Article VI: The Legislative Department

Section 1. Legislative Power; Non- Delegation

Araneta v Gatmaitan G.R. Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957
Ponente: Felix, J.
Facts:
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of
trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in
San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the
operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camaries Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-
fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22 Thereafter a
group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and director of Fisheries been joined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same
null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be
banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the Eos 22and 66 are invald
Issues:
1. Whether or not the President has authority to issue Eos 22, 66 and 80
2. Whether or not the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers
unduly delegated to the President.
Held:
YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from
all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of agriculture and Natural
Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can
exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, Eos 22, 66 and 80 restricting
and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority or law.




Rubi v Provincial Board, 39 Phil 660 (1918 -1919)
FACT:
Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves
on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a
very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends
over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300
Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was
taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from
the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of
the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the
reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board, was challenged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said law is constitutional.

HELD:
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non-Christian should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.
On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of
denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law
was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt
registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for,
besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it
helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources,
with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner
by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.





















PEOPLE VS. MACEREN, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.

FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the
dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority
in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro
fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking
body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules
to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the
rule-making power.



EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA)166 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on
March 15, 1985.His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2of
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance. The POEA nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant. The
petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986
is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseasworker.2. Whether or
not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative
power.
Held:
1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their
rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under
Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims , involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death, disability and other benefits
arising out of such employment.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant
to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.
2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before
it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."



TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April1987 and in the future. The trial court denied
said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:"
This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:"(a) To determine
and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine ;x x x(f) To accept
applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said
certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue
to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:"Admission
requirements.
The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from
the Board of Medical Education;(c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed
to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the
then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is
considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the
medical school sand its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cut
off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical college.


Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECSO rder No. 52,
s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non- waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word,
the public order of the general community. An important component of that public





























Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. v, Drilon 176 SCRA 24 (1989)

Facts:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement stipulates that in case any wage adjustment decreed by laws
higher than the increase given in the agreement, the company shall pay the difference, RA 6640
decreed a wage increase higher than the CBA increase. Dole, however, issued a regulation saying that
salary increase granted pursuant to a CBA will not be considered in determining compliance with the
new laws.
Issue:
Is it proper?

Held:
No. Administrative Regulation adopted under Legislative Authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provision of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect in
general regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend and act of Congress
























OSMEA v. ORBOS, 220 SCRA 703

Facts:
On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund,
designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange
rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987,
expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as
a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery
being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
reading as follows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated
as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for
a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only
for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further
points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State,
such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective
for which it was created."

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of
the Constitution, viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government;

and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations
and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be
taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry
of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956,
as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution.

(2) Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by
Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to the
Energy Regulatory Board.


Held:
The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of
crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order
No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum
products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined
by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government
corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of
Energy;

c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund
through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons
or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum
products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the
reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the
special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in
what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny
and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.

With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the
law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the
Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit
on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what
is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here
involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the
ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be
overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in
carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price
of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund,
do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the
petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the
undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed suffices to guide the
delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which it is
to be exercised.























Chiongbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)
Facts:-
Pursuant to article X sec 18 of the 1987 constitution, Congress passed Ra No. 6734 the organic act for
the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao calling for plebiscite to be held in 23 provinces-4
provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao,Sulu and Twi-tawi. Hence, in accordance to RA NO ^&#$ THESE 4 PROVINCES
BECAME THE ARMM.-On the other hand, With respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote
in favor of creating ARMM.
Article XIX Sec RA 6724 provides; That only THE PROVINCES and CITIES VOTING
FAVORABLY IN
SUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM and the provinces WHO DID NOT VOTE
FOR THEINCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE
REGIONS; PROVIDED, However, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION, MERGE the EXISTING REGIONS -Pursuant to the authority granted by the
above provision, then President Aquino issued EO NO 429PROVIDING FOR THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM Where in those who are not in favor in creating the ARMM
where transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are; a. misamis occidental,
at present part of Region X will become part of REGION XI,
-PETITIONERS, PROTESTED and Challenges the VALIDITY of EO 429 CONTENDING that
THERE is NOT LAW WHICH AUTHORIZES THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE ALTERATIONS ON
THEEXISTING STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS in other words RE Organization. And
that the AUTHORITY MERGE granted in RA 6724 DOES NOT INCLUDE the AUTHORITY to
REORGANIZE even if it does not affect the apportionment of the congressional representatives. In
addition, they contend that Article XIX SEC 13 of RA 6724 is UNCONSITTUIONAL for 1) it is
invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in
the title of the law.

Issues:
1. WON Article XIX sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express standard to guide the
Presidents Discretion and whether the power given fairly expressed in the title of the statue.
2. WON the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganization of those who did
not vote or not in favor to it.
3. WON the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region
IX from ZAmoanga to PAgadian since it should be the acts of Congress.


Ruling
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the constitution, it is
a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power
of general supervision over local governments (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). The regions
themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
but are mere groupings of contagious provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on
the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries.
1. No, A legislative STANdARD NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. May simply be GATHERED OR
IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenge because it may be embodied in other statues on
the same subject as that of the challenge legislation. And with respect to the power to merge existing
administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in RA NO. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Exec Department to Promote
simplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with
national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the services in the
transition of public business.
2.No, while ARTICLE XIX sec 13 provides that the provinces and cities which do not vote
for inclusion in the autonomous region shall remain in the existing administrative regions this
provisions Is subject to the qualification that the PRSIDENT MAY BY
ADMINISTRATIVEDETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. This means that
while non-assenting provinces are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with continuous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.










Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, 309 SCRA 661
FACTS:
The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor ConradoRodrigo, entered into an agreement
with Philwood Construction, representedby Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan,
San Nicolas, for thesum of P486,386.18. On September 2, 1992, Reynaldo Mejica, the
Planningand Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an AccomplishmentRe por
t s t a t i ng t ha t t he Ca bol oa n Powe r Ge ne r a t i on pr oj e c t wa s 9 7 . 5 %accomplished.
Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of
said report, payment of P452, 825.53was effected by the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner
Alejandro Facundo, to Philwood Construction. On 14 August 1993 petitioner received a Notice of
Disallowance dated 21 June from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who
found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.017%
of the project (equivalent to
(P291,915.05) was actually accomplished. The Ombudsman approved the filling of
information against Rodrigo et al .for violation of Anti Graft Lawbefor the sandigan
bayan petioners question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigooccupies a position of Grade
24 and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al.

