Combat Rescue Operational Review-Final

COMBAT RESCUE OPERATIONAL REVIEW
A Summary of Combat Rescue Operations

from Vietnam to Kosovo
May 2001
Revised June 2002
Prepared by:
Marc DiPaolo
301st Rescue Squadron
Patrick AFB, FL
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An effort as lengthy and detailed as the Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) cannot be
completed without the input and assistance of many people. First and foremost, the entire Future
Combat Rescue Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) team must be acknowledged. Although
the AoA was truly a team effort, the input and expertise of the following people was particularly
helpful to the completion of the CROR:
Lt Col Travis Chevallier, Air Combat Command
Major Tony Arrington, Air Force Materiel Command
Major Alvin Drew, Air Combat Command
Major Dave Fulk, PhD, Air Combat Command
Major Dave Morgan, Air Combat Command
Mr. Mike Agin, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Mr. Steve Alston, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Mr. Charles Cunningham, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Mr. Jeff Eggers, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Mr. Steve Lupenski, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Mr. Bob Mohan, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
Lt Col (ret.) Al Wood, Pioneer Technologies Corporation
The time spent and thoughtful review by Combat Rescue operators must also be acknowledged.
Their first-hand accounts of operations and frank feedback improved the quality of the CROR
immeasurably. Although there were too many to list individually, participation of the following
individuals was particularly helpful:
Lt Col Joe Callahan, Air Combat Command
Lt Col Tom Trask, Air Force Special Operations Command
Major John Cherry, Air Combat Command
Major John McGonagill, Air Combat Command
Major Mike Trumpfheller, Air Combat Command
The CROR relied heavily on the voluminous work done by others over the decades since the war
in Southeast Asia. That fine work, by analysts, operators, and researchers both known and
unknown, is acknowledged here. It is hoped that the CROR can match their standard of quality
and may be viewed as a helpful addition to existing papers. Access to much of that information
was possible only with the assistance of archivists at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
library in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and with the generous assistance of Mr. Steven Maxner of the
Vietnam Center at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas. Lastly, the significant assistance
of Ms. Donna Egner of the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center at Wright-
Patterson AFB, Ohio must be recognized. Her generous, timely, and expert support went well
beyond expectations, and benefited the CROR in a way that is beyond measure.
Executive Summary
“Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is an integral part of US combat

operations and must be considered across the range of military operations.
CSAR consists of those air operations conducted to recover distressed
personnel during wartime or Military Operations Other Than
War…Although all US Air Force weapon systems have the inherent
capability to support CSAR operations, certain forces are specifically
dedicated for search, rescue, and recovery operations.” (AF Doctrine
Document 1, Sep 97)
OVERVIEW
Per tasking to the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (CR AoA) team by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Milestone 0 Decision, a historical
review of operational factors relating to Combat Rescue missions was conducted.
Comprehensive reviews of Combat Rescue missions from Southeast Asia, Operations Desert
Storm, Operation Deny Flight, Operation Allied Force, and Cold War losses provide the basis of
research data for the study. The scope of this study focused on scenarios of downed aircrews in
combat, excluding missions such as conventional troop support, medical evacuation, and non-
combatant evacuation operations. The objectives of the study were:
o Describe historic Combat Rescue operations
o Identify trends pertaining to factors associated with combat aircraft losses
o Identify Combat Rescue capabilities and the threat facing recovery forces
o Identify factors that will affect recovery operations in future scenarios (2010-2030)
o Enhance the fidelity and accuracy of Combat Rescue modeling and simulation by
providing a single historical data source
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Although force composition, duration of the conflict, topography and climatologic factors,
Information Technology advances and enhancements, and Combat Rescue tactics, techniques,
and procedures varied from conflict to conflict, a remarkable anthology of lessons learned and
factors affecting successful recovery operations is derived. Foremost, a direct correlation exists
between exposure times in the target/terminal area of operations and rescue mission success
rates. Data analysis validates “slow moving” Combat Rescue assets and “fast moving” fighter
aircraft experience higher loss rates in the target/terminal area, while ingress and egress loss rates
were relatively low. Small arms, optically guided AAA, and IR MANPADS continue to incur
the greatest loss rate to rescue forces within the terminal area of operations. Additional factors
affecting successful Combat Rescue operations include (but are not limited to):
o Aircraft distance traveled from initial battle damage to aircrew ejection (data reveals that
survivor/evader recovery rates improved as the distance traveled after shootdown
increased)
o Injuries to aircrews suffered during shootdown (i.e. ejection parameters)
o Command and control relationships
o Available Combat Rescue assets (dedicated versus non-dedicated Combat Rescue
elements)
o Threat environment to both the Survivor/Evader and recovery forces (population density
of evasion environment, location of the S/E, terrain, weather, etc.)
The probability of rescuing downed Survivors/Evaders (S/E) is a function of accurate S/E
location identification and time available to rescue forces. From Desert Storm to current
contingency operations, this study reinforces the need for improved S/E communication
capabilities, to include passage of geo-location information, secure communications, and
increased transmission range of S/E communications equipment. The consistent ability of the
enemy to “spoof” and jam S/E communications complicated rescue efforts and increased the risk
to rescue forces. Adversaries, as witnessed in past conflicts, place high emphasis on capturing
downed aircrew and targeting rescue assets. In SEA, adversaries developed tactics known as
Search and Rescue Traps (SARTRAPS) designed not only to deceive rescue forces but to
position threat forces in advantageous locations for the purpose of destroying rescue forces.
TREND ANALYSIS
Growing political and military trends will have a dramatic effect on future Combat Rescue
operations. Perhaps the most significant factor will be the level of commitment to maintain a
trained Combat Rescue force organized under an Air Component Commander. Although current
USAF and Joint doctrine define tactics, techniques, and procedures for Combat Rescue, specific
command and control relationships continue to affect the safe and expeditious tasking and
execution of Combat Rescue missions. Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and
Rescue, specifically makes each service responsible for providing forces capable of performing
Combat Rescue in support of its own operations, consistent with its assigned functions. Each
service then organizes, trains, and equips its own Combat Rescue forces based on inherent
missions. An area of emphasis requiring attention is the use of another Component’s forces to
support an Air Component Commander’s Combat Rescue requirements. While other
Component assets continue to be a valuable resource in Combat Rescue operations, loss of Unity
of Command has been observed as a significant problem. There also exist doctrine, tactics, and
training gaps that affect the planning and coordination of effective recovery operations.
Differences between Services or Component communications systems, as well as Standard
Operating Procedures for sister-service units can, and has, led to significant mission delays. In
some cases, the breakdown of communications due to command relationships greatly impacted
the timely execution of rescue operations. Technological advances and system enhancements are
expected to reduce problems in the dissemination of data information between Combat Rescue
assets supporting forces, and Command and Control nodes, but specific command and control
relationships must be stated and adhered to by all players. The introduction of a Time-Critical
Targeting model to Combat Rescue operations significantly benefits recovery operations. With
improved Command and Control concepts (including full integration of Combat Rescue
functions into the Air Operations Center, mission risk will be reduced and Combat Rescue
success rates should increase.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Study Objectives and Overview............................................................................................ 1-1

2. Operational Summaries......................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1 Southeast Asia (1961-1975)............................................................................................... 2-2
2.1.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ............................................. 2-2
2.1.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents..................................................................... 2-10
2.1.3 Distribution of Losses ............................................................................................ 2-23
2.1.4 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents .................................................................. 2-26
2.1.5 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ................................................................. 2-26
2.1.6 Types of Recovery Forces ..................................................................................... 2-31
2.1.7 Terminal Area Characteristics ............................................................................... 2-40
2.1.8 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation ................................................................ 2-45
2.1.9 Recovery Force Losses .......................................................................................... 2-55
2.2 Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1991) ................................................................................ 2-61
2.2.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ........................................... 2-61
2.2.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents..................................................................... 2-63
2.2.3 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents .................................................................. 2-72
2.2.4 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ................................................................. 2-72
2.2.5 Types of Recovery Forces ..................................................................................... 2-73
2.2.6 Terminal Area Characteristics ............................................................................... 2-75
2.2.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operations .............................................................. 2-76
2.3 Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia 1993-1995) .................................................................... 2-80
2.3.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-83
2.3.3 Frequency of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-90
2.3.4 Distribution of Losses ............................................................................................ 2-91
2.3.5 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns....................................................................... 2-92
2.3.6 Use of Ground Forces for Aircrew Rescue............................................................ 2-96
2.4 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999) ........................................................................... 2-97
2.4.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents............................................................................ 2-99
2.4.3 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns..................................................................... 2-101
2.4.4 Frequency of Isolating Incidents.......................................................................... 2-101
2.4.5 Distribution of Losses .......................................................................................... 2-101
2.4.6 Types of Recovery Forces ................................................................................... 2-103
2.4.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation .............................................................. 2-105
2.4.8 Recovery Force Losses ........................................................................................ 2-105
2.5 Cold War Losses (1946-1991)....................................................................................... 2-106
2.5.1 General Description of the Operational Environment ......................................... 2-106
2.5.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents................................................................... 2-107
2.5.3 Distribution of Losses .......................................................................................... 2-108
2.5.4 Survivor/Evader Landing and Evasion Environments......................................... 2-109
2.6 Combat Rescue Test and Experiment Results ............................................................... 2-111
2.6.1 Summary of Major Exercise, Test, and Modeling Events ................................... 2-111
2.6.2 Summarized Findings .......................................................................................... 2-116
2.6.3 Warfighter Perspective on Combat Rescue Test Results..................................... 2-132
3. Lessons Learned and Trends in Combat Rescue Operations............................................ 3-1
3.1 Summary of Major Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation ............................................ 3-2
3.2 Summary of Ideal RV Characteristics ............................................................................... 3-3
3.3 Environmental Trends and Planning Factors..................................................................... 3-4
3.3.1 Global Trends........................................................................................................... 3-4
3.3.2 Physical Environment .............................................................................................. 3-4
3.3.3 Military Trends ........................................................................................................ 3-5
3.4 Characteristics of Future Isolating Incidents ..................................................................... 3-9
3.4.1 Reduced Combat Aircraft Loss Rates...................................................................... 3-9
3.4.2 Number of Rescue Candidates per Incident Will Not Increase ............................. 3-10
3.4.3 Losses to Remain Concentrated In/Around the Target Area ................................. 3-11
3.5 Trends in Enemy Reaction to Shootdowns...................................................................... 3-16
3.6 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure ........................................................................... 3-16
3.6.1 Trends in Modern Rescue Response...................................................................... 3-16
3.6.2 C2ISR Improvements Will Reduce CSAR Reaction Time ................................... 3-21
3.7 Types of Recovery Forces ............................................................................................... 3-23
3.7.1 Opportune Forces................................................................................................... 3-23
3.7.2 Special Operations Ground Teams ........................................................................ 3-23
4. References............................................................................................................................... 4-1
5. Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 5-1
6. Index........................................................................................................................................ 6-1
1. Study Objectives and Overview
In May 1999, the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Study Team was directed by
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[A&T]) to conduct a study
of historical data relating to operational aspects of the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
mission. Emphasis was to be placed on an evaluation of the factors found to be most important
to the success or failure of actual CSAR missions.
The scope of the study is generally limited to scenarios in which aircrew were downed in combat
(referred to here as a survivor/evader, or S/E). Missions such as conventional troop transport,
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) were
excluded. This report further restricts itself to assessment of operational factors, while questions
of accounting for aircrew declared Missing in Action (MIA) and assessment of the financial and
opportunity costs of performing the Combat Rescue mission will be addressed by the Defense
Prisoner of War (POW)/MIA Office. Within those constraints, the objectives of this study were:
• Describe historic Combat Rescue operations in their contemporary context.
• Identify important trends in the evolution of combat aircraft losses, Combat Rescue
capabilities, and the threat facing recovery forces.
• Attempt to identify those factors that will be most important in the 2010-2030 time
frame.
• Provide a convenient data source for developers of Combat Rescue models so that their
fidelity and accuracy may be enhanced.
To meet those objectives, the Research Team performed a comprehensive review of existing
Combat Rescue research, interviewed actual participants in Combat Rescue operations from
Vietnam to Kosovo, reviewed operational test data, and hosted round-table discussions to
provide context and perspective for the research findings.
A note on data—despite the voluminous reporting on the air wars covered in this report, there
are many gaps and conflicting information. The numerous reporting systems underwent many
revisions, and non-standard terminology created problems in analyzing/verifying data from
different sources. When data sources conflicted, the authors either cited both sources or, using
their judgment, used the data they perceived was most accurate.
Section 2 of the report, Operational Summaries, contains the bulk of the research findings, and
is organized by the conflicts that were studied. The purpose of each summary is to lay out the
facts at face value, using a common outline to provide an evidentiary point of departure for the
analysis in Section 3 as well as future studies of the Combat Rescue operations. Some analysis and
inferences are made in Section 2, however, and readers should consider the totality of the report
when drawing their own conclusions.
Section 3, Assessment of Empirical Combat Rescue Operations, contains the bulk of the
report’s analysis. The primary objective of this section is to put the findings of the discrete
operational summaries into historic context for comparison, and to identify trends that may help
Combat Rescue planners prepare for some future conflict. Equally important is the identification
of factors that are not trends—operational “dead-ends,” that (in context of our total Combat
Rescue experience) are probably not significant factors for future operations. Some of this
report’s most remarkable conclusions fall into this category.
1-1
2. Operational Summaries
Southeast Asia
(1961-1975)
Operation Desert Storm

(Iraq 1991)
Operation Deny Flight

(Bosnia 1993-1995)
Operation Allied Force

(Kosovo 1999)
Cold War
(1946-1992)
Combat Rescue Test and

Experiment Results
(1996-2001)
2-1
2.1 Southeast Asia (1961-1975)
2.1.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

The United States military buildup in Southeast Asia (SEA) began in earnest in 1962, and by
1965 a significant force had begun air operations in that Theater. The tempo of the war
increased and decreased until it peaked in response to the North Vietnamese 1972 Spring
Offensive and during Linebacker II in December of that year. US involvement in SEA began to
wind down during that period, leading to eventual "Vietnamization" of the conflict, and total
withdrawal of US forces by early 1973. Although commonly called the Vietnam War, the
fighting in Southeast Asia actually involved several wars of varying degrees of intensity. In
Laos, there was a three-way civil war between rightists, Neutralists, and the Pathet Lao. There
was an insurgency in South Vietnam (SVN) guided and eventually dominated by North Vietnam
(NVN). The United States conducted an air war against NVN, another against the infiltration
system along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, provided air support to the forces in SVN, and after 1970
carried out an air war against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.1 Accordingly, the environment
faced by rescue forces in the region varied significantly in terms of its physical characteristics
and the political and operational factors that shaped their missions.
2.1.1.1 The Physical Environment

Indochina presents a remarkable diversity in topography, climate, and flora and fauna. The area
could present a survivor with environments ranging from dense tropical jungle where a survivor
might take 30 minutes to travel 10 feet; to rice paddy areas where he could be seen from a mile
away; to mountainous karst regions with cold, wet nights; to mangrove swamps; to desert-like
stretches of sandy beach; to (best of all in terms of rescue success) open sea. Adding to that
description, the character of the environment changed twice a year depending upon the monsoon
1
Tilford, p. 31.
2-2
and the overabundance (or lack) of rain. A survivor landing in a rice paddy at one time of year
"might sink in mud above his knees. He might land in the same paddy 6 months later and break
an ankle on the parched earth."2
VIETNAM
Vietnam is located in the extreme southeastern part of the Indochinese peninsula and occupies
about 128,000 square miles (slightly larger than the state of California), and has a long, narrow
geography that made egress to the sea a matter of minutes if a damaged aircraft could hold
together that long. Before the communist takeover of SVN, a demilitarized zone divided the
country at approximately 17 degrees north latitude.
Vietnam is a country of tropical lowlands, hills and densely forested highlands, with level land
covering no more than 15-20 percent of the area.3 The country is divided into the highlands and
Red River Delta in the north; and the Central Mountains (sometimes called the Annamite
Mountains), the coastal lowlands, and the Mekong River Delta in the south.
The Red River Delta consists of a flat triangular region of 1,800 square miles, but is smaller and
more intensely developed than the Mekong River Delta. The Red River Delta is a highly
populated region, accounting for almost 70 percent of the agriculture and 80 percent of the
industry of NVN before 1975.4 The entire Delta region is no more than 3 meters above sea level
(much of it is 1 meter or less) and the area
is subject to frequent flooding. The Cau
Mau Peninsula consists of thick jungles and
mangrove swamps, which covers the
southernmost tip.
The highlands and mountain plateaus in the
north and northwest form Vietnam's border
with Laos and Cambodia, which terminates
in the Mekong River Delta north of Ho Chi
Minh City (formerly Saigon). In stark
opposition to the flat Delta region, these
jungled, irregularly formed mountains and
limestone karst outcroppings, sometimes
rising to 8,500 feet, presented a hazardous
obstacle to low flying aircraft and a
technical challenge to rescue crews.
Following bailout, some pilots were killed
when they landed on the jagged karst and
others suffered broken bones as they came
down through the branches of the multi-
layered jungle canopy.
Vietnam's climate was as debilitating as its Figure 2-1: Population Density in NVN
geography was rugged and hostile. The (Source: 7602 AIG, p. 18)
2
Porter, p. 9.
3
Smith , p. 12.
4
Cima, p. 85.
2-3
temperature rarely dipped below 80°F, while the humidity was always high (averaging 84
percent throughout the year). Annual rainfall is substantial in all regions and torrential in some,
ranging from 50 to 120 inches. Nearly 90 percent of the precipitation occurs during the summer.
During this period, most of SVN experiences heavy precipitation, low cloud ceilings, chronic
fog, and poor visibility. When the rains came, equipment often became inoperable, roads
impassible, and flying nearly impossible.
NVN experienced the same uneven distribution of population that was typical of Indochina,
which averaged 288 persons per square mile overall (see Figure 2-1). The extremes were greater
in NVN, however, with very sparse population of the inhospitable uplands, and with densities in
the Red River Delta being described as "among the highest in the world.”5 As the war
progressed, populations migrated from urban to rural areas in response to US bombing and
encouragement of the North Vietnamese government.
Considering its size, SVN as a whole was not densely populated. Although the average density
was about 243 persons per square mile, the distribution was uneven, ranging from more than
750-2,000 per square mile in the Mekong Delta to only 13 per square mile on some of the
plateaus of the Central Highlands.6 Contrary to what was observed in the North, the population
migrated towards urban areas as the war progressed.
LAOS
Laos, a landlocked nation covering 91,400 square miles (approximately the size of Great
Britain), is surrounded by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam in the center of the
Southeast Asian peninsula. Sixty percent of Laos, particularly the north, is covered with dense
tropical rain forest and humped-back mountains with elevations above 1,500 feet characterized
by steep terrain that has been described as "torturous." Laos has a tropical monsoon climate,
with a pronounced rainy season from May to October (as much as 145 inches of rainfall in some
areas). The cool dry season begins in November and continues through January. March begins
the warmer humid weather, and the temperature reaches a high of 95°F in April—the hottest
month of the year. Dust and haze dominate the dry season, when the Lao farmers practice their
slash and burn agriculture7.
Although not a physical characteristic per se, the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail deserves specific
mention here based on its operational significance during the war. The trail (actually a series of
footpaths) ran north-to-south along the Annamite Mountains on Vietnam’s western border, and
fanned out into the jungles of SVN. This terrain favored unconventional warfare, allowing
guerrillas to hide in the monsoon forest and jungle that covered 60 percent of the nation. The
forest canopy rose as high as 200-250 feet above the jungle floor—a factor that complicated the
efforts of rescue forces whenever an aircraft was shot down in tree-covered areas of Vietnam or
Laos.
The average density of the population was under 40 persons per square mile in 1959 and was
very unevenly distributed. The population density was greatest in the Mekong lowlands along
the Thailand border where it averaged 180 persons per square mile. Next highest was the
5
Smith [Area Handbook for North Vietnam], p. 15.
6
Smith [Area Handbook for South Vietnam], p. 61.
7
Roberts, p. 40
2-4
Ventiane plain which, excluding the city of Ventiane itself, was estimated at 77 persons per
square mile. Density was lowest in the far northwest, at less than 7 per square mile.8
2.1.1.2 The Operational Environment

Many factors shaped US rescue operations in SEA. One important factor was the politics
associated with military operations in the area (particularly in Laos). Often, military necessity
could not prevail against the political sensitivities present at the time. Detailed analysis of how
international (and domestic) politics may have interfered with the effectiveness of Combat
Rescue forces is well beyond the scope of this report, although it is undeniable that our ability to
recover Survivors/Evaders (S/E) in that Theater surely suffered as a result. Just how many
airmen were lost that could otherwise have been recovered will never be known.
A second significant factor that helped shape the operational environment in SEA is the level to
which American Combat Rescue capability had been allowed to decay after World War II and
Korea. Not just a by-product of poor planning, the lack of a wartime Combat Rescue capability
was the centerpiece of the plan itself. In 1958, HQ USAF withdrew its wartime mission clause
from the National Search and Rescue Plan by declaring:
"[The Air Rescue Service] will be organized, manned, equipped,
trained, and deployed to support peacetime air operations. No
special units or specially designed aircraft will be provided for the
sole purpose of wartime search and rescue. Wartime rescue
operations will be dictated by the capabilities of equipment used
for peacetime SAR…"9
As a consequence, the first few years of rescue operations in SEA were made up of a
hodgepodge of assets and informal agreements between services, government agencies, and
politicians. Once American involvement shifted from limited and clandestine operations to a
more conventional air war, the build-up of a rescue capability was rapid. By 1966, forces were
finally in place, the concept of a Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF or CSARTF)
was well developed, and Combat Rescue operations had become a key component of the air
campaign in SEA.
Sentiment of the local population in the vicinity of
a shootdown was another important variable in the Table 2-1: Fate of Aircrew That Were
operational environment. Over the course of the Not Rescued10
conflict, approximately 20 percent of the MIA POW Total
population in SVN was characterized as being NVN
51.5% 48.5%
under control of the Viet Cong, 25 percent was (412) (388) 800
82.6% 17.4%
characterized as “contested,” and the remainder SVN
(456) (96) 552
(about 55 percent of the SVN countryside) was 98.2% 1.8%
described as “relatively secure.”11. In such an Laos
(278) (5) 283
environment, 17.4 percent of Americans lost that
8
Roberts , p. 40.
9
HQ USAF letter to MATS, Sep 26, 1958, in Tilford, p. 16.
10
Commanders Digest, p. 6.
11
Westmoreland, p. 199.
2-5
were neither rescued nor killed in action (KIA) in SVN became POW, and the remainder (82.6
percent) were categorized as missing in action (MIA). As dismal as that statistic is, it is
markedly better than the situation in Laos where less than 2 percent of personnel that were not
recovered became POWs. The remainder, slightly more than 98 percent, were declared MIA,
prompting reasonable suspicion about the treatment of those men while in the hands of the local
population. In NVN, where one could assume the population was most hostile towards downed
Americans, about 48.5 percent of aircrew that were not rescued were categorized as POWs and
51.5 percent were declared MIA. Those numbers seem to contradict the trend noted in SVN and
Laos, suggesting that, in addition to the degree to which the population was “contested,” the
local government’s ability to control the behavior of the population is a key variable in the
survival of downed airmen. Such a measurement of the “sympathies” of the local population
may be useful when assessing the likelihood of evasion success in other areas of the world where
similar assessments can be made.
RESCUE FORCE ASSETS AND DEPLOYMENT

Rescue force strength generally paralleled the pace of USAF fixed-wing activity in SEA (see
Figure 2-10). The responsibility for providing assets to rescue personnel around SEA operating
bases and in hostile territory was delegated to the 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (3d
ARRG) by the Commander, Seventh Air Force. The Navy Control Center subordinate to this
group was responsible for sea/littoral rescues, and was located in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although
the number and basing locations varied over the course of the war, as of 1969 more than 15
rescue units contributed to that mission from operating locations across SEA (see Figure 2-2).
These widespread units, located in two nations, were responsible for search and rescue activities
in an area covering more than 1.1 million square miles. The 3d ARRG was also responsible for
operating a Joint Search and Rescue Center (then called a JSARC) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and
several subordinate Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC) assigned by region. A detailed
description of the aircraft used for rescue is in Section 2.1.6.2
2-6
Figure 2-2: 3rd ARRG Units in SEA
(Source: Overton, Figure 2)
2-7
SOUTHEAST ASIA RESCUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
When rescue assets and infrastructure were finally in place, employment followed a Concept of
Operations that had developed over time in that Theater. Any individual having knowledge of an
emergency could initiate a rescue mission by notifying the JSARC, an RCC, or some other
agency. At that point, the Mission Commander (typically aboard an HC-130) would determine
the composition of the SARTF to include task primary and secondary forces, if required. It was
even possible to receive support from civilian agencies such as Air America and Continental Air
Services.12 For missions entering NVN, Rescue Coordinators had the added requirement of
obtaining "border clearance" from the 7AF Commander.
Prepositioning: To reduce the time and distance for potential missions, rescue helicopters were
put at forward operating locations (FOL) in SVN and northern Laos. The aircraft would arrive at
the FOL at first light, staging two HH-53s (once they had arrived in theater) for northern
missions in NVN and HH-3s for missions in SVN and north of the demilitarized zone.
Orbit Concept: Another tool for decreasing response time was the "orbit concept." It was
conceived in March 1969 when the arrival of four additional HH-53s provided a sufficient
number of airframes to support such a
plan. Execution of the orbit concept
put rescue aircraft (both helicopters and
rescue escort [RESCORT]) in the air
during periods of heavy air activity
over NVN in anticipation of a
shootdown. Called “airborne alert” in
today’s terminology, the airborne forces
augmented the rescue forces on ground
alert (see Figure 2-3).
CSARTF: When a rescue mission
began, it tended to take priority over
other ongoing missions, and aircraft
were often diverted from their assigned
targets to support the recovery effort.13
Although much of the fighter-bomber
support marshaled was generic, some
roles were highly specialized. In
particular, On-Scene Commander
(OSC) and RESCORT tasks were
unique to rescue missions, and are
described in Section 2.1.6.3.
Once the CSARTF was assembled, the Figure 2-3: Ground Alert and Orbit Locations
helicopters were escorted to the (Source: Overton, Figure 10)
terminal area (usually by A-1E or A-7
12
Overton, p. 12.
13
Information suggesting that rescue missions received priority over other missions is anecdotal. Research has not
uncovered official policy that subordinated offensive air operations to Combat Rescue missions, and it is unlikely
that such a policy existed. Regardless, it is an often-mentioned observation (as in Overton, p. 96 and among aircrew
assigned to SEA). See Section 2.1.6.3 for more detail.
2-8
“Sandy” aircraft) where one helicopter was assigned as the “low bird.” When the “low bird”
aircraft commander had determined the survivor's location and his best course of action, he
would start the approach to the area, jettisoning external fuel tanks if necessary. "Normally, the
best approach was a high-speed descending pass over the survivor’s position, and then a tear-
drop turn to arrive back at the survivor's position headed into the wind.”14 The second helicopter
was assigned as the "high bird,” and would typically orbit over the pickup area at 5,000-6,000
feet, generally safe from the threat of small arms. If weather or hostile activity prevented
orbiting directly over the area he would orbit at a position from which the recovery could be
observed. The “high bird” would advise the SARTF of enemy activity and could act as a
forward air controller, if required. If the low helicopter were disabled, the high helicopter would
attempt the recovery unless denied by enemy activity.
Major Gerald A. Jones flew a typical recovery from an orbit position in November 1968. The
mission is best described in his own words:
“We were orbiting near Lima Site 36 [an FOL in northern Laos] when the
mission broke. The pilot was down in a relatively open area with much enemy
gunfire from surrounding hills. The [on-scene commander] mentioned that it
was an extremely hot area so I was required to hold out for one and one-half
hours during which time extensive sanitization was carried out by fast-movers.
Finally I was brought in through intermittent cloud coverage. I couldn’t spot
the survivor at all and was taken back out as we began receiving ground fire.
The survivor also came on the air and told us to leave the area. I then tried to
come in from the west real low with the sun behind me. The Sandys had laid
down a smoke screen for me, and flew ‘daisy chains’ over the area while
continually firing. I still couldn’t see him, but bored on in anyway. All of my
guns were firing at this time. The survivor came on the air saying, ‘I can see
you.’ We looked everywhere but couldn’t see him. We were taking fire and I
told the Sandys, but failed to give them exact positions. As I was casting
about, the survivor came on again, ‘You’re right over me.’ I did a quick 180
[degree turn] and there he was! The hoist operator sent down the penetrator
while the rest of the crew fired from the other guns. In about 30 seconds we
had him aboard and we egressed climbing and turning all the way…One of the
problems in a high threat area such as this was that when the hoist was in
operation, we lost the service of the #2 mini-gun.”15
The CHECO report from which that account was taken describes the terminal area operation in
greater detail as follows:
“The description of the rescue by Major Jones…did not detail the intense hostile
fire during ingress, egress and throughout the area. Six flights of fast-movers
were put on numerous hostile gun positions in the area for suppression.
Additionally, there were many troops within 200 yards of the survivor. As a
matter of fact, the pickup was made on the last possible attempt. The survivor
was in the open, being fired on from surrounding gun positions, and being
14
Overton, p. 25.
15
Jones, Maj. Gerald A. in Overton, p. 26.
2-9
approached quickly by enemy troops. A heavy smoke screen was used for
ingress and egress. It was a brilliant recovery, daringly conceived to bring out a
fellow flyer under extremely dangerous conditions.”16
Mission Closure/Suspension/Withdrawal: If operations were unsuccessful, and when it
appeared that all reasonable action had been taken, the JSARC would recommend to the 7AF
Commander that the mission be suspended. The Airborne Mission Commander (AMC, usually
the HC-130 Crown aircraft) or the On-Scene Commander could also direct the temporary
withdrawal of rescue forces in the situation dictated. The JSARC could close the mission
completely when:
The recovery was completed
The location of the survivor was positively identified but there could be no further
value in the continued use of the SARTF
There was no indication of need for Search and Rescue effort
Recovery was extremely doubtful due to hostile activity, probable capture, or time
lapse
The mission proved to be false
2.1.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents
2.1.2.1 Causes of Isolating Incidents

The type and severity of the threat faced by American and allied flyers in SEA varied
significantly by the location of the operation and the timeline of the conflict. In the end,
however, ground fire caused about 83 percent of total combat losses between 1962 and 1972.
During that same period, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) accounted for 6.3 percent of combat
losses, and base attack and Migs accounted for 5.5 percent and 3.8 percent respectively.17
Although enemy weapons typically used for air defense (SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery [AAA],
Mig fighters) caused most combat losses, it is noteworthy that (as of 1971) at least 80 fixed-wing
USAF aircraft had been lost in SEA due to small arms fire. The actual total for small arms may
be much larger due to many kills attributed to "unknown ground fire."18 Also noteworthy is the
introduction of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) late in the conflict. In 1972, as
US involvement waned, SA-7 MANPADS were introduced in SEA, killing 20 aircraft and
damaging six more.19 Had the war continued, MANPADS would have played a very significant
role in the air war over North and South Vietnam.
Figures 2-4 and 2-5 illustrate the proportions of aircraft losses that are attributable to each threat
category for operations in all of SEA. Of great significance is that simple, widely proliferated
weapons (AAA, large caliber automatic weapons, and small arms) account for more than 80
percent of SEA losses.
16
Overton, p. 27.
17
Granville, p. 24. Although not exactly identical, that general distribution of causes matches that described by
Hewett.
18
Hewett, p. 5.
19
Crosthwaite, p. 12.
2-10
60.0%
Laos
50.0% SVN
NVN
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
AAA Automatic Weapons Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD
Figure 2-4: Causes of Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Type of Weapon

(Source: Hewett, Tables IV, V, and VI)
60.0%
MANPAD
Air-Air
SAM
50.0% Small Arms
Automatic Weapons
AAA
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
NVN SVN Laos
Figure 2-5: Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Country

(Source: Hewett, Tables IV, V, and VI)
2-11
NORTH VIETNAM
On the eve of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964, air defenses in NVN were of low
effectiveness. There were no fielded missile defenses and conventional anti-aircraft weapons
used for air defense had very limited radar tracking capability.20 By June of 1968, Russia had
equipped NVN with about 35 SAM battalions and had supplied a sophisticated communications
and radar network, numerous aircraft (including the Mig-15, Mig-17, and Mig-21), and large
quantities of anti-aircraft weapons. All of those weapons contributed to establishing "the most
sophisticated air defense system ever faced by any force in combat."21 In NVN, AAA accounts
for nearly half of all losses, and nearly all aircraft lost to SAMs were in NVN.
NVN
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
AAA Automatic Small Arms SAM Air-Air Kills MANPAD
Weapons
Figure 2-6: Losses by Threat System in North Vietnam

(Source: Hewett, Table IV)
20
Sharp, p. 13.
21
Sharp, p. 4.
2-12
LAOS
In Laos, automatic weapons and AAA were predominant. Pathet Lao air defenses were less
sophisticated than were found in NVN but Laotian experience indicates that the threat was nearly
as lethal. Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in Viet Cong controlled areas of SVN, the enemy's
principle antiaircraft weapons were the 12.7 mm Soviet or Chinese built heavy machine gun and
small arms.
Laos
16.0%
14.0%
12.0%
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%
Weapons
Figure 2-7: Losses by Threat System in Laos

(Source: Hewett, Table VI)
2-13
SOUTH VIETNAM
In SVN, air defenses were similar to those found in Laos where small arms and automatic
weapons account for the majority of losses. South Vietnam differs from Laos in that, as the war
progressed, the North Vietnam regular army occupied more and more territory in SVN, bringing
with them a more conventional and more lethal air defense capability.
SVN
14.0%
12.0%
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%
Weapons
Figure 2-8: Losses by Threat System in SVN

(Source: Hewett, Table V)
CAMBODIA
In Cambodia, the communist Khmer Rouge remained a force without sophisticated weapons up
to the day they took power in April 1975. Throughout the war, they rarely, if ever, employed the
larger caliber anti-aircraft guns used by the North Vietnamese and, to a lesser extent, by the
enemy forces in SVN. As of 1971, only five aircraft were officially reported as lost over
Cambodia. Consequently, rescue activity there never assumed the scope that it did elsewhere in
SEA.22
22
Hewett, p. 8.
2-14
2.1.2.2 Type of Asset Lost
Table 2-3 summarizes USAF in-flight combat losses between 1962 and 1973, and suggests that
the average number of aircrew available for rescue per loss incident was 0.93. That number
includes only those aircrew known to be available for rescue (i.e., rescued or captured). The
figure was calculated by: (Rescued + POW)/Aircraft Lost.
US Navy (USN) combat loss experience is similar to that of the USAF. The average number of
aircrew available for rescue per loss incident is 1.0 (Table 2-2, based on data from Office of
Naval Aviation History and aircrew status distributions described in Every [2], pp. 27-30).
Table 2-2: Summary of USN Losses in SEA

Distribution of Personnel Available for
Typical Crew Size USN Losses by Losses per 100 Rescue per 100
Aircraft Type23 Aircraft Losses Losses
A-4 1 37% 37 26.3
R/F-4 2 21% 42 29.8
R/F-8 1 13% 13 9.2
E/A-6 2 10% 20 14.2
A-7 1 8% 8 5.7
E/A-1 1 7% 7 5.0
RA-5 2 3% 6 4.3
OV-10 2 2% 4 5.6
K/EA-3 9 1% 9 2.5
Average USN Crew Size per Aircraft Lost: 1.46
Available for Rescue per Loss (Rescued + POW): 1.0
23
Office of Naval Aviation History (no page number).
2-15
Table 2-3: Summary of USAF Combat Losses in SEA (1962-1972) 24
Fate of Aircrew
Available for
Aircraft Total Crew Typical Rescue per
25
Aircraft Lost Members Rescued MIA KIA POW Crew Size Loss
A-1 147 158 81 21 54 2 1 0.56
A-7 2 2 0 2 0 0 1 0.00
A-26 10 21 3 9 9 0 2 0.30
A-37 14 14 3 2 9 0 1 0.21
AC-47 15 109 24 28 57 0 7 1.60
A-119 2 10 7 0 3 0 5 3.50
AC-130 6 82 30 50 2 0 14 5.00
B/RB-26 9 21 1 0 20 0 2 0.11
B-52 16 98 32 44 4 18 6 3.13
B-57 32 65 26 16 21 2 2 0.88
C-7 7 22 4 0 18 0 3 0.57
C-47 6 47 11 8 28 0 8 1.83
C-123 17 77 15 16 46 0 5 0.88
C-130 22 134 35 34 65 0 6 1.59
CH-3 13 55 40 3 9 3 4 3.31
CH-53 2 8 6 0 2 0 4 3.00
EB-66 4 25 3 9 1 12 6 3.75
F-4 369 734 322 222 70 120 2 1.20
F-5 7 8 2 0 6 0 1 0.29
F-100 193 218 141 17 55 5 1 0.76
F/TF-102 3 3 2 1 0 0 1 0.67
F-104 8 8 2 3 2 1 1 0.38
F-105 334 353 127 105 25 96 1 0.67
F-111 8 15 0 15 0 0 2 0.00
HH-3 10 40 26 3 11 0 4 2.60
H-43 8 31 24 0 4 3 4 3.38
HH-53 8 44 18 1 25 0 6 2.25
HU-16 2 13 4 7 2 0 7 2.00
O-1 94 110 51 15 44 0 1 0.54
O-2 72 59 25 10 23 1 1 0.36
OV-10 44 59 25 10 23 1 1 0.59
RB-57 2 4 4 0 0 0 2 2.00
RB-66 2 9 5 0 4 0 5 2.50
RF-4 72 144 58 51 14 21 2 1.10
RF-101 32 31 9 10 1 11 1 0.63
T-28 17 20 6 5 9 0 1 0.35
UH-1 13 51 40 0 11 0 4 3.08
TOTAL 1622 2902 1212 717 677 296 1.79 0.93
24
Granville, Table 15. Data from Table 15 was adjusted, based on data in Table 6 of the same document, to remove
numbers of aircraft lost on the ground due to enemy attacks on airfields.
25
Although the summaries of aircrew status (rescued, MIA, KIA, POW) in Table 2-3 are useful for estimating
rescue demand for each aircraft type, the totals in this table appear to understate the POW and MIA totals when
compared with other accounts.
2-16
2.1.2.3 Type of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost
Figure 2-9 shows the distribution of S/Es in SEA by mission type, as well as the distribution of
S/Es that were captured and became POWs. It shows that two missions, “Strike” and
Reconnaissance (“Recce”), combine as the sources for more than half of all S/Es in SEA. A look
at the distribution of captured aircrew, also in Figure 2-9, paints a slightly different picture. It
shows that losses during strike missions resulted in aircrew capture at about twice the rate of S/E
production. Recce losses produced POWs in approximate proportion to the S/Es from that
mission, while losses during combat air patrol, while producing only 2.5 percent of total USAF
S/Es in SEA, produced 14.1 percent of the total POW population.26
2.1.2.4 Phase of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

Operations in the target area were, by far, the most lethal mission phase for combat aircrew
anywhere in SEA. For fixed-wing aircraft, the target area’s combination of threat exposure and
predictable aircraft flight profile account for 83 percent of all combat damage incidents leading
to aircraft loss.27 The remainder (17 percent) received combat damage and were lost during
ingress, egress, or during crash landing.
60.0%
% of POWs
50.0% % of S/Es
Percent of Total
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Close Air Support
Fwd Air Ctl/Spt
Search & Rescue
Cbt Cargo Carry
Combat Support
Escort
CAP
Air Interdiction
Training
Recce
Strike
Mission
Figure 2-9: Distribution of SEA Losses and POWs by Mission Type

(Source: Granville, Table 14)
26
Granville, Table 14.
27
Hewett , 1971, p. xii.
2-17
2.1.2.5 Frequency of Isolating Incidents
NUMBERS OF SURVIVORS/EVADERS
Although references to numbers of rescues attempted in SEA abound, it is difficult to assess
which are most accurate. Some reports are very detailed but cover only portions of the conflict’s
duration. Other reports contain summary information, but the figures vary widely and are
difficult to assess since various methods are used to categorize the losses. In his now classic
book, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, Earl Tilford credits the Air Rescue and Recovery
Service forces with saving 3,883 lives in SEA.28 That number includes not only the combat
rescues of aircrew that are the centerpiece of this report, but also rescues resulting from non-
combat losses of aircraft, evacuation of conventional US Army (USA) troops, and mass
evacuations of civilians from one area to another. Table 2-4 lists the number and status of
aircrew lost to combat action and their yearly distribution using the best data available. It
conflicts with tallies of POW and MIA aircrew in Tables 2-3 and 2-5 which are assessed as being
more accurate.
Table 2-4: Number and Status of Airmen Surviving Shootdown in SEA 1964-1972 29
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total
Combat 26 122 122 75
179 192 263 214 132 1325
ACR (est) (est) (est) (est)
POW 3 74 97 179 95 13 12 11 5 48930
MIA 4 54 204 226 294 176 85 79 23 1145

Rec Rate
31 89.7% 62.2% 64.9% 51.8% 73.5% 94.3% 91.7% 91.7% 93.8% 73.0%
(available)
Rec Rate
78.8% 48.8% 37.3% 32.2% 40.3% 53.1% 57.6% 57.5% 72.8% 44.8%
(inc. MIA)
Table 2-5: Summary of Airmen Downed in SEA (including KIA)

Rescued POW MIA/KIA
USAF Only (Granville)32 41.8% 10.2% 48.0% (24.7%/23.3%)
USAF Only (Hewett)33 44.3% 14.8% 40.9% (19.9%/21.0%)
34
USN Only (primarily NVN losses) 39.1% 32% 28.9%
28
Tilford, p. 155.
29
Combat ACR (1965), Tilford p. 74; Combat ACR (1966-1972), Tilford p. 98; MIA/POW (1964-1972),
Commanders Digest, p. 6.
30
In 1973, 587 American POWs were released from Vietnam. The figures in the table are dated 1973 (prior to
release of POWs) and may have categorized as MIA some personnel that were POW. In any case, figures of the
type shown in the table vary based on the source, and the MIA total is apparently not limited to downed aircrew.
31
“Available” refers to those S/E available for rescue (i.e. excludes KIA and MIA).
32
Granville, p. 57.
33
Hewett, pp. 43-44.
34
Every (2), pp. 27 and 30.
2-18
PEAK RESCUE DEMAND
To answer the question of how many rescue helicopters might be needed in a given strike area to
handle multiple aircraft losses in a short period of time, Every analyzed SEA data and found that
of over 500 Navy aircraft lost during the conflict, the numbers in Column A of Table 2-6
represent “the only cases of multiple aircraft ejection in a short period of time.”35 Making a
gross extrapolation based on approximately 1622 USAF combat losses,36 one might estimate the
following cases of multiple, simultaneous rescue operations in SEA (Column B):
Table 2-6: Estimated Simultaneous Rescue Events (1962-1973)

A B
Time (in Total Estimated Simultaneous
minutes) USN Cases (of 525 Est. USAF Cases (of Rescue Events (1962-1973)
losses)37 1,622 losses)
0-15 3 9 12
15-30 5 15 20
30-60 1 3 4
60-240 2 6 8
While one could reasonably assert that the final estimate (43 simultaneous rescue events in a 12-
year period) understates the rescue demand, it may be equally likely that the total demand is
overstated. The preponderance of USN air combat experience was in NVN, where loss rates
were SEA’s highest, and the simple estimate in Table 2-6 casts those loss rates over operations in
all areas of SEA.
Ultimately, rescue force structure appears to have been sufficient to handle the expected load.
Although 1.2 percent of POW cases were attributed to “SAR vehicle not immediately available,”
analysis of the “very limited number of instances (4) wherein the non-availability of vehicles was
reported as the primary cause of SAR mission failure disclosed that they were cases in which the
crewmembers were advised before the mission that SAR would not be available because of the
nature of the mission and its location.”38 Apart from that reference, there is no documented
instance in which rescue forces failed to react due to a lack of rescue helicopters.
35
Every (2), p. 44.
36
In addition to combat induced ejections, that figure also includes combat losses of fixed-wing transport aircraft
and rescue helicopters.
37
Two cases involved rescue aircraft themselves.
38
7602 AIG, p. 4.
2-19
450 80
400
Rescue Aircraft Inventory

70
Fixed-Wing Losses
350 60
300
50
250
40
200
30
150
100 20
50 10
0 0
CY65
CY66
CY67
CY68
CY69
CY70
CY71
CY72
USAF Acft Loss

Rescue Acft Inventory
Figure 2-10: Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Rescue Inventory (1965-1972)

(Source: Fixed-wing loss data-USAF Management Summary, SEA, 10 Nov 69; Rescue aircraft
inventory-ARRS CORONA HARVEST Report 1954 to 31 Mar 68, Vol I. Data for years after
1969 compiled from multiple sources including Tilford, Streets, Hewett, and the Office of Naval
Aviation History)
2-20
AIRCRAFT LOSS RATES
Table 2-7 lists aircraft that comprise more than 90 percent of total USAF combat losses in SEA.
The combat sortie data in the table was used to calculate the loss rate per 1000 sorties for each
aircraft type:
Table 2-7: Fixed-Wing Loss Rates in SEA39
Total Combat Losses per 1000
Losses
Sorties Sorties
F-4 496,670 382 0.769
F-105 159,795 334 2.090
F-100 360,665 198 0.549
A-1 91,855 150 1.633
O-1 485,452 122 0.251
O-2 281,000 82 0.292
RF-4C 100,050 76 0.760
OV-10A 123,572 46 0.372
B-57 43,772 40 0.914
C-130 227,807 36 0.158
RF-101 39,296 33 0.840
B-52 124,53240 16 0.190
TOTAL 2,493,934 1,515 0.607
2.1.2.6 Injuries to Survivors/Evaders

