A

REPORT ON VOCATIONAL TRAINING

NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.
(A Government of India Enterprise)
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, Rawatbhata








SUBMITTED BY: JITENDRA MEENA
B.TECHVII sem (Electronics & Communication)
University Roll No.- 11EAXECO35
Submitted in the partial fulfillment for award the degree of
Bachelor of Technology

Submitted to
Department of Electronic & Communication Engineering
Apex Institute of Engineering & Technology
Session 2014-2015







A
REPORT ON VOCATIONAL TRAINING
FROM



NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.
(A Government of India Enterprise)
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, Rawatbhata


SUBMI TTED TO: SUBMI TTED BY:
MR.AKHILESH SINGH JITENDRA MEENA
CORDINATOR (11EAXEC035)

SESSION 2014-15



TABLE OF CONTENTS


Certificate from the Institute..ii
Certificate from Company/organization.....iii
Declaration from student...iv
Acknowledgement.v
Company Detail...vi
Assessment of student.vii
Performance report of student...x
Preface..xi
Table of contents xii
Conclusion..xiv
Reference.........xv















PREFACE



As we know that an engineer has to serve an industry, for that one must be aware of industrial
environment, their management, problems and the way of working out their solutions at the
industry.
After the completion of the course an engineer must have knowledge of interrelation between
the theory and the practical. For this, one must be familiar with the practical knowledge with
theory aspects.
To aware with practical knowledge the engineering courses provides a six weeks industrial
training where we get the opportunity to get theory applying for running the various process
and production in the industry.
I have been lucky enough to get a chance for undergoing this training at RAJASTHAN
ATOMIC POWER STATION. It is a constituent of board of NPCIL. This report has been
prepared on the basis of knowledge acquired by me during my training period of 45 days at
the plant.




JITENDRA MEENA





ACKNOWLEDGEMENT




It was highly educative and interactive to take training at
RAJASTHAN ATOMIC POWER STATION. As technical knowledge is incomplete
without practical knowledge, I couldnt find any place better than this to update myself.
I am very much thankful to the Site director Mr. C.P. Jhamb &Training superintendent
Mr. D. Chanda for allowing me for the industrial training at RAPS. Thanks to Mr. A.P.
Jain for their guidance during my project.
I also take the opportunity to thanks Nuclear training Centre for providing lecture on
overview of the plant and providing me Orange qualification.







JITENDRA MEENA
4

INTRODUCTION

India's Nuclear power developments are under the purview of the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India, a government-owned entity under the Department of Atomic
Energy India. The corporation is responsible for designing, constructing, and
operating nuclear-power plants. In 1995 there were nine operational plants with a
potential total capacity of 1,800 megawatts, about 3 percent of India's total power
generation. There are two units each in Tarapur, north of Bombay in Maharashtra; in
Rawatbhata in Rajasthan; in Kalpakkam near Madras in Tamil Nadu; and in Narora in
Uttar Pradesh; and one unit in Kakrapur in southeastern Gujarat. However, of the nine
plants, all have been faced with safety problems that have shut down reactors for
periods ranging from months to years. The Rajasthan Atomic Power Station in
Rawatbhata, India was closed indefinitely, as of February 1995. Moreover,
environmental problems, caused by radiation leaks, have cropped up in communities
near Rawatbhata. Other plants operate at only a fraction of their capacity, and some
foreign experts consider them the most inefficient nuclear-power plants in the world.









5

MI SSI ON
To develop nuclear power technology and
produce in a self-reliant manner nuclear
power as a safe, environmentally benign
and an economically viable source of
electrical energy to meet the growing
electricity needs of the country
**********









6

VI SI ON
NPCIL has its vision to have an
installed nuclear power capacity
of 20,000 MW(e) by the year
2020. This capacity could be
achieved by the development of
more 220 MW(e) & 550 MW(e)
units of Pressurized heavy water
reactors, importing light water
reactors and by the introduction
of fast breeder reactors.
**************



7


8





9

















10

































Prime Minister
DAE
Atomic Energy Commission
NPCIL
Atomic energy Regulatory
board
TAPS 1&2
India Rare Earth
TAPP 3&4
BARC
RAPS 1& 2
Heavy Water Board
RAPS 3 & 4
ECIL
RAPP 5 & 6
UCIL
MAPS
Nuclear fuel complex
NAPS
Indra Gandhi center for
advance research
KAPS
KAIGA PS 1& 2
Center for advance technology
KAIGA Proj. 3& 4
KKPS
11

RAPS LOCATION AND SITE CONDITIONS

RAPS is located on the eastern bank of Rana Pratap Sagar lake (R.P.S) upstream of
the R.P.S dam across the chambal river at an elevation of 388 mt. above mean sea
level with a latitude of 24
0
53 north and a longitude of 76
0
36 east. The plant site is
about 64 KM from Kota city. The place has an average rainfall of 825mm as per
records. The maximum wind velocity records so far is 129 km/hr at 120 m. the most
predominant wind direction is at 7.90m and 120m heights is North of south west and
west of south west respectively.
The site has no population with in its vicinity of radius of 5km. It however does have
a population of about 58 thousand distributed in the radius of 15 Km. the only nearby
major industry is HEAVY WATER PLANT (H.W.P).


NUCLEAR ENERGY:

Mass defect converted into energy through nuclear reaction. Two processes produce
this:
1) Nuclear fission.
2) Nuclear fusion.
A neutron it splits into two big parts hits when a heavy nucleus likes that of uranium
235 & in addition 2 or 3 neutrons are released. However, the mass of the parts is
slightly less than the mass of the uranium nucleus. The mass that is destroyed is
converted into energy (200Mev/ fission). This process is called nuclear fission
reaction.
It is much more likely if neutrons are slow, in a reactor, some of the neutrons
produced are absorbed so that for every neutron causing fission, only one is left. This
neutron in turn collides with another U235 nucleus & causes fission. A chain reaction
is thus set up. Also, the neutrons have to be slowed down. The fuel in a nuclear
reactor consists of Uranium that may be natural or enriched in which proportion of
12

U235 is increased. Either light water (for enriched uranium) or heavy water (for
natural uranium) may be used as a moderator, for slowing down the neutrons. The
energy released is absorbed by the water (either light or heavy). This coolant in turn
transfers its energy to the light water. Ultimately water is turned into steam at high
pressure that is used to derive turbines as in any conventional power plant. India has
six Nuclear Power Plants;
At Tarapur in Maharastra.
At Rawatbhata near Kota in Rajasthan
At Kalpakkam near Madras in Tamil Nadu.
At Narora in Uttar Pradesh
At Kakarpara near Surat in Gujarat
At Kaiga near Karwar in Karnataka.
The reactors at Tarapur use enriched uranium as fuel & light water as moderator and
coolant, all others use uranium and heavy water. Nuclear Power Plant under
construction is two units of 500 MW at Tarapur and two similar units at Rawatbhata
near Kota. Nuclear fission has become commercially viable and is being exploited in
several countries.

13


SOME IMPORTANT NUCLEAR REACTIONS:

1)
92
U
238
+
0
n
1
-----
92
U
239
+r------
93
Np
239
-------
94
Pu
239

Typical fission reaction:
2)
92
U
235
+
0
n
1
------
38
Sr
90
+
54
Xe
144
+2
0
n
1
+r+200MeV
Reactor poisoning reaction:
3)
52
Te
135
----
53
I
135
-----
54
Xe
135
-----
55
Cs
135
---
56
Ba
135

(Stable)
We know that about 200MeV of energy is released during per fission.
This energy is divided in the following way:
1) K.E. of the fission fragments: 167MeV.
2) K.E. of neutrons: 5MeV.
3) Energy of gamma released at fission: 5MeV.
4) Energy of gamma rays released on ncapture: 10MeV.
5) Gamma decay energy: 7MeV.
6) Beta decay energy: 5MeV.
----------------------------
TOTAL =199MeV.
----------------------------






14


THREE STAGES OF INDIAN NUCLEAR POWER
PROGRAMME:


1) INTRODUCTION:
India figured in the nuclear power map of the world in 1969, when two boiling
water reactors (BWRS) were commissioned at Tarapur (TAPS-1&2) these
reactors were built on the turnkey basis .The main objective of setting these units
was, largely to prove the techno-economic viability of nuclear power.
The nuclear power programme formulated embarked on the
three-stage nuclear power programme, linking the fuel cycle of pressurized heavy
water reactor (PHWR) & Fast breeder reactors (FBR) for judicious utilization of
our reserves of Uranium & Thorium. The emphasis of the programme is self
reliance and thorium utilization as a long -term objective.