HELD:
Yes. Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
tot hose government offi ci al s havi ng Sal ar y Gr ade 27 or hi gher, muni ci pal mayors
were re-classified from Salary Grade24 to Salary Grade 27 by virtue of RA 6758 which took effect on
July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at tje time of the commission of the alleged crime on or
about 2 September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking official impleaded in this
case, wa s r e c e i vi n g a mont hl y s a l a r y o f P10, 441. 00. Suc h a mount 6758 i s
s uppos e dl y e qui v a l e nt t o a f our t h s t e p i nc r e me nt in Grade 24 under the Salary
Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No 6758.Congress adopted the scheme employed
in P.D. No.985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualification
for the purpose of according such position similar salaries. This scheme is known as the
Grade defined in P.D. No. 985 as including all classes of positions which, although
different with respect to kind or subject matter of work.


People v. Vera 65 PHIL. 56 [1937-1938]
FACT:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated
to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial,
he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge
Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in
the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec
1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion
to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD:
The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an
imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation
for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say
that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to
probation.




Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority


Facts:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs.
Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under
PD 1605 and waspermitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public stre3ets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations
was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After n omotion for reconsideration of
the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. With standing the Gonong decision still
violations of the said decisiontranspired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters
to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers.On
May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,authorizing itself to detach license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter
which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the
Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.

Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise
of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature?

Held:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining
all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor
vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations
within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations
was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should
be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not bepartial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must notbe unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.In the Gonong
decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it
did not conform to existing law. PD 1605does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is
nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes
is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of the principal.





ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251


FACT:

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct
allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not
empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF. In previous GAAs, said allocation and identification of projects were the main
features of the pork barrel system technically known as Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF). Nothing of the sort is now seen in the present law (R.A. No. 9206 of CY 2004). In its
memorandum, LAMP insists that [t]he silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by
members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap
and do away with the pork barrel system. In other words, [t]he omission of the PDAF provision to
specify sums as allocations to individual Members of Congress is a casus omissus signifying an
omission intentionally made by Congress that this Court is forbidden to supply. Hence, LAMP is of
the conclusion that the pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA
2004.

LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM
illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members
of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects
are to be actually funded by PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving
and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude
into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for
which was made by them. In their individual capacities, the Members of Congress cannot virtually
tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayers money.
[7]
Further, the authority
to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function
devoid of constitutional sanction,
[8]
and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less
than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution. Verily, the power of appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not
include the power of the Members thereof to individually propose, select and identify which projects
are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and exclusively pertains to
the Executive Department.
[9]
By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from
the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund,
the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.


For their part, the respondents
[10]
contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual
grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,
[11]
they argue that the former should
not be equated with pork barrel, which has gained a derogatory meaning referring to government
projects affording political opportunism.
[12]
In the petition, no proof of this was offered. It cannot be
gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures
alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration
especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their
pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the
supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork
barrel, is a source of dirty money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to
misuse their allocations. These facts have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition
accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a fortiori,
to the claim that Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the
PDAF allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of
the approved budget for a particular project.
[13]
Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media
preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof that the DBM Secretary has
been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of Congress, the
petition falls short of its cause.

Likewise admitting that CDF and PDAF are appropriations for substantially similar, if not the same,
beneficial purposes,
[14]
the respondents invoke Philconsa v. Enriquez,
[15]
where CDF was described
as an imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing priority programs/projects
specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress
to propose and identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said
case, it was also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.
ISSUE
The respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to establish factual and legal basis
to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential requisite of judicial reviewan actual case or
controversy.

HELD
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor
of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

US Vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1

FACTS:
On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under
extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919,
the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which
rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher
than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6
th
of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he
was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD:
Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC,
wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect
in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.



Employers Confederation of the Philippines vs. National Wages and Productivity Commission,
G.R. No. 96169 September 24, 1991

FACTS:

On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No.
NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade
Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel
Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed.

On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-
01. It provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region
already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five
pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.

ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's grant
of an "across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum
wage rates (up to P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges that under the
Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary
ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining
as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective
bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings.

On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case via
petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates, as
well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum
wage rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity
Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied
the petition of ECOP.

The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by
providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards
enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to
be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the
legislature's door at every turn.
.
The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act
would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or
better, would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so
for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by
statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital
Region, in decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that
wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may
delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient
standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient,
and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that the Commission correctly
upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.

















People v Rosenthal 68 Phil 328

FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. The
main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other
oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without
actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in
violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person,
partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative
securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular
Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-
pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a
certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied
with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers
or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said
Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to
cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be
had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is
unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in
determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion
the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be
issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon
the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention
and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold
that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a
decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term
public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to
the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest.
It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard
to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the
provision in question show the contrary. . .

Agustin v Edu, 88 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction
No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with
a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped
with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the
mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD:
Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners
whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2)
battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and
rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because:
Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even
under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from
any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion
of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in
the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded
by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that
while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in
negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with
the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial
in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or
urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare
occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has
been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v.
Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a
matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the
National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.








YNOT V. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
FACTS:
-Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A.
Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas bond.
-Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond; declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed validity.
-Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC.
-Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
-Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of legislative power by the former president is improper

HELD:
Yes. The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by Pres. Marcos,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued not for the
purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative
authority under Amendment No. 6.









U.S v PANLILIO, 28 phil 608

FACTS:
In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to the dangerous
and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized
agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga;
that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while
the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken
from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by
virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral
and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them. The accused was convicted
of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous
communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contends that the facts
alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760.


ISSUE:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture


HELD:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act
No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful
are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are
statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless
the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No.
1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such
violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal
Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic
disease among animals.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, 567 SCRA 354
FACTS:
[This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the
respondent corporation Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors with respect to Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act.]
- The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under
said memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.)
which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power generating barge.
In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of
the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).
- It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the Philippine Stock
Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC
received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the
directors to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules
on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated
the Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with
GHB. In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of
the Revised Securities Act.
- Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since according to PD 902-A,
jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and Enforcement Department) of the SEC
however, this issue is already moot since pending the disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed
thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to due process was
violated when the SEC required them to appear before the SEC to show because why sanctions should not be imposed
upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to respondents. The case reached the CA and said court
ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases
against respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that
since there are no rules and regulations implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR
ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any
suit against respondents. The CA, therefore, prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action against
the respondents for the alleged violations of the Revised Securities Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the RSA

HELD:

The Revised Securities Act does not require the enactment of implementing rules to make it binding and effective. The
provisions of the RSA are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. The requirements are specifically set out and the
acts which are enjoined are determinable.

