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The Geometrical Method in Spinoza's Ethics

Laura Byrne
Philosophy, University of Ottawa
Abstract
While the goal of Spinoza's Ethics has strong affinities with the Aristote-
lian goal of eudaimonia , structurally the text itself is modeled on Euclid's Elements
!oes Spinoza thin" that the precision and certainty of mathematics can #e extended
to moral philosophy$ %o answer this &uestion, ' discuss the relation #etween the
geometrical method of the Ethics and its content and goal Arguing that the deduc-
ti(e structure of the Ethics mirrors the causal necessity #y which all of nature follows
from )od, ' conclude that Spinoza applies the geometrical method to ethics #ecause
nothing, including human life and well-#eing, is exempt from this causal necessity
*urthermore, ' discuss the role the geometrical method plays in an aspect of the
argument of the Ethics which can #est #e descri#ed as dialectical, in the Aristotelian
sense of the word+ Spinoza hoped to persuade the mem#ers of his circle of theo-
logically radical yet de(out friends, and others intellectually similar to them, of the
truth of his philosophy #y #eginning with ,artesian principles they would accept
*inally, ' argue that certain nongeometrical portions of the Ethics are directed at the
emotions of these readers
Why Is Spinoza's Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order?
Spinoza's masterwor" is concerned with the &uestion of how we should
li(e 'ts title, the Ethics , echoes that of Aristotle's in&uiry into the good
life, the Nicomachean Ethics %he text itself is di(ided into fi(e parts+ the
first considers )od- the second, the nature of the human mind- the third,
the nature of the emotions- the fourth, the power of emotion to diminish
Poetics Today ./+0 1*all .2234 doi 525.5672000603.-.223-228
9 .223 #y :orter 'nstitute for :oetics and Semiotics
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:oetics %oday ./+0
human freedom- and the fifth, the power of the intellect to enhance it
%he goal of the wor" as a whole is to show the reader the path to human
freedom %his o#;ecti(e has strong affinities with the Aristotelian goal of
eudaimonia 1well-#eing or flourishing4, understood as the perfected exercise
of our characteristic capacities
)i(en this affinity #etween Spinoza's Ethics and Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics , the reader is surprised and puzzled upon ta"ing up the wor"+ follow-
ing the main title, the Ethics , are the words demonstrated in geometrical order
Sur(eying the wor" as a whole, one sees that while it is conceptually related
to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in terms of its goal, in terms of its structure
and method it is modeled on Euclid's Elements , the mathematical treatise
which transformed the geometrical "nowledge of anti&uity into a rigorous
deducti(e system #y deri(ing theorems with strict logical necessity from
axioms and definitions Each of the fi(e parts of the Ethics #egins with a set
5 Because the Ethics is di(ided into axioms, definitions, propositions, and so on,
scholars
generally find it more con(enient to refer to these su#di(isions than to page num#ers %o
facilitate this style of reference, the official ;ournal of Spinoza studies, Studia
Spinozana , has
set the following pattern, which is used in this article + E < Ethics 15, ., 0, 8, 6 < :art 5,
., etc4-
A < Appendix 1the Appendix to E 8 is di(ided into separate sections, ordered as ,aput ',
,aput '', and so on- hence, E 8A5 < Ethics , :art 8, Appendix, ,aput '4- Ax < Axiom- ,
<
,orollary- ! < !emonstration- !ef < !efinition- Ex < Explication- ' < 'ntroduction- L <
Lemma- :raef < :reface- : < :roposition- S < Scholium- hence E .:88,5 < Ethics, :art
.,
:roposition 88, ,orollary 5
. 'n his classic study of the influences on Spinoza's philosophy, Wolfson 15=>5 ?5=08@+
.004
asserts that Spinoza Amodeled his own discussions of goodness, (irtue, and happiness,
and
of the life in accordance with reasonB on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Ce also
discusses the
relation of Spinoza's terms felicitas 1happiness4 1E 8:5/S4, beatum esse 1to #e happy4,
bene agere
1to act well4, and bene vivere 1to li(e well4 1E 8:.54 to Latin translations of the terms
used to
refer to the goal of ethical action in the Nicomachean Ethics 1i#id+ .0/4
0 Wolfson 15=>5 ?5=08@+ 824 descri#es the Euclidean model as #eing structured in the
fol-
lowing way+
*irst, the primary truths which form the premises in the demonstration are grouped
together
and placed apart from the demonstrations as the first principles upon which the
demonstra-
tions rest, and are di(ided into definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions
Second,
that which is sought to #e demonstrated, that is, the conclusion which is to #e
esta#lished #y
the demonstration, is summarized apart from the demonstration in the form of a
proposition
%hird, the demonstration itself reasons from the "nown, that is, the first principles, to
the
un"nown, that is the conclusion *ourth, supplementary deductions, explanations, and
propo-
sitions are gi(en in the form of corollaries, scholia and lemmas
,onsidering the use of this Euclidean model in philosophy prior to Spinoza's Ethics ,
Wolfson
1i#id+ 884 asserts that, while it is Aadopted #y Spinoza and used consistently in his
discus-
sions of metaphysical matters throughout his chief philosophic wor",B it is Awith all his
pre-
decessors only a casual attemptB Wolfson 1i#id4 also notes that !escartes did not
thin"
it was con(eniently applied in metaphysics %his point is discussed in the section of this
essay
dealing with !escartes's method
:iet Steen#a""ers 15==8+ 5824 asserts that the geometrical method is Athe result of a
long
historical process of transmission, reception and interpretation, rather than the conscious
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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of clearly stated axioms and definitions, from which a series of propositions
a#out )od, the mind, the emotions, desire, and happiness are deduced At
the end of the :reface to :art 6, Spinoza writes that he intends to deduce
Aall those things which concern the mind's #lessednessB from Athe mind's
"nowledge aloneB 1E 6:raef4 'n the :reface to :art 0, he writes that he
will treat the nature and power of the emotions and the mind's power o(er
them in the same way he has treated )od and the mindFin the geomet-
rical manner, considering Ahuman actions and appetites ;ust as if it were a
&uestion of lines, planes and #odiesB 1E 0:raef4 't seems odd, if not per-
(ersely misguided, to consider our emotions, desires, and the conditions
of our well-#eing in the same manner as geometrical figures Euclidean
geometry is, after all, the domain of strict necessity and a#solute certainty
%riangles are eternally and e(erywhere the same %heir properties, such as
the sum of their interior angles e&ualing 5/2 degrees, are deduci#le from
their natures as specified #y their geometrical definitions and the first prin-
ciples of geometry !oes Spinoza thin" the certainty of mathematics can
#e extended to the in(estigation of human life and well-#eing$
Aristotle expresses our dou#ts and intuitions a#out this sort of enter-
prise in the Nicomachean Ethics 1 NE 4, asserting that we cannot demand the
precision of mathematical studies in moral and political philosophy, where
we in(estigate topics such as Afine and ;ust actions,B which exhi#it Amuch
(ariety and fluctuationB 1 NE ' 0, 52=8#56- 5=/8+ 53024 Accordingly, we ha(e
to #e content with merely indicating Athe truth roughly and in outlineB and
with Aspea"ing a#out things which are only for the most part trueB 1 NE ' 0,
52=8#.2G.5- 5=/8+ 53024 's Spinoza ignoring Aristotle's point that Ait is the
mar" of an educated man to loo" for precision in each class of things ;ust
so far as the nature of the su#;ect admitsB 1 NE ' 0, 52=8#.6- 5=/8+ 53024$
*urthermore, if Spinoza's concept of freedom has a great deal in common
with Aristotelian eudaimonia, what are we to ma"e of Spinoza's adopting
a method that Aristotle clearly thought to #e inappropriate to this su#;ect
matter$ Why, in spite of the affinity of its goal with that of the Nicomachean
Ethics , is Spinoza's Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order$
'n order to answer these &uestions, we need to understand the relation
of the geometrical method of the Ethics to its content A (ariety of opin-
ions a#out this can #e found in the secondary literature Scholars such as
Carry Wolfson 15=>5 ?5=08@+ 664 argue that Athere is no logical connection
#etween the su#stance of Spinoza's philosophy and the form in which it
creation of EuclidB *or example, the Acaptions o(er the principlesF'definitions,' 'postu-
lates,' 'axioms'Fare interpolations of a later dateB Steen#a""ers 1i#id4 traces the
Aclean-
cut, systematic differentiation #etween themB to Athe wor" of :roclus !iadochus 1fifth
cen-
tury ,E4B
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:oetics %oday ./+0
is writtenB Hather, Athe reason for its choice was pedagogical,B #ecause
of Athe clearness and distinctness with which the geometrical form was
#elie(ed to delineate the main features of an argument and to #ring them
into high reliefB 1i#id4 Similarly, Edwin ,urley 15=/6+ 82.4 asserts that the
geometrical method Arepresents nothing more, and nothing less, than an
awesome commitment to intellectual honesty and clarityB Ce maintains
that Spinoza sets out his philosophy in the form of propositions deri(ed
from clearly stated axioms and definitions #ecause he Awishes to use no
important term without explaining the sense in which it is to #e under-
stood, to ma"e no crucial assumption without identifying it as a proposi-
tion ta"en to re&uire no argument, to draw no conclusion without #eing
(ery explicit a#out why that conclusion is thought to follow from his
assumptionsB 1i#id4 Still, ,urley 15=//+ xi4 finds that ASpinoza's axiomatic
style of presentation does not in fact pro(ide the clarity Spinoza intendedB+
Athe definitions are typically o#scure, the axioms fre&uently not e(ident,
and the demonstrations all too often uncon(incingB Ie(ertheless, he finds
it Ahard to escape the feeling that there is something there worth ta"ing
pains to try to understandB- his strategy for understanding Spinoza's phi-
losophy 1as the title ehind the !eometrical "ethod implies4 is, therefore, to
Apenetrate #eneath the surface of the Ethics and to unco(er the dialogue
Spinoza was conducting with his predecessorsB 1i#id4 *or example, he
proposes to explicate the Ethics ' accounts of )od, mind, and matter as the
results of Spinoza's criticism of the philosophy of !escartes 1i#id+ 0G/4
,urley 1i#id+ xi4, howe(er, finds that this dialogue is something Athe geo-
metric presentation ser(ed to conceal, and was, perhaps, partly designed
to concealB
%he thesis that Spinoza wished to conceal his real (iews, such as the
identity of )od and nature, from religious authorities who would suppress
them and persecute him #ecause of their unorthodoxy was most famously
de(eloped #y Leo Strauss in his Persecution and the #rt of $riting 15=// ?5=6.@4
Efraim Shmueli 15=33+ .524 endorses this interpretation, adding that ASpi-