The three stages of our Nuclear power programme are:

1) STAGE I:- This stage envisages construction of natural Uranium, Heavy
water moderator & cooled pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWR). Spent fuel
from these reactors is reprocessed to obtain plutonium.
2) STAGE II: - This stage envisages on the construction of Fast breeder reactors
(FBR) fuelled by plutonium & depleted U produced in stage I. These reactors
would also breed U233 from thorium.
3) STAGE III = This stage would comprise power reactors using U233-
Thorium as fuel, which is used as a blanket in these type of reactors.


15


The PHWR was chosen due to the following:

1) It uses natural uranium as fuel. Use of natural uranium available in India,
helps cut heavy investments on enrichments, as uranium enrichment is capital
intensive.

2) Uranium requirement is the lowest & plutonium production is the highest.

3) The infrastructure available in the country is suitable for undertaking
manufacture of the equipment.
The short term goal of the programme was to complement the generation of
electricity at locations away from coalmines. The long-term policy is based on
recycling nuclear fuel and harnessing the available Thorium resources to meet
countrys long-term energy demand and security.
As a part of PHWR Programme (STAGE I) second nuclear power plant was
taken up as a joint Indo-Canadian venture this plant was built at Rawatbhata
(Rajasthan) two units laid a milestone in the history of India all the components
were taken up in India and the import content reduced considerably. Moreover,
Canadians withdrew in 1974; Indian engineers did balance design &
commissioning of the Unit 2.







16


2) CHALLENGES FACED:

The industry was new to the manufacturing techniques & stringent quality
requirements of the nuclear components like calandria, end shield, steam
generators, fuelling machine, and heavy water pumps. The requirement of
convectional power plant equipment was of much larger capacity than those being
manufactured in the country.
To achieve self sufficiency in this field in the long run, the
department of atomic energy established extensive research & development
facilities covering diverse areas for supporting technology absorption. Facilities,
from prospecting to mining to fabrication of fuel & zirconium alloy components,
for manufacture of precision reactor components & production of heavy water
were also set up. Supply of equipments of international nuclear standard was also
a problem so momentous efforts were put into development of such
manufacturing industries. Extensive R&D set up were established for
metallurgical studies of both fresh as well as radioactive material, non
destructive testing, environmental & seismic qualification of safety analysis,
preparation &development of validation of computer codes, etc.
Technologies for inspection of the reactor components, repair &replacement using
robotics & life extension programme of the operating reactors, have also been
successfully developed.
To summaries, the concerted efforts put in by DAE, its constituent units &
NPCIL, together with Indian industries & institutions have led to development &
full capabilities to design, manufacturing of equipment, construction, operation &
maintenance of nuclear power plant.
Today India is amongst the select band of few countries of the world that
have developed such capabilities.

3. Status of nuclear power generation & future plans:
17

The nuclear power programme in India up to year 2020 is based on
installation of a series of 235 MWe &500Mwe pressurized heavy water reactor
(PHWR) UNITS, 1000MWe light water reactors (LWR) UNITS & fast breeder
reactors (FBR) units. NPCIL plans to contribute about 10% of the total additional
needs of power of about 10000MWe per year i.e. 1000 MWe per year in the
coming two five year plans. The total installed capacity of nuclear generation
would increase to more than 20000 MWe in year 2020 from the present level of
2720 MWe.
The basic design of the 220/500MWe units in similar; however, a
number of significant design changes have been made progressively from the first
unit at Rajasthan to the 500 MWe units. These design changes have been made
from the consideration of currently prevailing safety criteria, seismicity, improve
availability requirement of in- service inspection, ease of maintenance etc., as
appropriate to the conditions in India.














18



DESCRIPTION OF STANDARD INDIAN PHWR:

1) LAYOUT:
The nuclear power stations in India are generally planed as two units
modules, sharing common facilities such as service building, spent fuel storage
bay & other auxiliaries like heavy water upgrading, waste management facilities
etc. . Separate safety related systems & components are however provided for
each unit. Such an arrangement retains independence for safe operation of each
unit & simultaneously permits optimum use of space, finance & construction time.
The lay out for a typical 220MWe station as given in figure 1, shows two reactor
building, active service building including spent fuel bay, safety related electrical
& control buildings and the two turbine buildings. Orienting turbine building
radial to the reactor building provides protection from the effect of turbine
missiles. Other safety related building s &structures are also located as not to fall
in the trajectory of missiles generated from the turbine. The buildings and
structures have also been physically separated on the basis of their seismic
classification.
Sectional views of the reactor building are shown in figure 2 depicting general
layout inside the reactor building.



2) REACTOR:
In concept, the Indian pressurized heavy water reactor is a pressure
tube type reactor using heavy water moderator, heavy water coolant & natural
uranium dioxide fuel. The reactor as shown in the cut away view in figure 3
consists primarily of calandria a horizontal cylindrical vessel. It is penetrated by a
large number of zircaloy pressure tubes (306 for 235MWe reactor), arranged in a
19

square lattice. These pressure tubes, also refer as coolant channels, contain the
fuel & hot high pressure heavy water coolant. The pressure tubes are attached to
the alloy steel and fitting assemblies at either end by special role expended joints.
A typical pressure tube assembly is shown figure 4 .End shields are the integral
parts of the calandria and are provided at each end of the calandria to attenuate the
radiation emerging from the reactor, permitting access to the fuelling machine
vaults when the reactor is shutdown. The end fittings are supported in the end
shield lattice tubes through bearing, which permit their sliding. The calandria is
housed in a concrete vault, which is lined with zinc metallised carbon steel &
filled with chemically treated demineralised light water for shielding purposes.
The end shields are supported in openings vault wall, and form part of the vault
enclosure at these openings. Removable shield plugs fitted in the end fittings
provide axial shielding to individual coolant channels.



3) REACTIVITY CONTROL MECHANISMS:

Due to the use of natural uranium fuel & on-load refueling, the PHWRs do
not need a large excess reactivity. Correspondingly the devices required for
control of reactivity in the core need not have large reactivity worths. Standard
reactors designs are provided with four systems for reactivity control, viz.
1) Regulating rods
2) Shim rods
3) Adjuster rods for xenon override
4) Natural boron addition in the moderator to compensate for the excess
reactivity in a fresh core &for absence of xenon after a long shutdown.
The reactivity control devices are installed in the low- pressure moderator region
& so they are not subjected to potentially severe hydraulic & thermal forces in
the event of postulated accidents. Furthermore, the relatively spacious core lattice
20

of PHWR allows sufficient locations to obtain complete separation between
control & protective functions. The regulating systems are thus fully independent
with its own power supplies, instrumentations & triplicated control channels.
Cobalt & stainless steel absorber elements have been utilized in the reactivity
control mechanisms.
For 220MWe standardized design, two diverse, fast acting &
independent shutdown systems have been adopted. This feature provides a high
degree of assurance that plant transients requiring prompt shutdown of the reactor
will be terminated safely. The primary shutdown system consists of 14
mechanical shut off rods of cadmium sandwiched in stainless steel &makes the
reactor sub- critical in less than 2 secs. Fail-safe features like gravity fall &spring
assistance have been incorporated in design if mechanical shut off rods. The
second shutdown system, which is also fast acting, comprises 12 liquid poison
tubes, which are filled with lithium penta borate solution under helium pressure.
The trip signal actuates a combination of fast acting valves and causes poison to
be injected simultaneously in 12 interstitial liquid poison tubes of calandria.





4) FUEL DESIGN:

Fuel assemblies in the reactor are short length (half metre long) fuel bundles.
Twelve of such bundles are located in each fuel channel. The basic fuel material is
in the form of natural uranium dioxide a pellet, sheathed &sealed in thin zircaloy
tubes. Welding them to end plates to form fuel bundles assembles these tubes.
Figure 5 shows the 19- element fuel bundle being used in 220 MWe PHWRs.

