"Phaedo" 104-105: Is the Soul a Form?

Author(s): Jerome Schiller

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 50-58
Published by: BRILL
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Phaedo 104-IO. Is the Soul a Form?
JEROME SCHILLER
In his Plato's Phaedo, R. Hackforth n otes that the con fusion s of the
fin al argumen t for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo are
deepen ed by a chan ge in Plato's con ception of the 'logical status'
of the soul from 'soul as form to soul as possessor of form' in the course
of the argumen t, probably at 105E10.1 D. Keyt, in a recen t article
in Phron esis, adapts Hackforth's view to his aim of locatin g the fal-
lacies in the fin al argumen t by commen tin g that even if Plato does n ot
take the soul to be an imman en t form in the argumen t, he does treat
it as if it were on e.2 Although Keyt does n ot accuse Plato of equivo-
catin g on 'soul' in the course of the argumen t, on e of the two fallacies
he attributes to him stems from Plato's treatin g the soul as if it were a
form. I should like to defen d Plato from both these criticisms by
showin g that he n ever treats the soul as an imman en t form in the course
of the argumen t.
The most importan t eviden ce that both Hackforth an d Keyt cite
for their view is the parallelism of the statemen ts at 104 D 1-7 an d
105 D 3-5. Here are these crucial passages:
A. 104D1-7
'Ap' o`v, o
J
K6f3q, -TBs et-n av, a O6- av x%-rciaT p'vov &vayx%'sL
u e , A, , ot ,,,ot\, v
TqV
COU 1Ocav Lu-ro a?LV, aO'CB xO'L evocv[ou [O?CV2VC ]
&L rtVo4;
iQ?sap &p-cL aeyopev.
O
9Ooa yap 37ou 5TL a av 1T Tv 'pLcov Loc?
ocz &v&yN Uo, ou Ztvov pLav sLVOCa & X& oZd
pLTT0L.
B. 105D3-5
T V el -A t ! n \ el 1/ X 5 I
9?Xn
apoc
OTL &v ocur&-
zxrc-azxm
&sLW ? 's.VO cpOuaX 6AV;
"Hxer.
tlSVTOL,
CyY.
Let us first review the con text in which these statemen ts appear. The
discussan ts have agreed that a safe prin ciple to be followed in fixin g
the cause of an ythin g's havin g a certain quality is to cite the presen ce
of a form in the thin g (100 C -101 D); that n either the form in n ature
1 R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, 1955), 165.
2
D. Keyt, 'The Fallacies in Phaedo 102a-107b,' Phron esis VIII (1963), 169.
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(the absolute form) n or the form in thin gs (the imman en t form) will
admit its opposite an d become other than what it was, but soon er would
depart or perish (102B-103B); that there are thin gs, such as sn ow
an d fire, which, though n ot the forms cold an d heat, behave just like
these forms when the opposites of the forms approach: they either
depart or perish (103C-103E); that this is true of other thin gs, for
in stan ce, the n umber three (which will n ot admit the form even ) an d
two (which will n ot admit the form odd) (103 E - 104 C). Socrates then
poses the question , What sort of thin gs are these? an d A is the an swer.
Between A an d B, in addition to a summary of poin ts made previously,
we have the observation that we can n ow n ame such thin gs as causes
of the presen ce of a certain quality in somethin g: thus fire (an d n ot
the old, 'safe' heat) can be cited as the cause of somethin g's bein g hot,
or fever (an d n ot illn ess) the cause of someon e's bein g ill (104 D -
105 C). B is then presen ted as an elaboration of an in stan ce of the
prin ciple just developed: the soul is (parallel to fire) that which causes
the body in which it is to be alive (parallel to its bein g hot). The
immortality of the soul is then established by recallin g the earlier
admission that thin gs, such as three, which are associated with
particular forms, such as odd, can n ot admit the opposite of those
forms. An d just as what can n ot admit the even an d has n o part in the
even is 'un even ' (aCvxpTLov), so the soul, which does n ot admit death,
is 'immortal' (&Oavaoov) (105 D - 105 E). (Then Socrates goes on to
prove that if it is immortal, it is imperishable [105E-107A], but we
are n ot con cern ed with this phase of his argumen t.)
