P10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of P110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
60
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for appellant.
W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as
principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as
sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation,
The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months
from date, with interest at P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five
debtors for payment of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate
of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on
Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in
default and were so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of
May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all
the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of
P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from
December 15, 1908, until complete payment should have been made of the
principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the
wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909,
the latter was declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila; (2) that she was appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on
October 11, following, she was authorized by the court, as guardian, to institute the
proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband
while in a state of insanity, among them that concerned in the present cause, issued
in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the guardian, was
not aware of the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance
informed thereof; (5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of
this suit, he was already permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and
still continued so, for which reason he neither appeared nor defended himself in
the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the said
defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered
against him in the suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the
introduction of evidence in behalf of the said defendant with respect to his capacity
at the time of the execution of the bond in question, which evidence could not be
presented in due season on account of the then existing incapacity of the
defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of
evidence, after due consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that
when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of December, 1908, executed the bond in
question, he understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act
performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was
entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such
findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the
judgment rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried
out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested
"with reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill
of exceptions was presented in support of the appeal submitted to this court and
which is based on a single assignment of error as follows:
61
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the
defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one
herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal
doctrine which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not
necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable
of executing a contract of bond like the one here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the
lower court. It would have been necessary to show that such monomania was
habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that the
bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the result of such monomania, and
not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, nor could there have
been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely
an effect of monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date
when the bond in question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of
this branch of medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and
imbecility, some of them, as Casper, going so far into a wealth of classification and
details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of
which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the doubt in the minds of the
majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane
judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who
consider as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility,
but even those other chronic diseases or complaints that momentarily perturb or
cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania, somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness,
suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which more or less violently
deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil
Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation
such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial
decision, that he who suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very
wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of
a judicial declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that
his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract .The bond, as
aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his
incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until
July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several
years suffered from such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-
legal doctrine above cited, that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or
his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or
incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically, in reference to this case, the
following facts were brought out in the testimony given by the physicians, Don
Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the
first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903,
and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his
houses and if you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would
understand the contents of the document?
A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing
particularly remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it
might be that he could not do that; it depends upon what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those
concerning greatness?
A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness
and wealth.
Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?
A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I
have made no trial.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this
monomania of greatness and wealth?
A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
62
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had
prepared the instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that
he explained to Mr. Villanueva its contents and when the witness asked the latter
whether he wished to sign it he replied that he was willing and did in fact do so;
that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness to be normal and
regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the
defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving
cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in
the Court of First Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate
of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety
therein, the witness asked him some questions about his property, in order to
ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate surety, and that
Villanueva testified the same as many, others had done, and witness did not notice
any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the
questions concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place
where it was situated, his answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated;
that he therefore approved the bond; and that all this took place between July and
September, 1908. This witness having been asked, on cross-examination, whether
Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been surety in any
other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should
engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond,
replied that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-
Co that he endeavored to investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to
whether Mr. Villanueva had given any other previous bond, and the discovered that
he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but that, as it had already
been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr. Villanueva
in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the
contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable,
crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been
proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must
be a consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it
should not be expressed in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract
of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure
beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a
bond may be given for some other consideration, according to the agreement and
the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and remuneratory
contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the
beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two
members of the firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara
testified that he had never had dealings with Villanueva; from which it is inferred
that the latter could hardly have been moved to favor the former by the benefit of
an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos, with monthly
interest .But he added that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for
them, to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The witness did not know,
however, whether Arenas gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in
order that the agent might find sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with the
agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his
dealings with Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on
the 13th of May, 1909, that is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in
default, inviting him to a conference "for the purpose of treating of a matter of
great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day,
in the garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on
Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can
not be affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva
engaged in the business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or
remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that there was no other cause for the
giving of the bond in question than the mental disorder that dominated the
intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing himself so
oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever.
There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate
ostentation of wealth, nor that, if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several
bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was influenced only by the
monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that,
granting that he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he
executed the bond now under discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this
63
kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is
not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of
dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the
performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on
the part of the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he
could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary,
deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who as physicians testified as to
extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct, referred, two of them, to a time
prior to 1903, and another of them to the year 1908, but none to December 15,
1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the
testimony of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored,
in 1908, to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for
therein, objection was made by the director of the institution who advised her that
if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, as soon as he
shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the
insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly
insane enough to be placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a
witness in this case, stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her
husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do what he liked; that her husband
had property of his own and was not deprived of its management; that he went out
every morning without her knowing where he went; that she did not know whether
he had engaged in the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference to the
one now concerned, she had learned of it only by finding to note, before
mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of
the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to deprive him of the
management of his own real estate which had been inherited by him, although he
did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax, all this
being done by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the
family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under
discussion, she was asked:
Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out
of the house and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets,
and buys provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being
sane when he was on the street, according to your opinion?
A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange
that this should have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many
people who can testify in regard to this particular.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to
the market, would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions,
and when she was asked by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she
replied that, as far as she knew, he had never squandered any large sum of money;
that he had never been engaged in business; that he supported himself on what
she gave him; and that if he had something to count on for his living, it was the
product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant,
and it is very evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15,
1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not
possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond
which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
64


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


FIRST DIVISION


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,





- versus -





ANICETO BULAGAO,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 184757

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:


October 5, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:


This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 and
Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.

Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of
rape in separate Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations
read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001

That on or about the 29
th
day of June,
2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a knife, with force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of [AAA],[3] 14 years old, against the
latters will and consent.[4]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001

That on or about the 17
th
day of June,
2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a knife, with force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latters will and consent.[5]

65

Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty on both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the
prosecution. AAA was born on April 13, 1986. According to her late-registered
birth certificate, her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however,
testified that BBB and CCC are not her biological parents, as she was only adopted
when she was very young.[6] CCC died in December 1999.[7]

In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house
of her brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and accused-
appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who were
also the children of BBB and CCC).[8]

On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in
a room which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody
enter the room. She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and saw
that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAAs neck,
causing her to freeze in fear. Accused-appellant removed AAAs clothes, and then
his own. Both AAA and accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts before
the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and inserted his penis into her
vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and
continued raping AAA for one hour.[9]

On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also
located in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was
sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA was
roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her.
Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant then
touched her breasts and kissed her. Accused-appellant remained on top of her for
half an hour.[10]

AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape
incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her.
[11]

During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the
character and chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse
between her and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in her
affidavit that CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still
alive. This allegedly happened five times, the first of which was when she was only
seven years old.[12] Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that she was
currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).[13]

The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray as its second witness. However, the latters testimony was dispensed
with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination of AAA by Dr.
Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the examination report,[14] which
includes the finding that AAA was in a non-virgin state.

When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a
year later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the
prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her and
the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape against
the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with him. She also
claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who investigated the incident
to say that the accused-appellant used a knife. She also testified that she was
raped by her father CCC when she was seven years old. She was recanting her
previous testimony because she purportedly was no longer angry with accused-
appellant.[15]

On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of
rape because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry
work for him. However, when asked if she consented and voluntarily submitted
herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse with him, she
answered in the negative. She had been released from the custody of the DSWD
and was alone by herself for some time, but she now lives with the family of
accused-appellant.

[16]

On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not
force himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in
his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was not
her sweetheart.[17]

Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical
psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on
September 12, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental
retardation as he had an IQ of below 50.[18]
66

Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June
15, 2005, claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted
that they ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse.
He denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was
asking for P300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified that
there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang).
[19]

On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case
No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and
hereby sentences him to suffer:

(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the
penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in
the amount of P50,000.00;

(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the
penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in
the amount of P50,000.00.[20]


The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-
appellant after her original testimony. It was during the time when she was back in
the custody of the accused-appellants family that she recanted her testimony for
the prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no other place to go
to as she was completely orphaned and was dependent on the family of the
accused, and it was understandable that she may have recanted in order to remain
in the good graces of the accused-appellants family.[21]

As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from
mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-
appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the
complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the
psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological
condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant
was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist testified that
accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong.[22]

On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming
that of the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23
January 2006, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
on the penalty imposed and damages awarded.
Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He is
further directed to pay private complainant the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each
count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity
awarded by the court a quo.[23]


Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties
manifested that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the
same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in their
appellants and appellees briefs.[24]

In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that
the prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs withdrawal
of her original testimony.

