Brentano's Hermeneutics

Klaus Hedwig*
Es kann einer eine Wahrheit aussprechen
und weiss selbst nicht, wie er dazu kommt
F . Brentano
It is surprising and often even puzzling to see that
Brentano, who in his own scientific work strictly insisted
on the return to "experience", to the "empirical stand-
point" and the "exact method" of natural science, was
for the whole of his life occupied with historical texts - -
from the young student who wrote numerous notes on
Aristotle ~ to the old man, who was no longer able to
read but who listened to texts read to him, who was no
longer able to write but who dictated his extremely
subtle philosophical reflections, which are interwoven
with numerous historical quotations. 2 While considering
any of these texts, one is surprised by the actual rele-
vance of historical references. It seems as if Brentano
did not understand history in a historical sense, nor the
past as past, but as "now" relevant. History is obviously
preceded by a theory of history or, as Brentano says, by
a "philosophy of the history of phi l osophy"? Historical
hermeneutics is part of philosophy itself.
The well-known, but also much criticized theory of the
"four phases "4 of history which Brentano, apparently,
already as a young student conceived of and which he
upheld even against increasing objections, appears in its
rigid scheme of historical ascent, culmination and decay
to be more misleading than revealing. What it tries to
explain is the rather startling fact that philosophy, as its
own history shows, has always been extremely suscept-
able to decadence. 5 It is known that Brentano regarded
his own time as a period of "most pitiable decay". 6 The
causes he thought he could find can all be reduced to the
met hod of scientific work which prevailed in a historical
period. In his criticism, Brentano qualifies certain
methods as "weak", "dull", "inhibited", "eccentric" or
"mystic". These qualifications imply, besides their
negative connotations, some very basic psychological
considerations or, as Brentano says himself, "kultur-
psychologische Erw/igungen einfachster Art". 7 The
history of science is marked by a constant change of
methods. However, the evaluation of these methods is a
task of psychol ogy which, as is well known, opened for
the young Brentano the field of phi l osophy.
Thus it is not history, but philosophy alone %vhich is
able to cultivate successfully the history of phi l osophy"/
However, the problem in question here is exactly the
concept of phi l osophy itself to which Brentano refers. In
various manuscripts 9 dating from the very early sketches
to the later, more intricate elaborations, Brentano tries
to clarify the position of philosophy in a systematic
context, which he calls "classification of sciences", j~ Its
aim is to define philosophy as a scientific discipline. The
early Brentano - - about 1870 -- develops his own
conception of philosophy with regard to a remarkably
large philosophical tradition. However, the numerous
definitions Brentano lists seem to be adduced only to
reject them. ~ The "subject" of philosophy is delineated
- - rather surprisingly -- in contrast to the classical texts
of the sacra doctrina ~2 of Thomas Aquinas: philosophy
works in "unilateral independence" (einseitige Unabhiin-
gigkeit) of theology, since it is a "natural science",
covering in its research the whole range of concrete
(and also abstract) 13 entities. Thus philosophy, taken
in a large sense, belongs to empirical science and should
therefore employ its methods, in particular induction. ~4
In a strict sense, with respect to the axiomatic founda-
tions of knowledge, philosophy is restricted to "inner
perception" and seems to be congruent with psychology.
"So philosophy, taken in a strict sense, ultimately is a
science which is concerned with being and its properties
insofar as it falls under concepts, given by inner percep-
tion, albeit that they are only taken from it or do not
exclusively belong to external percept i on' , j5 In this
early period, already, Brentano explains the structure of
"inner perception" by an epistemological model taken
over from Aristotle. In so far as consciousness in its
Topoi 6 (1987), 3--10.
9 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
4 KLAUS HEDWI G
acts implies an obj ect , it is also - - e n p a r &g o ~6 - -
consci ous of itself. Thus phi l osophy is, surprisingly, not
so much concer ned with t he obj ect s of per cept i on, but
r at her with t he per cept i on of obj ect s and its i nner, quasi-
refl ect i ve st ruct ure, which, f or Br ent ano, is t he charac-
teristic f eat ur e of e v i de nc e . On t he basis of this evi dence,
phi l osophy, whi ch Br ent ano regards as a "t heoret i cal
science", 17 woul d have to deri ve, by means of i nduct i on,
"intelligible t rut hs" f r om empi ri cal and also historical
facts. Lat er, t oo, aft er his r upt ur e with dogmat i c religion,
when t heol ogy came to be i nt egrat ed i nt o t he field
of phi l osophy (into "nat ural revel at i on"), ~8 Br ent ano
strictly insisted on t he evi dence of phi l osophi cal
st at ement s.
He r e t he phi l osophi cal f r amewor k becomes visible in
which f or Br ent ano her meneut i cs is embedded. The
"t rue met hod ''~9 of i nt er pr et at i on has t o expose t he
"t rut h" of empi ri cal and historical objects. Thi s means
t hat her meneut i cal pr ocedur es can be justified onl y by
e p i s t e mo l o g i c a l criteria.
II
An eval uat i on of Br ent ano' s her meneut i cs must t ake
into account t he fact t hat he i nt r oduces t he di scussi on on
met hod under a doubl e perspect i ve. 2~ The "hi st ori cal "
aspect is rel at ed t o t he vari ous t endenci es and devel op-
ment s of t he classical her meneut i cal t radi t i on, wher e-
as t he "psychol ogi cal " analysis, by an epi st emi c re-
exami nat i on, tries t o assess t he effi ci ency of a met hod.
The pr ocedur es whi ch Br ent ano lists ar e t he met hods
of "intuition", 2~ "mat hemat i cs", 22 "nat ural sci ence", 23
"rhet ori c", 24 "poet i cs", 25 and t he witness of "religious
bel i ef". 26 It seems t hat Br ent ano in this enumer at i on di d
not depend on a similar pat t er n in t he phi l osophi cal
l i t erat ure of his time.