Approximately 24 percent of aircrew losses were classified as KIA.41 Of those not KIA, pre-
ejection injuries (typically lacerations, fractures, and burns from exploding ordnance) accounted
for about 20 percent of all injuries received during combat losses. Those pre-ejection injuries
were highly susceptible to further complications during ejection, evasion, and periods of
captivity42 (see Table 2-8).
Table 2-8: Time of Occurrence of Combat Aircrew Injuries43
Descent and Escape and During
Pre-Ejection Ejection
Landing Evasion Capture
20% 60% 15% 3% 2%
The major single source of non-fatal injuries is the ejection process itself, and the bulk of those
injuries are minor. Windblast induced flailing of the extremities produced the greatest number of
injuries during the entire escape sequence. Windblast, also referred to as ram pressure or Q force
varies with the air density (ρ) and the square of the relative wind velocity (V) such that Q=½ρV2.
Because Q force is a function of the square of the velocity, there is a strong association between
39
Streets, p. 5. Minor discrepancies exist between this data and loss data from Granville listed in Table 2-3 of this
report.
40
Sortie data from http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/.
41
42
Every (2), p. 10.
43
Every (4), p. 14.
2-21
ejection at higher airspeeds and a higher proportion of major injuries (Figure 2-11). For a
discussion about how aircrew injuries affected rescue and capture rates, see Section 2.1.8.4
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% No Injury
Percent
50% Minor
40% Major
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 - 99
100 - 199
200 - 299
300 - 399
400 - 499
> 500
Ejection Speed (KIAS)
Figure 2-11: Severity of Aircrew Injuries by Ejection Speed

(Source: US Navy data from Every [1], p. 9; AF data from Shannon, Table III)
Spine Torso
16% 13%
Head/Face
11%
Upper
Extremities Neck
22% 7%
General
2%
Lower
Extremities
29%
Figure 2-12: Location of Major and Minor Injuries Among

USN Aviators Downed in Combat (Source: Every [1], p. 10)
2-22
2.1.2.7 Number of Survivors/Evaders per Incident
Figure 2-13 shows the distribution of losses in SEA by aircrew size. Tables 2-2 and 2-3 in
Section 2.1.2.2 suggest the average number of S/E per incident were 1.46 (USN) to 1.79 (USAF)
aircrew per aircraft lost. When looking only at the part of that population known to be available
for rescue (i.e. excluding MIA and KIA), the average numbers of aircrew per incident were 1.0
and 0.93 respectively.
100%
6%
90%
80%
32%
70%
Percent
60%
More Than 2 Crew members
50% 2 Crew members
1 Crew member
40%
30% 62%
20%
10%
0%
Figure 2-13: Distribution of SEA Combat Losses by Aircrew Size

2.1.3 Distribution of Losses
2.1.3.1 Distribution by Threat Level

Table 2-9 describes the distribution of combat losses by service and location. The losses reflect
the taskings of the different services, with the US Marine Corps (USMC) supporting its ground
operations in SVN, the USN focusing almost exclusively on NVN, and the USAF supporting
operations all across the peninsula. By classic definition, perhaps only areas in NVN qualified as
“high threat,” however the nature of the operations in SVN and Laos forced aircraft into the low-
altitude environment making them vulnerable to AAA and other assorted ground fire (which, as
a shown in Figure 2-14, were the most lethal threat categories in SEA).
2-23
Table 2-9: Distribution of Losses by Country and Service
USAF44 USN45 USMC46
NVN 40% 91% 17%
SVN 33% 3% 71%
Laos 25% 6% 10%
Other/Unknown 2% 1% 2%
80 Air-Air
SAM
70
AAA
60 Automatic & Small Arms
50
# of Kills
40
30
20
10
0
0 - 999
2000 - 2999
4000 - 4999
6000 - 6999
8000 - 8999
10000 - 10999
12000 - 12999
14000 - 14999
16000 - 16999
18000 - 18999
20000 - 20999
22000 - 22999
24000 - 24999
Altitude
Figure 2-14: Distribution of Combat Losses by Threat System and Altitude

(Source: Hewett, pp. 23-25)
2.1.3.2 Distribution by Range

Until helicopter air refueling became available in SEA, rescue crews had no alternative but to use
the FOL at Quang Tri in northern SVN and Lima Sites in northern Laos. At that time,
approximately 18.9 percent of cases in which aircrew became POWs were attributed to
insufficient range of the helicopter. After July 1966, with the arrival of air-refuelable HH-3s, no
44
Hewett, p. xii.
45
Office of Naval Aviation History in www.bluejackets.com.
46
Office of Naval Aviation History in www.bluejackets.com.
2-24
rescue mission failure was again attributed to insufficient range of the recovery vehicles (RVs).47
Even so, the HH-3s and HH-53s continued to use Lima Sites at Long Tieng and Na Khang.48
The combination of geography and basing options resulted in a maximum rescue radius of about
200 miles. Although aircraft improvements made covering those distances easier, it was aircrew
creativity that often made the difference. Consider the description, by an HH-43 Flight
Engineer, of how the range limitations of his helicopter were overcome:
“As you know, the HH-43 ‘Pedro’ and the HH-34 ‘Choctaw’ did not have in-
flight refueling capability. However, we did put 55-gallon drums of fuel on
board and [brought] a wobble pump. As we went along, we stuck the hose
from the drum to the outside fuel filler receptacle just outside the door (and
reachable by the FE). When the drum was empty, we kicked it overboard.
The number of 55-gallon drums we carried was set based on the distance to
the pick-up location and weight restrictions. The 43 was designed for [local
base rescue] and was assigned that in ‘Nam, but as the war changed, so did
we. Over time, the radius of required coverage became larger and larger so,
like all good Pedro's, we improvised. That’s how the first “North of the
DMZ” rescues early in the war were performed by the HH-43's. The HH-
34s were likely operated in the same way...”49
Although not a measurement of mission range per se, sortie duration is a helpful indicator of the
range (and the pace) of mission execution. The choice of staging locations and alert options
(airborne and ground) resulted in average CH-3/HH-3 combat sortie durations of 85.9 minutes.
At the extremes, the longest average sortie duration in any given year was 310 minutes by the
HH-3 in 1970 and the shortest was 32.1 minutes by the CH-3 in 1965.50
350
300
250
Minutes
200
CH-3
150 HH-3
100
50
0
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1965-
1970
Figure 2-15: Average CH-3 and HH-3 Combat Sortie Duration by Year
(Source: JTCG/ME, Table B-1)
47
7602 AIG, p. 4.
48
Tilford, p. 82.
49
DaSilva, interview
50
JTCG/ME, Table B-1.
2-25
No explanation is given in the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
(JTCG/ME) reference as to the reason for the significant increase in average sortie durations
from 1966 to 1970. One could infer, however, that the increase reflects more frequent use of the
orbit concept over time in order to keep response times to an absolute minimum. That
supposition is supported, at least anecdotally, by the upward trend of recovery rates during that
same time period.
2.1.4 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong placed significant value on the capture of downed
American aircrew. When the war began, their intention was to capture the aircrew for the
goodwill that might be generated by the prisoners’ release at a later date. Once they realized the
political leverage gained by long-term possession of American POWs, the strategy shifted
accordingly. Regardless of their intention, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong wanted to
capture downed aircrew before they could be rescued, and were willing to assign battlefield
resources to that end. Once an S/E was captured, the enemy frequently used his survival radio to
further confuse rescue efforts.
Very early in the war, North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao allies became adept at setting up
flak traps (sometimes called SAR Traps). The flak traps, ambushes of SAR forces using S/E as
bait, were the defining characteristic of enemy reaction to shootdowns in SEA. An excellent
example is the case of Wolf 06, an F-4D flying out of Udorn Royal Thai Air Base. In the late
afternoon of March 19, 1970, Wolf 06 was brought down by a direct hit from 57-mm AAA
during a visual reconnaissance mission over Laos. Separated from his backseater, the pilot
hunkered down in a concealed area to await rescue. From that vantage point, he witnessed savvy
and methodical enemy construction of a SAR trap that was typical in SEA:
“Enemy activity was astonishing. The minute we were down the
enemy started bringing in guns all around our position. They had
37mm, 23mm, ZPU, and small arms. It was obvious what they
were doing and it made me furious. They had set their pattern in a
crossfire, knowing that the SAR effort would begin in the morning.
They fired about 1,200 rounds throughout the evening to make
sure their crossfire pattern would cover the area where the Jolly
Greens or Sandies would be coming in.”51
2.1.5 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

Most Combat Rescue attempts, particularly long-distance missions, were a never-ending race
with time. In many cases, too much time was required to build an armada to penetrate enemy air
defenses and give rescue forces a reasonable chance for success.52 Key factors influencing the
time S/E were available for rescue included distance from friendly rescue forces, enemy
population density and sentiment, type of terrain, and amount of ground cover.
Figure 2-16 describes the cumulative status of S/E over time in proportion to the total population
that was available for rescue (i.e. excluding MIA/KIA). The data suggest that after the first 60
51
Porter, pp. 45-46.
52
Francis, p. 51.
2-26
minutes, enemy effectiveness in capturing S/E was almost completely diminished, while our own
ability to successfully recover personnel persisted (albeit at a reduced rate). In general, if an
S/E’s status changed after the first hour, it was more likely to reflect his rescue than his capture.
That trend is not evident when operations in NVN are looked at in isolation. In NVN, the enemy
was consistently more effective at capturing our S/E than we were at their rescue, and their
performance advantage persisted over time.
The spikes in the “Captured” category at the far right of Figures 2-17 and 2-18 actually represent
a disproportionately high number of S/E captured after 48 hours. 4.06% of the IPs were still
evading after 48 hours—of these, 78.8% were captured while 21.2% were rescued. We attribute
that phenomenon to instances where friendly forces were unable to locate the S/E, leaving them
exposed to “accidental” or opportune discovery by the enemy.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Percent
Awaiting Rescue
50% Rescued
40% Captured
30%
20%
10%
0%
Shootdown
3 hrs
6 hrs
9 hrs
12 hrs
15 hrs
18 hrs
21 hrs
24 hrs
Elapsed Time
Figure 2-16: Cumulative Status of S/E Over Time (SEA)

(Source: Total distribution from Granville, p. 57; ‘Rescued’ data from Directorate of Aerospace
Safety, Section D; ‘Captured’ data from 7602 AIG, p. 10)
2-27
30.0%
P e rce nt of Tota l Ava ila ble for 25.0%
20.0%
Re scue
15.0%
10.0% Captured
Res c ued
5.0%
0.0%
S hootdown
3 hrs
6 hrs
9 hrs
12 hrs
15 hrs
18 hrs
21 hrs
24 hrs
Ela pse d Tim e
Figure 2-17: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (SEA)

(Source: Total distribution from Granville, p. 57; ‘Rescued’ data from Directorate of Aerospace
Safety, Section D; ‘Captured’ data from 7602 AIG, p. 10)
70
Percent of Total Available for
60
50
40
Rescue
30
Rescued
20
Captured
10
0
Shootdown
1 hrs
2 hrs
3 hrs
4 hrs
5 hrs
6 hrs
7 hrs
8 hrs
9 hrs
10 hrs
11 hrs
12 hrs
Elapsed Time
Figure 2-18: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (NVN Only)

(Source: Every [2], pp. 28-9)
2-28
2.1.5.1 Elapsed Time to Rescue
Most aircrew downed in SEA were recovered in short order. Many factors had a bearing on this,
but “probably the most important were friendly control of the air, an efficient dedicated rescue
force, and aircrews who knew how to aid in their own rescues.”53 The use of FOLs and the
“orbit concept” described in Section 2.1.1.2 significantly improved rescue response times and
helped reduce the period of S/E exposure.
Actual experience of survivors/evaders on the ground varied significantly. While some S/Es
were forced to evade capture for weeks before being rescued, others were rescued within mere
minutes of his feet touching the ground. Causal factors for prolonged exposure were difficulty
locating the S/E, and the delay required to assemble a SARTF when the loss was in an area of
elevated threat.
Of S/E that were successfully recovered, 35 percent were recovered in the first 30 minutes. At
the end of the first hour of exposure, 56 percent of rescues had been accomplished. Only 16
percent had to spend more than six hours on the ground, and that was usually because darkness
terminated the rescue effort. Most
100%
of these were picked up at first
54
light the next day. After 48 90%
hours, 99 percent of S/Es that
Cumulative Percent Recovered
80%
were going to be rescued had been
picked up. 70%
The influence of threat level on 60%

time-to-rescue can be seen in a
50%
comparison of land rescues
performed in NVN (a traditional 40%
high-threat environment) with the 30%
overall land experience for Water Recoveries
combat recoveries in SEA, and 20% Land (NVN)
with water rescues in the Gulf of Land (All SEA)
10%
Tonkin and South China Sea
0%
(Figure 2-19). Although the
0 30 60 90 120 150 >150
threat increased as one
Elapsed Time to Rescue (minutes)
approached the shoreline, the vast
majority of water recoveries were
not contested, and might represent Figure 2-19: Time to Rescue in Various
a theoretical minimum response Environments/Threat Levels
time given the equipment and (Source: ‘Water’ from Every (1), p. 30; ‘Land’ (NVN) from Every (2),
p. 29; ‘Land (SEA)’ from Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)
procedures available in SEA
53
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, p. 5.
54
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, p. 5.
2-29
Hours
Hours
Years
Figure 2-20: Percent of Land Rescues Accomplished Over Time

With Data for Years 1963 to 197155
(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)
55
Data for each individual year were included in the figure to highlight the constancy of the rescue rates over time in
SEA. It is remarkable considering the evolving nature of the decade-long war, and the changing capabilities of the
recovery vehicles and escort aircraft themselves.
2-30
2.1.5.2 Elapsed Time to Capture
Once the staging locations and orbit concepts were established, elapsed time to capture was a
function of four major variables—S/E injury, intensity of the threat surrounding the S/E,
population density of the evasion environment, and distance traveled before ejection after being
hit (see Section 2.1.8.3). The cumulative effect of those variables on the speed of capture can be
seen in the USN results in Figure 2-21. The USN experience in NVN is characterized by more
severe injuries, higher threat, higher population density, and shorter distance traveled between
being hit and the point of ejection.
100
90
80
Percent Captured
70
60
AF Average
50
Navy Average
40
30
20
10
0
1 60 120 180 240 300 360
Minutes
Figure 2-21: Elapsed Time Until Capture (by Service)

(Source: AF data from 7602 AIG, p. 10; Navy data from Every (1), Figure 13)
2.1.6 Types of Recovery Forces

Multiple, disparate efforts were made in SEA to recover downed aircrew. They ranged from
conventional Combat Rescue forces to political pressure to offers of reward for the safe return of
our aircrews. Planners had also hoped to establish an underground network of friendly natives in
NVN and Laos that would assist pilots (as had the French Maquis in World War II), but such an
underground never materialized.56
Friendly guerrilla units operating in southern Laos and CIA Roadwatch teams were also given a
secondary mission of searching for missing and captured airmen. Although the Roadwatch
teams operated until the end of the war, recovery of downed aircrew members was only a
secondary mission for these teams, and they rescued only a small number of people. In 1968, for
example, there were only seven instances in which Roadwatch teams were alerted for possible
recovery activity, and in only two cases were teams actually used.57
Regarding the many methods available at the time, Col William M. Harris, IV, commander of
56
Tilford, p. 68.
57
Tilford, p. 68.
2-31
the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron in 1971 and 1972, noted, “During my tour
rescue efforts have called on every conceivable military resource as well as…Air America,
special ground teams, clandestine operations, frogmen, aircraft carriers, tanks, and so on. There
is no limitation to tactics or concepts to be employed to effect a rescue.”
But despite all of the options available, and Col Harris’ aggressive efforts to use every means
imaginable to recover our airmen, the
reality was that the helicopter emerged as 100%
98.6%
the single, best tool to do the job.
Helicopters performed 98.6 percent of 80%
successful rescues, with ground parties
performing the remaining 1.4 percent (see 60%
Figure 2-22). Further, the vast majority
of recoveries via ground party were not 40%
pre-planned recovery missions, but the
result of opportune arrival of friendly 20%
ground forces in the vicinity of the 1.4%
evader. For rescues performed over 0%
water, the helicopter remained the Helicopter Ground Party
primary means of recovery, performing
86.2 percent of water recoveries. Surface Recovery Mode
vessels (including ships and amphibious
aircraft) accounted for the remaining 13.8 Figure 2-22: Recovery Modes for Land Recoveries
percent of successful water recoveries.58 (Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section I)
2.1.6.1 Dedicated vs. Opportune Recovery Forces

In all, about 20 percent of successful SEA
rescues were accomplished by opportune
forces (Figure 2-23). Early in the 80%
conflict, doctrinal considerations made it
difficult to send rescue forces into 60%
Indochina to support Farm Gate air
operations there. Farm Gate was a
politically sensitive operation, and the 40%
presence of rescue forces would have

highlighted the fact that they were doing 20%
more than "training" missions. At that
time, what Tilford calls the "dark ages of 0%
SAR," there was a misconception on the Dedicated Rescue Opportune Rescue
part of some US Army helicopter
crewmen, shared by their Marine and Figure 2-23: Dedicated vs. Opportune Rescue in
Vietnamese counterparts, that rescue SEA (Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section D)
“entailed nothing more than flying over a
58
Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, “Recovery Means” table.
2-32
downed crewman and picking him up.”59
Even with the development of a robust, specialized rescue force in SEA, “opportune” rescue
forces had a significant impact on recovery rates. As of 1968, the US Army had more than 3,200
helicopters operating in SEA and because of that saturation, “an aircrew member downed in
South Vietnam who declares an emergency [could] usually expect to have an Army helicopter
overhead within minutes after giving his position.”60 In all, US Army helicopters were credited
with rescuing 238 people from SVN and 2 from Laos (most of these saves occurred when one
helicopter moved in to save the crew of a nearby downed chopper).61 In fact, opportune rescue
forces were responsible for the shortest evasion period reported by USAF evaders (20 seconds)
when an Army helicopter that followed a pilot during his parachute descent, landed beside him,
and made the recovery. An account of one of the more sensational opportune recoveries makes
the point that, in a pinch, an evader will be happy to take the first ride home, no matter what it is.
Shortly after landing, the pilot was advised by his flight lead that a pair of Army AH-1 Cobra
helicopters was heading for the area.
“One set down about 20 yards in front of me but couldn’t spot me and
started to lift off. For the first time I exposed myself. I jumped up and
waved my arms and started through the mud and slime toward that
beautiful chopper. All the time I was expecting to get a bullet in the back.
They couldn’t take me inside, since it was a two-seated tandem cockpit, so
they dropped a gun-bay door cover and motioned to me to lie down on that
and hang on to the skid. It was rather windy riding out there, but I was
really relieved to see that Vietnamese countryside going away from me.”62
2.1.6.2 Recovery Vehicles Used

Helicopter recoveries in SEA began with 16 Sikorsky H-34 "Choctaw" helicopters sent to Air
America in 1961. The rescue vehicles in the 1961 inventory (primarily the H-34 Choctaw and
the HH-43 Husky [also called the “Pedro”]) were ill suited for search and rescue in jungles and
mountains. Their most appropriate use was supporting rescue in close proximity to the air base
and for fire fighting.
By 1967, the primary aircrew recovery helicopters were the HH-43F and the HH-3E “Jolly
Green Giant,” off-the-shelf vehicles modified to satisfy the immediate rescue requirements.
Each aircraft had its peculiar deficiencies and neither had the speed or range to rapidly reach
airmen downed deep inside NVN or Northern Laos and the HH-43F was unable to hover over
the higher mountains and karst formations.
When the HH-53 “Super Jolly Green Giant” was introduced in late 1967, it became the mainstay
of Combat Rescue operations in NVN, leaving coverage of SVN and Laos largely to the HH-3
while the numerous HH-43s in Theater retained their traditional taskings of local base rescue.
As early as 1966, the H-3’s deficiencies in combat had been categorized by the aircrew flying
them. Stated deficiencies included:63
59
Tilford, p. 42.
60
Tuckey, p. 3.
61
Tilford, p. 76.
62
Tuckey, p. 31.
63
Tilford, p. 89.
2-33
• Lack of sufficient armor • Limited firepower
• Marginal hover capabilities • Only one 7.62 mm machine gun
The deficiencies were addressed with newer models of the H-3 that included a 650-gallon fuel
tank, and two jettisonable 200-gallon external tanks like those used on the F-100 jet fighter.
With those improvements, the H-3 could attain a combat range of 500 miles (depending on loiter
time and other operational considerations).64 It also had a 240-foot hoist with forest penetrator.
In the HH-53, the rescue service had an aircraft that, with in-flight refueling, had excellent range,
improved defensive systems, and represented the best in rescue technology. Yet there were some
limitations in the system. Described in Tilford as “too large to be an ideal rescue helicopter,” its
size kept it from maneuvering in tight areas like karst valleys and made it an easy target for
enemy gunners.”65 Despite the expansion in capabilities offered by the HH-53, “the 3d ARRGp
had two primary objections to [the HH-53]: the helicopter was too large and too slow.”66 Pilots
complained about the HH-53’s limited field of view and that the position of the rotor mast forced
the pilot to maintain a 5-degree nose up attitude during the hover, thus further restricting vision.
“[HH-53] crew commanders were also concerned that during a hover the starboard side was not
covered by the minigun because if one parajumper was on the jungle penetrator or helping the
survivor aboard, and the other was working the winch, there was no one available to fire the
minigun.”67
Table 2-10: 3 ARRG Aircraft Strength-as of May 196968
Aircraft Type Authorized Assigned
HH-3E 18 20
HH-43B 25 25
HH-43F 7 6
HH-53B 6 6
HH-53C 4 4
HC-130P 11 11
64
Tilford, p. 70.
65
Tilford, p. 93.
66
Francis, p. 51.
67
Tilford, p. 93.
68
Overton, p. 3.
2-34
Table 2-11: SEA Recovery Vehicle Data
Type HH-43 CH-3 HH-3 HH-53
Crew 4 4 4 5
Speed 75 knots 110 knots 120 knots 140 knots
Radius of Action 91 miles 220 miles (unrefueled) 310 miles (external tanks) 290 miles (unrefueled)
Endurance 2+20 3+00 Unlimited with air refueling Unlimited with air refueling
Armament None 1 x M-60 (7.62) 2 x M-60 (.7.62mm) 3 x GAU-2 (7.62mm)
Armor HH-43B: No, HH-43F: Yes No Yes Yes
Hoist Capability 210 feet 240 feet 240 feet 240 feet
Normal Operating
9150 lbs 18000 lbs 18000 lbs 36000 lbs
Weight
Length 25 feet 73 feet 73 feet 88 feet
Combat History Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate Sorties Losses Rate
NVN Unk 1 n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 n/a 246 1 .0041
SVN Unk 9 n/a 9878 1 .0001 7557 2 .0003 1719 3 .0017
Laos 157 0 0 9761 9 .0009 5398 5 .0009 0 0 n/a
1 combat loss reported The HH-53 flew 177
The HH-43 flew 7 sorties in
during operations in sorties in Cambodia with 1
Cambodia with no losses
Thailand loss (.0056 loss rate)
(Discrepancies exist between these combat history data [from Granville Tables 8-11] and that from Table 15 of the same document.)
2-35
Sikorsky HH-34 Choctaw Kaman HH-43B “Huskie”
Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green Giant Sikorsky HH-53D Super Jolly Green Giant
2-36
2.1.6.3 Recovery Support Forces Marshaled
Rescue concepts of operations and tactics evolved quickly in SEA. By 1965, with experienced
helicopter and A-1E RESCORT crews, and with the amphibious, fixed-wing HU-16s operating
out of Da Nang to cover the water rescue mission, a full SARTF was available in SEA. Over the
years, equipment improved and aircraft changed, but the SARTF of 1965 closely resembled that
of 1973 in doctrine, tactics, and procedures.
Rescue efforts generally took precedence over normal strike missions (particularly in the war’s
later years) and aircraft were often diverted from their assigned targets to support the S/E and
rescue helicopters. Battle managers’ willingness to task assets to support Combat Rescue
operations was, at times, astounding. On one mission in December 1969, 336 sorties were flown
over a three-day period to help rescue forces recover a navigator evading capture near Ban
Phanop, Laos, just outside Tchepone. In addition to the A-1 and Jolly Green sorties, the USAF
used 50 F-105, 43 F-4, 4 F-100, plus assorted O-1 and O-2 sorties. The Navy also contributed a
number of A-6 and A-7 sorties.69
Another mission, the rescue of Lt Col Iceal Hambleton, an Electronics Warfare Officer on Bat
21, is perhaps the most famous example of massive airpower used to support Combat Rescue
operations, and served as an indication that sometimes the blunt instrument of massive firepower
simply is not effective. In March, 1972, Hambleton ejected safely from his damaged EB-66, but
landed directly in the middle of a major North Vietnamese army unit sweeping south. A rescue
operation was launched that took precedence over virtually all other air missions being flown in
South Vietnam, and included eight hundred sorties flown by bombers, fighters, forward air
controllers, and helicopters. In the process, six more aircraft were shot down, several others
were severely damaged, ten more airmen were killed, and air operations against the massive
Easter Offensive were disrupted. Bat 21 would evade capture for twelve days before being
rescued by a Navy SEAL, Lieutenant Tom Norris, who received the Medal of Honor for leading
a daring and unorthodox boat-borne recovery. Col Jack Allison, a helicopter pilot since 1951
and a veteran of numerous Combat Rescue missions, said “against opposition like that
encountered in the Bat 21 mission the traditional SARTF was useless.”70
RESCUE ESCORT
During the course of the war, fixed-wing aircraft used most extensively for RESCORT included
the T-28 Trojan, A-1 Skyraider and, toward the end of the conflict, the A-7 jet fighter. By 1967
the A-1E had the highest overall loss rate of any airplane in SEA. Skyraider loss rates per 1,000
sorties ranged from 1.1 in SVN to 1.5 over Laos and up to 6.6 for missions over NVN. The high
loss rate over NVN was directly attributable to the A-1s rescue escort role. For context, NVN
loss rates for the F-105, F-4 and HH-53 were 3.3, 1.6, and 4.1, respectively.71
The A-1 was almost ideally suited for the RESCORT mission because of its ability to fly an
efficient cover pattern in the helicopter’s airspeed regime. They were durable against anti-
aircraft fire; and could also carry and effectively deliver a wide range of suppressive ordnance.
69
Tilford, p. 96.
70
Tilford, p. 118.
71
Granville, Tables 8, 9, and 10.
2-37
The enemy had an excellent understanding of the capabilities of different support aircraft, and
showed little regard for those that were typically equipped with conventional bombs. On the
other hand, they had great fear of the A-1, not only for its special munitions, but also because of
the surgical precision of its machine guns and their effectiveness against individually targeted
soldiers.
Normally, four A-1s in two flights of two were used for RESCORT. The elements, referred to as
“Sandy High” and “Sandy Low,” either flew with the helicopters, or split, sending one element
to the terminal area to provide an OSC and immediate protection to the S/E, and holding one
element back to support the helicopters as they made their way towards the terminal area. When
Sandy Low determined that it was safe for the helicopters, he briefed Sandy High on the
situation in the terminal area who then escorted the helicopter designated as “low bird” into the
zone. The “high bird” typically remained in a safe orbit, ready to advance if the need arose.
Late in the war, the A-1s were retired from this role and were replaced by the A-7. At the time,
rescue helicopter crews expressed their concern:
“The SAR community generally feels the A-7, being a jet aircraft, is not the
optimal aircraft to support this mission. The A-7’s sustained turn radius is
quite small for a jet fighter, but even this radius of turn will occasionally
place the escort pilot in a position where visual contact with the helicopter is
difficult to maintain. Tests plus combat experience have shown that less
than two or three miles of visibility will negate the ability of the A-7 to
effectively perform the escort mission.”72
The bomb load of the A-7 was theoretically twice that of the Skyraider. However, this was less
relevant for the rescue escort mission because the ordnance load typically included special
munitions rather than a large load of 500-pound bombs. In the rescue configuration the first
three rescue escort aircraft, Sandys 1, 2, and 3, usually carried two CBU-38 cluster bombs, two
LAU-3 launcher pods packed with high explosive rockets, and two additional LAU-3 pods filled
with white phosphorus rockets. The fourth plane in the rescue escort flight, Sandy 4, carried two
CBU-38s and a pair of CBU-12 cluster smoke bombs.
ON-SCENE COMMANDER
The term “On-Scene Commander” describes a specific role filled by a player in the terminal area
of an ongoing rescue mission. Although any aircraft in the area could assume the role, it
typically fell to the Sandy aircraft when they were available. In those cases, one of the pilots in
the Sandy Low element acted as OSC. In the terminal area, the OSC determined the location and
condition of the S/E, assessed enemy defenses, and marshaled/controlled forces to suppress the
threat until it was safe for the helicopters to attempt the pick-up. If Sandy Low required
additional support, he coordinated with HC-130 Crown aircraft to redirect airborne fighters to
launch fueled/armed aircraft that (depending on availability) were on standby to support the
mission. Ultimately, the OSC determined exactly when, and under what conditions, the pickup
attempt would be made.
72
Every (2), p. 31.
2-38
It was not an accident that OSC duties, arguably the most difficult to be found in anywhere SEA,
were assigned to Sandy aircraft when they were available. The intense demands of the mission
required aircrew that were specifically trained to meet those demands. Inevitably, as described
in a Pararescueman’s End of Tour report, when the training was insufficient, mission success
suffered:
“Another area I feel deserves attention is the coordination and tactics
between the A-1 Sandy aircraft and the rescue helicopters….The SAR
aircrews felt that it took a number of SAR missions to produce a good
Sandy pilot and even more missions to qualify a Sandy lead, which is one
of the most important elements involved in a combat recovery. By flying
actual SAR missions on a day-to-day basis, these pilots received training
that could never be obtained by [previous] pilots that were required to fly
four different types of A-1 missions. The lack of mission experience by the
A-1s caused errors in timing or mission sequencing. This often manifested
itself as indecision on when to bring the Jolly in to attempt the pick-up….A-
1’s flying solely for SAR support were in the best position to get the type of
SAR experience needed. Further lack of A-1 experience led to the
development of an over-cautious attitude among the SAR forces.”73
The importance of dedicated training of rescue forces in Combat Rescue doctrine and tactics, and
the value in a primary focus on that mission, was consistently emphasized among those that
operated in SEA. It is also a theme that emerged as universal across all conflicts studied for this
report.
OTHER SUPPORTING FORCES

Beginning in 1970, twin-engine OV-10 "Broncos" began working with the SARTF as forward
air controllers (FAC). Because of their speed, armament that included four 7.62mm machine
guns as well as a rocket or gun pod, and great visibility, the Jolly Green pilots preferred the OV-
10 to the slower, unarmed O-ls and O-2s. The FAC was often the first aircraft in the area and
assumed the OSC role until the arrival of Sandy Low. Once Sandy Low arrived, OSC duties
were handed off and the FAC assisted by directing fighter-bombers if they were needed. As the
number of A-1s was reduced, the role of the OV-10 in the SARTF expanded.
During our involvement in SEA, just about every imaginable combat capability was assessed for
its ability to support the rescue mission. The idea of using AC-130 Spectre gunships in rescue
work can be traced to an incident in late 1972. In December 1972, an AC-130 was diverted from
its patrol along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to help an HH-53 search for the crew of another Specter
gunship shot down over Laos, pinpointing the survivors with the AC-130’s night vision devices.
The AC-130’s effectiveness in support of the rescue mission, deriving primarily from its loiter
time, remarkable firepower and ability to do command and control (C2), led to establishment of
a Special Operations search and rescue integration training program.74 The AC-130 would not
again be seen in such a support role until August, 1995, when the Spectre assisted in the
(fruitless) search for Ebro 33, shot down during Operation Deny Flight (see Section 2.3).
73
Farrior, p. 2
74
Tilford, pp. 135 and 136.
2-39
2.1.7 Terminal Area Characteristics
2.1.7.1 Physical Environment

In SEA, 80 percent of USAF parachute landings were made on land while about 20 percent
ended up in the water. Almost the reverse was true for the Navy, with 73 percent of parachute
landings putting the aircrew in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the remaining 27 percent onto land
(frequently near the North Vietnamese coastline, the worst possible location for evasion). Figure
2-24 describes the distribution of landing environments and outcomes among downed USAF
aircrew.
Of the land environments encountered, Figure 2-24 also shows that slightly more than half of the
S/Es that ejected landed in a wooded area. In almost half of those cases the survivor became
hung-up in the trees, some as much as 200 feet off the ground. Figure 2-25 shows the results of
tree landings in SEA:
2-40
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Trees-Wooded
Open Ground
Swamp/Marsh/Rice
Dense Vegetation
Hills/Slopes
Rocks/Karst/Stumps
Side of Cliff
Crevice
Villiage
Paddy
Figure 2-24: Survivor/Evader Evasion Environment

(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section C)
80.0% Of survivors hung-up in trees:
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Remained in Tree
Survivor hung-up in
Descended/Fell/Blown
Survivor was not hung-
trees
up in trees
from Tree
Figure 2-25: Results of Parachute Landings into Trees in SEA

2-41
2.1.7.2 Locating the Survivor/Evader in the Terminal Area
Although data describing how each isolating event was detected does not exist in summary form,
anecdotal accounts and sensor technology available at the time suggest that radio calls from the
distressed aircraft and wingman were the primary method of notifying command and control
centers of a loss. Once on the ground, evaders had a myriad of options for signaling their
location. In thick jungle areas, however, most were ineffective. By every account, the survival
radio was the most important piece of equipment available to S/E in SEA. Figure 2-26
summarizes the types of signal devices used in the terminal area by aircrew that were
successfully rescued.
Percent of Rescues Device was Used
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Survival Radio
Survivor Visually Located
Mod 0 MK-13 and other flares
Personnel Parachute
Pengun Flare
Personnel Locator Beacon
Sighted Aircraft Wreckage
Signal Mirror
Waved Objects
Strobe Light
Compass
Tracers (.38 Cal)
Flashlight**
Sighted Life Preserver/Raft
Aircraft Radio
Dye Marker
Signal Panel
Figure 2-26: Types of Signalling Devices Used in Successful SEA Rescues

(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section H)
2-42
2.1.7.3 Recovery Modes
Among AF aircrews rescued in SEA, the rescue hoist was the primary means for their extraction
from the terminal area (see Figure 2-27). Depending on the time of year and rainfall, even flat
areas like rice paddies could require a hoist recovery. Some of the difficulties involved with
hoist recoveries in rugged terrain are described in this debriefing of a rescued pilot:
“…I saw that I was going to land in the trees, so I discontinued
steering, put my feet together, shielded my face, and prepared for a
parachute landing fall or tree penetration. I went through the tops
of the trees and my chute hit the trees and hung up, causing a very
gentle tree landing. I was six feet from the side of a karst face, and
although I could not see the valley floor due to the dense foliage, I
estimated it was 100 to 200 feet below me. There was also a ledge
of karst about 25 feet below me.”75
After an H-34 tried unsuccessfully to get a horse collar to the pilot through the trees, an HH-3
equipped with a forest penetrator arrived in the valley. At that point, the recovery continued:
“…the Jolly Green moved in with a PJ on the hoist. The PJ was
unable to get to me due to the trees and because the refueling probe
of the helicopter forced it to remain too far from the karst face. I
used my helmet and oxygen line as a lasso; the PJ grabbed it and
reeled himself over to me. The PJ was sitting on two legs of the
penetrator and was strapped in, with another strap ready to put
around me. He lowered the third seat but I was unsuccessful in
getting on it. I felt secure enough from the strap under my arms
and did not attempt to use the seat any more. The PJ was on the
radio and called to have us raised a foot or two so that he could cut
the shroud lines and back pack which were still connected to me.
It took ten minutes to cut all 28 lines. He then swung us away
from the tree and we banged into another tree before being hoisted
up to the chopper.”76
The problem the H-34 had using a horse collar in a foliated area highlights why the forest
penetrator was the extraction device of choice, used in more than 90 percent of the successful
hoist recoveries (see Figure 2-28).
Bringing S/Es aboard the helicopter via a landing or while in a low hover were the next most
frequent means of recovery (used in 34 percent of cases). Unfortunately, the data do not describe
how that 34 percent was divided between landings and low hovers.
75
Seig, p. 48.
76
Seig, p. 49.
2-43
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Hoist Landed/Hovered Rope/Other* Unknown
TOTAL 60.7% 34.0% 1.8% 3.4%
63-65 63.2% 36.8% 0.0% 0.0%
66 70.6% 27.5% 2.0% 0.0%
67 66.7% 31.7% 1.6% 0.0%
68 68.1% 25.7% 0.0% 6.2%
69 55.4% 36.6% 3.6% 4.5%
70 59.7% 35.1% 2.6% 2.6%
71 42.4% 50.8% 1.7% 5.1%
Figure 2-27: Land Recovery Means Used in SEA Combat

100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Forest Penetrator Sling (horse collar) Stokes Litter/Basket Unspecified
Figure 2-28: Hoist Insertion/Extraction Devices Used in SEA Combat

2-44
2.1.8 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation

POPULATION DENSITY OF THE EVASION ENVIRONMENT
A study of returned American prisoners of war compared time on the ground for downed aircrew
and the average population densities of their aircraft incident locale.77 The results showed a
dramatic difference in evasion potential between the highest and lowest areas of population
density. Table 2-12 and Figure 2-29 show comparative evasion times for each population
density area and the percentage in each area captured within 30 minutes.
USN experience is consistent with that conclusion. Because most USN aircrew downed over
land were in heavily populated areas near the coast of NVN (areas with population densities that
frequently exceeded 520 persons per square mile) it should be expected that evasion times or
Navy aircrew that were captured would be substantially less than the POW population as a
whole. That proved to be the case. Within 20 minutes of landing, 80 percent of USN POWs had
been captured,78 versus 62 percent of USAF POWs (shot down across the entire SEA area).
Table 2-12: Impact of Population Density on Aircrew Capture79
< 130 Persons per 130 Persons per 520 Persons per
Square Mile Square Mile Square Mile
Percent Distribution of Captures by 23% 38% 39%
Population Density (62 of 274 RPWs) (104 of 274 RPWs) (108 of 274 RPWs)
Percent of Evaders in Each Area

52% 61% 76%
Captured Within 30 Minutes
100%
Cumulative Percent Captured
90%
80%
Figure 2-29: Air Force
70%
Evasion Times by
Population Density 60%
(first 6 hours) 50%
(Source: 7602 AIG, 40%
520 per sq mile
Section C, Figure 2) 30%
130 per sq mile
20% <130 per sq mile
10% AF Average
0%
1 Min
6 hrs
10 min
20 min
30 min
40 min
50 min
60 min
Evasion Time
77
7602 AIG, p. 19.
78
Every (1), Figure 13.
79
7602 AIG, Section C, Tables 1 through 3.
2-45
TERRAIN
The characteristics of the parachute landing area were directly related to time-to-capture and
survival. Although high trees, rocky terrain, and thick jungle vegetation were responsible for
some parachute landing injuries, the thick vegetation served to give a survivor much better cover
to avoid enemy detection. Conversely, if the survivor was severely injured and unable to
communicate, it could also be responsible for his not being found by either friendly or enemy
forces. The open, populated coastal areas generally resulted in a survivor’s immediate capture,
whereas the heavy thick jungle areas and open ocean favored recovery.80 Open water landings,
while resulting in a high rescue rate, also resulted in some severe parachute entanglement
problems.
In any source that is referenced, the correlation between parachute landings in open terrain and
high rates of capture appears to be very strong. An interesting exception is from the perspective
of those that were actually captured. When interviewed after their release, only 5.4 percent of
returned POWs cited “inadequate cover” as the primary reason for their evasion failure. Figure
2-30 shows aircrew status by parachute landing terrain.
Table 2-13 describes the impact of topography and foliage on rescue of USN aircrew in SEA.
The statistics include only those aircrew known to be available for rescue following combat loss
(i.e. instances of KIA and MIA are excluded).
Table 2-13: USN Aircrew Status by Terrain Type (excluding MIA and KIA) 81
% %
Terrain Type
Recovered POW
Open Ocean 96% 4%
In Shore, Open Areas, Lakes, Marshes, Rice Paddies, Populated Areas 15% 85%
Thick Jungle, Trees, Heavy Vegetation 91% 9%
Often, the jungle canopy was so thick in SEA that the survivor could not see the rescue aircraft
even when it was in the immediate vicinity, and injuries often prevented the survivor from
moving to an open area that would facilitate location and rescue. If a rescue was attempted in an
area of rugged karst terrain with steep, sheer rock walls of high trees, it was often difficult to get
the helicopter into a safe hover location. During retrieval, re-entanglement with the vegetation
was a problem.82
Interaction between terrain and the recovery vehicle itself was often the origin of problems.
During the actual recovery, radios were practically useless due to the helicopter noise; requiring
helicopter crews to rely almost completely on hand signals.83 Helicopter downwash was also a
problem both over land and over water (see Section 2.1.2.6 for an explanation of windblast, or
80
Every (2), p. 18.
81
Every (2), p. 18.
82
Every (2), p. 23.
83
Every (2), p. 24.
2-46
Q-force). In the cases recoveries from the water, helicopter downwash “was often severe and
hampered the recovery effort.”84 Sometimes, as in the 1964 case of an attempted recovery by a
relatively lightweight UH-1, the downwash doomed the recovery by actually drowning the
rescuee.85 The interference of helicopter downwash during land rescues was no less severe. The
force of the downwash would blow down trees and branches, knock survivors out of trees, and
create a harsh environment beneath the helicopter during hoist recoveries.
100%
90%
Village
80%
Percent of Total
70% Rocks/Karst/Hills
60%
Swamp/Marsh/Rice
50%
Paddy
40%
Open Ground
30%
20% Trees-Wooded
10%
0%
Recovered POW KIA/MIA
Figure 2-30: Aircrew Status by Parachute Landing Terrain

(Source: KIA/MIA/POW data from Every [5], p. 24; ‘Recovered’ data from Directorate
of Aerospace Safety, Section C)
DARKNESS AND WEATHER

In 1964 the HH-43F flew its first night mission picking up a Vietnamese A-1 pilot.86 Despite
that early success, a viable night Combat Rescue capability never developed. In the early 1970s,
an experimental night imaging system was installed on several HH-53s operating in SEA, but it
was rarely used (although it was credited with enabling one night rescue in a remote area of Laos
in December 1972). All in all, night efforts were rarely attempted and virtually always
unsuccessful.87 Because so few night rescues were attempted, darkness is only rarely listed as a
cause for mission failure. When darkness was listed as a reason for mission failure, it was
generally because a rescue attempt begun in the late afternoon had to be abandoned because of
darkness before the aircrew was recovered.
Weather is cited as a causal factor in only 6 percent of cases where a rescue mission was
launched and the S/E was subsequently captured. Poor visibility and low ceilings in the terminal
84
Every (2), p. 24.
85
Tilford, p. 43.
86
Tilford, p. 61.
87
Tilford, p. 72.
2-47
area were typical of the weather that was described as contributing to rescue failure.88 While this
data may be of interest, it must be remembered that the “causes of failure,” and other information
from the 7602 Air Intelligence Group (AIG) source, are based on the opinion of the individual
that was captured and not the crews attempting the recovery.
Figures 2-31 and 2-32 show the problems complicating successful rescues in SEA for both the
USAF and USN.
88
7602 AIG, p. 7.
2-48
Percent of Cases Su
rv
ivo
C T In r R Percent of Cases
Ph Pro om opo No ad e
0%
5%
10%
15%
ys bl m gr
i e u a R eq qui
ua red
es
R cal m B nic phy
es L a cu te
e Su A s s
cu im oar tio D rv is
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
e ita din ns ev ivo tan

Eq tio g ic H r c
ui n-S RV La Co e o ost Tra e
pm u ck m n i
R litie inin
He en rviv of m d ec s g
t F or C i ov in
I n lico a om ffic e Ar
ad pt Da ilur m ultie ry A ea
Pa eq er D rkn e D i
ev s (e rcra
ra ua o es ic qu ft*
ch cy wn s e
R ut /L w Po on ipm
V/ e ac as or
C En k h
Pe en
re ta of
Pe SA ne t)
wm ng R ne R F R tr
le V tra or oto ator
W an
m to c
I n eig Su Ass W en rE eP rW
ad ht rv i e t nt ro as
eq /D ivo st H ath D ang ced h
Ha r
ua ag A es er r en l ur
m se ed e
pe R cy o (no ctio itan Ju in T s
re V f R t d ns cy ng re
d F / le e
by ac es ue t Pan
c
En G s
t o ta
n H r
Pe or ue c ic o ow
D gle ist th
d
rs (po P hu ar
on o er te Fa
in
(Source: Every [4], p. 26)

kn
al r p so )
Su ro nn es P ilu
s/ ara re
Ph I n rv ce el Ba ch
ys ad Ta d u
ic eq
Eq d u
ui re) ng W te
al pm le H
ea
Li uat R Sm d
m e F V en Pe ea ther
ita R ire F t Pe ok n vy
S
(Source: Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Section L)
tio es /E ailu ne e O etr

c
n- u xp re tra bs ato eas
R e to c r
es E los r Z ure Ca
cu qu ion ip d b
e ipm pe Su le
Pe e r M rv
rs nt al ivor
fu
on nc
ne tio
l n
Figure 2-31: Problems Complicating Successful Rescues in SEA- AF Experience
Figure 2-32: Problems Complicating Successful Rescues in SEA- Navy Experience
2-49
2.1.8.2 Threat
A study of US aircrew taken
prisoner in SEA concluded that
“the principal cause for failure to
be rescued or evade was the
immediacy of capture or the Enemy No
proximity of enemy forces.”89 In Proximity Contact
30.3 percent of USAF POW cases, 80% 8%
a rescue effort was not even
attempted because the shootdown Weather
occurred in a high threat area that 6%
prohibited any realistic chance of
successful recovery.90 In those Darkness
cases, it is doubtful that any 4%
improvement in rescue reaction Injuries
2%
time could have changed the
outcome. Figure 2-33 shows that
for cases where rescues were
unsuccessfully attempted, enemy Figure 2-33: Reasons for Failure of Viable Rescue
proximity was considered as the Missions in SEA
primary cause of mission failure in (Source: 7602 AIG, p. 5)
about 80 percent of those cases.91
2.1.8.3 Time From Emergency to Ejection