To rule that absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress would empower administrative
bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. Where the statute contains sufficient standards and
an unmistakable intent (as in this case, the RSA) there should be no impediment as to its implementation.

















GEROCHI V. DENR G.R No. 159796

FACTS:
Petitioners (Geroche, et.al) filed against the respondents a complaint assailing the constitutionality of
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. They contend
that the power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed
and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.

HELD:
No. The Court said that since the purpose of the law was not revenue generation but energy regulation,
the power involved was more police power than the power to tax. Moreover, the Court added that the
power to tax could be used for regulation. As to the validity of the delegation of the executive agency,
the Court was satisfied that the delegating law was complete in itself and the amount to be charged was
made certain by the parameters set by the law itself.









PSL, Inc. vs. LLDA 608 SCRA 442
Facts of the Case:
On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from the plant of the Petitioner Pacific
Steam Laundry, Inc. a company engaged in the business of laundry services located at 114 Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated
wastewater generated from petitioners laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San
Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioners plant was
operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September
2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of
petitioners effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent
standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD),
Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of
Violation dated 30 October 2001 Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and
Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the
water pollution. On 1 March 2002, a compliance monitoring was conducted and the result of the
laboratory analysis still showed non-compliance with effluent standards in terms of TSS, BOD,
Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Oil/Grease Concentration. It was reported that petitioners
wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was
conducted on 25 April 2002 but the results still failed to conform with the effluent standards in terms
of Oil/Grease Concentration.
Meanwhile, on 15 April 2002, a Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against
petitioner before the LLDA. During the public hearing on 30 April 2002, LLDA informed petitioner of
its continuous non-compliance with the effluent standards. Petitioner requested for another wastewater
sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002. The laboratory results of the wastewater sampling
finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters. On 9 August 2002, another
public hearing was held to discuss the dismissal of the water pollution case and the payment of the
accumulated daily penalty. According to LLDA, the penalty should be reckoned from 5 September
2001, the date of initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the date LLDA received the request for re-
sampling. Petitioner manifested that its wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis. In its position
paper dated 25 August 2002, petitioner prayed that the Notice of Violation dated 30 October 2001 be
set aside and the penalty and fine imposed be reckoned from the date of actual hearing on 15 April
2002.
On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the LLDA denied in its Order dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.

ISSUE: Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in
PD 984?

2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-
delegation of legislative powers?
HELD: The Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision dated 30 June 2004 and
the Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.
















People v. Que Po Lay, 94 PHIL 640
FACTS of the CASE:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and
US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment,
pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to
become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is
bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its
penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the
appellant, with costs de oficio.







People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
FACTS of the CASE: In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4,
1975, herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria,
public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in
Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for
arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the
accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on June 13, 1975. On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack
of merit. On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null
and void for being unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for private
respondents on October 20, 1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On October 26, 1975,
private respondents filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622,
to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from
proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal
Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended
petition alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal
provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes
a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion
perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government. On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of
herein private respondents was related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch
for further proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. On
March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
petitions but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. On August 2, 1976,
herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended petition. On September
8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in substance that
Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation. As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of
the lower court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the
validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. Respondent judge denied both motions for
reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19, 1976.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.
4670
(2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
HELD: The decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

















Carbonilla vs. Board of Airlines Representatives, 657 SCRA 775
FACTS of the CASE:
The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005)
amending CAO 7-92.6 The Department of Finance7 approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2006. CAO
7-92 and CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to Section 35068 in relation to Section 6089 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). Petitioners Office of the President, et al. alleged
that prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a committee to review
the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and to propose
its adjustment from the exchange rate of P25 to US$1 to the then exchange rate of P55 to US$1. The
Office of the President, et al. alleged that for a period of more than two years from the creation of the
committee, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent Board
of Airlines Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be embodied in
an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order. On the other hand, BAR alleged that it learned of the
proposed increase in the overtime rates only sometime in 2004 and only through unofficial reports.
On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief, Bonded Warehouse
Division, BOC-NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the overtime
rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter. BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance
on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005 reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005.
In a letter dated 3 March 2005, the Acting District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary
of Finance already approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2005. As such, the increase in the overtime
rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR still requested for an audience with the Secretary of
Finance which was granted on 12 October 2005.
The BOC then sent a letter to BARs member airlines demanding payment of overtime services to
BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BARs member airlines refused and manifested
their intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 31 August 2006,10 Undersecretary
Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr. (Usec. Mendoza), Legal and Revenue Operations Group, Department of
Finance informed BAR, through its Chairman Felix J. Cruz (Cruz), that they find no valid ground to
disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to suspend its implementation or effectivity and that its
implementation effective 16 March 2005 is legally proper.

In separate letters both dated 4 December 2006,11 Cruz requested the Office of the President
and the Office of the Executive Secretary to review the decision of Usec. Mendoza. Cruz manifested
the objection of the International Airlines operating in the Philippines to CAO 1-2005. On 13
December 2006, Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Exec. Sec. Gaite) issued an
Order12 requiring BAR to pay its appeal fee and submit an appeal memorandum within 15 days from
notice. BAR paid the appeal fee and submitted its appeal memorandum on 19 January 2007. Because
of this issue, the Petitioner, Carbonilla, et.al former custom personnel filed a motion for intervention
before the Court of Appeals on the case between the Board of the Airline Representatives and the
Board of Customs with regards to the issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005)
amending CAO 7-92 on the the ground that they would be directly affected by its outcome which the
Court of Appeals denies.
ISSUE:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the intervention of
Carbonilla, et al.;

HELD: ,

The Court of Appeals denied Carbonilla, et al.s motion for intervention in its 26 February
2009 Resolution on the ground that the case was for collection of unpaid overtime services and thus
should be pursued in a separate proceeding against the proper respondents. A reading of the
Carbonilla, et al.s Omnibus Motion supports the ground invoked by the Court of Appeals in denying
the motion















Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives; Appointment; Party List
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL., 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by
invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of
Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250
and reappropriating the legislative districts.


Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the
act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.






Mariano v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 118627, 07 March 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati
violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with
technical descriptions
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence
will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by
the Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized
city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the
requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not
an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming
a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left
to the courts to decide.
1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and
duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of
not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law.







Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008.
Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting
Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).


Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite
the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).



Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule
that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.


Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with
any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city
and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created,
or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a
legislative district.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in
its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national
law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior
legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body.



In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus
will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty.


In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14
May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted
this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an
inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA
Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or
another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised
here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all
the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.


In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for creating
congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative
districts indirectly through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the
creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative
districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in
Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone
from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create
provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a
legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that
each province shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan
upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of
the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of
RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of
2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become
distinct possibilities:

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers
of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself
states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This
follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x
x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
















Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 176970, December 08, 2008

FACTS:
A representative of the city of Cagayan de Oro file and sponsored a bill (HB No.5859) which later
became a law(RA No. 9371). The said legislative district from one to two.
COMELEC promulgated a resolutionimplementing the said law for election purposes.Herein
petitioner, filed a petition against COMELEC arguing that it cannot implement the law without
thecommencement of a plebiscite of which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local
government unit. Inrelation to this, petitioner prayed for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. Both
were not granted, and the Nationaland Local elections proceeded.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the
division andconversion of a local government unit
HELD: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires
thecommencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI,
Sec.5 need not.
They are related but are different from each other.Both provisions mentioned above are within the
vested authority of the legislature. The Legislature undertakesthe apportionment and reapportionment
of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by settingstandards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating,
dividing,merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.
Other than this, not muchcommonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently
different although they interface and relatewith one another.In the case at bar, no division of CDO city
takes place or is mandated. CDO city politically remains a single unitand its administration is not
divided along territorial line. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is onlythe
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representationin the House of Representatives.
Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite isnecessary to
validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts.


SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 189793,
April 7, 2010
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000)
for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC, GR No. 18078 Jan. 25, 2010
Facts:
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of
Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied
on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that
the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city
to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos,
Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was issued upon the
request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation
of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year
between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of
175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on
an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
G.R. No. 158466 June 15, 2004
PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
FACTS: On 23 May 2001, Crespo was declared as the elected Congressman of the
6
th
District of Manila. Ocampo was the rival candidate who filed an electoral protest in the HRET
alleging that Crespos win was due to election fraud and vote buying. On 06 March 2003, Crespo was
declared by the HRET as ineligible for office due to lack of residence in the said district of Manila.
Due to such declaration, Ocampo then requested the HRET to declare him as the winner of the election
done in 2001 pursuant to RA 6646 which provides that Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted
Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then be considered as stray votes. And that being the
fact that Ocampo received the second highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of
768 votes), he should be declared as the winner of the said election contest. The HRET denied
Ocampos petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.

HELD: Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the
first among the remaining qualified candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is
disqualified. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered
stray. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the Election
Day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the
foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they
would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.




Party List
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
,
which approved the participation
of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The
facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the
criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration
of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the
pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to
determine compliance by the party lists.

VC Cadangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009

FACTS: On September 13, 2006, petitioner Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (CivilServants), filed a
petition for registration as a sectoral organization. It claimed thatit had been in existence since
December 2004 and to represent past and presentgovernment employees in the party-list system. The
COMELEC issued anOrder requiring Civil Servants to file a memorandum that would prove its
presenceor existence nationwide, track record, financial capability to wage a nationwidecampaign,
platform of government, officers and membership, and compliance withthe provisions of the Party-List
System Act and the eight-point guideline laid down by this Court. Civil Servants consequently filed the
required memorandumattaching vital documents, with manifestation of intent to participate in
the May14, 2007 Elections. however, the COMELEC issued a Resolution denying Civil
Servants petition for registration.
Because Civil Servant exists only in Paraaqueand Quezon City. Civil Servants moved for
reconsideration, arguing in the mainthat the law does not require a sectoral organization to have
a nationwide presenceor existence for it to be registered under the party-list system. Subsequently, it
wasdenied by the COMELEC. The petitioner filed the instant case praying for the writof mandamus to
command the latter to register the former as a sectoralorganization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus to register as a sectoral organizationis valid.
RULING: The COMELEC denied the latters plea for registration as a sectoral party, for its failure to
show that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized andunderrepresented sectors.
The Courts function, as mandated by Section 1,Article
VIII of the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, notthat it erred or has a different view. The
Supreme Court will have no occasion toexercise its corrective power. It has no authority to inquire into
what it thinks isapparent error. the Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as
asectoral party, because to do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence todetermine whether indeed
petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization andwhether it has made untruthful statements in its
application for registration.Premises considered, the petition for
certiorari
and mandamus is dismissed

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)

FACTS:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats
for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

HELD:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to
promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).




Partido ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC , GR 164702, March 15, 2006

Facts:
The petition involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-
list elections. Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the
formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004
elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting the simplified
formula of "one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes.

ISSUE: What is a decision Pro Hac Vice?

Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion. A ruling expressly qualified as
pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. In this case, it was ruled that it
was erroneous for respondent Commission to apply Resolution No. 6835 and rule that the formula in
Veterans has been abandoned.
















Lokin Jr. v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010.
Facts:
Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee
of CIBAC. In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January12,
2007;and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution
by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section
13 of Resolution No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a
petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as
Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins p roper recourse was an electoral protest filed in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over
the matter being raised by Lokin.For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a
petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to havehim
proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act.

Ruling
: The petitions are granted..
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine
of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for
doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to
any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated. Under certain circumstances,
the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and
promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix
the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to
guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is
established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature
leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although
there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a
distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be. The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to
effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather
administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be
contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or
executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution To be valid,
therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation
must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;3.
It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and4. It must be reasonable. The
COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and are call]In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs
implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and
administers the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and the Party-List System Act.
Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question
that Resolution No. 7804underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or
not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that
the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly
exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative
agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces,
and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 8.
Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-
Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days
before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who
have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any
elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned. The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization
of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC,
except when: (
a) the nominee dies;
b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or
c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain
and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is
conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the
courts should be convinced that the Legislature really

intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the
enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but
only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous. The legislative intent to deprive the
party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also
expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz :MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the
nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows
the nominating party to change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the
implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered? MR.
ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay and perhaps
a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the
same.MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.MR. ABUEG:
Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been submitted to the
Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party affiliation. The
nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right
to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation.MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course.
In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception rather than the rule. Another
exception most probably is the nominee dies, then therehas to be a change but any change for that matter should
always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.
The usage of No in Section 8

No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases wherethe nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list

renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory.
Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command
thou shall not , and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law
itself, like in this case. Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its
nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list
organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended
nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the
individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization
are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of
the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list
organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations or to alter the order of the
nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency. The
lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.