We have recently held that [c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness who
has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another.[25] We have, in
the past, also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not
67
necessarily render the prosecutions evidence inconclusive.[26] In the often-cited
Molina v. People,[27] we specified how a recanted testimony should be examined:

Mere retraction by a prosecution
witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in
cases where previous testimony is retracted
and a subsequent different, if not contrary,
testimony is made by the same witness, the
test to decide which testimony to believe is
one of comparison coupled with the application
of the general rules of evidence. A testimony
solemnly given in court should not be set aside
and disregarded lightly, and before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which
each was made, careful l y and keenl y
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the
change, discriminatingly analyzed. x x x.[28]
(Emphases supplied.)


These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant
is usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa,[29] where the rape
victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father, this Court
held:


I n r ape cases par t i cul ar l y, t he
conviction or acquittal of the accused most often
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant's testimony. By the very nature of
this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually
the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape
victim's testimony is straightforward and marked
with consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent
and credible to establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on
it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate her original testimony.

A retraction is looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary
consideration. Like any other testimony, it is
subject to the test of credibility based on the
relevant circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand.[30]


In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility
of AAAs accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation
was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where
recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the opportunity
to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the
alleged rape by her adoptive brother, but also when she claimed that she made
up her previous rape charges out of anger. As such, it is difficult to overlook the
fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after examining the
young witness as she made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The
legal adage that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this case where AAA was
subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross
examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found
that the private complainants testimony for the prosecution was the one that was
worthy of belief.

However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to
this Court which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted.
AAAs testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she was in the custody
of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All accused-
appellant can harp on in his appellants brief was AAAs failure to recall the length
of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant detail not material to the
elements of the crime of rape. She remained steadfast on cross-examination even
as defense counsel tried to discredit her by bringing up her dark past of being
68
sexually molested by the accused-appellants father when she was seven years old.
This is in stark contrast to her testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living
with accused-appellants family, claimed that she fabricated a revolting tale of rape
simply because accused-appellant made her do laundry. AAAs recantation even
contradicts the testimony of accused-appellant himself. While AAA claims in her
retraction that she had consensual sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified
that they merely kissed and that AAAs purported motive for the rape charges was
monetary.

As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, the cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was
taken at a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the
family of accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the familys implied
commitment to send accused-appellant to Mindanao:

PROS. JOSON:

Q: Where are you staying at present?
A: In our house, sir.

Q: And your house where you were staying is
the house of the parents of the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you dont have any relatives where
you can go and stay except from that
house?
A: None, sir.

Q: Where [are] your parents?
A: I do not know, sir.

Q: Are they all dead or still alive?
A: They are deceased, sir.

Q: All?
A: Both are deceased, sir.

Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full
blood brother and sister?
A: They all separated, sir.

Q: Do you know where they were living?
A: No, sir.

Q: From the time you were released from the
DSWD you are alone by yourself?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care
of you are giving you shelter and
everyday foods [sic] from the family of
the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will
be dismissed because you testify
today[, would] you admit for a fact that
he [was] also staying in the house
where you are staying now?
A: No, sir.

Q: Where will he stay?
A: In Mindanao, sir.

Q: Because that was one of the promise or
commitment of the family of the
accused, is it not?
A: No, sir.

Q: And how did you know he will stay in
Mindanao?
A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him
to stay in the house, sir.

Q: Because your other Kuya does not like
Aniceto Bulagao to do the things that
you have complaint [sic] against him, is
it not?
69
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what you are isinusumbong is the
case today against him, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.[31]


Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the
trial court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree
with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition
accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma
was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence.[32] Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the
accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a
complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
the time of the commission of the crime.[33] Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.[34]

As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the
penalty of death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the
penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
It should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of
moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing
jurisprudence.[35]

In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by
the use of a deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the use of a
deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime was
proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have
occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance
was alleged in the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant
used a knife on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29,
2000, the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36] As such, the crime that was
proven in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any
circumstance affecting criminal liability. However, simple rape is also punishable by
reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.

In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed
even without the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award
of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, both for each count of rape.

[37] In addition, we have held
that since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be awarded,
not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender.[38] This Court believes that the conduct of accused-appellant herein,
who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and is therefore
liable for exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count of rape,
in line with existing jurisprudence.

[39]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-
appellant Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA
the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count
of rape, in addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of
Appeals, namely: civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, both for each count
of rape; and

2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.



70

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 193536
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari
1
questioning the resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237,
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010 Resolution
2
of
the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution
3
of the COMELEC
En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy on the
ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino
(Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc,
which applied the rule on succession under the Local Government Code in filling
the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte
created by the cancellation of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term.
Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisin
mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case
No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his
sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been
granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos probation in
an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC
issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied
with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections
the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same
grounds.
4

The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos criminal record as
follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of
robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro.
Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co-accused
guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional
minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court
of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a
lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a
Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by
the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos probation
was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding
warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and
Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that
respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the
dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed
as SPA No. 04-235.
71
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of
the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting
to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and
conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is
quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador
Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification,
which was issued by the accused without adequate or official support, was
subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated
February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said
probationer has complied with the order of probation and setting aside its Order of
January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said Certification was
also used by the said probationer and became the basis for the Commission on
Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private
complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running
for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of
2004.
5

The COMELECs Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and
cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded
that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks
to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal
case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."
6
The COMELEC First Division
found that Jalosjos certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued;
thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos
was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of
prisin correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisin
mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible
by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No.
7160."
7

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos motion for
reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos earlier probation and a clear showing that
he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos
to claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. Having been
convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His
proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive
the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality, and to
oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied
for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to
CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions of the Office of
the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local Government
Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.
8

Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while
Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated
August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are
hereby AFFIRMED.
9

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial
notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
10
on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved
11
to
consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed a
Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position
of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was
accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E.
Yebes."
12
Jalosjos resignation was made "in deference with the provision of the
72
Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."
13

These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos resignation. In resolving Jalosjos
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardinos Petition in G.R. No.
193536, we address not only Jalosjos eligibility to run for public office and the
consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, but also
COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the
conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos
probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate
for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a
deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith
upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position
from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and
11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the
dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession should apply.
This Courts Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for
any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never
a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy
"that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for
the public office.
14
If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by
final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office,
then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for
a petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus
73
Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a
petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section
12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if
he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x
Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification. The duration of the penalties of
prisin mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
x x x x
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public
office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
74
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisin mayor its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisin mayor
shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,
15
the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The
duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code
perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,
16
the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the
import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
appellees conviction of a crime penalized with prisin mayor which carried the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory
penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which
lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of disqualification.
75
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should
be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word
"perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the
phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both
special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their
durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of
said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or
the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold
public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately
once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory
penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether
the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes
final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding
at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the
convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the
case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective
public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74,
the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is,
having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As
this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,
17
the false material
representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from
perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy
stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly
required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate
made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate
states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78
of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for
quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
18
(Emphasis
supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisin mayor, to which
perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a
petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated
in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised
Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
76
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including
the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the
offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that
Jalosjos conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a
ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for
cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that
offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a
ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,
19
the Court
declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is eligible for the
office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidates allegiance to the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
20

We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate
of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The
COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to
run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting
opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under
Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility
of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78 without,
however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can
be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisin mayor, a petition under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section
40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies
and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.
21
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because
he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran
unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed
winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
22
should be limited to
situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time
of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that
took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections
at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of
the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are
stray votes.
23
If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more
after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because
the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same
position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice
77
to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."
24
The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code,
as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will
result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior
perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor.
The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and
administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio
bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and
the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010
and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Bane,
respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the
highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to
constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the
duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of
Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause
the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his
conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.
SO ORDERED.