Ejections initiated immediately after being hit decreased that aircrew's chances of successful
rescue in several ways. First, it caused ejection in an area of known enemy activity; second, the
immediacy of the event often led to a poor posture in the ejection seat, causing injuries that
hampered evasion; third, it resulted in ejection at higher airspeeds, causing more severe (often
debilitating) flail injuries; and fourth, it often prevented communication with wingmen or rescue
forces before ejection (of those aircrew that became POWs, 47 percent were unable to transmit
prior to ejection).
The immediacy of aircraft kill is directly related to the country of hit and, by extension, threat
level. For example, in NVN 63 percent of all aircraft lost flew more than 5 miles after hit; the
corresponding percentages for SVN and Laos are only 32 percent and 46 percent, respectively.
It appears that the pilot's willingness to remain with his severely damaged aircraft is strongly
dependent on the geographical area in which he is hit.92 Because of the threat in NVN, pilots
tended to stay with their aircraft as long as possible to increase their chance of recovery. Rescue
experience confirms the pilots' suspicions—pilot recovery rates were also directly related to
country of hit, as well as distance flown after sustaining a lethal hit. For example, the recovery
89
7602 AIG, p. vi.
90
7602 AIG, p. 4.
91
7602 AIG, Table 1.
92
Hewett, p. xii.
2-50
rate for pilots of aircraft hit in NVN who fly more than 5 miles after hit is triple the recovery rate
for those who fly less than 5 miles.93 Of all USN aircrew forced to eject due to combat damage,
only 47.5 percent were able to delay ejection more than 60 seconds after being hit (Table 2-14).
Significantly, when only the subgroup of USN aircrew that were successfully rescued is
examined, 87 percent of those aircrew had been able to delay their ejection beyond 60 seconds
after being hit.94
Table 2-14: Distribution of Ejection Delays After Hit (USN)95
1-10 sec 11-20 sec 21-60 sec 1-10 min 10-30 min 30-60 min
% of Total 24.7% 5.6% 22.2% 35.8% 9.9% 1.7%
Figure 2-34 vividly illustrates the association between delayed ejection and improved recovery
rates. Of the USN aircrew losses represented in the figure, the mean time from emergency to
ejection among those that were captured was 1 minute.96 In SEA, even if a Navy aircraft had
time to get away from an inland target, the aircrew generally headed for the coast to reach the
“feet wet” safe area. If they were unable to reach the safety of the open ocean, they were forced
to eject over the more heavily populated coastal areas of NVN. Conversely, USAF aircraft
would generally head back to bases in Thailand; and if forced to eject, the aircrew would eject
over more densely vegetated portions of NVN or Laos.97 In those cases, although the range and
response time was increased for rescue forces, recovery rates were higher. In NVN, a pilot who
was able to travel at least 50 miles after being hit was more than seven times more likely to be
recovered. Figure 2-35 shows the loss outcome by country and distance traveled after hit.
20 18.6
18
16
13.8
14
12 10.3 10.6
Minutes
Recovered Aircrew
10
POW
8
6
4 2.4 2.1
1.6
2 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.2
0
A-4 A-6 A-7 F-4 F-8 RA-5C
Aircraft Type
Figure 2-34: Mean Ejection Time for Navy Aircrew in NVN

(Source: Every [1], p. 7)
93
Hewett, p. xv.
94
Every (4), p. 7.
95
Every (2), p. 9.
96
Every (2), p. 9.
97
Every (2), p.16.
2-51
Rescue Status vs Distance-NVN
100%
90%
80%
70%
POW-Returned
60% KIA
50% MIA
40% POW
Recovered
30%
20%
10%
0%
< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nm
Distance Traveled from Location of Hit
Rescue Status vs Distance-SVN
100%
90%
80%
70%
POW-Returned
60% KIA
50% MIA
40% POW
Recovered
30%
20%
10%
0%
< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nm
Distance Traveled From Location of Hit
Rescue Status vs Distance-Laos
100%
90%
80%
70%
POW-Returned
60% KIA
50% MIA
40% POW
Recovered
30%
20%
10%
0%
< 5nm 5-50 nm > 50 nm
Distance Traveled fom Location of Hit
Figure 2-35: Loss Outcome by Country and Distance Traveled After Hit
(Source: Hewett, Tables XXIX-XXXI)
2-52
2.1.8.4 Survivor/Evader Injuries
Injuries were cited as the primary cause of evasion failure in 12.4 percent of USAF POW cases.98
More than 75 percent of all injured S/E that were captured were able to evade for only 60
minutes or less. In contrast, the population of uninjured evaders did not cross the 75 percent
threshold until after twelve hours of evasion (Figure 2-37). Certainly, the absence of injuries
plays a very significant role in an evader’s ability to remain available for rescue.
Beyond being a factor in evasion success, S/E injuries also affected the rescue operation itself. A
1980 study of USN evaders confirmed what might seem intuitive—that “the time necessary to
extract a survivor was almost directly related proportionate to the extent of the injuries to the
survivor.”99 Inevitably, what that meant was longer orbit and hover times required in the
terminal area. Compounding the exposure of the helicopter during recovery of injured S/Es,
when Pararescue specialists were deplaned to assist, it frequently meant that one or more of the
helicopters guns were unmanned.
Those aircrew that were captured were more likely than those that were successfully rescued to
have experienced a more severe aircraft emergency during the incident leading to the aircraft’s
loss. As described in Section 2.1.2.6, the POW group were forced to eject sooner, resulting in an
overall mean ejection speed (for the POW group studied in Every [1] of 407 knots. This
compares with an overall speed of 302 knots for aircrew that were successfully recovered in
combat, and a speed of approximately 213 knots for non-combat ejections occurring during the
same approximate time period.100
The severity of aircraft emergency facing those who eventually became POWs is also suggested
by their inability to control their aircraft. Among USN pilots studied, the recovered group was
4.5 times more likely to have a nose-up or straight-and-level attitude at the time of ejection than
the POW group.101 Such catastrophic emergencies, and the consequent ejections, tended to
produce more (and more severe) aircrew injuries.
98
7602 AIG, p. 9.
99
Every (2), p. 22.
100
Every (1), p. 7.
101
Every (1), Table 4, p. 7.
2-53
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% None
Percent
50% Minor Injury

40% Major Injury
30%
20%
10%
0%
Navy POW
POW
Air Force
Recovered
Navy
Recovered
Air Force
Figure 2-36: Distribution of Injuries Among POW and Rescued Aircrew
Groups (Source: Navy data and AF POW data in Every [1] p. 12; AF
Recovered data in Hewett p. 43)
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
Injured
50.0% Not Injured
Average
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
0 to 1 min 2 to 30 min 31 to 60 1:01 to 12 12:01 to 48 48:01+hrs
min hrs hrs
Figure 2-37: Influence on Injuries on Cumulative Capture Rates

(Source: 7602 AIG, Figure 1)
2-54
2.1.9 Recovery Force Losses
Rescue force planners assumed from the beginning that rescue force attrition would be high.
Brigadier General Adriel Williams, Commander of the Air Rescue Service, in a letter to CSAF,
Gen Curtis Lemay, cited Air Rescue Service Programming Plan 563, which estimated that the
HH-43B/F force would suffer a 40 percent attrition rate in the first year of combat operation.
Attrition rates matched the estimates, but not in the way that General Williams had probably
anticipated—three HH-43Bs and two HH-43Fs were indeed damaged or destroyed, but they
were lost on the ground during the Viet
Cong attack at Bien Hoa. Captured
In the end, more than 190 helicopters 3%
from all services were lost performing
rescue in SEA, including 47 assigned to Killed
ARRS.102 Of the 178 USAF rescue
crewmembers aboard helicopters lost in 29%
combat, 29 percent were killed outright
(see Table 2-15).
A review of H-3 damage incidents in
SEA from 1965 to 1970 suggests that, Rescued
in cases where the enemy inflicted Missing
combat damage, it resulted in mission
64%
4%
termination (by destruction, forced
landing, or mission abort) in about 40
percent of cases. In the remaining 60
Figure 2-38: Results of ARRS Rescue Helicopter
percent of cases where H-3 combat
Crew Losses in SEA
damage was received, neither aircraft
loss nor mission abort was reported.104
Table 2-15: AF Helicopter Losses (Aircraft and Crew)103

Aircraft
Aircraft Rescued Missing Killed Captured
Losses
CH-3 14 40 3 9 3
CH-53 2 6 0 2 0
HH-3 10 26 3 11 0
HH-43 10 24 0 4 3
HH-53 9 18 1 25 0
TOTAL 45 114 7 51 6
64.6% 3.9% 28.7% 3.4%
102
AF data from Granville, Table 15; Other service data from Air Combat Command, “Rescue and Recovery”
worksheet. The 47 ARRS losses include two HU-16 airplanes. The USAF also lost 13 UH-1 helicopters in combat
(although not necessarily while performing rescue missions). In the HU-16 incidents, 4 men were rescued, 7 MIA, 2
KIA, and none captured; the totals for the UH-1 incidents is 40 rescued, 0 MIA, 11 KIA, and none captured.
103
104
JTCG/ME, p. xii.
2-55
2.1.9.1 Recovery Force Losses by Mission Phase
Fixed-wing combat loss experience described in Section 2.1.2.4 is not dissimilar to the combat
loss experience of "Rescue and Recovery" helicopters in SEA105. Side-by-side comparison of
the two categories is interesting—it shows that helicopters were no more likely to be lost than
other combat aircraft (in terms of loss rate per 1000 sorties), and that the losses generally did not
occur during the enroute phase, but were concentrated in the terminal area. For losses where the
mission phase was reported, those data count 91 percent of "Rescue and Recovery" losses as
occurring in the target (or terminal) area, compared with 83 percent of fixed-wing losses (see
Figure 2-39). That comparison suggests that neither low altitude operations nor slow enroute
airspeed alone are significant determinants of aircraft loss (even in the face of SEA's ubiquitous
and lethal AAA/automatic weapons threat
environment). Rather it is the combination
of forced exposure to the threat and the
terminal/target area’s restricted or
predictable flight profile that is likely the
source such a significant increase in risk
Enroute
(the significance of this important concept is
discussed in detail in Section 3.4.3). Terminal
Those data are consistent with 190 CH/HH-

3 combat damage incidents examined by
JTCG/ME. In that study, only 10.8 percent
of incidents occurred during the “enroute”
phase. The remaining 89.2 percent of
Figure 2-39: Rescue Helicopter Losses by
incidents were attributed to mission phases
Mission Phase
associated with the terminal area
(Source: ACC XP/SAS Worksheet)
(“hovering,” “orbiting,” “on ground,”
“landing,” “taking off,” “on water”).106
2.1.9.2 Recovery Force Losses by Threat System Type

Of the helicopters that served the French (prior to US involvement in Vietnam), virtually all
combat damage was caused by small arms fire.107 As a result, the French took certain
precautions including institution of a 3,000-foot minimum cruise altitude to keep helicopters well
out of range of most rifle and machine gun fire. Use of “high-bird/low-bird” tactics in the
terminal area (see Section 2.1.1.2) suggests that that tactic remained effective for the duration of
the conflict. On the other hand, with the arrival of MANPADS in SEA, those tactics would have
surely evolved had the war continued.
Improvements in rescue aircraft helped somewhat (for example, the use of titanium armor in
vital engine and hydraulic areas improved the aircraft’s chances when it encountered small arms
or light anti-aircraft fire) during the enroute portions of the mission. However, in a hover over a
105
XP/SAS, “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet.
106
JTCG/ME, p. 102.
107
There is one documented case of helicopter loss during air refueling by a surprise attack by a North Vietnamese
Mig fighter. That loss is not reflected in Figure 2-40.
2-56
survivor “it was still quite assailable.”108 That susceptibility is vividly illustrated by the fact that
more than 90 percent of rescue helicopter losses took place during terminal area operations that
represented only a fraction of the total mission time.
70%
60%
50%
Percent
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Weapons
Automatic
Small Arms &
weapon
RPG/exploding
Ground Fire
Unidentified
Rocket
Mortar
AAA
Figure 2-40: Causes of SEA Rescue Helicopter Combat Loss Incidents
(Source: Air Combat Command, “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet)
2.1.9.3 Battle Damage to Recovery Vehicles

In terms of system vulnerability, the XP-SAS data shows that, among all rescue aircraft types,
the aircrew themselves were the most vulnerable system, cited in 66 percent of incidents leading
to loss of the rescue aircraft (see Figure 2-41). Engines and fuel systems were the next most
vulnerable systems, receiving damage in 24 percent and 18 percent of cases, respectively.
A JTCG/ME review of H-3 systems damaged by enemy fire from 1965 to 1970 showed that for
H-3 variants in SEA, the overall probability of kill per hit (Pk/h) was 0.021. When forced
landings kills are included in the total, Pk/h = 0.036.109 One noteworthy finding of the study was
that the average number of hits per incident was 3.8—nearly twice the number of hits per
incident reported in previous studies on transport and armed escort helicopters.110 More than 90
percent of those hits took place when the helicopter was moving at less than 75 knots, and the
most frequent listed phase of flight when hit was “hovering.” While hovering, the average
number of hits per incident was 5.5. The main rotor system was involved in the greatest number
of damage incidents, and suffered the second highest number of actual hits, although damage to
the main rotor system resulted in “relatively few” adverse reactions.111 The JTCG/ME data also
gives an indication the impact of battle damage on mission performance (Figure 2-42).
108
Tilford, p. 92.
109
JTCG/ME, p. xii.
110
JTCG/ME, p. ix. The average for HH-53s (operating mostly in NVN) was 7.5 hits per incident.
111
JTCG/ME, p. 22
2-57
70%
Percent of Losses 60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Un re
n
on
ne
em
ls
l
m
sm s
er
m
ne
ow
lic
ro
te
te
th
si
gi
on
ct
st
au
nt
kn
we Sys
/O
ys
En
is
ru
Sy
Co
rs
dr
in
rS
St
Pe
Hy
ra
el
il
an
ht
to
rT
Fu
ig
Ro
Tr
Fl
Po
Figure 2-41: Systems Damaged in Rescue Helicopter Combat Loss Incidents
(Source: Air Combat Command, XP-SAS “Rescue and Recovery” worksheet)
100%
90%
80% No Mission Impact
70%
60%
Mission Aborts
50%
40%
30% Crashes & Forced
20% Landings
10%
0%
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
TOTAL (65-70)
Figure 2-42: Impact of Combat Damage on CH/HH-3 Missions

(Source: JTCG/ME, p. xii)
2-58
2.1.9.4 Combat Experience at Koh Tang
On May 12, 1975, the American-registered cargo ship Mayaguez was taken at sea by Cambodian
naval forces, and the ship’s crew was brought ashore and held on Koh Tang Island. US reaction
included a plan to land up to 600 US Marines on Koh Tang to recover the crew, setting into
motion a remarkable series of events that is as sensational as it is instructive. Although it was
not a Combat Rescue mission of the type described elsewhere in this report, a review of certain
operational aspects is germane to understanding helicopter risk and the effectiveness of certain
risk-reduction measures.
A detailed description of the entire battle on Koh Tang Island is beyond the scope of this report,
but one must know that the insertion of the Marines into various landing zones (LZ), and their
subsequent extraction was in the face of significant enemy opposition. In that environment,
experience at Koh Tang Island is particularly useful due to the simultaneous employment of
Combat Rescue and Special Operations helicopters with different combinations of armor,
armament, training, fixed-wing support, and vulnerability reduction systems. In an excellent
analysis of the battle, Jeffrey Eggers’ “Analysis of Helicopter Operations in the Battle of Koh
Tang” looked at each of those variables to assess their impact on helicopter mission success and
survivability.
For helicopter operations in contested areas, Eggers identified significant operational value in the
use of dedicated ground attack assets to reduce enemy “anti-helicopter” defenses before
commencing terminal area operations. Consistent with helicopter loss-rate trends in the terminal
area, Eggers also found significant tactical value in coordinated defense suppression during the
terminal area operation, and for RVs equipped with armor and vulnerability reduction features.112
ARMORED VS. UNARMORED HELICOPTERS
Twenty-seven helicopter runs were made on the island of Koh Tang during the one-day battle.
Of those runs, eighteen were by armored HH-53s (from the 40th ARRS), and nine were by
unarmored CH-53s (from the 21st SOS). It should also be noted that the armored aircraft were
also equipped with an additional machine gun employed from the HH-53’s aft ramp. Of the
eighteen armored passes, there were no helicopter losses. Fourteen of the eighteen passes (78
percent) left the helicopter in a mission capable status, and four resulted in successful recovery of
the helicopter but in an “unusable” status. Of the nine unarmored passes, three aircraft were lost,
three remained mission capable, and three were recovered but unusable. Using those criteria,
experience on Koh Tang Island suggests a strong advantage to the armor and armament available
on the HH-53s.
DEFENSE SUPPRESSION IN THE LANDING ZONE
Although the data were insufficient to separately assess the effectiveness of defense suppression
activity before and during the terminal area operations, Eggers suggests that the data “strongly
support” the conclusion that the combination of LZ preparation and suppression during the
112
In the case of the Battle for Koh Tang, the vulnerability reduction feature assessed was fire suppressant foam in
external fuel tanks. While the example is specific, the concepts certainly apply to vulnerability reduction measures
in general.
2-59
terminal area operation greatly helped the helicopters in terms of both survivability and mission
success.113 It should be noted that the effectiveness of defense-suppression activity was
influenced by the helicopter crew’s ability to anticipate, understand, and (at times) direct that
activity. Of the forces at Koh Tang, the 40th ARRSq crews were experienced in those operations
while the Special Operators, because of their different employment concept, were not.
Of the twenty-seven helicopter attempts to reach an LZ on Koh Tang, fourteen were performed
with fixed-wing defense suppression support. Of those fourteen attempts, twelve (86 percent)
resulted in aircraft that remained mission capable, two aircraft (14 percent) were recovered
unusable, and none were lost. The results of the thirteen runs that did not have coordinated
defense suppression available, five (38 percent) yielded mission capable aircraft, five resulted in
a helicopter that was recovered unusable, and three helicopters (23%) were lost.
In the end, experience at Koh Tang, while not the typical Combat Rescue mission, seems a
microcosm for the general Combat Rescue experience in SEA. It shows that integration and
training with fixed-wing support assets matters, and that armoring aircrew stations and critical
flight components significantly impacts both mission success and helicopter survivability.
113
For the purpose of his analysis, Eggers defines Mission Success as whether or not a run on an LZ resulted in
successful insertion/extraction of Marines in the LZ.
2-60
2.2 Operation Desert Storm (Iraq 1991)

On August 2 1990, Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein invaded the sovereign nation of Kuwait and
claimed it as an Iraqi state as it had been in past history. Believing Iraq's aggression would not
be satiated by its conquest of Kuwait, US President Bush initiated Operation Desert Shield. At
the end of this build-up there were over 2,400 fixed-wing Coalition aircraft in Theater, along
with their support entourages, in place ready for war. After sanctions and political negotiations
failed to persuade the Iraqis to leave Kuwait, the United Nations passed a resolution approving
the use of force to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.
Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991 with an USAF-led air campaign and ended on
February 28, 1991 after a four-day combined ground and air assault. Coalition forces expelled
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroyed much of Baghdad's military machine. From the outset,
U.S. air power was central to the success of the campaign; it enabled the Coalition to deploy its
forces and cripple Iraqi military capabilities, paving the way for Baghdad's unambiguous defeat on
the battlefield.
2.2.1.1 The Physical Environment

The Southwest Asia environment presented a series of problems for waging a modern war. The
first was blowing dust and sand, lowering visibility on the ground and forcing aircraft
maintainers to find new ways to keep grit and fine sand particles out of the aircraft parked out in
the elements. Maintenance difficulties for sophisticated aircraft, munitions, and armored
vehicles were abundant. The harsh arid desert was suited for neither aircrew survival nor
evasion--the land provided no food, and little water; the temperatures reached extreme highs
during the day, and extreme lows at night; the terrain was flat and featureless, providing no
terrain or vegetation for concealment; and few landmarks existed for help in navigation.
The weather over Iraq during Desert Storm was the worst in fourteen years, twice as bad as the
climatological history of the region would have suggested. The conditions, in fact, approximated
2-61
a rainy European summer, not the kind of blue-skies conditions one normally associates with
desert warfare. Cloud cover exceeded 25% percent at 10,000 feet over central Iraq on 31 days of
the 43-day war; it exceeded 50 percent on 21 of those days, and 75 percent on 9 days.
Accompanying this cover were occasionally violent winds and heavy downpours that played
havoc with targeting and bomb damage assessment. Eventually, about half of all sorties to Iraq
were affected by weather, resulting in cancellations or diversions. The weather problem proved
very serious, particularly because the Coalition's rules of engagement (ROE) demanded stringent
identification of targets before weapons release.114
KUWAIT
Kuwait is one of the world’s smallest countries, occupying only 6,880 square miles (about two-
thirds the size of New Hampshire) at the point where Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran converge. Its
greatest distance from north to south is 120 miles, and is no more than 110 miles from east to
west. The terrain consists of flat desert with some small rolling hills, and is covered in sand of a
very fine consistency. Kuwait also includes several offshore islands, the largest of which is
Bubiyan, a muddy, uninhabited island near the Iraqi border. Faylakah Island, several miles
south, is smaller, but populated with fishermen and light industry. Kuwait has no lakes and
rivers and few sources of fresh water. Drinking water is available only from underground
aquifers and through desalination of seawater. Although the climate is extremely hot in the
summer, the average temperature during the war was 56°F. Annual rainfall is typically less than
5 inches per year, and almost all of it falls in the cooler winter.
Kuwait has an estimated population of 1.8 million. The average population density at the time
was 264 per square mile, with most of the population concentrated in cities along the Persian
Gulf coast. Slightly fewer than 40 percent of the people are native Kuwaitis, with the remainder
of the population composed largely of foreign workers.
IRAQ
Iraq is bounded on the north by Turkey; on the east by Iran; on the south by Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf; and on the west by Jordan and Syria. Iraq has an area of 168,000
square miles (about the size of Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin combined), and a population of
about 21.4 million. The estimated overall population density is about 126 per square mile,
although the density varies markedly, with the largest concentrations in the area of the river
systems. In Western Iraq, population density over vast stretches averages less than one person
per square mile. The population is about 70 percent urban and Baghdad is the country’s capital
and largest city.
The northern portion of Iraq, known as Al Jazìra, is mountainous. Elevations of nearly 7,000
feet above sea level are found near the Turkish border, and in the northeastern part of the country
peaks range to 11,811 feet atop Jabal Ibrahìm, the highest point in Iraq. Farther south the
country slopes downward to form a broad, central alluvial plain, which encompasses the valley
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The extreme southeastern portion of Iraq is a low-lying,
114
HQ USAF, Section 2, “The Weather Factor.”
2-62
marshy area adjacent to the Persian Gulf, on which Iraq fronts for a distance of about 25 miles.
West of the Euphrates, the land rises gradually to meet the Syrian Desert.
Most of Iraq has a continental climate with extremes of heat and cold. The mountainous
northern portion of the country has cool summers and cold winters, often accompanied by snow.
In central Iraq the summers are long and hot and the winters short and cool. During the war,
S/Es were exposed to wind, rain, and cool daytime temperatures below 50°F.
2.2.1.2 Operational Environment

This war was fought over sparsely populated desert and mountain environments as well as
densely populated and heavily defended urban areas. The Iraqis had just completed a long and
bloody war with Iran in 1988 and had grown in stature to the world's fourth largest Army. Most
of their weaponry was Soviet-built and, although it was not state-of-the-art, Coalition war
planners believed Iraqi soldiers and equipment to be very capable in a wartime environment.
The following points excerpted from the Gulf War Air Power Survey provide a succinct
summation of key operational factors:
• The military forces that seized Kuwait in August 1990 were traditional mechanized forces
backed by a relatively modern industrial infrastructure in Iraq. Hence, Iraq and its
military presented the kinds of targets that have traditionally been vulnerable to air attack,
and in marked contrast to the Korean and Vietnam wars, Iraq was largely isolated from
external sources of armaments for its war effort.
• The Gulf War took place in open, desert terrain well suited to the effective employment
of air power.
• Once Desert Storm began, Iraqi air and air-defense forces proved unable to mount any
serious opposition to Coalition control of the air.
• Coalition air forces had significant equipment and technological advantages over the
opposition − advantages that were further magnified by the far-superior aircrew training,
operational concepts, and doctrine of Coalition forces.
• The air campaign neither incurred significant losses of Coalition aircraft and crews nor
inflicted widespread collateral damage or civilian casualties on Iraq.115
The United States sent more than 400,000 troops of its own, and more than 200,000 additional
troops came from Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Senegal, Niger,
Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. Other
countries contributed ships, air forces, and medical units. Survival training and equipment varied
greatly among US forces and the addition of Coalition forces into the equation further
complicated the situation for rescuers.

By the time the war was over, the USAF Central Command (USCENTAF) JRCC had tracked 56
combat incidents, launched 13 rescue missions in efforts to rescue 77 personnel, and ultimately
115
In terms of friendly losses, the contrast between Desert Storm and the strategic bombing of Germany, which cost
the American and British air forces more than 150,000 personnel and 38,000 aircraft lost in action, is stark [D'Olier,
et al. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all Report (European War), p x]. Nor did Desert Storm
witness anything remotely comparable to the incineration of enemy cities like Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo that
occurred during World War II.
2-63
recovered three individuals. Combined with a recovery by US Army ground forces of a two-
person AH-64 crew, the total aircrew recovered under combat conditions during Desert Storm is
five.116 In the end, the Iraqis had captured 21 Americans and 10 Allied airmen.

Loss rates for Coalition aircraft were very low relative to historic averages, consistent with a
declining trend observed since World War II. The Coalition’s aggressive Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses (SEAD) defeated most Iraqi radar systems. This enabled Coalition aircraft to
conduct operations in the middle altitudes (about 15,000 feet) in relative safety because they
were less vulnerable to infrared (IR)-guided SAMs or unguided AAA. One of the greater
dangers Coalition pilots faced was from IR- or electro-optically (EO) guided SAMs while they
were flying at relatively low altitudes supporting Coalition ground forces.117
14
12
Loss Incidents
10
8 Other Coalition
6 US Aircraft
2
0
IR SAM Radar AAA MIG Other
SAM
Threat Causing Loss
Figure 2-43: Causes of Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in Desert Storm

(Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641)
116
GWAPS, Vol V, Section II, Day C+206.
117 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 178.
2-64
As evidenced by pilots’ accounts and low-level losses that continued throughout the war,
Coalition aircraft were not able to defeat the AAA or portable IR SAM threats because of the
very large number of these systems and the difficulty in finding such small, mobile, non-emitting
systems. This meant that while Coalition aircraft had a high-altitude sanctuary, medium- and
especially low-altitude deliveries remained hazardous throughout the war.118
The primary threat to aircrews was from IR SAMs, accounting for 46 percent of US losses, and
38 percent of losses overall in cases where the cause was known.119 Of US fixed-wing losses
known to have been caused by IR SAMs, 14 percent are attributed to SA-9/13 and 71 percent
were known or probable MANPADS kills.120 Figure 2-44 depicts the altitudes and airspeeds of
US fixed-wing aircraft hit by IR SAMs (for encounters where altitude and airspeed are known).
There were two reported instances of helicopter incidents involving IR SAMs. Both were AH-
64 encounters with MANPADS, resulting in one lost and one damaged helicopter.121
40000
35000
30000
Altitude (feet)
25000 Damaged (SA-9/13)

Loss (SA-9/13)
20000
Damaged (MANPAD)
15000 Loss (MANPAD)
10000
5000
0
0 200 400 600
Airspeed (KIAS)
Figure 2-44: Outcome of US Fixed-Wing Encounters With IR Missiles During

Desert Storm
(Source: Crosthwaite, Slides 4-6)
118
GAO, Appendix III 9.2.1.
119 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641.
120 Crosthwaite, Slides 4-6. Crosthwaite documents 14 US losses to IR SAMs, which differs from official Gulf War
Airpower Survey results by inclusion of one additional A-6 and one additional AV-8B loss attributed to IR SAMs
(MANPAD category).
121 Crosthwaite, Slide 4.
2-65
2.2.2.2 Types of Assets Lost
Fighter-type aircraft represented 97 percent of fixed-wing combat losses (37 out of 38). The
single exception was an AC-130 that lingered past dawn in an area with a known SAM threat.
10
9
8
Number of Losses
7
6 U.S. Aircraft
5 Other Coalition
4
3
2
1
0
GR-1
A-10
F-16
A-6E
F-15E
F-14
AC-130
EF-111
F-4G
F/A-18
A-4
F-5
AV-8B
OA-10
OV-10
Figure 2-45: Fixed-Wing Combat Losses During Desert Storm

(Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 641)
2.2.2.3 Type of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

The following figure shows the distribution of Desert Storm combat losses by mission type.
30
25
20
15
10
0
Interdic tion
Clos e A ir
A ir Control
E lec tronic
SEAD
S upport
Com bat
Forward
Figure 2-46: Fixed-Wing Losses by Mission Type

(Source: JSSA, “Gulf War Combat Losses”)
2-66
LOSS RATES
From 17 January 1991 through 28 February 1991 US and Coalition forces lost 38 fixed-wing
aircraft to the enemy in combat, and 48 others were damaged.122 Optimists predicted losing one-
half of one percent of all sorties, (150 aircraft over a 30,000 sortie campaign, a .005 loss rate)
with roughly a quarter of all shot-down aircrews killed, a quarter captured, and half rescued or
able to return to friendly territory. Thoughtful pessimists estimated losses at 2% (which the
Israelis had suffered in their spectacularly successful campaign of 1967), or possibly 3%. Dire
pessimists--and there were some--forecast losses as high as 10%, equivalent to the casualties
experienced by RAF Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force during the worst days of 1943.
General Buster Glosson, an architect of the Desert Storm air war, had greater confidence than
this; in October, during a briefing to President Bush, he predicted that the coalition would
certainly lose no more than 80, and probably less than 50, aircraft in the entire campaign. In
actuality, the Air Force loss rate in Desert Storm was .00047--one twentieth of one percent--per
combat sortie. That rate reflected a strategic commitment to avoiding aircraft losses and
associated casualties. For the first three weeks of the war, for example, Glosson restricted attack
aircraft from descending below 8,000 feet to avoid dense antiaircraft fire that had proven so
murderous in previous wars.123
Table 2-16 describes combat loss rates by aircraft type (aircraft types that experienced no losses
are not included). Due to the low loss numbers, relative differences in the loss rates should not
be overvalued.
122 Cohen, Summary Report, p. 61.

123
USAF, Strategic Air Campaign Section
2-67
Table 2-16: Desert Storm Aircraft Combat Attrition Rates
(Source: GWAPS, Vol. V. p. 651)
Combat Losses per
Aircraft Type Losses
Sorties Flown 1000 Sorties
A-10 7983 4 0.5
A-4 651 1 1.5
A-6E 5593 3 0.5
AC-130 101 1 9.9
AV-8B 3349 5 1.5
EF-111F 1105 1 0.9
F/A-18 9250 2 0.2
F-14 3916 1 0.3
F-15E 2142 2 0.9
F-16 13066 3 0.2
F-4G 2678 1 0.4
F-5 1129 1 0.9
GR-1 2482 9 3.6
OA-10 657 2 3.0
OV-10 482 2 4.1
2-68
DISTRIBUTION OVER TIME
0
17-Jan-91
24-Jan-91
31-Jan-91
7-Feb-91
14-Feb-91
21-Feb-91
28-Feb-91
Figure 2-47: Combat Losses per Day During Desert Storm
(Source: Arnold, p. C-9)
Figure 2-47 shows the distribution of fixed-wing combat losses over time during Desert Storm.
Although sortie rates were relatively constant, approximately half of its fixed-wing combat
losses occurred during either the first week of Operation Desert Storm (17 aircraft), before
enemy defenses had been suppressed, or during the last week (eight aircraft), when aircraft were
operating at lower altitudes in the IR SAM threat region.124
Figure 2-47 also demonstrates that the peak demand on any given day was four losses.
Regarding simultaneous incidents, there were four cases in which two loss incidents occurred
within 60 minutes of each other, including one case of near simultaneous shootdown of a flight
lead and his wingman. Although some calendar days showed instances of multiple loss events,
there was no case in which rescue forces had to respond to more than two incidents in any four-
hour period. Table 2-17 lists the intervals between shootdowns and the total instances of near
simultaneous shootdowns.
Table 2-17: Estimated Simultaneous Isolating Incidents125
Interval Between
Total Instances of Near
Shootdowns
Simultaneous Shootdowns
(in minutes)
0-15 1
15-30 1
30-60 2
60-240 4
124
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6, p. 178.
125
JSSA, Calculated from shootdown times listed in “Gulf War Combat Losses.”
2-69
2.2.2.5 Injuries to Survivors/Evaders
During Desert Storm, 60 percent of downed airmen were known to have been killed during the
shootdown phase of the isolating incident.126 That figure represents a sharp increase in
shootdown fatalities when compared with a 24 percent rate in Vietnam.127 The immediate fate of
an additional 31 percent is not known, although all were subsequently proven or pronounced
KIA.128 It should also be noted that, of the 68 airmen killed in combat losses, one incident alone
(Spirit 03) accounted for 14 of the fatalities.

Although several loss incidents involved aircraft with large crews (AC-130, UH-60), in each of
those cases, the entire crew perished in the crash. The largest fixed-wing crew available for
recovery following combat loss (i.e. not KIA) was two people. Including helicopter losses, the
largest crew available for recovery included the three surviving members of an original UH-60
crew of eight. In the end, more than 90 percent of incidents produced only one or two candidates
for rescue (see Figure 2-48).
100%
80%
60% 3 Crewmembers
2 Crewmembers
40% 1 Crewmember
20%
0%
Figure 2-48: Size of Crew Available for Rescue in Desert Storm [n=15]
(Source: JSSA, “Gulf War Combat Losses”)
2.2.2.7 Distribution by Range

Figure 2-49 shows the geographic distribution of POWs and combat recoveries in Desert Storm.
126
GWAPS, Tables 205 and 209; If Spirit 03 is not included (14 KIA), the total KIA would be 50 percent. Keep in
mind that the small size of the population has a low confidence level and is very sensitive to perturbations.
127
128
Arnold , p. C-10.
2-70
Figure 2-49: Geographic Distribution of POWs and Combat Recoveries in Desert Storm
(Source: Compiled from data in JSSA “Gulf War Combat Losses” summary, Tyner, Arnold, and
GWAPS references)
2-71
2.2.3 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents
Although Iraq placed emphasis on capturing downed aircrew quickly, there was apparently no
effort to use the S/E as “bait” for a SAR trap. There were basic jamming and spoofing efforts
throughout Iraq using VHF Guard (121.5 MHz) and UHF Guard (243.0 MHz), and there is
anecdotal evidence suggesting the Iraqis attempted, sometimes successfully, radio direction-
finding of S/E using survival radios.
2.2.4 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

The Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA) debriefed S/E from Desert Storm and collected data on
isolating event times, duration of evasion, locations, and evader physical conditions for all
twenty three fixed-wing aircrew that evaded over land until capture or recovery. JSSA noted that
experiences were similar to those recorded by evaders in North Africa during World War II.
Although the general pattern is not dissimilar to that seen in Vietnam (Figure 2-50), the small
number of isolating incidents during Desert Storm permits few statistical conclusions to be
drawn from the operation. One notable exception may be the effect of darkness on the evasion
process. No evader who was isolated during daylight hours was able to evade capture for more
than ten minutes, while every evader who was isolated at night was able to evade for at least two
hours prior to his capture or recovery. Of eighteen losses over land resulting in S/E that were
available for rescue, only four of those airmen were rescued (two by opportune ground forces),
and the remainder became POWs.
100%
90%
80%
70%
Percent Captured
60%
50%
Vietnam
40% Desert Storm
30%
20%
10%
0%
0 to 1 min 2 to 30 min 31 to 60 min 1:01 to 12 hrs 12:01 to 48 48:01+hrs
hrs
Evasion Time
Figure 2-50: Cumulative Percent of Survivors/Evaders Captured Over Time

(Source: Vietnam Data: 7602 AIG, p. 10; Desert Storm Data: Mohan, p. 4)
2-72
Table 2-18: Summary of Successful Rescues Under Combat Conditions
Time to
Aircraft Rescued by: Notes
Rescue
(Maj Ball)
F-16 USN helicopter Controlled bailout over the Persian Gulf.
30 minutes
WOLF 01 (SH-60) Ejection was tracked by AWACS
Recovery was unopposed
(CW2 Rogers and CW2 Kurinj)
US Army ground Two-man crew
AH-64 4.5 hours
forces
Rescue was completed about four hours after
initial radio contact had been established
(Capt Thomas)
F-16 160 SOAR
C2 failure delayed launch of recovery forces
2 hours helicopter
BENJI 53 (CH-47) PRC-90 malfunctioned. Was able to signal
forces with strobe-light only
(Lt Jones and Lt Slade)
F-14 AFSOC
7 hours helicopter Jones and Slade were separated by about 15
SLATE 46 (MH-53) miles after ejection. Jones was rescued, Slade
was captured.
While it is unlikely that any Combat Rescue CONOPS or readiness posture could have changed
the outcome for those that were captured during the day, our failure to locate and recover those
S/E that had evaded capture for two hours or more is troubling. The now famous case of
Corvette 03 is a particularly egregious example in which the two crewmembers were caught and
imprisoned after successfully evading capture for more than 48 hours. Even the cases of the two
successful helicopter recoveries over land do not offer much opportunity for satisfaction—a full
two hours had elapsed before the first recovery had been accomplished, and seven hours had
elapsed for the other.

During Desert Storm, Air Force Special Operations Command Central Command
(AFSOCCENT) was tasked to be the single manager for all CSAR aviation. In that capacity,
AFSOCCENT provided mission guidance to Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) and
to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). All assets responded to the
Joint Recovery Coordination Cell (JRCC) at Riyadh. By the time Desert Storm began, aircraft
supporting Combat Rescue were located at five forward operating locations in Saudi Arabia and
two in Turkey.129 Background on the use of Special Operations aviation forces for conventional
CSAR is described in the Gulf War Air Power Survey:
129
GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 301. Operating locations in Saudi Arabia included King Khalid Military City (KKMC),
Rafha, Al Jouf, Ar’Ar, and Ras al Mishab. Operating locations in Turkey included Diyarbakir and forward
2-73
“None of the Services possessed forces trained and equipped solely to
conduct classic combat rescue missions. In Desert Storm, SOF aviation
assets were the only forces with the requisite capabilities to penetrate
enemy territory, recover a downed pilot, and egress safely. Special
Operations Forces, however, are equipped and trained for night missions.
A 24-hour on-call search and rescue mission could put Special
Operations Forces in enemy territory during daylight hours—a
circumstance they were taught to avoid.”130
2.2.5.1 Dedicated vs. Opportune Recovery Forces

AFSOCCENT aircraft were responsible for on-call CSAR in Kuwait and Iraq, south of 33
degrees, 30 minutes north latitude, and Air Force Special Operations Command, European
Command (SOCEUR) aircraft in Turkey covered the area north of the 33 degree 30 minute
latitude line. Dedicated Combat Rescue forces during Desert Storm were made up of eight
AFSOCCENT MH-60G Pavehawks operating out of Saudi Arabia. They were reinforced by
eight MH-53 Pave Lows available in support of Combat Rescue and other special operations
taskings.131 Providing a secondary capability were several MH-60Ks and CH47s from the US
Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).132 Also available were five HH-
3s from the Air Force Reserve’s 71st Special Operations Squadron. Arriving immediately prior
to the start of the war, the HH-3s sat alert at Ras al Mishab, focused primarily on the over-water
Combat Rescue mission. They also participated in several Special Operations missions and at
least one medical evacuation.133 The US Navy also committed to have two HH-60Hs on alert
around the clock for rescue operations beyond 12 miles from shore in the Gulf and in the Red
Sea,134 and four dedicated Navy Strike Rescue HH-60Hs on the ground at Al Jouf that were
assigned to the Combat Rescue mission under SOCCENT.135 Five additional MH-53s operating
out of Turkey (and assigned to SOCEUR) were available for recoveries in the northern region, if
the MH-60Gs could not be used.
Dedicated rescue forces performed two of the four successful combat recoveries during Desert
Storm. Although two opportune attempts were successful, opportune recovery was not without
risk. One opportune mission to recover an F-16 pilot was attempted by Bengal-15, a US Army
Blackhawk. It resulted in the shootdown of the rescue helicopter, yielding five fatalities and
three POWs. Aircrew on that mission explained that they attempted it because Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC) forces were not in the area. In fact, the area was “too hot and
Special Operations Forces (SOF) described it as a ‘RED’ zone that made rescue unlikely and
probably impossible in daylight operations.”136 See Section 2.2.8, “Recovery Force Losses,” for
more information.
operating location Batman.