The quest i on of met hod in phi l osophy is nor mal l y
pr eceded by a mor e f undament al pr obl em which, f or
Br ent ano, concer ns t he j ust i fi cat i on of "knowl edge"
( Wi s s e n ) . In his criticism of t he met hods of rhet ori c,
poet i cs and of religious belief, Br ent ano underl i nes t hei r
epi st emol ogi cal deficiencies: t hey do not give "any
insight, any knowl edge". 27 Let us not e her e onl y in
passing t hat Br ent ano at t ri but es t o dialectics r at her
"poet i cal mot i ves". 28 The rej ect i on of mat hemat i cal
deduct i on 29 and in par t i cul ar of i nt ui t i on 3~ as t he onl y
t r ue and al most magic met hod of phi l osophy, a t endency
domi nat i ng t he phi l osophi cal scene of . W/ i r zbur g at t he
time, refers t o t he compl et e lack of axi omat i c cert ai nt y
and t he insufficient rat i onal justification of phi l osophi cal
st at ement s. Thi s epi st emol ogi cal r eser ve does not
ext end to t hese pr ocedur es i nsofar as t hey are const i t u-
tive part s of t he "met hod of nat ural science". However ,
as usual in his work, Br ent ano revises and r ef or mul at es
t he t opi cs t aken over f r om ot her disciplines or t radi t i ons.
Wi t h r ef er ence t o i nner per cept i on or, mor e precisely, t o
refl ect i ve evi dence, one can i nt er pr et i n t u i t i o n as an act
of knowl edge coveri ng t he whol e field of assert ori c and
apodi ct i c knowl edge, whi ch d e d u c t i o n - - seen f r om this
poi nt of depar t ur e - - conver t s i nt o a set of a pri ori
der i ved concept s, whereas t he met hod of i n d u c t i o n by
its r ecour se t o similar or part i al l y i dent i cal phenomena
pr epar es t he epi st emi c way t o exhibit within concr et e
exper i ence general and uni versal l y valid st ruct ures. It is
well known t hat t he earl y Br ent ano r egar ded this
met hod as paradi gmat i c f or all phi l osophy. "Ver a
phi l osophi ae met hodus nulla alia nisi sci ent i ae naturalis
est". 31 However , t he ast oni shi ng car eer of this ' thesis
in cont empor ar y phi l osophy may as well be due to a
carel ess i nt er pr et at i on of it.
The supposed affinity bet ween nat ural sci ence and
phi l osophy seems t o be not onl y mor e compl ex t han one
is usually i ncl i ned to admit, but also mor e fragile and
mor e pr obl emat i c, whi ch Br ent ano, by t he way, hi msel f
conceded. "Onl y t he met hod of nat ural sci ence has
remai ned. Thi s does not mean t hat phi l osophy rests on
t he basis of nat ural science". 32 If Br ent ano was not able
t o "fulfil his goal of devel opi ng t he whol e of phi l osophy
t hr ough t he empl oyment of t he met hod of nat ural
sciences", 33 one may, of course, concl ude t hat t he
concept ual and met hodol ogi cal claims of his pr oj ect di d
not rest on solid foundat i ons. On t he ot her hand,
however , it mi ght pr ove t o be far mor e i mpor t ant t o
l eave t he di f f er ence bet ween phi l osophy and nat ural
sci ence open t han t o cl ose it. Br ent ano r epeat edl y
poi nt ed out t he i ncongr uence of a di r ect t r ansposi t i on
of t he met hods of nat ural sci ence t o "intellectual
domai ns". 34 He knew ver y well t he "mat hemat i cal sun" 35
of AmpEre, "which casts t he most penet r at i ng light upon
all obj ect s just in or der t o make t hem fade, t o dr y t hem
up t o t he root ". The cri t eri a of nat ural sci ence can
be t r ansposed t o phi l osophy onl y by means of "anal ogy"
or, as Br ent ano says, in t he sense of "pr opor t i onal
r esear ch ''36 by whi ch t he exact met hods of nat ural
sci ence are "pr opor t i onal l y" t r ansf er r ed and adapt ed.
Thi s nuance has of t en been over l ooked. When Br ent ano
insists t hat phi l osophy shoul d wor k "in anal ogy to
BRENTANO' S HERMENEUTI CS 5
nat ural sci ence", 37 he does not mean a di r ect appl i cat i on
of ext r aneous met hods to a field of research which can
be ent er ed onl y by refl ect i on and whi ch demands a
specific epi st emi c at t i t ude in or der t o per cei ve its obj ect s
and to descr i be t hem. It is t r ue t hat phi l osophi cal
research, as Br ent ano admits not wi t hout admi rat i on,
shoul d follow t he "exact i t ude" of nat ural science, but this
does not mean mor e t han to t ake into consi der at i on
(mitberiicksichtigen) t he met hods and results of empi ri -
cal investigations which are t o be used as i nst rument s
only. Phi l osophy has to devel op its own met hod.
If we defi ne t he subj ect of phi l osophy as ext endi ng to
t he whol e field of empi ri cal "obj ect s", as appr ehended in
"i nner per cept i on", we meet her e with an ambi val ence
which Br ent ano - - cont r ar y t o Husser l - - resolves in
f avour of perception itself. Thus it is not t he "obj ect " in
t he act of per cept i on or, as Husserl woul d say, t he
"noema", but r at her t he "el ement s" of consci ousness and
its "modes of combi nat i on ''3~ which Br ent ano tries
to clarify and t o descri be. The pr oj ect of "descri pt i ve
psychol ogy" or, as Br ent ano specifies in a strictly
epi st emol ogi cal sense, of "phenomenol ogy ''39 at t empt s
to investigate t he "psychic life" of man with regard t o "all
its const i t uent s" (siimtliche Grundbestandteile) which,
however , pr esuppose and i nvol ve t he deci si ons of a
pr edomi nant l y reistic ont ol ogy. The "met hod of descri p-
t i on" not onl y implies, but also works with, a set of
exclusively episternic pr ocedur es such as "Er l eben",
"Fi xi eren", "Bemer ken", "i ndukt i ve Ver al l gemei ner ung"
and "dedukt i ve Verwert ung". 4~ This epi st emi c pat t er n of
descri pt i on i s-appl i ed to psychi c acts and t hei r cor r e-
lates. One might be inclined to think of Husserl ' s met hod
of "eidetic descri pt i on" here. However , t he underl yi ng
cat egori cal divisions of psychi c acts and t he t endency t o
"classify" psychi c phenomena systematically suggest a
mor e t radi t i onal pr ovenance of this t ype of descri pt i on.
