Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No.

132601, January 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying
the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.


Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in
the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction
over the case


Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the
SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is
an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests
the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. The important part of
a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts
to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent
and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondents contention that
by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art.
VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of
insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot
be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that
of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress
of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered
as a violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life. To
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3
branches of the government.