5) FUEL HANDLING:
21


On power fuelling is a feature of all PHWRs, which have very low excess
reactivity. In this type of reactor, refueling to compensate for fuel depletion & for
over all flux shaping to give optimum power distribution is carried out with the
help of 2 fueling machines, which work in conjunction with each other on the
opposite ends of a channel. One of the machines is used to fuel the channel while
the other one accepts the spent fuel bundles. In addition, the fueling machines
facilitate removal of failed fuel bundles. Each fuelling machine is mounted on a
bridge & column assembly. Various mechanisms provided along tri- directional
movement (X, Y&Z direction) of fueling machine head and make it possible to
align it accurately with respect to channels. Various mechanisms have been
provided which enables clamping of fueling machine head to the end fitting,
opening & closing of the respective seal plugs, shield plugs &perform various
fuelling operations i.e. receiving new fuel in the magazine from fuel transfer
system, sending spent fuel from magazine to shuttle transfer station, from shuttle
transfer station to inspection bay & from inspection bay to spent fuel storage bay.


6) PRIMARY HEAT TRANSPORT (PHT) SYSTEM:

The system, which circulates pressure coolant through the fuel channels to remove
the heat generated in fuel, is referred as Primary Heat Transport System. The
major components of this system are the reactor fuel channels, feeders, two
reactor inlet headers, two reactor outlet headers, four pumps &interconnecting
pipes & valves. The headers steam generators & pumps are located above the
reactor and are arranged in two symmetrical banks at either end of the reactor. The
headers are connected to fuel channels through individual feeder pipes. Figure 6
depicts schematically the relative layout of major equipment in one bank of the
PHT system .the coolant circulation is mentioned at all times during reactor
operation, shutdown & maintenance.

22



7) MODERATOR SYSTEM:

The heavy water moderator is circulated through the calandria by aid of a low
temperature & low pressure moderator system. This system circulates the
moderator through two heat exchangers, which remove heat dissipated by high
energy neutrons during the process of moderation. The cooled moderator is
returned to the calandria via. Moderator inlet nozzles. The high chemical purity
and low radioactivity level of the moderator are maintained through moderator
purification system. The purification system consists of stainless steel Ion
Exchange Hoppers, eight numbers in 220MWe contains nuclear grade, mixed Ion
- Exchange resin (80% anion & 20% cation resins) .the purification system is
also utilized for removable of chemical shim, boron to effect start up of reactor
Helium is used as a cover gas over the heavy water in calandria. The
concentration deuterium in this cover- gas is control led by circulating it using a
sealed blower and passing through the recombination containing catalyst Alumina
coated with 0.3% Palladium.

7) FUEL:

The use of natural uranium dioxide fuel with its low content of fissile material
(0.72% U-235) precludes the possibility of a reactivity accident during fuel
handling or storage. Also, in the core there would no significant increase in the
reactivity, in the ever of any mishaps causing redistribution of the fuel by lattice
distortion or otherwise.
The thermal characteristics namely the low thermal conductivity and high specific
heat oh UO2 permit almost all the heat generated in a fast power transient to be
initially absorbed in the fuel. Furthermore, high melting point of UO2 permits
several full power seconds of heat to be safely absorbed above that contained at
normal power.
23

Most of the fission products remain bound in the UO2 matrix and may get
released slowly only at temperatures considerably higher than the normal
operating temperatures. Also on the account of the uranium dioxide being
chemically inert to the water coolant medium, the defected fuel releases limited
amount of radioactivity to the primary coolant system.
The use of 12 short length fuel bundles per channels in a PHWR, rather than full
length elements covering the whole length of the core, subdivides the escapable
radioactive facility in PHWR has also the singular advantage of allowing the
defected fuel to be replaced by fresh fuel at any time.
The thin Zircalloy 2/4 cladding used in fuel elements is designed to collapse
under coolant pressure on to the fuel pellets. This feature permits high pellet - clad
gap conductance resulting in lower fuel temperatures & consequently lower
fission gas release from the UO2 matrix into pellet clad gap.















24




REACTOR AUXILIARIES

END SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM

There are two End Shields provided at both the ends of calandria performing the
following functions.
(i) Providing supports for calandria tubes and pressure tubes.
(ii) Provides radiation and thermal shielding for fuelling machine vaults so that the
fuelling machine vaults can be accessible during shutdown.
Heat is removed from the end shields to moderator and calandria vault water.
However the bulk of the heat is removed by End shield cooling system.

The basic requirements of the end shield cooling system are:

(i)To maintain calaridria side tube sheet (CSTS) of end shield at an average
temperature of 67deg centigrade.
(ii)To maintain temperature difference between various parts of end shield
within permissible limits.
(iii) To avoid stagnant pockets of coolant, in end shield, which could cause
corrosion problems.
(iv)To avoid overheating and hot spots which could lead to damage of end
shield.
(v)To provide venting of end shield for uniform shielding in accessible and
25

S/D accessible areas.

The End Shield Cooling System is a closed loop system Consisting of end shields,
circulating pumps, and heat exchangers. An auxiliary loop exists for the control of
water chemistry.
There are two end shields where the heat is generated due to radiation and
conduction from other reactors component i.e. End fittings, Feeders, convection
and
radiation across insulation gaps. (Almost 50% of the

heat load is from PHT). A total of 1.4 MW of heat load
exists for each end shield. This heat is removed by
__ circulation of demineralised water through the End
Shields. The End Shields consist of two compartments called front and rear
compartments. DM Water (900 LPM)
enters the front compartment (the compartment facing the calandria) from five
inlets at the top. Front Compartment is further divided into five separate columns.
DM Water passes through these columns at a velocity of 37.7 cm/sec and flows
into the annulus space between the outer and inner shells of End shield.

CALANDRIA VAULT COOLING SYSTEM

In RAPS calandria vault (the space between the calandria and steel lined structural
wall) is full of demineralised (DM) water. DM water filled calandria vault
provides radiation, biological and thermal shielding, and also acts as heat sink in
case of serious contingency. Filling of calandria vault with DM water eliminated
Argon-41 activity of earlier Indian PHWRs which had air filled calandria vaults
(RAPS 1&2 AND MAPS). This drastically cuts the exposure of public in the
vicinity of Indian Nuclear Power Plants.
26

The dimensions of the calandria vault are such that a minimum water thickness of
1.35 meters is ensured between the calandria and concrete vault.
This ensures adequate shielding.

FUNCTIONS OF THE CALANDRIA VAULT COOLING
SYSTEM
i)To remove heat generated in vault water.

ii)To provide thermal shielding and biological shield under all condition.

iii) To maintain uniform temperature in the vault structure below permissible limit
under all condition.

iv) Provide an environment compatible with the material used for components
within vault.

Heat appearing in calandria vault water is removed by a closed loop cooling
system. Water at 42.5deg cen. is distributed through perforated header laid out in
the bottom of the vault and warm water at 46.2deg cen. leaves the vault through
header at the top.

VAPOUR SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

Large pooi of water (2200M3, 2.4m deep) at the basement of the reactor building
is provided to limit peak pressure inside volume Vi during LOCA (Loss of coolant
accident) or MSLB(Main steam line break) by condensing
high enthalpy steam. Volume Vi is connected to the suppression pool via an
annular space between the RB structure wall and inner containment wall.
27

The suppression pool is provided with a re circulation system to protect against
corrosion and biological growth.

ANNULUS GAS MONITORING SYSTEM

The annulus gas monitoring system of RAPP 3&4 provides a means of monitoring
the leakage (if any) of heavy water either from PHT or from moderator system
due to failure of coolant tube calandria tube or rolled joints. It is a closed loop
recirculating system which maintains flow of C02 gas through the annulus gap
between coolant tithe and calandria tithe. Apart from leak detection, the annulus
gas also acts as a thermal barrier, separating the hot high pressure coolant tubes
and the comparatively cooler low pressure calandria tubes. By reducing heat
transfer between coolant tube and calandria tube, heat removal requirements from
moderator system are minimized as well as the reduction in loss of heat from PHT
system. In addition, the annulus gas minimizes corrosion and hydrides formation
in the coolant tubes or in the garter spring spacers by providing a dry 02 doped gas
atmosphere in the annulus.