Section 6. Qualifications of Representatives
AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400)

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and
13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in
the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Issue:
Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
Held:
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The
purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favourable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. Aquinos connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to
be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences
in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District
of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.




Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)
FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St.Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due
to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of
a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation
of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil
Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an
act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where
he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate
of candidacy, is nota resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he
seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls
for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio
St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991,
he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is
now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a
new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; bona fide intentions of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandonit does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.


Maguera v. Borra 15 SCRA 7
Facts:
Maquera seek that the RA 4421 requiring all candidates for national, provincial city and municipal
offices to post a surety bond equivalent to salary or emoluments to which he is a candidate.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 44 is constitutional.

Held:
No. The Constitution, in providing for the qualification of Congressmen, sets forth only age,
citizenship, voting and residence qualifications. No property qualification of any kind is thereunder
required. Since the effect of Republic Act 4421 is to require of candidates for Congress a substantial
property qualification, and to disqualify those who do not meet the same, it goes against the provision
of the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character, requires no property qualification for
the right to hold said public office.
The Court resolved, without prejudice to rendering an extended decision, to declare that said Republic
Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as
well as their representatives and agents, from enforcing and/or implementing said constitutional
enactment.






SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD, GR NO. 157870 (2008)

FACTS:
In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec
36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator
and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the
Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected
to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be
certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications
of Senators.

HELD:
Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision [n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC,
to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
Section 7. Term of Representatives
Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during
the1987 congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor
of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of
Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of theOmnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election
wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties andfunctions as an elected member of the
Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in theCongress.Dimaporo contended that he
did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 isnot operative in the present
constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:1.Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, orinstru
mentality thereof.2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior3.Disqualification
as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest4.Voluntary renunciation
of office
ISSUE:
W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
anothergovernment position
HELD:
No.In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers.
In the 1935Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve
with the highestdegree of responsibility and integrity.If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor
who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for anoffice other than the one he was elected to, then
that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandateof the people which was placed upon him
and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be
considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandateto the people and he should
therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.







FARINAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR 147387 (December 10, 2003)

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in
expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a
limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9006.
ISSUE: in view of sec 26 (1)article 6, Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14
of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators
and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members
of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware
of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as
ipso facto resigned from their positions.






















Quinto V. COMELEC, GR NO. 189698, December 1, 2009

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as
ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate
of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it
only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD: NO.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive
officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced
that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an
obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely
challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites
of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than
to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government
will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to
wield influence in the political world. The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices,
whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
involved on such a sweeping scale.

Section 8. Regular Elections
G.R. No. 150605
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,
respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as
against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent
moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order,
petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of
soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon
motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondents
proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent
resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet
been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the
petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis.
Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent
the electorates choice.
2. Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the
Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying
petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents
eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on
the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits
recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.
Section 9. Special Elections
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-
006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the
13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared
official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the
Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further
provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for
the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the
elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator
to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC
issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to
require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of
RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen
seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order
during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court
required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's
standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that
COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of
the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Section 10. Salaries
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October
4, 1966
Facts:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor
of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in
audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House
of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that
such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason
given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA
4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House
who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the
House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the
increase becomes effective?
Held:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of
the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using
the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses
for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the
singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is
that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired
before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.



Section 11. Privilege from Arrest; Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
People vs. Jalosjos, Sunday, January 25, 2009
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of
a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and
the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.





Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines.
Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to
place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise
and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The
letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is
immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said
letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance
of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in
session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages. Although
the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as planners,
and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of
course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they
are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners include these two (2) high ranking
officers. Petition is dismissed.
ANTONINO V VALENCIA, 57 SCRA 70
FACTS:
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election
for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by
Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a
division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged
and double-crossed them, the LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon
Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of
Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2. W/N the Press Release is libelous
Held/Ruling:
YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the
following facts:
1. The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.
2. On the press release there was marked For release under the date.
3. It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in
the same numerical order.
4. press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5. The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the
presence of the press
6. The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and
information he received about Antonino
7. The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time
constraint
8. Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain
corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is
presumed and such presumption was not overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions
and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on
the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filed charges against
Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate for election and that his term as
senator was no yet to expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous
statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossing cannot be considered libelous as contemporary
politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.










Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, AC No. 7399,
August 25, 2009

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
i.e., Miriam Baliw vs. Supreme Court of Idiots
Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador Miriam Defensor-Santiago ang:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang constitutional rights bilang isang miyembro ng
Kongreso (parliamentary immunity). May mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang
may kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice.
Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng
kanyang mga karapatan bilang isang senador.
Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya nang hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol.
Eto seryoso na.
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional rights na makikita sa Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof. Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free speech sa mga pundasyon ng
demokrasya.
Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte
Suprema ang senadora.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used
in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.
Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na hatol kay Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House
ang kanyang nilabag.
Huling hirit ng Korte Suprema: It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their
own rules on her. i.e., #$%^&*&^%$#$%^&* dahil sa separation of powers, wala tayong magawa noong
ininsulto tayo ng luka-lokang iyon dahil hindi natin siya saklaw.
Nakanino ang huling halakhak?
"I lied." *hysterical laughter*

Section 13. Prohibitions on Members of Congress
Liban VS. Gordon, GR No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Liban vs. Gordon (2009) Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC
Red Cross Chapter while Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Consti: No Senator or Member of the HoR
may hold any other office/employment in the Govt, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including govt-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term w/o for feitinghis seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or theemoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected).Petitioners cite
Camporedondo v. NLRC
Which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation.
Flores v. Drilon
held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.Respondent:
Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/cappears to be an action for quo warran to they do not claim
to be entitled to the Senateoffice of respondent.
Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil Procedure:action should be commenced w/in 1 year after the cause of public
officers forfeiture of office respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs
Petitioners cannot raise a constitution all question as taxpayers no claim that they suffered some actual
damage/threatened injury or illegal disbursement of public funds
If petition is for declaratory relief, SC has no jurisdiction
Origina jurisdiction in RTC

PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation
Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to PNRC is not an office/employment
Petitioners: present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning unlawful disbursement of fundsconsidering that
respondent has been drawing hissalaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled
to his office. Courthas jurisdiction because it involves alegal/constitutional issue of transcendental importance.
Issues, Holding & Ratio:
WON petitioners have standing.
SC:
NO.
The petition is an action for quo warran to(Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court an action for theusurpation of a
public office against a public officer who does or suffers an act which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his
office).
See facts for petitioners allegations.
Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
WON PNRC is a Private or Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation.
SC:
PNRC is a Private Corporation.
May 22, 1947 Pres. Manuel Roxas signed RA95 (PNRC Charter) adhering to the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929. PNRC is:
-
A non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization whose mission is tobring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable w/o consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or politic alaffiliation.
-
A member of National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 7 Fundamental
Principles: Humanity, Impartiality,
Neutrality, Independence
, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality.
-
Must be autonomous, neutral and independent; not appear to be instrument/agency that implements govt
policy to merit the trust of all and effectively carry out its mission therefore, it cannot be owned/controlled
by the govt
The Philippine govt does not own the PNRC
does not have govt assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Congress. It is financed primarily
by contributions from private individuals/entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its
Board of Governors (Sec. 11, PNRC Charter).
The govt does not control the PNRC
. Only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines
(Sec. 6, PNRC Charter). A majority of 4/5 of the PNRC Board are elected/chosen by the private sector members
of the PNRC.
The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or any subordinate govt official, therefore, he is not an
official/employee of the Philippine Government.
Sec. 16, Art. VII of Consti President appoints all officials & employees in the Executive branch whose
appointments arevested in the President by the Consti or by law. President also appoints those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. The law may also authorize the heads of deparments,
agencies, commissions, or boards
















Section 14. Prohibitions Related to the Practice of Profession
Puyat Vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31

Political Law Appearance in Court
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries.
The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not
properly counted hence he filed a quo warran to proceeding before the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros
group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have
the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for
Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to
anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioners
action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC
case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel
in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as
a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so
under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work
around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the
litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.





Section 16. Officers of Congress; Quorum Discipline; Journal/Records

Sec. 16 Santiago v Guingona G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.

Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad
as the rightful minority leader.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
Drilon as majority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
"majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and,
thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and
Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed
to resolve the issue.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader?
Held: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Avelino v. Cuenco, GR No. 83 PHIL 17 (1949)
FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warran to Proceeding , asked the court to declare him
the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President
Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only12 Senators were
left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was
appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of
the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was
validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in
doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the
answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1)
and the constitution algrant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the
Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without
any immediate remedy.
Afortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change orrein state them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner
top reside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.2. It was held that
there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court
being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate
in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support
Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to
declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure
of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions here in involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place
them beyond the shadow of a doubt.


People vs Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 68
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of
a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bail able offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of Houseof
Representatives
Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted bylaw. The
immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec.11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privilege sappurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)
Facts:
An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of
Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was
later passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second
reading, herein petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally
needed to conduct business. Petitioner's motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then
signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.
Held:
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal
voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time
a House has to vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the third readings of
the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the
House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony
with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is
applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.









Osmea, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et. al. G.R. No. L-17144, 28 October 1960
FACTS:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A
Message to Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the
President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the Constitution gave
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution.
RULING:
Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. Although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in any other place in
Congress.



Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636
Political Law Suspension of a Member of Congress RA 3019
On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was
said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information,
Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned
for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a
long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter
moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office.
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.
HELD:
The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides: SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.






United States vs. Juan Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)
Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to
Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs
authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and
dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in
session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the
case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond
the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.





Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.V Gimenez
Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used
primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank
later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for
reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The
CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor
refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par
18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the
provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.
The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term
urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He
further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and
between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt
urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the
entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts.
It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.


Astorga vs. Villegas
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on
its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then
sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas
recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was
approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its
certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino
amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate
President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus
was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the
Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law
Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:
Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires
the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if
the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort
to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may
still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to
speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a
case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for
this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.


Philippine Judges Association V Prado
Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank
mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes,
such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming
from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that
because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be
withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law.
PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within
the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory
as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of
others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the
franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense
allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the
removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for
if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary,
then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the
problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is
no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there
is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary
for such privilege.


ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056 September 1,
2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of
the Constitution.

3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the
House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.

3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation
has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to
be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States
power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.


Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 644 SCRA 741
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel),
Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan
Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole
(respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo
A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S.
Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in
the 2008 General Appropriations Act.
The Antecedents
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech
entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the
congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million
appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat
Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another
P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-
5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation
covers the same stretch from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City. Senator
Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed
that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he
followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,3 the full text of which reads:
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly "advocated" (sic) the construction of the
C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Paraaque City to the South
Luzon Expressway;
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road
Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;
WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion
for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President;
WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was
member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the
realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Pias would be financially
benefited by the construction of the new road;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his
corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same
properties affected by the projects he proposed;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of his
landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area,
the government, and the Filipino people;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced sale
of another property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit made
from the overprice by the Villar owned corporations;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his
personal interests thereby sacrificing the peoples welfare;
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the
people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the peoples trust and
confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go
unpunished;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE
ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS
THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD
RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS
REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL4
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics
Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members:
Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson
Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal
Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member
Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President.
The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and
Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the
Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of the Minority,
Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics
Committee.6 On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the
Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a
caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the Senate adopted
the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published
in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he stated that he would answer
the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009,
Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics Committee was
not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was
approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.12
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven
Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009,
petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14
May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary
Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary
Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May
2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the
adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint
filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and
of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution
when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own
provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the
alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has
been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the
doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively
pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the
adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14
The Issues
The issues for the Courts resolution are the following:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party
in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity.
The Ruling of this Court
Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who
has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such
nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action
before it may properly go forward.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those
already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple
litigation.15
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it
may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706,
the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee
of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest. The nature of
Senator Madrigals interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without
her participation.1awphi1
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of
administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than
by courts of justice."16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of
petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means
that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to
resolve.19
As regards respondents invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government
by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."20 Thus, it has been held that "the power
of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and
that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by
the principle of separation of powers."21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the
legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On
the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of
the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate
Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and
removed Senator Villars recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
as a body.
We do not agree with petitioners.
Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court
notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics
Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senates attention to the
alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December
2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to
the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the
Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the
Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him
that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee.
Senator Pimentel promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter
is final but the records did not show that a caucus was convened.
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer
the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the
accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case that Senator
Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as
a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none
against, and five abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges,
safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges."22 However, in this case, the refusal of
the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while
ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within
the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator
Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the
accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances,
the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy
undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
by the Senate Committee of the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of
the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not
violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate
Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villars right to
due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized
and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty
to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum,
voting and publication.23
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will
not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent
counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely
adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23
March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics
Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,24 the Court
declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights
of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate
to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended
or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in
the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale
for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.26
(Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,27 the
Court further clarified:
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in
the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure.
Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its
ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of
Taada v. Tuvera. Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution
nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either
a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.28
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules
can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the
Senate since the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its
members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.29
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate
approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which
they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published
in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require
publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole30 is
an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges31 which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary
to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition,
Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole32 is an exact reproduction of
Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges33 which states
that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondents
allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a
quorum.34
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is
required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.35 Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution
on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require
modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have
overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on
Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
SO ORDERED.
Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
0001000
SPONSORED ADS
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par.
6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take
cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Section 17. Electoral Tribunal
Angara V Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par.
6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take
cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Vera vs Avelino, 77 PHIL 192 (1946)
Facts:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding
the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence
in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not
reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not
be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their
election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the
said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero
should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was
not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted
to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in
nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts. The case is therefore dismissed
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315
Facts:
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private
respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an
urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this
Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the
general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the
certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor,
Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the
crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the
list of qualified candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of
the Senate.
Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the
controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.
While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective
officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act
7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case
may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.








FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)
Facts:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners'
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing
SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral
Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.

Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of
the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.











Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)

FACTS:
Pineda (LDP) won as representative. His opponent, Bondoc (NP), filed a protest with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He was later declared the winner. Among those who voted
to proclaim him winner was Camasura, an LDP member.
Camasura was later expelled from the LDP for doing acts said to be a betrayal to the cause and loyalty
of the LDP. Camasura was then removed by the House as member of the HRET. The HRET later
cancelled its Bondoc decision saying that since the decision lacks the concurrence of at least 5 votes
(the 5th that of Camasuras), the decision cannot be validly promulgated.

ISSUE:
Was Camasura validly removed? Should the HRET decision remain valid? Yes. Yes.

HELD:
The removal of Camasura because he cast his vote in favor of an NP candidate is a clear impairment of
the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of an election contest. The HRET is an
independent body and its function may not be interfered with to serve the interests of the party in
power.
Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as expiration of the
members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the HRET for party disloyalty short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. There was no such proof and therefore his expulsion
was not for a valid cause, violating his right to security of tenure.
The members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribulal.




REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ROMEO L.
SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.
EN BANC
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein
private respondents Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated
January 26, 1989, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections.
Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged, among others,
that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the
commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the
counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the
recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts (pp. 16-20, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest. He alleged as among
his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest.
On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the revision of
contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total
contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo).
On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts, representing the initial 25% of all
the contested precincts, was terminated.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12,
1988, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).
No action on Robles motion to suspend revision and Santos motion to withdraw protest on unrevised
precincts were yet taken by respondent HRET when on September 14, 1988, Santos filed an Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp. 81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988,
Robles opposed Santos Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent Motion to
Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo).
On the same day, respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted Santos Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest. The said resolution states:
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs. Virgilio P. Robles).
Three pleadings are submitted for consideration by the Tribunal: (a) Protestees Urgent Motion to
Suspend Revision, dated September 8, 1988; (b) Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing, dated September 12, 1988; and (c)
Protestants Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14,
1988.
Upon the filing of Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots was stopped and
such revision remains suspended until now. In view of such suspension, there is no need to act on
Protestees Motion.
The Motion to Withdraw Protest, has been withdrawn by Protestants later motion, and therefore
need not be acted upon.
WHEREFORE, Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and Protestants Motion to
Withdraw Protest are NOTED. The Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest is
GRANTED.
The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to schedule the resumption of the revision on September 26,
1988 and to send out the necessary notices for this purpose. (p. 84, Rollo)
On September 20, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation praying that his Urgent
Motion to Cancel Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be treated
as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94, Rollo).
On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to comment on Robles Urgent Motion to
Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal and ordered the
suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for September 26, 1988.
On January 26, 1989, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal denied Robles Motion for
Reconsideration (pp. 109-111, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989 (pp. 1-
14, Rollo).
On February 2, 1989, We required the respondents to comment within ten (10) days from notice of the
petition (p. 118, Rollo). On February 9, 1989, petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion Reiterating
Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16,
1989. Petitioners Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the same resolution of
February 16, 1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this
time questioning respondent HRETs February 16, 1989 resolution denying petitioners motion to
defer or reset revision until this Court has finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a
partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules
was had with private respondent Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex C of
Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo).
It is petitioners main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion
to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for hearing dated September 12,
1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently
ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
We do not agree with petitioner.
It is noted that upon Santos filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts on
September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by respondent HRET. Contrary to petitionerss claim
that the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show that it was only on September
19, 1988 when respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other motions. The
questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3) motions, namely: a) Protestees Urgent
Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestants
Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, dated September 14, 1988. The
resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows:
x x x
WHEREFORE, Protestees Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and Protestants Motion to
Withdraw Protest are NOTED. The Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest is
GRANTED.
x x x.
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any
action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated (Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held:
We cannot agree with Protestees contention that Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts effectively withdrew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before
the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the
Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise
would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestants
Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the
will of the electorate is ascertained.
Since Protestants Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised Precincts had not been acted upon
by this Tribunal before it was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the
precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn from the protest, then
the granting of Protestants Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest did not
amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the
cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected
by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount
Insurance Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564). This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and
again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra, at 162.] The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under
the 1935 Constitution has been described as intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature [Id. at 175.] Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919).] Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil.
818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and
the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140.]
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution. Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is
(thus) possible only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x upon a
determination that the tribunals decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law,
or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR manifestly constituting such a GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in
promulgating the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue.
Further, petitioners objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on
procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction
over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the
essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral
mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been
set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the
popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its function as a
constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words.
The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 282) relied upon by
petitioner does not help to bolster his case because the facts attendant therein are different from the
case at bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon before the resolution
thereon was questioned.
As regards petitioners Supplemental Petition questioning respondent tribunals resolution denying his
motion to defer or reset revision of the remaining seventy-five (75) per cent of the contested precincts,
the same has become academic in view of the fact that the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989
and was terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondents Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo). This fact
was not rebutted by petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a
partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery
of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise,
no basis. The partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to
each party in the revision of which both parties were properly represented.
It would not be amiss to state at this point that an election protest is impressed with public interest in
the sense that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections (Dimaporo v.
Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.