78
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013
which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27
March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to
make a determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the
Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass
upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having
denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."
1
(as originally
underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque."
2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go
thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications
are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's
submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed
on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is
likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and
effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that
before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point
has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of
her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on
18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED
petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even
any attempt to remove it.
79
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to
proclamation may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court
for a restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme
Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner.
That did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred
from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her
certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed
because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.
3
She needed a
restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five
days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme
Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her
recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would
allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and
demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an
attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation.
What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a proclamation
in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14 May
2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of
Rule 18 in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become
FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by
the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained,
moves from promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in
Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the
Commission or a division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very
date of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before
us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13.
4
On that date,
she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to
remove the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a
proclamation two days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane
decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on
permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the
petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted
proclamation as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer
be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at
which she directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It
is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision,
by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the
COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all
administrative and judicial actions thereon, past and present. And by her
proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a
candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the
objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by
virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing
legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET
which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives
is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because
she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership.
5
Indeed,
the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in
which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation,
was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the
80
COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013,
there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision
sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to
petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was
obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning
the COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane
decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of
promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the
Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate
of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18
May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as
basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil
action for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed
by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily.
The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special
Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any
of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to
receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position paper together with
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that this
provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence
are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
6

It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the
exercise of the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with
the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is
brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court
should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is
here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of
Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x
to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy
are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner
was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10
October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
81
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the
party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts:
(1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-
General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's
lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's
burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become
either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation
dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder
of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner
was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed
to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore,
i nel i gi bl e t o r un f or and hol d any el ect i ve publ i c off i ce i n t he
Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane,
petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she
is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do
not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she
attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and
to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with
the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner
cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as
the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.1wphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did
not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath
of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she
reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC.
This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she
not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
82
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No.
9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection
with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to
have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time
before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said
oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225
as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as
the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and
the HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is
concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of
candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions
that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme
Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in
fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than
mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At
and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate
cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s
constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes
so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step
towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such,
proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just
stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be
made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative
who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative
is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of
certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties:
who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no
HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste
can be attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition
promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the
HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the
petition was done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of
its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET,
but not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives.
8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the
motion was contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding
that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts
approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this
Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted.
It may well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not
lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is terminated.
9

When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and,
in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such
jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance,
undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of
withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal
effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes.
Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw
her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as
she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the
petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.

83

THIRD DIVISION


EDUARDO B. OLAGUER,
Petitioner,




- versus -





EMILIO PURUGGANAN, JR. AND RAUL LOCSIN,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 158907

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA,
*
JJ.


Promulgated:

February 12, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision,[1] dated 30 June 2003, promulgated by the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated 26 July 1995,
dismissing the petitioners suit.

The parties presented conflicting accounts of the facts.



EDUARDO B. OLAGUERS VERSION

Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer alleges that he was the owner of 60,000
shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday) with a total par value of
P600,000.00, with Certificates of Stock No. 005, No. 028, No. 034, No. 070, and
No. 100.[2] At the time he was employed with the corporation as Executive Vice-
President of Businessday, and President of Businessday Information Systems and
Services and of Businessday Marketing Corporation, petitioner, together with
respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin), was active in the
political opposition against the Marcos dictatorship.[3] Anticipating the possibility
that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the Marcos military, Locsin,
Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwritten agreement that, in the event that
petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioners family by the continued
payment of his salary.[4] Petitioner also executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA), on 26 May 1979, appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and
Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioners shares of stock with
Businessday. During the trial, petitioner testified that he agreed to execute the SPA
in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of
concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military
crackdown against the opposition.[5] The parties acknowledged the SPA before
respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of
Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City.[6]

On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by
virtue of an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing
arson. During the petitioners detention, respondent Locsin ordered fellow
respondent Purugganan to cancel the petitioners shares in the books of the
corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsins name.[7]

84
As part of his scheme to defraud the petitioner, respondent Locsin sent
Rebecca Fernando, an employee of Businessday, to Camp Crame where the
petitioner was detained, to pretend to borrow Certificate of Stock No. 100 for the
purpose of using it as additional collateral for Businessdays then outstanding loan
with the National Investment and Development Corporation. When Fernando
returned the borrowed stock certificate, the word cancelled was already written
therein. When the petitioner became upset, Fernando explained that this was
merely a mistake committed by respondent Locsins secretary.[8]

During the trial, petitioner also agreed to stipulate that from 1980 to 1982,
Businessday made regular deposits, each amounting to P10,000.00, to the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company accounts of Manuel and Genaro Pantig,
petitioners in-laws. The deposits were made on every 15
th
and 30
th
of the month.
[9] Petitioner alleged that these funds consisted of his monthly salary, which
Businessday agreed to continue paying after his arrest for the financial support of
his family.[10] After receiving a total of P600,000.00, the payments stopped.
Thereafter, respondent Locsin and Fernando went to ask petitioner to endorse and
deliver the rest of his stock certificates to respondent Locsin, but petitioner refused.

[11]

On 16 January 1986, petitioner was finally released from detention. He then
discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday in its
corporate books. He also learned that Purugganan, as the Corporate Secretary of
Businessday, had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor of respondent
Locsin, while petitioner was detained. When petitioner demanded that
respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of stock, they refused to do
so. On 29 July 1986, petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court against
respondents Purugganan and Locsin to declare as illegal the sale of the shares of
stock, to restore to the petitioner full ownership of the shares, and payment of
damages.[12]

RESPONDENT RAUL LOCSINS VERSION

In his version of the facts, respondent Locsin contended that petitioner
approached him and requested him to sell, and, if necessary, buy petitioners shares
of stock in Businessday, to assure support for petitioners family in the event that
something should happen to him, particularly if he was jailed, exiled or forced to
go underground.[13] At the time petitioner was employed with Businessday,
respondent Locsin was unaware that petitioner was part of a group, Light-a-Fire
Movement, which actively sought the overthrow of the Marcos government through
an armed struggle.[14] He denied that he made any arrangements to continue
paying the petitioners salary in the event of the latters imprisonment.[15]

When petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioners
shares, but nobody wanted to buy them. Petitioners reputation as an oppositionist
resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers
for the shares of stock.[16] In view of petitioners previous instructions, respondent
Locsin decided to buy the shares himself. Although the capital deficiency suffered
by Businessday caused the book value of the shares to plummet below par value,
respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value.[17] However, he
had to borrow from Businessday the funds he used in purchasing the shares from
petitioner, and had to pay the petitioner in installments of P10,000.00 every 15
th

and 30
th
of each month.[18]

The trial court in its Decision, dated 26 July 1995, dismissed the Complaint
filed by the petitioner. It ruled that the sale of shares between petitioner and
respondent Locsin was valid. The trial court concluded that petitioner had
intended to sell the shares of stock to anyone, including respondent Locsin, in
order to provide for the needs of his family should he be jailed or forced to go
underground; and that the SPA drafted by the petitioner empowered respondent
Locsin, and two other agents, to sell the shares for such price and under such terms
and conditions that the agents may deem proper. It further found that petitioner
consented to have respondent Locsin buy the shares himself. It also ruled that
petitioner, through his wife, received from respondent Locsin the amount of
P600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock.[19] The dispositive part of the trial
courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the [herein
petitioner] to prove by preponderance of
evidence, his causes of action and of the facts
alleged in his complaint, the instant suit is hereby
ordered DISMISSED, without pronouncement as
to costs.