LIQUID POISON INJECTION SYSTEM

For prolonged shutdown of reactor (1) for maintenance jobs or (ii) when reactor
has tripped on reactivity transient which do not permit restart of reactor within
poison override time, LPIS is actuated so that sub criticality margin is maintained
under all conditions. LPIS adds a bulk amount of liquid poison directly to the
moderator to keep the reactor under shutdown state for prolonged duration. This is
an independent process system and is the replacement of (i) ALPAS bulk addition
mode (at NAPP and KAPP) which required moderator circulation and (ii) gravity
addition of boron (GRAB)
The LPIS works on pneumatic pressurization of boron solution by helium. The
system consists of poison tank

28


and helium tank. When a command for poison addition is received the pressure
balance valves and siphon break valves close and injection valves open. This
causes the pressurisation of poison tank by helium stored in helium tank. This in
turn causes injection of boron poison directly into the moderator through two
nozzles in calandria at 75%FT level

D2O EVAPORATION AND CLE~AN UP SYSTEM

D20 evaporation and clean up system purifies downgraded heavy water to a level
which is not harmful to heavy water upgrading system by removing all the
impurities. The heavy water collected from various leakages and spills contains a
number of impurities which normally arise from Surf ace from which D20 is
collected. Corrosion products produced inside the reactor D20 system.
Products resulting from radiolytic process. Organic material from ion exchange
resin dueteration and breakdown.
D20 evaporation and cleanup system is designed to clean the downgraded heavy
water chemically so that it can be fed to upgrading plant. Cleanup system
comprises of oil water separation stage, filtration stage and ion exchange stage.

HEAVY WATER UPGRADING SYSTEM

Heavy water is used as moderator and primary heat transport fluids in PHWRs.
Heavy water is highly hygroscopic. Hence it leaks from the system, it gets
downgraded on exposure to atmosphere. Such leaked heavy water collected from
various points in the reactor is to be upgraded before use in reactor, since the
isotopic purity required for moderator heavy water is as maximum as achievable.

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM
29


Fire protection system in a nuclear power plant is meant To prevent damage to
various equipment or system due to fire.
To ensure decay heat removal of the reactor. To minimize the release of
radioactivity to environment in the event of a fire.
To provide backup PW cooling to various systems. To ensure personnel spray
supply.
Fire protection system consists of fire fighting water system, carbon dioxide fire
protection system and portable fire protection system.



FIRE WATER SYSTEM

Fire water system comprises of constantly pressurized fire hydrant system and
sprinkler system. Automatic sprinklers have been provided for oil filled
transformers and non-automatic sprinklers are provided for oil systems, cable
vaults and cable tunnels. Hydrant system covers the whole plant for outdoor and
indoor supply of firewater. Water for both hydrant and sprinkler system is
supplied by the firewater pumps from the sumps located in the cooling water
pump house(CWPH).


ACTIVE PROCESS WATER SYSTEM

Active process water system provides direct means of heat transport from
equipment and heat exchangers in the primary heat transport system, moderator
system and reactor auxiliary system to ultimate heat sink during all operational
stages of the plant and accident condition like LOCA. Thus it forms the secondary
30

part in the ultimate heat removal system. It is a safety-related system. Reliability
and continuous heat removal is achieved by designing the system for SSE/OBE by
providing redundancy in rotating equipment, Class III power supply to all safety
related electric motor driven equipment and backup supply from fire water system
to meet static component failure This system is potentially active since there is a
possibility of leakage of active primary fluid to this system through various heat
exchangers.


RB VENTILATION SYSTEM

RB is designed as a double containment structure in order to prevent ground level
release during accident conditions. Primary containment houses all equipments
and piping of nuclear systems. Secondary containment envelops the primary
containment with an annular radial gap of 2 meters.
PC is divided into two volumes. Vi containing the systems having high enthalpy
fluids comprising of F/M vaults, pump room, dome region and includes FMSA
when they are in contact with F/M vaults. These areas are not accessible during
normal plant operation. No ventilation is provided for this volume but closed loop
heavy water vapour recovery system is provided to recover D20 that escapes from
high enthalpy systems. The remaining area constitutes volume V2. Volume V2 is
separated from Vi by a leak tight barrier and pressure suppression pool. The
volume Vi is maintained at negative pressure with respect to V2 by maintaining
continuously a small purge to the stack. Volume V2 is normally accessible except
moderator room, FMSA and DN monitoring rooms.

HEAVY WATER VAPOUR RECOVERY SYSTEM

Heavy water vapour arising out of spills/leakages from primary heat transport,
moderator and fuelling machine circuits is recovered from building atmosphere by
31

adsorption on molecular sieve beds. Vapour recovery system is an important
feature of the station heavy water management schemes. Following are the criteria
for design and operation of vapour recovery system To effect economy in
reactor operating costs by efficient recovery of heavy water that escapes into the
building atmosphere.
To minimise heavy water loss and tritium loss and tritium release through stack.
To minimise tritium activity levels in various areas of the reactor building.

To keep the volume Vi area under negative pressure with respect to volume V2
area for preventing the spread of activity from volume Vi to volume V2.



CALANDRIA

The calandria is horizontal vessel housed in a rectangular calandria vault. The
calandria is a single walled austenitic stainless steel vessel. The main shell is
stepped down in diameter at each end and site welded to their cylindrical
extensions of the end shields on each side of the reactor.


END SHIELD

The end shields are cylindrical boxes whose extensions are welded to the
calandria side tube sheet at the calandria end and fueling machine side tube sheets
at fueling machine end of the end shield during shop fabrication. The box is
pierced by 306 lattice tubes arranged on 228.6mm square pitch. The space inside
the end shield is divided into two compartments by a 38mm thick baffle plate and
32

fueling machine side tube sheet is filled with 10mm dia spherical mild steel balls
and light water in the 57:43 ratio.



CALANDRIA TUBE


The calandria tubes are manufactured from Zircalloy2 strip that is cylindrically
formed and seam welded. The seams are then leveled by rolling. The primary
functions of the calandria tubes in a reactor system are-

1.To separate the relatively cold moderator from hot coolant tubes to minimize
heat losses.
2.To support the horizontal coolant tubes (through garter springs) and prevent the
excessive sag caused by creep. To act as containment vessel for the contents of the
channel in the unlikely but postulated instance of a pressure (coolant) tube rupture
accident.





COOLANT TUBE

Coolant tube is the most important structural component inside the reactor core.
Coolant tubes are manufactured from Zr-Nb. Each end of the coolant tube is
joined to a special type 403SS end fitting. Such 306 Nos. of parallel coolant tubes
33

are placed horizontally inside the reactor core at the square lattice distance of 228.
6mm.



END FITTINGS

The end fittings on either end of the reactor identical and connected at the ends.

GARTER SPRING SPACERS

Four numbers of garter spring for each coolant channel and located in the annulus
space between coolant and calandria tubes.

SEAL PLUG

The function of the sealing plug is to close the ends of the coolant assemblies and
prevent the escape of heavy water from the end fittings. During fuel changes it is
necessary to remove these plugs.