noza had to appease his li#eral friends who remained ,hristian #elie(ers
of (arious shades %herefore, he concealed his partial #ut decisi(ely impor-
tant disagreement with these ,hristian li#eralsB *urthermore, Shmueli
argues, the impersonality and impartiality of the method were intended
to encourage tolerance from readers+ calling for careful and dispassionate
reasoning, the geometrical method discourages religious pre;udice rooted
in di(isi(e and unexamined emotion *inally, he argues that Spinoza used
8 See Iadler 5=== for a detailed account of orthodoxy, suppression, and persecution in
Colland during Spinoza's lifetime
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the method as a de(ice of self-discipline, to a(oid Athe personal touches
which ordinary composition #rings clearly into lightB 1i#id+ .2/4 Shmueli
supports this position #y arguing that the nongeometrical portions of the
Ethics are (ery different in emotional tone from the geometrical portions
What he finds remar"a#le a#out the Ethics is Athe difference #etween the
restrained and detached, although contro(ersial assertions dressed in the
geometrical form, and the non-geometrical assertions loaded with harsh
re#u"es, refutations, ridicule and scornB 1i#id+ .2=4
Li"e Shmueli, Jirmiyahu Jo(el 15=/=4 claims that Spinoza meant the
calm impartiality of the geometrical method to encourage dispassionate
rationality Ce maintains, howe(er, that Spinoza did not thin" e(eryone
capa#le of this and distinguished the philosophical reader, who could put
emotion aside and reason carefully, from the mem#ers of the irrational
multitude, only led #y sensation, imagination, and emotion 1i#id+ 5.=4
%hese two fundamentally different readerships had to #e addressed in dif-
ferent ways ,onse&uently, the Ethics , directed at the first readership, is
Spinoza's Apurest philosophical textB 1i#id+ 5034 Emphasizing the (alues
of clarity, rigor, and philosophical detachment, it is a model of how Spi-
noza would li"e his potentially philosophical readers to respond to issues
that arouse strong emotions 1i#id+ 50=4 'n contrast, the Theologico%Political
Treatise , directed at the nonphilosophical multitude, must employ another
strategy to increase human freedom Spinoza did not thin" mem#ers of the
multitude could put aside their emotional and imaginati(e attachment to
their traditional religious #eliefs in order to consider calmly the arguments
for his unorthodox philosophical system ,onse&uently, it would #e futile
to structure the Theologico%Political Treatise geometrically, expecting that the
logic of argument could persuade the multitude to accept deeply distur#-
ing ideas a#out )od and nature 'nstead, the Theologico%Political Treatise
ad(ocates social and religious reforms meant to reshape pu#lic emotion
and imagination, so as to reduce the intolerance that was the destructi(e
conse&uence of the psychology of the multitude 1i#id+ 5.=G024 :rudently,
the Theologico%Political Treatise cloa"s the Ethics ' unorthodox philosophy,
which is the conceptual warrant for these reforms, in a rhetorical mas" of
e&ui(ocation 1i#id+ 58.4
Kther commentators, such as Eartial )uLroult 15=>/+ .6G03, 5=38+ 8>3G
/34, Mance Eaxwell 15==2+ 50.4, HS Woolhouse 15==0+ 054, Ste(en Iadler
15===+ ..>4, and Aaron )arrett 1.220+ 504, do discern a logical connection
#etween the content of the Ethics and its geometrical form %hey are in
agreement in asserting that the deducti(e relations #etween the axioms,
definitions, and propositions of the Ethics mirror the causal necessity of
nature %his logical connection is well expressed #y Iadler !enying that
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the geometrical method is Asome superficial shell for material that could
ha(e #een presented in a different, more accessi#le manner,B he 15===+
..>4 asserts that the Astructure of the uni(erse, with its causally necessary
connections, is mirrored #y the structure of ideas, with their logically nec-
essary connectionsB
' systematically de(elop this position, offering a reading of the Ethics
which shows that its geometrical demonstrations fulfill the Aristotelian
ideal of epist&m& *urthermore, ' demonstrate that, contrary to Aristotle, the
deducti(e certainty of this type of "nowledge can #e extended to the in(es-
tigation of human life and well-#eing #y considering the ways in which the
three distinct elements of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect promote human flour-
ishing in the midst of the strict causal necessity that the method mirrors
After this, ' consider the role of the geometrical method in an aspect of
the Ethics that can #est #e descri#ed as dialectical in the sense, discussed
#y Aristotle in the Topics , of persuading an audience #y arguing on the
#asis of propositions that would #e persuasi(e to it 1 Topics ' 5, 522a.6G02-
5=/8+ 5>>4 ' argue that the Ethics is directed, historically, at the mem#ers
of the philosophical circle with whom Spinoza shared his ideas during all
of his adult life and, more generally, at readers intellectually similar to
them %he mem#ers of this circle were radical #ut de(out ,hristians %hey
(alued reason and were sympathetic to ,artesian philosophy ' argue,
against scholars li"e Shmueli, that Spinoza did not wish to conceal his
(iews from these radical #ut de(out friends 'nstead, he wished to persuade
them of the truth of his system #y starting with ,artesian principles that
they would accept readily ' also consider why Spinoza confidently used
the geometrical method to con(ince his ,artesian friends, e(en though
!escartes himself, when as"ed to demonstrate his philosophy in the geo-
metrical manner, asserted that Ait cannot so con(eniently #e applied to
these metaphysical su#;ectsB 1 #uthor's (eplies to the Second Set of Ob)ections ,
A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8 ?5>85@+ 5554 *inally, ' demonstrate that the Ethics
does not always operate in the thin and impersonal air of deduction from
6 ,urley 15=//+ 04 also asserts that the Ethics has its starting point in ,artesian
philosophy
'n explicating Spinoza's philosophy, his method is Ato start from the philosophy of
!escartes
and to see how far the central themes of the Ethics can #e deri(ed from critical
reflection
on the ,artesian systemB As noted a#o(e, howe(er, he argues that the geometrical
method
concealed this dialogue Jo(el 15=/=+ 5034 asserts, #ut does not de(elop in the way that
'
do, the point that Spinoza Aclearly ta"es into consideration his audience and its point of
departureB *urthermore, Jo(el also claims that this audience consists of ,artesians Ce
asserts that Athe first ele(en propositions address proponents of the Iew :hilosophy in a
tacit effortFpolemical and didacticFto draw them away from !escartes and toward
Spi-
noza's positionB 1i#id4
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self-e(ident first principles 't shows many traces of Spinoza's effort to
engage the opinions, difficulties, and emotions of his intended audience
,onse&uently, some of the nongeometrical portions of the Ethics are rhe-
torically aimed at managing its readers' emotional responses to the most
distur#ing parts of the text, so that these responses will not interfere with
their a#ility to attend rationally to the tra;ectory of the argument
The Geometrical Method and the Causal ecessity o! ature
'n its ideal form, the geometrical method deduces theorems rigorously,
without appeal to outside concepts, from axioms concei(ed as necessary
truths that are disco(ered #y reason 'n this way, the Ethics is an example
of Aristotelian epistNmN %his type of "nowledge is discussed in the Pos%
terior #nalytics , especially the first #oo" Ho#in Smith 15==6+ 834 explains
that epistNmN Ais a #ody of "nowledge a#out some su#;ect, organized into
a system of proofs or demonstrations B and asserts that Aristotle's model for
such demonstrati(e "nowledge was Athe mathematical disciplines of arith-
metic and geometry, which in his time were already #eing presented as sys-
tematic series of deductions from #asic first principlesB Euclid's Elements
aspires to this ideal
!eduction, or syllogismos , is characterized #y Aristotle in the Prior #na%
lytics 1' 5, .8#5=G.2- 5=/8+ 824 as Aa discourse in which, certain things #eing
stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their
#eing soB 1emphasis added4 %he rele(ant point here is the necessity of
assenting to certain propositions on the #asis of the acceptance of others
Writing in the geometrical manner ma"es manifest that the nature of the
relationship #etween a set of premises and what follows from them is one
of logical necessity *urthermore, the logical necessity of the relationship
#etween premises and conclusions in Spinoza's geometrically ordered text
reflects the causal necessity actually present in nature Hather than #eing
poles apart, logic and the fa#ric of reality are in perfect harmony+ #ecause
of this actual causal necessity, deducti(e relationships represent real causal
relations %hat is, ;ust as the Ethics ' propositions a#out nature are the nec-
essary logical conse&uences of its premises a#out the nature of )od, so too
the constituents of the natural world itself are the necessary effects of the
di(ine first cause Logical necessity go(erns the construction of the text
#ecause causal necessity or determinism reigns in the actual world
,haracterized #y this all-per(ading determinism and an unflinching
naturalism, the cosmological framewor" of Spinoza's Ethics seems #lea"
and comfortless )od does not transcend nature, as he does in orthodox
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supernaturalist (iews, #ut is identified with the causal power of nature
Cuman #eings are parts of nature, su#;ect to its impersonal causal laws
and easily o(ercome and annihilated #y its immense, indifferent forces
Jet the goal of the Ethics is freedom 1 libertas 4 1E 6:raef4, which Spinoza
further &ualifies as #lessedness 1 beatitudo 4 1E 6:raef4 and sal(ation 1 salus 4
1E 6:8.S4 'n positing freedom as the goal of the Ethics , Spinoza might
seem to #e directing us to the Stoic ideal of freedom in a deterministic
uni(erse, namely, impertur#a#ility or atara*ia %his state is attained #y
retreating inward and resol(ing to care only for that which is directly in
our controlFour emotional reactions to whate(er fortune #rings our way
As ' explain later in the essay, Spinoza denies that we possess this "ind
of freedom As part of nature and su#;ect to its power, we cannot simply
choose to #e unpertur#ed #y the natural forces that threaten our li(es and
our happiness
'n what, then, does our freedom consist$ Spinoza's understanding of
#lessedness has much in common with Aristotle's conception of eudai-
monia, understood as flourishing through the perfected exercise of human
capacities But how is flourishing possi#le in Spinoza's deterministic, indif-
ferent uni(erse$ *urthermore, what is the relationship #etween a method
that mirrors the causal determinism of nature, on the one hand, and the
happiness of finite creatures necessarily su#;ect to pitiless fortune, on the
other$
Spinoza's ethical teaching for the achie(ement of human freedom is
de(eloped in :arts 0 to 6 of the Ethics %his teaching, preceded #y an
account of the nature of )od in :art 5 and of the human mind in :art ., has