130
GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 300.
131
According to Lt Col Trask (MH-53 flight lead for the recovery for Slate 46), MH-53s supporting the Combat
Rescue mission were exclusively assigned to that mission, and did not provide their services as a “secondary
capability,” as suggested by some sources.
132
Tyner, p. 38.
133
Bergeron, p. 48 and p. 105
134
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter 6, pp. 533 and 728.
135
Trask, no page number
136
Tyner, p. 46.
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2.2.6 Terminal Area Characteristics

Three of the four successful land recoveries took place in the deserts of Southern Iraq. The
terrain is mostly flat, has little or no vegetation, and provides little or no cover for evaders on the
ground. Because of the arid climate and lack of vegetation, brownout conditions during
helicopter landing could be severe, with dust clouds blowing as high as 75 feet and visibility
inside the cloud of less than 5 feet. Although the environment was not suited for evasion or
survival, it was very well suited for search and recovery where the flat terrain, and dry climate
enhanced both visual and electronic search methods. Unfortunately, survival radio malfunctions
were epidemic and, when the radios worked, the conditions benefited the enemy as well as
friendly forces.
2.2.6.2 Terminal Area Operations

SLATE 46 (January 21, 1991)
The first successful Combat Rescue was a daylight recovery of a Lt Jones, a USN F-14 pilot, on
the ground 130 miles inside Iraq. The mission had been impacted by delays in locating and
authenticating the survivor that were attributed to limitations of the survival radio issued to the
S/E. Before his eventual recovery, at least one failed mission had been launched to find the
crew, and both fixed and rotary-wing assets were forced to conduct visual searches in enemy
territory during daylight hours in a desperate effort to locate him.137 Once Lt Jones was finally
located, the support package for his recovery became much larger than was expected because
bad weather had prevented many aircraft from expending their ordnance on their assigned
targets. At one point there were twelve F-16s, four A-10s, and two F-15s standing by to assist
the AFSOCCENT helicopters.138
Finally, under cover provided by two A-10s, an MH-53 Pave Low arrived in the terminal area,
landed, and recovered the airman.139 The potential for armed opposition during the recovery was
presented in the form of an Iraqi truck driving straight for the S/E as the MH-53 approached. An
A-10 on station quickly engaged with its cannon and immediately destroyed the truck. By the
time they recovered to Al Jouf, the MH-53s that rescued Slate 46 had flown six and a half hours
inside Iraq.
BENJI 53 (February 17, 1991)
The only other land recovery by helicopter (a CH-47) occurred on February 17, 1991, in which a
downed F-16 pilot (Capt Thomas) was recovered 2 hours after being shot down. There were no
significant complicating factors during the mission, although when the helicopter arrived in the
terminal area the S/E was unable to establish communications using his PRC-90 survival radio.
He resorted to using his strobe light to highlight his position to the helicopter. His wingman and
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) accomplished the initial location and
137
Initial coordinates passed to the recovery forces were about 50 miles away from the location of the actual
recovery performed several hours later [Trask, no page number].
138
Bergeron, p. 93.
139
GWAPS, Volume IV, pp. 302 and 3.
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identification tasks. It was reported later that the helicopter’s radar warning receiver was used to
detect and avoid a threat on their return and two IR missiles had been fired (and missed).140
AH-64 (February 20, 1991)
The last land rescue under combat conditions was that of CW2 Rogers and Kurinj, both an AH-
64 Apache crew. Originally part of an 8-ship package, the weather was so severe that seven of
the Apaches aborted the mission. While attempting to continue the mission the others had
aborted, the eighth Apache flew into the ground under instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC). Using PRC-90 survival radios, the crew established radio contact with airborne C2
aircraft but, because of the weather and proximity to friendly lines, ground forces were
dispatched to recover the aircrew.
2.2.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operations

COALITION ISSUES
In the beginning of Desert Storm, Pave Lows and other Special Operations Forces assets
deployed in Southeastern Turkey were not permitted to fly in Turkish airspace until a political
agreement was reached with the US. This action essentially “froze” these assets for three days at
the start of the war.141 This delay had a certain impact on the recovery of the Corvette 03 by
delaying their availability until January 20, 12 hours after the shootdown. Although they never
materialized, Coalition language differences and equipment interoperability issues (particularly
with respect to survival radios and signaling devices) represented other potential problems of
significance during Desert Storm.
ABSENCE OF SPECIALLY TRAINED COMBAT RESCUE FORCES
After Vietnam, the USAF allowed its Combat Rescue force to wither away, and most Combat
Rescue aircraft were assigned special operations roles. Although, by the early 1990s, Air Rescue
Service had just begun to establish deployable MH/HH-60G Combat Rescue squadrons, none
were yet available when the war broke out.142 Consequently, SOF aviation assets were the only
forces with the requisite capabilities to recover a downed pilot under combat conditions, and they
were tasked with the Combat Rescue mission. Although they did the best they could,
conventional Combat Rescue was not a mission for which the SOF community trained, nor did
their doctrine and tactics at the time anticipate those operations.
This arrangement was problematic in several ways. First, C2 relationships were established that
deviated from the concept of Unity of Command. Specifically, final mission approval authority
did not rest with the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), but with AFSOCCENT
in the South143 and SOCEUR in the North.144 Such complex information paths can be expected
to fail, as in the case of the pilot of Benji 53 (Capt. Thomas). Although he contacted AWACS
before bailing out, and talked to his wingman on his PRC-90 after hitting the ground, recovery
assets were not launched until after his wingman returned to base and started asking about what
140
Tyner, p. 45.
141
Tyner, p. 38.
142
Tyner, p. 40.
143
GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 301.
144
Tyner, p. 38.
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was happening to rescue Thomas.145 Fortunately, the Iraqis were also slow in reacting and Capt
Thomas was safely recovered.
Second, SOF planners were uncomfortable with immediate, daytime missions, and generally
unfamiliar with CAF tactics, terminology, and conventional fixed-wing support capabilities.
Detection avoidance and secrecy were primary planning factors, and general integration with
CAF airpower was, by definition, not a typical component of their concepts of operations. While
suitable for special operations missions, that employment concept was at odds with the rest of the
air campaign in which the significant majority of missions (and majority of shootdowns)
happened during daylight.146 It should be noted that some AFSOC crews that were in Southwest
Asia during the conflict do not agree with that characterization. Lt Col Tom Trask, MH-53
flight-lead for the rescue of Slate 46, commented, “Though we…believed that flying at night was
certainly safer than flying during the day, we also knew, and had re-learned only months before
in Panama, that we must be prepared to fight in the daytime.”147 Notwithstanding that
observation, aircrew awareness of tactical-level requirements was not supported by their doctrine
or formal training. Emphasis on “detection avoidance,” for example, during the planning process
after Corvette 03 was lost (described below), may have had a decisive negative outcome.
Finally, although they are the best in the world for the Special Operations mission, AFSOC
helicopter crews had little corporate expertise in supporting conventional Combat Rescue or in
integration with conventional Combat Air Force (CAF) operations. Their task was made more
difficult by the loss of institutionalized rescue knowledge as the Air Rescue and Recovery
service was dismantled after Vietnam. After decades of neglect, conventional Combat Rescue
experience was limited to the few aircrew that had flown rescue missions in Vietnam, relying on
concepts that had not benefited from reassessment when technology and air power theory
evolved. For example, because AFSOC crews were generally unfamiliar with CSARTF tactics,
that capability was neither developed nor exercised during Desert Shield.148 Lt Col Weaver,
Chief of Operations Plans for the 1st Special Operations Wing (deployed to Al Jouf during the air
war), illustrated the extent of the training deficiency in a remarkable statement when he said,
“We started working with the A-10s as Sandys with much more enthusiasm after we deployed to
Al Jouf and realized what a great CSAR asset they were.”149 Although some individual aircrew
members had familiarity with the CSARTF concept (having been previously assigned to HH-53,
HH-3, or HH-1 CSAR squadrons), their numbers were too few, and the training too perfunctory,
to sway the CONOPS towards more robust integration.150 Because the “corporate memory” had
been dismantled, even forces that had been “trained” in conventional Combat Rescue were
victims of wildly varied tactics, procedures, and quality of instruction. Some units and
145
Boucher, p. 2.
146
GWAPS, Summary Report, p. 201 (Figure 33).
147
Trask, no page number
148
Tyner, p. 41. Once Desert Storm began, several large scale exercises were conducted that involved CSARTF
operations and involved crews from around the theater [Trask, no page number]
149
Tyner, p. 45.
150
As late as 1995, the formal training syllabus at the MH/HH-60G Replacement Training Unit, the 512th Special
Operations Squadron, continued to emphasize special operations modes (close formation, pre-planned missions to
meet a precise time-over-target, totally comm-out radio procedures, and general absence of CSARTF training), even
when conventional Combat Rescue pilots were being trained there. The MH-53 syllabus had even less exposure to
conventional rescue concepts.
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individuals excelled. Others did not. There was no uniformity across the community, and no
baseline CONOPS.
SOF unfamiliarity with the breadth of support available to them from CAF assets may have been
a direct contributor to the capture of the crew of Corvette 03, an F-15E crew shot down on the
night of January 19, 1991. In that incident, the first scheduled recovery mission was originally
planned for execution during darkness, but was cancelled before takeoff when diplomatic
airspace coordination delays prevented a night recovery. SOCEUR’s rationale for canceling the
mission was that the threat was too high and would only permit a night recovery. There was
additional concern that they had almost no possibility of getting to the western part of Iraq
“without detection.”151 In the end, despite having successfully evaded capture for more than 48
hours, both members of Corvette 03’s crew were seized by the Iraqis, and spent the rest of the
war as POWs. By the time recovery forces arrived on scene (the night of January 22), the Iraqis
were waiting for them and greeted them with a barrage of AAA.
The failure to recover Corvette 03 after they had spent so long on the ground did not go
unnoticed by the warfighters in Southwest Asia. Lt Col Trumbull, 550th Tactical Fighter
Squadron, had the following comments when interviewed by Gulf War Air Power Survey
researchers in June 1991:
“The other thing I think was missing was SAR (Search and Rescue). Our DO and
his backseater were on the ground for three and one half days in western Iraq.
Nobody’d go in and pick them up, and eventually they became prisoners of war.
The advertised special operations guys that came down to talk to us before the war
said, ‘no sweat, we’ll come get you wherever you are.’ That from my perspective
was a big lie. When I’ve got guys on the ground for three and one-half days and
they don’t go pick them up, we basically decided at that point that if anybody went
down, you were on your own. Nobody was going to come get you.”152
At this point, one can only speculate about the outcome if recovery forces had employed sooner,
using Combat Rescue tactics that exploited CAF firepower. It is possible that a properly
assembled CSARTF could have sufficiently suppressed the threat, and made moot the
requirement for “detection avoidance.” Regardless, the delay was costly. Colonel Ben Josey,
Batman’s FOL commander, stated, “…I think we would have picked Corvette 03 up had we
been able to get out the night before.”153

Rescue force losses were limited to one US Army UH-60L lost due to enemy fire while on an
opportune Combat Rescue mission. There were a number of significant factors in the chain of
events leading to this incident. The Army planners planned the mission to go to the last known
position of the downed aircraft. No one had established radio contact with the downed pilot after
ejection, and he was never located, identified, or authenticated during the planning and execution
of the attempted recovery. In fact, the pilot had been captured a few minutes after reaching the
ground.
151
Tyner, p. 42.
152
GWAPS, Vol. IV, p. 302 (Footnote 154).
153
Tyner, p. 42.
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Intelligence personnel briefed mission planners on the threat on the ground, and they sensibly
planned the mission around a major concentration of ground forces. As was standard Army
practice at the time, the mission plan was passed from the Battalion planning staff down to a
MEDEVAC aviation company for execution which meant that the crews that flew the mission
were not involved in its planning. The mission included one MEDEVAC UH-60L, carrying an
Army Flight Surgeon and a four-man Pathfinder Team, and two AH-1 gunships for escort.
There was no fixed-wing component to the CSARTF that was assembled. Once airborne, the
formation contacted Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) for flight
following and C2. The ABCCC, lacking situational awareness (SA) of the ground order of
battle, cleared the package to fly direct to the objective, rather than the circuitous planned route.
The UH-60 crew, unfamiliar with ABCCC’s limitations, and unfamiliar with the command
relationship, deviated from their planned route in accordance with ABCCC clearance. The new
route took the package directly over an Iraqi infantry division. Upon coming under heavy enemy
fire, the two Cobras immediately turned and egressed the area. Before the Blackhawk could
escape, it was shot down. Five of the eight crew aboard were killed in the crash. The other three
were seriously injured and trapped in the wreckage of the crushed and inverted helicopter. All
three were extracted from the wreckage by their Iraqi captors, and became POWs along with the
pilot they were attempting to rescue.
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2.3 Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia 1993-1995)
In general terms, the primary cause of the Bosnian conflict was the economic and political
decline of the Yugoslav Federation during the 1980s. The net effect of this prolonged crisis on
Yugoslavian national and provincial politics was the breakup of the country. The republics of
Slovenia and Croatia left in the summer of 1991, while Bosnia and Macedonia pulled out in the
winter of 1991–92. Left behind in a rump state referred to as “the former Yugoslavia” were
Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo—all under the domination of Serbia and its
president, Slobodan Milosevic. The breakup was not peaceful. The Yugoslavian People’s Army
(JNA) fought a 10-day war in June and July 1991 to keep Slovenia in the federation, and it
fought a much longer and more bitter war to quash the Croatian secession, between August 1991
and January 1992. In cooperation with the JNA, Serbian minority groups in Croatia and Bosnia
fought to hold those provinces in the federation and under the pale of Milosevic or, failing that,
to carve out their own ethnic enclaves (krajinas) for ultimate unification with “greater Serbia.”154
This war ended in January 1992, with the establishment of a tense truce in the krajina and
creation of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise it. All of these
conflicts were characterized by an appalling viciousness on all sides, including massacres of
civilians and captured soldiers, mass robbery and rape, and scorched-earth conquests—all
encapsulated in a new international term: ethnic cleansing. Dismay and disgust at that violence
and its implications for regional stability prompted outside states and international organizations
to intervene in the Balkans crisis in general and in Bosnia in particular.155
Heavy fighting began immediately after Bosnia formally withdrew from Yugoslavia in March
1992. Forces of the Serb Republic, with overt assistance from the JNA, advanced to expand its
borders, while the relatively weak Bosnian army fought to preserve the territorial integrity and
authority of its newly independent state. Within a few weeks, Serbs controlled almost two-thirds
of the territory of Bosnia. By that time, the direct international intervention that eventually
would have a crescendo in Deliberate Force was under way.
154
In 1991 the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia were the Muslim Serbs, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Catholic
Croats, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 18 percent of the population, respectively
155
Owen [1], Political and Institutional Context Section
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated Operation Deny Flight at the request
of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in April 1993, in response to the ongoing war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two and one-half years later, in December 1995, Deny Flight officially
ended after an almost continuous 970-day aerial presence constituting over 100,000 aircraft
sorties. In that time, NATO aircraft dropped more than 3,000 bombs while participating in
combat operations for the first time in alliance history.156
Deny Flight’s initial mission was to enforce a UN Security Council mandated no-fly zone over
Bosnia. In the ensuing months, NATO and the UN added other missions to Deny Flight,
including close air support (CAS) to protect UN personnel under attack, offensive air support to
in response to aggression against six UN-designated safe areas, and suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) to protect NATO aircraft. At the start of Deny Flight, NATO also activated a
joint target coordination board (JTCB), composed of senior NATO and UN tactical commanders
concerned with the use of airpower in the region and its consequences. These developments, and
the planning that went into them, constituted an incremental, evolutionary process that laid the
foundation for Operation Deliberate Force (29 August through 14 September 1995) which,
technically, was but the final phase of Deny Flight.
In Deliberate Force, NATO took a stronger stance designed to break the so-called siege of
Sarajevo and get peace negotiations back on track. Although Deny Flight was generally
ineffective, Deliberate Force was, in the words of US Secretary of Defense William Perry, “the
absolutely crucial step in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton, leading
to the peace agreement.”157 By the late summer of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs, who early on
controlled 70 percent of Bosnia, were in retreat. Serbia cut off its economic and political support
to the Bosnian Serbs and a Bosnian/Croat Confederation Army had been gaining ground against
the beleaguered Serbs throughout the spring and summer. Facing defeat and domination, the
Bosnian Serb Army was a ripe target for a bombing operation. That bombing (Deliberate Force)
proved to be the coercive catalyst that led to the Dayton peace agreement and the ensuing
cessation of hostilities.
NATO’s organizational structure during the conflict was quite elaborate. The Bosnian region
fell under the purview of NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), with headquarters at
the Italian Air Force’s Dal Molino Air Base (AB), Vicenza, Italy. The Italian general
commanding 5 ATAF, who at the time of Deliberate Force was Maj Gen Andrea Fornasiero,
reported to the commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Command (AIRSOUTH). From
December 1992, the AIRSOUTH commander was Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, until his replacement by
Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan in September 1994. These two United States Air Force officers, in turn,
reported to United States Navy admirals commanding Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFSOUTH), also headquartered in Naples, Italy. The commander in chief of AFSOUTH
(CINCSOUTH) at the beginning of Deny Flight was Admiral Jeremy Boorda, until his
156
Beale, p. v. When four warplanes violating the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone were shot down by NATO
aircraft on 28 February 1994, that act was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the NATO Alliance
157
Lowe, p. 1. Gen. Michael Ryan, then-commander of NATO southern air forces described Deny Flight as
“piecemealed airpower.” Without "a sustained effort [as in Deliberate Force]," Ryan said, airpower was not "taken
seriously by the warring factions." (Tirpak, no page number)
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replacement by Admiral Leighton W. Smith Jr.158 To complete the chain of command,
AFSOUTH reported to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), also an American
four-star general. SACEUR took his general guidance from the ambassadors sitting on NATO’s
North Atlantic Council (NAC).
Deny Flight was a joint NATO/UN undertaking. Although AIRSOUTH received UN and NAC
approval for initial rules of engagement (ROE) by February 1993, real tension came from what
proved to be the UN’s reluctance to actually act on the ROE. “NATO would always view the
use of force in terms of compelling the Bosnian Serbs . . . [while] the UN . . . viewed force in a
much more limited context of self-defense.”159 That hesitance was also reflected in the theater’s
OPLAN that admonished NATO airmen to ensure that their strikes, when authorized at all, were
“proportional” (i.e., that they avoided unnecessary casualties and collateral damage). General
Ryan and Admiral Smith were in full agreement that the diplomatic sensitivities of the campaign
made collateral damage an issue of pivotal strategic importance. Once the high-tempo
operations of Deliberate Force had begun, General Ryan believed that a stray bomb that caused
civilian casualties would take the interventionists off the moral high ground, marshal world
opinion against the air campaign, and probably bring it to a halt before it had its intended
effects.160 Operations were not only defensive with respect to collateral damage, but also
regarding losses of NATO aircraft. After NATO lost its first aircraft to Serb MANPADS
(presumed to be an SA-16), NATO's reaction was to limit the minimum altitude for interdiction
and CAS operations to 10,000 feet, outside the effective envelope of the SA-16 and weapons like
it. In so doing, however, the effectiveness of the 'shooters' decreased significantly.161
The physical and temporal dimensions of the Deliberate Force air campaign were fairly compact,
particularly when compared to the scale and scope of a major air campaign like Operation Desert
Storm. Compared to the vast reaches of Southwest Asia, NATO air attacks in Deliberate Force
occurred in a triangular area only about 150 nautical miles wide on its northern base and
stretching about 150 miles again to the south. The weight of the NATO attack also was
relatively limited. Desert Storm lasted 43 days compared with the 22 calendar days of Deliberate
Force. Of those 22 days, NATO actually released weapons against the Serbs on just 12 days.
Two days into the campaign, NATO commanders halted offensive air operations against the
Serbs for four days to encourage negotiations. When useful negotiations failed to materialize,
they resumed bombing on the morning of 5 September and continued through the 13th. When
notified that the President of the Serb Republic had accepted the UN’s terms, CINCSOUTH and
the UNPROFOR commander jointly suspended offensive operations at 2200. NATO's Deny
Flight operation was ended on December 20, 1995, when implementation force (IFOR) assumed
responsibility for airspace over Bosnia.
The total air forces involved included about 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support aircraft from
three US services, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and France—
all directly assigned to AIRSOUTH and based mainly in Italy—and a steady stream of airlift
aircraft bringing forward units and supplies. On days when strikes were flown, the AIRSOUTH-
assigned forces launched an average of four or five air-to-ground “packages,” involving perhaps
60 or 70 bomb-dropping sorties and another 100 to 150 additional sorties to provide combat air
158
AFSOUTH [2], p. 1
159
Owen [1], Planning Section
160
Owen [2], Execution Section
161
Cook [2], p. 63
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patrol, defense suppression, tanker, reconnaissance, and surveillance support to the “shooters.”
In total, Deliberate Force included 3,515 aircraft sorties, of which 2,470 went “feet dry” over the
Balkans region to deliver 1,026 weapons against 48 targets and 338 individual desired main
points of impact (DMPI).162 These figures equated to just about a busy day’s sortie count for
coalition air forces during the Gulf War—and only a tiny fraction of the 227,340 weapons those
air forces released against the Iraqis in the 43 days of Desert Storm.
2.3.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents

Three combat aircraft were lost to enemy action in the Bosnian Theater of Operations during
Deny Flight. One of those losses was an American F-16C, and two were Coalition losses (a
British GR-7 Sea Harrier and a French Mirage 2000). Those incidents resulted in a total of four
S/E, of whom two were recovered and two were captured.163 Those incidents are described
below in chronological order.
2.3.2.1 GR-7 (April 16, 1994)

A British GR-7 Sea Harrier (from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, call sign unknown),
piloted by Lt Nick Richardson, was shot down on April 16, 1994. On that day, two Sea Harriers
on station over the Bosnian town of Gorazde were directed to provide close air support for
UNPROFOR troops threatened by Serbian tank fire. On their first pass, the two Sea Harriers
were engaged by a single MANPADS, which they were both able to evade. Unable to positively
identify the target because of cloud cover, they overflew the area again but were again unable to
confirm the target. On their third run, under direction from a Special Air Service (SAS) forward
air controller, the lead aircraft was hit by what was thought to be an SA-7 or SA-16 MANPADS,
forcing the pilot to eject at about 2,500 feet above the ground.164 He landed safely in an urban
area near the town of Gorazde that was under control of the (sympathetic) Bosnian Government
Army, and was later rescued by UN forces and returned to the carrier.165
An unconfirmed (even dubious) source describes the incident in the following way:
"Two Sea Harriers were guided onto Bosnian-Serb armour on the outskirts of
Gorazde by SAS forward air controllers...stationed on top of the Hotel
Gardina. The Sea Harriers, under the rules of engagement, were to make a
low pass over the area to try and stop the armour advancing on the city. It was
on this pass that [the aircraft] was hit and the pilot ejected and landed in the
Muslim held lines of the city. The pilot was later handed over to the SAS
team in the city. They and the pilot subsequently escaped and evaded and
were picked up by a French forces Puma."166
162
Owen [2], Execution Section
163
The two French Mirage crewmembers were freed and handed over to French authorities on December 12, 1995,
ending 104 days of captivity. Operation Deny Flight was formally ended on December 20, 1995.
164
Furdson, p. 18, Cook [1], p. 4 and Cook [2], p. 63
165
AFSOUTH [2], Chronology and SHAPE, p. 32
166
The description is from an uncited source at http://www.aeronautics.ru/, a site known for its attention to detail in
Russian aviation affairs, and also known for its pro-Yugoslavia position on NATO involvement there. Some
information on the site is clearly untrue (for example, it promotes Serbian propaganda about the number of NATO
aircraft shot down in the Balkans during Deny Flight and Allied Force). The reference is included only because it
appears consistent with NATO and other Western accounts of the incident, and provides the most specific
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2.3.2.2 BASHER 52 (June 2, 1995)
Basher 52, an F-16C piloted by USAF Capt. Scott O’Grady, was shot down during cruise flight
on June 2, 1995, by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 battery 25 miles south of Banja Luka.167 The location
of the missile was the result of a shift in defenses recently undertaken by the Bosnian Serbs that
had generally escaped the notice of NATO intelligence. The Serbs had never before positioned
their SA-6s in that area, and they used its radar sparingly, setting up a trap. The Serbs launched
two missiles—the first missile exploded between the two aircraft, and the second one emerged
from the undercast cloud deck and hit Basher 52 in the belly, destroying the aircraft at an altitude
of 26,000 feet. At the time, an Air Force official said, “We think this was the first time the Serbs
fired an SA-6…They waited until just the right moment, and they ambushed us.”168 The event
certainly represented a clever use of air defense systems in an environment of total NATO air
superiority.
EJECTION
Basher 52’s encounter with the missile was observed by his wingman but, because the aircraft
descended into the clouds as it was breaking apart, he did not witness the actual ejection. It
would be another five and a half days until Basher 52 would make radio contact with NATO
forces with his PRC-112, confirming for the first time that he had survived the encounter.
Once hit, Basher 52 ejected immediately, and manually opened his parachute instead of waiting
for its automatic activation at 14,000 feet. Such a high altitude ejection resulted in wind drift of
the parachute and more than five miles of geographic separation of the parachute landing from
the aircraft wreckage. He descended into a grassy clearing in an area that has been described as
very hilly and “relatively uninhabited.”169 The area was densely forested and pocketed by caves
that had been used for evasion before—by partisans evading Nazi troops during World War II.170
The area was described as having Karst formations that were similar to those seen in SEA.
According to an Operation Deny Flight chronology released six months after Basher 52 was lost,
“[the same day O’Grady was shot down], NATO received unconfirmed reports that the Bosnian
Serb Army had recovered the pilot. NATO was not able to independently confirm this
information.”171 That statement in the chronology is particularly interesting in light of the fact
that, only hours after the incident, CINCSOUTH (Admiral Leighton Smith) confirmed to the
press that “that the pilot survived and was taken captive by the Serbians.”172 It didn’t take long
before the Serbs (and NATO) changed their story, the next day declaring, “We have no
information about the pilot.”173 Two days later, in an odd disclosure of sensitive information,
Gen. Ronald Fogelman, the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, mentioned to reporters at a Pentagon
reception that intermittent signals had been received from what could be Basher 52’s PRC-112A
emergency locator beacon. The reason for conflicting and curious accounts is not known.
description of the actual recovery of the pilot. In any case, even NATO accounts have been, at times, misleading.
In its first public statements about the loss of the GR-7, NATO claimed the aircraft was on a “reconnaissance
mission.”
167
Owens, p. 1; Beale, p. 33
168
Fedarko et a., p. 20
169
Owens
170
Fedarko, p. 20
171
AFSOUTH [2], Chronology
172
AFNS, p. 1
173
Davies, no page number
2-84
US REACTION TO THE SHOOTDOWN
Perhaps because NATO had air superiority (and could control the pace of the offensive), or
perhaps because military support for the way air power was being used was lukewarm, American
commanders showed a great willingness to make Combat Rescue the overwhelming tactical
priority when the need arose. Regardless of the motivation, the NATO position was clear—after
the loss of Basher 52, Admiral Smith (CINCSOUTH) sent a message to the UNPROFOR
commander requesting that he contact the Serbs with the following pointed message: "You have
shot down one of my aircraft, I am coming after the pilot and I will kill anyone who attempts to
impede us in our mission."174 Admiral Smith explained that position in a 1998 speech to the
Armed Forces Staff College:
“After going into Bosnia as the IFOR commander, I had several high
ranking Serbian officials ask why we made such a big deal out of the
O’Grady affair. Why, they asked, did we expend so much effort to rescue
just one pilot? And why, they asked, was his safe return so important? I
told them that we place a very high premium on the welfare and safety of
our forces. That, I said, is why we will use the force necessary to carry out
our mission and protect the lives of those we are asking to do the job.”175
In the five days following the loss of Basher 52, more than 500 missions were flown in an
exhaustive search to locate the downed pilot. CINCSOUTH also ordered the USS Kearsarge
and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)] to take up a
position off the Croatian coast as near to the scene of the search effort as could be safely
executed.
Acknowledging the risk posed by the search, Admiral Smith said, “I knew we would be
expending a lot of effort in searching for the downed pilot, and that there was a constant danger
of losing another aircraft. I wanted to provide those conducting the search with the best possible
chance of a recovery should one of them be forced to eject over enemy territory.” 176
COMPOSITION OF RESCUE FORCES

Like Operation Desert Storm before it, and Operation Allied Force to follow, conventional
USAF Combat Rescue forces (flying HH-60Gs) were not immediately available due to their
support of other operations in the northern and southern Theaters of Southwest Asia. As a result,
the seven Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) MH-53J helicopters were primarily
responsible for performing Combat Rescue during Deny Flight in addition to their traditional
taskings in support of special operations missions. The MH-53s were stationed at Brindisi Air
Base, Italy. Those forces were augmented by HH-60H Sea Hawks from the aircraft carrier USS
Theodore Roosevelt and the considerable fixed-wing attack assets at various locations in the
theater (principally from the aircraft carrier USS T. Roosevelt and Aviano Air Base, Italy).
174
Smith [2], Aircraft Down section
175
Smith [2], Aircraft Down section
176
Smith [2]
2-85
Super Puma helicopters from the French Air Force were also on-call from their staging area at
Split, Croatia (see Figure 2-51).
After Basher 52 was lost, CINCSOUTH moved the USS Kearsarge into the area and put the 24th
MEU(SOC) on-call for the recovery (in case Basher 52 could be located).177 The MEU(SOC)’s
planned method of recovery was to use Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
procedures, and the following aircraft: CH-53, AH-1W, AV-8B, F/A-18, and EA-6B.178
Depending on the time of day, the duty for recovering downed pilots alternated between JSOTF
(1500-0300) and the MEU(SOC) (0300-1500). When Basher 52 made radio contact early in the
morning on June 8, CINCSOUTH bypassed the alert schedule somewhat, calling BG (sel) Marty
Brandt at about 0230 (local), already having decided that the USMC would prosecute the
mission if possible.179
The Marines and the JSOTF both established concepts of operations that that anticipated
executing combat operations only at night. Although rescue forces were on-call around the
clock, very rapid response times were anticipated only in “permissive” environments. “Non-
permissive” environments were restricted to periods of darkness and required several hours’
notice prior to takeoff.180 While true that Basher 52’s rescue was accomplished during daylight,
that was not the original plan. After more than five days of evasion, Basher 52 finally made
contact with NATO aircraft at 0208(L) on June 8. When he did, he was disappointed (to say the
least) when the plan passed back to him was to prepare for pickup “mañana” (tomorrow), when it
was dark again. He immediately vetoed that plan and, in response, CINCSOUTH gave the
MEU(SOC) two options—launch the mission in darkness immediately but without additional air
support, or delay for additional air support and accept a daylight mission. BG (sel) Berndt,
commanding the MEU(SOC) chose the latter.181 Once the Basher 52 mission was underway, the
multinational effort to recover him also included support from about forty aircraft including F-
16C, F-15E, EF-111, A-10, KC-135R, HC-130, and MH-53J.182
THE RECOVERY
The helicopters departed the USS Kearsarge at 0505 (L) on June 8. Although airborne, they
were forced to delay their ingress for 45 minutes as the fixed-wing support forces were launched
and assembled from Brindisi Air Base, Italy, and from the USS Teddy Roosevelt. Once the
TRAP force had been assembled, the helicopters went “feet dry” over Bosnia, and quickly
covered the approximately 90 mile distance to Basher 52. As they approached the last ridge line
before reaching O'Grady, the two CH-53s that were the primary recovery vehicles stopped short
and held while the two AH-1W Cobra gunships, providing escort, continued forward. The
Cobras made voice contact with Basher 52 at about 0640(L) on the morning of the rescue. Once
communications were established, Basher 52 used his survival radio to vector the helicopters
closer using the sound of the helicopters since they were obscured by fog. When the helicopters
177
Ships supporting the recovery operation included the USS Kearsarge (an LHD-class amphibious assault ship), the
USS Nashville, USS Pensacola, and the aircraft carrier T. Roosevelt.
178
Gunther, p. 20
179
Smith [4], Opening Statement. BG (sel) Berndt was the commander of the Marine force (24th MEU(SOC) that
would perform the mission.
180
Simmons, p. 11-27
181
Smith [4], Opening Statement
182
Pomeroy, p. 1
2-86
were close, Basher 52 activated a smoke grenade from his survival vest to mark his position.
Once spotted, the crew of one of the Cobras opened its canopy and dropped a yellow smoke
grenade to mark the position for the CH-53s. The other Cobra circled the area to ensure it was
safe and then guided the CH-53s into the landing zone.
The LZ was on the side of a hill in what appeared to be a pasture, strewn with large rocks and
smaller pine scrub. A line of tall pine trees surrounded the LZ and a primitive fence divided it in
two. Heavy fog hung just below the treetops over the LZ as the CH-53Es landed as close to the
mark as possible. As soon as the first CH-53 landed about 20 Marines scrambled down the aft
ramp to establish perimeter security and prepare for a search. The second CH-53 initially landed
on the fence, making it impossible to lower the tail ramp. The helicopter adjusted its position a
few meters forward in the LZ, let down the ramp and began to let out more Marines.
Simultaneously and unexpectedly, Captain O'Grady came running from the tree line. Caked with
mud, wearing an orange watch cap and carrying his 9-mm Beretta pistol, he ran to the helicopter
and was assisted aboard through the starboard gunner's hatch. With Basher 52 safely aboard, the
security element from the lead CH-53 reboarded and a head count was conducted. After seven
minutes on the ground in the LZ (most of which was spent ensuring accountability of the Marine
security force), the two CH-53s lifted off heading due west toward the coastline. About 0650,
word was passed over the loudspeaker on the Kearsarge that the TRAP force had recovered the
pilot and was on the way back. 183
On egress, USAF jets detected a Serb search radar (Giraffe) along the Croatian coast, searching
for targets. Airborne forces recommended destroying the Serb radar, but the request was denied,
partly out of concern that a strike could spark wider conflict. Before arriving back at the ship,
the helicopters were confronted with fire from small arms, AAA and MANPADS, experiencing
minor damage to the helicopters and no casualties.
Although the mission was successful, certain deficiencies are apparent. Beyond the questions of
the very lengthy search phase, and the vulnerability of the helicopters parked in the LZ for
several minutes, the most significant issue over which there was some degree of control was the
amount of delay introduced in the Command and Control process. The following timeline
(Table 2-19) for the Basher 52 recovery reflects significant delay during surface-based command
and control decision-making—delays that are noteworthy when one considers that forces had
been anticipating (and planning for) that particular mission for the preceding five days. The
timeline shows that two full hours were consumed between the positive identification of Basher
52 and the issuance of an execute order.
183
Berndt, pp 45-47.
2-87
Table 2-19: Basher 52 Recovery Timeline (Local Times)
(Sources: Various, including: Auster, Smith [4], Fedarko)
0208 Basher 52 contacts Deny Flight aircraft flying overhead
0220 Basher 52 positively identified as Captain O'Grady
0230 CINCSOUTH notifies the Kearsarge of a possible mission.
Allied air forces operating out of bases in Italy, the UK, and
Germany, are put into an increased readiness posture
0440 CINCSOUTH calls Colonel Berndt aboard the Kearsarge
again with orders to "execute."
0505 Helicopters from the Kearsarge are airborne, awaiting rejoin
of fixed-wing support assets before pushing into Bosnia.
0550 Forces begin ingress
0635 Helicopters approach the terminal area
0644 Basher 52 recovered
0730 Basher 52 delivered to the Kearsarge
A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF THE RECOVERY

A detailed account of the recovery found its way onto the Internet and caused quite a sensation.
It was written by Air Force Capt. Scott Zobrist, an F-16 pilot based with O'Grady at Aviano AB,
Italy, just hours after O'Grady's rescue. Although Zobrist was flying an F-16 on the periphery of
the operation, he provides a first-hand account of the recovery operation. Despite some initial
embarrassment, Defense officials alternately declared that no classified information was revealed
in the e-mail, and that the report has been so widely disseminated that further distribution would
not cause more damage. Accordingly, that e-mail is included here:
Date: 95-06-08 19:32:48 EDT

(8 Jun 95)
To all my Viper buds and other Shit Hot Fighter Gods on the net -
It was a good day at Aviano! As you guys have no doubt heard, we rescued Scott "Zulu"
O'Grady today after 6 days of E&Eing in the Bosnian countryside. We had an idea that he
was still out there but hadn't had positive radio contact until about 0000Z this morning when
Capt T.O. Hanford had some extra gas so he stayed in his CAP a little longer and tried to
reach Zulu on the SAR A (PRC-112) freq from the day of the shoot down.
After about 40 minutes of calls in the blind, T.O. started getting some suspect clicks on the
mike. Finally, Zulu came up voice. T.O. didn't have all the info from Zulu's ISOPREP so he
came up with a quick way to verify it was indeed Zulu, although it sounded like Zulu
recognized T.O.'s voice and called him by name (although the comm was weak since T.O.
(Basher 11) was about 70 miles away). The comm went something like this.
"Basher 52 this is Basher 11"
2-88
--- click ---
"Basher 52, this is Basher 11, are you up on this freq"
"This is Basher 52"
"Say again, understand this is Basher 52"
"This is Basher 52...I'm alive"
"Say again, Basher 52, you are weak and unreadable, this is Basher 11"
"This is Basher 52!"
--- pause ---
"Basher 52, what squadron were you in at Kunsan?"
"Juvats! Juvats! I'm alive!"
"Copy that, you're alive! Basher 52, sit tight and come back up at 15 past the hour"
T.O. then started coordinating with Magic to pass words to the Deny Flight CAOC (command
center) that he had positive radio contact with Basher 52. They replied that T.O. should pass
the word “mañana” to Basher 52. When he did, Zulu replied “I want to get picked up tonight!”
(imagine that). So T.O. passed that to the CAOC and the decision was made to press with a
rescue. We were 2 hours before sunrise so it would be daylight but there was concern
(rightly so) that word would get out to the press and every SA-6 in the AOR would be mobile
and spiking us and the rest of the rescue package. So they went ASAP.
T.O. stayed airborne (now at about the 4 hour point in his sortie - one note here: T.O. got
high marks for wingman consideration for advising his wingman that it was a good time to
take a piss on the way to the tanker! That video clip probably won't make CNN ) and the 510
FS Buzzards scrambled our alert guys (I was #2). Unfortunately, Vaughn "Slot" Littlejohn and
I had just gone from 60 minute alert to 180 minute alert and I had headed home to get some
sleep. The phone rang at about 0255L (after about 10 minutes of sleep) telling me to get in
there ASAP. I was back at the SQ in 15 minutes. Before I was even in the door, our ADO,
Phil "Psycho" Sever told me we had positive radio contact, get dressed, step, crank, and taxi
ASAP - I would meet SLOT in EOR whenever he made it in. We were in the air at about
0400L (1+05 from a dead sleep at home) loaded with 2xGBU-12s, 2 slammers, 2 9Ms, a 131
pod, and 2 tanks (Standard DF SCL). We swapped out with T.O. manning the cap and
staying in touch with Zulu every 15 minutes. A SEAD package was getting airborne as T.O.
started his RTB. We had a plan with the F-18Ds (Harm shooters (kind of), with NVGs and a
WSO), EFs, and EA-6Bs to try to establish contact. But since we already had contact, the F-
18s just did a recce run to get a good fix on him and to check the weather.
Meanwhile, Zobe the hero, callsign Rock 42, was hanging on Slot's wing 70 miles away
listening to the whole thing, ensuring my tape was on. I can't wait to tell my grandkids about
the day I put all my Weapons School training to use - "No shit, kids, there I was - tape on,
tape off, tape on, tape off. The pressure was incredible!" Seriously, although I didn't do shit,
it was shit hot to listen to the entire mission unfolding. The helos were inbound, authenicating
Zulu (they asked him what he was called in high school when he got drunk!) With a good ID
they moved in, had Zulu pop some smoke, and picked him up. The whole thing from the
authentication to the pick-up was about 10 minutes (seemed like an eternity). To hear comm
like, "Basher 52, got you in sight", was pretty moving, especially after thinking for most of the
week that Zulu was a mort ("Wilbur" Wright didn't see a chute, no radio contact, etc.) I've
never been choked up in the jet before, but I was this morning.
Unfortunately, they weren't out of danger yet. We hit the tanker and when we came back up
to Magic freq the helos were about 13 miles from feet wet. Then I heard the escort chopper,
c/s Bull, say, "Bud, impacts underneath you. SAMS IN THE AIR! SAMS IN THE AIR!"
FUCK!! Luckily, they missed, although they took some small arms fire and apparently the
gunner from Bull silenced that. About 10 minutes later, we heard the call that they were feet
2-89
wet, then shortly after that that they had "mother in sight" (the ship), two more bits of comm
that I will never forget.
So we got one of our own back. What a day. I wish we could have done more in the rescue
but it was almost entirely a Navy and Marine show (we and the mud-eagles were in the cap)
and they kicked ass. So don't bad mouth the squids and jarheads too loudly - they put on a
good act today and we've got a Viper driver back because of it.
I thought you might enjoy hearing the story straight from the CSAR Commander of VTR Ops!
Hope it wasn't too mushy, but after all, I did cry when I watched Old Yeller. That's just the
emotional type of guy I am! Hope all is well with you guys at your various bases. Drop me a
line and let me know what's up. Fly safe, check six, and pray for the UN leadership to get a
clue and let us blow these bastards back into the stone age!
Zobe
2.3.2.3 EBRO 33 (August 30, 1995)

A Mirage 2000K, operated by French Air Force Captain Frederic Chiffot and Lieutenant Jose
Souvignet (callsign, Ebro 33), was shot down in the target area by a heat-seeking MANPADS,
on August 30, 1995 (the first day of Operation Deliberate Force). The loss occurred during
daylight operations, 20 miles southeast of the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale.184 After being hit,
both Mirage crewmembers were filmed ejecting from their aircraft.
Although ambiguous radio signals were received and conspicuous ground-to-air symbols were
observed, no positively identified signal was ever received from Ebro 33. Serb claims that they
had immediately captured the men turned out to be true (one of the two crewmembers had a
serious leg injury, making successful evasion even more unlikely). The status of the aircrew
could not be confirmed and, because of a successful Serbian deception campaign (see Section
2.3.5), NATO launched helicopter “reconnaissance” missions on three successive days to locate
the French airmen. In the many days that followed, NATO continued the search for Ebro 33,
tasking dozens of aircraft to fly hundreds of missions with the hope that they could be found.
2.3.3 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

During the 983 days of Operation Deny Flight, 23,021 "No-Fly Zone” fighter sorties were flown
over Bosnia-Herzegovina and an additional 27,077 Close Air Support and strike sorties were
flown. Given the three aircraft lost in combat, the frequency of isolating incidents is roughly
0.06 per 1000 combat sorties. That number does not include 29,158 support sorties flown by
SEAD, electronic warfare, tanker, reconnaissance, and support aircraft.185
Although Deliberate Force was but a phase of Deny Flight, its more aggressive posture and
higher tempo merit a concentrated look at the subset of sorties flown during the operation.
Deliberate Force included 2,470 “feet dry” combat sorties over the Balkans region, during which
the French Mirage was the only combat loss, yielding a loss rate of 0.4 per 1000 combat sorties.
Because of the very small number of losses during Deny Flight and Deliberate Force, statistical
conclusions should be drawn with caution.
184
AFSOUTH [2], Chronology and Smith [1], no page number
185
AFSOUTH [2], Statistics
2-90
The following sections characterize the isolating incidents during Deny Flight by categories of
threat, range, and time.
2.3.4.1 Distribution By Threat Level and Time of Day

Although the coalition enjoyed air superiority, the small arms, AAA, SAM, and MANPADS
threat was persistent. The Serbs had fewer surface-to-air missiles than were faced during
Operation Desert Storm, but showed a higher proficiency with the weapons than did the Iraqis.186
From the perspective of the rescuers, the considerable number of scattered Serbian ground
troops, and a hostile population in Bosnian Serb controlled areas significantly elevated the risk
level of any mission. In the end, one of the losses (Basher 52) can be attributed to a mobile SAM
(SA-6), and the remaining two were lost to MANPADS.
A couple of conclusions might be drawn regarding the surface-to-air threat. First, that efforts to
suppress Serb radar SAM systems were effective. While true that Basher 52 was lost to a radar
guided SAM, the Serbs were forced to be clever in its use (and to deviate from traditional
doctrine) to have any chance of success. The second conclusion regards the intractable nature of
the threat posed by dismounted infantry. The Serbs, by remaining scattered in the countryside,
were able to avoid making themselves targets for traditional bombing campaigns while
exploiting their broad area coverage to take shots at targets of opportunity. That battlefield
characteristic impacted not only the two fighters lost to MANPADS, but was a significant factor
facing their would be rescuers.
Both Basher 52 and Ebro 33 were lost in areas solidly under control of the Bosnian Serb Army
(BSA), making successful evasion difficult and dangerous. Consistent with that description, two
of those three crewmembers were captured, and the other suffered an abnormally long period of
silent evasion before he could contact friendly forces to initiate his rescue. The rescued pilot of
the downed GR-7 may have benefited from a pocket of localized control that the Bosnian
Government Army (BIH) maintained around the city of Gorazde. Once outside the vicinity of
Gorazde, movement and popular sentiment were under control of the BSA
2.3.4.2 Distribution By Range

The locations of the downed aircrew and the basing locations of rescue forces are depicted in
Figure 2-51. At the extreme, forces from Brindisi responding to the Ebro 33 or GR-7 incidents
would have operated at a range of just under 200 miles. That range was reduced by operational
measures such as the establishment of an FOL at Split, Croatia and the use of HH-60H
helicopters from the USS Teddy Roosevelt during initial searches for the crew from Ebro 33.
The rescue of Basher 52 was staged from the USS Kearsarge and other ships that had
repositioned off the Croatian coast during the lengthy search phase. When the mission was
initiated, forces on the Kearsarge were at a point 87 miles from their objective. Because
CINCSOUTH was able to position the ships much closer to the area of interest than the special
operations forces stationed at Brindisi, the 24th MEU(SOC) aboard the Kearsarge was tasked as
the primary rescue response package.
186
Col. Charles Wald, commander of the 31st Fighter Wing as quoted in Borg, p. 1
2-91
Figure 2-51: Locations of Combat Rescue Incidents in OAF
2.3.5 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns

The Serbs appear to have placed significant strategic value on the capture of downed Coalition
pilots, and exploited the hostility of the local population to search for aircrew on the ground after
aircraft had been shot down. Search activity was coupled with deception efforts that can
generally be characterized as effective. Deception included possible use of false emergency
beeper transmissions, and propagation of misinformation in the press.
2-92
One of the most remarkable (and successful) efforts to deceive was observed during the search
for Ebro 33. Although the crew had been seen bailing out, voice contact had never been
established. Hopes were raised when, on September 5 (six days after the shootdown), a German
reconnaissance aircraft returned with what CINCSOUTH considered “convincing evidence” of
the status of the crew of Ebro 33. That photograph included “what appeared to be a 3 with the
outline of a Mirage aircraft, another 3, followed by the letters E, B, and something beyond that
which I was not personally able to make out…There was an individual photographed standing on
the road adjacent to this sign, pointing to it.”187
Based on that photograph, CINCSOUTH received approval to launch three helicopter
“reconnaissance” missions to search for the crew of Ebro 33. In a press conference after the
missions had been completed, CINCSOUTH made the following distinction between a
reconnaissance mission and a rescue mission:
“Let me first point out the difference between a reconnaissance mission and a
rescue mission. A pickup or rescue mission is similar to that which was
conducted for Capt. Scott O'Grady. You will recall that we had voice
communications with Capt. O'Grady, he had authenticated his call sign, we
knew his precise location, and we knew that he was physically well enough to
get to a helicopter if we got into the area…Now the reason we were able to do
[the three reconnaissance missions] is, earlier, we had been briefed by some
young men from the combat search and rescue organization on board the
Theodore Roosevelt as well as our special operations forces out of Brindisi,
and I was convinced that they had done some very good planning to navigate
to this objective area, to conduct reconnaissance in the area, and to egress out
of the area. So we knew that there had been considerable work done and
that's why Gen. Ryan and I elected to go up our chain of command and
recommend that we conduct the mission.” 188
The reconnaissance missions were conducted on September 6, 7, and 8, and included a large
contingent of support aircraft, including those for CAS, SEAD, combat air patrol, airborne
command and control, and NATO AWACs. On those missions, helicopters (carrying up to 11
ground troops each) searched the terminal area for 30 minutes or more, encountering enemy fire
described as “fulsome” and “fairly heavy.” Each of the three missions took fire, resulting in the
wounding of two of the would-be rescuers.189 It should be emphasized that performing a
“combat search” using helicopters in denied areas is a departure from Joint (and Air Force)
doctrine and, considering the vulnerability of the helicopters and the number of personnel they
carried, was performed at considerable risk. Doctrine does contemplate the use of
reconnaissance missions but the intended vehicle is not a helicopter, but an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) or a higher-flying fixed-wing aircraft.190 The successful hoax upped the ante for
187
188
189
Smith [3], in Opening Statement and responses to reporters questions
190
Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, suggests, “Visual searches using manned aircraft
conducting search patterns are not recommended in other than low-threat environments (p. III-6).” Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue, is consistent in that regard. It says, “The concept of “combat
search” associated with Air Force CSAR should be considered extremely limited in scope…The vulnerability of
rescue resources in a threat environment precludes extended aerial search operations in all but a permissive
environment. (p. 20)”
2-93
NATO commanders, prompting a response that put many additional NATO personnel at very
high risk of loss. This is not necessarily a critique of the decisions leading to the reconnaissance
missions, but is intended to highlight how a successful deception campaign can significantly
benefit an outnumbered, outmatched enemy force.
Serb deception was not limited to the one photograph. In the cases of Ebro 33 and Basher 52,
multiple conflicting public statements were made by the Serbs, alternatively claiming to have
captured the airmen and claiming no knowledge of their status. The following tables outline the
chronology of often conflicting public statements made regarding the status of the aircrew:
Table 2-21: Chronology of Public Statements - Basher 52

June 2 Basher 52 shot down by SA-6. It is not known whether O’Grady survived the
incident.
Serb military leaders tell Western officials they are holding the pilot.
Adm. Leighton Smith (CINCSOUTH) confirms to the press that the pilot
survived and was taken captive by the Serbians.
June 3 Wreckage of the F-16 is shown on Bosnian Serb television.
The same day, A spokesman for Serb leader Radovan Karadzic then declares,
"we have no information about the pilot."
June 4 Gen. Ronald Fogelman (USAF Chief of Staff) mentions to reporters at a
Pentagon reception that intermittent signals have been received from what
could be the airman's emergency locator beacon.
June 7 NATO reports that aircraft flying over the region confirm they were getting
transmissions from what was thought to be O'Grady's radio beacon
June 8 A pilot from Capt. O'Grady's own squadron, (555th Fighter Squadron) from
Aviano Air Base, hears and recognizes O’Grady’s voice while flying over
Bosnia. O’Grady is recovered.
2-94
Table 2-22: Chronology of Public Statements – Ebro 33
Aug 30 Ebro 33 shot down by MANPADS. Film of the aircrew bailing out confirms their survival.
Sept 4 Serb military sources say a Serb farmer armed with a pistol captured the officers and handed
them to Bosnian Serb soldiers.
Sept 5 A German reconnaissance aircraft returns with a photograph of what is presumed to be a
ground-to-air signal constructed by the crew of Ebro 33.
Sept 6 Recon Mission #1: Two US Navy HH-60H helicopters from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, each
carrying an eight-man SEAL team, attempt to locate Ebro 33. Sporadic ground fire was
encountered and the mission was eventually turned back due to heavy thunderstorms without
arriving in the terminal area.
CNN broadcasts Peter Arnett's interview of Bosnian-Serb President, Radovan Karadzic. When
asked about the fate of the aircrew, Karadzic said the truth was "secret."
Sept 7 Recon Mission #2: Four MH-53J helicopters from the Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSOTF) at Brindisi, Italy attempt to locate Ebro 33. Each helicopter carried “15 or 16” personnel
(including aircrew). “Rather fulsome” ground fire was encountered and the mission was
eventually turned back due to very dense ground fog after searching the terminal area for a
“considerable mount of time.”
Sept 8 Recon Mission #3: Four JSOTF MH-53J helicopters attempt to locate Ebro 33. They spent
“almost 30 minutes” searching and received small arms fire described as “fairly heavy.”
Sept 7 French Defense Minister Charles Millon hints he knows the pilots are still free, saying they “are
out there in the Bosnian countryside in a place known only to those whose mission today is to go
and bring them back.''
Sept 18 France asks the Red Cross to help find the two airmen, abandoning its suggestions they are still
at large.
Sept 22 The Yugoslavian Foreign Minister said he understood that one of the pilots had been in hospital
in Bosnian Serb territory where he had treatment for a broken leg.
Later on the same day he said he has no knowledge of the pilots' whereabouts.
Sept 27 Millon says France has proof that the servicemen are alive and being held by Bosnian Serbs.
Sept 28 French magazine Paris Match publishes the first photographs of the two, held by Bosnian Serbs.
Search efforts are discontinued.
Oct 18 Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic confirms the two airmen were captured but says they
were later kidnapped by an unknown group.
Dec 8 Without specifying the actions that will be taken, France sets December 10 as deadline for the
Bosnian Serbs return the two flyers.
Dec 11 France backs away from its ultimatum after the deadline passes with no word on pilots' fate.
The Yugoslav Defense Minister later tells a NATO delegation in Belgrade that the Bosnian Serb
authorities are about to issue a statement on the pilots' fate and hints it would be positive.
Dec 12 The Serbs release the crew from Ebro 33 to French authorities.
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2.3.6 Use of Ground Forces for Aircrew Rescue
Although airpower was a primary focus during Deny Flight for both the enforcement of the NFZ
and during attempted rescue missions, NATO had a noteworthy presence on the ground in
Bosnia, totaling about 15,000 troops serving under UNPROFOR. Their concentrations,
however, were not in likely areas of aircraft loss, reducing their potential to conduct opportune
recoveries. Nevertheless, the rapid recovery of the GR-7 crew benefited from the proximity of
UNPROFOR ground troops.
Other ground forces were available to support recovery of S/E (i.e. SOF and SEALS), but their
use as clandestine ground recovery teams, while advocated by some during the search for Ebro
33, was deemed impractical. In retrospect, that assessment appears to have been a wise one.
Even if the crew had not already been captured, an Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR)
mission to recover Ebro 33 would have presented a nearly insurmountable tactical challenge to a
team on the ground in light of the scant information that was available and the large search area
in the vicinity of a Serb stronghold (for aircrew with whom NATO had no contact). In the end,
such a mission would have exposed the team to significant risk to recover an aircrew that was
already in enemy hands.