SHIELD PLUG

The shield plug which normally resides in the end fitting serves the three
functions of providing Radiation shielding at the ends of the coolant tubes
Means of locating the fuel in the fuel channel and stopping the fuel column from
following the seal plugs when they are withdrawn during fuel changes. The
turbine is of the horizontal tandem compound, reheating, impulse type, running at
34

3000 rpm, with special provision for extraction of moisture. The turbine has a
maximum continuous and economic rating of 220 MW, The turbine comprises of
one HP cylinder and two double flow LP
Cylinders thus providing 4 LP flow in parallel. Thetas are five impulse stages in
the HP cylinder and six stages for
each of the LP cylinders. The turbine cylinders and generator is solidly coupled
together in line, with a single thrust bearing on HP shaft between No, 2 bearing
(HP rotor bearing) and the HP~LP. Coupling each rotor is supported in two main
bearing. A solid forged steel rotor is provided in the HP cylinder whilst the LP
rotor have shrunk and keyed on discs, The nozzle plates of the HP cylinder are
welded assemblies incorporating machined nozzle segments, The LP diaphragms
are cast iron with cast-in nozzle division plates. Steams packed labyrinth glands
are provided for each cylinder, Live steam at a pressure of 580 psig and temp
482.60F (saturated) is supplied to the HP cylinder of the turbine through two
separately anchored steam chests each containing a steam strainer a combined
stop and emergency valve and two throttle (or governing) valves, The chests are
connected to the HP cylinder through loop at allow axial movement of this
Cylinder, and ensure that no excessive thrust loads from the piping are transmitted
to the HP cylinder. Extraction steam is taken for feed heating purpose before
stages 4&5 and at the exhaust of the H.P cylinder after expansion is led two
moisture separators in parallel which reduce the moisture content of the steam
before it is reheating is two live steam reheaters, The steam from the reheaters
Having a pressure of 47.5 psig and temperature of 43OoF passes through governor
operated butterfly interceptor valves before entering the two double flow LP
cylinders. An interceptors valve is provided in the line from each reheater to the
LP inlets, The LP cylinder of turbine is of four flow design: each two flow LP has
a central admission belt with outward direction of steam flows. Steam is supplied
to the two flow provision via the separator and reheater in each HP cylinder .the
exhausts from the LP bleeding combines into a condenser, which is maintained at
vacuum 27.5 hg.

Steam is extracted from double flow L1~ cylinder before stages 24 and b for feed
heating and before stage 6 for a moisture extractor, The over all length of the
35

Turbine generators 100 and the outside diameter of the last row of blade is 100.
A data logger monitors all turbine and ancillaries parameter.



STEAM CYCLE:

Steam for the turbine through two steam lines or header to the two stem lines or
header to the two combined stop and emergency valves. A10 balance line
connected line connect the header the C.S.E. valves. During normal operation the
C~S.E. valves are fully open to permit steam flow to inlet steam chest and then to
the two governor valves. Governor valve position controls turbine speed and load
and thus are made responsive to the governor valves (two on each bank) are
connected by means of balance lines and the steam passes to the H.P. inlet
nozzles, trough the H.P. cylinder. The to governor valves in each steam chest are
in parallel i.e., there is common inlet and outlet manifold for both of the two
governor valves in a steam chest. Also lines from each steam chest joint and go to
both top and bottom of H.P, cylinder This arrangement in conjunction with the
10 balance line ensures uniform steam take off from each of the 8 boiler and
uniform distribution to each portion of H~P. cylinder, After expansion, the steam
leaves the H~P. cylinder and passes through the separator, reheater, LP emergency
stops valves and interceptor valves, before entering LP cylinders. Also to relief
valves are installed after each of the two re heaters. In the event of governor or
interceptor valve malfunction the relief valve will open and vent the steam to
atmosphere preventing over pressurizing the separator or reheaters,



The interceptor valves remain full open normal operation and admit the steam to
LP cylinder from where it is exhausted to the condenser, not all of the steam to the
LP cylinders from where it is exhausted to condenser. Not all of the steam
36

admitted to turbine by the governor valves is expanded through the turbine and
exhausted to main condenser At different points on the turbine, steam is bled off
or Extracted and passed to feed water heat exchangers. Heating the feed water by
extraction steam has two beneficial results; one is an increase in the heat cycle
efficiency and the minimum permissible inlet feed temp. to boiler is 24OoF, The
RAPS turbine has six extractions feed heaters three including deaerators heaters


Fed from the H.P, cylinder, and are called lob pressure heaters if they are in the
feed line before the boiler feed pumps and are called high pressure if they are in
the feed line after the pumps. Five of the extraction lines have spring closed check
valves. These check valves close on a turbine trip to prevent entrained stream in
the extraction lines and heaters from backing up into the turbine and causing it to
over speed. Entrained steam from the (one, remaining extraction line and heater
was calculated to give only a small increase so check valves were omitted

CONDENSING SYSTEM:

GENERAL.

The circulating water in the condenser condenses the exhaust steam from LP
Turbines. The condensate is recycled through boilers. The air gases are removed
from the condensate by the air ejectors. The condensing system is provided to
supply condensate from the deaerators under all condition of operation. The
maximum flow of condensate to deaerators at 100% turbine load is i
900.000lbs/hr, the design temp. are 91 5oF in the condenser hot well and 245oF at
the deaerators inlet


DESCRIPTION
37


Condensate system comprises of main condenser two 100% capacity condensate
extraction pumps and two 21/4% duty emergency pump, 2 moisture Extractor,
gland steam and high level reserve feed water tank with their associate fittings,
pipelines and instrumentation
The condensate extraction pumps take suction from the condenser hot well and
discharge through the moisture extractors, drain cooler and LP heaters, the
condensate flow is controlled by the control valve part of the Condensate front the
condensate pump discharge header flow changes the gland steam condenser and
air ejectors and returns to main condensate line before it enters the moisture
extractors. The flow in this line is controlled by means of regulating control valve
which maintains a fixed differential pressure across the gland steam condenser
having been designed to have the same pressure deferential tar its design flow as
the air ejector. A condensate recirculation line back to the condenser is provided.
This take off is located downstream of the condenser. The condensate pumps also
supply boiler feed pump gland seal water and water f or the turbine spray cooling.
One 21/2% capacity auxiliary condensate
Extraction pump takes water from the condenser hot well and discharge into the
same system as the 100% pumps.


SAFETY DESIGN PRINCIPALS

It has been ensured that systems, components & structures having a bearing on
reactor safety are designed to meet stringent performance & reliability
requirements. These requirements are met by adopting the following design
principles:
a) The quality requirements for design, fabrication, construction & inspection
for these systems are of the high order, commensurate with their importance to
safety.
38

b) The safety related equipment inside the containment building is designed
to perform its function even under the elevated pressure & temperature &steam
environment conditions expected in the event of postulated loss of coolant
accidents (LOCA).
c) Physical & functional separation is assured between process systems &
safety systems.
d) Adequate redundancy is provided in systems such that the minimum
safety functions can be performed even in the event of single active components
in the system.
e) To minimize the probability of unsafe failures
f) Provisions are incorporated to ensure that active components in the safety
systems are testable periodically.
g) All the supplies /services (electric, compressed air or water) to these
systems, necessary for the performance of their safety functions are assured &
safety grade sources.




SAFETY & SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION OF SYSTEMS:


SAFETY CALSSIFICATION:
In the design of Indian PHWRs, it is required to grade various systems, equipment
& structures in their importance to safety & reliability. The safety gradation
consists of four different safety classes depending upon the nature of safety
functions to be performed by the various items of the plant.


39

SAFETY CLASS I: It is the highest safety class & includes equipment &
structures needed to accomplish safety functions necessary to prevent release of
substantial core fission product inventory. This includes reactor shutdown systems
& primary heat transport system.


SAFETY CLASS II: Includes equipment, which performs those safety
functions, which become necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident
involving release of substantial core fission product inventory from fuel. This
class also includes those items, which are required to prevent escalation of
anticipated operational occurrences to accident conditions. Boiler feed water &
steam system, emergency core cooling system, reactivity control provisions &
reactor containment building are included in this class.


SAFETY CLASS III:
Includes systems that perform functions, which are needed to support the safety
functions of safety class II & I. Also, it includes systems & functions required to
control the release of radioactivity from sources located outside the reactor
building. Process water-cooling system include induced draft cooling towers, air
supply system, shield cooling system primary coolant purification ion exchange
columns & filters etc. are included in this category.