three distinct elements %he first, de(eloped in :art 8 of the Ethics , start-
ing at E 8:5/S, is practical+ it consists of rational principles for the self-
interested regulation of our conduct and our relationships with others %he
second element is therapeutic+ it indicates how one might #e less trou#led
#y distur#ing emotions :resupposing the analysis of emotion in :arts 0
and 8 of the Ethics , it is de(eloped in :art 6 of the Ethics from its #eginning
to E 6:.2 %he third element might #e called soteriological, #ecause it
completes the ethical pro;ect #y pointing the way to the highest form of
#lessedness or sal(ation 't follows the therapeutic sections of :art 6 of the
Ethics Bearing these elements in mind, let us re(iew the fi(e parts of the
Ethics in order to see the place of the ethical teaching in the geometrical
ordering of the wor" as a whole
:art 5 of the Ethics esta#lishes the relationship of )od to nature )od
necessarily exists, or existence follows necessarily from his nature 1E 5:554
)od is the only su#stance 1E 5:584, and e(erything is in )od 1E 5:564
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Eind and matter are attri#utes of )od 1E .:5, .4 Whate(er is, is in )od
Iothing can #e or #e concei(ed of without )od 1E 5:564 %hat is, all the
finite things of ordinary experience, ta#les and chairs, dogs and trees,
human minds and #odies, are modes of )od :art 5 also argues for com-
plete determinism )od is the immanent cause 1 causa immanens 4 of all things
1 omnium rerum 4 1E 5:5/4 Cis actions are not the result of the free choice of a
will exempt from causal determination #ut, instead, follow from the inner
causal necessity of his nature 1E 5:534 %here is no contingency 1E 5:.=4
,onse&uently, the freedom possi#le in this uni(erse must #e understood
#y Spinoza in compati#ilist terms+ a thing is free if it is exempt, not from
all causal determination #ut only from determination #y causes external to
it ,ompati#ilist freedom is the expression of the inner causal necessity of
a thing's nature without external causal determination )od is free in this
sense+ #ecause there is nothing external to him, his actions follow from his
nature alone :art 5 also esta#lishes that )od's essence is causal power Ce
is the power #y which all things exist and act 1E 5:084
All finite things are determinate or limited expressions of )od's infinite
power 1E 5:.6,4 %his esta#lishes a dispositionalist ontology of power-
ful particulars or finite things endowed with determinate causal powers
and capacities 1E 5:0>4 Because )od's actions are not exempt from inner
causal determination, neither are the actions of finite things %heir free-
dom, therefore, must also #e a freedom from external causal determina-
tion %he pro;ect of the Ethics , then, is to show how freedom from exter-
nal constraint is possi#le for finite things, although, unli"e )od, they are
enmeshed in the we# of uni(ersal determinism
:art 5 ends with an appendix which clearly delimits the exiguous space
within which Spinoza must construct his ethical teaching aimed at human
freedom 't ma"es these limits clear #y explicitly stating some of the conse-
&uences of this complete determinism *ree will, understood as complete
freedom from all causal determination, is once again denied *urther-
more, the existence of a pro(idential order directing all things for the good
of human"ind is re;ected Iormati(e terms such as good and evil , beauty and
ugliness , order and disorder are asserted to express human su#;ecti(e e(alua-
tions of what is useful or pleasing As such, they do not apply o#;ecti(ely or
a#solutely to )od or nature 1E 5A4
> Spinoza defines attri#utes as Awhat the intellect percei(es of a su#stance, as
constituting
its essenceB 1E 5!ef84 )od is Aa su#stance consisting of infinite attri#utes, each of
which
expresses a certain eternal and infinite essenceB 1E 5:554
3 %he term powerful particulars is from the wor" of Hom CarrL and Edward Eadden
15=36+ 64,
who argue, contrary to Cumean s"epticism, for the attri#ution of causal powers to
material
things
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'n summary, :art 5 esta#lishes that, contrary to Aristotle, we can expect
the same precision in moral philosophy as in mathematics #ecause the
entire uni(erse is to #e understood as the necessary expression of the self-
caused di(ine power Iothing is exempt from this immanent necessity
%he fact that all things follow with a#solute necessity from the nature of
)od means that we need not #e content with reaching conclusions that are
Aonly for the most part trueB Cuman #eings and their #eha(ior can, and
should, #e treated in the geometrical manner #ecause e(erything follows
from )od as the self-caused, first cause 't is #ecause of its assertion of
uni(ersal determinism that Spinoza's Ethics , unli"e Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics , is demonstrated in the geometrical order
:art . of the Ethics denies that the human mind and #ody can inter-
act with each other Eind and #ody are causally closed systems 1E .:64
Bodies are extended things 1E .!54 Bodily powers and capacities are
descri#ed in terms of the laws of mechanical physics, such as the law of
inertia, which Spinoza #riefly outlines in the :hysical !igression of :art .,
following E .:50 %he mind, on the other hand, is understood in terms
of intentionality+ it is essentially directed at an o#;ect, the human #ody
1E .:55G504 'ntentionality is as genuine a feature of the world as inertia
But this does not mean that mind and #ody are metaphysically separate
su#stances 1E 5:52S4, as they are for !escartes 1 "editations on +irst Philoso%
phy , A% M''+ 3/G3=- 5=/8+ 684 %he "ey to the relationship #etween mind
and #ody is Spinoza's su#stance monism Eind and #ody are attri#utes of
the one su#stance, understood as causal power %hey are the same causal
power differently expressed 1E .:34 or, in !a(idsonian terms, under irre-
duci#ly different descriptions 1see !a(idson 5=/24 %his explains the con-
sonance of logic and the fa#ric of reality Eind mirrors the physical world
%he logical necessity of the geometrical method models the causal neces-
sity of the world %he unity and order of the world can #e captured in a
unified and ordered system of propositions that ha(e #een deduced from
first principles #ecause the world it represents is the necessary conse&uence
of )od's self-caused nature
:art 0 of the Ethics de(elops the doctrine of the conatus 1from the Latin
(er# conor , meaning to endea(or4 %his doctrine is found in the wor" of
!escartes, Co##es, and, ultimately, the Stoics 't refers to the stri(ing,
not necessarily conscious, of all finite things in the world to perse(ere in
their existence 1E 0:>4 %he law of inertia is an instance of this stri(ing
Because each finite thing is defined in terms of its continued effort to per-
sist as a powerful particular with a repertoire of characteristic capacities
and the acti(ities which express them, this stri(ing constitutes its essence
1E 0:34 %he goal of Spinoza's ethical teaching is to preser(e and enhance
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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human #eings' power to perse(ere in existence and express their character-
istic capacities in acti(ity %his enhancement of power entails an increase
in freedom, insofar as freedom is understood in the compati#ilist sense of
inner as opposed to external causal determination %he more the conatus is
expressed, the less the indi(idual suffers external constraint %his increase
in freedom is e&ually what Spinoza means #y #lessedness Cere is where a
comparison with Aristotle's doctrine of eudaimonia is most rele(ant+ finite
things flourish when they exercise their capacities in the #est possi#le way
According to Spinoza, they do this when they are undiminished #y exter-
nal forces
Io finite thing can achie(e the a#solute freedom that )od en;oys,
namely, that of completely internal determination )od is a#solutely
free, his actions following from his nature alone, #ecause there is nothing
external to him to constrain him 'n contrast, #y the definition of fini-
tude 1E 5!.4, there is necessarily always something external to a finite
thing that might constrain it All finite #eings are externally determined
to some extent 1E 5!., E 5:./4 %hey are not the whole of )od or nature
#ut merely a part of it Cowe(er, the doctrine of the conatus implies that,
though ine(ita#ly mo(ed to some extent #y the other parts of nature, each
finite thing has its own powers and capacities Although all finite things
are passi(ely determined #y other finite things 1E 5:./4, the immanence
of )od's power in nature endows all things with their own intrinsic acti(e
powers and capacities 1E 5:5/, E .:86S4
%hus, finite things must #e understood in terms of two distinct lines of
causation, which we might respecti(ely call the mechanical and the free
%hese two lines of causation correspond to the two ways in which nature
is to #e understood Spinoza gi(es these the Latin names, natura naturata
1nature natured or nature as passi(e4 and natura naturans 1nature naturing or
nature as acti(e4 1E 5:.=S4 Iatura naturata is the infinite series of external
causes that #ear down on each finite indi(idual Iatura naturans is the set
of intrinsic causal capacities that each indi(idual possesses #ecause it is an
expression of )od's internally determined causal power Although there is
no respite from necessary determination, freedom consists in diminishing
the causal power of natura naturata and enhancing that of natura natu-
rans %he practical, therapeutic, and soteriological elements of the Ethics
in(estigate the ways in which this enhancement and diminution can #e
performed #y the indi(idual and coordinated powers of human #eings
/ Sa(an 15=/>+ 5264 refers to these two lines of causality as the Atopographic axisB and
the
Aradial axisB
= ,urley's translation lea(es these terms in the Latin
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:oetics %oday ./+0
:art 0 of the Ethics analyzes the emotions 1 affectus 4 2 %hey are not,
strictly spea"ing, powers themsel(es #ut increases or diminutions in the
powers of acting that characterize the essence of human #eings 1E 0!04
Spinoza defines and classifies all emotions in these terms Ooy, for example,
is defined as an increase in our essential capacities to act, sadness as a dimi-
nution of these capacities 1E 0:55S4
%he :reface to :art 0 asserts that emotions are to #e treated geometri-
cally #ecause they are go(erned #y a strict necessity 1E 0:raef4 Iature is
always the same, #ecause the laws that go(ern natural powers are unchang-
ing 1E 0:raef4 As human #eings are finite parts of nature, the powers that
constitute the essence of human nature, and their increase and diminution,
are su#;ect to these unchanging laws 1E 0:raef4
Being part of nature and su#;ect to its immense forces, we are, in Spi-
noza's words, Adri(en a#out in many ways #y external causes li"e wa(es
on the sea, dri(en #y contrary winds, we toss a#out, not "nowing our out-
come and fateB 1E 0:6=S4 Against this sea of forces, the ethical teaching
endea(ors to enhance our intrinsic causal powers as much as possi#le Spi-
noza identifies (irtue with power or acting from the laws of one's nature
rather than #eing determined #y external causes 1E 8!/4 %he good is