Although every rescue reconnaissance and recovery mission experienced took fire from various
small arms, AAA, and SAMS, there were no recovery force losses during Deny Flight. Several
of the helicopters received minor battle damage, and two cabin crewmembers received (non-
critical) shrapnel wounds. All forces involved in the rescue missions returned safely to their
respective bases.
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2.4 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo 1999)
For 78 days, from March to June 1999, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies engaged in a major military operation (Operation Allied Force
[OAF]) to bring an end to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo.191 The operation resulted 14,000 combat
sorties and two combat losses of aircraft.

Nineteen NATO nations worked together to support Operation Allied Force. In all, 14 Air
Forces contributed combat and combat support sorties for the air campaign in rough proportion
to the size of each member’s Air Force, and European nations, both NATO and non-NATO,
deployed substantial ground forces in neighboring Albania and Macedonia.
Despite those factors, NATO successfully integrated air, land, and sea operations throughout the
conflict. Some activities—notably, targeting, strike operations, and humanitarian assistance
were conducted from locations around the globe. Within the Kosovo area of operations, NATO
carried out combat strikes over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the province of Kosovo
using aircraft from 14 of its member states, including the United States. In addition, NATO
forces provided defense and logistics support for the alliance forces deployed in Italy, Albania,
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted support operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; and carried out naval operations in the Adriatic Sea. The latter included, at one
time, aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships from four nations, all operating within the
same confined sea space.192 Ultimately, NATO’s military effort prevailed, incurring very few
losses in the process.193
191
Cohen, p. 1 of “Message from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Henry H. Shelton” in Kosovo/OAF After Action Report.
192
Cohen, p. xiv.
193
Cohen, p. 2.
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Despite the significant NATO presence, the campaign over Kosovo was not a traditional military
conflict. Instead of pursuing decisive airpower objectives, NATO chose a coercive strategy that
was similar to that used during Operation Deny Flight. Further, there was no direct clash of
massed military forces in Operation Allied Force. Because the Serbs were generally ineffective
in directly countering NATO’s military operations (although the continuous threat to allied pilots
posed by large numbers of SAMs and AAA was formidable), they chose to fight chiefly through
indirect means: use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians; attempts to exploit the premium
the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage; creation of enormous
refugee flows to trigger a humanitarian crisis; and the conduct of disinformation and propaganda
campaigns. Serb forces dispersed themselves among civilian populations and exploited the small
signature of scattered light infantry and police forces. The Serbs also hid many of their better
military weapons and kept their SAM defenses largely intact through hit-and-run-tactics.
Although overwhelmed militarily, the Serbs proved to be remarkably agile and resilient,
constantly adjusting their tactics based on what they observed. An A-10 pilot who operated in
the region describes that flexibility:
“I flew the first day that we went, and flew 25 missions, 19 as mission
commander. So I saw the evolution. It really was an evolutionary period.
The Serbs reacted to everything we did. When we initially went into country
we found the military vehicles on the roads, we attacked them with precision-
guided missions, bombs, bullets, and within three days we drove them off the
roads. They were smart…. We had to change our tactics. The first week or
so we were very effective, and then we found that they were driven into
hiding. Then we had to develop techniques for finding them in the
mountains, in revetments. We found them there, again began to engage
them. Before long they left the revetments and started going into the tree
lines. For the tree lines we used other assets along with that to find them. So
there are peaks and valleys, along with the poor weather, where our actual
tactics evolved over the period. At the very end, with Mount Pec, we saw
some of the Serbs coming out to engage and we were able to find them out in
the open and engage them. So there were peaks and there were valleys. The
Serbs were very smart on the ground.”194
Weather was also a factor, complicating efforts to acquire and identify targets and making it
more difficult to prevent collateral damage.195 Only 50 percent of the strike days during the
conflict were described as “good weather days.”196
The OAF Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC), located within the Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, was responsible for establishing, maintaining, and
operating the personnel recovery (PR) architecture for OAF and other ongoing operations within
the Theater. Consistent with doctrine, the PRCC established a “PR umbrella” over the entire
Theater, consisting of PR forces and assets provided by all Services of the U.S., the United
Nations (UN), and several Allied Nations within NATO.
194
Unnamed A-10 pilot, quoted in Gen Clark’s press conference (see Boyle reference).
195
Cohen, p. xiv.
196
Boyle (no page number).
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2.4.2 Narratives of Isolating Incidents
There were a total of three isolating incidents involving Coalition assets in the Balkan Theater of
Operations in 1999. Two of these incidents involved combat loss of Coalition aircraft. The third
incident, which is not a subject of this report, was the ambush and capture of three US Army
soldiers conducting a border patrol. Both aircraft incidents resulted in the use of helicopters to
perform the recoveries.
2.4.2.1 VEGA 31 (March 27, 1999)

Vega 31, a USAF F-117A, was hit by a radar guided SAM while egressing the target area on a
night mission over Kosovo. It immediately became uncontrollable, and the pilot ejected without
delay in the vicinity of the missile system that led to aircraft loss. He landed in an area of
plowed fields and irrigation ditches, about 50 yards from a road and rail track intersection. Once
on the ground, he concealed himself in a culvert about 200 yards from his landing site.197
Initial notification originated with a radio call from Vega 31 (using his PRC-112A survival
radio) to AWACS during his parachute descent.198 Additional contact from the survivor would
not be received until about 3-1/2 hours later, when he informed support forces that he was okay
and that there was a fair amount of ground activity in the area. The location effort was made
more difficult due to enemy spoofing and jamming.199
The recovery of Vega 31 was the first Combat Rescue mission of OAF. The nighttime mission
had an inauspicious beginning when, at the direction of the JSOTF, the three-ship formation of
helicopters launched without the knowledge of the CAOC. The JSOTF’s unilateral launch order
to the helicopters had a high potential for fratricide. The flight’s location was unknown to the
CAOC, and NATO forces were shooting down helicopters when they were detected. Although
the helicopter crews felt confident that their identity and status were known (based on the
presence of a mission tasking in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and their transponder codes),200
there was actually great ambiguity within the command and control network and among fighters
flying combat air patrol that night. In fact, the helicopters were targeted by a formation of
American F-15Cs after an interrogation of the lead MH-53’s transponder failed to return to
proper identifying codes. Because the F-15s were engaging the helicopters beyond visual range
(BVR), theater procedures required the CAOC to authorize engagement of the target. It was
during the pause created by that final safeguard, based on nothing more than an uneasy suspicion
in the CAOC, that the fighters were directed to break off the engagement.201
Because the CAOC received late notice that the helicopters were airborne, CSARTF assembly
was delayed. As a result, when the helicopters arrived at the Serbian border, the fighters, C2
aircraft, and other assets needed for the rescue were not yet ready for the push into Serbian
airspace. The helicopters hovered for a while at the edge of Serbian territory, then landed with
engines running to conserve fuel. Now in contact with the OSC (a Sandy qualified A-10), it was
decided that, since their remaining fuel only permitted about 10 minutes of loiter time, they
197
Borg, p. 1.
198
Borg, p. 1.
199
Laushine, p.1.
200
Trask, in correspondence
201
Trumpfheller (from his personal interviews with the F-15C flight lead that flew the intercept that night and Maj
McGonagill, the PRCC director during Allied Force).
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would need more fuel before attempting the recovery. Accordingly, the helicopters rejoined with
an MC-130P tanker (which itself was running low on fuel) for air refueling. The refueling took
place within 3 miles of the Serbian border at an altitude of just 700 feet. Because of the early
launch, the helicopter refueling occurred when the rest of the CSARTF was ready to push,
further upsetting the synchronization of the mission.
By the time the fixed-wing support package crossed into Serbia, the downed pilot's location had
been determined within a mile. The pilot was 25 miles outside of Belgrade and within 10 miles
of three Serb Army Brigades. As the helicopters got close to the pilot's reported position, a cloud
deck made it impossible for the A-10s to visually locate him (see Section 2.4.6for a more
detailed discussion about the placement of the A-10s above the cloud deck). All the rescuers
could determine was that the pilot was near a major intersection, where Serb vehicles stopped
regularly to unload soldiers and search dogs.
The final push into the terminal area had been delayed three times. First, so that the helicopters
could refuel; second, when the CSARTF received false reports that Vega 31 had been captured;
and third, following the bogus capture reports, when Sandy 1 had difficulty re-contacting Vega
31 on his survival radio. After spending an additional eight minutes trying to make contact, the
helicopters were finally cleared in for the recovery.
Once in the terminal area, Vega 31 was directed to ignite the smoke generator available in his
survival vest. When he did, helicopters (about a half-mile away) spotted him immediately. Six
hours after the shootdown, the third helicopter in the formation, an MH-60G quickly touched
down, and within 60 seconds was airborne again with Vega 31 on board.202 On egress, they
experienced Serb searchlights, small arms fire, and AAA.203
2.4.2.2 HAMMER 34 (May 2, 1999)

On the night of May 2, 1999, the Serbs launched three SA-3 missiles, from two separate sites,
against a four-ship of F-16CJs on a Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (DEAD) mission near
Novi Sad, in northern Serbia. One of the missiles hit Hammer 34, damaging his engine. The
aircraft remained controllable, but engine performance was immediately degraded. Within about
5 minutes, the engine failed entirely, and the pilot was forced to glide away from the threat.
Initial notification of the loss was by a radio call from the Hammer 34 to his wingman
immediately after being hit. Hammer 34 was in constant contact with his wingman, right up
until ejection, as he assessed the severity of his problem.204
The ejection was a controlled bailout within a safe ejection envelope, approximately 20 miles
from the area where the SAM was encountered.205 The pilot landed in plowed fields and
concealed himself in an adjacent tree line until recovery three hours later.206 Once on the
ground, Hammer 34 was in immediate contact with his flight-lead (Hammer 33), now acting as
the OSC. Hammer 33 organized a flow plan for tanker aircraft to keep a constant stream of
fighters over the crash site and coordinated the fighter orbits so that aircraft would be available to
202
Borg, p. 1.
203
Information in the account that is not specifically cited is a composite from Newman and interviews of Laushine,
McGonagill, Cherrey, and Trumpfheller.
204
Hammer 34 interview.
205
Hammer 34 interview.
206
Williams, p. 1.
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knock out any SAMs that popped up. The Serbs still managed to fire a few shots, at one point
forcing his new wingman to jettison his weapons to outmaneuver a missile.
Meanwhile, NATO had launched rescue helicopters (two MH-53Js and one MH-60G) from
Bosnia, hoping to arrive before sunrise less than two hours later. Because the crews felt that
there was no time to wait for their A-10 RESCORT, the helicopters flew without them. As the
helicopters searched in the vicinity of the initial coordinates for about 7 minutes, and as they
navigated to the multiple incorrect locations that were reported to them over the course of the
next hour, the three helicopters faced sporadic barrages of SAMs, AAA, and small arms fire, and
used their on-board guns to suppress what they could.207 At one point, the MH-60G was targeted
by an SA-9 missile, which missed by about 100 feet. Later on, the same helicopter took rounds
in the fuselage and left engine cowling from small arms fire. Finally, vectors from the OSC
pointed the helicopters towards Hammer 34’s actual location about 17 miles away. It is a small
(and illustrative) irony that the A-10s, for which there was not enough time to wait, actually
saved the mission in its role as OSC by handing-off the correct S/E location to the helicopter.
Once in the terminal area, Hammer 34 vectored the helicopters toward him based on their rotor
noise. As they were just passing his location, Hammer 34 turned on his strobe light, and the
MH-60G made a quick turn and landed in the clearing. Although the time in the LZ was
measured in seconds, it was enough time for Serbs with small arms to approach the area and fire.
On egress, as was the case during the recovery of Vega 31, Serb heavy AAA and small-arms fire
followed the helicopters until they were once again in Bosnia.208
2.4.3 Adversary Reaction to Shootdowns

The Serbs appear to have placed significant strategic value on the capture of downed Coalition
pilots. Special effort was taken to increase the likelihood of their success, and forces were
assigned to that role. Further, Serbs attempted (successfully) to disrupt rescue activity with
spoofing and jamming of rescue frequencies.209
2.4.4 Frequency of Isolating Incidents

Over 38,000 sorties were flown in support of OAF and related operations in the Balkan Theater
for the period of March to June 1999. Approximately 16,500 of those were strike, air defense, or
air defense suppression sorties.210 Given the two aircraft lost in combat, the frequency of
isolating incidents is roughly 0.121 per 1000 combat sorties.

The following sections characterize the isolating incidents of OAF by categories of threat, range,
and time. It should be recognized that the limited number of incidents might present a
misleading picture.
207
Newman (no page number).
208
The account is a composite of information from Williams and interviews of Laushine, McGonagill, and
Trumpfheller.
209
Laushine, p. 1.
210
Clark, pp. 16-18.
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2.4.5.1 Distribution By Threat Level
Both combat losses during OAF occurred under conditions described as “non-permissive.”
Although the coalition enjoyed air superiority (and eventually air supremacy), the small arms,
AAA, and SAM threat was persistent. From the perspective of the rescuers, the considerable
number of ground troops distributed throughout Serbia, and a hostile Serbian population
significantly elevated the risk level of any mission.
2.4.5.2 Distribution By Range

Figure 2-52 shows where the F-117 incident (Vega 31) occurred, approximately 20 miles west of
Belgrade.211 That location was about fifty miles from recovery forces at Tuzla. The F-16
incident (Hammer 34) occurred about 40 miles from recovery forces, just after his strike on SAM
sites near Novi Sad.212 All of the incidents (including the non-combat events) happened within
50 miles of recovery forces, and can be considered short-range missions.
Figure 2-52: Locations of Combat Rescue Incidents in OAF
211
Vega 31 interview.
212
Williams, p. 1.
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2.4.5.3 Distribution by Time of Day
Both combat losses occurred at night. This is primarily a function of the doctrine and tactics
employed throughout the operation. From the standpoint of successful evasion, it is noteworthy
to point out that most movement of Serbian ground combat forces occurred during the night.213
In both cases of combat loss, the downed pilots reported a significant amount of nighttime
activity in their immediate area.

AIRBORNE FORCES
For both the Vega 31 and Hammer 34 recoveries, a fixed-wing force of about 50 aircraft
supported the operation.214 In each case, it was a mixed-aircraft formation of MH-53Js and MH-
60Gs operating from ground-alert at Tuzla Air Base in Bosnia that made the recovery. At the
insistence of the JSOTF Commander, the MH-53s carried a platoon-sized “ground security”
element that was supposed to deploy in the LZ if the MH-53s landed. Although the AFSOC
crews operating the helicopters disagreed with the use of that tactic, they were given no choice
but to bring the ground forces along. Fortunately (perhaps conveniently) the MH-60G made the
pick-up in both cases. Had the security element been deployed, it is inevitable that the
helicopters would have been forced to spend more time on the ground in the LZ (as during the
recovery of Basher 52 during Operation Deny Flight).
With regard to CSAR support for the combat operation, OAF had many similarities to Desert
Storm and Deny Flight. First, AFSOF were assigned as primary CSAR assets. Conventional
CSAR forces (flying HH-60Gs) were not immediately available due to their support of other
operations in the northern and southern theaters of Southwest Asia. Although HH-60Gs
eventually arrived, they did not meet the theater’s requirements for operations in the robust IR
threat environment. By the time the aircraft were fitted with the appropriate countermeasures,
the war was essentially over, and both rescues had already been successfully prosecuted.
Second, assignment of AFSOF to the conventional Combat Rescue mission manifested force
integration problems resulting, primarily, from the now familiar dual chain of command for the
helicopters.215 Under that organization, operational control was maintained by the JSOTF who,
when a rescue mission was assigned, gave tactical control of the assets to the JFACC once the
helicopters became airborne. As in Desert Storm, complex information pathways and reporting
relationships caused critical communications failures resulting, for example, in the launch of
rescue forces without the direction (or knowledge) of the CAOC.216 In the end, the integration
failures ranged from the esoteric (violation of the principle of Unity of Command) to the
213
Cohen, p. 62.
214
McGonagill, interview.
215
The dual JSOTF/JFACC command chain was observed in Desert Storm, Deny Flight, and Allied Force. Perhaps
because its persistence over time has conferred it some credibility, it remains (as of this writing) the preferred mode
of operation when JSOTF assets are tasked to perform Combat Rescue in support of a JFACC. It was briefed as
standard operating procedure by General Bailey (Commander of USSOCOM) during the January 2001 Department
of Defense Personnel Recovery Conference. At the same briefing, the Director of Operations for Air Combat
Command, MGen Lamontagne, remarked, “we’re familiar with that, and can expect to see that organization again in
the future.”
216
Trumpfheller, interview.
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mundane (the JFACC and the JSOTF used different communications security codes, making
secure communications between players from each organization essentially impossible).
Training shortcomings were also evident during OAF, and the lack of procedural familiarity
among task force members created significant coordination problems during both CSAR
efforts.217 For example, as during Desert Storm, AFSOF were uncomfortable with traditional
RESCORT tactics, fearing that the fighters overhead would “give away” their position. During
training in the weeks before to the loss of Vega 31, AFSOF helicopter crews had insisted that A-
10s performing RESCORT remain detached so that they did not “highlight the helicopters.”
According to Sandy 1 during the Vega 31 mission, the weather, while adverse, would have
allowed the A-10s operate below the cloud deck, but would have required attached escort due to
the limited visibility.218 The contract established during training, however, caused the A-10s to
remain above the cloud deck, and unable to provide protection to the low-level helicopters as
they ingressed, or to visually locate Vega 31 in the terminal area. During the rescue of Hammer
34, AFSOF helicopters pushed into Serbia without waiting for RESCORT, causing massive
confusion and lengthy exposure to (and engagement by) threats on the ground.219
Many of the integration problems may have been discovered had the in-theater training been
more robust. Because the CAOC resisted running large-package Combat Rescue exercises
(SAREX) for training, rescue remained on the periphery of theater exercises, often taking place
after the main exercise activity had concluded, and without the benefit of the entire command
and control architecture.220 According to Major John Cherrey, “we never got a real command
and control workout during a SAREX.”221 In the end, training was generally limited to sorties
flown between the A-10s and either the AFSOF or French helicopters. Over time, AFSOF
helicopter crews changed and, for both the Vega and Hammer missions, the participating
helicopter crews were not those that had received the pre-conflict training.222
GROUND FORCES
Because of the nature of the ground threat during OAF, and general resistance to the use of US
(or other) ground forces in Bosnia or Kosovo, the use of ground teams as recovery forces was
generally discounted. Further, it was assessed that ground forces could not meet established
“time to recovery” criteria.223
217
Cohen, p. 72.
218
Cherrey, interview.
219
Trumpfheller, interview. During in-theater training, AFSOF helicopter units and A-10s providing RESCORT
had established “a contract” that said (a) the helicopters would not push across the border without RESCORT and
(b) that RESCORT would fly detached from the helicopters to accommodate AFSOF concerns about highlighting
the helicopters [Cherrey, interview]. Sudden departure from the expected concept of operations was a primary
contributor to the confusion among the players that night.
220
Trumpfheller, interview.
221
Cherrey, interview. Maj Cherrey, a Sandy-qualified A-10 pilot, was the OSC for the recovery of Vega 31.
222
Cherrey and Trumpfheller interviews.
223
McGonagill, interview.
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2.4.7 Factors Affecting the Rescue Operation
The following factors complicated one or both Combat Rescue missions in OAF: 224
• Both missions were hampered by delays in determining and disseminating the survivor’s
location.
• SOF elements were uncomfortable and unprepared to work as an element of a
conventional CSARTF.225
• SOF units were not given the opportunity to exercise with a large-scale CSARTF
package supported by command and control. This created numerous problems that
manifested themselves during both rescue missions.
• Conventional Combat Rescue forces, when they arrived in theater, were not equipped to
operate in the theater’s IR threat environment.
• US-only information. The US-only Air Tasking Orders (ATO) slowed reaction times and
lowered the overall situational awareness of the (NATO) CAOC. Further, the
simultaneous use of US-only and NATO communications security codes (COMSEC)
made secure communications between JSOTF and JFACC forces essentially impossible
until it was discovered.
• Dual Chain of Command – Joint Task Force (U.S.) and ALLIED FORCE (NATO).
• Dual Chain of Command of CSAR helicopters – CFACC and JSOTF.
• The JSOTF’s unilateral launch order to the helicopter flight had a high potential for
fratricide. The flight’s location was unknown to the CAOC, and helicopters were being
shot down by NATO forces when detected. Because of the early launch, the flight
required refueling when the rest of the CSARTF was ready to push, upsetting the
synchronization of the mission.
• Combat Rescue planning did not adequately consider the adversary’s communications
capability; including the effectiveness of jamming, spoofing, and the ability to identify
the CSAR channels being used.

Although both combat recovery missions experienced resistance and fire from various small
arms, AAA, and SAMS, there were no recovery force losses during OAF. One MH-60G
received battle damage to a main rotor blade and engine cowling from small arms fire during the
recovery of Hammer 34.
224
Cherrey, McGonagill, Laushine, and Trumpfheller interviews.
225
From the helicopter perspective, the approach to Combat Rescue execution during OAF was essentially as it was
eight years earlier during Desert Storm. One by one, the operational and tactical missteps observed in SWA were
repeated in the Balkans.
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2.5 Cold War Losses (1946-1991)
This section summarizes publicly reported incidents in which US military or other Government
aircraft were attacked by Soviet or other Communist forces, resulting in US casualties. Not
included are those losses occurring during military operations incident to and during the Korean
and Vietnam Wars. Also not included are those incidents in which US aircraft were forced or
shot down, but in which all aircrew were returned to the US unharmed. The references on which
the section is based emphasize that they are not an exhaustive account.

From the moment Winston Churchill warned in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain" had descended
across Europe, the Cold War became the defining feature of the remainder of the century. When
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became the centers of two
contending blocs, representing fundamentally opposed political ideologies, American military
strategy changed radically. The end of the war with Japan also witnessed the dawn of the
nuclear age with its subsequent stockpiles of weapons and delivery systems. The American
monopoly on nuclear power was broken with the Soviet acquisition of an atomic weapon in 1949
and by the late 1960s, a deliberately contrived nuclear weapons parity existed between the two
superpowers. Each was generally deterred from direct hostile acts against the other by the
knowledge that in a general war, victory could only be Pyrrhic. Amid conditions of nuclear
stalemate, the American defense establishment sought to contain an opponent perceived as
implacably hostile and bent on constant aggrandizement.
In this international setting, underdeveloped areas and emerging nations in the so-called Third
World sought to broker their own independent futures, often with the superpower aid and
assistance. Several limited conflicts raged on the periphery of superpower influence in countries
seen as client states of the respective superpowers. Yielding anywhere threatened to tumble local
commitments and alliances like so many dominoes.
After nearly a half-century punctuated by two major and protracted conflicts, several simmering
ones, and constant tension over client state loyalties, the Cold War drew to a close with the
collapse and dissolution of one of the principal contenders. The Soviet Union succumbed to the
increasing internal contradictions of its economic system and a political structure resistant to
change and sustained in power by an elaborate police and propaganda network.
2-106
Throughout the Cold War, American forces maintained the ability to project American power
abroad in support of national foreign policy. Naval forces in particular were engaged in
continuous patrol in the Mediterranean after a U.S. presence was established there as early as
1946. The Truman Doctrine, announced in 1947, pledged American help to legitimate
governments battling insurgent forces. The doctrine was itself considered the first application of
the evolving containment policy. The US Navy also sailed in contested waters separating the
Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan and its Communist counterpart on the mainland of
China.
Containment came to be played out in a series of smaller, localized conflicts rather than in a
direct confrontation between the two superpowers. The call-up of military and air reserve forces
helped resolve the Berlin Crisis of 1961. Washington was also inclined to use force in the
sensitive Caribbean basin, site of the strategic Panama Canal. The protection of American
interests in this region and along the southern border of the United States included the quarantine
of Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962, the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
the Grenada intervention of October 1983, and the Panama operation of 1989.
The Soviet Union's successes in consolidating and controlling a bloc in Eastern Europe in the
early years of the Cold War and the victory of Chinese Communism in the same period
contributed to a pervasive sense of danger and threat in the United States. The closing of the
Cold War, defined in terms of the end of the bipolar strategic equation, finds the United States
redefining its global commitments, reassessing its force structure, and restructuring Department
of Defense to adapt to a new and uncertain role in world affairs.

Over the course of nearly 50 years of “cold war,” U.S. government aircraft were shot down with
regularity by the USSR, Eastern European countries, China, and North Korea. Some of these
aircraft were performing intelligence missions near or actually inside Soviet airspace; others
were definitely in international airspace and/or were not involved in intelligence operations.
While virtually all such aircraft losses were acknowledged at the time, often with considerable
publicity, their intelligence functions were not.226
The American intelligence community would come to rely on the intelligence gathered during
those missions to assess Soviet technological advances. However, the Soviet Union was not the
sole objective of the operation. For instance, in September 1956, Francis Gary Powers flew over
the eastern Mediterranean to determine the position of British and French warships poised to
assist Israel's invasion of Egypt after Egyptian forces seized the Suez Canal. Other flights
followed to gather data on military activity during crises involving Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, and Yemen.
Between 1946 and 1992, there are 19 publicly reported incidents in which US Government
aircraft were destroyed and one involving a ship (the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, by the North
Koreans in early 1968). Of the 194 crewmembers involved in publicly reported aircraft
incidents, 38 were rescued, 12 were eventually repatriated to the United States, 29 were known
226
Goldrich (2) (no page number).
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to have been killed, and 115 remain unaccounted for.227 If there were loss incidents that were
not publicly reported, those numbers would inevitably rise.

In 17 publicly reported Cold War incidents where the cause of loss or damage is known, 14 were
caused by enemy fighters (Soviet, Chinese, or North Korean). The remainder is split between
AAA (two) and SAMs (one).
Without knowing the total number of missions flown in Cold War scenarios, it is impossible to
calculate loss rates per sortie. Even so, the losses were distributed rather evenly over time,
averaging about one loss per year between the first reported loss in 1950 and the last in 1969.
Unlike the more traditional conflicts included in this report, Cold War incidents tended to
involve aircraft with larger crews (averaging 10 crewmembers per incident). Figure 2-53 shows
the distribution among the 19 reported incidents.
8
7
6
5
Incidents
4
3
2
1
0
1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30+
Crew Size (personnel)
Figure 2-53: Distribution of Crew Sizes Among Reported Cold War Losses
(Source: DPMO PM-Cold Database and Goldrich [1] Summary)

Figure 2-54 shows the physical distribution of reported aircraft losses during the Cold War (not
shown is an additional U-2 loss over Cuba). With the exception of a U-2 lost deep in the USSR
near Sverdlovsk (the “Gary Powers U-2 Incident”), aircraft losses were at the geographic
periphery of the Soviet Union. Because those aircraft did not have the U-2s ability to fly at
remarkably high altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses, it is assumed that they were not routinely
227
Compiled from Goldrich (1) and DPMO.
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tasked for flights into the USSR’s interior. If that is the case, the loss distribution probably
represents the concentration of mission profiles in those areas, as opposed to a weaker air
defense inside the USSR’s. One can only speculate about the missions that were accomplished
without incident, or that went unreported.
Figure 2-54: Distribution of Known Cold War Incidents

(Source: DPMO PM-Cold Database and Goldrich [1] Summary)
2.5.4 Survivor/Evader Landing and Evasion Environments

Because of the incredible vastness of the Soviet Union, any aircrew that was shot down could
have been exposed to just about any imaginable physical environment, including desert, tundra,
glacier, and urban areas. Despite those potentialities, 13 of 18 incidents (72 percent) for which
the S/E’s physical environment was known resulted in aircraft losses over water. Except for a
US Navy P2V that crash landed on St. Lawrence Island in Alaska after being damaged by Soviet
fighters, there was no instance of a successful rescue over land (among the small group of
incidents covered in this section). Table 2-22 summarizes the outcomes for the 18 incidents
where the physical environment was known.
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Table 2-27: Incident Outcomes Over Land and Water
Incidents Incidents Geography
Total
Over Land Over Water Unknown
All aircrew killed or missing 2 8 1 11
At least one crew member

1 4 - 5
successfully rescued
At least one crewmember
2 1 - 3
repatriated after capture
Total 5 13 1 19
When a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down in May of 1960, nearby civilians
captured him almost immediately after his parachute landing. Among his possessions were a
“blood chit” for requesting assistance in several languages, several ounces of gold, and cash in
denominations from several European countries. Those items, along with contemporaneous
interest in the feasibility of evasion by foot over extremely long distances, and the limited range
and capabilities of that era’s helicopters, suggest that rescue from deep inside the Soviet Union
may not have been seen as realistic. By contrast, recovery forces (usually the US Navy) were
frequently available to respond to incidents at sea and near coastlines.
Soviet reaction to Cold War incidents was secretive and confounding. Few details were
volunteered by the Soviets and what information was available was often demonstrably false. It
is surmised that some of the aircrew listed as an
MIA had actually been captured by the
Soviets—a fact that they denied then, and
continue to deny now.
Because of the scarcity of information about the

isolating incidents during the Cold War, the
uniqueness of the missions, and the significant
evolution of Combat Rescue and Special
Operations capabilities since most of those
events occurred, no significant conclusions
could be drawn from that part of our history. At
best, the Cold War incidents serve as a reminder
that the World is very large and that rescue may
sometimes be needed at the most improbable
Figure 2-55: Washington Daily News,
locations.
May 7, 1960
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2.6 Combat Rescue Test and Experiment Results
One of the outcomes of the numerous problems experienced during Combat Rescue missions
since the war in SEA, particularly after Desert Storm, was a heightened DOD interest in “fixing
Rescue.” As the HH-60G was introduced to the Combat Rescue role, Air Rescue Service (ARS)
was reactivated in 1989 and organized under USAF Military Airlift Command.228 By 1993, ARS
was again deactivated and its aircraft and resources were subsequently transferred to Air Combat
Command as part of an Air Force Chief of Staff plan to integrate the Combat Rescue function
with the combat air forces (CAF). With the realignment came a significant increase in funding
for conventional Combat Rescue equipment and personnel. In addition to the increased
resources dedicated to Combat Rescue, more emphasis was placed on development of doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Consequently a variety of Combat Rescue oriented
experiments and testing events have occurred since the early 1990s. Significant among them
were the Joint Combat Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation (JCSAR JT&E), Expeditionary Force
Experiments (EFX 1999 and Joint EFX 2000), and numerous CSAR tactics development and
evaluations (TD&E), operational tests (OT&E), and computer modeling and simulation (M&S)
conducted by the Air Warfare Center (AWFC).
The data derived from the combination of all those events provide a sample size that rivals the
SEA conflict, and offer results that are germane to the purpose of this report. Note, however,
that this section provides only an overview of these events—for a detailed presentation of data,
and for in depth analysis, the published reports must be referenced.
2.6.1 Summary of Major Exercise, Test, and Modeling Events

The scope of the “wars” that made up the exercise and test events were such that every
imaginable type of tactical, ISR, and C4I asset was represented. The events had varied levels of
real and notional players, and took place at a wide variety of stateside and overseas locations.
228
At the time, the aircraft was designated the MH-60G. Identical to the MH-60G used for Special Operations, the
designations of aircraft assigned to Combat Rescue squadrons were later changed to HH-60G.
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2.6.1.1 Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation
The Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) was a three-
year, Office of Secretary of Defense-chartered program to assess the effectiveness of the
Services' current (at the time) JCSAR capabilities and identify problems and potential
enhancements. The JCSAR JT&E examined the entire JCSAR process from the initial report of
a downed aircraft to the recovery of isolated personnel. It tested the effectiveness of individual
JCSAR functions (i.e., S/E location and identification; surface-based command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence (SBC4I), and mission execution), as well as
comprehensive, end-to-end JCSAR environments. To make their overall assessment the JT&E
test schedule included 10 major field tests, 3 command post exercises, and 2 virtual simulation
tests. Stateside events were conducted in desert environments (on the Nellis, Ft Irwin, and
Fallon ranges) and forested environments (in Washington, Alaska, Florida, and Mississippi).
Exercise and test players came from all services and included the range of air vehicles and
satellites employed by DOD. The JCSAR JT&E Final Report contains a complete summary of
all test events and a CD ROM containing all Test Plans and Reports. The following table
summarizes the major JT&E events:
Table 2-28: Summary of JCSAR JT&E Events

Recovery
Event Focus RESCORT Other Forces Location
Vehicles
Various Various USCENTCOM
Blue Flag 96-3 SBC4I SBC4I
(Simulated) (Simulated) scenario (Simulated)
RC-135
S/E Location Camp Shelby,
EC-130 E
ASCIET 96 & N/A N/A Mississippi
Identification EP-3
Eglin AFB, Florida
NSS
FTX-1A and 1C Nellis AFB, Nevada
Mission
(1996 and HH-60G A-10 E-3 (Weapons School
Execution
1997)) CSARTF & ME)
HH-60G A-10 Nellis AFB, Nevada

FTX-1B (1996 Mission
E-2C (Weapons School
and 1997) Execution HH-60H AH-64 CSARTF & ME)
Cook Inlet and
HC-130 Yukon/Susitna
Ranges, Alaska
S/E Location OA-10
Loc/ID Mini-Test & HH-60G N/A Aviano Range, Italy
Identification
Tuzla, BanjaLuka,
EC-130E Sarajevo, Mostar,
Bosnia-Herzegovina
A-10 Camp Shelby,
Mission HH-60G E-2C
FTX-2 (1997) F-16 Mississippi
Execution HH-60H E-8
AH-64 Eglin AFB, Florida

(Simulated) (Simulated) scenario (Virtual)
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Recovery
Event Focus RESCORT Other Forces Location
Vehicles
CH-47
ES-3
HH-60G HC-130
Woodland A-10
End-to-End HH-60H MC-130 Spokane, Washington
Cougar 97 AV-8B
UART MH-60K
Realistic S/E229

(Simulated) (Simulated) scenario
A-10
Virtual Mission HH-60G
Execution F/A-18 E-3 Notional DIA “medium
Simulation HH-60H
and Airborne AH-1W F-15C threat” environment
(VS-1) C4I UH-60L
AH-64
A-10 E-2C
Virtual Mission HH-60G
Execution F/A-18 E-3 Notional DIA “medium
Simulation HH-60H
and Airborne AH-1W E-8 threat” environment
(VS-2) C4I UH-60L
AH-64 F-15C
HH-60G
NSS Spokane, Washington
JREX 98 End-to-End HH-60H A-10
Realistic S/E Tacoma, Washington
UART
2.6.1.2 Expeditionary Force Experiments

The general operational focus of EFX 98, JEFX 99, and JEFX 2000 was to find and kill time
critical targets such as ballistic missile transporter erector/launchers (TELS), mobile SAMS, or
even fixed targets that are critical in the time dimension. By JEFX 2000 a Time Critical
Targeting (TCT) Cell had evolved to include a “Hunter” section with direct links to multiple ISR
assets and a “Killer” section consisting of operators (including a Search and Rescue Duty
Officer, or SARDO) and weaponeers with direct links to on-call airborne shooters.
For participants working Combat Rescue issues during the experiment, the hypothesis for JEFX
was that Combat Rescue is basically a Time Critical Targeting problem. Keep in mind that there
are certain steps that must be accomplished in order to prosecute any target, whether or not it is
“time critical” (those steps are find, fix, identify, target, task, engage, and assess—also called the
“Kill Chain”). TCT is a complex, evolving process that seeks to speed the flow of a target
through that chain. To do that, TCT managers in the AOC are given processes, assets (strike,
ISR, and communications), and JFACC authority to act within certain parameters. Further,
229
All of the JCSAR JT&E events included S/E play in one way or another. Sometimes, that play was scripted, and
sometimes it was simulated, depending in the requirements of the test event. During Woodland Cougar 97 and
JREX 98, S/E play was robust and particularly realistic. S/E were in the field for days, evading live OPFOR and
attempting to facilitate their own rescues.
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assets with particular capabilities are specifically apportioned to support TCT operations. Wide
use of datalinks (primarily Link-16 and Situational Awareness Datalink, or SADL) in JEFX
passed critical information among all players, and was used to create (and share) a common
operating picture (COP). In that TCT environment, a target could be found, fixed, identified,
targeted, and tasked in single-digit minutes.
If the Kill Chain is examined from a CSAR perspective, and the survivor visualized as a “target,”
the process looks very familiar. Because of their similarity, Combat Rescue planners during
JEFX supposed that if CSAR events were handled using generic TCT processes, and supported
by appropriate enabling technologies, they could reduce CSAR response time from several hours
down to several minutes. In the end, their supposition was proven correct.
2.6.1.3 Air Warfare Center Tests

AWFC testing was smaller in scope than JCSAR JT&E and EFX activity, instead focusing on
tactics and systems-level issues. Test events included both enroute and terminal area operations,
depending on the specific test objectives. The scenarios ranged from major theater war down to
small-scale contingencies with restrictive ROE. Due to resource constraints, some of the “big
war” was notional so that the testers could concentrate on the specific issues. Threats included
live and notional players, real and simulated enemy fighters, SAMs, AAA, MANPADs, and
small arms. The opposition forces (OPFOR) employed realistic electronic, air, and ground
orders of battle although no single event had the full array. In some test events, OPFOR
response to friendly action was scripted, while in others they were given free play.
RV enroute operations were examined during the HH-60G Defensive Systems and Foreign
Material Exploitation (FME) tests in which scenarios were used to examine adversary
engagement of enroute helicopters with RF/IR SAMs and fighters. These were ambush
scenarios with the enemy employing its early warning, ground control intercept (GCI), and C4I
capability to track the helicopter until it was in the heart of the envelope and then engaging the
helicopters. The threat operators exercised counter-SEAD tactics in these scenarios so the
CSARTF players usually got little or no warning. Despite this, the HH-60G escaped from the
majority of these engagements using a combination of expendables and maneuver.
In recognition of the particular danger during terminal area operations, AWFC conducted
extensive testing and tactics development in that regime from 1996 until 1999 in three separate
efforts—HH-60G Cabin Configuration Test, Terminal Area Tactics (TAT) Test, and Extended
Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) Test. Detailed results for all of the AWFC testing have been
published as test reports and in AFTTP 3-1.
2.6.1.4 Modeling and Simulation

The JCSAR JT&E conducted extensive research into Modeling and Simulation tools available to
support the JCSAR JT&E and the Combat Rescue community at large. The JT&E grouped
Modeling and Simulation needs into four types of tools:
Support Analysis of Proposed Equipment
Support Tactics and Processes Development and Evaluation
Support Operational Plans Development and Evaluation
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Support Mission Planning, Rehearsal, and Virtual Training
The JCSAR JT&E research also determined that other than the Air Force Rescue Model no tool
or tools had been developed to address these stated needs.
To support JCSAR JT&E objectives the Test Team adapted a number of virtual simulation tools
to evaluate CSARTF operations as part of major force employment operations. In two separate
Virtual Simulation Tests, the JCSAR JT&E integrated up to 5 virtual simulation facilities to
allow the interaction of Recovery Vehicles (HH-60G, HH-60H), RESCORT/OSC (A-10, AH-64,
AH-1, F/A-18), RESCAP (F-15C), and Command and Control Platforms (E-3, E-2, and
JSTARS). The forces flew CSARTF operations against virtual and constructive ground and air
threats.
To support AFWC defensive simulation testing, the Test Team used Georgia Tech Infrared
Simulator (GTSIM) to evaluate expendable countermeasure effectiveness and develop an
optimum mix of flares to counter advanced IR missiles. The GTSIM model was consistent with
live-fire IR missile test results. The GTSIM model is in use today for the development of
improved IR countermeasures.
In the spring of 2000, the Combat Rescue Analysis of Alternatives (CR AoA) picked up where
the JCSAR JT&E left off, but focused on tools needed to support the CR AoA mission --
analysis of proposed Combat Rescue equipment, tactics, and processes. Where appropriate the
CR AoA adapted existing modeling and simulation tools. These tools include:
Campaign and Operations Models (Air Force Rescue Model and SIMPROCESS [named
Combat Rescue Operations Simulation]) to model the Combat Rescue process in a 30 day
campaign. Inputs to these tools include various threat levels found in two separate DIA
validated threat laydowns, performance and availability characteristics of the concept
Recovery Vehicles under study (HH-60G, Compound Helicopters, Medium Lift
Helicopters, and Tiltrotors), and various air and ground command and control delays.
Outputs included Percent Of Isolated Personnel Rescued And Time To Rescue
Combat Rescue Mission Level Models (SUPPRESSOR and Joint Conflict and Tactical
Simulation (JCATS)) to evaluate performance characteristics of the concept Recovery
Vehicles under study.
o SUPPRESSOR evaluated the ingress and egress survivability of the recovery vehicles.
Inputs to SUPPRESSOR include one-on-one threat engagement results from Enhanced
Surface to Air Missile Simulation (ESAMS), Radar Guns (RADGUNS), and MOSIAC
(IR SAM). SUPRESSOR was also used to investigate the relative benefits of advanced
countermeasure capabilities and use of RESCORT.
o Terminal area M&S using the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) began in
the fall of 2000. It allows users to model CSARTF players (including RVs) with virtually
any flight, operational, or weapons characteristics. It can also model RV and weapons
interaction against enemy forces that react to events in accordance with user-defined rule
sets. JCATS also permits the use of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) or
equipment that are not currently fielded. For example, the utility of battlefield obscurants
and agents like CS gas can be examined without the controversy or safety questions that
may accompany their use. These enjoyed modest success in SEA, but they have fallen in
disuse due to a lack of certified munitions and legal restrictions on their use. JCATS
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provides a means to “test” them, and future non-lethal munitions, providing insight to
their possible utility. Although it has the limitations that are typical of computer models,
JCATS is the first tool of its type used to examine the terminal area phase of a Combat
Rescue mission.
2.6.2 Summarized Findings