SAFETY CLASS IV:
Includes those items & systems, which do not fall within the above classes but are
required to limit the discharge of radioactive material & airborne radioactivity
below the prescribed limits .D2O upgrading, waste management, dueteration
&service building ventilation systems are classified as class IV safety systems.
40























41

1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION:
COIS is a data acquisition and display equipment for providing the operator with process
alarm messages, status, trend curves, history displays and printouts of groups of process
variables etc.
. A three-tier system design consisting of Display Stations, Data Acquisition Computers
and I/O subsystem has been adopted to improve the reliability and availability. This
makes the different subsystems to be hardware independent on each other. A high speed
Ethernet LAN (Local Area Network) is used for communication between the subsystems.
10 of the Display Stations are Utility CRTs (UCRTs) and the remaining 2 are Alarm
CRTs (ACRTs). They are Intel 80386 microprocessor based systems doing most of the
user interface job. These systems are having high resolution (Super VGA-1024 x 768
pixels) 19 monitors, which give a good pictorial representation of the data.
Data Acquisition Computers are based on Intel Pentium which UNIX SVR 4.2 as the
Operating system. Both the DACs work in dual redundant hot standby mode. They
mainly acquire the data from I/O subsystems and other Computer Systems like PLC,
DPHS, RADAS etc. and pass the required data to display stations. They do the logging
of the history data and take care of the printer tasks. They also do the network
management of both the LANs. They also direct the I/O systems to govern the field
outputs as required.
I/O subsystems are Motorola 68020 CPU based systems. Each I/O subsystem has 2 CPUs
working in dual redundant mode. They mainly do the scanning and alarm checking of
the field inputs connected to them and pass on the data to DACs. They also change the
field outputs as per the directive from DACs.
The network topology is designed in such a way that a single break anywhere in the
network (broken cable or failed n/w equipment) will not result in a collapse of the total
system, but will allow the system to continue to work at a degraded level. The significant
aspects of the designed network topology are:



42


a). Thicknet cable is used as it is much more rugged than the thinnet cable.

b). Transceivers that are used to connect different nodes to the network are piercing
type tap boxes, which facilitate the connection without a cut in the cable.

c). A significant component in the topology is Repeater. Repeater is an active
component that can be used to connect different cables of networks. It isolates the
remaining network from a fault in any of the other cables. This has given rise to a fault
tolerant network. The network is divided into 4 parts each connecting of the system.
The various failures considered their effect is described below:
i). If any transceiver or the cable connecting the transceiver to the node fails, only
that node will fail & reset of the system will continue to work as usual. If the connection
with the Master DAC fails, the hot standby DAC will take over and the system will not
be affected.
ii). If any one of the cables of LAN1 - a, b, c or d fails than of inputs/outputs (of
the nodes connected to that part of the network) will be lost & the system will continue to
work with 75% of inputs/outputs data. If more than one cable fails, COIS still will work
with the reduced capacity accordingly.
iii). If any one of the cables of LAN-2 a, b, c or d fails, then of display stations
will not be available. Display stations are connected in these four cables in such a way
that CRTs on adjacent Main Control Room panels are connected to different cables and
will not fail simultaneously. ACRTs are connected to different repeaters and hence will
not fail simultaneously. If more than one cables fail, COIS will still work with the
corresponding reduction in display stations.




43


1.1 Inputs/Outputs
There are various types of plant inputs to the COIS viz. analog inputs and digital inputs.
Each plant input is also referred to as point the COIS also provides voltage free relay
contacts as outputs.




Analog inputs

There are 1256 analog inputs to the COIS. These include about 10% spare points. The
approximate distribution into different categories is as follows: -

RTDS 392 points
Thermocouples 16 points
Volts/Current Inputs 824 points
Thermistor 8 points

Exact details of description, input range, alarm priority, process range and processing
required etc. for each analog input are available in the COIS analog input..

For the current inputs the terminating resistors (of value as specified in analog input list)
are a part of the COIS. Among the 824 voltage or current inputs, any number may be

44

voltage input. Thus all of these 824 inputs can be arranged to take a current or voltage
input. Input impedance of voltage inputs is greater than 1 Ohm. Linearisation and lead
resistance compensation wherever necessary, e.g. for RTD and thermocouple inputs, will
be performed by the COIS. All RTD inputs will use 3 wire RTDs in the field. Provision
will be use 3 wire RTDs in the field. Provision will be made to terminate a 3 wire RTD at
each RTD input point.
Cold junction compensation for thermocouple will also be provided by the COIS. These
analog inputs are numbered in the range of 000 to 1299.




1.1.1 Digital (contact) Inputs
There are 1136 digital inputs of contact type. There are two types of contact inputs as
follows:

1.1.1.1 Voltage free contact inputs: There are 736 voltage free contact inputs. These
contacts represent alarm or status inputs.

1.1.1.2 Shared contact inputs: There are 400 field contact inputs which are shared
between the window Annunication system (WAS) and the COIS. These contacts
represent alarm events.
1.1.2 Digital (Voltage level) Inputs
There are 656 voltage level inputs representing the status of valves (open or closed).
State Voltage
Level 0 Between 0 volts and 2 volts

45

Level 1 Between 40 volts and 48 volts.
The input impedance presented by COIS to these inputs will not be less than 10K ohm.

1.1.3 Input Data from other computer systems
COIS receives data from other computers viz. Digital Recording System (DRS),
Radiation Data Acquisition System (RADAS), Electrical DAS and PLCs via LAN
thorough gateways. In the COIS, these input parameters are numbered as follows:

(1) Radiation Data Acquisition System:
Analog points: 3601 to 3799
Digital points: 3001 to 3999
(2) Electrical DAS:
Analog & contact points: 7001 to 9499
(3) PLCs Digital points representating : 1301 to 1999
Status of hand switch position & 5901 to 5999
(4)Digital Recording System (DRS)
a) Normal/Disturbance Analog inputs : 2801 to 2899
b) Visicorder Function Analog inputs : 2901 to 2999
c) Contact inputs of ESR function : 9501 to 3499
d) Dual Process Hot Standby : 9501 to 9699 Analog inputs

(5)Other Computer Systems
a) Analog inputs : 9701 to 9899
b) Contact/digital inputs : 9901 to 9999

46

Note: There are no physical inputs corresponding to these points. Values of these points
are provided to the COIS periodically by the above systems. For all displays and logging
functions except alarm functions, these points are treated as the field COIS inputs.

1.1.4 The COIS will also provide 224 outputs of voltage free relay contacts. Ten or
these contacts are used for Fuel Failure Monitoring function described in Sec. testing
function described in section 5.11. The remaining contacts will be used for miscellaneous
purposes like giving time synchronizing pulses to other computer based systems,
annunciation of the failure of the COIS, indication of which computer system is faulty
etc.



1.1.5 Ethernet
The COIS will provide Ethernet LAN connectivity for connection to other computer
systems.

1.1.6 The COIS will also provide, on operators demand, processed data outputs called
calculated analog variables, for e.g. selected channel differential temperatures and DNM
detector outputs etc. These variables will be numbered in the range of 6001 to 6699.

1.2 Accuracy, Noise Rejection, Contact Debounce and Isolation.
1.2.1 For all digital and analog inputs, a very high isolation between the transducer
circuit and the COIS is provided to avoid problems in the transducer circuit due to ground
faults etc.



47


1.2.2 Overall accuracy of analog data acquisition for any point will be 0.25% of span or
better. This accuracy will be maintained even in the presence of common mode noise
(Max.) + 15V d.c./50Hz. on the input. A low pass filter will be provided on each analog
input to suppress normal mode (predominantly) 50Hz. noise. Protection will be provided
against following conditions for different categories of analog input.240V AC (Max.),
50Hz common mode voltage on any thermocouple inputs.
For RTD inputs: Depending on RTD bridge excitation network
Or + 50V d.c./a.c. (Whichever is more) common mode or normal
mode voltage.+ 250V d.c./a.c. common mode or + 50V dc/ac
normal mode voltage on any other type of analog inputs.

1.2.3 Processing of potential free contact type inputs will not be affected even under a
max. common mode voltage of + 15V d.c./50Hz a.c. on any input. Beyond 15V,
protection is provided for a max. + 250V d.c. /a.c. common mode voltage. For providing
the above common mode voltage capabilities, opto-isolators are used for digital inputs.