[Herein respondents] counterclaims,
however, are hereby DISMISSED, likewise, for
dearth of substantial evidentiary support.[20]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that
there was a perfected contract of sale.[21] It further ruled that granting that there
was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner, nevertheless, ratified the sale to
85
respondent Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price, and his failure to raise any
protest over the said sale.[22] The Court of Appeals refused to credit the
petitioners allegation that the money his wife received constituted his salary from
Businessday since the amount he received as his salary, P24,000.00 per month, did
not correspond to the amount he received during his detention, P20,000.00 per
month (deposits of P10,000.00 on every 15
th
and 30
th
of each month in the
accounts of the petitioners in-laws). On the other hand, the total amount received,
P600,000.00, corresponds to the aggregate par value of petitioners shares in
Businessday. Moreover, the financial condition of Businessday prevented it from
granting any form of financial assistance in favor of the petitioner, who was placed
in an indefinite leave of absence, and, therefore, not entitled to any salary.

[23]

The Court of Appeals also ruled that although the manner of the cancellation
of the petitioners certificates of stock and the subsequent issuance of the new
certificate of stock in favor of respondent Locsin was irregular, this irregularity will
not relieve petitioner of the consequences of a consummated sale.[24]

Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court
disallowing respondent Locsins claims for moral and exemplary damages due to
lack of supporting evidence.[25]

Hence, the present petition, where the following issues were raised:

I.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR. LOCSIN OVER
THE SHARES;

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER CONSENTED TO THE ALLEGED
SALE OF THE SHARES TO MR. LOCSIN;

III.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS IN
LAWS WERE NOT PETITIONERS SALARY FROM
THE CORPORATI ON BUT I NSTALLMENT
PAYMENTS FOR THE SHARES;

IV.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
MR. LOCSIN WAS THE PARTY TO THE ALLEGED
SALE OF THE SHARES AND NOT THE
CORPORATION; AND

V.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES WAS VALID
ALTHOUGH THE CANCELLATION OF THE
SHARES WAS IRREGULAR.[26]


The petition is without merit.


The first issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale since
respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA[27] issued in his, Joaquin
and Holifenas favor. He alleged that the authority of the afore-named agents to
sell the shares of stock was limited to the following conditions: (1) in the event of
the petitioners absence and incapacity; and (2) for the limited purpose of applying
the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioners subsisting obligations
with the companies adverted to in the SPA.[28]

Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the
definition of the word absence to a condition wherein a person disappears from
his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to
administer his property,[29] citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the entire
provision hereunder quoted:

ART 381. When a person disappears from
his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his
property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
86
appoint a person to represent him in all that may
be necessary.

This same rule shall be observed when
under similar circumstances the power conferred
by the absentee has expired.


Petitioner also puts forward that the word incapacity would be limited to
mean minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction.[30] He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of this
definition, which is hereunder quoted:

ART. 38 Minority, insanity or
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person, from certain obligations,
as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.


Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among the
instances covered by the terms absence or incapacity, as provided under the SPA
he executed in favor of respondent Locsin.

Petitioners arguments are unpersuasive. It is a general rule that a power of
attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only those
powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from
the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied
to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the power. If the language will
permit, the construction that should be adopted is that which will carry out instead
of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney that are
repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument
in accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the
instrument should always be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in
effectuating the express powers.[31]

In the present case, limiting the definitions of absence to that provided
under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of incapacity under Article 38 of the
same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not
impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards
that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the
standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been appointed to
administer the property. In the present case, petitioner himself had already
authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and thus, no longer
necessitated the appointment of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the
construction of incapacity to minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction, as provided under Article 38, would
render the SPA ineffective. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides that the
death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent
extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright
impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an imbecile, a
deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In such cases, not
only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he himself would be unable
to administer his property.

On the other hand, defining the terms absence and incapacity by their
everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, the state of not being
present and the inability to act, given the context that the SPA authorizes the
agents to attend stockholders meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner, to sell the
shares of stock, and other related acts. This construction covers the situation
wherein petitioner was arrested and detained. This much is admitted by petitioner
in his testimony.[32]

Petitioners contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose
of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioners subsisting
obligations to the company is far-fetched. The construction, which will carry out the
purpose, is that which should be applied. Petitioner had not submitted evidence
that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. Nor
could he have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, at the time of
its execution, he was concerned about his possible arrest, death and
disappearance. The language of the SPA clearly enumerates, as among those acts
that the agents were authorized to do, the act of applying the proceeds of the sale
of the shares to any obligations petitioner might have against the Businessday
group of companies. This interpretation is supported by the use of the word and
in enumerating the authorized acts, instead of phrases such as only for, for the
purpose of, in order to or any similar terms to indicate that the petitioner
intended that the SPA be used only for a limited purpose, that of paying any
liabilities with the Businessday group of companies.

87
Secondly, petitioner argued that the records failed to show that he gave his
consent to the sale of the shares to respondent Locsin for the price of
P600,000.00. This argument is unsustainable. Petitioner received from respondent
Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a total of
P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It was only four
years after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the shares. The
petitioners claim that he did not instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the money
to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that petitioner did not give his
consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was authorized, under the SPA, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the manner of payment.
Moreover, had respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the petitioner, as
the latter suggested in this petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included
among petitioners properties which were confiscated by the military. Instead,
respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank accounts of petitioners in-
laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioners wife received these amounts.
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agents authority shall
not be considered exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more
advantageous to the principal than that specified by him.

In addition, petitioner made two inconsistent statements when he alleged
that (1) respondent Locsin had not asked the petitioner to endorse and deliver the
shares of stock, and (2) when Rebecca Fernando asked the petitioner to endorse
and deliver the certificates of stock, but petitioner refused and even became upset.
[33] In either case, both statements only prove that petitioner refused to honor his
part as seller of the shares, even after receiving payments from the buyer. Had the
petitioner not known of or given his consent to the sale, he would have given back
the payments as soon as Fernando asked him to endorse and deliver the
certificates of stock, an incident which unequivocally confirmed that the funds he
received, through his wife and his in-laws, were intended as payment for his shares
of stocks. Instead, petitioner held on to the proceeds of the sale after it had been
made clear to him that respondent Locsin had considered the P600,000.00 as
payment for the shares, and asked petitioner, through Fernando, to endorse and
deliver the stock certificates for cancellation.

As regards the third issue, petitioners allegation that the installment
payments he was adjudged to have received for the shares were actually salaries
which Businessday promised to pay him during his detention is unsupported and
implausible. Petitioner received P20,000.00 per month through his in-laws; this
amount does not correspond to his monthly salary at P24,000.00.[34] Nor does the
amount received correspond to the amount which Businessday was supposed to be
obliged to pay petitioner, which was only P45,000.00 to P60,000.00 per annum.[35]
Secondly, the petitioners wife did not receive funds from respondent Locsin or
Businessday for the entire duration of petitioners detention. Instead, when the
total amount received by the petitioner reached the aggregate amount of his
shares at par value -- P600,000.00 -- the payments stopped. Petitioner even
testified that when respondent Locsin denied knowing the petitioner soon after his
arrest, he believed respondent Locsins commitment to pay his salaries during his
detention to be nothing more than lip-service.[36]

Granting that petitioner was able to prove his allegations, such an act of
gratuity, on the part of Businessday in favor of petitioner, would be void. An
arrangement whereby petitioner will receive salaries for work he will not perform,
which is not a demandable debt since petitioner was on an extended leave of
absence, constitutes a donation under Article 726[37] of the Civil Code. Under
Article 748 of the Civil Code, if the value of the personal property donated exceeds
P5,000.00, the donation and the acceptance shall have to be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation will be void. In the present case, petitioner admitted in his
testimony[38] that such arrangement was not made in writing and, hence, is void.