This section summarizes the findings of the tests, experiments, and mission modeling that were
previously described. Findings are categorized into the areas of rescue force training,
location/identification of the S/E, Command and Control, threat encounter and suppression, use
of ground teams, and interoperability. For a thorough description of how the events were
constructed, conclusions, and the limits of the data, the source reports must be referenced. They
are listed in this report’s References section.
2.6.2.1 Rescue Force Training

Anomaly Review Boards and Expert Panels that reviewed all the JCSAR JT&E test results
unanimously identified insufficient mission area training as a root cause for many of the
observed problems. It follows that, in a larger sense, the quality, focus, and curricula of the
individual Service’s training programs are problems themselves. JT&E findings put emphasis on
end-to-end training with live OPFOR equipped with MANPADS and small arms.
A general unwillingness to include Combat Rescue operations as part of an exercise’s main body
is routinely observed (and was specifically cited by the Expert Panels) during in-CONUS
exercises and during theater spin-up training (as was observed in Desert Storm and Allied
Force). In a well-intended attempt to make up for the oversight, major exercises (like Red Flag)
will often set aside a day as “CSAR day,” during which the sole focus is Combat Rescue. That,
also misses the mark—experience during contingency support, JCSAR JT&E, and JEFX,
suggests that the most appropriate training for Combat Rescue occurs when the rescue operation
is an integral part of the larger air battle plan being executed. “CSAR day” may tend to reinforce
the notion that battle managers must “stop the war” when a Combat Rescue event is in progress.
Woodland Cougar 97 and JREX 98 represented rare examples of live-fly events that included
rescue forces, realistic survivors, robust enemy ground order of battle, and a complete, end-to-
end command and control architecture. Participant feedback and the JT&E Expert Panels that
reviewed the results were unanimous in recommending regular end-to-end training exercises
integrated with existing major exercises as an enhancement to JCSAR effectiveness. Training
events must include all elements that would participate in actual Combat Rescue operations
(including surface-based C4I elements) executing a well-understood CONOPS in order to
maximize both the training opportunity and the likelihood of success in combat. Woodland
Cougar 97 and JREX 98 results illustrate that when CONOPS and interoperability violations
occur, delayed and failed missions are the result. That conclusion appears to have certain
validity as the predicted results of CONOPS and interoperability violations were directly
observed during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force.
Although not a literal part of the rescue force, the ability of the S/E to assist his own rescue was
observed as a key predictor of success across almost all of the test events. Significant S/E related
factors include the ability to accurately report location and local threats, ability to follow rescue
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force instructions, and ability to evade capture (particularly during the first 60 minutes after S/E
isolation).
2.6.2.2 Location, Identification, and Authentication of the Survivor/Evader

Initial notification of the isolating incidents varied from test venue to venue. In some of the
limited tests, S/E detection was scripted, but during the major exercises (JEFX 2000, JREX 98,
WC 97) an attempt was made to allow the process to unfold in a realistic way. Consistent with
what has been observed in history, the primary means of incident notification was a radio call
from the isolated person himself on a survival radio or a wingman call. In some cases, the call
from the isolated person was undetected by C4I elements. Causes for failed detection included
improper use of the radios, incorrect frequencies, monitoring/transmitting schedule confusion,
and equipment failures. The S/E suffered from additional problems of antennae misuse, low
batteries, terrain masking, vegetation attenuation, and poor radio human factors. In other words,
the same failure modes experienced in the real world were observed during testing.
Testing demonstrated the logical result that that delays and errors in locating the survivor result
in delays issuing a launch order to recover the survivor. Errors of sufficient magnitude cause
mission failure because, when CSAR forces arrive at an expected survivor location, they are not
close enough to the survivor to use their locating equipment and line-of-sight radios. Location
errors also cause unneeded exposure of forces to threats during an extended search phase that
may not result in a rescue, incorrect threat assessments, and selection of improper CSAR forces.
JCSAR JT&E also found that these failed rescue attempts attracted the OPFOR and had a
adverse impact on the survivability of the rescue force on their second attempt–the bad guys
were waiting.
Compounding those problems is the fact that all of the currently fielded survival radios (PRC-90
and PRC-112A, Hook 112) are subject to direction finding (DF) by the enemy. OPFOR
exploited that vulnerability during WC 97 and JREX 98 and, as a result, enjoyed some success in
capturing survivors or setting up SAR traps. The current radios have no encryption capability,
remain vulnerable to spoofing, and are easily jammed due to their low transmitter power. All of
those weaknesses were observed in testing and have been exploited by real enemy forces in
every conflict covered by this report. Friendly forces also use DF techniques to locate S/E on the
ground. Using airborne C4I assets (Rivet Joint, Senior Scout, and an EP-3), JT&E testing
measured the average DF location error at 6 to 7 miles for the PRC-90 and PRC-112A. The
amount of error is significantly dependant on the physical position of the DF asset relative to the
radio on the ground and, even when all systems are working correctly, could measure in the
dozens of miles.
To assess solutions to limitations of the standard radios, some test scenarios equipped S/E with
advanced radios capable of over the horizon (OTH) geolocation and messaging capabilities.
These technologies included the partially fielded PRC-112B (“Hook-112”), the prototype PRQ-7
Combat Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL) radio, and the experimental Global Personnel
Recovery System (GPRS). System architectures and detection success of these advanced
signaling devices varied. The very nature of OTH communications drives an increased level of
complexity that includes multiple satellites, landlines, downlinks, uplinks, etc. Additionally the
CSEL and GPRS devices were immature designs, so it was unsurprising during testing when one
of the links in the chain broke. Thus the advent of the advanced technology radios mitigated
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some of the deficiencies of the older radios while introducing more possible failures modes with
their greater complexity.
JT&E and JEFX results reflect a vastly improved capability when everything in an advanced
radio’s architecture worked as advertised. The detection of the isolating incident was in near
real-time, and can be made simultaneously available to multiple players in a CSARTF, C4I
elements, and even in the Pentagon. The specific content and quality of the messages varied by
device, but each delivered some capability for precise, self-reported geolocation and low-
probability of exploitation (LPE) two-way messaging for communication of S/E physical
condition, threat activity, weather, or whatever else he chose to send. The advanced radios
employ combinations of databurst and LPE waveforms to make them both difficult to detect and
to jam. OPFOR attempts to DF, spoof, and jam the radios were made with only limited success.
The enhanced capability demonstrated that the mean survivor location error could be reduced
from at least 6 nautical miles to 0.5 nautical miles. With those enhancements alone, the median
SBC4I processing time was reduced from 7.3 to 3.8 hours. The overall impact on mission
success is inconclusive—JT&E testing measured mission success rates between 46 and 49
percent when either the standard or advanced radios were used (although their use during JEFX
was one of several decisive factors for successful real-time reaction to shootdowns).
The S/E himself is not the only source of error in his reported location. JT&E testing quantified
how frequently the C4I system itself introduced S/E location error as the information was being
collected, recorded, or distributed. Remarkably, after the S/E location was reported to the JSRC,
additional errors were introduced and reported in more than 60% of cases. Typical sources of
error included incorrectly plotting survivor locations on maps, distance unit conversion,
coordinate system conversion, and true/magnetic heading conversion, transcription error, or
simply mis-hearing the information.
Utility of National Security Systems (NSS) in locating and identifying S/E was also examined
during JT&E and JEFX testing. While those systems offer capabilities that are helpful to those
tasks, using them effectively is difficult. Unfamiliarity with NSS CONOPS within each of the
CSAR elements (SBC4I, rescue forces, isolated personnel, or SOF) is extremely high, and they
are therefore rarely used. Opportunities for forces to train or test with National Assets in an
operational Theater were described by the JT&E as “nearly non-existent.” While that may have
been true during the JT&E, accessibility had improved over time such that (after significant pre-
coordination) JEFX 2000 received support from several NSS and every imaginable intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance asset. Looking ahead, one of the most valuable results of major
exercises and experiments will be aircrew and battle manager familiarity with NSS request and
coordination procedures.
2.6.2.3 Command and Control

Given current SBC4I processes, the test team found that the median and average SBC4I process
times, from shootdown to issuance of a launch order, were 7.3 hours and 5 hours respectively.
Even using enhanced processes and systems developed by the JT&E, the test team found that the
median SBC4I process time was 3.8 hours and, in any case, could not be completed in less than
30 minutes. Because of the significant process redesign, JEFX results significantly departed
from those of the JT&E and showed that by exploiting the breadth of experience and assets
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available in a TCT-capable AOC, SBC4I can accomplish the same tasks, with higher quality, in
less than 10 minutes.
Even several hours of process time do not prevent fundamental errors from having a significant,
sometimes decisive, effect on rescue operations. Some errors observed by the JT&E include:
o JSRC confused aircraft callsigns (Ambush 41 versus Ambush 42). JSRC logged in
mission folder that 1 chute was seen for Ambush 42 but posted on JSRC status board that
no chutes were seen for Ambush.
o JSRC located, identified, and authenticated isolated personnel. Based on operational
factors, JSRC passed mission to SOC RCC. SOC RCC selected forces, developed
CONOPS, and approved mission. SOC RCC sent mission approval message to JSRC.
JSRC filed message in mission folder but did not transmit an execute order.
o JSRC assessed threat at isolated personnel's last known position as medium but did not
examine the threat along route from rescue forces to isolated personnel, which was high.
o Initial notification of lost aircraft came as an overdue aircraft report from Wing
Operations Center (no time, cause, or location of loss). JSRC stopped efforts to locate,
identify, and communicate with the isolated personnel after first failed attempt, JSRC
made no follow-up efforts.
o JSRC located, identified, and authenticated isolated personnel. JSRC passed mission to
SOC RCC and instructed isolated personnel to evade to a low-threat area. Survivor
evaded to a low threat area. Army and Navy RCCs provided forces/CONOPS to conduct
rescue mission. SOC RCC declined mission after threat degraded to low. JSRC did not
assign mission to another agency.
o JSRC located and identified isolated personnel. JSRC did not communicate with or
authenticate isolated personnel. JSRC misconverted isolated personnel's location from
lat./long. to range/bearing from SARDOT by using statute miles instead of nautical miles,
placing isolated personnel in adjacent country . JSRC passed wrong isolated personnel
location down-channel to CSAR Forces.
The JT&E found that, despite improved processes, most of the problems identified over the
course of the multiple test events were persistent. The test team found that those problems are
symptomatic of the following root causes:
o CONOPS. The various CSAR CONOPS in use by the Services and Theaters are based,
in part, on assumptions that may be obsolete. They do not address the factors that the test
team has shown are linked to success or failure.
o TTP. The current Joint TTP are insufficient for the needs of the C4I element. Joint TTP
have not kept pace with the CSAR C4I process. Service TTP for CSAR C4I are not
standardized, resulting in interoperability issues.
o Training. There is a lack of joint, integrated training opportunities for CSAR C4I
personnel. Negative learning occurs when JSRCs and CSAR forces train separately.
CSAR C4I personnel have few opportunities to experience and deal with interoperability
problems.
o Technology. No automated information technology has been effectively fielded in any
JSRC or RCC to support the CSAR C4I process. The CSAR C4I tasks of collecting,
filtering, organizing, and distributing information are currently being performed manually
and human errors will persist.
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o Manpower. Manpower and experience within the CSAR C4I element are eroding.
Service and Component RCCs continue to decline in size and capability. The skill and
experience prerequisites assigned to personnel manning a JSRC or RCC have been
reduced or eliminated.
To address the larger command and control issues, the JT&E recommended a Survivor-Sensor-
Save concept that obliges the planners to look at the Joint CSAR mission area as an overall
system or process, not individual elements. They proposed a Joint CSAR system made up of
three basic elements (isolated personnel, recovery forces, and C4I) between which the interfaces
are well defined. For the system to work effectively, the interfaces (indicated by the arrows)
must work together seamlessly and within the existing warfighting environment.
Figure 2-56: Survivor-Sensor-Save Process Model
As a long-term vision, the system the JT&E described would interact in the following manner:
o The advanced survival radio should be capable of near real-time, two-way, OTH,
databurst communication and geo-location
o The RV should be capable of receiving battlespace awareness information, trading digital
information, and maintaining constant track of each other
o Using the PRQ-X, the isolated person alerts the CSAR C4I element and distributes
critical information electronically to an automated information system
o The C4I element uses an automated information system to filter and organize isolated
personnel and battlespace information, plan a mission to recover the isolated person, and
produce a decision aid to present to the launch authority
o Through the battlespace awareness system, the isolated personnel information and
mission plan can be distributed to the selected recovery force (HH-X, RESCORT, and
support aircraft, as needed) while on ground or airborne alert for prosecution and
recovery of the isolated person.
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In practical terms, what the JT&E described was the JEFX time-critical targeting data
architecture (in which Combat Rescue was only one of many participating mission areas).
Considering the remarkable effect such a system had on SBC4I process time, the JT&E
recommendation was prescient.
2.6.2.4 Time Critical Targeting for Combat Rescue

Exploitation of TCT processes for CSAR during JEFX improved rescue response in two basic
ways:
1. Considerably less Surface-based C4I (SBC4I) time was consumed following
“shootdowns.”
2. Asset packaging decisions and coordination quality were significantly improved
During JEFX, the TCT Cell performed real-time mission execution management duties normally
accomplished by an air component’s RCC. By reassigning those tasks to a TCT organization,
the S/E was located and identified, “targeted” by battle managers, and tasked for prosecution by
a CSARTF in real-time using assets that were already airborne at the time of the “shootdown.”
SBC4I time required during JEFX Combat Rescue missions showed marked improvement over
current processes—what used to take, on average, more than five hours, was being done (better)
in about 10 minutes.230 Compared against current capability, such a response is revolutionary.
In context of JEFX Time Critical Targeting operations, however, such performance was routine
and expected, regardless of whether the target was a mobile SAM or a Survivor/Evader. The use
of common, integrated processes meant that all of the Combat Rescue activity took place
simultaneously with continuous prosecution of other nominated TCTs. The leverage produced
by putting wide variety of expertise in a common environment to execute a clearly defined,
collaborative battle management process cannot be overstated.
The following extract from the JEFX 2000 Experiment Report provides a synopsis of the typical
TCT Cell mission flow (in a Combat Rescue scenario):
• Receive, correlate, and then “plot” location best determined by the SARDO onto the
Common Operational Picture (COP). [30 sec – 5 min, depending on signal device
accuracy progression].
• Identify an initial On-Scene Commander with suitable area suppression munitions from
the airborne TCT asset pool. Task the OSC to move into the vicinity of the S/E.
Simultaneously, improve the position of the rescue forces as close to the S/E as possible
(in accordance with JFACC guidance) from their airborne alert anchor via a cleared
holding point [30 sec – 1 min]231.
230
Using traditional processes, the average SBC4I process time to make a go/no-go decision is 3.95 hours (JCSAR
JT&E data). Using the same SBC4I processes, the average time required to simply disseminate a mission execution
decision that has already been made is 1.15 hours. The data also show that the higher the threat, the more SBC4I
process time is consumed. In other words, our ability to respond quickly is at its worst when the need for a fast
response is greatest.
231
All CSAR forces were staged in an airborne alert posture. Although airborne alert reduced reaction time and
helped the helicopters meet JEFX range time restrictions, airborne alert is not necessarily a prerequisite for Combat
Rescue operations in a TCT environment.
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• Hunter Section establishes a 20 NM ring around the S/E location, and informs the Killer
Section/SARDO of all SIGINT/COMINT and ground activity until mission complete.
Ingress/egress routings are evaluated as well [30 sec to initiate, 1 - 5 min’s for substantial
ISR analysis, area dependent].
• Attempt to receive real-time video from a UAV or similar source to validate S/E location
and status, locate dismounted enemy infantry, and (in the event of S/E capture) document
the S/E status as Prisoner of War.
• Evaluate SEAD and CAP requirements (to include EA-6B jamming) and confirm
adequate coverage. Put in direct contact with OSC [1 min].
• TCT assets, including appropriate strike aircraft and surface-to-surface weapons, begin
sterilization process around S/E and RV routing.
• Once the complete plan is assembled, gain execution approval from JFACC prior to RV
threat penetration [15 mins to two hours].232
o Obtain ISOPREP from RCC, then pass it to RV’s, and OSC (1
min)
o CAOC-F orchestrates additional TCT support (as required) and
maintains battle-space awareness until egress complete.
A summary of major elements that were considered as a recovery plan was assembled included:
• Requirements for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense assets
• Requirements for Combat Air Patrol assets
• Real-time intelligence from coordinated ISR assets
• Weapons effects
• Support from classified programs
• Enroute and terminal area weather
• Support available from other Components (Land, Maritime, and Special Operations)
• Air Refueling requirements
To the extent that a targeting process is intended to produce a desired effect, S/Es in the field
were indeed “targeted” during JEFX but, unlike more traditional targets, the desired effect on
S/Es was their protection. Once the survivor was formally declared a target, the first priority was
immediate assignment of airborne assets that could refine the location of the S/E (if required)
and provide protection until the arrival of recovery forces (if required). The SARDO’s position
in the TCT Cell section allowed his real-time collaboration with experts from many disciplines in
232
A requirement for the JSRC Director to provide the CFACC a structured Combat Rescue mission briefing made
this a very time-consuming process relative to the speed of other rescue activity and decision-making. The
CFACC’s confidence in the rescue process improved as a track-record of mission success was developed during
live-fly. At its fastest (on the last day of live-fly), the briefing/approval process took as little as 15 minutes.
Approval for missions executed during Spirals 2 and 3 took substantially longer (in one case as long as two hours).
Stringent requirements for centralized control/centralized execution of Combat Rescue missions can be expected to
diminish as CFACC comfort level increases.
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order to assemble a properly armed, high-SA protective force capable of operating in any threat
environment in which TCT operations were expected. One must keep in mind that there were no
“Combat Rescue TCT procedures,” per se. Attack missions and Combat Rescue missions were
prosecuted using identical TCT procedures.
There was one significant difference between “traditional” targets and S/Es that were classified
as targets—unlike more traditional TCTs, once CSAR missions arrived at the “task” step in the
Kill Chain, the TCT Cell was obligated pause and wait for specific JFACC approval to execute
the mission. That additional “go wake the General” step delayed mission execution by, at times,
up to two hours. Separate interviews with the JFACC during JEFX, the JFACC “mentor” from
the Aerospace C2ISR Center, and with the Air Combat Command Commander identified the
reason for their insistence on that extra step—they unanimously perceived excessive variation in
Combat Rescue C2 processes across the CAF, among the warfighting commands, and in actual
Combat Operations. As a result, each felt it was important to ensure their significant
involvement in what they perceived to be a very important mission that carries with it
considerable risk.233
Regardless of those additional delays, the significance of the improvements can be clearly seen.
The curve in Figure 2-57 shows survivor viability as a function of exposure time. For a rescue
mission about 80 miles from recovery forces (as was used in JEFX scenarios), the three labeled
points show the impact of SBC4I process time.
• Point A shows that after 4:40 hours of exposure time (representing 3.95 hours of SBC4I
delay plus 40 minutes of RV enroute time), only about 5% of S/Es remain viable.
• Point B shows the improvements observed when Combat Rescue was prosecuted via
TCT processes during JEFX (representing 15 minutes of TCT processing time, 30
minutes of JFACC approval time, and 40 minutes of enroute time). TCT processes
reduced S/E exposure time from 4:40 minutes to 1:25 hours, and increased S/E viability
by a factor of five.
• Point C shows what would have been possible if Combat Rescue operations had been
prosecuted like other TCTs during JEFX, without the additional requirement for specific
JFACC mission approval. After 55 minutes of exposure (15 minutes TCT processing
time plus 40 minutes enroute time), S/E viability is more than 10 times higher than the
status quo (Point A), and about two times better than what was observed during JEFX
(Point B).
233
Jumper, Keck, and Corder interviews.
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100%
(i.e. Remaining Available for Rescue)

Chance of Successful Rescue
Chance of Avoiding Capture
75%
50%
C
25% B
A
9 hrs
6 hrs
7 hrs
8 hrs
1 hr
4 hrs
5 hrs
2 hrs
3 hrs
S/E Exposure Time

Figure 2-57: Impact of Reduced SBC4I Time on Chance of Successful Rescue
(Source: USAF Air Warfare Center; “Combat Rescue Time Critical Targeting and Tactical
Datalinks—JEFX 2000 Final Report,” p. 10)
It must be emphasized that activity in support of Combat Rescue missions took place
simultaneously with the prosecution of other TCTs in the TCT Cell. In short, inclusion of
downed aircrew on a theater’s list of approved TCTs did not adversely affect prosecution of
other targets and, by virtue of the planning process that precedes TCT operations, actually
reduced total resource demand for Combat Rescue missions.
2.6.2.5 Threat Encounter and Suppression

Although most of the defensive systems and terminal area test results are classified, certain broad
conclusions may be stated here. Foremost among them is the survivability advantage derived
from high Situational Awareness (SA) among combat aircrews and battle mangers. As
adversaries improve their capabilities, testing suggests that the best countermeasure is to
maintain high, real-time SA of the threat (via radar warning, real-time intelligence to the cockpit
(RTIC), and datalink systems), status of friendly forces, and the intentions of both.
OPPOSITION FORCES USED IN THE TESTING

The capabilities and effectiveness of OPFOR participating in each test event varied. Some
JCSAR JT&E events employed adversaries equipped with small arms, MANPAD simulators
with Night Vision Devices, unarmored vehicles, and tactical radios (VHF-FM) for
communications. They were deployed in platoon strength throughout the exercise area, and their
vehicles and the existing road net permitted rapid reaction to extended CSAR efforts. The tactics
employed by OPFOR in these scenarios was a meld of those seen by the North Vietnamese
Army, the Viet Cong, the Iraqis, and the Serbs, coupled with their rather detailed knowledge of
US tactics and equipment. Enemy objectives were to inflict as much damage on US forces as
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possible. The enemy sought to use the survivors as bait for SAR traps or, failing that, to capture
the survivor. Due to the short duration of some of the events, some enemy behaviors, strengths,
and initial locations were scripted to ensure a “fight” would actually occur. Beyond that, enemy
forces were generally allowed to free play and employ whatever they could get their hands on to
win.
The enemy forces conducted limited SIGINT collection during WC 97 and JREX 98 in addition
to their DF activities. This information was exploited to obtain general operational patterns. Call
signs and aircraft types were obtained from the context of conversations with air traffic control.
The adversaries also exploited captured personnel and their equipment. No interrogations were
conducted but the adversaries made full use of survivors’ radios and GPS devices to obtain
frequencies and coordinates. Using this information and equipment, the enemy was able to
conduct radio intrusion and jamming sufficient to result in several aborted rescue attempts. It
should be reiterated that no currently fielded survival radio has secure or anti-jam modes so, in
the terminal area, the CSARTF is talking in the clear by necessity. This problem was
compounded by frequent Blue Force abandonment of security procedures designed for passing
sensitive information over unclassified communications nets.
A specially trained team of Security Forces and Tactical Air Control Personnel from the AWFC
were tasked as OPFOR during most of the AWFC-directed testing. They were deployed as a
single platoon (9 to 11 personnel) in close proximity to the survivor’s location such that they
could react to the pickup attempt. They were equipped with small arms, a single, unarmored all-
terrain vehicle, and tactical radios (VHF-FM) for communications. The same AWFC team also
deployed to JREX 98 as adversaries. Additional adversaries at JREX 98 included a USMC Light
Armored Reconnaissance Company (140 personnel) and an Army Special Operations Team-
Alpha with DF equipment.
Adversary ground teams employed small-arms and automatic weapons with blanks, and Smoky
SAMs to provide visual feedback to the aircrews. Flares were also employed at night to simulate
missile firings. For safety reasons, RVs employed blanks in the door guns, but CSARTF aircraft
used no other munitions. JREX 98 also saw the use of threat emitters capable of emulating the
ZSU-23-4, and the SA-8, Giraffe acquisitions radars, and generic EW radar.
THREAT EFFECT ON MISSION PROGRESS

The average speed of advance of the CSARTF helicopters to the terminal area in these
tests/experiments was largely threat dependent. RESCORT directed the helicopters to orbit at
the “safest” available intermediate points while enroute, pushing the RVs closer as each segment
was cleared for them. It was recognized that extended orbiting in enemy territory, itself, would
soon draw an enemy response, thus “safety” was relative. Enroute delays ranged from as short
as a single orbit to as long as 30 minutes. When proceeding, the helicopters flew as fast as
conditions (weather and illumination) allowed. The resulting “hurry up and wait” meant that
140-knot helicopters had an average speed of advance as low as 30 knots over a distance of 80
miles enroute. That experience is not dissimilar to what was observed in recent conflicts,
including an instance in which an MH-53 was airborne for more than five hours and required air
refueling to reach an S/E less than 50 miles away.
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It should also be noted that defensive systems testing has debunked some conventional wisdom
about low-level helicopter invulnerability to certain tactical SAM systems. Adversaries
continuously adapt and improve their anti-aircraft systems, and our assessment of their
effectiveness is often dated or based on faulty assumptions. Only a robust, on-going test process
will identify areas of weakness (or strength), so that tacticians and systems may adapt.
TERMINAL AREA OPERATIONS

Terminal Area Tactics testing began with the RVs orbiting at an initial point a few miles way
from the survivor. The test S/E concealed himself the best he could be in the available cover,
sometimes with simulated injuries or a parachute entanglement that would tend to increase the
amount of time an RV had to spend in the Terminal Area. OPFOR were given a general vicinity
for the S/E (two to ten square miles) and sufficient time to deploy within the play area in
accordance with their tactics. Generally they chose to place radio-equipped observers on any
high ground and deploy the remainder of their forces in small groups scattered throughout the
Terminal Area.
The small number of adversaries and their relatively light armament were deliberately chosen to
emulate the dismounted, squad size remnants that could elude detection and destruction by
RESCORT. If the S/E’s position is well known, US forces generally have the capability to
create a protective ring around him, outside of which dismounted troops are subject to a lethal
mix of ordnance: bombs, air-to-ground missiles, rockets, strafing, mines, combined effects
munitions, and (historically) napalm and tear gas. Enemy vehicles are quickly targeted and
destroyed in open terrain and only stationary vehicles survive in forested terrain. Radar and
radio emitters are also targeted. Once adversaries advance inside that ring, RESCORT ability to
do additional suppression becomes limited. Consequently, unless the enemy is already very
close to an S/E by the time the RV arrives in the Terminal Area, a likely worst case for the
recovery helicopters to deal with are dismounted, squad size remnants of larger forces.
Even with highly precise S/E coordinates or a high-quality hand-off from RESCORT/OSC,
getting “eyes on” the S/E from the RV is both difficult and important. If the S/E can be spotted
quickly, the RV is less likely to find itself in a “trolling” mode—in testing, every RV that began
a slow troll in the Terminal Area was hit at least once. The RV’s wingman was a partial cure for
suppressing close-in OPFOR because it had far better likelihood of detecting dismounted
infantry, and has weapons that are more precise than a fighter’s, reducing risk of fratricide.
However, the RV wingman’s effectiveness was inversely proportional to its speed and its
distance from what it was protecting (i.e. the hovering helicopter, deployed PJs, or S/E). As
TAT progressed, OPFOR learned to simply ignore the wingman when it was out of position,
pressing inward towards the S/E whenever possible. Compounding matters, as the wingman got
lower and slower, his increase in effectiveness was matched by an increase in his vulnerability.
The best tactic for the wingman was a compromise in speed and proximity. An optimum trade-
off of effectiveness and vulnerability is classified, and is described in detail in the test report and
AFTTP 3-1 Volume 24 (S).
JCATS modeling has generally confirmed that the best use for the RV’s wingman (or the flight
lead, once PJs are on the ground) is to provide mutual support to the ground element with
proactive gun patterns and suppressive fire. The modeling also suggests that against close, soft
targets, the rate of fire and field of fire of the RV’s weapon is a primary determinant of
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suppression effectiveness. A direct communications link between the deployed PJ team and
RESCORT was also assessed to be an important (and often overlooked) aspect of a successful
Terminal Area operation.
TAT results were far more extensive then can be addressed here, but the major lessons learned
were unsurprising in the context of what history has already made clear. First and foremost was
that a helicopter hovering for more than a few minute over a deployed PJ team or S/E is a recipe
for failure, even in the relatively low threat scenarios used during TAT. The helicopter is a
beacon to enemy forces, the noise of the helicopter deafens the deployed PJs and S/E, and the
downwash partially blinds them in sand and snow. When the helicopter remained in a hover in
these extended scenarios, every single attempt in multiple trials resulted in mission failure. The
adversary forces quickly learned that they could approach from the recovery vehicle from its six
o’clock with near impunity from its scanners and guns.234 This result was quantified in JCATS
modeling. The implication is that a simple change in tactics may result in significant
improvement in RV survivability.
Another primary finding of all of the Terminal Area testing was that dismounted troops are very,
very difficult to detect, and their destruction is largely a matter of chance. RESCORT fighters
were unable to see dismounted OPFOR, even in low desert scrub. Further, when responding to
PJ Emergency CAS (ECAS) requests, the fighters were frequently unable to engage the enemy
close to the hovering helicopter, deployed PJs, or S/E due to fratricide concerns. RESCORT
fighters were still key to the operation for numerous reasons, but real limitations in the capability
of fixed wing air power to suppress dismounted adversaries, particularly in rough or foliated
terrain, were demonstrated repeatedly. This was true when the RESCORT duties were
performed by A-10s, and even more so when F-16s or F-15Es were used. The JCSAR JT&E
observed that the use of mixed helicopter/fixed-wing RESCORT packages might be an
appropriate mitigating tactic.
MANPADS were the most effective threat against CSARTF aircraft during all the tests,
particularly since a hit by MANPADS tends to result in the destruction of a helicopter, and the
likely destruction of a RESCORT fighter. NVG-equipped MANPADS operating at night proved
to be only one-third as effective against CSARTF aircraft as their daytime counterparts. It is a
significant factor that most suppression of MANPADS was performed only after at least one
missile had been launched.
Also a factor, although less so than OPFOR use of MANPADS and small arms/automatic
weapons, were “leaking” enemy fighters that were occasionally able to execute unobserved,
radar-silent, GCI assisted attacks and achieve kills with simulated IR missiles and guns. In
contrast, no enemy fighter was able to achieve a gun track or achieve IR missile tone if the RV
aircrews were alert to the enemy presence and maneuvered. Regardless of the weapon used,
visual lookout from the RV and by the rest of the CSARTF was the best preventative measure.
Tactical deception improved Terminal Area success rates dramatically. False insertions and
extractions compounded the OPFOR targeting problem, forcing them to split their already small
forces, or to guess which insertion point was real. Having the pickup helicopter insert the PJs
and move away during S/E packaging eliminated both the beacon effect and the
234
The recovery vehicles used for TAT testing were HH-60Gs. The HH-60G has side windows for visual look out
of the cabin crew (i.e. scanning), and machine guns mounted in the windows that have a near 180-degree field of
fire. The HH-60G does not have an aft ramp or rear-facing gun.
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deafening/blinding of the deployed team. The inserting helicopter was then able to join the
wingman in a gun cover pattern, doubling the eyes on lookout and number of guns. The insert-
leave-return-extract tactic does have shortfalls as described in the report, but worked better than
the “parked overhead” tactic every time it was tested.
The PJ team’s situational awareness was another key factor in the TA success rate. PJ
familiarity with the Terminal Area plan prior to insertion, awareness of the location/status of
other friendlies, and the ability to detect and avoid/engage the enemy are determinants of success
or failure. When a deployed PJ could communicate with his teammates, the helicopters,
RESCORT, and the S/E, they were able to find the survivor, package him, react to changing
situations, and prepare for extraction successfully. Their best weapons were pointing devices
and radios that were used to direct employment of helicopter and RESCORT weapons.
Unfortunately there remain numerous shortfalls in PJ equipment that reduce their SA and,
ultimately, their effectiveness.
Results of JCATS modeling are consistent with the Terminal Area findings of the JT&E and
AWFC events. Within the limits of the model, the results of AWFC TAT and WEZ testing have
also been confirmed.
RECOVERY VEHICLE WEAPONRY

Even with the best tactics, the helicopter weapons tested lacked sufficient lethality. That
conclusion was affirmed in both the Cabin Configuration and Extended WEZ tests. This
lethality shortfall was a combination of inadequate coverage in the tail and nose quadrants
(limited by both crew field of view and weapon field of fire), poor design of the weapon mounts
themselves that inhibit the fields of fire, low rates of fire in the simple 7.62mm guns (M-60D and
M-240), low reliability of the 7.62mm GAU-2 system, and the absence of manned gun on the
right side of the helicopter when the flight engineer was performing work in the cabin or
operating the hoist (a problem critically observed by rescue helicopter aircrew since the War in
SEA).235 None of the fielded 7.62mm weapons have sufficient tactical range for use in open
terrain, or sufficient energy for penetration of masonry, thick foliage, or the lightest of armor.
Other weapons (like the 50cal machine gun) provide significantly more energy, but lack other
important characteristics such as a sufficiently high rate of fire or area effects. Appropriate
weapons selection, like every other factor, depends on finding the optimum balance of system
capabilities and limitations.
JCSAR JT&E observations regarding RV self-protection and weaponry were consistent with
those in the TAT and WEZ tests. Accordingly, the test team recommended the Services
investigate munitions tailored/suited for Combat Rescue. They concluded that rescue forces
need:
o Obscurants (both visual and IR) to protect the RV during critical portions of ingress,
pickup, and egress. They also noted that obscurants like the old White Phosphorous
(WP) bombs are are more effective in masking the RVs during terminal pickup phase
235
Testing indicated that if the right gun will be unmanned then it should be fixed forward for firing by the pilots.
Although fixing the gun forward is better than nothing, the ability of the pilots to employ the gun ffectively is
extremely limited, particularly during AIEs. Even when the pilots were free to maneuver the aircraft, fixed-forward
guns were of limited utility. Other categories of weapons (such as rockets) may not be similarly restricted.
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than WP 2.75” rockets currently in the inventory—they are too small, and their effects
are very fleeting.
o Non-lethal weapons which can minimize collateral damage while also providing the
isolated personnel and RV vital protection from hard to locate, dismounted adversaries.
Non-lethal weapons, like BLU-52, that provide CS riot control agent, are no longer
authorized for use, but are needed to enhance survivability during the end-game pickup
phase. If CS is no longer authorized, then a suitable alternative is needed. Research into
newer non-lethal technologies being developed for other mission areas is suggested.
o Longer Reach Weapons like rockets to provide improved standoff and potent anti-
personnel capability.
o Sensor Technologies to enhance detection and engagement of threats to match the longer
reach weapons.
The JT&E’s VS 2 event included five trials in which HH-60Hs were equipped with Hellfire
missiles (which are currently being installed on those Navy helicopters). During that test event,
RVs armed with those missiles produced no measurable impact on mission effectiveness.
However, none of the aircrews had any experience using the Hellfire and, either no training and
no TTP to guide them, they were less effective in exploiting new weapon than the JT&E expects
trained crews would be.
INFLUENCE OF RECOVERY VEHICLE SIZE ON OPERATIONS

A composite of findings of several tests (chiefly TAT, Defensive Systems, Self Protection
System, Bulldog, and Cabin Configuration tests) also highlights the significant influence of the
physical size of the recovery vehicle on operations. In context of threat encounter, several
conclusions are supported. First, the larger the RV, the greater its susceptibility (generally).
Size effects include greater presented area for ballistic shots, greater radar signature, and (due to
power requirements to keep larger aircraft airborne) potentially greater IR signatures.
Maneuverability and flexibility (particularly in the terminal area) are also significant operational
factors relating to aircraft size. Anecdotal information supports those test results, with aircraft
like the HH-53 (used in SEA) described as “too large” by rescue crews at the time. Those
factors would tend to support movement towards ever-smaller RVs.
A second conclusion, however, sets a lower bound on RV size. Testing assessed that the cabin
space available in an HH-60G is insufficient to meet mission requirements. Simultaneous
treatment of two non-ambulatory S/E is not feasible in such a limited area, and the size of the
Pararescue team that can be carried is also limited by cabin space. Although TAT confirmed that
a three-man PJ team is both sufficient for terminal area operations and can fit into a single HH-
60G, any requirement for additional PJs in the terminal area forces participation of a second
helicopter. Adding the second helicopter to the terminal area’s tactical scenario not only
increases risk to that aircraft (during insertion/extraction of its PJs), but significantly increases
the complexity of the operation itself. Synchronization, span of control, mutual support,
fratricide risk, and bump plans are all adversely affected as a result. Optimally, an RV would
provide more cabin space than is available in an aircraft the size of an HH-60G.
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2.6.2.6 Ground Teams
As in the rest of this document, the term “ground team” refers not to a Pararescue element
deployed in the terminal area to assist the S/E (or even a helicopter-borne, platoon-sized element
like that used during the recovery of Basher 52), but to a Unconventional Assisted Recovery
Team (UART) operating independently of helicopter or other air support. The tendency towards
lengthy overland movement and the unique training of the Special Operations Forces performing
them characterize UART missions.
In summary, the JCSAR JT&E found that ground teams performing aircrew recoveries suffer
from:
o Mission planning delay/errors
o Ineffective command and control
o Ineffective ground linkup procedures
The JT&E also found that the elapsed time between launch of rescue forces and recovery of
isolated personnel showed a significant difference between CSARTF and SOF team trials. The
SOF mission execution delays were assessed to be a result of a number of factors: delay in
locating the isolated personnel due to lack of a contact plan, slow travel on the ground, and delay
in obtaining exfiltration transportation. The JT&E also assessed that a SOF team’s difficulties in
locating the S/E also degrade mission effectiveness. Those difficulties increased the teams’
threat exposure because teams had to conduct various compromising search techniques or use the
radio to locate the isolated personnel.
Linkup with S/E was also found to be a problem. After the Woodland Cougar trials highlighted
it, future test events included enhanced ground linkup procedures in aircrew special instructions
(SPINS) for use in an evasion situation. JREX 98 test results showed no improvement in SOF
force effectiveness as a result of the enhanced linkup procedures. Even with remedial training,
S/E were still unable to develop ground linkup plans that were viable for the SOF teams to
execute. JT&E research of a sample of SOF units found that different teams use different linkup
procedures. The procedural variation is enough that it would be difficult to prescribe a single
rule for high-risk-of-capture personnel to follow that meets the expectations of all SOF. JT&E
research also showed that S/E do not understand when to come out of their hide site and show
themselves to the team. This is particularly true when SOF forces are not readily distinguishable
from OPFOR personnel. Advanced survival radios with two-way messaging capabilities may
reduce some of the linkup problems that were observed in testing.
The operational utility of tasking ground teams to support aircrew recoveries is not a settled
issue. While they offer unique capabilities, thorough assessment of their effectiveness has been
hampered by scant data and evolving methods of mission risk assessment. For example, during
the JCSAR JT&E, the primary criterion for deciding whether a mission should be assigned to
conventional Combat Rescue forces or to SOF was the mission’s assessed “threat level.” When
an S/E was assessed to be in a “high threat” area, conventional Combat Rescue forces were ruled
out as an option and missions were exclusively assigned to SOF teams. The teams would be
inserted some distance from the Terminal Area and move overland for linkup with the S/E. At
the time of the JT&E, Combat Rescue doctrine defined threat levels in terms primarily related to
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the sophistication of an enemy’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).236 The resulting
classifications of low, medium, and high threat levels were misleading for Combat Rescue
operations, and their use during JCSAR JT&E testing probably mischaracterized the actual risk
to forces selected to perform each mission.237 Although threat categorizations in use at the time
of the JCSAR JT&E have been abandoned (for the reasons described here), the old paradigm
remains—that ground forces will succeed in high threat areas where Combat Rescue forces
would be expected to fail.
That paradigm is problematic. Decades of experience indicate that IADS type weapons systems,
and aircraft with look-down/shoot-down radar (i.e. a “high threat” environment), are not what
cause Combat Rescue helicopter losses. Instead it is dismounted infantry, using portable
weapons like small arms, automatic weapons, RPGs, and MANPADS that will cause the
overwhelming majority of Combat Rescue losses. That class of threat—individual enemy
ground troops—is precisely the threat that may tend to put the SOF teams’ ground operation at
significant risk, particularly if a search is required. Except, perhaps, for urban terrain, it may be
an unlikely scenario that a UART could operate effectively in an area where a helicopter could
not when each is attempting to recover downed aircrew.
2.6.2.7 Interoperability
Lack of joint training and joint leadership were assessed by the JCSAR JT&E as significant
factors that degraded mission effectiveness or caused mission failure. Based on the problem
counts, the analysis indicates mission planning, mission execution, and staffing and resource
shortfalls are the primary contributing factors to interoperability problems. Test participants
identified the need for added mission planning when operating jointly because of unfamiliarity
with the operating procedures of other Services.
Secure communications was another interoperability problem area observed by the JT&E.
Testing showed that most CSARTFs were not able to operate in secure mode because at least one
element in the force did not have the capability to go secure in a given band. RESCORT aircraft
were usually the limiting factor in communications for the CSARTF. The AH-64s could only go
secure on FM, while the A-10s could only go secure on UHF. The anti-jam frequency hopping
systems are also different between Services and platforms. The USAF uses Have Quick II, while
236
The low/medium/high threat definitions used during the JT&E have recently been abandoned because of their
inability to accurately describe RV risk. The March 1998 version of Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint TTP for Combat
Search and Rescue, offered the following (now obsolete) definition of High Threat: “The operating environment
presents hostile forces over a wide area of coverage, densely concentrated, and capable of rapid reconstitution and
mobility. Enemy weaponry includes advanced or late generation SAMs, modern ground-based radars, early
warning systems, electronic counter-countermeasures, integrated AAA, and aircraft with look-down and/or shoot-
down capabilities. High threat environments are characterized by fully-integrated air defense systems and C2
networks, as well as EW capabilities.”
237
This limitation was understood by the JT&E test team. In the Enhanced Capability Test Report, they noted, “The
current CSAR threat categories do not effectively support the CSAR mission. Intelligence assessments of a ‘low
threat,’ using current doctrinal guidance regarding air and ground threat levels, potentially result in an inaccurate
assessment… Threat categories are subjective. Many undocumented variables influence the threat assessment
process that are not accounted for in the current threat level categories. The threat levels described in JP 3-50.21
account for only the types of threat systems and the density of systems deployed. The threat levels do not account
for terrain, weather, threat system operator qualifications, time of day, or capabilities of specific assets within the
CSAR forces.”
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the USA uses SINCGARS. While the USN also uses Have Quick, the USN HH-60Hs relinquish
this capability during non-deployment training.
A positive JT&E finding was that mixed helicopter and fixed-wing RESCORT packages
suppressed a greater percentage of the threats encountered and had a lower overall loss rate than
missions protected by pure helicopter or fixed-wing packages. Mixed RESCORT also had the
best results with respect to the overall measures of success. Accordingly, the JT&E concluded
that a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing RESCORT can be more effective than either all
fixed- or all rotary-wing support.
2.6.3 Warfighter Perspective on Combat Rescue Test Results