1.2.4 In case of digital (contact) inputs and digital (voltage level) inputs input status
changes lasting less than 50 milliseconds will be ignored by the system.
Note: Sampling interval for all analog & contact inputs will be adjustable to any
of the following: 5 sec. 10 sec., 30 sec., with the normal interval specified in the above
table. This adjustable could be on an individual basis or on group basis (Group = type of
input).
For all analog inputs, five samples will be taken within the sampling interval
and the average of these five samples will be taken as the value for that sampling interval.
There will also be a provision for averaging over last five sampling intervals for
selected number of analog inputs (max. 100Nos.). These average values will be used in
all displays and printouts.

48




1.3 Alarm Function

The computer system will check some of the analog inputs and almost all of 736 digital
alarm inputs in the 656 Digital (voltage) inputs for alarm events. Many analog points are
only for periodic logging and BG display etc. and are not checked for alarm at all. And
some points have to be checked for alarm at all. And some points have to be checked for
only low alarm limit or only high alarm limit i.e. both alarms are not required. Some
COIS points are inhibited from reporting to ACRTs as alarms, i.e. these points are not
displayed on the ACRTs when the status of these points changes. But this does not
prevent them from displaying their status in BGs, tabular trends etc. The remaining point
will have both low and high alarm limits. Some of contact (digital) inputs are for status
monitoring only and will not be checked for alarm. The remaining points will be checked
for alarms. The frequency of alarm checking will be same as that or the point for data
acquisition. The alarm events are defined as follows:
1. An analog input going above a high limit (HL) or falling below a low limit (LL)
or a digital input sent to alarm state since previous scan is referred to as an Alarm
occurrence.
2. Analog input returning between its high and low point or a digital input going to
normal state since previous scan is referred to as return to normal occurrence. This is
also referred to as Normal occurrence is short.
As for as ACRT display or output on alarm printer are concerned, analog points will be
limited to only low, High and Bad states. BL (Bad Low) than lower end of span
Lost. Such additional alarms will store in the computer memory and arranged as CRT
concealed alarm pages for display purposes.
Capacity for such 100 additional alarms is provided. A suitable audiovisual indication for
the alarm in the concealed pages is provided. Operator will be able to call up for display

49

any of the ACRT concealed alarm pages on any of the two ACRTs or on both ACRTs
will be different and independent. Provision will be made for scrolling up or down (one
line at a time) of ACRT display. Latest alarm/ return to normal message line will also
be displayed on the last line of all the ACRT pages. Provision will be made so that the
operator can retain on the screen the most important/of immediate interest/relevant
alarms only on the screen and put the rest of them in concealed alarm pages. Provision
will also be made to list the alarms on any UCRT for a selected USI or a range of USIs
keyed in by the operator. This is called alarm display management. Each input point
will be given a priority number of 1 or 2. Inputs with priority of 2. It will be possible for
the operator to call up the summary of existing alarms on any UCRT. It will also be
possible to call this summary as total or only of alarms with a priority 1 or only of alarms
with a priority 2. Provision will be made to list all alarms for a selected USI or range of
USIs keyed in by the operator.
Operator will be able to tell the COIS any analog/digital inputs which are to be ignored
(i.e. as if those do not exist) for alarm function. Such ignored inputs will be resumed
automatically in 30 minutes or whenever desired by the operator, whichever is earlier.
Such operator commands will get immediately logged on Alarm Printer.
The system will maintain a list of such alarm-disabled points. It will be possible to
add/delete points in this disabled list.

The COIS will have the following two codes of alarm processing.
1) Mode 1: Under this mode repetitive alarms are suppressed.
2) Mode 2: Under this mode, repetitive alarms are also reported (without any
suppression) lost. Such additional alarms will be stored in the computer memory and
arranged as CRT concealed alarm pages for display purposes.
Capacity for such 100 additional alarms (i.e. approx. 5 concealed alarm pages) is
provided. A suitable audiovisual indication for the alarm in the concealed pages is
provided. Operator will be able to call up for display any of the ACRTs or on both
ACRTs i.e. the pages selection keys for both the ACRTs will be different and

50

independent. Provision will be made for scrolling up or down (one line at a time) of
ACRT display. Latest alarm/ return to normal message line will also be displayed on
the last line of all the ACRT pages. Provision will be made so that the operator can retain
on the screen the most important/of immediate interest/relevant alarms only on the screen
and put the rest of them in concealed alarm pages. Provision will also be made to list the
alarms on any UCRT for a selected USI or a range of USIs keyed in by the operator. This
is called alarm display management. Each input point will be given a priority number
of 1 or 2. Inputs with priority 1 being more important than those with a priority of 2. It
will be existing alarms on any UCRT. It will also be possible to call this summary as total
or only of alarms with a priority 1 or only of alarms with a priority 2. Provision will be
made to list all alarms for a selected USI or range of USIs keyed in by the operator.
Operator will be able to tell the COIS any analog/digital inputs which are to be ignored
(i.e. as if those do not exist) for alarm function. Such ignored inputs will be resumed
automatically in 30 minutes or whenever desired by the operator, whichever is earlier.
Such operator commands will get immediately logged on Alarm Printer.
The system will maintain a list of such alarm-disabled points. It will be possible to
add/delete points in the disabled list.
i) Mode 1: Under this mode repetitive alarms are suppressed.
ii) Mode 2: Under this mode, repetitive alarms are also reported (without any
suppression). The operator through a password can select alarm-processing mode 1 or 2.


1) Alarm processing under mode 1:

Under some abnormal field conditions, some of the points (analog/contact) may oscillate
between alarm and normal states and hence any cause large number of alarm/normal
messages on the alarm printer & ACRTs. Hence, it is required that not more than six
message (status changes) are generated by any point in any quarter of an hour. For this
purpose, the COIS will set the status change count of each to zero, every quarter of an

51

hour. Any point which changes status (from normal to alarm/bad or alarm/bad to normal
etc.) 6 times in any quarter of the hour, will be automatically disabled from alarm
scanning for the remaining part of the quarter hour. But the COIS will freeze the status
only with alarm/bad status i.e. if 6
th
message is normal message, the COIS will disable
alarm scanning of the point after 7
th
message (i.e. Alarm message) is reported. This
period for checking max. NO. Of alarm generation will be programmable between of
an hour to a selected period will also be adjustable between 4 and 10.



Alarm processing under mode 2 :

All alarm messages are reported without any suppression.

1.3.1 There are about 400 Nos. digital inputs (shared input contacts) which are scanned
only for the logging of their status changes on the alarm printer and mag. Tape
cartridge/disk cartridge (i.e. CRT display and audio ann. Is not required for these). (Note:
These are the window annunciator points numbered in the range of 4001 to 4999). These
are scanned every one second.

1.3.2 Latest Alarm Message Display Function on UCRTs


The latest Alarm/Normal message displayed on the ACRTs will also be displayed on
the bottom-most line of all the UCRTs also. No flashing of the alarm message or any
audio is required on the UCRTs. However, successive alarm message will be displayed in
alternate red and pink colours on UCRTs (e.g. first alarm message in red colour, second

52

in pink colour and third in red again and so on). Normal message will always be shown in
green colour. Any alarm/normal message will be continuously displayed until another
alarm/normal message is generated to replace the previous one. Operator will provide a
facility to switch off this alarm/normal message display on any UCRT whenever
required.

1.3.3 Valve Status Monitoring
There are 656 Nos. voltage level inputs representing the valve status (open or closed).
These inputs are scanned once every 1-second for displaying the actual status of the
valves in the Mimics and for logging their status changes on printer used for alarm
logging. Status changes are recorded on magnetic tape also.
Each valve to be monitored for its status on COIS will have one or two inputs connected
to COIS. These are voltage level inputs with two levels, i.e. at 0 volt for 48 volts dc.
Voltage level inputs are normally taken across the indicating lamps corresponding to the
valve. When the indicating lamp is ON indicating valve Fully open or fully closed,
the input to COIS is +48V DC, otherwise it is zero. If there are tow inputs corresponding
to a valve, the COIS will sense both the inputs and derive the status as follows:



Fully open input Fully Closed Input Status
48 V 0 V Fully open
0 V 48 V Fully closed
0 V 0 V In intermediate
position
48 V 48 V INST. FAILURE

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The COIS will show the actual status in the Mimics appropriately. It will also log the
change of status on the printer accordingly.
For valves having single input to COIS, the status will be either Fully open or Not
Fully open (Not Fully Closed).
If there is a change in status the new status will be logged on to the printer. It may be
noted that the Intermediate status and Instrument failure status are taken as new
status only if it has remained so for two successive scans. The Instrument failure status
is treated as an alarm and would be annunciated on the ACRT.