Does Plato view the soul, up to 105 E at least, as an imman en t
form? The soul is in troduced as bein g parallel to certain thin gs - sn ow,
fire, an d three
-
each of which,
while
bein g
so
in timately
associated
with a form that it can n ot exist without that form, is n ever really
called a form, an d, common sen sically, should n ot be taken as other
than a con crete thin g. Two poin ts, however, seem to shatter this
simple an swer: on e of these 'thin gs,' at least, does seem to be iden tified
as a form in the course of the argumen t, n amely, three at 104D5-6
( V
TPv
'EpOv 'L); moreover, this form is said to occupy
(xorOCay-n )
somethin g, just as the soul is said to occupy
(xc-aXa-)
the body at
105 D3.
Hackforth develops his argumen t in this fashion : In 103 C 10 - 105 B 4,
he claims, Plato is exten din g to other en tities the prin ciple of exclusion
of opposites established earlier. These other en tities are forms such as
'twon ess' an d 'fierin ess'. Though n ot themselves opposites, they
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exclude forms which are opposites. Hackforth defen ds his in ter-
pretation of these other en tities bein g forms (an d n ot thin gs) in these
words: "Here [104E10-105A1] at least, whatever be the case else-
where..., -To -sup is con ceived as a form, fierin ess, n ot as a particular
fire; n ot merely because it is men tion ed in the same breath with
a &uc, but also because the whole paragraph in which it occurs is
con cern ed n ot with thin gs but with forms... Plato defin es [these
forms] by referen ce to the thin gs which they come to 'occupy'
(104 D1, 6): an d that he should do so is quite n atural, sin ce the form
which he has in min d - the form to which all the illustration s of his
prin ciples poin t - is soul, which occupies a body, an d 'brin gs up' in to
that body the form of an opposite, viz. the form 'aliven ess' (life) ."3
In commen tin g later on his in terpretation of the soul as a form, he
n otes: On ly if soul is regarded as a form "can what is n ow asserted of
soul be a corollary, or deduction , or application - whatever on e chooses
to call it - of the elaborate argumen t about the exclusion of opposite
forms: provided, that is, that I have been right in regardin g that
argumen t as con cern ed with forms... An d if an y doubt still lin gers in
the reader's min d, surely the use of the word
XoaraGZ-n
in 105 D 3 is,
despite Burn et's n ote, con clusive; to my min d, at all even ts, it is
in con ceivable that it could mean there an ythin g other than what it
mean t at 104 D 1, n amely the occupation of a subject by an imman en t
form."4
In light of this last statemen t, Archer-Hin d's commen t on araCaxB
at 105 D 3 is perplexin g: "It is to be n oted that the usage of xa-n xa-j&
here is differen t from that in 104 D. The soul does n ot occupy the body
in the sen se in which IpL&' occupies -pta: the triad is the cause why
three are three, the soul is n ot the cause why body is body, but the
cause why it is alive. The differen ce lies in this: the triad is the idea
of three; the soul which quicken s the body is n ot the idea of soul, but
a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever."5
How shall we decide between these readin gs? We might suspect
Archer-Hin d of sacrificin g the parallelism of the passages because he
is con vin ced
- on eviden ce extern al to the argumen t
- that there
can n ot be an 'idea of soul,' but on ly particular souls. But he can n ot
be guilty of such prejudice, for he goes on , in this very n ote, to claim
that the argumen t commits Plato to an idea of soul -
though this is a
3Hackforth, op. cit., 156.
4
Hackforth, op. cit., 162.