The fact that some of the deposit slips and communications made to
petitioners wife contain the phrase household expenses does not disprove the
sale of the shares. The money was being deposited to the bank accounts of the
petitioners in-laws, and not to the account of the petitioner or his wife, precisely
because some of his property had already been confiscated by the military. Had
they used the phrase sale of shares, it would have defeated the purpose of not
using their own bank accounts, which was to conceal from the military any
transaction involving the petitioners property.

Petitioner raised as his fourth issue that granting that there was a sale,
Businessday, and not respondent Locsin, was the party to the transaction. The
curious facts that the payments were received on the 15
th
and 30
th
of each month
and that the payor named in the checks was Businessday, were adequately
explained by respondent Locsin. Respondent Locsin had obtained cash advances
from the company, paid to him on the 15
th
and 30
th
of the month, so that he can
pay petitioner for the shares. To support his claim, he presented Businessdays
financial records and the testimony of Leo Atienza, the Companys Accounting
Manager. When asked why the term shares of stock was used for the entries,
instead of cash advances, Atienza explained that the term shares of stock was
more specific rather than the broader phrase cash advances.[39] More to the
point, had the entries been for shares of stock, the issuance of shares should
have been reflected in the stock and transfer books of Businessday, which the
petitioner presented as evidence. Instead the stock and transfer books reveal that
88
the increase in respondent Locsins shares was a result of the cancellation and
transfer of petitioners shares in favor of respondent Locsin.

Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and respondent
Locsin of the disputed shares of stock is void since it contravenes Article 1491 of
the Civil Code, which provides that:

ART. 1491. The following persons
cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:

x x x x

(2) Agents, the property whose
administration or sale may have been entrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal has been
given; x x x.

It is, indeed, a familiar and universally recognized doctrine that a person who
undertakes to act as agent for another cannot be permitted to deal in the agency
matter on his own account and for his own benefit without the consent of his
principal, freely given, with full knowledge of every detail known to the agent which
might affect the transaction.[40] The prohibition against agents purchasing property
in their hands for sale or management is, however, clearly, not absolute. It does not
apply where the principal consents to the sale of the property in the hands of the
agent or administrator.[41]

In the present case, the parties have conflicting allegations. While
respondent Locsin averred that petitioner had permitted him to purchase
petitioners shares, petitioner vehemently denies having known of the transaction.
However, records show that petitioners position is less credible than that taken by
respondent Locsin given petitioners contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[42] In
1980, when Fernando returned a stock certificate she borrowed from the petitioner,
it was marked cancelled. Although the petitioner alleged that he was furious
when he saw the word cancelled, he had not demanded the issuance of a new
certificate in his name. Instead of having been put on his guard, petitioner
remained silent over this obvious red flag and continued receiving, through his
wife, payments which totalled to the aggregate amount of the shares of stock
valued at par. When the payments stopped, no demand was made by either
petitioner or his wife for further payments.

From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner knew of the transaction, agreed
to the purchase price of P600,000.00 for the shares of stock, and had in fact
facilitated the implementation of the terms of the payment by providing
respondent Locsin, through petitioners wife, with the information on the bank
accounts of his in-laws. Petitioners wife and his son even provided receipts for the
payments that were made to them by respondent Locsin,[43] a practice that
bespeaks of an onerous transaction and not an act of gratuity.

Lastly, petitioner claims that the cancellation of the shares and the
subsequent transfer thereof were fraudulent, and, therefore, illegal. In the present
case, the shares were transferred in the name of the buyer, respondent Locsin,
without the petitioner delivering to the buyer his certificates of stock. Section 63 of
the Corporation Code provides that:

Sec.63. Certificate of stock and transfer of
shares. xxx Shares of stock so issued are
personal property and may be transferred by
delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed
by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other
person legally authorized to make the transfer. No
transfer, however, shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded
in the books of the corporation showing the
names of the parties to the transaction, the date of
the transfer, the number of the certificate or
certificates and the number of shares transferred.
(Emphasis provided.)

The aforequoted provision furnishes the procedure for the transfer of shares
the delivery of the endorsed certificates, in order to prevent the fraudulent
transfer of shares of stock. However, this rule cannot be applied in the present case
without causing the injustice sought to be avoided. As had been amply
demonstrated, there was a valid sale of stocks. Petitioners failure to deliver the
shares to their rightful buyer is a breach of his duty as a seller, which he cannot use
to unjustly profit himself by denying the validity of such sale. Thus, while the
manner of the cancellation of petitioners certificates of stock and the issuance of
the new certificates in favor of respondent Locsin was highly irregular, we must,
nonetheless, declare the validity of the sale between the parties. Neither does this
irregularity prove that the transfer was fraudulent. In his testimony, petitioner
admitted that they had intended to conceal his being a stockholder of Businessday.
89
[44] The cancellation of his name from the stock and transfer book, even before
the shares were actually sold, had been done with his consent. As earlier
explained, even the subsequent sale of the shares in favor of Locsin had been done
with his consent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 30 June
2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the shares of stock in favor of respondent
Locsin. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
90

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

LEONARDO S. UMALE, [deceased] represented by CLARISSA VICTORIA, JOHN
LEO, GEORGE LEONARD, KRISTINE, MARGUERITA ISABEL, AND MICHELLE
ANGELIQUE, ALL SURNAMED UMALE,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 181126

Present:

VELASCO, JR.,
Acting Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
!



DEL CASTILLO, and
- versus -


PEREZ, JJ.
ASB REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 15, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Being placed under corporate rehabilitation and having a receiver appointed to
carry out the rehabilitation plan do not ipso facto deprive a corporation and its corporate
officers of the power to recover its unlawfully detained property.

Petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the October 15,
2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91096, as well as its
January 2, 2008 Resolution.[3] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March
28, 2005 of the trial court is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[4]


Factual Antecedents

This case involves a parcel of land identified as Lot 7, Block 5, Amethyst Street,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation
(Amethyst Pearl), a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by respondent ASB Realty
Corporation (ASB Realty).

In 1996, Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the
subject premises in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of
Amethyst Pearls outstanding capital stock from ASB Realty.[5] Thus, ASB Realty became
the owner of the subject premises and obtained in its name Transfer Certificate of Title
No. PT-105797,[6] which was registered in 1997 with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.

Sometime in 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Pasig City for unlawful detainer[7] of the subject premises against
petitioner Leonardo S. Umale (Umale). ASB Realty alleged that it entered into a lease
contract[8] with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was
for Umale to conduct a pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of
P60,720.00 to ASB Realty.


Upon the contracts expiration on May 31, 2000, Umale continued occupying the
premises and paying rentals albeit at an increased monthly rent of P100,000.00. The last
rental payment made by Umale to ASB Realty was for the June 2001 to May 2002
period, as evidenced by the Official Receipt No. 56511[9] dated November 19, 2001.


On June 23, 2003, ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease
and Demand to Vacate and Pay.[10] ASB Realty stated that it was terminating the lease
effective midnight of June 30, 2003; that Umale should vacate the premises, and pay to
ASB Realty the rental arrears amounting to P1.3 million by July 15, 2003. Umale failed to
91
comply with ASB Realtys demands and continued in possession of the subject premises,
even constructing commercial establishments thereon.

Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease
contract but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. He was adamant that his
lessor was the original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Since there was no contract between
himself and ASB Realty, the latter had no cause of action to file the unlawful detainer
complaint against him.