1.4 Interface to Various other Computer Based Systems
The COIS will also provide Ethernet LAN interface for connecting the following
computer systems. The COIS will receive data from them as required as per the approved
protocol. The data will be available for all the functions described in this design manual
except for alarm function:
a) RADAS
b) Electrical SCADA (EDAS).
c) PLC
d) DRS
e) DPHS
f) CTM
g) PDCS etc.





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1.5 General Features:
1. The COIS will be user friendly and the operator will be able to get the desired
information in desired formats on the various UCRTs in an interactive manner. Menu
driven CRT based dialogue with the system will be designed. Various menus/indexes/lists
of UCRTs functions, BGs, History groups and graphic trend groups etc. will be displayed
on the UCRT on operators demand. Help facility will be available at all phases of
dialogue. Data retrieval procedures will be quick and easy. No UCRT will have a blank
screen at any time. If no display is demanded, it will be showing the main menu, so that
operator can quickly select the display of his choice.
2. Process data base will contain flags for each Analog input to indicate whether any Low
Alarm Limit/High Alarm Limit is applicable or not. Software for Alarm processing and
various displays etc. will not call for entry of artificial low/high alarm limit e.g. lower than
lower end of span/higher than higher end of span etc. as this causes confusion and
inconvenience to the operator while studying the printouts/displays.
4. Microprocessor based and standalone type I/O subsystems are used. Analog inputs
cards are designed for automatic calibration at regular intervals under software control
using precision reference sources for 25% and 75% scale. Hence, software offset correction
is provided for any drift due too temperature or time.
5. A facility for enabling/disabling low alarms in bulk for certain points with a single
command will be provided. These low alarms mostly correspond to the failure of the
sensors.







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1.6 Resolution of Values in Numeric/Plot/Bar Graph Form
Resolution of Values (i.e. data such as current value of a process variable, alarm point, etc.)
will in various cases be as follows or better:
Sr. No. Type of output Resolution
1 Numeric form 0.1%
2 Graphic Display/Mimic/Bar Graph/Plot 0.2% or better

Numerical resolution will be limited to 0.1 to 0.2% of full span. The operator will not
require a better resolution than this and it will waste the useful area of the screen. Hence
numerical displays like 21.3245 for a process range of 0-100C will be avoided and an
approximated value 21.3 will be displayed.

1.7 Response Time
Expected response times are described as follows:
1. Initial Display Lag: It is defined as the Maximum Time taken for the first
complete display (static + dynamic parts) to appear on the display after the operators
common will not be more than 2 seconds.

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2. Time Stamp Lag: It is defined as the maximum time difference between the
real time of a field event occurrence and the time stamp (Time stamp will be done as
soon as the scanning is done) will in principle be same as the sampling interval.
3. Display Lag: It is defined as the maximum time difference between time
stamping of an event and it being displayed will not be more than 1 second.
4. Sampling interval: It is defined as the maximum time between the two
consecutive scanning of the inputs
5. Print Lag: It is defined as maximum time difference between the
commencement of the demanded printout and the operators commands and will not be
more than 10 seconds.
1.8 Data Storage/Retrieval and Off-line Computer System
1.8.1 Data Storage
The following on-line data will be recorded on the magnetic disk for last 32 hours:
a) History data
b) Static data base
c) Changes done in static data base
d) Five sets of DNM data & ECCS Test Data
e) Alarm logging
f) Snapshot of current values of all the points at every shift and as demanded by the
operator.
g) Data and time of recording the data.

This data for the last 24 hours, on default, will be dumped on to the magnetic tape one in
a day at a fixed time, which will be adjustable on system starting time.
Typically, one tape will be used for a day and previous one months data will be stored
(i.e. 31 tapes will be available). Before dumping the data, system will check, if the tape

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on the drive is of that days tape. If not, it will ask the operator to insert new tape for
dumping the data.
1.8.2 Data Retrieval
Provision will be made to retrieve the data from the disk (current 24 hours) or from any
previously recorded magnetic tape and store it on a PC (MS-DOS) compatible floppy.
Facility will be provided to select any type of data and in any range (time, usi, etc.).
1.8.3 Off-line computer system
Off-line computer system will comprise of a standard PC-AT and a printer. It will be
possible to read the data recorded on floppies by the on-line system .The software would
also include standard package like DBASE IV.
1.9 Input Power Supply to the Equipment and Effect of Power
Failure.
Two independent sources of single phase, A.C. power supply of the following
specifications will be available in the station.
Voltage
RMS Value : 240 Volts + 10%
Steady state variation : + 10%
Transient variation : 0% (for 200m secs)
Frequency
Frequency : 50 Hz
Steady state variations : + 1%
Transient variation : + 5%
During transient variations (upto 200m sec) the COIS will continue to operate without
malfunctioning.
An input a.c. power interruption (total outage) lasting 30 milliseconds or less will not
affect the working of the COIS in anyway.

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For all 240V AC loads, both sources of main supply will be connected through
contractors such that failure of any main power supply will not affect operation of any
subsystem. Wherever duplicated D.C. power supplies are used, separate a.c. main source
will be given to the two D.C. power supplies will be connected to the load through
isolation diodes.
1.9.1 Seismic specification
1. The I/O subsystem equipment will operate satisfactorily during and after the
vibration tests at the following peak accelerations when subjected to a sinusoidal
acceleration for 30 seconds at each frequency in the given range.
Peak acceleration I the horizontal axes and vertical axis: 3.5g from 1 Hz to 33 Hz.

1.10 Master Clock Time
Real time clock of the COIS Unit-1 will be used as the master clock for synchronizing
time of various computer systems of the plant. The COIS will provide a potential free
change over contact to each of the computer based systems for time synchronization with
0.5 second status change at 10.00 hours every day (Normal status will be resumed at
10:00:00 hours). The contact status change will be sensed by each of the computer based
systems and the time will be set to 10:00:00 hrs.



1.11 Reliability and Availability
The meantime between failures (MTBF) of the system excluding the printers, plotters and
CRTs will be 4000 hours or more with an availability of 99.9% or better. MTBF and
availability figures for the printers/plotters and CRTs will be 2000 hours and 99%
respectively. The meantime to detect a fault (MTTD) plus the mean time to detect a fault
(MTTD) plus the mean time to repair (MTTR) will not exceed 1 hour. In order to achieve

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the high availability figures, a master and hot standby computer redundancy is employed.
In case of a computer going faulty, its load will be automatically switched over to the
other computer. Displays/printouts active before the failure of computer, become active
automatically without operators intervention after switching over pertaining to History
will not be lost due to such switchover. To keep the MTTD+MTTR under one hour, hot
repairs concept is used.





CONCLUSION

As an undergraduate of the Rajasthan University I would like to say that this
training program is an excellent opportunity for us to get to the ground level
and experience the things that we would have never gained through going
straight into a job. I am grateful to the Rajasthan University and APEX for
giving me this wonderful opportunity.

The main objective of the industrial training is to provide an opportunity to
undergraduates to identify, observe and practice how engineering is
applicable in the real industry. It is not only to get experience on technical
practices but also to observe management practices and to interact with
fellow workers. It is easy to work with sophisticated machines, but not with
people. The only chance that an undergraduate has to have this experience is
the industrial training period.

I feel I got the maximum out of that experience. Also I learnt the way of
work in an organization, the importance of being punctual, the importance of
maximum commitment, and the importance of team spirit. I have learnt
many things in this 45 days training session. In my opinion, I have gained
lots of knowledge and experience needed to be successful in a great

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engineering challenge, as in my opinion, Engineering is after all a
Challenge, and not a Job.













References

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rajasthan_Atomic_Power_Station
Power Point Presentation Slides Prepared by me
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, Rawatbhata
https://www.google.co.in










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