5
R. D. Archer-Hin d, The Phaedo of Plato (2n d ed. Lon don , 1894), 115-116.
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'metaphysical mon strosity'
-
which supplies the idea of life to par-
ticular souls, which in turn bear this idea to bodies. Even though this
idea of soul is n ot men tion ed in the argumen t, he claims that it is
n ecessitated by 'the elaborate parallel' an d supported by other
passages from early Plato.6
I believe that three features of this argumen t con clusively support
Archer-Hin d's readin g that the soul fun ction s here as a particular
thin g, n ot as an imman en t form. First, if Hackforth is correct, Plato
has n ot on ly equivocated on 'soul,' but he would also be forced to
accept the absurd implication that the body is immortal. Secon d, the
shift in
xovraX
n ecessitated by Archer-Hin d's in terpretation does n ot
spoil the argumen t, but fits n aturally in to its developmen t. Third, a
study of the locution s Plato uses for 'three' un dermin es Hackforth's
readin g.
Hackforth tran slates 104 D5-7 of passage A above (olaOo ...
7rept-ToZq)
in this way: "You kn ow presumably that an ythin g occupied by the
character of three must be n ot on ly three but also odd."7 Plato
con tin ues (104D9-10):
'E7r.L 'rO' oLtQov
8",
Y04LEV, I
EVOCVT'C lBea ?XCSLVy)
Tfn
{UopqPn
as cxv '7OUO
iUMpYOCJTOC
CL OUU7MOT OaV ?E'XOOL.
Here Hackforth tran slates: "Well, what we main tain is that such a
thin g can n ever be visited by the character that is opposite to the
form which brin gs that about."8 The secon d passage clearly in dicates
that the thin g occupied by the character of three (ro toLoitov) can
n ever admit of even n ess. Now if
xoc-&aX-n
were bein g used in a perfectly
parallel fashion here an d at 105 D3, as Hackforth main tain s, the thin g
occupied in that passage (the body) could n ever be visited by the
character that is opposite to the form which brin gs life about (death):
in other words, Plato would have shown that the body can n ot admit of
death, that is, that the body is immortal.
Three con sideration s show that the shift in the use of
xot&aXj
from
104 D to 105 D is a n atural an d expected on e. First, the use of xovc(X&a
at 105 D3 may be viewed as remin din g the reader of a previous part
of the argumen t an d n ot n ecessarily as assertin g an y parallels with its
previous use. It is certain ly clear that Plato is pressin g the parallel
6
Archer-Hin d, op. cit., 116.
7Hackforth, op. cit., 152.
8
Idem.
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between the soul an d three. Thus at 104E1 ff. he claims successively
that the even n ever visits three (O86n o'Te i"s), that three has n o part
(o`4otpa)
in the even , an d that it is thus un even (iv0ap'ro4). At 105 D
lOff. he n otes that the soul will n ever admit (ou'
[.o$n o'r 8r6-iqto)
death,
that we n ow (v5v) agree to call that which does n ot admit the even ,
the un even
(v6p4rtov);
so we should call the soul immortal (iOOvourov).
But between these two passages Plato in troduces his exten sion of the
causal prin ciple (105B-C). The later use of
xmrx-Zn
may thusi be
justified as weldin g together two parts of the argumen t. It preserves
the con tin uity by bein g 'a simple military metaphor' which
'implies
n o metaphysical theory.'9
A secon d reason for thin kin g the shift in the use of
xoo&a/yr
to be an
easy on e lies in the tran slation of 104D1-3. Altern atetran slation sof
this part of passage A above (TAp' o'v... -uvO4;) deman d very differen t
degrees of parallelism in the two uses. Con trast Hackforth's tran slation
with Treden n ick's: Hackforth: "Must they n ot be those which compel
the object which they come to occupy to have n ot on ly its own
character, but also the character of a certain opposite, which it will
n ever lose?"10 Treden n ick: "Well, then , Cebes, would this describe
them
-
that
they
are
thin gs
which are
compelled by
some form which
takes possession of them to assume n ot on ly its own form but in -
variably also that of some other form which is an opposite?"11
No doubt Hackforth's tran slation con forms well to the Greek,
but thin gs can be said for Treden n ick's ren derin g which
perhaps
over-
weigh this. First, it makes the referen ce of X in D 1 con sisten t with that
in D5 as 'thin gs occupied.' Secon dly, it obviates Burn et's n ote on the
shift from the plural (1) to the sin gular (octu'ro5) in the referen ce to the
occupyin g thin gs.'2 (Of course this n ote is also obviated in Hackforth's
tran slation with ai&ro5 bein g taken as referrin g to the thin g occupied.13)
9John Burn et, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), 123.