whate(er promotes this 1E 8!54 Spinoza is, therefore, an ethical natural-
ist+ normati(e terms such as virtue and the good are ultimately reduced to
natural properties understood in terms of essential power
:art 8 explores the impediments to the exercise of our powers Io finite
thing is so powerful that the powers of nature outside it cannot dominate
and destroy it 1E 8Ax54 We cannot step outside of nature and #ecome
a#solutely self-determining 1E 8:., 84 Kur own internal acti(e power is
limited and Ainfinitely surpassed #y the power of external causesB 1E 8:04
Cuman agency, then, can ne(er #e exercised in complete independence of
the mechanistic, external determination of natura naturata %he practical
element of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect responds to the ine(ita#le external
determination of human agency with a Baconian pro;ect of putting the
understanding of nature in the ser(ice of controlling nature Iatura natu-
rata is to #e understood and o#eyed so that it might #e commanded 'f
nature's laws are understood, they can #e managed and exploited in order
to minimize the powers of the mechanical series that threaten human free-
dom and to harness and amplify those that enhance it Oust as the geome-
ter deduces the properties of geometrical figures from their definitions,
so too Spinoza deduces the laws of material and social engineering from
52 ,urley translates this term as AaffectB
55 Bacon writes that Awe cannot command nature except #y o#eying herB 1 New
Organon ,
Aphorism 5.=- 5=>2+ 55=4
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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the concept of )od or nature 'n this respect, the geometrical method
is in the ser(ice of the practical pro;ect of controlling natura naturata
*or example, in the :hysical !igression, which considers natura naturata
under the attri#ute of extension, we find laws that go(ern the interactions
of material #odies, such as the law of inertia 1E .L04 %he material world
can #e managed #y using these laws to create de(ices that channel nature's
physical forces Kptical lenses, for example, ground #y Spinoza to earn
his li(ing, ma"e use of the law of refraction to enhance our (isual powers
#y focusing light 'n the same way, the Ethics unco(ers laws that go(ern
human interaction *or example, E 8:0.G:08 demonstrate the power of
emotion to create social conflict and strife, E 8:06 the power of reason to
create harmony E 8:5/S demonstrates that cooperation with other ratio-
nal people coordinates and concentrates human powers, ma"ing each per-
son stronger than he or she would #e alone Knce these laws are "nown,
they can #e used to encourage and create social practices and institutions
that enhance freedom %he institution of marriage, for example, ser(es this
end when those who enter into it are rational 1E 8:>/S4 *urthermore, on
the #asis of the ad(antages of cooperation, E 8:03S. ad(ances a contract
theory of the state
%he therapeutic element of Spinoza's ethical teaching is grounded
in a theory of the emotions that has strong affinities with that of Oohn
Searle 15==/+ ==ff4 Emotions and desires in(ol(e propositionally consti-
tuted #eliefs a#out the world %hat is, they include propositional attitudes
or statements a#out the world, which are either true or false Lo(e, for
example, in(ol(es the ;udgment that some external cause is responsi#le
for an increase in one's power 1E 0A>4, hate in(ol(es the ;udgment that
an external cause is responsi#le for its decrease 1E 0A34 We can alter our
emotions #y analyzing and re(ising their propositional content, replacing
false #eliefs with true ones %hese true #eliefs are the results of the demon-
strations of the geometrical method Cere is an example of an emotional
state altered #y ha(ing true #eliefs as its content+ hatred of a particular
person will #e dissipated if his or her actions are seen as the product of infi-
nite chains of necessity rather than as wholly caused #y his or her male(o-
lent and free will 1E 6:.4 %his, in turn, reinforces the social engineering
pro;ect+ if our hatred and anger are diminished, so too are their corrosi(e
social conse&uences We are, then, less trou#led #y distur#ing emotions,
emotionally and practically, when we understand the world in the geomet-
rical mannerFas go(erned #y a causal necessity grounded in the nature
of )od Because understanding the necessity that go(erns nature ma"es
our emotions less trou#lesome, understanding in the geometrical man-
ner is itself a form of therapy %his therapy has strong affinities with the
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:oetics %oday ./+0
Stoic pro;ect of amending our emotions #y correcting the ;udgments they
in(ol(e We do this #y replacing false, unrealistic ;udgments with ;udg-
ments that accurately represent the necessity that go(erns all things
%he third element of the ethical teaching is soteriological, #ecause it
points the way to the final and highest stage of freedom, #lessedness or
sal(ation %his soteriological element is moti(ated in part #y Spinoza's
recognition of the limitations of the practical and therapeutic elements As
concerns the former, no matter how s"illed and powerful our material and
social engineering, we can master neither nature nor oursel(es entirely
Although we might defend and increase our capacities, we can ne(er fully
extricate oursel(es from the causal we# of nature in which we, as finite
#eings, are enmeshed E(ery finite thing, including an indi(idual person
or an entire society, is a part of nature and necessarily su#;ect to its forces
1E 8Ax54 As for the therapeutic aspect, e(en if all of our #eliefs are true
descriptions of nature, we will sometimes #e unhappy, #ecause, as finite
parts of nature, we are necessarily (ulnera#le to that which is external to
our own indi(idual #eing
Spinoza, therefore, finds the Stoic position unrealistic in that it asserts
that our emotions Adepend entirely on our will, and that we command
them a#solutelyB 1E 6:raef4 Spinoza denies that we ha(e such complete
control o(er our emotionsFAexperience cries out against thisB 1E 6:raef4
*or Spinoza, the necessity that go(erns all things ma"es this ideal of a#so-
lute control impossi#le Ooy necessarily follows upon the increase of our
power, sorrow upon its decrease Although emotions can #e made less dis-
tur#ing when we re(ise their propositional content to reflect accurately the
causal order, we could no more free oursel(es of them completely than
we could ta"e oursel(es outside of nature We will always #e emotionally
affected #y the external Cuman #eings and their emotions are not exempt
from the laws of nature While the Stoic (iew implies that human #eings
are somehow outside of nature and not su#;ect to its laws, Spinoza's posi-
tion is more modest We can ma"e our emotions less painful and socially
corrosi(e #y ma"ing the ;udgments they in(ol(e more realistic We can-
not, howe(er, control them completely Io one is exempt from necessity
All things follow necessarily from the di(ine nature 1E 5:5>4 %his is why
SpinozaF#ut not the StoicFconsiders human nature in the geometrical
manner
Still, we can increase our acti(ity and freedom, e(en when threatened
#y the forces of nature arrayed against us, #y the acti(ity of understand-
ing itself when it is determined #y causes internal, rather than external,
to us %he possi#ility of this "ind of understanding is rooted in Spinoza's
epistemological distinction #etween ideas that are ade&uate, or complete
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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and perfect, and ideas that are inade&uate, or incomplete and imperfect
1E .!ef8, :.=4 We ha(e inade&uate ideas insofar as we are part of natura
naturata or finite parts of the infinite series of external causes %he ideas of
sensation and imagination fall into this category, #ecause they arise from
#odies external to our #ody that affect our organs of sensation 1E .:.=S,
:82S.4 'magining and sensing, therefore, cannot #e the source of freedom
from external determination ,onse&uently, we are not free when we sense
and imagine Kn the other hand, in forming ade&uate ideas, the mind
turns in on itself 't experiences itself as natura naturans, there#y consider-
ing the causal power of )od immanent in it 1E .:03, 0/4 'n understanding
ade&uately, therefore, the mind is internally determined ,onse&uently,
the acti(ity of understanding #y means of ade&uate ideas increases our
freedom
Spinoza posits two ways of ade&uately or perfectly and completely
understanding nature 1E .:82S., E .:854 %he first, reason, deri(es Acom-
mon notions and ade&uate ideas of the properties of thingsB 1E .:82S.4
from reflection on )od's immanent causal power 1E .:0/,, 0=, 0=,4 't is,
therefore, the source of the deducti(e inferences of the geometrical method
that mo(e from propositions a#out the nature of )od to propositions a#out
all things in nature %his means that reasoning #y means of the geomet-
rical method in and of itself increases freedom #ecause it is an inwardly
determined acti(ity
Heason is also the source of the "nowledge of the laws of nature upon
which rests the practical Baconian pro;ect of the control of nature+ while
the causal interchanges of finite things cannot #e ade&uately "nown indi-
(idually, or one #y one, #ecause the mechanical series to which they
#elong extends to infinity, the laws which descri#e them can #e ade&uately
"nown %his is #ecause these laws descri#e actions which are expressions
of the causal powers common to all finite things as determinations of the
same attri#ute of )od )i(en, howe(er, that the "nowledge of these laws is
an inwardly determined acti(ity and there#y increases freedom, it is also,
apart from the program of controlling nature, an end in itself
%he other way of ade&uately understanding the necessity of nature is
intuiti(e science 1 scientia intuitiva 4 %his "ind of understanding is intuiti(e
in the philosophical sense of direct or unmediated 't is defined as "nowl-
edge that Aproceeds from an ade&uate idea of the formal essence of cer-
tain attri#utes of )od to the ade&uate "nowledge of the essence of thingsB
1E .:82S.4 %his definition is misleading if one fails to ta"e the immanence
of the di(ine into account+ the word proceeds implies inference from one
5. ,urley translates scientia intuitiva as Aintuiti(e "nowledgeB 1Spinoza 5==8+ E
.:82S.4
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:oetics %oday ./+0
proposition to another rather than immediate intuition 'ntuiti(e science,
howe(er, is the understanding that the essence of )od, expressed as it is
#y the attri#utes of thought and extension, and the essence of things are
not ontologically distinct #ut one 't does not, therefore, mo(e discursi(ely
from one discrete idea to another, as reason does when it deduces the exis-
tence and properties of all finite things and the laws that go(ern them from
the nature of )od and his attri#utes 'nstead, it immediately percei(es the
identity of nature and )od in one act of mental (ision 't is the immediate
insight that the world and all things in it are di(ine 't consists, therefore, in
a shift in mental perspecti(e away from #oth sensation and the deductions