In asserting his right to remain on the property based on the oral lease contract
with Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that the lease period agreed upon was for a
long period of time.[11] He then allegedly paid P1.2 million in 1999 as one year
advance rentals to Amethyst Pearl.[12]

Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl
ended in May 2000, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that
Umale did not have to pay rentals until the sale over the subject property had been
perfected between them.[13] Despite such agreement with Amethyst Pearl regarding
the waiver of rent payments, Umale maintained that he continued paying the annual rent
of P1.2 million. He was thus surprised when he received the Notice of Termination of
Lease from ASB Realty.[14]

Umale also challenged ASB Realtys personality to recover the subject premises
considering that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed.
Under Section 14(s), Rule 4 of the Administrative Memorandum No. 00-8-10SC,
otherwise known as the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim
Rules), it is the rehabilitation receiver that has the power to take possession, control and
custody of the debtors assets. Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject
premises, it is its duly-appointed receiver that should sue to recover possession of the
same.[15]

ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for Umale to have entered into a
Contract of Lease with Amethyst Pearl in 1999 because Amethyst Pearl had been
liquidated in 1996. ASB Realty insisted that, as evidenced by the written lease contract,
Umale contracted with ASB Realty, not with Amethyst Pearl. As further proof thereof,
ASB Realty cited the official receipt evidencing the rent payments made by Umale to
ASB Realty.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its August 20, 2004 Decision,[16] the MTC dismissed ASB Realtys complaint
against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no cause to seek Umales
ouster from the subject property because it was not Umales lessor. The trial court noted
an inconsistency in the written lease contract that was presented by ASB Realty as basis
for its complaint. Its whereas clauses cited ASB Realty, with Eden C. Lin as its
representative, as Umales lessor; but its signatory page contained Eden C. Lins name
under the heading Amethyst Pearl. The MTC then concluded from such inconsistency
that Amethyst Pearl was the real lessor, who can seek Umales ejectment from the subject
property.[17]

Likewise, the MTC agreed with Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could
file suit to recover ASB Realtys property.[18] Having been placed under receivership,
ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

ASB Realty appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
[19] which then reversed[20] the MTC ruling.


The RTC held that the MTC erred in dismissing ASB Realtys complaint for lack of
cause of action. It found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that it was indeed
ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract with Umale, hence, the proper party who
can assert the corresponding right to seek Umales ouster from the leased premises for
violations of the lease terms. In addition to the written lease contract, the official receipt
evidencing Umales rental payments for the period June 2001 to May 2002 to ASB Realty
adequately established that Umale was aware that his lessor, the one entitled to receive
his rent payments, was ASB Realty, not Amethyst Pearl.

ASB Realtys positive assertions, supported as they are by credible evidence, are
more compelling than Umales bare negative assertions. The RTC found Umales version
of the facts incredible. It was implausible that a businessman such as Umale would enter
into several transactions with his alleged lessor a lease contract, payment of lease
rentals, acceptance of an offer to sell from his alleged lessor, and an agreement to waive
rentals sans a sliver of evidence.

With the lease contract between Umale and ASB Realty duly established and
Umales failure to pay the monthly rentals since June 2002 despite due demands from
ASB Realty, the latter had the right to terminate the lease contract and seek his eviction
from the leased premises. Thus, when the contract expired on June 30, 2003 (as stated
in the Notice of Termination of Lease), Umale lost his right to remain on the premises and
92
his continued refusal to vacate the same constituted sufficient cause of action for his
ejectment.[21]

With respect to ASB Realtys personality to file the unlawful detainer suit, the RTC
ruled that ASB Realty retained all its corporate powers, including the power to sue,
despite the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the Interim Rules, the RTC
noted that the rehabilitation receiver was not granted therein the power to file
complaints on behalf of the corporation.[22]

Moreover, the retention of its corporate powers by the corporation under
rehabilitation will advance the objective of corporate rehabilitation, which is to conserve
and administer the assets of the corporation in the hope that it may eventually be able to
go from financial distress to solvency. The suit filed by ASB Realty to recover its property
and back rentals from Umale could only benefit ASB Realty.[23]

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff-appellant ordering defendant-appellee
and all persons claiming rights under him:

1) To immediately vacate the subject leased
premises located at Lot 7, Block 5, Amethyst St., Pearl
Drive, Ortigas Center, Pasig City and deliver
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;

2) To pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
P1,300,000.00 representing rentals in arrears from
June 2002 to June 2003;

3) To pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of
P100,000.00 a month starting from July 2003 and
every month thereafter until they finally vacate the
subject premises as reasonable compensation for the
continued use and occupancy of the same;

4) To pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
P200,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[24]


Umale filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] while ASB Realty moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.[26]

In its July 26, 2005 Order, the RTC denied reconsideration of its Decision and
granted ASB Realtys Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.[27]

Umale then filed his appeal[28] with the CA insisting that the parties did not enter
into a lease contract.[29] Assuming that there was a lease, it was at most an implied lease.
Hence its period depended on the rent payments. Since Umale paid rent annually, ASB
Realty had to respect his lease for the entire year. It cannot terminate the lease at the
end of the month, as it did in its Notice of Termination of Lease.[30] Lastly, Umale
insisted that it was the rehabilitation receiver, not ASB Realty, that was the real party-in-
interest.[31]

Pending the resolution thereof, Umale died and was substituted by his
widow and legal heirs, per CA Resolution dated August 14, 2006.[32]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.[33]

According to the appellate court, ASB Realty fully discharged its burden to prove
the existence of a lease contract between ASB Realty and Umale,[34] as well as the
grounds for eviction.[35] The veracity of the terms of the lease contract presented by
ASB Realty was further bolstered, instead of demolished, by Umales admission that he
paid monthly rents in accordance therewith.[36]

The CA found no merit in Umales claim that in light of Article 1687 of the Civil
Code the lease should be extended until the end of the year. The said provision stated
that in cases where the lease period was not fixed by the parties, the lease period
depended on the payment periods. In the case at bar, the rent payments were made on
a monthly basis, not annually; thus, Umales failure to pay the monthly rent gave ASB
Realty the corresponding right to terminate the lease at the end of the month.[37]

The CA then upheld ASB Realtys, as well as its corporate officers, personality to
recover an unlawfully withheld corporate property. As expressly stated in Section 14 of
93
Rule 4 of the Interim Rules, the rehabilitation receiver does not take over the functions of
the corporate officers.[38]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[39] which was denied in the

assailed January 2, 2008 Resolution.[40]

Issues

The petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:[41]

1. Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file
suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the
corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?

2. Whether a contract of lease exists between ASB Realty and Umale; and

3. Whether Umale is entitled to avail of the lease periods provided in Article 1687 of the
Civil Code.


Our Ruling


Petitioners ask for the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer on the
ground that it was not brought by the real party-in-interest.[42] Petitioners maintain that
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for ASB Realty deprived its corporate officers
of the power to recover corporate property and transferred such power to the
rehabilitation receiver. Section 6, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court states that a receiver has
the power to bring actions in his own name and to collect debts due to the corporation.
Under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A and the Interim Rules, the rehabilitation
receiver has the power to take custody and control of the assets of the corporation.
Since the receiver for ASB Realty did not file the complaint for unlawful detainer, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject property.[43]

Petitioners cite Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[44] Yam v. Court of
Appeals,[45] and Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. The Manila Banking
Corporation,[46] as authorities for the rule that the appointment of a receiver suspends
the authority of the corporation and its officers over its property and effects.[47]

ASB Realty counters that there is no provision in PD 902-A, the Interim Rules, or in
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court that divests corporate officers of their power to sue upon
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.[48] In fact, Section 14 , Rule 4 of the Interim
Rules expressly limits the receivers power by providing that the rehabilitation receiver
does not take over the management and control of the corporation but shall closely
oversee and monitor the operations of the debtor.[49] Further, the SEC Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Recovery (SEC Rules), the rules applicable to the instant case,
do not include among the receivers powers the exclusive right to file suits for the
corporation.[50]

The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.

There is no denying that ASB Realty, as the owner of the leased premises, is the
real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer suit.[51] Real party-in-interest is defined as
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[52]

What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated
to file this suit to recover a corporate property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed
rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file
the instant suit.

Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of
law.[53] As a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out,
expressly or impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law to a
corporation is the power to sue in its own name.[54] This power is granted to a duly-
organized corporation, unless specifically revoked by another law. The question
becomes: Do the laws on corporate rehabilitation particularly PD 902-A, as amended,
[55] and its corresponding rules of procedure forfeit the power to sue from the
corporate officers and Board of Directors?

Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position
of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is
economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern
than if it is immediately liquidated.[56] It was first introduced in the Philippine legal
system through PD 902-A, as amended.[57] The intention of the law is to effect a
feasible and viable rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as a going
concern, because the assets of a business are often more valuable when so maintained
than they would be when liquidated.[58] This concept of preserving the corporations
business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-
94
possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation (the corporation
undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains
in control of its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the
appointed rehabilitation receiver.[59] The concept of debtor-in-possession, is carried out
more particularly in the SEC Rules, the rule that is relevant to the instant case.[60] It states
therein that the interim rehabilitation receiver of the debtor corporation does not take
over the control and management of the debtor corporation.[61] Likewise, the
rehabilitation receiver that will replace the interim receiver is tasked only to monitor the
successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan.[62] There is nothing in the concept
of corporate rehabilitation that would ipso facto deprive[63] the Board of Directors and
corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such as ASB Realty, of control such that it can
no longer enforce its right to recover its property from an errant lessee.

To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor
corporation. The rules enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions[64]
(most of which involve some kind of disposition or encumbrance of the corporations
assets) during the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings but none of which touch
on the debtor corporations right to sue. The implication therefore is that our concept of
rehabilitation does not restrict this particular power, save for the caveat that all its actions
are monitored closely by the receiver, who can seek an annulment of any prohibited or
anomalous transaction or agreement entered into by the officers of the debtor
corporation.

Petitioners insist that the rehabilitation receiver has the power to bring and
defend actions in his own name as this power is provided in Section 6 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court.

Indeed, PD 902-A, as amended, provides that the receiver shall have the powers
enumerated under Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. But Rule 59 is a rule of general
application. It applies to different kinds of receivers rehabilitation receivers, receivers of
entities under management, ordinary receivers, receivers in liquidation and for different
kinds of situations. While the SEC has the discretion[65] to authorize the rehabilitation
receiver, as the case may warrant, to exercise the powers in Rule 59, the SECs exercise of
such discretion cannot simply be assumed. There is no allegation whatsoever in this case
that the SEC gave ASB Realtys rehabilitation receiver the exclusive right to sue.

Petitioners cite Villanueva,[66] Yam,[67] and Abacus Real Estate[68] as authorities
for their theory that the corporate officers of a corporation under rehabilitation is
incapacitated to act. In Villanueva,[69] the Court nullified the sale contract entered into
by the Philippine Veterans Bank on the ground that the banks insolvency restricted its
capacity to act. Yam,[70] on the other hand, nullified the compromise agreement that
Manphil Investment Corporation entered into while it was under receivership by the
Central Bank. In Abacus Real Estate,[71] it was held that Manila Banks president had no
authority to execute an option to purchase contract while the bank was under
liquidation.

These jurisprudence are inapplicable to the case at bar because they involve
banking and financial institutions that are governed by different laws.[72] In the cited
cases, the applicable banking law was Section 29[73] of the Central Bank Act.[74] In stark
contrast to rehabilitation where the corporation retains control and management of its
affairs, Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as amended, expressly forbids the bank or the
quasi-bank from doing business in the Philippines.

Moreover, the nullified transactions in the cited cases involve dispositions of assets
and claims, which are prohibited transactions even for corporate rehabilitation[75]
because these may be prejudicial to creditors and contrary to the rehabilitation plan. The
instant case, however, involves the recovery of assets and collection of receivables, for
which there is no prohibition in PD 902-A.

While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power
to sue to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity of keeping
the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court.
Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the rehabilitation receiver has to be
notified of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in
accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan.

Coming to the second issue, petitioners maintain that ASB Realty has no
cause of action against them because it is not their lessor. They insist that Umale entered
into a verbal lease agreement with Amethyst Pearl only. As proof of this verbal
agreement, petitioners cite their possession of the premises, and construction of
buildings thereon, sans protest from Amethyst Pearl or ASB Realty.[76]

Petitioners concede that they may have raised questions of fact but insist
nevertheless on their review as the appellate courts ruling is allegedly grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises, and conjectures and its conclusions regarding the termination
of the lease contract are manifestly absurd, mistaken, and impossible.[77]

Petitioners arguments have no merit. Ineluctably, the errors they raised involve
factual findings,[78] the review of which is not within the purview of the Courts functions
under Rule 45, particularly when there is adequate evidentiary support on record.

95
While petitioners assail the authenticity of the written lease contract by pointing
out the inconsistency in the name of the lessor in two separate pages, they fail to account
for Umales actions which are consistent with the terms of the contract the payment of
lease rentals to ASB Realty (instead of his alleged lessor Amethyst Pearl) for a 12-month
period. These matters cannot simply be brushed off as sheer happenstance especially
when weighed against Umales incredible version of the facts that he entered into a
verbal lease contract with Amethyst Pearl; that the term of the lease is for a very long
period of time; that Amethyst Pearl offered to sell the leased premises and Umale had
accepted the offer, with both parties not demanding any written documentation of the
transaction and without any mention of the purchase price; and that finally, Amethyst
Pearl agreed that Umale need not pay rentals until the perfection of the sale. The Court
is of the same mind as the appellate court that it is simply inconceivable that a
businessman, such as petitioners predecessor-in-interest, would enter into commercial
transactions with and pay substantial rentals to a corporation nary a single
documentation.

Petitioners then try to turn the table on ASB Realty with their third argument.
They say that under Article 1687 of the New Civil Code, the period for rent payments
determines the lease period. Judging by the official receipt presented by ASB Realty,
which covers the 12-month period from June 2001 to May 2002, the lease period should
be annual because of the annual rent payments.[79] Petitioners then conclude that ASB
Realty violated Article 1687 of the New Civil Code when it terminated the lease on June
30, 2003, at the beginning of the new period. They then implore the Court to extend the
lease to the end of the annual period, meaning until May 2004, in accordance with the
annual rent payments.[80]

In arguing for an extension of lease under Article 1687, petitioners lost sight of the
restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. It states that a lessee that commits
any of the grounds for ejectment cited in Article 1673, including non-payment of lease
rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated, cannot
avail of the periods established in Article 1687.[81]

Moreover, the extension in Article 1687 is granted only as a matter of equity. The
law simply recognizes that there are instances when it would be unfair to abruptly end
the lease contract causing the eviction of the lessee. It is only for these clearly unjust
situations that Article 1687 grants the court the discretion to
extend the lease.[82]

The particular circumstances of the instant case however, do not inspire granting
equitable relief. Petitioners have not paid, much less offered to pay, the rent for 14
months and even had the temerity to disregard the pay-and-vacate notice served on
them. An extension will only benefit the wrongdoer and punish the long-suffering
property owner.[83]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 15, 2007 Decision and
January 2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91096 are hereby
AFFIRMED. ASB Realty Corporation is ordered to FURNISH a copy of the Decision on
its incumbent Rehabilitation Receiver and to INFORM the Court of its compliance
therewith within 10 days.

SO ORDERED.