10
Hackforth, op. cit., 151.
11 Hugh Treden n ick, 'Phaedo,' in Last Days of Socrates, reprin ted in E. Hamilton
an d H. Cairn s, eds. Collected Dialogues of Plato (New York, 1961), 86.
3 Burn et, op. cit., 119-120.
13
Treden n ick's or Burn et's tran slation of uT-rO in which it refers to the occu-
pyin g form - "forces the thin g occupied to assume the form of the occupier" -
when coupled with Hackforth's in terpretation of the parallels of 104 I) an d
105 D, may appear to lead to an even greater paradox than that of the body's
immortality, n amely, the paradox that the body is really a soul. Thus, followin g
the lead of 103E3 an d 104A2 where thin gs other than forms are said to receive
n ames of forms, it might be argued that the object occupied wouild lhave to
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As Burn et n otes, 'the pron oun s are a little puzzlin g' in this passage ;14
perhaps in such a situation the advan tages of Treden n ick's tran slation
outweigh those of Hackforth's.
If we do adopt Treden n ick's readin g, there seems to be less deman d
for parallelism in the use of
xcetaCXq
at 104 D an d 105 D. The 'thin gs'
which behave like opposites are thin gs occupied by forms an d n ot
forms which actively occupy. Thus it is an object occupied by the form
of three, an d n ot the threen ess which occupies it, which, n ot acceptin g
the opposite of the form that accompan ies threen ess, is said to be
un even (104E). The stress on these thin gs which passively receive
their properties de-emphasizes
xcn az-p
in its first appearan ce, while
pavin g the way for a soul which is immortal, just as three is un even .
But though the way is prepared for an easy tran sition to the
differen t use of xo&aXy, on e further step is required: to associate these
objects, hitherto characterized primarily in a passive fashion , with
some sort of activity. The tran sition is accomplished by makin g these
thin gs in to causes. Thus, accordin g to the n ew, refin ed an swer to the
causal question , it is n ot heat which makes a body hot, but fire; n ot
illn ess which makes a body ill, but fever. But this observation will n ot
con vin ce an yon e who takes the fire or fever of 105 C to be forms, an d
n ot to be examples of thin gs occupied. I suggest that Plato shows, in
an other difficult passage, 105 A 3-5, that the latter is the more plausible
in terpretation .
As we have seen above, such thin gs as three do n ot admit the
opposite of the form accompan yin g their occupyin g form. Un til
104 E 10 these thin gs are n ot characterized as en gagin g in an y activity
further than this refusal to admit forms. At 104E7-105A1, however,
they n ot on ly do n ot admit (axeLroc) the opposite, but they brin g
forward (Ern pepet) the opposite they con tain again st the in trudin g
form, as three brin gs forth oddn ess again st the even , two brin gs forth
even n ess, an d fire, heat. In his n ext breath, Plato elaborates their
receive the n ame of the occupyin g form, so that, assumin g the parallelism of the
two passages, the body would have to be n amed 'soul' in con forman ce with its
occupyin g form.
But there are two reason s for n ot pressin g this paradox. First, the referen ce of
muTro5 is n ot at all clear. Secon d, even if Treden n ick's tran slation is correct,
Plato n eed n ot be taken as sayin g that the thin g occupied must receive the
n ame of the occupyin g form as its substan tial n ame, but on ly as an attribute.