of reason %he di(ine causal essence is directly apprehended as it is imma-
nent in each finite mode 'nfinity, as it were, is seen in a grain of sand
'n summary, we sense insofar as our organs of sensation are affected #y
#odies outside us We reason insofar as we infer conclusions from premises
%he geometrical method deduces the immanence of )od in nature from
the di(ine nature, for example, in E 5:5/ 'ntuiti(e science, #y contrast,
directly intuits the presence of the di(ine in the finite While distinct from
reason, intuiti(e science can arise from it 't cannot, howe(er, arise from
imagination or opinion 1E 6:./4 When we achie(e this inwardly caused
intuition of the di(ine in the finite, we are at the height of our power ,on-
se&uently, we experience the greatest well-#eing possi#le Spinoza, accord-
ingly, refers to intuiti(e science as the highest (irtue 1E 6:.64 't completes
the soteriological element of Spinoza's ethical teaching and is the final and
highest stage of freedom
't is not, therefore, per(ersely misguided to consider the conditions of
our well-#eing in the geometrical manner Eirroring the causal necessity
of nature, the geometrical method is essential to #oth the practical and
the therapeutic elements of Spinoza's ethical pro;ect for the achie(ement
of human freedom %he propositions it deduces from the nature of )od
#oth inform the physical and social engineering pro;ects in the practical
element and replace the unrealistic propositional contents of distur#ing
emotions in the therapeutic element %he geometrical method is e&ually
essential to the soteriological element, where Spinoza's ultimate answer to
the &uestion of how we should li(e lies in the life of the mind Pnderstand-
ing #y means of ade&uate ideas is a free and inwardly determined acti(ity
that is possi#le e(en in the face of the destructi(e powers of nature %he
geometrical method is an instance of one form of ade&uate understanding,
reason 't leads to the second, intuiti(e science
50 See Bla"e's #uguries of ,nnocence 15=/.+ 8=24
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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The Geometrical Method and the Dialectical Aspect o! the Ethics
Ca(ing explained the role that the geometrical method plays in the prac-
tical, the therapeutic, and the soteriological elements of Spinoza's ethical
teaching, we can now turn to consider the method in the light of the dia-
lectical aspect of the Ethics Aristotle states in his Topics 1' 5, 522a.6G024
that dialectical arguments persuade an audience #y arguing on the #asis
of propositions that would #e persuasi(e to it 15=/8+ 5>>4 %his aspect of
the Ethics #ecomes clear when we consider its intended audience and the
circumstances of its composition
As Iadler 15===+ 5=0G=84 tells us in his #iography, Spinoza was far from
#eing the solitary recluse he was depicted as #eing in older #iographies
Ce was, instead, the leader of a group of philosophical friends %heologi-
cally, these friends were radical #ut de(out :rotestants- philosophically,
they were ,artesians 'n late 5>>. or early 5>>0, he sent to these friends
portions of the Ethics as he wrote them, in(iting their &uestions and com-
ments 1i#id+ .2.4 %hese philosophical readers were the ideal audience
for the geometrically structured Ethics !isciplined #y the careful study of
,artesian philosophy, they were capa#le of following a difficult argument
where(er it would lead and accepting the truth of distur#ing ideas if they
were rigorously demonstrated Being committed to the mechanical (iew of
nature articulated in !escartes's Principles 15=/6 ?5>88@4, they were capa#le
of forming the ade&uate ideas of reason descri#ed a#o(e
,onse&uently, ,urley's 15=//+ xi4 assertion that the geometrical method
conceals and was, perhaps, partly designed to conceal the dialogue Spi-
noza was conducting with the philosophy of !escartes cannot #e accepted
Spinoza does not intend the geometrical method to conceal his philosophy
from his ,artesian readers #ut to con(ince them of its truth #y the force of
argument Kn the other hand, the geometrical method would #e unsuit-
a#le for those who form their ideas mainly through sensation and imagi-
nation and whose emotions ha(e these inade&uate ideas as their proposi-
tional content 'n this respect, we can contrast the geometrical method of
the Ethics with the narrati(e style of the Theologico%Political Treatise %he
latter is directed at those who form their ideas #y means of sensation and
imagination and must #e persuaded #y means directed at these faculties
Spinoza was well aware of how contro(ersial his philosophy was and
careful a#out those with whom he shared it 1Iadler 5===+ .884 'ts doc-
trine of the immanence of )od re;ects the personal, transcendent )od
of orthodox religion 1see, for example, E 5A4 'n conse&uence, orthodox
58 %his difference #etween the two texts is discussed in Jo(el 5=/=+ esp 5./G6.
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:oetics %oday ./+0
religious authorities would li"ely suppress it *or these reasons, Strauss and
Shmueli assert that Spinoza wished to conceal his (iews ,onsideration
of the Ethics ' ideal reader and the rigorous demands that the geometrical
method places on reason, howe(er, clarifies Spinoza's intentions %he geo-
metrical method is meant to "eep potentially hostile readers, whose ideas
come from sensation and imagination, from e(er "nowing the true content
of his philosophical system Headers cannot #e angered #y ideas they ha(e
not encountered %he orthodox cannot suppress ideas of which they are
unaware Spinoza's ideal reader can #e persuaded of the truth of his sys-
tem #y the rigor of the Ethics ' geometrical demonstrations %he reader who
forms ideas from sensation and imagination, orthodox religious authorities
included, would find the geometrical presentation an impenetra#le #ar-
rier to e(er learning its content *ollowing its deduction re&uires rational
powers that they do not possess
Spinoza had nothing to fear within his closed circle of friends Ce
expected the geometrical method to engage them rationally Ie(ertheless,
while the ,artesian system, which they accepted, could easily coexist with
their li#eral yet de(out ,hristianity, the philosophy of the Ethics would con-
flict with it *urthermore, although the Ethics would stri"e them as shoc"-
ingly unorthodox in some respects, it would seem distur#ingly reactionary
in others Kn the one hand, Spinoza's pantheism would push their ,hris-
tianity, howe(er radical, #eyond the #rea"ing point %he transcendent cre-
ator )od of the ,artesian system would ha(e to #e replaced with a )od
understood as the causal power immanent in nature Kn the other hand,
Spinoza's understanding of finite indi(idual things as powerful particulars
would seem to these same readers to reinstate the late medie(al doctrine
of su#stantial forms that !escartes tried to o(ercome once and for all As
a result, the mem#ers of Spinoza's circle might find his philosophy #oth
radical and retrograde %hat this would ma"e con(incing them a difficult
challenge explains the dialectical necessity of #eginning the Ethics with
,artesian principles they would accept Ea"ing this clear re&uires a #rief
outline of the ,artesian system
The Cartesian System
'n the ,artesian system, )od is the necessarily existing transcendent cre-
ator and preser(er of nature 1 Principles of Philosophy : 5Art58, A% M'''A+
52G55 - !escartes 5=/6+ 5=3- : 5Art.5, A% M'''A+ 50- !escartes 5=/6+ .224
56 Heferences to the Principles follow the following pattern+ : < Principles 15, ., 0, 8,
etc <
:art 5, ., 0, etc4- Art < Article
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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Hadically free, )od's will is determined #y nothing %he world is the way
it is #ecause of the free choice of the di(ine will E(en the laws of mathe-
matics could ha(e #een otherwise if he had so chosen 1Letter to Eersenne,
April 56, 5>02, A% '+ 58>- !escartes 5==5+ .04
%he created world consists of two metaphysically separate su#stancesF
mind and matter 1 Principles : 5Art/, A% M'''A+ 3G/- 5=/6+ 5=64 %he essence
of mind is thought 1 Principles : 5Art/G=, A% M'''A+ 3G/- 5=/6+ 5=64 Will
is a mode of thought 1 Principles : 5Art0., A% M'''A+ 53G5/- 5=/6+ .284
Cuman #eings possess free will 1 Principles : 5Art03, 0=, A% M'''A+ 5/G.2-
5=/6+ .26G>4 'n the freedom of their will, human #eings resem#le )od
1 "editations , A% M''+ 63G6/- 5=/8+ 824 As the perceptions of the human
intellect are limited, it is finite %he will, on the other hand, is a pri(ileged
faculty Asince we o#ser(e without exception that its scope extends to any-
thing that can possi#ly #e an o#;ect of any other willFe(en the immeasur-
a#le will of )odB 1 Principles : 5Art06, A% M'''A+ 5/G5=- 5=/6+ .284
%he essence of matter is geometrical extension 1 Principles : .Art8, A%
M'''A+ 8.G80- 5=/6+ ..84 !aniel )ar#er 15==.+ =6G55>4 explains that this
account of matter is grounded in a re;ection of the Scholastic notion of
su#stantial forms as the ultimate explanatory principle of the #eha(ior of
natural su#stances Such notions, according to !escartes, are without any
explanatory force Substantial form is merely a term for the un"nown cause
of a percei(ed property !escartes understands hea(iness or gra(ity as the
premier example of a su#stantial form, descri#ing it as Aa (irtue or &uality
5> 'n a letter to Hegius, !escartes characterizes su#stantial forms as principles
Aintroduced
#y philosophers solely to account for the proper actions of natural thingsB 1%o Hegius,
Oanu-
ary 5>8., A% '''+ 62>G/- 5==5+ .2/4 %his doctrine is expressed, for example, in the
assertion
in the ,oim#rian ,ommentaries that Athere are indi(idual and particular #eha(iors ?
func%
tiones @ appropriate to each indi(idual natural thing these #eha(iors do not arise
from
matter alone which has no power to #ring anything a#out %hus, they must arise
from the su#stantial formB 1&uoted in )ar#er 5==.+ =>4 %his doctrine is ultimately con-
nected to certain Aristotelian notions 'n the Physics , Aristotle asserts that things
existing #y
nature ha(e in themsel(es a principle of motion and standing still Iature is an acti(e
realm
'ndi(idual natural things ha(e natures that are understood in terms of the causal powers
that
explain their acti(ities 1 Physics '' 5, 5=.#52G.6- 5=/8+ 0.=4 %he su#lunary elements,
earth,
air, fire, and water, are understood in terms of their dispositions to mo(e to certain
natural
places 1 On !eneration and -orruption '' 5G8, 0./#.2G005#06- 5=/8+ 60/G8.4 'n On
the .eavens 1'
5G0, .>/#52G.32#024, Aristotle 15=/8+ 883G654 asserts that, while simple #odies
composed of
these elements possess a principle of rectilinear motion in their own nature, hea(enly
#odies
composed of the fifth element, ether, naturally mo(e in circles
53 !escartes asserts that Ano natural action at all can #e explained #y these su#stantial
forms, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand
them themsel(esB 1%o Hegius, Oanuary 5>8., A% '''+ 62>G/- 5==5+ .2/4 Ce also claims
that
when philosophers explain an action as proceeding from a su#stantial form, they are
merely
asserting that Ait proceeds from something they do not understandB 1%o Hegius, Oanuary
5>8., A% '''+ 62>G/- 5==5+ .2/4
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8>.