I ndeed, Br ent ano seems t o depend on t he t radi t i onal
definitio descriptiva 41 used by vari ous nat ural sciences
such as geography, bot any or anat omy. On t he ot her
hand, however , t he descri pt i ve met hod whi ch Br ent ano
devel ops on a purel y "t heoret i cal " level cont rast s
curi ousl y with t he lacking pract i cal and experi ment al
r esear ch which he suppor t ed in principle. At t he
begi nni ng of his academi c car eer in Vi enna al ready,
Br ent ano insisted on the i mpor t ance of exper i ment s in
sci ence and r equest ed an "institute of exper i ment al
psychol ogy" 42 even publicly, but in vain.
It is i nt erest i ng to not e t hat not onl y Br ent ano' s
met hodol ogi cal reflections, but also (and even much
mor e) t he subjects of his phi l osophi cal r esear ch are
i nt erl aced with numer ous historical r ef er ences which
influence, di rect l y or indirectly, t he i nt er pr et at i on of a
phi l osophi cal topic. That whi ch hi st ory may or may not
cont r i but e t o t he "di scovery of t rut h" in phi l osophy
Br ent ano tries t o assess by a surprisingly flexible t heor y
of historical hermeneut i cs.
III
Al r eady as Privatdozent at Wi i rzburg, t he earl y
Br ent ano, in his l ect ures on t he hi st ory of phi l osophy,
submi t t ed t he br oad historical material he t r eat ed t o a
preci se scheme of evaluation. The r ecor d of t he "hi st ory
of phi l osophy f r om anci ent t i mes t o our own days" is
mar ked by several epi st emi c cri t eri a such as "concept ",
"aim", "met hod" and "di vi si on' , 43 whi ch suggest t hat
hi st ory mi ght be c ome intelligible in t he cont ext of
cert ai n logical and epi st emol ogi cal rules whi ch in
general are used in scientific research. Thi s is t he
f r amewor k of Br ent ano' s earl y t heor y of historical
hermeneut i cs.
In a ver y general or "obj ect i ve" sense, t he not i on of
hi st ory applies t o "t hat whi ch happened" or, as Br ent ano
says in an et ymol ogi cal pl ay on words, "Geschi cht e . . .
sei nichts ander es als das Geschehene". In a mor e
"subjective" sense, hi st ory can be under s t ood as t he
cognition 44 of t hese obj ect i ve but past event s or, mor e
precisely, as t he "cogni t i on and st at ement " of that whi ch
"happened" t o man (Erkenntnis und Darstellung der
Erlebnisse des Menschen). The hi st ory of phi l osophy
ext ends to t hese subjective and obj ect i ve spheres.
However , it concent r at es on t he Erlebnisse whi ch men
have exper i enced in t hei r at t empt s t o "di scover"
intelligible truths. "The hi st ory of phi l osophy must
r epor t on t he di scover y of t hese t rut hs as well as on t he
at t empt s which led t o t hese di scoveri es or which at least
shoul d have led t o t hem and t he ci rcumst ances which
wer e f avour abl e or i mpedi ment al in this process", as It
may be not ed her e t hat this compl i cat ed f or mul at i on
al ready i ndi cat es t he i dea whi ch Br ent ano will l at er
devel op in mor e detail within t he cont ext of a reistic
ont ol ogy: that - - in a strict sense - - t her e is nei t her
phi l osophy, nor science, nor even hi st ory as such, but
onl y this individual man, her e and now, who in his very
concr et e ci rcumst ances works, thinks and endeavour s t o
find truth. The hi st ory of phi l osophy must serve man.
Thus t he phi l osophi cal i nt er pr et at i on of hi st ory does not
6 KLAUS HEDWIG
end up for Brent ano, as Renan supposed it did, in a
"t ransformat i on ''46 of phi l osophy i nt o hi st ory of itself,
nor does it cul mi nat e in t he rat her malicious suggestion,
as Descart es proposed, j ust to "forget" 47 it.
In a certain sense, as far as the quest i on of the intel-
lectual cul t ure of man is concerned, the hi st ory of
phi l osophy may be occupi ed with purel y historical facts,
but, in a strict sense, its aim is t he encount er with truth.
' q' he ul t i mat e aim of t he hi st ory o f phi l osophy must
always be the exposi t i on of t rut h (Herausstellung der
Wahrheit)".48 Of course, in science t here is no "deut sche
Wahrhei t ". 49 The quest i on of met hod or historical
hemeneut i cs t hus remai ns strictly subordi nat ed to this
aim, which is, in every epoch, basically the same. The
hermeneut i cal pr ocedur es which the early Br ent ano
hi msel f applied to vari ous texts of the phi l osophi cal
t radi t i on try t o work out t he "views" (Ansichten) of the
mai n aut hors, the "value and t rut h" of t hem (Wert und
Wahrheit), their "chronol ogi cal or der " (nach Philoso-
phen) or, preferabl y, their "t hemat i c or der " (nach
Materien), which in some cases might be more effec-
tive. 5~ But here again, t he "met hod" must di scover and
prepare the "way leading to phi l osophi cal t rut h" (Weg
zur philosophischen Wahrheit). This epistemological
perspective domi nat es the hermeneut i cal t echni que. 51
Lat er, duri ng his academi c career in Vienna,
Brent ano devel oped these early sketches into an explicit
hermeneut i cs of "historical research in philosophical
domai ns". 52 The i mmedi at e occasi on may have been the
harsh (and also personal l y hurting) cont roversy with E.