The last event that combined total fidelity with a very large “sample” size was the war in SEA
more than a quarter century ago. The conflicts since the war in SEA have seen newer
technologies (night vision systems, datalinks, stealth technology, etc.) and different physical and
operational environments, but the sample size for CSAR was very small. This was fortunate in
that it speaks well of advances in susceptibility and vulnerability reduction, but the small number
of CSAR missions results in a paucity of data on the effectiveness of the equipment and TTP that
were used. Were we good or just lucky? Would the same methods have resulted in disaster or
success if used repeatedly? Testing is the only way to address the question and it is an imperfect
tool. Only results that have been rigorously checked for proper experiment technique and plain
common sense should be accepted.
With that caveat clearly in mind, we asked a team of Combat Rescue operators (many of whom
designed, managed, or participated in the test events) to perform a Warfighter review of all of the
detailed test reports and to summarize their conclusions. They found the following:
o The very best people, with the very best tools, must man the SARDO positions in the AOCs
because the senior guy in the AOC will have limited CSAR experience, and little
understanding of helicopter operations.
o It would be impossible for a SARDO/JSRC to have the breadth of expertise to respond
optimally to all aspects of a CSAR mission within the given time constraints. If they try to
do it all, they will fail. Integrate with the AOC.
o Bad C4I will always waste more time the slowest airplane
o Datalinks, Near Real-Time Intelligence in the Cockpit systems, and over-the-horizon
communications are all two edged swords with potential for information overload and
micromanagement from REMFs
o Although CSAR is, by definition, a reactive mission, good planning can mitigate many of the
variables
o Don’t plan for too long—most captures happen within 30 minutes
o Shaping the battlefield with the best available force is generally a better alternative than
delaying a recovery until battlefield conditions are ideal (waiting for darkness, etc)
o Situational Awareness of the Terminal Area will always be imperfect. Further delay to
improve it rapidly reaches the point of diminishing returns
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o Any survivor position other than from an eyeball by an RV aircrew is suspect. Any reported
position with a CEP greater than 20 meters will result in a search.
o Trained OSCs are worth a dozen untrained strikers
o An untrained OSC now is better than a trained OSC 30 minutes from now
o The highest likelihood of enemy encounter will always be in the LZ
o CSAR aircrews will overcome limitations in creative, unpredictable ways
o The single greatest threat to the survivor and to the recovery vehicle is dismounted infantry
o Simultaneous 4-quadrant gun coverage in the hover is a must
o Unreliable guns are worse then no guns
o A gun being fired by a pilot badly is better than the gun being unmanned
o The unobserved adversary gets the kill so heads up/out must be primary
o Jets can't see dismounted gomers and can't kill them close to the helicopter even if they could
o The helicopter wingman isn't a great gunship, but he is the only one who will see dismounted
gomers and have the precision weapons to engage them pointblank
o Using Unconventional Assisted Recovery Teams to respond to an air component's isolating
incidents does not work—too slow, too complex, and is generally based on old “threat level”
paradigms
o An appropriately sized PJ ground team reflects a balance between capabilities required and
minimizing complexity of the operation (span of control, time in the LZ, risk of loss/frat,
etc.)
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3. Lessons Learned and Trends in Combat Rescue
Operations
It is axiomatic that judgments based on trends can be relatively precise for the near term, but
become less so as the focus extends into the future. Most analysts, for example, did not foresee
the end of the Cold War five years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and reunification of
Germany. Yet, in a relatively short period, these events profoundly affected geopolitics in
general and US military force-structure planning specifically.
Given that qualification, this section offers some general observations about the likely
characteristics of the world environment that will influence Combat Rescue operations and
capabilities over the next two decades. This section also identifies Combat Rescue mission
trends observed since Vietnam, and suggests how those trends might be manifested in future
operations. Those observations derive from the research supporting Section 2 and from subject
matter experts from many disciplines.
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3.1 Summary of Major Factors Affecting the Rescue
Operation
The following have been observed as the factors most significant to Combat Rescue operations:
• Accuracy in Location/Identification of the Survivor/Evader
• Survivor viability
- Distance of ejection from location of hit
- Intensity of threat around Survivor/Evader
- Population density around Survivor/Evader
- Severity of Survivor/Evader injury
- Enemy government’s interest in capturing Survivors/Evaders and its ability to
control the behavior of its population
• Friendly response to the isolating incident
- Unity of Command and interoperability among recovery forces and the supported
Component
- Command and Control processes/delays
- Presence/absence of trained conventional Combat Rescue forces exploiting
appropriate doctrine and tactics
- Time required to assemble an effective CSARTF
- Readiness posture of Recovery Forces
- Recovery Vehicle protection in the Terminal Area
- Availability of Opportune Forces
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3.2 Summary of Ideal RV Characteristics
The following “ideal” characteristics were gleaned from a thorough review of Combat Rescue
operations and from aircrew comments about RVs from Vietnam to present:
• Self-Protection:
- Ability to locate/suppress dismounted infantry
- Simultaneous four-quadrant coverage in the terminal area
- Ability to carry a variety of ordnance for mutual support and survivor protection
- Ballistic protection for aircrew and systems
- Low susceptibility to infrared missiles
• Ideal size:
- More cabin space than an HH-60G
- Smaller total size than an HH-53
• Hover/Hoist capability to recover S/E in the following conditions:
- Areas tightly confined by terrain and vertical obstructions
- Through dense foliage
- Over water
- Over surfaces covered with fine particulates (i.e., sand and snow)
- “Single skid” conditions
• Other Capabilities
- Out of ground effect (OGE) hover power available in the Terminal Area
- Improved enroute cruise speed without increasing enroute loss-rates
- Perform takeoff/low-level cruise/approach/hover in IMC
- Rapid offload/recovery of Pararescuemen and Survivors/Evaders by landing or by
alternate means
- Rotor downwash that does not exceed that generated by and MH-53J
3-3
3.3 Environmental Trends and Planning Factors
3.3.1 Global Trends
Some of the global trends that will affect our future National Military Strategy include:238
• Changing Demographics: Demographic trends indicate a tremendous increase in the
numbers of people moving to and living in urban areas. By 2010, nearly two-thirds of the
world’s population will be urbanized, with much of the growth in littoral areas of the
world.
• Economic Development: While developing nations will experience economic growth,
the poorest nations will face declining standards of living. Mass communications will
convey these differences, leading to political instability in some places. Global economic
growth and resulting tax revenues will provide many states with considerable means to
invest in weapons and military forces.
• More Players on the International Scene: The number of international groups seeking
to influence global security issues will increase. The number of developing countries that
face serious instability and potential state failure due to political unrest will increase.
• Technological Developments: The diffusion of technology and information will
accelerate. In support of economic and political agendas, developed countries will export
advanced technological systems, including weapons. Nations and others will be able to
purchase access to space-based capabilities and modern computer and communications
equipment, which can be used to support military operations.
From a strategic perspective, patterns of conflict that we have experienced since about 1989 will
likely continue into the 21st century. We should expect to be involved—probably as part of a
multinational force—in large-scale combat contingencies akin to Operation Desert Storm,
foreign humanitarian assistance efforts such as Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh,
noncombatant evacuation requirements such as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia,
peace operations such as those in Bosnia and Haiti; and various other types of operations
requiring US military capability. Although the threat of particularly large-scale conflict is less
likely than during the Cold War, such conflict remains possible in a world made increasingly
smaller by the 24-hour news cycle.239
3.3.2 Physical Environment

True to the pattern of history, military operations in the next few decades are likely to be
conducted across the widest imaginable range of physical environments. In addition to physical
variation, darkness and poor weather will increasingly fall within the bounds of acceptable
environments for future air wars as improved sensors and weapons remove operational
limitations.
With regard to the impact of the physical environment on Combat Rescue operations, the past
should guide our plans for the future. Because they have been encountered with regularity,
238
JCS, p. 8-9.
239
JCS, p. 7
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rescue operations in every extreme of temperature, darkness, topography, pressure altitude, and
foliage should be expected. In Joint Vision 2020, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen
Hugh Shelton, defined the tomorrow’s battlefield environment as follows:
“The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full
range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate
with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as
necessary, with government agencies and international
organizations.”240
A significant trend towards (or, some might say, the return to) urban warfare is an important
environmental development that will gain prominence over the decades to follow. As global
urbanization continues, and as adversaries perceive an asymmetric advantage in that
environment, the trend toward military operations in urban terrain is likely to accelerate.241
Further, aircrew losses in urban environments inject Combat Rescue operations into an
exceedingly difficult tactical scenario. Although tactics and technology will inevitably adapt, the
threat posed by widely proliferated, man-portable weapons (small arms, automatic weapons, IR
MANPADS, Rocket Propelled Grenades, etc.) is sure to persist and will be both more
concentrated and more difficult to suppress in an urban environment.
3.3.3 Military Trends

ADVERSARIES
Greater global interaction will strongly influence the nature of future threats. While unlikely that
any single nation could globally challenge US interests in 2010, it is probable that more than one
will have both the will and the ability to concurrently issue such a challenge. Potentially, the US
could face parallel military challenges in different regions at roughly the same time. Global
interaction, for example, provides a regional power the potential to accelerate its development as
a peer competitor without the buildup signals and warning time expected in the past. A regional
competitor taking advantage of advanced technological capabilities may be able to gain local
superiority long enough to achieve limited aims, resulting in a range of combat and noncombat
requirements.242
Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can provide asymmetrical counters to US
military strengths. Adversaries will closely observe US capabilities and tactics in an effort to
exploit weaknesses by asymmetric approaches that may include attempts to inflict heavy
casualties at home or abroad, to exploit the media, to conduct acts of terrorism, and to defeat our
national will.243 General Shelton assesses the potential for such asymmetric approaches as
“perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future. The
asymmetric methods and objectives of an adversary are often far more important than the relative
technological imbalance, and the psychological impact of an attack might far outweigh the actual
physical damage inflicted.”244 Most importantly, these asymmetric threats are dynamic and
subject to change. Combat Rescue operations are particularly influenced by such asymmetric
240
Shelton, p. 4
241
JCS, p. 77
242
JCS, p. 13-14.
243
JCS, p. 15.
244
Shelton, p. 5.
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threats since successful capture of US aircrews is doubtlessly the centerpiece of many of such
strategies.
Weaponry will become more portable and lethal. Military forces will increase their mobility,
complicating US and allied targeting. Against paramilitary forces, distinguishing combatant
from noncombatant will become increasingly difficult.245 Man-portable weapons will continue
to be widely proliferated, and are likely to remain one of the most intractable hazards on the
battlefield. Man-portable weapons will be enhanced by the use of inexpensive night vision
systems, computer integration, and improved communications among fielded forces.246 Despite
the inevitable improvements in our adversaries’ capabilities, however, simple, low-technology
weapons like AAA and automatic weapons will be present in abundance, and will remain the
most resilient threats the US will encounter over the next two decades.
It is also worthwhile to note that there is an increasing trend for non-state groups to threaten US
interests. Multinational corporations, legal and illegal cartels, alliances, and special interest
groups will compete with the US in specific arenas. Criminal organizations will oppose US
interests in areas such as drug and arms trafficking, immigration, and antidemocratic political
intimidation. Technology may provide criminal organizations with weapons capabilities,
intelligence, and communications comparable—and in some cases superior—to those of law
enforcement agencies. Also, the distinction will blur between terrorist groups, warring factions
in ethnic conflicts, insurgent movements, international criminals, and drug cartels.247
In sum, the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing
varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity.248
US EXPLOITATION OF TECHNOLOGY
By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead
of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other
ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired
effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will
allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets, applied in a
sequential manner. With precision targeting and longer-range systems, commanders can achieve
the necessary destruction or suppression of enemy forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing
the need for time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Improved C2, based on
fused, all-source, real-time intelligence will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations
days and hours in advance of attacks.
In the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) four key technological areas highlighted in
Joint Vision 2010—Low Observable/Masking Technologies, smarter weapons, long-range
precision weapons, and information technologies—are destined to shape the conduct of U.S.-led
245
JCS, p. 9-10.
246
In SEA, about 9 percent of MANPADS incidents occurred at night, compared with 4 percent of MANPADS
incidents during Desert Storm (Crosthwaite [2], p. 13). While nighttime MANPADS capabilities are expected to
improve, it would probably be an overstatement to suggest that the distinction between day and night will be
eliminated.
247
JCS, p. 13.
248
Shalikashvili, p. 10-11.
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air campaigns over the next few decades.249 The net result is that combat units will pack more
combat capability into smaller, more survivable packages.
FASTER, MORE INTENSE AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Multispectral sensing, automated target recognition, and other advances will enhance the
detectability of targets across the battlespace, improving detection ranges, turning night into day
for some classes of operations, reducing the risk of fratricide and further accelerating operational
tempo. Improvements in information and systems integration technologies will also significantly
impact future military operations by providing decision makers with accurate information in a
timely manner. Information technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and
assess information. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors,
platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of
operational tasks to be accomplished faster. Advances in computer processing, precise global
positioning, and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations
of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to
thousands of locations.250
CONTINUED PRESENCE OVERSEAS

The demand for US overseas presence is not likely to diminish. The US will continue to
maintain forces and other military capabilities in foreign regions. Carefully tailored to regional
requirements, overseas presence facilitates power projection and sends a clear signal of US
commitment and resolve. Effective overseas presence demands a balance between permanently
stationed forces, rotational forces, and temporarily deployed forces. Each contributes uniquely
to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that support US interests.251
Deploying US forces over long distances to unfamiliar surroundings will be a continuing
challenge. Combat operations could closely follow deployment, particularly if forcible entry
operations are required. In other cases, combat operations to achieve limited objectives might be
conducted without establishing preliminary lodgments in the operations area, or perhaps before
the joint force is fully formed. A combination of forces could conduct such operations, such as
forward-deployed naval forces and land-based air and land forces deploying from Continental
United States, other Theaters, or forward bases elsewhere in the Theater.252
MORE JOINT/COALITION OPS

In Joint Vision 2010, Gen Shalikashvili, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised
that “our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert
with our friends and allies in almost all operations.”253 He emphasized the point again by
suggesting the following:
249
JCS, p. 24-26.
250
Shalikashvili, p. 13.
251
JCS, p. 10-11.
252
JCS, p. 14.
253
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“It is not enough just to be joint, when conducting future
operations. We must find the most effective methods for
integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition
partners. Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive
unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and
coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and
increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must
recognize this reality.”254
IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Mindful of public concern and expectation to minimize the unnecessary risk of casualties, the
National Command Authorities will seek quick, focused, effective, and decisive application of
combat power when and where it is required.255 The American people will continue to expect us
to win in any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives
and resources while accomplishing the mission successfully. Commanders will be expected to
reduce the costs and adverse effects of military operations, from environmental disruption in
training to collateral damage in combat. Risks and expenditures will be even more closely
scrutinized than they are at present.256
254
255
JCS, p. 11.
256
Shalikashvili, p.8
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3.4 Characteristics of Future Isolating Incidents
3.4.1 Reduced Combat Aircraft Loss Rates
US combat aircraft loss rates have been in near constant decline since the dawn of air power (see
Figure 3-1). Although loss rates during the most recent conflicts are already particularly low,
several factors, described below, suggest that combat aircraft losses will continue to decline.
12
9.71
10
Losses per 1000 Sorties
4
2.06 2.04
2
0.43 0.54 0.53
0.13 0.06 0.12
0
WW II Korea SEA SEA SEA SEA Desert Deny Allied
(Total) (NVN) (Laos) (SVN) Storm Flight Force
Figure 3-1: Combat Loss Rates (per 1000 sorties) During US Air Campaigns
Sources: Granville, p. 17 (World War II, Korea, SEA); GWAPS, Statistical Compendium
(Desert Storm); AFSOUTH Fact Sheet (Deny Flight), Cohen, pp. 68-70 (Allied Force)
MORE FIREPOWER, FEWER COMBATANTS

Although improvements in combat aircraft loss rates can be observed over the decades since
World War II, threat systems seem to be evolving as quickly as aircraft countermeasures, and
component-level improvements (on their own) do not appear likely to significantly reduce
combat aircraft loss rates.257 On the other hand, the sum total of the product of the current RMA
is likely to deliver a distinct advantage to US combat aircraft. The systemic, integrated
improvements in precision, stealth, C2, sensors, information processing, etc., suggest fewer
aircraft losses across the spectrum of conflict. Loss rate reductions will derive, primarily, from
our ability to accomplish the effects of mass—the necessary concentration of combat power at
the decisive time and place—with less need to mass forces physically than in the past.258 For
example, without stealth, “a typical strike mission requires 32 planes with bombs, 16 fighter
257
For example, analysis done by SURVIAC shows that the Pk/h has remained relatively constant during the last 60
years (when averaging overall tactical aircraft types, all threats, and all missions for various conflicts). Mr.
Crosthwaite attributed the stability in aircraft vulnerability to the efforts of the vulnerability reduction community
keeping pace with an ever evolving and more lethal threat. (Crosthwaite [1], p. 9).
258
Shalikashvili, p. 17
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escorts, eight Wild Weasel aircraft to suppress enemy radar, four aircraft to electronically jam
enemy radar, and 15 tankers to refuel the group. With stealth technology the same mission can be
accomplished with only eight F-117s and two tankers to refuel them. Stealth technology
combined with precision guided munitions puts far fewer aircraft at risk and saves lives -- both
of aircrew and innocent civilians.”259
MORE STANDOFF WEAPONS

As the accuracy and confidence in standoff weapons continue to improve, they will play a larger
role on future battlefields. Systems like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, Army Tactical
Missile System, Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and Standoff Land Attack Missile
are just a few of the family of options that can apply force with great precision without risking
the loss of aircrews. Standoff weapons are not only increasingly effective, but are appealing to
political leadership that may be averse to US casualties. As the proportional use of standoff
weapons increases, combat aircraft loss rates will be reduced.
LESS PUBLIC TOLERANCE FOR LOSSES OR COLLATERAL DAMAGE

For better or for worse, the precedent for “loss-less” warfare has been set. Skilled practitioners
of war using good technology have made such warfare look easy, and it may be now more or less
expected by civilian authorities by the public. Although public tolerance for casualties will
certainly vary based on the nature of the conflict, it seems inevitable that casualty minimization
will be at the core of likely future battle plans, and fewer combat aircraft losses will result. That
pressure will be perpetuated by the omnipresence of the media on the battlefield and the
continuous reporting requirements of the 24-hour news cycle.
On the other hand, the public’s intolerance of collateral damage during air wars may tend,
initially, to increase the risk of loss to US aircrews (particularly when operating over urban
terrain). The pressure to minimize collateral damage drives robust requirements for highly
precise weapons delivery, carefully controlled effects, and minimization of total damage. All of
those requirements tend to increase the risk level to aircrews performing their missions in urban
environments. Despite those competing requirements (minimal US aircrew losses vs. minimal
collateral damage on the ground), the public seems likely to abandon its resistance to collateral
damage, if US losses begin to mount.
3.4.2 Number of Rescue Candidates per Incident Will Not Increase

CREW SIZES WILL NOT INCREASE
The pool of combat aircraft, from which losses will be expected, will evolve but remain largely
as it is today. Current trends in aircraft acquisition time and cost, combined with increased
congressional oversight, legal battles, and smaller budgets, suggest that most of the airframes
flying today will still be flying in the next two decades. For context, note that the A-6, B-52,
C-130, C-141, KC-135, and U-2 flew during Vietnam and are still flying today. Thirty years will
elapse from the time the F-15 became operational until its replacement by the F-22—assuming
no further delays. The next 20 years may yet see an F-16 block 80, F-15F, or a B-2 block 40
259
USAF Fact Sheet 91-03
3-10
aircraft. Forecasts show the venerable B-52 remaining in service until 2040. Budgetary
constraints may find the United States purchasing only manned aircraft that are currently past the
demonstration and validation phase (e.g., the F-22, V-22, and possibly the Joint Strike Fighter).
From a Combat Rescue perspective, such a scenario would tend to hold constant the number of
personnel isolated in each combat loss incident.
A likely exception to the slow evolution of new weapon systems is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV). The military services are just beginning to understand what capabilities UAVs might
offer, and are likely to pursue more rapid acquisition of UAV systems. The next two decades
will see the UAV evolving from airborne sensor to forward air controller to weapons delivery
platform. If that should prove to be the case, it would be another downward pressure on the
number of personnel required to create sufficient mass on the battlefield.
SHOOTDOWN INCIDENTS WILL BE MORE LETHAL THAN IN THE PAST

In forecasting the number of Survivors/Evaders that may be available for rescue following each
loss incident, one must also consider the severity of injury during aircrew ejection. Losses
during Operation Desert Storm showed a marked increase in the number of airmen known to
have been killed during the shootdown phase than was observed in SEA (50 percent vs. 24
percent respectively).260 One explanation may be that, due to improvements in aircraft
vulnerability reduction or more effective enemy weapon systems (or both), events causing
aircraft loss tend to be more catastrophic.261 Regardless, the probability of a higher proportion of
aircrew killed during ejection, and a reasonably predictable combat aircraft inventory, together
suggest the number of S/Es per incident will tend to remain static or decline. The result will be a
downward influence on the total rescue demand.
3.4.3 Losses to Remain Concentrated In/Around the Target Area

One constant in this study has been the concentration of combat aircraft losses in the target area.
It was true for every type of mission, every conflict, and every type of combat aircraft studied
(including Combat Rescue helicopters). Although exploitation of Dominant Maneuver will
result in operations conducted from multiple, dispersed locations, it is not anticipated that those
disparate basing locations will influence the very strong trend of concentrated losses in the target
area.262 That trend is important to this study’s line of inquiry (1) for its impact on the likely
distribution of S/Es on the battlefield; (2) for gaining insight into effective risk-reduction tactics
for Combat Rescue helicopter crews; and (3) for detecting deficiencies in RV self defenses.
Those three issues are described below.
3.4.3.1 Impact on Survivor/Evader Distribution on the Battlefield

Because rescue success is significantly influenced by the S/E’s proximity to the enemy (see
Section 2.1.8.3, for example), the constancy of losses in the target area levies a significant and
260
The 50 percent KIA rate during Desert Storm does not include 14 KIA during the shootdown of Spirit 03, an AC-
130. If they were to be included, the Desert Storm KIA rate would be 60 percent.
261
Bennett, interview.
262
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unchanging time pressure on rescue forces. The only factors that might abate that pressure
would be design improvements would cause the aircraft to “hold together” so that aircrew could
delay ejection until some distance from the target has been achieved, or the development of
ejection systems that offer some “fly away” capability to the aircrew. Significant advances in
those areas are not expected in the look-ahead time frame covered by this report.
3.4.3.2 Assessment of Recovery Vehicle Risk

Beyond the question of forecasting where S/Es may be concentrated on the battlefield, the fact
that both fixed-wing and Combat Rescue helicopter losses were similarly concentrated in the
target/terminal area reveals an important point about the effectiveness of Combat Rescue
helicopter tactics. Both the loss data and interviews with combat aircrew support the conclusion
that (for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft) the proportion of losses in the target area derives
from essentially two considerations—threat avoidance during a mission’s enroute phases (ingress
and egress), and a tendency towards a predictable flight profile in the target area. Although it
reads at first like simple common sense, that conclusion is noteworthy for its implications:
• Aircraft speed does not appear to be a singularly effective preventive countermeasure to
threats in the target area.263
• Helicopters operating enroute at very low altitudes are not necessarily more
susceptible/vulnerable to loss than higher-altitude fighters/bombers. In fact, the contrary
may be true.
For its sheer volume of sortie data, US experience in SEA is instructive. A comparison of
absolute fixed-wing and Combat Rescue helicopter loss rates shows that CSAR helicopter
operations were decidedly more risky, particularly as the density of the threat increased (see
Table 3-1, Column C). However, when losses are broken out by mission phase, a clearer picture
emerges. In SEA, about 83 percent of all fixed-wing combat losses occurred in the
target/terminal area, compared with about 91 percent of helicopter losses during Combat Rescue
missions. Casting those proportions over SEA loss data suggests that Combat Rescue helicopter
loss rates during ingress/egress were roughly equal to (or modestly less than) those of fixed-wing
fighter/attack/bomber aircraft. That trend held true for operations all over SEA.264
It is only in the target and terminal area that the helicopter experienced relative inferiority with
respect to loss rates. That interpretation of the data suggests that, despite its relatively slow
speed, the helicopter’s low altitude ingress and egress tactics are as effective for risk reduction as
is the fighter’s combination of high-altitude, speed, and maneuverability. It must be noted that
the environment in Vietnam was essentially free of MANPADS.
The presence of MANPADS on a future battlefield could change the equation, depending on
MANPADS proliferation, effectiveness of a low-altitude aircraft’s tactics and IR
countermeasures, and the difference in Pk/h between MANPADS and other optically aimed
weapons. Although it is impossible to predict how the technology will evolve, it is expected that
improvements in RV susceptibility to IR threats and improvements in IR missile effectiveness
263
Although the statement is true in the absolute, fixed-wing encounters with IR missiles during Desert Storm may
highlight an exception. They resulted in a Pk/h of about 0.7 at airspeeds below 300 KIAS (5 kills out of 7 hits), and
a Pk/h of 0.0 above 300 KIAS (zero kills out of 8 damage incidents). See Figure 2-44 in Section 2 of this report.
264
Granville, Tables 8-10.
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will maintain a rough parity, and that the probability of hit (Ph) will return to relatively “normal”
levels. Pk/h, however, is expected to remain high relative to other battlefield threats to RVs.
Although US experience with MANPAD/helicopter engagement is limited in that regard,
Russian experience is not. After reviewing helicopter losses in Afghanistan, Russian
survivability analysts summed up those encounters by saying (with almost comic
understatement), “a hit by a portable anti-aircraft missile system on helicopters is accompanied
primarily by a catastrophic outcome.”265
265
Crosthwaite[2], p. 488
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Table 3-1: SEA Combat Aircraft Loss Rates per 1000 Sorties by Mission Phase and
Location (Source: Granville, Tables 8-10) 266
A B C
ENROUTE TERMINAL AREA TOTAL LOSS RATES
Helos: 0.37 Helos: 3.70 Helos: 4.07
NVN
Fighters: 0.39 Fighters: 1.89 Fighters: 2.28
LAOS
SVN
0.6
0.5
0.4
Pk/h
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
SA/AAA RF SAM IR SAM
Figure 3-2: General Probability of Fixed-Wing Kill Given a Hit, by Threat Type
(Source: Rainis, p. 6)
266
The term “Helos” refers to USAF Combat Rescue helicopters. To paint a more accurate picture of combat
operations, H-43 sorties were not included in the loss rate calculations. Had they been included, there would have
been no change in NVN and Laos loss rates. In SVN, the composite enroute and terminal area loss rates would have
been 0.017 and 0.170 respectively, with a total SVN Helo loss rate of 0.187 per 1000 sorties.
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3.4.3.3 Recovery Vehicle Vulnerabilities in the Terminal Area
High Combat Rescue helicopter loss rates in the terminal area (relative to loss rates for
fighter/bomber/attack aircraft) suggest a significant deficiency in the ability of RESCORT to
suppress key threats (primarily dismounted infantry), and the inability of the RVs to perform that
function for themselves. For RVs to have (and use) a robust self-defense capability has been an
obvious need in each conflict studied as part of this report. That is not meant to suggest that
combat support from RESCORT has not been a key factor in the success of many, many
operations. Rather, it recognizes the real limitations in the capability of fixed wing air power to
suppress small concentrations of dismounted infantry, particularly in rough or foliated terrain.
As the role of RESCORT has been handed from the slower, propeller-driven A-1E (and its
predecessor, the T-28), to faster flying jets like the A-7, F-16, F-18, and F-15E, the ability to
deliver ordnance in very close proximity to the S/E on the ground has been reduced while
response time following call for fire has increased. While the A-1E could pursue and attack
individual soldiers on the ground during the war in SEA, current RESCORT aircraft, with the
possible exception of the A-10, do not have that capability. In SEA, attempts to fill the void by
using battlefield obscurants and agents like CS gas enjoyed modest success, but their use has
been abandoned and is not likely to be resurrected.
The inability of the RV (or wingman) to engage in a “knife fight” in the terminal area has
emerged as one of the most commonly observed operational deficiencies for the Combat Rescue
mission. A review of hundreds of individual Combat Rescue mission narratives, and numerous
interviews with Combat Rescue aircrew with experience from Vietnam to Kosovo indicate that
the need is real and persistent. Over the years, and still today, aircrew have been particularly
concerned about ensuring simultaneous weapons coverage in all four quadrants. The aircrews’
concern seems to be well placed since it is typical of Combat Rescue mission narratives to
describe that when one of the helicopter’s guns was firing, all of the others on board were soon
firing as well.
Recent testing indicates that even with four-quadrant coverage, RV self-defense capability is still
insufficient due to the limited capability of the machine guns that have been traditional Combat
Rescue helicopter weaponry. History suggests that weapons not traditionally seen on USAF
helicopters (rockets, air-to-ground missiles, larger caliber guns, and combined effects munitions)
are appropriate candidates for future Combat Rescue aircraft. Weapons versatility and
employment will be key determinants of success during recoveries in contested areas
(particularly in urban terrain).
Beyond the question of improved RV weapons, only a significant reduction in RV vulnerability
is likely to reduce terminal area loss rates to those experienced by fixed-wing combat aircraft.
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3.5 Trends in Enemy Reaction to Shootdowns
Even the least sophisticated adversaries will perceive and exploit asymmetric advantages during
conflict with the United States and, as part of that effort, will assign resources to the capture of
downed U.S., or Coalition, aircrew. Their efforts will be facilitated by the trend towards
Coalition warfare, which exposes US plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures to forces beyond
the US span of control. In an environment of such broad distribution to organizations or
individuals that may have their own agendas, information will make its way to our adversaries.
As happened in Somalia (Operation Continue Hope), Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight), and
Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), that information will be used effectively by our adversaries to
put US forces into scenarios of asymmetric vulnerability. Types of information that should be
expected to arrive in enemy hands include target lists, ATO, codewords, communications plans,
and ROE. While it would be an overstatement to say that such information in the hands of an
adversary could lead to disproportionate aircraft losses, it may tend to enable occasional aircraft
kills that would otherwise not have been possible. On a battlefield pervaded by 24-hour news
networks, such limited, solitary victories could change the outcome of an entire campaign.
With respect to Combat Rescue, it is probable that in a Coalition warfare environment,
adversaries will have awareness of SAR codewords, survival radio frequencies, and pick-up
procedures. Spoofing should be expected on UHF and VHF SAR frequencies and, depending on
the mobility of the enemy’s forces, SAR Traps in the terminal area are likely. The enemy will
use the Internet to gather remarkably detailed information about the units, aircraft, and
individuals involved in loss incidents for exploitation before and after an S/E’s capture.
3.6 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

3.6.1 Trends in Modern Rescue Response
Since 1991, 27 American combat aircrew have been shot down in combat and survived the
event.267 Of the 27, eight (30 percent) were successfully rescued before capture. Although the
sample size is small, there is sufficient information to begin drawing some broad conclusions:
3.6.1.1 The “Golden Hour” Belongs to the Enemy

In rescue circles, the first 60 minutes an S/E is on the ground is sometimes called the “Golden
Hour,” ostensibly representing the period of time when the chance for successful recovery is
greatest. Although that first hour certainly has operational significance enough to warrant its
name, the verbal lore is misleading—the data do not illustrate a particular advantage for rescuers
during that first hour. Instead, the Golden Hour is really a description of the contest between the
S/E and those that would capture him. The hour is golden, indeed, for if the S/E can avoid
capture in that time period, his proportionate chance of being rescued is significantly improved
(because his chances of being captured are so much less).
To be precise, the Golden Hour is really only 30 minutes. Table 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show the
cases of recent shootdowns (from Desert Storm for present), during which the enemy enjoyed a
267
This figure includes 24 during Desert Storm, Vega 31, and Hammer 34 during Operation Allied Force, and
Basher 52 during Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia.
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14 to 1 advantage in aircrew capture in the first 30 minutes. After the first 30 minutes, the
enemy had lost all of his relative advantage, and his ability to capture aircrew before they were
rescued lagged at a 0.7 to 1 ratio. Our voluminous experience in SEA shows remarkable, almost
mathematical, similarity with the Golden Hour trends observed in recent history (see Figures 2-
17, 2-18, and 3-3).
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Table 3-2: Rescue and Capture Rates During the "Golden Hour"
Operation Rescue Rate Capture Rate
0-30 mins > 30 mins 0-30 mins > 30 mins
268
Post 1990 4% 58% 52% 42%
269
SEA (NVN Only) 3% 53% 69% 46%
SEA (All)270 27% 83% 17% 17%
Notes:
• This table only considers those S/E that were available for rescue
(i.e. MIA and KIA are excluded).
• The rescues/captures happening before 30 minutes had expired,
and those happening after the first 30 minutes, are examined here
as separate populations. Consequently, the percentage total for
those rescued or captured in less than 30 minutes will not add up to
100% (i.e. not all of the S/E available for rescue were rescued or
captured in “0-30 mins”), while the “>30 mins will add-up to 100%
(i.e. 100% of those still available after 30 minutes were either
rescued or captured)
14
Number of Downed Aircrew
12
Rescued
10 Captured
0
Shootdow n
1 hrs
2 hrs
3 hrs
4 hrs
5 hrs
6 hrs
7 hrs
8 hrs
9 hrs
10 hrs
11 hrs
12 hrs
13 or more hrs
Elapsed Time
Figure 3-3: Distribution and Status of S/Es Over Time Since 1991
(Source: GWAPS, Vol. IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol V, p. 660;
Borg, p. 1; Williams, p.1; AFNS, p. 1
268
GWAPS, Vol IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol. V, p. 660.
269
Every (2), pp. 28-9.
270
Granville, p. 57; 7602 AIG, p. 10.
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3.6.1.2 Current Time To Rescue is Measured in Hours, Not Minutes
Faster, more capable RVs with better countermeasures and communications suites have not
resulted in improved Combat Rescue performance over time. Even when compared against
experience in NVN, SEA’s most difficult rescue environment, modern efforts do not show an
obvious improvement. To the contrary, the average time to recover an evader has more than
doubled, climbing from 1.7 hours in NVN to 4.1 hours in operations since 1990 (i.e. from Desert
Storm to present).
Table 3-3: Comparison of Response Times between
SEA and Recent Operations
Mean Time to Mean Time to

Operation
Capture Rescue
Post 1990271 5.8 hrs 21.4 hrs
272
Post 1990 (adjusted) 0.6 hrs 4.1 hrs
273
SEA (NVN Only) < 0.2 hrs 1.7 hrs
SEA (All)274 < 0.2 hrs 0.8 hrs
For perspective, consider the fact that during OAF it took recovery forces 6 hours and 3 hours,
respectively (and required mid-mission air refueling), to cover less than 50 miles during the
rescues of Vega 31 and Hammer 34. Also, recall the case of Basher 52, shot down over Bosnia
during Operation Deny Flight. After evading capture for almost 6 days, he was finally able to
establish radio contact with US forces overhead. From that point, it took almost five hours
before the RV arrived to bring him safely out of Bosnia. Keep in mind that from the moment
Basher 52 was reported lost, there were two rescue teams (one AFSOC and one USMC) on alert
around the clock, waiting to perform that very mission.
Current deficiencies in reaction time have two primary origins—(1) the absence of specially
trained Combat Rescue forces in recent conflicts, and (2) C2 practices that impede Combat
Rescue mission success.
ABSENCE OF SPECIALLY TRAINED COMBAT RESCUE FORCES
There is remarkable similarity in the Section 2 descriptions of CSAR operations in Desert Storm
and in Allied Force. In each case, specifically trained Combat Rescue expertise was not
available, and in each case our CSAR capability suffered (sometimes with heartbreaking results,
as with the case of Corvette 03). Nearly all of the mistakes made during Desert Storm that came
from an absence of forces trained for conventional CSAR, or failure to exploit appropriate
271
GWAPS, Vol. IV, pp. 302-3 and Vol. V, p. 660.
272
The adjusted figures are somewhat arbitrarily manipulated to present what is probably a more accurate picture of
rescue and capture capabilities. Mean Time to Capture was adjusted by removing the case of Corvette 03 (F-15E
lost during Desert Storm). Instead of being captured by a search party, the crew evaded towards the Syrian border
for almost 50 hours, and (having run out of food and water) approached what turned out to be an Iraqi border post.
Mean Time to Rescue was adjusted to change Captain Scott O’Grady’s evasion time from 144 hours down to the 5
hours that elapsed between his establishing radio contact and his eventual rescue.
273
Every (2), pp. 28-9.
274
Granville, p. 57; 7602 AIG, p. 10.
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doctrine and tactics, were repeated less than 10 years later in Kosovo (i.e., lack of Unity of
Command, unfamiliarity with proven Combat Rescue tactics, poor integration with conventional
players, etc.). Given the expected acceleration of the pace of future air wars, an absence of
conventional Combat Rescue forces is likely to be the limiting factor in future rescue attempts.
Because of their remarkable capabilities, SOF have been routinely tasked to fill the CSAR void.
However, although the tools used for Special Operations and for Combat Rescue are similar (or,
sometimes, identical), the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that support the two
missions are very different, and each requires maintenance of very specialized capabilities. It is
unlikely that SOF performing Combat Rescue as a collateral mission) will ever perform the
mission as effectively as a dedicated conventional Combat Rescue squadron.275 Whether the
relative rarity of isolating incidents warrants investment in such single-role capability is another
question entirely, and is well beyond the scope of this report.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PRACTICES

The framework for current Combat Rescue C2 processes originated in Vietnam. During that
conflict, the requirement to manage a broad array of Combat Rescue forces and to ensure reliable
dissemination of mission information led, inevitably, to the development of a very centralized,
hierarchical C2 organization. Such a centralized approach to C2 and mission execution
inevitably caused delays and confusion, but represented the optimum solution given the
technology at the time.
Little has changed since Vietnam. Although the advent of the HH-60G Pavehawk ushered in a
new, modern era for the operational aspects of Combat Rescue employment, Combat Rescue C2
processes are largely as they were when the venerable HH-3H sat alert at Lima Site 36 in Na
Khang. Although some improvements have been adopted, the inadequacy of current Combat
Rescue C2 processes is obvious on the modern battlefield, and is reflected in rescue reaction
times and S/E capture rates. Recent testing of surface-based elements of Combat Rescue C2
highlighted mission critical delays, failure to complete significant tasks (such as transmission of
a launch order to Combat Rescue forces or reassessment of mission viability after a change in
threat level), and failure to relay information to recovery forces. The most egregious C2 delays
occur when Survivors/Evaders are in areas where the threat level is elevated. In other words, C2
is least effective when the need for speed is most acute.276 Of course, the real sense of urgency
present during combat operations is not felt during testing, and may explain some of the poor
results. On the other hand, even the most egregious failures observed during Joint CSAR testing
have precedent in actual Combat Rescue operations from Desert Storm to today, many of which
have been cited in this report.
275
Ten years after Desert Storm, and following several conflicts in which SOF had primary responsibility for
supporting the air component’s Combat Rescue requirements, the Special Operations Forces Posture Statement says,
“SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF perform CSAR in support
of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF
missions.” Consistent with its Congressional mandate, USSOCOM lists CSAR as a collateral mission, subordinate
to nine assigned “Principal Missions.” (Sheridan, p. 44).
276
DiPaolo, p. 5.
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3.6.1.3 Most Shootdowns May Be Hopeless Cases for Rescuers
It is important to note that almost 70 percent of US aircrew captured since 1991 were in enemy
hands, not just within the first 30 minutes, but within the first 7 minutes.277 That trend is likely
to continue. On a battlefield where aircraft combat damage leading to loss is expected to be
more catastrophic than in the past, target area losses are more likely to place the downed aircrew
in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. In those cases, it may be unrealistic to expect that even a
perfect Combat Rescue capability could identify the loss, locate the S/E, assess and suppress the
threat, and deliver a RV to the S/E in less than 10 minutes. While there are sure to be exceptions
(recall the SEA case of opportune recovery [Section 2.1.6], in which a downed pilot was
recovered after 20 seconds on the ground), sustained performance within such narrow time
constraints should not be expected.
Two factors may tend to mitigate this trend:
• Nighttime operations: All of the immediate captures during Desert Storm occurred
during daylight hours. In contrast, every S/E isolated at night was able to evade for at
least 2 hours. However, keep in mind that the deserts in Southwest Asia were a “worst
case scenario” for evaders during daylight hours—there was no foliage, footprints could
be tracked in the sand, and the terrain was described as “pancake flat.”
• Limitation of fixed-wing combat sorties to medium or high altitudes: Operations that
made minimization of aircrew losses a top priority (OAF and Operation Deny Flight)
appear to have more successful outcomes following combat loss. While it is difficult to
draw any firm conclusions given the extremely small sample size (n=3), it seems
reasonable to consider that the separation between the downed aircrew and the threats
that hit them aided the successful evasions. Because the aircraft were hit at relatively
high altitudes, the longer parachute descent into hilly terrain created physical and
temporal separation from the aircraft crash site that may have complicated the enemy’s
search efforts, and ensured successful evasion during the critical Golden Hour.
Improvements in C2 processes described in Section 3.6.2 are also likely to produce some benefit.
In the look-ahead time frame covered by this report, it is anticipated that an S/E could be
located/identified, and protection assets will be tasked, within single-digit minutes following a
combat loss. Time of arrival of the RV will depend on its readiness posture, location, and speed.
Also key will be Air Forces Component Commander’s willingness to decentralize execution of a
mission with such high political interest and visibility.
3.6.2 C2ISR Improvements Will Reduce CSAR Reaction Time
3.6.2.1 Survivors/Evaders Will Be Immediately Located and Identified

Recent testing highlighted problems with our ability to accurately locate and identify S/Es on the
battlefield. In 71 trials, testing measured an average location error of 38.1 nautical miles, with a
median of 9 NM. Those errors were introduced by human error and poor system accuracy.278
Over the next 5 years or so, current survival radios will be replaced by an advanced radio that
will improve location/identification capability, and will have the following characteristics:
277
Thirteen out of 19 POWs.
278
Stanley, p. 4-6.
3-21
• High reliability
• Two-way voice on UHF or VHF
• Two-way text messaging via databurst
• Integrated geolocation capability with good precision
• Use of Low-Probability of Exploitation wave forms for databurst
When fielded, these radios will (in most cases) eliminate the requirement to perform additional
location/identification of the Survivors/Evaders, and will feed required information to the
CSARTF, RV, and the Pararescue team on the ground. Additional electronic tagging
technologies, and the rapid exploitation of electronic, electro-optic, and hyperspectral sensors
will also support the location/identification task. In turn, those capabilities will reduce reaction
time and increase the chances for successful recovery.
3.6.2.2 Real-Time CSARTF Reaction to Shootdowns Will Be Possible

Future conflicts will exploit some version of Time Critical Targeting (TCT) capability to
accelerate the C2 decision-making process. Combat Rescue will be handled as a TCT process,
enabling the construction of a high-SA, appropriately armed CSARTF in real-time from assets
that are already airborne. CSAR C2 processes will be more integrated with the rest of the
campaign’s C2 architecture, and readiness postures will also include better integration of Combat
Rescue operations into air battle plans, putting the RVs as close as possible to areas of expected
losses. On-board intelligence systems and data-links will enable “just-in-time” flight planning.
The net result will be to provide immediate protection to the S/E, and more rapid arrival of the
RV in the terminal area.
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3.7 Types of Recovery Forces
While the comparison between CSAR and SOF has already been made, it should be emphasized
that history doesn’t suggest the conclusion that SOF (particularly AFSOF) “can’t do rescue,” but
that they “don’t do rescue” as a matter of assigned roles and missions (see Footnote 275). It also
suggests that when SOF find themselves performing the mission anyway, they don’t use CAF
Combat Rescue doctrine or tactics. Unfortunately, this report’s multiple references to AFSOC-
led rescue missions may imply a false conclusion that a decision to use AFSOC forces was a bad
one—the fact is that it, in each case, it was the best option available at the time to provide needed
rescue capability. The issue is that when it reached the point that AFSOC was assigned the
rescue mission, the stage had already been set. From there, our warfighters relied on the
creativity and perseverance of the AFSOC crews who were operating without the benefit of
Combat Rescue doctrine or tactics, and were organized in a way that was at odds with basic
tenets of airpower. From that perspective, their performance was remarkable.
Two other categories of recovery forces merit attention—opportune forces and Special
Operations ground teams.
3.7.1 Opportune Forces

This category of rescuer refers, primarily, to US Army and USMC helicopters or ground forces
operating in the vicinity of downed aircrew. In SEA, due to the saturation of the Vietnamese
countryside with US Army UH-1s, the recovery rate for opportune forces during that conflict
was nothing short of surprising—they recovered about 20 percent of the more than 2,900 combat
aircrew that were shot down. However, recent uses of airpower suggest that robust air combat
operations are likely to precede any large scale fielding of ground forces, thereby reducing the
likelihood of opportune recovery in future conflict.
3.7.2 Special Operations Ground Teams