:oetics %oday ./+0
inherent in e(ery #ody we call hea(y, which ma"es it tend towards the cen-
tre of the earthB 1%o Eersenne, 50 Ouly, 5>0/, A% ''+ ..0G.8- 5==5+ 555G5.4
'nstead of resorting to such o#scure and empty explanations, !escartes
proposes a reduction of all physical explanation to the di(ision and motion
of matter understood as extension 1 Principles : .Art.0, A% M'''A+ 6.G60-
5=/6+ .0.G004 )ra(ity, for example, is explained #y the downward pres-
sure of particles dri(en #y the motion of the (ortices 1 Principles : 8Art.2G
.3, A% M'''A+ .5.G5>- 5=/6+ .>/G324
Because matter is nothing #ut inert extension, the primary cause of
motion in the created world is )od When )od created the world from
which he remains transcendent, he made all of the matter in it and set it
in motion Ce now preser(es what he originally created Because )od is
perfect, he operates in a manner that is constant and unchanging ,on-
se&uently, he preser(es the exact amount of motion he conferred on the
material world at the moment of creation 1 Principles : .Art0>, A% M'''A+
>5- 5=/6+ .824 Since this &uantity is conser(ed, mo(ing #odies can always
#e expected to mo(e in certain ways *or example, a #ody will not acceler-
ateFslow down, speed up, stop, or change directionFunless there is trans-
ference of motion #etween it and another #ody *urthermore, when two
#odies collide, they might transfer motion one to the other, #ut the sum of
motion after the collision must e&ual the sum of motion #efore Accord-
ingly, !escartes first deri(es three laws of nature from the immuta#ility of
)od's preser(ation of the amount of motion in the created material world+
a law of inertia 1 Principles : .Art03, A% M'''A+ >.G>0- 5=/6+ .82G854, a law
of rectilinear motion 1 Principles : .Art0=, A% M'''A+ >0G>8- 5=/6+ .85G
8.4, and a law of collision 1 Principles : .Art82, A% M'''A+ >6- 5=/6+ .8.4
%hese are followed #y se(en laws, e&ually grounded in this conser(ation of
motion, go(erning the direction and speed of #odies after impact 1 Principles
: .Art8>G6., A% M'''A+ >/G32- 5=/6+ .864
'n summary, !escartes #anishes su#stantial forms from his physics in
his campaign to o(ercome the explanatory o#scurity of Scholastic philoso-
phy Ce asserts that matter is inert, passi(e extension A material #ody can-
not mo(e itself or change its state of motion or rest Knly #eings endowed
with minds are to #e understood as acti(e )od initiates motion in matter
5/ According to the ,om#rians, ASince hea(y and light things tend toward their natural
places, though a#sent from that which produces them, they must necessarily ha(e #een
gi(en some means ? instrumentum @ that remains with them #y (irtue of which they are
mo(ed
But this can only #e their su#stantial form and what follows from it, hea(iness and
lightnessB
1&uoted in )ar#er 5==.+ =>4
5= !escartes does refer to forces or powers 1(is4 of #odies to act on or resist the action
of
other #odies as one of the factors determining the outcome of collisions 1 Principles :
.Art80,
A% M'''A+ >>G>/- 5=/6+ .80G884 Westfall 15=35+ 6.=4 remar"s that the term force
Aappears in
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
8>0
in the created uni(erse as a whole Besides )od, finite human minds can
initiate motion in the human #odies to which they are attached 1 "edita%
tions , A% M''+ /8G/>- 5=/8+ 6/4 2 Because matter is the inert extension
of the geometers, in !escartes's hands physics is reduced to geometry
%he only principles re&uired or accepted in physics are Athose of geome-
try and pure mathematicsB 1 Principles : .Art>8, A% M'''A+ 3/- 5=/6+ .834
Scholastic o#scurity has #een replaced with the clarity and certainty of
mathematics
The Ethics !rom a Cartesian "erspecti#e
We ha(e seen that Spinoza asserts a ,artesian set of laws go(erning the
motions of material #odies Ce therefore accepts !escartes's physics at
the le(el of its description of phenomena+ ,artesian physics applies to
the causal interactions of the infinite series of finite #odies that consti-
tute natura naturata %his is #ecause the ,artesian account of matter as
passi(e extension is consistent with each part of natura naturata's #eing
causally influenced #y the infinitely many other finite parts of nature But
all finite things are products of two distinct lines of causation, natura natu-
rans as well as natura naturata By the causality of natura naturans, all
finite things, #oth minds and #odies, are endowed with causal powers and
capacities 1E 5:08, 0>4 %his explicitly contradicts the ,artesian account
of matter as passi(e extension, in which )od must impart motion to the
material world, which is then transferred from one #ody to another 'n a
letter to %schirnhaus, Spinoza explicitly criticizes !escartes's account of
matter as inert extension Ce writes that matter, defined #y !escartes as
extension, must, instead, #e defined #y an attri#ute which expresses an
eternal and infinite essence 1%o %schirnhaus, Letter /0, Ouly 56, 5>3>- Spi-
noza 5==8+ .36G3>4 What he means #y this is made clear in the Ethics
Eatter is an attri#ute of )od All things are in )od, who is their effi-
cient cause 1E 5:5>,.4 )od's power is his essence itself 1E 5:084 Whate(er
exists expresses this essence or power 1E 5:0>4 Eaterial #odies are not
inert and passi(e #ut acti(e expressions of the power of )od %hey are, as
we ha(e seen, powerful particulars
!escartes' writings in great profusionB and speculates that Apro#a#ly it was this fre&uent
use
which ga(e it general currency and led to its ultimate selection as the name of the
concept
central to dynamicsB !escartes's references to forces or powers, howe(er, seem &uite
incon-
sistent with his ontology of two created su#stances, matter, understood in terms of
passi(e,
inert extension, and acti(e mind *or a discussion of this issue and the secondary
literature
concerned with it, see )ar#er 5==.+ .=0G==
.2 )ar#er et al 15==/+ 6/24 point out that, Amore rarely,B #odies are animated #y the
minds
of angels
Page 22
8>8
:oetics %oday ./+0
Spinoza's understanding of #odies as powerful particulars was li"ely
to stri"e his ,artesian friends as a return to the explanatory o#scurity of
the Scholastic doctrine of su#stantial forms *urthermore, the doctrine of
su#stantial forms itself was associated with conser(ati(e ,al(inist forces
in !utch intellectual life As Iadler 15===+ 55.4 points out, ,artesianism
was lin"ed to the ideological di(isions of !utch society and had #een con-
demned #y more conser(ati(e ,al(inist leaders %he conser(ati(e rector
of the Pni(ersity of Ptrecht, Moetius, for one, was a strident critic of !es-
cartes's re;ection of su#stantial forms Ce wanted ,artesian philosophy
#anned from the uni(ersities Ce feared that the elimination of these tradi-
tional Aristotelian notions would undermine the foundations of traditional
Scholastic philosophy and education 1 Oolley 5==.+ 0=64 *urthermore, he
understood the doctrine of su#stantial forms to #e the necessary philo-
sophical underpinning of the notion of nature as pro(identially ordered
1(an Huler 5==6+ >4 Such contro(ersies would ha(e cemented the asso-
ciation #etween philosophical reaction and the doctrine of su#stantial
forms, thus sharpening the o#;ections of Spinoza's ,artesian friends to
that doctrine
While associated with reactionary ,al(inists, howe(er, Spinoza's doc-
trine of powerful particulars was pro#a#ly, on the other hand, more of
a reform of traditional religion than Spinoza's radical ,hristian friends
could easily accept Although they wanted to li#erate ,hristianity from
the rites and dogma of esta#lished religion, asserting that inner faith alone
was the source of sal(ation 1Iadler 5===+ 5824, they would #e reluctant to
dissol(e ,hristianity into naturalism and pantheism As Stephen )au"-
roger 1.22.+ 3>4 has pointed out, mechanism appealed to figures li"e Eer-
senne precisely #ecause it stripped nature of all acti(e power 'n doing
so, it reaffirmed )od's transcendence against the pantheism that seemed
to #e the ine(ita#le conclusion of Henaissance Aristotelian naturalism
%his naturalism endowed nature with so many acti(e powers that )od was
ine(ita#ly incorporated in it As such, Spinoza's philosophy would ha(e
had alarming resonances all around While it was too ,artesian for Moetius
and traditional educators, it was not sufficiently ,artesian for Spinoza's
immediate audience
Descartes on Method
%hus, Spinoza faced a formida#le challenge in persuading his audience
of ,artesian friends ,onsider what !escartes says a#out the geometrical
method When as"ed to demonstrate his philosophy in this manner, he
declares, Ait cannot #e so con(eniently applied to these metaphysical su#-
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
8>6
;ectsB 1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 5554 Why, then, does Spi-
noza choose the geometrical method in defiance of !escartes's expressed
reser(ations$ %o answer this &uestion, we must recall the reasons for !es-
cartes's restriction of the geometrical method
'n his /iscourse on the "ethod , !escartes contrasts the certainty of mathe-
matics with the dou#tful and disputatious nature of philosophy Ce argues
that the syllogism, the cornerstone of the method and logic of the medi-
e(al schools, is Aof less use for learning things than for explaining to others
the things one already "nows or e(en for spea"ing without ;udgement
a#out matters of which one is ignorantB 1 /iscourse on the "ethod of (ightly
-onducting One's (eason and See0ing the Truth in the Sciences A% M'+ 53G5=- 5=/6
?5>03@+ 55=4 %hat is, it is not useful for the disco(ery of new "nowledge
At #est it ser(es, insofar as it can display the systematic relations #etween
ideas, as a method for organizing, presenting, and explaining things already
"nown At worst, the historical authority of its Aristotelian origins con-
fers a spurious legitimacy on those with mere pretensions to "nowledge
'n contrast, the method of the geometers seemed a promising method
of disco(ery to !escartes, #ecause it ena#led the geometers to Aarri(e at
their most difficult demonstrationsB 1 /iscourse on the "ethod of (ightly -on%
ducting One's (eason and See0ing the Truth in the Sciences A% M', 5=G.2- 5=/6+
5.24 !escartes's Principles also seems to endorse the geometrical method
of deducing propositions from first principles Because the A"nowledge of
all other things depends on the "nowledge of )odB 1 Principles : 5Art50,
A% M'''A+ =G52- 5=/6+ 5=34, the explanation of created things should #e
deduced from "nowledge of )od 1 Principles : 5Art.8, A% M'''A+ 58G56-
5=/6+ .254 %his gi(es us the most perfect scientific "nowledge+ "nowledge
of effects through their causes 1 Principles : 5Art.8, A% M'''A+ 58G56- 5=/6+
.254 'n light of these passages, it appears that !escartes's endorsement of
the geometrical method is unrestricted ,onse&uently, Spinoza's use of it