Zel l er 53 on t he nor ms of an adequat e i nt erpret at i on of
Gr eek phi l osophy in general and on Ari st ot l e in
particular. His sceptical "Blick auf Berlin" is ennoyed by
the at t i t ude of historicist research and its at t empt to
"t ransform science into hi st ory of science and to do this
with phi l osophy as well". 54 In cont rast t o this rat her
unpl easant future, Br ent ano looks upon t he "virginal soil
of Vi enna" as mor e favourable, since here, in his
opi ni on, the "old doct ri ne" (alte Lehre) cooperat es wi t h
the young experi ment al sciences. 55 This new and
moder n t ype of scientific research seemed t o be the seed
of a "fut ure" phi l osophy for the rise of which Brent ano
wor ked until the last days of his life. In addition, this new
and scientific t ype of phi l osophy was pr omot ed by
numer ous "support ers" (Tra'ger) and devel oped by
"young talents" (j unge Talente). It shoul d be not ed
t hat these external ci rcumst ances were by no means
uni mpor t ant for Brent ano, since he consi dered the
social and political status of phi l osophy, because of its
purel y "theoretical" relevance, as rat her weak.
Accor di ng to Brent ano, t here are, in principle, four
hermeneut i cal directives s6 by which historical research
of phi l osophy anywhere, not onl y in Berlin, shoul d be
governed. However, al ready at the very beginning, the
selection of topics (Auswahl tier Themen), which shoul d
also ext end to natural science, seems to pose an al most
i nsuperabl e probl em. If we select - - which we are in fact
supposed to do - - a historical subject accordi ng to
philosophical criteria, it is clear t hat the very first step
leading into history al ready leads out of it. Brent ano,
who is aware of this puzzle, rigorously opt s for the
"philosophical sense" of history. One may, of course,
object t hat hi st ory in its own, genui nel y historical sense
seems to be forgot t en here. However, Br ent ano woul d
answer t hat hi st ory as such does not exist. It exists onl y
i nsofar as t here is a subject who is able to represent
an object as "standing of f " (abstehend) from "now".
The nucleus of hi st ory does not seem to be historical.
A second criterion concems the "underst andi ng"
(Verstiindnis) of texts in general, but also the expl anat i on
of the numer ous fragment ary transmissions of literary
document s, especially in the early Gr eek philosophy.
The central probl em for Brent ano is the conceptional
i nt erpret at i on of these texts. In this context, he empl oys
the model of the "whol e" (Ganzes) und of its "parts"
(Teile), a pat t ern accordi ng to which the i nt erpret at i on
of a detail must be related to the compl et e work of an
author, and this aut hor hi msel f shoul d also be seen in
relation to his predecessors. However, the decisive nor m
of i nt erpret at i on is a maxi m which Brent ano unrestrict-
edl y admi red for the whole of his life in mediaeval
philosophy: the scholastic phi l osophers tried to explain a
text by "Nach- und Mi t denken", 57 by the at t empt to
approach it "by t hought " (denkend entgegenkommen).
In or der to di mi ni sh the "danger" which this purel y
intellectual approach might carry with it, Br ent ano
insists not onl y t hat an i nt erpret at i on shoul d "mi rror"
(widerspiegeln) the text but also t hat the i nt erpret er
shoul d "t ransform his own subjectivity into the aut hor",
trying to "assimilate" (veriihnlichen) hi msel f to him. This
"assimilation" (Veriihnlichung) is the mai n requisite for
being able to under st and a text. In consequence, as a
rat her ambi guous result of this st andpoi nt , the t hor ny
probl ems concerni ng the "aut hent i ci t y" (Echtheit) of a
text seem to be less i mport ant . This third criterion of
Brent ano' s hermeneut i cs, which applies to philology in a
BRENTANO' S HERMENEUTI CS 7
nar r ow sense, is di sput abl e. The a ppr oa c h of "hyper -
cri t i ci sm" is rai sed easily: si nce t he canon of i mpor t ant
t ext s is al r eady secured, he is i ncl i ned t o j oi n t he
"conser vat i ve side" in cont r over si al mat t ers. And of
ma ny insignificant texts we had bet t er say: "Let us bur y
t he phi l osophi cal l y dead wi t h t he dead". The last, fourt h,
cri t eri on i nvol ves t he "cri t i ci sm and eval uat i on" (Kri t i k
und Wertung) of a text. I n this respect , Br ent ano seems
to j udge t he compl ex hi st ori cal si t uat i on of an aut hor
wi t h a r emar kabl e flexibility: t he vari ous hi st ori cal
ci r cumst ances of a phi l osophi cal syst em ( pr obabl y also
of t he Berliner Schulpolizei, 58 as Br ent ano aci dl y
r emar ks ) coul d be consi der ed t he life of an aut hor , t he
capaci t y of his t hought and t he wor k done by his
pr edeces s or s shoul d not be f or got t en. I n vi ew of t hese
her meneut i cal aspect s an i nt er pr et at i on shoul d poi nt out
not so much t he defi ci enci es of a phi l osophi cal syst em,
but r at her - - as Br ent ano says - - its "good". It is obvi ous
t hat this t ype of her meneut i cs conver ges wi t h Br ent ano' s
ai m in his own st udi es on Ari st ot l e, t he search of
"congeni al i t y" (Kongenialitiit) wi t h t he aut hor.
However , t he subl i me excl usi vi t y of this me t hod has
never been left unchal l enged. It seems as if Br ent ano di d
not onl y under es t i mat e t he effi ci ency of t he hi st ori cal
and phi l ol ogi cal met hods. It may even be t hat lie was
afrai d of t hem. The phi l ol ogi cal met hod, in spi t e of t he
i ndi sput abl e val ue of a refl ect i ve r econst r uct i on of
hi st ory, insists on t he hi st ori cal fact, in vi ew of whi ch
phi l osophy - - not onl y wi t h r espect t o hi st ory - - comes
cl ose t o sur r ender .