One of the most surprising findings of this report’s research effort was the extreme rarity of the
use of SOF for “Planned Assisted Recoveries,” and the even more rare occasions of mission
success. Since the advent of the helicopter, there are only a few (not more than three)
documented cases of S/E recovery by Unconventional Assisted Recovery Teams (UART). As
was the case for the recovery of Col Iceal Hambleton (Bat 21) in Vietnam, successful recoveries
by such unconventional means tend to get a disproportionate amount of attention. The
sensational details of those missions tend to perpetuate a general misconception regarding the
real effectiveness of such an approach.279
Several factors appear to contribute to the infrequent success of recovery by SOF teams. First,
and primarily, is the scarcity of the teams themselves. Second, the limited numbers of teams,
because of their unique capabilities, are typically tasked with higher-priority missions, leaving
very little excess capacity to support S/E recovery operations. Lastly, the CONOPS itself may
279
The discussion here is limited to the observed utility of Planned Assisted Recoveries of an Air Component’s S/Es
by unconventional ground forces. Other SOF activities in support of Theater personnel recovery operations
(organization of in-Theater evasion networks, support for SOF emergency exfiltration, psychological and
information operations support, etc.) are manifestly important components of comprehensive personnel recovery
programs.
3-23
be faulty. The time required for a team to enter isolation for mission planning, and then perform
the mission (including overland movement) almost guarantees mission failure based on known
“time to capture” curves. Further, US Army SOF guidance for Unconventional Assisted
Recovery states that the normal use of SOF teams for recovery operations is to pre-position the
team at a Selected Area For Evasion (SAFE) to link-up with the S/E.280 They may be waiting to
quite a while, however, since SAFEs are seldom (if ever) used by evaders. In fact,
recommending S/E movement to SAFEs may tend to increase S/E risk of exposure for very little
potential benefit. The SEA POW Analysis Program came to the following conclusion regarding
SAFEs:
“We have not determined that persons who made their way to ‘SAFE’
areas were in a more advantageous position to evade capture. The sole
advantage to those areas apparently lay in the fact that they were
subject to continuing surveillance. Any low population density area,
remote from significant anti-aircraft threat, was relatively ‘safe’
compared to areas near most incident sites.”281
The wartime utility of SAFEs notwithstanding, UARTs are tasked so infrequently as to make the
issue moot. All of those factors combined have resulted in land rescues being performed by
helicopters in 98.6 percent of cases from Vietnam to present. The bulk of the remaining 1.4
percent of successful recoveries was by opportune arrival of conventional ground forces in the
area of the survivor.
280
Bowra, p. 13. A SAFE is defined as “a designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a
reasonable chance of avoiding capture and surviving until they can be evacuated.” (JP 1-02)
281
7602 AIG, p. 41
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4. References
SOUTHEAST ASIA SECTION
7602 Air Intelligence Group (AIG); SEA PW Analysis Program Report--Factors Relating to the
Search and Rescue (SAR) and Evasion Experiences of US Prisoners of War (PWs) in Southeast
Asia; Report Number 700/FO-1; USAF Captivity Analysis Program, Washington DC, September
1976.
Air Combat Command (USAF), XP/SAS; Southeast Asia Helicopter Loss spreadsheet, February
1999.
Boyne, Walter; Boeing B-52 -- A Documentary History, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981 in
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/b052-11.html, prepared by Joe Baugher.
Cima, Ronald J.; Vietnam: A Country Study. Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Washington DC 1989.
Crosthwaite, Kevin; "MANPADS Combat History" in Aircraft Survivability (pp. 12-13), Joint
Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS), Arlington VA, Summer
1999.
Dasilva, Ricardo SMSgt (ret.), SEA HH-43 Flight Engineer, in correspondence with by Combat
Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Marc DiPaolo; November 12, 2000.
Department of Defense; Commanders Digest (a periodical); Washington DC, May 11, 1972.
Directorate of Aerospace Safety; South East Asia Escape, Evasion, and Recovery Experience,
1 Jan 63 - 31 Dec 71 [Preliminary Report]; Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Air Force
Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, CA, October 1972.
Eggers, Jeffery W.; An Analysis of Helicopter Operations in the Battle of Koh Tang; 422nd
Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB NV; September 10, 2000.
Every, Martin G. (1); Biomedical Aspects of Escape and Survival Under Combat Conditions,
Biological and Medical Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, March 1976
Every, Martin G. (2); Problems and Alternatives in the Combat Rescue of Navy
Aircrewmen, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA,
November 1980.
Every, Martin G. (4); Review of Problems Encountered in the Recovery of Navy
Aircrewmen under Combat Conditions, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval
Research, Arlington VA, June 1973.
Every, Martin G. (5); Summary of Navy Air Combat Escape and Survival, Naval Air Systems
Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA, February 1977.
Farrior, Tsgt Aaron D., Pararescue NCOIC, Det 1, 40 ARRSq; End of Tour Report sent to
CORONA HARVEST; Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai AFB, Thailand; December 11, 1969.
Francis, Capt David G.; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Search and Rescue
Operations in SEA 1 April 1972-30 June 1973. HQ PACAF, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST
Division; November 27, 1974.
4-1
Granville, John M.; Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA; HQ Tactical Air
Command/XPSY, Langley AFB VA, June 1974.
Hewett, Paul C.; Analysis of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses, Aircrew Casualties and F-105
Damages in SEAsia Conflict, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory [AFFDL-TR-72-15],
Wright-Patterson AFB OH, July 1971.
Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME); Analysis of
Combat Damage on H-3 Helicopters in Southeast Asia From 1965 Through 1970,
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; US Government Printing Office 1972-769-
010/40, April 1, 1972.
Lee, Col Branford; Briefing: Pararescue Emergency Medical Training, HQ ACC/SG
(Aerospace Medicine), 1996.
Office of Naval Aviation History; U.S. Air Operations in Southeast Asia, 1964-73--Southeast
Asia Statistical Summary. Washington Navy Yard, Wash DC in www.bluejackets.com.
Overton, Major James B.; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, USAF Search and Rescue
November 1967-June 1969. HQ PACAF, CHECO Division; July 30, 1969.
Porter, Mel; Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Escape and Evasion SEA 1964-1971.
HQ PACAF, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division; February 4 1972.
Roberts, T. D.; Laos: A Country Study [DA Pam No. 550-58]; Foreign Area Studies Series,
The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.
Shannon, Robert H. Combat Use of Life Support Systems in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 67-31 Dec
68; Life Sciences Group, Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton AFB, CA, May 5-8, 1969.
Sharp, Admiral U. S. G., Commander in Chief Pacific; Report on the War in Vietnam-Section
I; Vietnam, June 30, 1968.
Seig, Major Louis; Project CHECO Report, Impact of Geography on Air Operations in
SEA, HQ PACAF, CHECO Division; June 11, 1970.
Smith, Harvey H. (1); Area Handbook for North Vietnam [DA Pam No. 550-57]; Foreign
Area Studies Series, The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.
Smith, Harvey H. (2); Area Handbook for South Vietnam [DA Pam No. 550-55]; Foreign
Area Studies Series, The American University, Washington, DC, June 1967.
Streets, Gary B., Comparative Analysis of USAF Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast
Asia Combat [Technical Report AFFDL-TR-77-115]; Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, December 1977.
Tilford, Earl H.; Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975; Office of Air Force
History, United States Air Force, Washington DC, January 1992.
Tuckey, Major R. F.; Search and Rescue Operations Combat Experiences-Lessons Learned
No. 72; Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; November 18,
1968.
Westmoreland, General William C., Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam;
Report on the War in Vietnam-Section II, June 30, 1968.
4-2
OPERATION DESERT STORM SECTION
Arnold, John; Analysis of V-22 and H-60 Effectiveness for the Combat Search and Rescue
Mission, ANSER Inc.; Arlington VA, Sep 1997.
Bergeron, TSgt Randy G. ; Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Air Force Special Operations
Command in the Gulf War; Headquarters AFSOC, Office of the Command Historian; Hurlburt
AFB, FL, June 2000
Boucher, Paul; “Desert Storm Rescue Results Summary Briefing”; Joint Services SERE Agency,
Ft Belvoir, Washington DC, 1995.
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress,
Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel
Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25); Washington DC, April 1992.
Crosthewaite, Kevin; “MANPADs Combat History” in National MANPADS Workshop
Proceedings, Volume 1, SURVIAC-TR-99-006; Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville AL, 15
December 1998.
Department of the Air Force; Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS); Government Printing
Office, Washington DC, 1993.
Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States
Air Force in the Gulf War-A Report, Washington DC, September 1991.
General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign,
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives,
GAO/NSIAD 97-134, Washington DC, June 1997.
Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA), “Gulf War Combat Losses-Aviation Related,” (typed
document summarizing data from JRCC logs and open source information). JSSA Library,
Desert Storm Archive, Ft Belvoir VA.
Mohan, Capt Robert; Report on Historical CSAR and Evasion Data and Discussion of
Mission Failure Factors, Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Feasibility Study, Nellis AFB,
NV, January 1995.
Trask, Lt Col Thomas, MH-53 flight-lead during the rescue of Slate 46, in correspondence with
Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Michael Agin; February 12, 2001.
Tyner, Lt Col Joe E.; AF Rescue and AFSOF: Overcoming Past Rivalries for Combat
Rescue Partnership Tomorrow; US Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.
USAF; Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force In The Gulf
War—A Report; September 1991.
OPERATION DENY FLIGHT SECTION

Auster, Bruce B.; “One Amazing Kid,” U.S. News & World Report; June 19, 1995
Air Force News Service (AFNS); “F-16 Pilot Shot Down,” Washington DC; June 2, 1995.
4-3
AFSOUTH [1]; Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: Operation Deliberate Force;
AFSOUTH Public Information Office, Viale della Liberazione, Naples, Italy; November 16,
1995.
AFSOUTH [2]; Allied Forces Southern Europe Fact Sheet: Operation Deny Flight; AFSOUTH
Public Information Office, Viale della Liberazione, Naples, Italy; November 16, 1995.
Beale, Michael O.; “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina;”
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University; Maxwell AFB AL; June 1996.
Berndt, BG Martin,; “The Recovery of Basher 52,” Proceedings, US Naval Institute, Vol
121/11/113; November 1995. BG (sel) Brandt was the commander of the 24th MEU(SOC)
during the recovery of Basher 52.
Borg, Capt. Lindsey; “Serbian Air Defenses a Threat;” air Force News Service; Aviano Air
Base, Ital; September 12, 1995.
Bowman, Steven R.; “Bosnia: US Military Operations,” Issue Brief 93056; Congressional
Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division; December 16, 1996.
Cook, Nick [1]; “Survival of the Smartest,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 033, Issue 009;
March 1, 2000.
Cook, Nick [2]; “Serb Air War Changes Gear,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 031, Issue
014; April 7, 1999.
Davies, Karin; Associated Press, “Rescued US Pilot Was One Amazing Kid,” reported in The
Standard Times, New Bedford MA, June 9, 1995.
Fedarko, Kevin; “All For One,” Time, Volume 145, No. 25; June 19, 1995.
Furdson, MGen Edward; “Task Group 612.02,” Jane’s Navy International; Volume 100, Issue
001; January 1, 1995.
Gunther, Lt Col Christopher J.; “Fortune Favors the Bold,” in Armed Forces Journal
International; Washington DC, December 1995. Lt Col Gunther was the USMC mission
commander for the mission to rescue Basher 52.
Lowe, MSgt Merrie Schilter; “America Introduces New Way of War,” Air Force News Service
report; Orlando, FL; Feb 23, 1996.
Murray, BG Terry, DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA); June
8, 1995 (in http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1995/t060995_t0608rsc.html).
Owen, Robert C. [1]; “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," Air Power Journal, Vol. XI,
No. 2 (Summer 1997): pp. 4-24.
Owen, Robert C. [2]; “The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2," Air Power Journal, Vol. XI,
No. 3 (Fall 1997): pp. 6-26.
Owens, Admiral William, Joint Chiefs of Staff; DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); June 8, 1995 (in
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1995/t060995_t0608rsc.html).
Pomeroy, MSgt Gary; Air Force News Service (AFNS); “Downed Pilot Rescued by NATO
Team,” Washington DC; June 8, 1995
4-4
SHAPE; Information Booklet on NATO, SHAPE and Allied Command Europe; SHAPE Public
Information Office; May 2000.
Simmons, L. D.; Lessons and Implications From the US Air Operations in the Former
Yugoslavia 1992-1995, Volume I (S); IDA Report # R-3.97; Institute for Defense Analysis,
Alexandria, VA; July 1996. Excerpts cited from this source are unclassified.
Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [1], Commander In Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe;
Transcript of news conference, “NATO Air Strike Against Bosnian Serbs;” Headquarters, Allied
Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy; 1000 hours, August 31, 1995.
Smith, Admiral Leighton W. [2]; “NATO’s IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace
Support Operations,” Strategic Forum, Number 154; National Defense University; Washington
DC; January 1999.
Transcript of press conference, Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy;
1700 hours, September 22, 1995.
Transcript of news conference, “Rescue of F-16 Pilot;” London, June 8, 1995.
Tirpak, John A.; “Deliberate Force,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 80, No. 10; October 1997.
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE SECTION

st st
Borg, 1 Lt Matthew, 31 Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs Officer, “Rescued Pilot Details
Evasion, Inspiration;” Aviano Air Base, Italy, April 5, 1999.
Boyle, Col (no first name); quoted in Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment by
General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John
Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team; NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
Belgium, 16 Sept 99.
Cherrey, Major John, A-10 Sandy pilot and Sandy flight lead during the recovery of Vega 31;
Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; February 16,
2001.
Clark, General Wesley K., Supreme Allied Commander Europe; “When Force Is Necessary:
NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis,” NATO Review, Summer 1999.
Cohen, William S, et. al.; Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report; Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS);
Washington DC, 31 January 2000.
Fedkow, CW4 Walter; Operations Warrant Officer, HHC 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne),
Ft. Lewis, WA, 28 February, 2000.
Hammer 34, pilot of downed F-16CJ; Interviewed by ABC News, April 25, 1999.
(http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/Popoff/pilot_coversheet_000425.popoffblk.html).
Laushine, Lt Col Steven, Mission Commander for the recoveries of Vega 31 and Hammer 34;
Interviewed by ABC News, April 25, 1999.
(http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/Nightline/nl000425_F117fighter_pilot_feature.html)
4-5
McGonagill, Major John; Director, Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC), 5 ATAF,
Vicenza, Italy, Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review (CROR) researcher Robert
Mohan; 21 March 2000.
Newman, Richard J.; “Ten Airmen Were Awarded The Silver Star For Their Heroic Efforts In
The Kosovo Campaign,” Air Force Magazine, Volume 83, Number 6 (www.afa.org/magazine)
June 2000.
Schmitt, Eric; “Downing a Stealth Jet: Shrewd Tactics or a Lucky Shot?” New York Times (in
www.nytimes.com), April 11, 1999.
Trumpfheller, Capt Michael, USAF Weapons School Instructor assigned to the Air Operations
Center in Vicenza during Operation Allied Force; Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational
Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; June 24, 2000 and February 16, 2001.
Williams, Rudy; “Daring Rescues Snatch Pilots from Jaws of Enemy,” American Forces Press
Service; Fort Belvoir, VA, February 17, 2000.
COLD WAR SECTION

Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), Personnel Missing-Cold War
(PMCOLD) Database; available at http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmcold/index.htm.
Goldrich, Robert L. [1], Un-numbered Memorandum: “Cold War Shoot-Down Incidents
Involving US Military Aircraft Resulting in US Casualties;” Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Washington DC; July
1992.
Goldrich, Robert L. [2], CRS Issue Brief: 92101: “POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting
Issues;” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress; Washington DC; November 7, 1996.
COMBAT RESCUE TEST,AND EXPERIMENT SECTION

Corder, Lt Gen (ret) John A., Aerospace C2ISR Center JAFCC Mentor; Interviewed by CROR
researcher Marc DiPaolo; August 12, 2000.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Enhanced Capability Test Report,” TR-01-0399; Nellis AFB,
NV; March 1999.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Woodland Cougar End-to-End Test Report,” TR-01-0898;
Nellis AFB, NV; August, 1998.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR VS-1 Detailed Test Plan,” JCSAR DTP-VS 1-01-0597; Nellis
AFB, NV; May 1997.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Location and Identification of Isolated Personnel, Interim Test
Report,” Nellis AFB, NV; February 1997.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “Joint Rescue Exercise 98, Executive Summary;” Nellis AFB, NV;
September 1998.
4-6
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Field Training Exercise 1, Executive Summary;” Nellis AFB,
NV; October 1997.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR JT&E Final Report,” Final Report-01-0499; Nellis AFB, NV;
April 1999.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Current Capability Test Report,” TR-01-0898; Nellis AFB,
NV; August 1998.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Mission Execution Test Report,” TR-01-0498; Nellis AFB,
NV; April 1998.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Test At Surface-Based C4I Blue Flag 98-2,” Nellis AFB, NV;
July 1998.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Blue Flag 97-1 Surface-Based C4I Interim Test Report,”
Nellis AFB, NV; October 1997.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Blue Flag 96-3 Surface-Based C4I Interim Test Report,”
Nellis AFB, NV; February 1997.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “Joint Combat Search and Rescue All Service Combat Identification
Evaluation Team 96 Detailed Test Plan,” Nellis AFB, NV; August 6, 1996.
JCSAR Joint Test Force; “JCSAR Field Training Exercise 2 at ASCIET 97,” Nellis AFB, NV;
October 1997.
Jumper, Gen John, Commander, Air Combat Command; Interviewed by CROR researcher Marc
DiPaolo, August 13, 2000.
Keck, Lt Gen Thomas, JFACC during JEFX 2000; Interviewed by Robert Donnelly, JSRC
Director for JEFX 2000; August 12, 2000.
USAF Air Warfare Center; “Combat Rescue Time Critical Targeting and Tactical Datalinks—
JEFX 2000 Final Report,” ACC Project 00-152AR; Nellis AFB, NV; February, 2001.
USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Cabin Configuration Final Operational Test and
Evaluation Test Report,” ACC Project 96-012A, April 1997
USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Defensive Systems Employment Tactics OT&E Test
Report,” ACC Project 96-562FTR, August 1996.
USAF Air Warfare Center; “HH-60G Terminal Area Tactics Development and Evaluation Test
Report,” ACC Project 97-507A, August 1999
REFERENCES FOR SECTION 3

AFSOUTH Operation Deny Flight Public Information Office; “Allied Forces Southern Europe,
Fact Sheet,” AFSOUTH Viale della Liberazione, ITALY; December 1995.
Air Force News Service (AFNS); “Air Force F-16 Shot Down;” Washington DC; June 2, 1995.
Bennett, Gerald; Survivability Analyst, Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center;
Interviewed by Combat Rescue Operational Review researcher Marc DiPaolo; August 28, 2000.
Borg, 1st Lt Matthew, 31st Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs Officer, “Rescued Pilot Details
Evasion, Inspiration;” Aviano Air Base, Italy, April 5, 1999.
4-7
Bowra, Maj Gen Kenneth R.; “Unconventional Assisted Recovery,” USAJFKSWC Pub 525-5-
14; US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg NC; January 1999.
Crosthwaite, Kevin [1]; “airplanes Vulnerability: A Survey of Combat and Peacetime
Experience,” Aircraft Survivability, pp. 8-9; Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft
Survivability (JTCG/AS), Arlington, VA; Spring 1998.
Crosthwaite, Kevin [2]; “MANPADS Combat History,” Aircraft Survivability, pp. 8-9; Joint
Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS); Summer 1999.
Department of the Air Force; Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS); Government Printing
Office, Washington DC, 1993.
DiPaolo, Marc C.; Ready, Fire, Aim: A Dynamic Approach to Command and Control for
Combat Rescue; Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation, Nellis AFB NV;
September 17, 1999.
Every, Martin G. (2); Problems and Alternatives in the Combat Rescue of Navy
Aircrewmen, Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Arlington VA,
November 1980.
Granville, John M.; Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA; HQ Tactical Air
Command/XPSY, Langley AFB VA; June 1974.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Concept for Future Joint Operations; Joint Warfighting Center,
Fort Monroe VA; 30 January 1998.
Rainis, Dr. Al “airplanes Vulnerability to Man Portable Air Defense Weapons,” Aircraft
Survivability, pp. 6-7; Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability
(JTCG/AS), Arlington, VA; Summer 1998.
Shalikashvili, Gen John M.; Joint Vision 2010; Joint Staff, Department of Defense, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C; July 1996.
Shelton, Gen Henry H.; Joint Vision 2020; Joint Staff, Department of Defense, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.; June 2000.
Sheridan, Brian E. United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2000; Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict), Pentagon,
Washington D.C.; 2000.
Stanley, Col Kenneth C.; JCSAR Current Capability Surface-Based C4I Test Report; Joint
Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation; Nellis AFB, NV August 1998.
Unterreiner, Cdr Ronald J. “Kill Mechanism Carriage,” 2025, College of Aerospace Doctrine,
Research, and Education; Maxwell AFB AL, August 1996.
USAF Fact Sheet 91-03 Special Edition, May 1991.
4-8
5.Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ACR Aircrew Recovery
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOCCENT Air Force Special Operations Command, Central Command
AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces
AIG Air Intelligence Group
AMC Airborne Mission Commander
AoA Analysis of Alternatives
AOC Air Operations Center
ARRG Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group
ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
ARRSq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron
ARS Air Rescue Service
ATO Air Tasking Orders
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
C2 Command and Control
CAF Combat Air Forces
CAOC Combined Air Operations Center
CFACC Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CR Combat Rescue
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSARTF Combat Search and Rescue Task Force
CW Chief Warrant Officer
DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defense
DMZ De-Militarized Zone
FOL Forward Operating Locations
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IR Infrared
5-1
JEFX Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JRCC Joint Recovery Coordination Cell
JSARC Joint Search and Rescue Center (Vietnam era)
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSSA Joint Services SERE Agency
JTCG/ME Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
JT&E Joint Test and Evaluation
KIA Killed in Action
KKMC King Khalid Military City
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
MIA Missing in Action
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NM Nautical Miles
NVN North Vietnam
OAF Operation Allied Force
OGE Out of Ground Effect
OSC On-Scene Commander
Ph Probability of hit
Pk/h Probability of kill given a hit
POW Prisoner of War
PR Personnel Recovery
PRCC Personnel Recovery Coordination Center
RCC Rescue Coordination Centers
Recce Reconnaissance
RESCORT Rescue Escort
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE Rules of Engagement
RTIC Real-Time Intelligence/Information to the Cockpit
5-2
RV Recovery Vehicle
S/E Survivors/Evaders
SA Small Arms or Situational Awareness
SAFE Selected Area for Evasion
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue
SARTF Search and Rescue Task Force
SEA Southeast Asia
SERE Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape
SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOCEUR Air Force Special Operations Command, European Command
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOS Special Operations Squadron
SVN South Vietnam
SWA Southwest Asia
TCT Time Critical Targeting
TFTS Tactical Fighter Squadron
US United States
UART Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN United Nations
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USCENTAF USAF Central Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTE Monthly Airframe Utilization Rate
5-3
6.Index
160 SOAR........................................................ 2-73 88, 2-94, 2-102, 3-10, 3-15, 4-3, 4-5, 4-7
24 MEU(SOC) ....................... 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 4-4 F-4................................................................2-68
3d ARRG .......................................... 2-6, 2-34, 5-1 F-4 or RF-4 ......................2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-37
5th Allied Tactical Air Force ....................2-81, 4-6 F-5...................................................... 2-16, 2-68
AFSOC ...... 2-73, 2-74, 2-103, 3-19, 3-23, 4-3, 5-1 F-8................................................................2-15
AFSOCCENT ...............2-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-76, 5-1 GR-1 ............................................................2-68
Air Component Commander (Joint/Combined)... 2- GR-7 ......................................... 2-83, 2-91, 2-96
105, 2-113, 2-121, 2-122, 2-123, 4-7, 5-1 HC-130 ................................. 2-34, 2-112, 2-113
Air Force Reserve ............................................ 2-74 HU-16 ................................................ 2-16, 2-55
air refueling (also see HC-130) 2-24, 2-35, 2-56, 2- MC-130......................................................2-113
122, 3-19 Mirage....................................... 2-83, 2-90, 2-93
airborne alert (Also see Orbit Concept) .2-8, 2-120, O-1 ............................................ 2-16, 2-21, 2-37
2-121 O-2 ............................................ 2-16, 2-21, 2-37
Airborne Mission Commander (AMC).....2-10, 5-1 OA-10 .............................................. 2-68, 2-112
aircrew size, downed..................... 2-15, 2-16, 2-23 OV-10 .................... 2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-39, 2-68
airplanes RA-5 ............................................................2-15
A-1............................................ 2-37, 2-38, 2-39 RB-57...........................................................2-16
A-10 2-68, 2-75, 2-77, 2-86, 2-98, 2-100, 2-101, RB-66...........................................................2-16
2-112, 2-113, 2-115, 3-15 RC-135.......................................................2-112
A-119........................................................... 2-16 RF-4 ................................................... 2-16, 2-21
A-26............................................................. 2-16 T-28........................................... 2-16, 2-37, 3-15
A-37............................................................. 2-16 Al Jouf (Saudi Arabia) .................. 2-73, 2-75, 2-77
A-4......................................................2-15, 2-68 Albania .............................................................2-97
A-6 or EA-6..................... 2-15, 2-37, 2-65, 3-10 armor (helicopter).................2-34, 2-56, 2-59, 2-61
A-7....2-8, 2-15, 2-16, 2-21, 2-37, 2-38, 2-39, 2- Army (US)....2-18, 2-32, 2-33, 2-64, 2-73, 2-74, 2-
47, 3-15 78, 2-99, 3-23, 3-24, 4-8
AC-130...................2-39, 2-66, 2-68, 2-70, 3-11 Army, (US)............................................... 2-18, 5-3
AC-47.......................................................... 2-16 Aviano Air Base (Italy) . 2-85, 2-88, 2-94, 4-4, 4-5,
AH-64................................. 2-112, 2-113, 2-115 4-7
AV-8B ........................... 2-65, 2-68, 2-86, 2-113 AWACS ....................... 2-73, 2-75, 2-76, 2-99, 5-1
B-52................................... 2-21, 3-10, 3-11, 4-1 bailout..................................................See Ejection
B-57............................................................. 2-21 Basher 52.2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-87, 2-88, 2-89, 2-91,
C-130..................................................2-21, 3-10 2-94, 2-103, 2-130, 3-16, 3-19, 4-4
E-3 ...................................... 2-112, 2-113, 2-115 Bat 21 ..................................................... 2-37, 3-23
E-8 ..................................................2-112, 2-113 Batman (Turkey). Also see FOL .....................2-78
EA-3 ............................................................ 2-15 Bengal 15..........................................................2-74
EB-66 .................................................2-16, 2-37 Bosnia... 2-1, 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-
EC-130 ...................................................... 2-112 90, 2-94, 2-96, 2-97, 2-101, 2-104, 2-112, 3-4,
F/A-18 ......................... 2-68, 2-86, 2-113, 2-115 3-16, 3-19, 4-4
F-100 ............................... 2-16, 2-21, 2-34, 2-37 Bosnian Government Army (BIH) ...................2-91
F-104 ........................................................... 2-16 Brindisi Air Base (Italy) . 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-
F-105 ................................. 2-16, 2-21, 2-37, 4-2 95
F-111 ..................................................2-16, 2-68 brownout...........................................................2-75
F-117 ........................................................... 2-99 Bush, President George H. ..................... 2-61, 2-67
F-14 .......................................... 2-68, 2-73, 2-75 CHECO ............................................... 2-9, 4-1, 4-2
F-15 ............................................................. 2-75 CINCSOUTH2-81, 2-82, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-
F-15C..............................................2-113, 2-115 91, 2-93, 2-94
F-15E......................2-68, 2-78, 2-86, 3-15, 3-19 close air support..................2-81, 2-82, 2-93, 2-127
F-16 2-68, 2-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-83, 2-84, 2-86, 2- coalition operations 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 2-
6-1
67, 2-76, 2-83, 2-92, 2-99, 2-101, 3-7, 3-16 AH-64 ..............................2-64, 2-65, 2-73, 2-76
Cold War...2-1, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 2-109, 2-110, CH-3 ................................2-16, 2-25, 2-35, 2-55
3-1, 3-4, 4-6 CH-47 ........................................................2-113
command and control.2-39, 2-42, 2-73, 2-76, 2-79, CH-53 ..............................2-16, 2-55, 2-86, 2-87
2-87, 2-93, 2-99, 2-112, 2-113, 2-115, 2-116, 2- H-34 ................................................... 2-33, 2-43
118, 2-119, 2-120, 2-121, 2-123, 2-124, 2-130, HH-3 2-8, 2-16, 2-24, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-
2-131, 3-2, 3-6, 3-9, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 3-22, 5-1 43, 2-55, 2-56, 2-74, 2-77
CONOPS 2-73, 2-77, 2-86, 2-116, 2-118, 2-119, 3- HH-43 .2-16, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-47, 2-55,
23, 5-1 3-14, 4-1, 4-3
Corvette 03........................... 2-73, 2-76, 2-78, 3-19 HH-53 ...2-8, 2-16, 2-25, 2-33, 2-34, 2-35, 2-37,
CSARTF .2-5, 2-8, 2-10, 2-29, 2-37, 2-39, 2-78, 2- 2-39, 2-47, 2-55, 2-57, 2-59, 2-77, 3-3
79, 2-100, 2-105, 2-112, 2-114, 2-115, 2-118, 2- HH-60G .... 2-85, 2-103, 2-111, 2-112, 2-113, 2-
121, 2-125, 2-127, 2-130, 2-131, 3-2, 3-22, 5-1, 114, 2-115, 2-127, 2-129, 4-7
5-3 HH-60H .............................. 2-112, 2-113, 2-115
data................................................ 2-16, 2-21, 2-55 MH-532-73, 2-74, 2-75, 2-85, 2-86, 2-95, 2-103
deception.................................................2-93, 2-98 MH-60G......... 2-74, 2-100, 2-101, 2-103, 2-105
desert.... 2-2, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-109, 2-112, 2-127 MH-60K.....................................................2-113
downwash ........................................ See Windblast SH-60...........................................................2-73
Ebro 33..... 2-39, 2-90, 2-91, 2-93, 2-94, 2-95, 2-96 UH-1 ......................................... 2-16, 2-47, 2-55
ejection 2-19, 2-21, 2-31, 2-50, 2-51, 2-53, 2-73, 2- UH-60 ..............................2-70, 2-74, 2-78, 2-79
78, 2-84, 2-100, 3-2, 3-11, 3-12 high bird ................................................... 2-9, 2-38
enemy reaction (to isolating incidents) ..2-26, 2-72, Ho Chi Minh Trail....................2-2, 2-4, 2-13, 2-39
3-16 hoist ............................ 2-9, 2-34, 2-43, 2-47, 2-128
environment 2-2, 2-5, 2-23, 2-29, 2-31, 2-47, 2-56, Holland .............................................................2-82
2-59, 2-61, 2-63, 2-75, 2-84, 2-93, 2-103, 2-109, hovering............................2-56, 2-57, 2-127, 2-133
3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 3-12, 3-16, 3-19 Hussein, Saddam ..............................................2-61
evasion ..2-6, 2-21, 2-31, 2-33, 2-40, 2-45, 2-46, 2- injuries............... 2-21, 2-31, 2-46, 2-50, 2-53, 2-79
50, 2-53, 2-61, 2-72, 2-73, 2-75, 2-78, 2-83, 2- integration..2-39, 2-60, 2-77, 2-103, 3-6, 3-7, 3-20,
84, 2-86, 2-90, 2-91, 2-103, 2-110, 2-130, 3-19, 3-22
3-21, 3-23 interoperability 2-76, 2-116, 2-119, 2-131, 3-2, 3-8
Farm Gate ........................................................ 2-32 Iraq .. 2-1, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-64, 2-72, 2-74, 2-75,
flak traps ................................... 2-26, 2-117, 2-125 2-77, 2-78, 2-79, 2-83, 2-91, 2-107, 3-19
Fogelman, Gen Ronald ...........................2-84, 2-94 Italy 2-81, 2-82, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-95, 2-97, 2-98,
forest penetrator .............................. 2-9, 2-34, 2-43 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7
forward air controllers (FAC) .......................... 2-39 jamming and spoofing (radio transmissions)...2-72,
forward operating locations (FOL) .. 2-8, 2-9, 2-24, 2-99, 2-101, 2-105, 2-117, 2-118, 2-125, 2-131
2-78, 2-91, 5-1 Jones, Lt Devon............................... 2-9, 2-73, 2-75
France ..............2-31, 2-56, 2-83, 2-90, 2-95, 2-107 JRCC (also see JSRC) ..............2-63, 2-73, 4-3, 5-2
Germany ................................ 2-63, 2-82, 2-88, 3-1 JSRC... 2-6, 2-8, 2-10, 2-98, 2-99, 2-105, 2-118, 2-
Glosson, Gen Buster ........................................ 2-67 119, 2-120, 2-122, 2-132, 4-6, 4-7, 5-2
Great Britain ................................... 2-4, 2-63, 2-82 jungle....................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-34, 2-42, 2-46
Greece .............................................................. 2-82 karst ....................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-33, 2-34, 2-43, 2-46
ground teams (Also see Unconventional Assisted Khmer Rouge ........................................... 2-2, 2-14
Recovery) ........................... 2-116, 2-125, 2-130 KIA.. 2-6, 2-16, 2-18, 2-21, 2-23, 2-26, 2-46, 2-55,
Gulf of Tonkin ....................... 2-6, 2-12, 2-29, 2-40 2-70, 3-11, 3-18, 5-2
guns (helicopter) .2-9, 2-26, 2-33, 2-34, 2-38, 2-39, Koh Tang Island .............................. 2-59, 2-60, 4-1
2-53, 2-56, 2-59, 2-101, 2-125, 2-127, 2-128, 2- Korea ............... 2-5, 2-63, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 3-9
133, 3-15 Kosovo . 1-1, 2-1, 2-80, 2-97, 2-98, 2-99, 2-104, 3-
Hambleton, Lt Col Iceal......................... See Bat 21 15, 3-16, 3-19, 4-5, 4-6
Hammer 34 ..2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, 2- Kuwait ..................................2-61, 2-62, 2-63, 2-74
105, 3-16, 3-19, 4-5 Laos .................................................See SEA: Laos
helicopters Lima sites (also see FOL).......2-9, 2-24, 2-25, 3-20
AH-1.....................2-33, 2-79, 2-86, 2-87, 2-113 losses 1-1, 2-10, 2-12, 2-14, 2-15, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19,
6-2
2-21, 2-23, 2-35, 2-51, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-59, 61, 2-76, 2-81, 2-106, 3-4, 3-6, 3-10, 3-21
2-63, 2-65, 2-66, 2-67, 2-69, 2-70, 2-72, 2-78, population. 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-17, 2-23, 2-26, 2-31, 2-
2-82, 2-83, 2-90, 2-91, 2-96, 2-97, 2-102, 2-103, 45, 2-46, 2-51, 2-53, 2-62, 2-63, 2-70, 2-80, 2-
2-105, 2-106, 2-107, 2-108, 2-109, 2-131, 3-5, 91, 2-92, 2-102, 3-2, 3-4, 3-24
3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 3-16, 3-21, 3-22 POW 1-1, 2-5, 2-6, 2-15, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-
low bird.....................................................2-9, 2-38 24, 2-26, 2-45, 2-46, 2-50, 2-53, 2-70, 2-71, 2-
Macedonia...............................................2-80, 2-97 72, 2-74, 2-78, 2-79, 3-21, 3-24, 4-6, 5-2
Mayaguez......................................................... 2-59 pre-ejection (also see Ejection) ........................2-21
MEDEVAC....................................... 1-1, 2-79, 5-2 Q force..............................................See Windblast
Mekong River .............................................2-3, 2-4 rain........................................................See weather
MIA..1-1, 2-5, 2-6, 2-16, 2-18, 2-23, 2-26, 2-46, 2- Ras al Mishab ......................................... 2-73, 2-74
55, 2-110, 3-18, 5-2 RCC (also see JSRC)........................... 2-6, 2-8, 5-2
Milosevic, Slobodan (Serbian president) ......... 2-80 Red River.................................................... 2-3, 2-4
Missing in Action...................................... See MIA Red Sea.............................................................2-74
mission failure .....2-19, 2-25, 2-47, 2-50, 2-116, 2- RESCORT 2-8, 2-37, 2-38, 2-101, 2-104, 2-112, 2-
117, 2-119, 2-127, 2-131 115, 2-120, 2-125, 2-126, 2-127, 2-128, 2-131,
Montenegro...................................................... 2-80 2-132, 3-15, 5-2
NATO .2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-90, 2- roadwatch teams ....... See Unconventional Assisted
93, 2-94, 2-95, 2-96, 2-97, 2-98, 2-99, 2-101, 2- Recovery
105, 4-4, 4-5, 5-2 Ryan, Lt Gen Michael ................... 2-81, 2-82, 2-93
Navy (USN) . 2-15, 2-18, 2-19, 2-23, 2-24, 2-31, 2- Sandy......................................2-9, 2-38, 2-39, 2-77
45, 2-46, 2-48, 2-51, 2-53, 2-73, 2-75, 2-119, 2- SAR trap..............................................See flak trap
129, 5-3 SARTF .............................................. See CSARTF
NEO ............................................................1-1, 5-2 Saudi Arabia............. 2-62, 2-63, 2-73, 2-74, 2-107
night2-29, 2-39, 2-47, 2-61, 2-72, 2-74, 2-75, 2-77, SEA .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 2-14,
2-78, 2-86, 2-89, 2-99, 2-100, 2-103, 2-124, 3-4, 2-15, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 2-23, 2-24,
3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-21 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-30, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33,
North Vietnam ............................... See SEA: NVN 2-35, 2-37, 2-39, 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-45, 2-46,
On Scene Commander (OSC).... 2-8, 2-38, 2-39, 2- 2-47, 2-48, 2-50, 2-51, 2-55, 2-56, 2-57, 2-60,
100, 2-101, 2-115, 2-121, 2-122, 2-126, 2-133, 2-63, 2-70, 2-72, 2-76, 2-84, 2-106, 3-1, 3-3, 3-
5-2 4, 3-6, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-17,
Operation Allied Force 2-1, 2-83, 2-85, 2-92, 2-97, 3-18, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 3-23, 3-24, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3,
2-98, 2-99, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 4-8, 5-2, 5-3
2-116, 3-9, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 4-5, 5-2 Cambodia..................... 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-14, 2-35
Operation Deliberate Force. 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 2-83, Laos 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-9, 2-13, 2-14,
2-90, 4-4, 4-5 2-23, 2-24, 2-26, 2-31, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-
Operation Deny Flight .2-1, 2-39, 2-80, 2-81, 2-82, 39, 2-47, 2-50, 2-51, 3-14, 4-2
2-83, 2-84, 2-85, 2-88, 2-89, 2-90, 2-91, 2-96, NVN.. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-12, 2-13, 2-
2-98, 2-103, 3-9, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 4-4, 4-7 19, 2-23, 2-24, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-31, 2-33,
Operation Desert Shield.................. 2-61, 2-77, 4-3 2-35, 2-37, 2-45, 2-50, 2-51, 2-57, 3-14, 3-
Operation Desert Storm 2-1, 2-61, 2-63, 2-64, 2-65, 18, 3-19, 5-2
2-66, 2-67, 2-68, 2-69, 2-70, 2-71, 2-72, 2-73, SVN .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-13, 2-14, 2-
2-74, 2-76, 2-78, 2-82, 2-83, 2-85, 2-91, 2-103, 23, 2-24, 2-33, 2-35, 2-37, 2-50, 3-14, 5-3
2-105, 2-111, 2-116, 3-4, 3-6, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12, Thailand ...............................2-4, 2-35, 2-51, 4-1
3-16, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 4-3, 4-8 SEAL (Also see Unconventional Assisted
opportune rescue or capture 2-27, 2-32, 2-33, 2-74, Recovery)........................................... 2-37, 2-95
2-78, 2-96, 3-21, 3-23, 3-24 search. 2-5, 2-6, 2-31, 2-33, 2-39, 2-74, 2-75, 2-85,
orbit concept .......................... 2-8, 2-26, 2-29, 2-31 2-87, 2-90, 2-91, 2-92, 2-93, 2-95, 2-96, 2-100,
parachute descent/landing... 2-33, 2-40, 2-43, 2-46, 2-101, 2-117, 2-130, 2-131, 2-133, 3-19, 3-21
2-84, 2-99, 2-110, 3-21 Selected Area For Evasion (SAFE) ..................3-24
pararescuemen (PJs) ................ 2-43, 2-53, 4-1, 4-2 Serbia................................2-80, 2-81, 2-100, 2-102
Perry, William.................................................. 2-81 signal devices ...................................................2-42
political aspects of rescue ... 2-2, 2-5, 2-26, 2-31, 2- radio2-26, 2-42, 2-72, 2-75, 2-76, 2-84, 2-86, 2-
6-3
88, 2-99, 2-117, 2-120, 2-125, 3-16, 3-21 2-65, 2-66, 2-69, 2-84, 2-89, 2-91, 2-94, 2-
simultaneous rescue events .. 2-19, 2-59, 2-69, 3-15 98, 2-99, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-108, 2-114,
Slovenia ........................................................... 2-80 2-115, 2-121, 2-125, 2-126, 2-131, 5-3
Smith, Admiral Leighton W. (CINCSOUTH) .. 2-3, Tilford, Earl.2-2, 2-5, 2-18, 2-25, 2-31, 2-32, 2-33,
2-4, 2-82, 2-84, 2-85, 2-86, 2-88, 2-90, 2-93, 2- 2-34, 2-37, 2-39, 2-47, 2-57, 4-2
94, 4-2, 4-5 training 2-32, 2-39, 2-59, 2-60, 2-63, 2-76, 2-77, 2-
South Vietnam ................................ See SEA: SVN 89, 2-116, 2-119, 2-129, 2-130, 2-131, 2-132, 3-
Special Operations forces2-39, 2-59, 2-73, 2-74, 2- 8, 3-19
76, 2-77, 2-78, 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-95, 2- trees2-3, 2-4, 2-34, 2-40, 2-43, 2-46, 2-47, 2-84, 2-
96, 2-99, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 2-110, 3-20, 3- 87, 2-98, 2-100
23, 3-24, 4-3, 4-8, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 trends (in Combat Rescue operations). 1-1, 2-59, 3-
Spirit 03 ..................................................2-70, 3-11 1, 3-4, 3-10, 3-17
spoofing ........................See jamming and spoofing Turkey ........................ 2-62, 2-73, 2-74, 2-76, 2-82
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Udorn Air Base.................................................2-26
(TRAP)...............................................2-86, 2-87 Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) 2-31, 3-
target/terminal area operations 2-8, 2-9, 2-17, 2-38, 23, 3-24
2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-48, 2-53, 2-56, 2-57, 2-59, United Nations..... 2-81, 2-82, 2-83, 2-90, 2-98, 5-3
2-60, 2-75, 2-88, 2-90, 2-93, 2-95, 2-99, 2-100, unmanned aerial vehicle.................. 2-93, 3-11, 5-3
2-101, 2-114, 2-116, 2-122, 2-124, 2-125, 2- UNPROFOR............... 2-80, 2-82, 2-83, 2-85, 2-96
129, 2-130, 3-3, 3-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3- USS Kearsarge ........... 2-85, 2-86, 2-87, 2-88, 2-91
21, 3-22 USS Theodore Roosevelt 2-85, 2-86, 2-91, 2-93, 2-
Thailand ....................................See SEA: Thailand 95
threats Vega 31 2-99, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 3-16, 3-
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 2- 19, 4-5
23, 2-26, 2-56, 2-64, 2-65, 2-78, 2-87, 2-91, Vicenza (Italy)..........................2-81, 2-98, 4-5, 4-6
2-96, 2-98, 2-100, 2-101, 2-102, 2-105, 2- Viet Cong ...............................2-5, 2-13, 2-26, 2-55
108, 2-114, 2-131, 3-6, 5-1 Vietnam .....................................................See SEA
automatic weapons .... 2-13, 2-125, 2-127, 2-131 water ....2-29, 2-32, 2-37, 2-40, 2-46, 2-56, 2-61, 2-
fighters...................................... 2-10, 2-12, 2-56 62, 2-74, 2-109, 3-3, 3-19
infantry .....................2-79, 2-91, 2-98, 3-3, 3-15 water recoveries...................................... 2-29, 2-32
infrared missiles (also see MANPADS).2-64, 2- weapons (helicopter) .............................. 2-39, 2-59
65, 2-69, 2-76, 2-103, 3-5, 3-12, 5-1 weather .. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-9, 2-47, 2-61, 2-62, 2-63,
infrared missiles (also see, MANPADS) 2-65, 3- 2-75, 2-76, 2-89, 2-98, 3-3, 3-4, 5-1
12 clouds. 2-4, 2-9, 2-47, 2-62, 2-75, 2-83, 2-84, 2-
MANPAD ................................................. 2-124 86, 2-87, 2-95
MANPADS ..2-10, 2-56, 2-65, 2-82, 2-83, 2-87, rain .....................................2-4, 2-43, 2-62, 2-63
2-90, 2-91, 2-95, 2-114, 2-116, 2-127, 2-131, temperature ........................................ 2-61, 2-63
3-5, 3-6, 3-12, 4-1, 4-3, 4-8, 5-2 wind .............................................................2-62
small arms . 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-14, 2-26, 2-56, 2- windblast ..................................... 2-21, 2-47, 2-127
87, 2-89, 2-91, 2-95, 2-96, 2-100, 2-101, 2- World War II 2-5, 2-31, 2-63, 2-64, 2-72, 2-84, 3-9
102, 2-105, 2-114, 2-116, 2-124, 2-125, 2- Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA) ..................2-80
127, 2-131, 3-5 Zobrist, Capt Scott............................................2-88
surface to air missiles (SAM).. 2-10, 2-12, 2-64,
6-4
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Combat Rescue Operational Review-Final

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Combat Rescue Operational Review-Final

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COMBAT RESCUE OPERATIONAL REVIEW

A Summary of Combat Rescue Operations

Revised June 2002

“Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is an integral part of US combat

1. Study Objectives and Overview............................................................................................ 1-1

Operation Desert Storm

Operation Deny Flight

Operation Allied Force

Combat Rescue Test and

2.1.1 General Description of the Operational Environment

2.1.1.1 The Physical Environment

2.1.1.2 The Operational Environment

RESCUE FORCE ASSETS AND DEPLOYMENT

2.1.2 Characteristics of Isolating Incidents

2.1.2.1 Causes of Isolating Incidents

Figure 2-4: Causes of Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Type of Weapon

Figure 2-5: Fixed-Wing Combat Losses in SEA by Country

Figure 2-6: Losses by Threat System in North Vietnam

Figure 2-7: Losses by Threat System in Laos

Figure 2-8: Losses by Threat System in SVN

Table 2-2: Summary of USN Losses in SEA

2.1.2.4 Phase of Mission Being Conducted When Asset Was Lost

Fwd Air Ctl/Spt

Search & Rescue

Cbt Cargo Carry

Figure 2-9: Distribution of SEA Losses and POWs by Mission Type

MIA 4 54 204 226 294 176 85 79 23 1145

Table 2-5: Summary of Airmen Downed in SEA (including KIA)

Table 2-6: Estimated Simultaneous Rescue Events (1962-1973)

Rescue Aircraft Inventory

USAF Acft Loss

Figure 2-10: Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Rescue Inventory (1965-1972)

2.1.2.6 Injuries to Survivors/Evaders

Figure 2-11: Severity of Aircrew Injuries by Ejection Speed

Figure 2-12: Location of Major and Minor Injuries Among

Figure 2-13: Distribution of SEA Combat Losses by Aircrew Size

2.1.3 Distribution of Losses

2.1.3.1 Distribution by Threat Level

Figure 2-14: Distribution of Combat Losses by Threat System and Altitude

2.1.3.2 Distribution by Range

2.1.4 Enemy Reaction to Isolating Incidents

2.1.5 Duration of Survivor/Evader Exposure

Figure 2-16: Cumulative Status of S/E Over Time (SEA)

P e rce nt of Tota l Ava ila ble for 25.0%

Figure 2-17: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (SEA)

Figure 2-18: Status of Survivors/Evaders Over Time (NVN Only)

The influence of threat level on 60%

Figure 2-20: Percent of Land Rescues Accomplished Over Time

Figure 2-21: Elapsed Time Until Capture (by Service)

2.1.6 Types of Recovery Forces

2.1.6.1 Dedicated vs. Opportune Recovery Forces

presence of rescue forces would have

2.1.6.2 Recovery Vehicles Used

Type HH-43 CH-3 HH-3 HH-53

Speed 75 knots 110 knots 120 knots 140 knots

Armament None 1 x M-60 (7.62) 2 x M-60 (.7.62mm) 3 x GAU-2 (7.62mm)

Armor HH-43B: No, HH-43F: Yes No Yes Yes

OTHER SUPPORTING FORCES

2.1.7.1 Physical Environment

Figure 2-24: Survivor/Evader Evasion Environment

80.0% Of survivors hung-up in trees:

Figure 2-25: Results of Parachute Landings into Trees in SEA

Survivor Visually Located

Mod 0 MK-13 and other flares