96
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185922 January 15, 2014
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and
Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE,
Petitioners,
vs.
JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D.
FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents
SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision
1
and 7
January 2009 Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497
dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of the Deed of Donation for failure
to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with
whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, Consolacion
Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly
Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana
Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G.
Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed
an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is
married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named Ma.
Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea
D. Favis.
Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the following properties:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
consisting an area of 898 square meters, more or less, bounded on the north by
Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio St., and
on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed
value of P126,000.00; x x x;
3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy. VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an
area of 154 sq. ms., more or less, bounded on the North by the High School Site;
on the East by Gomez St., on the South by Domingo [G]o; and on the West by
Domingo Go; x x x;
4. A house with an assessed value of P17,600.00 x x x;
5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing an area
of 2,257 sq. ma. (sic) more or less, bounded on the North by Lot 1208; on the East
by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot 1211-B, 1212
and 1215 x x x.
3

Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was beset by various illnesses,
such as kidney trouble, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, Parkinsons disease
and pneumonia. He died of "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to multi-organ/
system failure secondary to sepsis secondary to pneumonia."
4

On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation
5
transferring and
conveying properties described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with
Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with
Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of
Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and
Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties donated
do not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because said donation was made
inter vivos, hence petitioners have no stake over said properties.
6

The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of
donation and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs
of Dr. Favis.
7

97
In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation
and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr.
Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of
his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the
subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the
trial court also declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. The
dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
the Deed of Donation dated October 16, 1994 is hereby annulled and the
corresponding tax declarations issued on the basis thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. having died without a will, his estate would result to intestacy.
Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., namely Purita A. Favis,
Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F. Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart,
Mercedes A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte and the defendants Juana Gonzales now
deceased and Mariano G. Favis, Jr. shall inherit in equal shares in the estate of the
late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which consists of the following:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
consisting an area of 89 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by Salvador
Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by Bonifacio St., and on the
West by Carmen Giron;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an assessed
value of P126,000.00;
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,] containing
an area of 2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north by Lot 1208; on the
east by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the West by Lot 1211-B,
1212 and 1215.
4. The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan Coliseum in the amount of One
Hundred Thirty [Thousand] (P130,000.00) pesos per annum from the death of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr.
8

Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the
trial courts nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation
in favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the
petitioners nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by
herein respondents as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate
court justified its order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the
trial court even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not
subject to compromise as it involves future legitime.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners contention when it ruled that the
prohibited compromise is that which is entered between the decedent while alive
and compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court observed that while
the present action is between members of the same family it does not involve a
testator and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the
subject properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact,
legitime, as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.
Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the
following arguments:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY and SERIOUSLY ERRED in
DISMISSING the COMPLAINT.
2. Contrary to the finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the verification of the
complaint or petition is not a mandatory requirement.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously failed to appreciate that the filing of
an intervention by Edward Favis had placed the case beyond the scope of Article
151 of the Family Code.
4. Even assuming arguendo without admitting that the filing of intervention by
Edward Favis had no positive effect to the complaint filed by petitioners, it is still a
serious error for the Honorable Court of Appeals to utterly disregard the fact that
petitioners had substantially complied with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code.
5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying
substantially with Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same should be
considered as a non-issue considering that private respondents are in estoppel.
98
6. The dismissal of the complaint by the Honorable Court of Appeals amounts to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction and a
complete defiance of the doctrine of primacy of substantive justice over strict
application of technical rules.
7. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely and seriuosly erred in not affirming the
decision of the Court a quo that the Deed of Donation is void.
9

In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch upon the merits of the case,
which is the validity of the deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended the
ruling the Court of Appeals that the complaint is dismissible for failure of
petitioners to allege in their complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been exerted.
The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made. The appellate court committed egregious error in
dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of
the Family Code, viz:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds:
x x x x
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of
the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. $ Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio
dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.
10
Specifically in
Gumabon v. Larin,
11
cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,
12
the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances
when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any
order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying
and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of
Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it
appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations. x x x.
13

The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is
kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of
Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with,
a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between
members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but
had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly,
the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before
99
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame
indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted,
only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in
the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is
not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas
14
cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation
v. ALS Management and Development Corporation
15
where we noted that the
second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule
that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu propio on any of the
enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the
allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from
the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived
ground.
Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit
among members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of
Versoza v. Versoza,
16
a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial
court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article
222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court
ruled that a complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise
and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot be a
ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action.
The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that
the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer
jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-
matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages,
cognizable by the court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,
17
allowed an amendment which "
merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellants cause of action,
because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action." We
there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v.
Bautista,
18
that an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the
court x x x. (Italics supplied).
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a
compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the
conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were
described as a "condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court."
19
In
such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule.
Thus:
x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection,
in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection
which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
20
(Underscoring supplied).
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to
dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by
respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no
mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply
with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure
assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of
Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection
is wholly applicable to respondent.1wphi1 If the respondents as parties-
defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest
efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any
authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been
given more teeth"
21
by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say
that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a
compromise, has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the
Family Code
100
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to
breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
22

The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the
respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation
was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the
respondents insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject
properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order
specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not
respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not
only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their
appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have
relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the
refusal by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of
petitioners complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown
during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on the erroneous ruling of
the Court of Appeals even when petitioners came to us for review not just on the
basis of such defective motu propio action but also on the proposition that the trial
court correctly found that the donation in question is flawed because of vitiated
consent. Respondents did not answer this argument. The trial court stated that the
facts are:
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the
action for annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.
at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age,
health and environment among others should be considered. As testified to by Dr.
Mercedes Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who
were all presented as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had long been
suffering from Hiatal Hernia and Parkinsons disease and had been taking
medications for years. That a person with Parkinsons disease for a long time may
not have a good functioning brain because in the later stage of the disease, 1/3 of
death develop from this kind of disease, and or dementia. With respect to Hiatal
Hernia, this is a state wherein organs in the abdominal cavity would go up to the
chest cavity, thereby occupying the space for the lungs causing the lungs to be
compromised. Once the lungs are affected, there is less oxygenation to the brain.
The Hernia would cause the heart not to pump enough oxygen to the brain and the
effect would be chronic, meaning, longer lack of oxygenation to the brain will make
a person not in full control of his faculties. Dr. Alday further testified that during his
stay with the house of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (1992-1994), he noticed that the latter
when he goes up and down the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he called this
pulmonary cripple a very advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one lung,
but both lungs are compromised. That at the time he operated on the deceased,
the left and right lung were functioning but the left lung is practically not even five
(5%) percent functioning since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of Donation was already 92
years old; living with the defendants and those years from 1993 to 1995 were the
critical years when he was sick most of the time. In short, hes dependent on the
care of his housemates particularly the members of his family. It is the contention of
the defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had full control of his mind during
the execution of the Deed of Donation because at that time, he could go on with
the regular way of life or could perform his daily routine without the aid of anybody
like taking a bath, eating his meals, reading the newspaper, watching television, go
to the church on Sundays, walking down the plaza to exercise and most importantly
go to the cockpit arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert however,
testified that a person suffering from Parkinsons disease when he goes to the
cockpit does not necessarily mean that such person has in full control of his mental
faculties because anyone, even a retarded person, a person who has not studied
and have no intellect can go to the cockpit and bet. One can do everything but do
not have control of his mind. x x x That Hiatal Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one
is not sure especially if the person has not complained and no examination was
done. It could be there for the last time and no one will know. x x x.
The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis,
Maria Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Maria Thea D. Favis, all of whom
are the children of Mariano G. Favis, Jr. was executed on [16 October] 1994, seven
(7) months after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis, Sr. at Bonifacio St.,
Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter and the defendants.
Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time of the execution of
the Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was already at an advanced age of 92,
afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons disease and
pneumonia, to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or
mental faculties and the deed being executed only when Dra. Mercedes Favis had
101
already left his fathers residence when Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so
earlier or even in the presence of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the
Deed of Donation was not in full control of his mental faculties. That although age
of senility varies from one person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those
medications and treatment one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his
mind remains unimpaired, would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation
was only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his father's house necessarily
indicates that they don't want the same to be known by the first family, which is an
indicia of bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had influence
over the donor.
23

The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered,
erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding,
therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any
argument to have it reversed.
The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the trial
court. Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court chose to confine its review to the procedural
aspect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only with procedure,
is deemed to have covered all issues including the correctness of the factual
findings of the trial court. Moreover, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals
would only constitute unwarranted delay in the final disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
102