IV
We may di st i ngui sh t wo per i ods in Br ent ano' s i nt er-
pr et at i on of t he hi st or y of phi l osophy. The earl y
Br ent ano t ri ed to wor k up t he anci ent , medi aeval and
mode r n t radi t i ons of phi l os ophy in a cycle of l ect ures 59
in whi ch he st ressed t he line of hi st ori cal ascent and
decay. Her e, in this cont ext , t he t heor y f or t he "four
phases" with its hi st ori cal pat t er ns is t he domi nat i ng
pri nci pl e. Lat er , in his Vi enna days, when Br ent ano
began t o concent r at e on his own r esear ch, he liked to
mi r r or t he vari ous syst ems of t he phi l osophi cal t radi t i on
in his own work. However , in bot h per i ods t he
her meneut i c pr oc e dur e is basi cal l y t he same. Ther e is, as
a mat t er of fact, no Coper ni can t urn in Br ent ano' s
phi l osophy.
I f one l ooks f or a hi st ori cal cont ext of this obvi ousl y
unhi st ori cal per spect i ve of hi st ory, one is puzzl ed not to
find such a cont ext . Br ent ano' s met hod is cert ai nl y not a
"her meneut i cs of vi ol ence", nor does it show any affinity
wi t h t he ol der classical t r adi t i on of Schl ei er macher , who
t ri ed t o r edi scover and save t he uni que "dignity" of
ever y hi st ori cal epoque. The charact eri st i c f eat ur e of
Br ent ano' s met hodol ogy be c ome s cl ear in r at her insig-
ni fi cant t er ms when he writes: t he aut hor "means t o say",
"i ndi cat es" and "poi nt s t o" a sol ut i on or, on t he ot her
hand, his f or mul at i ons shoul d have been "bet t er",
"cl ear er " or " mor e exact". That is to say t hat Br ent ano
tries to cor r ect and r est or e t he phi l osophi cal t radi t i on.
He does not abandon it, but saves it as a "heri t age", on
t he basi s of whi ch a ' `future ' ' 6~ phi l os ophy mi ght be
built. Ther e is an i ndi sput abl e cont i nui t y in phi l osophy:
"Sci ence does not begi n anew in ever y head". 61 On t he
ot her hand, however , this t r adi t i on seems to be ma r ke d
by a law of gr avi t at i on drawi ng it back t o one man, to
Ari st ot l e, t he "man of all t i mes". 62 He is, in Br ent ano' s
est i mat i on, the phi l os opher who has domi nat ed the
Mi ddl e Ages 63 and t he mode r n per i od 64 until
Br ent ano' s own time. 65 However , t her e r emai ns a
reserve: Ar i st ot l e may have had t he first wor d in t he
hi st ory of phi l osophy, but he does not have t he last wor d
in phi l osophy.
What "exists" is nei t her yest er day nor t omor r ow, but
"now" - - t he const ant l y changi ng " boundar y ''66 of t he
cont i nuum of time, in t he cont ext of whi ch ever ybody,
even a phi l os opher t hi nki ng a t i mel ess idea, real l y lives,
wor ks and does his l i mi t ed r esear ch. It becomes cl ear
her e t hat f or Br ent ano t he "pr esent " ( Gegenwar t ) wei ghs
mor e t han t he past. An obj ect can be under s t ood as a
historical event onl y in r ef er ence to a per son, living her e
and now, who is abl e t o concei ve it as "st andi ng of f "
(abst ehend) f r om now. Thi s means t hat hi st ory can be
appr oached onl y indirectly. Thi s i ndi rect or, as Br ent ano
woul d say, "obl i que" rel at i on of man to t he past ext ends
to t he whol e scientific t r adi t i on t hat a phi l os opher must
r edi scover in or der to answer t he quest i ons whi ch are
"now" rel evant .
No t e s
* I thank Mr C. Meertens for his kindness to revise the English
version of the text.
1 The Nachlass contains 159 Mss on Aristotle. Brentano developed
his hermeneutical theories mainly in contrast to E. Zeller (cf. Note
8 KL AUS HE DWI G
52), but also i n t he cont ext of his own st udi es on Ari st ot l e; cf.
Ms. A20: Aristoteles' Terminologie; Ms. A2: Grundziige fiir die
Interpretation grosser philosophischer Denker, insbesondere des
Aristoteles; Ms. A154: Zur Methode Aristotelischer Studien und zur
Methodik geschichtlicher Forschung auf philosophischem Gebiet
iiberhaupt. - - The quot at i ons follow t he Meiner edi t i ons of
Br ent ano' s works and t he Catalogue of Manuscripts est abl i shed by F.
Mayer - Hi l l ebr and and revised by W. Baumgart ner.
2 In his last di ct at i on (9 Mar ch 1917) on Anschauung und abstrakte
Vorstellung Br ent ano refers t o Ari st ot l e, Lei bni z, Berkeley, Newt on,
Clarke, Kant , Eul er, and Schopenhauer .
3 Thi s is t he title of several Seminariibungen hel d at Vi enna (SS
1878; SS 1880; SS 1883). A fragment of t hi s text is i ncl uded i n Ms.
H45: Gesch. d. Phil. ( 25248- - 25252) .
4 Accor di ng t o C. Stumpf, Br ent ano woul d have concei ved t hi s
t heory about 1860; cf. L. McAl i st er (ed.), The Philosophy of F.
Brentano, London 1976, 11.
5 Thi s is t he mai n di fference wi t h regard t o A. Comt e; cf. Ms. H45:
Gesch. d. PhiL (n. 25325) : " . . . der Verfall bl i ebe unberi i cksi cht i gt ,
der doch von grosser hi st ori scher Bedeut ung l i s t ] " . Cf. on Comt e Ms.
H48: Auguste Comte (Kolleg SS 1869); Ms. LS20: Positivismus
(Kolleg WS 1893/ 94) ; VPhPh, 79- - 133.
6 ANR, 291.
7 VPhPh, 7; cf. Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phi l (n. 25280): "Allein, die drei
grossen Peri oden, i n wel che di e seitherige Geschi cht e hi erzu zerf~illt,
verl aufen i n ei ner gesetzm~issigen und alle drei nahezu der sel ben
Weise, die dur ch psychologische Erwiigungen ni cht schwer i hre
Erkl i i rung l i nden".
s Ms. H39: Zur Methode der historischen Forschung auf phi l oso-
phischem Gebiet, 6. Thi s is t he Ms. in whi ch Br ent ano devel ops his
pr ogr am of hi st ori cal hermeneut i cs; cf. Not e 52.