in the Ethics seems appropriate, gi(en the ,artesian readers to whom the
wor" is directed
But !escartes's attitude to the form in which Euclid cast his wor" is not
so straightforward When as"ed in the Second Set of Ob)ections to demon-
strate his philosophy geometrically, he expresses his reluctance, ma"ing it
clear that his admiration for the method of ancient mathematicians is not
.5 !escartes is, in fact, s"eptical a#out the power of all forms of deduction to produce
new
"nowledge *or a discussion of this, see Cac"ing 5=/2 and )au"roger 5=/=+ esp 55>G
.> *or
a critical discussion of the standard understanding of the rationalist program as consist-
ing in an a priori deduction from first principles, see ,urley 5==. %he relation of the
first
principles of !escartes's metaphysics to the details of his natural philosophy is
discussed in
)au"roger .22.+ esp 5G05 and )ar#er 5==.+ esp 0=G63
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8>>
:oetics %oday ./+0
directed at the method of Euclid, which he considers to #e the method of
synthesis Ce descri#es this as an a posteriori method which demonstrates
conclusions #y means of Aa long series of definitions, postulates, axioms,
theorems and pro#lemsB 1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 552G
554 't does not, in his (iew, Aengage the minds of those who are eager to
learn, since it does not show how the thing in &uestion was disco(eredB
1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 5554 ,onse&uently, !escartes
prefers the method that he asserts is employed in the "editations Ce calls
this method analysis, descri#ing it as showing Athe true way #y means of
which the thing in &uestion was disco(ered methodically and as it were a
priori B 1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 566G6>- 5=/8+ 5524 %his method, there-
fore, can #e characterized, for purposes of understanding !escartes's atti-
tude toward the geometrical method, as a method of disco(ery, illustrated
#y the method of the "editations , which does not follow the Euclidean pro-
cedure of deducing conclusions from axioms, definitions, and so on 't
was so admired #y the ancients, he claims, that Athey "ept it to themsel(es
li"e a sacred mysteryB 1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 5554
!escartes actually diagnoses synthesis as ha(ing the same limitations
he has ascri#ed to the syllogisms of Scholastic philosophy Both are meth-
ods of demonstration and presentation, #ut neither can disco(er true first
.. *or a discussion of the terms a posteriori and a priori in this context, see note .0
#elow
%he translators' comment 1!escartes 5=/8+ 552n.4 pro(ides a useful gloss on the
historical
senses of these terms
.0 Apart from this, it is not at all clear what !escartes means #y the method of analysis
,oncerning the fact that !escartes refers to the method of the "editations as analytic,
,urley
15=/>+ 5604 asserts that Athere is no general agreementB a#out what this means and
concludes
that on the A,artesian proposition that disagreement indicates that no party to the
dispute
has "nowledge,B it follows that Awe must say that no one "nows, at this stage, what that
important fact meansB *or a list of the representati(e secondary literature dealing with
this
topic, see ,urley 5=/>+ 535n. !escartes complicates rather than clarifies the concept of
AanalysisB #y asserting that it proceeds a priori, while synthesis proceeds a posteriori 1
Second
Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 552G554, #ecause he seems to #e using these
terms in
neither the modern, post-Lei#nizian sense nor the medie(al, %homistic sense %he
former
sense, in which the a priori is that which is "nown independently of sense experience,
while
the a posteriori is that which is "nown #y means of experience, does not seem appropri-
ate, gi(en that !escartes clearly distinguishes the clear and distinct ideas of arithmetic
and
geometry from ideas which are the result of sensation 1 Principles : 5Art>=, A% '''A+
00G06-
5=/6+ .53G5/4 %he latter, medie(al sense, in which the a priori proceeds from cause to
effect,
while the a posteriori proceeds from effect to cause, does not seem to apply to the
"edita%
tions %his is #ecause the "editations proceeds from the disco(ery of my existence as a
thin"-
ing thing to the proof that )od exists as the only possi#le cause of my existence 1
"editations
on +irst Philosophy , A% M''+ .8G60- 5=/8+ 5>G0>4
.8 )au"roger 15==0+ 5354 points out that, in Hule 8 of the (ules for the /irection of the
"ind ,
!escartes Acomplains that :appus and !iophantus, 'with a "ind of low cunning,' "ept
their
method of disco(ery secret, presenting us with 'sterile truths' which they 'demonstrated
deducti(ely'B 1 (ules for the /irection of the "ind , A% Q+ 03>G034
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
8>3
principles Synthesis might #e used when first principles are not in dispute,
when all that is re&uired is Athe proper deduction of the conse&uencesB
1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G63- 5=/8+ 5554 'n contrast, it Acannot
#e con(eniently applied to metaphysical su#;ects,B precisely #ecause
Athere is nothing which causes so much effort as ma"ing our perception of
the primary notions clear and distinctB 1 Second Set of (eplies , A% M''+ 56>G
6/- 5=/8+ 555G5.4 %his is why !escartes does not write the "editations in
the form of A'!isputations,' as the philosophers ha(e done, or '%heorems
and :ro#lems,' as the geometers would ha(e doneB 1 Second Set of (eplies , A%
M''+ 563G6/- 5=/8+ 55.4
The Ethics !rom Cartesian "remises
Spinoza, howe(er, does write the Ethics in the geometer's form of theorems
and postulates, untrou#led #y !escartes's methodological scruples %his
is #ecause he accepts the first principles disco(ered #y ,artesian analysis
Analysis has done its wor"+ the pre;udices of the senses ha(e #een dis-
carded, and the correct first principles ha(e #een unco(ered *urthermore,
Spinoza uses the power of the geometrical method to re(eal clearly what
can and must #e inferred from an initial set of premises to show that !es-
cartes failed to draw the correct conclusions from his own first principles
'n so doing, Spinoza deri(es the elements of his own philosophical system
from these first principles As a result, he is a#le to persuade his ,artesian
friends of the truth of his system, and the ethical teaching founded on it,
#y using the principles they would accept
%he foundations of Spinoza's philosophical system are esta#lished in
:art 5 of the Ethics Arguing, first, that there can #e only one su#stance,
and second, that this one su#stance is )od, Spinoza concludes that )od
and nature are one *rom this, two other pantheistic doctrines follow+
mind and matter are attri#utes of )od, and )od is to #e understood as the
immanent causal power in all things Spinoza deduces these propositions
from concepts of su#stance, )od, and the infinite that he shares with !es-
cartes %hat is, Spinoza uses these ,artesian concepts as the first principles
of his own philosophy %o grasp this, it is necessary to consider !escartes's
account of su#stance, )od, and the infinite
!escartes defines su#stance in terms of independence+ it is that which
exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence 1 Prin%
ciples : 5Art65, A% M'''A+.8G.6- 5=/6+ .524 )od alone exhi#its this inde-
pendence fully and completely 1 Principles : 5Art65, A% M'''A+ .8G.6- 5=/6+
.524 ,reated things can exist only with )od's concurrence %hey can, how-
e(er, #e called su#stances in a secondary sense, insofar as their existence
Page 26
8>/
:oetics %oday ./+0
is ontologically independent of other created things %hat is, mental and
material su#stance are ontologically prior to their &ualities or attri#utes,
such as shape and motion, or sensation and will 1 Principles : 5Art65G60, A%
M'''A+ .8G.>- 5=/6+ .52G554 *urthermore, no created su#stance is onto-
logically dependent on any other created su#stance+ mental and material
su#stance are really distinct 1 Principles : 5Art>2, A% M'''A+ ./G02- 5=/6+
.504 Cence, the term substance does not apply uni(ocally, or in exactly the
same sense, to )od and his creatures, #ecause they are not independent
in exactly the same way 1 Principles : 5Art65, A% M'''A+ .8G.6- 5=/6+ .524
,onse&uently, )od's creatures are properly called su#stances only in this
secondary sense 1 Principles : 5Art6., A% M'''A+ .6- 5=/6+ .524 *urther-
more, !escartes contrasts )od with created things not only in terms of
his a#solute independence #ut also in terms of his infinity )od alone is
infinite, which !escartes understands as #eing unlimited, ha(ing no limit
whatsoe(er 1 Principles : 5Art.3, A% M'''A+ 56G5>- 5=/6+ .2.4
:art 5 of the Ethics deri(es the doctrine of pantheism from these ,arte-
sian concepts of su#stance, )od, and the infinite Li"e !escartes, Spinoza
defines su#stance in terms of independence 1E 5!ef04 and )od in terms of
infinity )od is defined as the a#solutely infinite #eing 1E 5!ef>4, while the
finite is the limited 1E 5!ef.4 %he a#solutely infinite is limited #y nothing
whatsoe(er 1E 5!ef>Ex54 *rom this it follows that if )od is the a#solutely
infinite independent su#stance, he can #e limited #y nothing Iothing can
stand outside of him 1E 5:58, 564 But a transcendent )od, li"e the one of
!escartes's system, is ontologically separate from his creation, as a carpen-
ter is distinct from the structure he #uilds %herefore, a truly infinite )od
cannot transcend his creation #ut must #e immanent in it 1E 5:56, 5/4 Spi-
noza concludes that )od is the immanent causal power #y which all things
exist and act 1E 5:084 Although each finite thing is externally determined
#y the infinite series of other finite things, natura naturata, the force #y
which it perse(eres in existence follows from the power of )od immanent
in it, natura naturans 1E .:86S4 !escartes's transcendent )od is replaced
.6 ' am inde#ted here to ,urley's 15=//+ /4 pro;ect of showing that Athe ,artesian
meta-
physic leads #y (ery plausi#le steps to the Spinozistic oneB Ey understanding of the
steps
#y which Spinoza mo(es from ,artesian principles to his own philosophy, howe(er, dif-
fers from ,urley's ,urley correctly notes that E 5:58 argues not only from )od's
a#solute
infinity #ut also from E 5:6's assertion that there cannot #e two or more su#stances of
the
same nature or attri#ute %he ,artesian distinction #etween attri#utes that can #e
ascri#ed
to )od and those that can #e ascri#ed to his creation alone, howe(er, is effecti(ely
refuted on
the grounds of )od's a#solute infinity 'f no attri#utes can #e denied of )od, then
attri#utes
reser(ed #y !escartes for the created world must #e attri#uted to him E 5:6 eliminates
a
much less plausi#le Adou#ledB ontology, in which the attri#utes that !escartes reser(ed
for
created things exist #oth as attri#utes of )od and as attri#utes of a second order of