Thus heat causes an object to be hot, n ot to be heat; life causes it to be alive,
n ot life; so soul would cause body to be besouled, perhaps, an d n ot soul.
14
Burn et, op. cit., 119.
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activity in an other direction : n ot on ly will opposites n ot admit
opposites, but (105A3-5):
xalt ?XE6VO,
O &V
k7r!typpf
tL &VOCVTLOV SX'LVW,
p'
OTC XV OC'r6 t. aur
TO
?7rvppOV
V TVO Lc7p[LSVOU V EVLXV87OT S7tOt p ?e a'XCaOC .
Fowler tran slates this passage thus: "n othin g which brin gs an opposite
to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositen ess of
that which is brought."'5 Note the importan t shift here. The con text
clearly in dicates that the 'thin gs' bein g discussed are the same en tities
(such as three) which were first characterized as n ot admittin g
opposites, an d then were said to brin g forth an opposite again st an
approachin g opposite. Now they are said to brin g an opposite to some-
thin g which they approach (Xcp' 6-r xv cc&r6 t. Though Plato proceeds
to sum up his argumen t at 105 A8ff. by n otin g that these objects will
n ot admit (ou taerxL) opposites, he almost immediately utilizes their
n ewly acquired activity in his refin ed theory of causes. He does n ot
say explicitly that fire an d fever cause bodies to be hot an d ill by
brin gin g an opposite to them, but this mechan ism becomes obvious
in his parallel treatmen t of the soul. Just before the passage we have
called B above, Plato establishes that it is the soul which always
causes the body in which it is to be alive. He then relates cause an d
activity in these words (in Hackforth's tran slation ) B: "Then soul
always brin gs life alon g with it to an ythin g that it occupies.'"16
This sen ten ce seems simply to relate 105A3-5 to the soIl. In
105A3-5 somethin g is said to brin g somethin g opposite
(ea7rp6pn
-n
Spvaw'tov) to what it approaches (sup' oa ocv &'CU-6 ). Here the soul
brin gs life ("xze cppouao Ccov) to what it occupies (xartas). The
military overton es of &
c
1 are caught in the
xoavraaX?n
of the secon d
passage. The use of xcxra'C^n at 105 D 3 in a fashion n ot perfectlv
16
H. N. Fowler, Plato with an En glish Tran slation , Vol.
1
(Lon don , 1914), 361.
Hackforth tran slates the passage thus: "if an y form brin gs up on e of two
opposites in to that which it itself en ters, that form itself will n ever admit the
character opposite to the on e brought up." (Hackforth, op. cit., 152-153)
Fowler's 'oppositen ess' is a bit clumsy, but Hackforth's 'form' is clearly n ot
in dicated in the Greek, an d prejudices the discussion . Fowler's tran slation seems
also preferable to Treden n ick's, which un deremphasizes the thin g's activity.
(See Treden n ick, op. cit., 86.)
16
Hackforth, op. cit., 159.
17
See Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n . 4; Burn et, op. cit., 121.
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parallel to its earlier use at 104 D is thus n atural an d required by the
developmen t of the argumen t."8
The third support for Archer-Hin d's in terpretation is Plato's mode of
referrin g to n umbers in 104-105. We saw above that Hackforth feels
that this mode of referen ce actually supports his in terpretation : thus
a reason for thin kin g that rO 7Up is a form at lOSA1 is "that it is
men tion ed in the same breath with n aua&.'. But I thin k Hackforth is
mistaken . The most n oteworthy feature here is Plato's studied in -
differen ce to the locution s by which he refers to n umbers. Thus he
explain s, at 104A7ff., that n rpr.&4, an d half of n umbers in gen eral
(o
%uavUq
'o0 &pLO0,oii &7rtCo) are odd though n ot iden tical to the odd,
'an d in the same way' (xc' cx i') r'c 3o an d all the other series of n umbers
(OC7=a
o -TpOG
o
MU
a-TLZoq
ro5 OpLOV?o5) are even , though n ot iden tical to
even n ess. But if r 'pL&4 an d Ta& 36o are equaUy parts of the n umber
series, so similarly, we might expect, would be TL0C 'pLoC an d n 8uG.