9 It is surpri si ng to not e t hat Br ent ano' s concept i on of "phi l osophy"
has never been st udi ed explicitly. The Ms. mat eri al is copious: Ms.
EL 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60; M 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18; H 45; Et h 19.
]0 Cf. LRU, 80 on t he concept of "classification".
11 In Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25275) Br ent ano quot es t he
following aut hor s and t hei r defi ni t i ons of philosophy: Epi curus,
Seneca, Wolff, Kant , Schelling, Hegel, Her bar t , Tr endel enbur g,
Ueberweg, St6ckl, Ubaghs.
12 Br ent ano explicitly quotes: S. th. I, 1, 1 ad 2; I, 1, 2 c; I, 1, 3 c;
I, 1, 3 ad 1; I, 1, 7 c (Ms. H45: n. 25253) . Br ent ano' s own copy of t he
Summa theologiae (Parma) cont ai ns several not es on t hese passages.
The Habilitationsthesen II and III refer to this probl em.
13 The young Br ent ano still concei ves "abst ract i on" as an adequat e
epistemological i nst rument : "Dur ch Abst r akt i on also wer den die
sensi bl en Di nge intelligibel; sie gibt auch dem, was an und fiir sich
bloss der M6gl i chkei t nach intelligibel ist, wirkliche Intelligibilit~it"
(Ms. H45: n. 25945). In this respect Br ent ano is obvi ousl y dependent
on Ari st ot l e (Metaph. VI 1, 1025 b 19) and Thomas Aqui nas (S. th. I,
85, 1 ad 2). Ther e are also affinities with A. Comt e: " . . . deux genres
des sciences naturelles: les unes abstraites, g6n6rales, ont pour obj et
la d6couvert e des lois qui r6gissent les di verses classes de ph6-
nom~nes" (Cours I, 56, Paris 1864). In his own copy of t he Cours
Br ent ano underl i nes this text. However, already t he early Br ent ano
l earned from Ockham t hat abst r act i on is a ki nd of "fiction" (cf.
GMPh, 81).
~4 Cf. Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25324): "Die Phi l os ophi e . . . ei ne
i ndukt i ve Wissenschaft"; cf. also VE, 68 ss.
15 I quot e t he Ge r ma n text, since this mi ght be Br ent ano' s first
defi ni t i on of phi l osophy: "So ergi bt sich denn di e Phi l osophi e i m
enger en Si nn als di e Wi ssenschaft , wel che von dem Sei enden and
sei nen Ei gent i i ml i chkei t en handel t , i nsofern es unt er Begriffe f~illt,
welche dur ch i nner e Er f ahr ung gegeben sind, sei es dass sie nur
dur ch sie gewonnen werden, oder doch ni cht der ~iusseren Er f ahr ung
ausschliesslich angeh6r en" (Ms. H45: n. 25254). Thi s defi ni t i on is
const ant l y modi fi ed (cf. n. 25282; 25946) ; cf. also GGPh, 355.
16 Ps. I , 1 8 5 ; cf. Ari st ot l e, Metaph. XII 9, 1074 b 37. In Ps. II, 38 ss.
Br ent ano devel ops t he concept i on i n mor e detail.
~7 However, t he "purely t heoret i cal i nt erest " ent ai l s t hat t he social
and political status of phi l osophy is r at her weak, "since phi l osophy
does not serve t he need of life". On t he ot her hand, "t he indirect
advant age is great, as is t he case wi t h all t heor y" (Ms. H45: n. 25270).
18 Cf. t he Letter to H. Schell (30. 10. 1895): " . . . was der Ver nunf t
und dem Her zen i n nat i i rl i cher Of f enbar ung gegeben" (Ed. J.
Hasenfuss, Pader bor n 1978, 64, 95); cf. also LWO, 26; RPh, 43 ss.,
61 ss.; LJ, XVIII.
19 The quest i on of met hodol ogy is extensively di scussed in Ms. H45:
Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25290- - 25301) .
2o Ibid. (n. 25290): "Doppel t er Beweis: (a) hi st ori scher (19) psycho-
logischer, aus der Nat ur der Sache . . . 6 Ar t en, i n denen wir ei ne
Ansi cht gewinnen: (1) Intuition, (2) Dedukt i on, (3) Indukt i on, (4)
Rhet or i sche Argument at i on: (a) Autorit~iten, (b) Anal ogi e und
Beispiel, (c) Wahrschei nl i chkei t sbewei s, (5) Poet i sches Gewi nnen.
Macht des Sch6nen. Pulchritudo requirit tria: integritatem, propor-
tionem debitam et claritatem, (6) Zeugni s des Gl aubens. "
21 Ibid. (n. 25294): "Die intuitive Met hode, zu der als eine
besonder e Wei se auch die myst i sche geh6rt. Dur ch die Kraft des
Geni es, dur ch ei nen Li cht bl i ck des Geistes, dur ch ei nen Blitz des
Gedankens, der pl 6t zl i ch das Dunkel der Nacht durchzuckt , wie man
es auch genannt hat, will di e intuitive Met hode unmi t t el bar die
ver bor genst en phi l osophi schen Wahr hei t en erfassen . . . Sie kann
ni cht gel ehrt werden. War um aber auch soll di e Phi l osophi e zu
besonder er Riicksicht auf das Unver m6gen verpfl i cht et sei n?"
22 Ibid. (n. 25295) : "Die mathematische Met hode (Int ui t i on und
Dedukt i on). Spinoza. Defi ni t i onen. Axi ome (und Postulate), und aus
i hnen [werden] Lehrs~t ze und Cor r ol ar i en [gewonnen], zum Teil
auch Her bar t und seine Schule. Wolff."
2s Ibid.: "Die naturwissenschaftliche Met hode. Intuition, Dedukt i on
und Indukt i on. In den aufst ei genden Per i oden [ist sie] die
her r schende; schon [wurde] er w~mt , dab Plato, Ari st ot el es, Al bert ,
Thomas, auch aus der neuer en Zei t Bacon, Hobbes, Descart es,
Locke, zum Teil Lei bni z [ihr folgen]."