created
su#stances
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%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
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#y Spinoza's )od immanent in nature !escartes's understanding of mat-
ter as inert extension must gi(e way to Spinoza's dispositionalist ontology
of powerful particulars All finite things are determinate or limited expres-
sions of )od's infinite power 1E 5:.6,4 As such, they are endowed with
determinate causal powers and capacities 1E 5:0>4
The on$eometrical "ortions o! the Ethics
Iot all of the Ethics is written in the geometrical manner Spinoza some-
times #rea"s the order of deduction, most nota#ly in the Scholia, Expli-
cations, :refaces, and Appendices While the chains of inference in the
strictly geometrical parts of the text are directed to the reason of its readers,
material can also #e found in the Ethics that appeals to their emotions We
can understand Spinoza's insertion of this material #y considering Aris-
totle's statement in the (hetoric 1'' 5, 503/a.5G..4 that the Aemotions are all
those feelings that so change men as to affect their ;udgements, and that
are also attended #y pain or pleasureB 15=/8+ .5=64 Spinoza was as"ing a
great deal of his readers who were #oth ,hristian and ,artesian %hough
careful and disciplined reasoners, they were finite human #eings su#;ect to
emotion+ emotions could affect their ;udgment and impair their a#ility to
attend to the demonstrations of the geometrical portions of the text
As a student of the emotions, (ery much aware of their power, Spinoza
would thin" it prudent to anticipate and counter the emotional resis-
tance his readers might ha(e to the distur#ing tra;ectory of his demon-
strations Ce corrects the pertur#ations of emotion with carefully calcu-
lated counterforces *re&uently, he ;udges it sufficient simply to remind his
readers of their rational powers At one point, he does this #y distinguish-
ing his readers from those who cannot reason carefully and attenti(ely
%o his demonstration that it #elongs to the nature of su#stance to exist
1E 5:3!4, he adds that this will #e difficult to concei(e for those who A;udge
things confusedly, and ha(e not #een accustomed to "now things through
their first causesB 1E 5:/S.4 Later, he expects resistance to the assertion
that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of )od Ce ac"nowl-
edges that he is as"ing a great deal of readers and appeals to their ratio-
nality #y as"ing them to Acontinue on with me slowly, step #y step, and to
ma"e no ;udgment on these matters until they ha(e read through them allB
1E .:55S4
.> *or a discussion of the history of the addition of scholia to Euclid's Elements , see
Ceath
5=6>+ >8G38 'nterestingly, Spinoza writes the scholia to his own text %his indicates that
he
is stepping out of the demonstration proper to reflect and comment on it or to add
material
he does not wish to include in the chain of deductions of the main text
Page 28
832
:oetics %oday ./+0
Sometimes, Spinoza #rea"s the order of his deduction simply to reassure
his readers ,oncerned that his doctrine of ethical egoism might #e asso-
ciated with (ice rather than with the con(entional (irtues, he pauses to
summarize his position clearly Ce assures his readers that self-interest,
rationally understood, does not imply a life of tyrannical self-indulgence
Hational persons, desiring Anothing for themsel(es which they do not
desire for other men,B are A;ust, honest and honora#leB 1E 8:5/S4
At other times, Spinoza treats irrational, emotional responses to his
argument with a much stronger rhetorical medicine We ha(e seen that
Shmueli discerns in these sections elements of anger and sarcasm, which
are not present in the portions of the wor" that attempt to persuade #y
purely rational means When these passages are read carefully, howe(er,
one does not there find unrestrained anger #ut something much more
interesting 'n all of these passages, Spinoza demonstrates that a certain
position actually leads to the opposite of that which its defenders inferred
from it %he tone of these passages is one of intellectual delight in ironic
re(ersal, s"illfully executed %he reader is expected to share this delight
%his "ind of intellectual pleasure engages the powers of reason and, as
such, is an appropriate remedy for emotions that might interfere with care-
ful attention to a demonstration %hree re(ersals of this "ind are especially
noteworthy, for they ha(e as their o#;ect the issues that might particularly
distur# Spinoza's ,artesian friends
%he Appendix to :art 5, as indicated a#o(e, denies the existence of a
pro(idential order, there#y re;ecting finalist notions of nature, which
understand natural processes as #eing designed #y )od to ser(e the inter-
ests of human"ind We ha(e already noted the possi#ility that a ,artesian
reader might identify Spinoza's dispositionalist ontology with the su#stan-
tial forms of conser(ati(e anti-,artesians such as Moetius Moetius defended
the doctrine of su#stantial forms as the metaphysical support for the doc-
trine of a pro(idential order grounded in finalist notions of causation 1(an
Huler 5==6+ >4 'n refusing to attri#ute a pro(idential design to nature, Spi-
noza neatly clears up any misunderstandings a#out the real implications of
his ontology of powerful particulars+ he is not criticizing !escartes simply
to return to the metaphysics of the medie(al Scholastics %o distance
his philosophy from the medie(al schools, Spinoza attac"s these finalist
notions #y demonstrating that they actually imply the opposite of what
their adherents thought Iature's destructi(e powers thwart our am#itions
.3 Lloyd 15==>+ .54 notices that the Ethics is Arich in ironyB She, howe(er, finds a
much
greater difference #etween the method of the Ethics and that of Euclid's Elements than '
do
She argues, for example, that there Ais in fact little resem#lance #etween reading the
Ethics
and reading EuclidB
Page 29
Byrne
D
%he )eometrical Eethod in Spinoza's Ethics
835
and swamp our agency %herefore, the supposition that nature is go(erned
#y a di(ine intelligence does not imply that )od is wise and #ene(olent #ut
that he is Aas mad as menB 1E 5A4
%wo later interesting examples of ironic re(ersal are directed at !es-
cartes %he first re(ersal, found in the :reface to :art 0, concerns !es-
cartes's doctrine of the freedom of the will %he central ,artesian (irtue
is generosity 1 !enerosit1 4, the "nowledge that all that really #elongs to us
is our free will and the resol(e to use it well 1 The Passions of the Soul :S
0Art560, A% Q'+ 88> - 5=/6 ?5>8=@+ 0/84 'n the ,artesian uni(erse, it is
in (irtue of the freedom of the will that human #eings A#ear in some way
the image and li"eness of )odB 1 "editations , A% M''+ 63G6/- 5=/8+ 824 As
such, the possi#ility of the freedom of the will is grounded in !escartes's
notion of the di(ine as transcendent and radically free 'f this freedom
were eliminated from his metaphysical system, human #eha(ior would #e
no less #lindly determined than chun"s of matter mo(ing according to geo-
metrical necessity %he will is the only thing that li#erates human #eings
from the mechanistic necessity of matter %his doctrine, howe(er, is at odds
with !escartes's program of doing ethics en physician , that is, as a natural
philosopher 1 The Passions of the Soul2 Prefatory 3etters , Egmont, 58 August
5>8=, A% Q', 0.>- 5=/6+ 0.34 Spinoza asserts that, although !escartes
aspires to treat emotional life in the same rigorous fashion as his mathe-
matical physics treats the motion of #odies, he founds his ethics, instead,
on an undetermined act of the will that could not #e comprehended #y any
science K#(iously sa(oring the irony, Spinoza writes that Athe cele#rated
!escartes, although he too #elie(ed that the mind has a#solute power o(er
its own actions, ne(ertheless sought to explain human affects through their
first causes, and at the same time to show the way #y which the mind can
ha(e a#solute dominion o(er its affects But in my opinion, he showed
nothing #ut the cle(erness of his understanding, as ' shall show in the
proper placeB 1E 0:raef4
%he same "ind of s"illful re(ersal is directed at the doctrine of the pineal
gland in the :reface to :art 6 Ca(ing criticized the Scholastics for the
o#scurity of their explanations, !escartes rests his doctrine of interaction
on the pineal gland, Aa hypothesis more occult than any occult &ualityB
1E 6:raef4 %a"en together, these three passages suggest that the non-
geometrical portions of the Ethics ser(e to differentiate Spinoza, on one
side, from the Scholastics 1E 5A4 and, on the other side, from !escartes
1E 0:raef, 6:raef4
./ %his reference to the Passions of the Soul follows the following pattern+ :S <
Passions of the
Soul 15, ., 0, etc < :art 5, ., 0, etc4- Art < Article
Page 30
83.
:oetics %oday ./+0
Conclusion
%his essay has examined the relation of the geometrical method to the
argument and goal of the Ethics Written in the geometrical style, the
Ethics , as a whole, fulfills the Aristotelian ideal of epistNmN, an organized
#ody of "nowledge in which propositions are deduced from self-e(ident,
first principles *urthermore, the goal of the Ethics has strong affinities
with the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia Pnli"e Aristotle's Nicoma%
chean Ethics , howe(er, Spinoza's Ethics , as its full title indicates, is an Ethica
Ordine !eometrico /emonstrata Spinoza extends the notion of epistNmN far
#eyond its original Aristotelian #oundaries to the in(estigation of human
life and well-#eing %his is possi#le, according to Spinoza, #ecause e(ery-
thing that exists, including human #eings and the conditions of their hap-
piness, follows necessarily from )od All propositions a#out the world can
#e deduced from the nature of )od as the self-caused, first cause
'n writing in this geometrical manner, Spinoza distinguishes himself not
only from Aristotle, #ut also from !escartes, who did not thin" the geo-
metrical method well suited to metaphysics %he Ethics was addressed, his-
torically, to Spinoza's circle of friends %heologically, they were radical #ut
de(out ,hristians :hilosophically, they were ,artesians %he pantheism
and determinism of the Ethics , howe(er, would shoc" e(en these ratio-
nal and radical philosophical friends ,onse&uently, the argument of the
Ethics has a dialectical aspect to which the geometrical method contri#-
utes 't #egins #y ma"ing clear that the ,artesian principles these ,arte-
sian friends would accept are the first principles of Spinoza's system 't
then demonstrates that their proper conse&uences are deduced with geo-
metrical rigor and certainty, not in the wor"s of !escartes #ut in the pages
of the Ethics
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