In deed, Plato's easy moves from r-' tptL to n
'pLacq
at 104C1-5 an d
104E3-5, which in dicate n o obvious chan ge in his referen ce, support
this view.
In light of this situation Hackforth's n otes at 104C2 an d 104E3
can on ly be misleadin g. At 104C2 he writes "-o& -cpLa is n ot of course
three thin gs, but (as is eviden t from the immediate substitution of
'rptoc in C5) imman en t 'threen ess'"';19 at 104E3, "here again the
mean in g of ro-c rpca is determin ed by the substitution of
-
rpLmq in
ES."20 I would certain ly agree with Hackforth, as again st Archer-
Hin d, for in stan ce, that ra' tpLoc at 104E1, does n ot refer to three
thin gs.21 But I can n ot accept his implication that it thus must refer to
'threen ess.' It seems plausible, in this argumen t at least, to see it as
referrin g to the n umber three, which is differen t both from thin gs
(which it occupies) an d threen ess (which occupies it). Plato explicitly
refers to threen ess on ly on ce in the argumen t ( '&v TpLWV Be'a at
104 D5-6) in statin g that this form occupies 'thin gs' in such a way
18
Hackforth himself n otes the importan ce of
105
A3-5 as an amplification of the
earlier argumen t (Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n .). But he reads it as an explan ation
of the
&vayxaCe,t
of 104 D 1-3 to the effect that the form wlich possesses thin gs
carries an accompan yin g form an d will n ot allow either itself or the thin g it
occupies to admit the opposite of this accompan yin g form. But I believe that
my in terpretation better prepares us for the causal accoun t to come.
19
Hackforth, op. cit., 151 n .
20
Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n .
21
Archer-Hin d, op. cit., 113 n .
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that they must be odd as well as three. The thin gs possessed, which
have n o part in the even an d are un even , are the r&
ptoac
- n
trp6xq
of
104E1-5, that is, the n umber three.
The use of the altern ate forms
p
Tpcq
an d TrcX rpLto for the n umber
three seems to support this in termediate status between forms an d
thin gs. I do n ot wish to commen t further on this suggestion , either to
try to clarify the n ature of such 'in termediates' or to argue for their
appearan ce in other Platon ic writin gs. I wan t
merely
to emphasize
their seemin g differen ce from rv rptv 'am an d thus chan ge what
seems to be a support for Hackforth's position to a
support
for our
in terpretation .22
In con clusion , the paradoxical con sequen ce of Hackforth's in ter-
pretation , the plausibility of the n ew use of
xovmaxn
at 105D3, an d
the eviden ce of Plato's referen ces to n umbers in 104-105 force us to
accept Archer-Hin d's in terpretation that the soul is con strued as a
thin g in this argumen t, an d n ot as a form as claimed by Hackforth an d
Keyt.23 We might have to agree with Archer-Hin d that the argumen t
implies the existen ce of that metaphysical mon strosity, an idea of soul.
But such an idea is n ever used in this argumen it. An d thus we can at
least free Plato from the logical mon strosity of equivocation which
Hackforth claims he commits.
Washin gton Un iversity, St. Loutis, Missouri
22
The parallel between the n umber three (un even ) an d soul (immortal) which
assures the support has been developed above. Keyt seems also to rely too
heavily on 104 D5-6 as settin g the ton e for all referen ces to three (Keyt, op. cit.,
168 n .).
23
I should perhaps n ote that Archer-Hin d offers a tran slation of 104 D 1-3
close to Hackforth's. I fin d, however, that this makes the tran sition between
the two uses of
xor&axn
more difficuilt to accept.
58
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