24 Ibid.: "Di e Met hoden der rhetorischen Ar gument at i on [sind]
mannigfach: (1) Met hode der AutoritSt: (a) eines Mannes.
Pythagor~ier: aut6s dra. Averroes: erravit quia incoepit quasi a se.
Thomi st en usw. (b) hi st ori sche [Autorit~it]: (aa) des Proklos, die
Gesamt masse der Tr adi t i onen (Gegenst i i ck zur kirchlichen), so dab
nur Timaeus und die G6t t er spr i i che (16gia chaldaikai), di e allegorisch
erkl~irt [wurden]; Cob) yon Doell[inger] mi r empfohl en: das
Gemei nsame, Bl ei bende. Abe r freilich was? (zudem ni cht stringent).
(2) Popul~ire Met hode. Franz6si scher Materialismus. Epi kur und
viele andere".
25 Ibid. (n. 25295/ 97) : "Die Met hoden dur ch poetisches Gewi nnen
[sind] ebenfalls vielfach. Der hi. Thomas: pulchritudo requirit tria:
scilicet integritatem, proportionem debitam et claritatem . . . (1)
Ausser e Sch6nheit, z.B. Voltaire, Macht des L~icherlichen. Viele
B R E NT ANO' S HE R ME NE UT I C S 9
Platoniker, wegen der Sch6nhei t der Dialoge, obwohl gewiss Pl at on
solche Bewegungsgriinde ni cht gebilligt h~itte. (2) Innere Sch6nheit:
(a) eklektische Met hode (claritas). Cicero; (b) konst r ui er ende
Met hode (claritas et proportio); w~ihrend dor t Sch6nhei t des
Ei nzel nen massgebend list], hi er des Ganzen. Was der Wel t anschau-
ung eine gewisse Regelm~issigkeit gibt, wird fiir wahr angenommen.
Uberal l [wird] AJlalogie und Proportionalit~it aufgesucht. Pyt ha-
gorScr. Er f i ndung der Gegenerde. Schelling . . . (c) rhyt hrni sche
Met hode (proportio). Alle Lehr en [werden] nach ei nem Schema
behandel t , wie in ei nen Rhyt hmus g e b r a c h t . . . Kant . . . . Fi c h t e , . . .
Hegel".
:6 Ibid. (n. 25294): "Zeugni s des Gl aube ns . . . Der Wille best i mmt
den Verst and, mi t voller Gewi sshei t zuzust i mmen, gleich als wenn
die Gr / i nde zwingend w~iren. Nut die Pflicht des Gl aubens ist evident.
Evi dent e Glaubwiirdigkeit list] ni cht evi dent e Wahrhei t . Daher freie
Gewissheit, und der Gl aube list] ei ne Tugend. "
27 Ibid. (n. 25300).
28 Ibid. (n. 25296): "Von selbst soll j a ein Begriff den ander en
hervort rei ben, der Phi l osoph nur den unmi t t el bar en Beobacht er
machen. Der Drei schl ag ware hi ernach ni cht eigentlich Met hode,
sonder n das gefundene Gesetz, die Met hode nut passiv hi nzust arren.
Abe t freilich list sie] ni cht so ent st anden. Selbstt~iuschung. K/instlich
und sophi st i sch zusammengestellt, und so wenigstens list eine]
schei nbar regelm~issige Durchfi i hrung gewonnen. Was also list]
leitend? Ant wort : poet i sche Motive. "
29 Ibid. (n. 25300): "Auch die mat hemat i sche [Methode] ist zu
verwerfen. Sie schei nt bloss exakter. Wo die Obers/itze ni cht dut ch
sich evi dent sind, tritt an die Stelle ei ne petitio principii."
3c~ Ibid.: "Auch die intuitive [Methode] ist zu verwerfen. Sie ist
unm6glich f/ir alle phi l osophi sche Wahrhei t . War um [gilt sie] ni cht
sonst auch f/Jr die mat hemat i sche [Erkenntnis], die doch so sehr
evi dent ist? War um ni cht flit die physikalische, da doch die K6r per
n~ichster und ei nfachst er Gegenst and der Er kennt ni s sind? War um
war sie den gr6sst en Denker n fremd? Verwechsl ung yon Int ui t i on
und Erfassen mi t einem Blick. Sie ruht teils auf fal scher Er kennt ni s
(theoria), teils auf Ver kennung des Unt er schi eds zwischen NatiJr-
lichem und l ]bernat i i rl i chem. "
3J ZPh, 136.
32 Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25301). However, t he l at er Br ent ano
increasingly t ends to identify t hese met hods: "Die Phi l osophi e . . .
muss dat um, richtig bet r i eben, auch ei ne mit der Met hode ander er
Wi ssenschaft en wesentlich i dent i sche Met hode haben" (LWO, 32).
33 Cf" L" Gils~ Brentan~ ~ Sciences and Phil~176 in McAlister'
op. cir. 78.
34 ZPh, 75 ss. and Ps. II, 172 ss. ( Vom Versuch, die Logik zu
mathematisieren ).
35 DPs, 76.
36 Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25301): "Nur proportionale
Forschung auf phi l osophi schem Gebi et . Wie anch verschi edene
Zweige der Nat urwi ssenschaft en pr opor t i onal forschen. Beobach-
t ung und Experi ment , besonder s Sel bst beobacht ung. Dies lwar] nun
die Met hode der erst en Phi l osophen. Sie hat t en also die richtige
Met hode, wie das richtige Interesse. "
37 ZPh, 8; 45.
38 Cf. DPs, 2.
39 The rel evant texts (Ms. M96: Wiirzburger Metaphysikkolleg) will
be edited by W. Baumgart ner.
s0 Cf. DPs, 28 ss.
41 Thi s is a field open t o research. It seems t hat some traits of
Br ent ano' s "descri pt i ve" met hod can be t raced back t o J. St. Mill,
A. Bai n and A. Comte. However, t he geographi cal examples ("Geog-
nosi e" and "Geol ogi e' ) are obvi ousl y t aken over from W. Whewell,
Geschichte der induktiven Wissenschaft, Stuttgart 1841. Br ent ano' s
copy cont ai ns several notes. In or der to solve this question, one
would have to check t he Br ent ano' s Handbibliothek, which cont ai ns
a consi derabl e number of works on nat ural science and its history.
42 ZPh, 51 ss.; LWO, 15.
43 Cf. GGPh, 1--23. The i nt r oduct i on (Einleitung) to Br ent ano' s
lectures on Geschichte der Philosophie (W/ i rzburg 1870) has been
conserved in several, pr obabl y three, versions.
44 Cf, GGPh, 4.
45 Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25279) ; cf. also GGPh, 14 ss.
46 In Ms. H39 (Zur Methode, 1) Br ent ano refers to E. Renan,
L 'A verro~s et l'averroisme, in Oeuvres Completes, III, Paris 1953, 15:
" . . . ce qu' on r echer che dans l' histoire de la phi l osophi e, c' est
beaucoup moi ns de la phi l osophi e pr opr ement dite que l' histoire".
47 Cf. Ms. H3: Descartes. Meditationen (n. 25002): "Was i hn
[Descartes] betreffe, so habe er . . . . ins Al t er der Ver nunf t
gekommen, Got t sei dank alles wi eder ver gessen' ; cf. also GGPh, 16.
48 GGPh, 16: "Letztes Zi el der Geschi cht e der Phi l osophi e muB
stets die Herausst el l ung der Wahr hei t sein".
49 Ps. I, 2: "Auch eine spezifisch nat i onal e Psychologie - - und wenn
es sogar ei ne deut sche w~ire - - daf t es so wenig geben, als es eine
spezifisch deut sche Wahr hei t gi bt ' .
50 Ms. H45 (n. 25281); cf. also GGPh, 17: "Jede der bei den
Met hoden [hat] i hre besonder en Vorz/ige, und das best e w~ire, bei de
zu verbi nden".
51 Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil. (n. 25263): "Wir werden [des Aut hors]
Lebensschicksale und dann die Grundz/ i ge und den i nner en
Zusammenhang seines Systems mi t aller Vollst~indigkeit darlegen;
wir werden i nsbesonder e auf die Methode seiner Forschung acht en
und die Wahrheit i hrer Resul t at e priifen; wir werden seine
historische Stellung, seine in allen fol genden Zei t en f or t dauer nde
Wirksamkeit bel eucht en und endl i ch auch noch die eine oder ander e
Stelle aus sei nen Schrifien ausheben, dami t wir auch die Ar t und
Weise seines Ausdrucks kennen l ernen, da auch diese charak-
teristisch ist und ni cht wenig dazu di enen wird, uns mi t i hm bekannt
und vert raut zu machen. 0-ber vieles ander e dagegen werden wi t
schnel l er hi nwe gge he n. . . " .
5z Ms. H39: Zur Methode der historischen Forschung auf philoso-
phischem Gebiet (Apri l 1888). Thi s is t he text of t he openi ng lecture
delivered by Br ent ano before t he Philosophische Gesellschaft in
Vi enna; cf. also ZPh, 159, Not e 1.
53 Cf. ALU, 1 ss. and 39 ss.
5~ Ms. H39: ZurMethode, 1; cf. Not e 46.
s5 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ms. A154: Zur Methode Aristotelischer Studien (n. 04890): " . . .
um so mehr mi i ssen wi r angesichts der lSlberlegenheit i hrer
Erkl~irung in ei nzel nen der wichtigsten F~ille auf die Ver mut ung
gefiihrt werden, dass auch i n i hr er Forschungswei se etwas Gut es lag,
was der unsri gen verl oren gegangen i s t . . , das phi l osophi sche Mi t -
und Nachdenken' ; cf. also Ms. EL55: Gegen den Vorwurf
scholastischer Methode.
58 Brent ano, who quot es J. F. Fri es (Geschichte der Philosophie,
Halle 1840), states not wi t hout sarcasm: "Hegels Lehr e geh6rt i hr em
1 0 KL AUS HE DWI G
grossen Einfluss nach mehr i n die Geschi cht e der Schulpolizei
Berlin, als in die Geschi cht e der Phi i osophi e; denn das Mi ni st eri um
Al t enst ei n hat i hr l ange Zei t ei nen forci ert en Cours hoch fiber Pa d
gesi chert ' .
59 Cf. GGPh ( 1963) and GMPh (1980). The text of Br ent ano' s
l ect ure on t he Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie, including t he
H-Mss, is i n print.
6o ZPh, 1 ss., 83 ss.; LWO, 32; ANR, 392.
6~ ZPh, 88: "Es best eht ei ne Tradi t i on, ei n Er kennmi sschat z, der
sich erh~ilt, i ndem die sp~itere Zei t die Er bschaf t der fri i heren antritt. "
62 Ms. H45: Gesch. d. Phil (n. 25677): "Ari st ot el es ist ni cht bl oss ei n
Phi l osoph des Gr i echent ums, er ist sozusagen ei n Ma nn aller Zei t en".
63 The "mai n works" (Hauptwerke) of scholastic phi l osophy woul d
have been, in Br ent ano' s view, only "comment ar i es on Ari st ot l e"
(Ms. H45, n. 25677).
64 Not Kant, but r at her Lei bni z is t he "Ari st ot l e of moder n times"
( GAE, 34; VPhPh, 24); cf. also Ms. A 1: Leibniz und A ristoteles.
65 WE, 88: "Hat er ni cht wesent l i ch gedacht wie wi r ?' ; cf. also ANR,
291: "Ich hat t e mi ch zun~ichst also Lehrl i ng an ei nen Mei st er
anzuschl i essen und konnt e, in ei ner Zei t kl~iglichsten Verfalles
geboren, kei nen besseren als den al t en Ari st ot el es finden, zu dessen
ni cht i mmer l ei cht em Verst i i ndni s mi r oft Thomas von Aqui n di enen
musste".
6~ RZK, 156 ss. A study of Br ent ano' s t heory of t i me (and
cont i nuum) is still lacking.
Br oi chbacht a140a,
D- 5120 Her z ogenr at h,
B. R. D.