Joker Arroyo vs HRET & Augusto Syjuco, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)
After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the lone district of
Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before
the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for revision and recounting.
HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to
ensure Syjucos win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and
recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his
complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is actually based
on a broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-
based anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices
members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunals jurisdiction and the 6
representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest
filed by Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD:
However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in his
memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally
sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive
emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondents belated attempt to inject
this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence (consisting of thousands of documents)
aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely
abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly
coined as precinct-level document-based evidence. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election
protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules.









Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), GR NO. 141489 May 29, 2002


Facts:
Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction were filed before the court that the respondents
be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and CA to include
part-list representatives in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and 18, Art VI.
Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of which are party-list representatives (PLR), the
petitioners put forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted and be replaced by PLR nominees.

Issues:

(I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because no party-list representatives are members thereof.
(II) Whether the refusal of the HRET and CA to reconstitute themselves to include party list representatives
constitute a grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

The court dismissed the case on the following grounds:
(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because:

a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members will occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and CA. And even if the
PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their own nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and
not the Supreme Court) in accordance with the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed to meet the requirements set forth for judicial
review. The petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA and neither were they nominees
to take the seat.

(II) There was likewise no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by HRET and CA because under Sec 17
and 18 of Art VI, the HRET and CA are deprived of any power to reconstitute themselves.
(III) The instant petitions must fail because of the new set of district and party-list reps elected in the House. It
cannot be resolved based on the "present composition" of the House as presented
by the petitioners.







AGGABAO vs. COMELECGR No. 163756 | Jan 26, 2005 | Certiorari | Ynares-Santiago Petitioner:
Georgidi Aggabao Respondents: COMELEC, Provincial Board of Canvassers of Isabela and Anthony
Miranda

Facts:
Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela
during the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San
Agustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was 1. tampered with
2. prepared under duress 3. differed from other authentic copies and 4. contained manifest errors.
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for a pre-proclamation
controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of Representatives.
May 22, 2004 - the reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested
COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th copies of the COCVs. Based on the results, Miranda garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Congressman.
On appeal with the COMELEC, Aggabao asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard
Mirandas Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, it still erredin
excluding the contested COCVs as they appeared regular and properly authenticated.
June 6, 2004 - Miranda filed a Very Urgent Motion for Proclamation.
Aggabao opposed it. He contended that the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second Division is a
bar to Mirandas proclamation.
In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, commissioner in-charge for Regions I
and III, approved the proclamation of the remainin winning candidates for the province of Isabela.
June 9, 2004 - the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 7233 likewise directing the proclamation of the
remaining winning candidates in Isabela.
On the same day, Aggabao filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Notice of Proclamation
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
June 14, 2004 - Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.
Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition assailing Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the
COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the
Second Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
In his comment, Miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao
isbest addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).

August 27, 2004 - Aggabao filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Resolution; Manifestation that the
COMELEC Second Division Issued a Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of the Petitioner; and Reply to the
Comment.
He manifested that on August 16, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division gave due course to his pending appeal.
At the same time, he bewailed the failure of the COMELEC Second Division to annul the proclamation.

Issue: WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies
Held:
No. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.













LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC GR NO. 178831, APRIL 2009

FACTS:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and some other
concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs dad. During the pendency of the case
against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified.
About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the
following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued
a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in
compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before
the COMELEC. Limkaichongasailed Paras petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the
COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise
jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC should
still exercise jurisdiction over the matter
HELD:
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing
of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment
to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides:
Sec 2: Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a division shall be filed 5 days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends
the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the HOR, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latters election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word sole in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

BANAT v. COMELEC,G.R. 177508, August 7, 2009
FACTS:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party list petitioned in Court for
the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No.5352.
Petitioner also assailed the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged
that they were of questionable application and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether RA
9369, RA 7166 as amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated
Section 26(1)of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." BANAT also questioned the validity of
Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section17 or Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that
the Senate and the House of Representatives should each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all election, returns, and qualification contests relating to its Members.
Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of RA 9369.
ISSUE:
Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?

HELD:
No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption isthat the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional
must show that there is a clear anunequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments
introduced by Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on thepre-
proclamation controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "en banc" may entertain pre-
proclamation cases for national elective posts.







DRILON, ET AL VS. SPEAKER GR NO. 180055, JULY 31, 2009
Facts:
Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents tothe Commission on
Appointments (CA). Petitioners went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the
Liberal Party in the CA. RepresentativeTaada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include oneseat
for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution
Representative Taada also brought the matter to the attention of then Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the
position that since there were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the party should be
represented in theCA.However, No report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department,drawing
Representative Taada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned
the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition bypetitioner former Senator Franklin M. Drilon (in
representation of the Liberal Party), et al., for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against then Speaker De Venecia,
Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives,
Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity as exofficio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D. Aspiras in her
capacity as Secretary of the CA, and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent to the
CA.
Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in constituting the commission on appointments in contravention of the required proportional
constitution by depriving the Liberal Party of its constitutional entitlement to one seat therein.
Held:
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on
the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.







GUERRERO VS. COMELECG.R. NO. 137004, JULY 26, 2000
Facts:
Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the
First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged thatFarinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in
the May 11, 1998polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8,
1998,Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas whowithdrew on April 3,
1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election,
Farinas was duly proclaimed winner.Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas
could notvalidly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but
was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for anindependent candidate. Ruiz claimed that
Farinas certificate of candidacy was fatallydefective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a
member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion inholding that the determination of the
validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondentFarinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Held:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it heldthat its jurisdiction over the case
had ceased with the assumption of office of respondentFarinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos
Norte. While COMELEC isvested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal toexercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC andthe HRET. Under Art. VI,
Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate
has beenproclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,returns and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, theCOMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the
case is justifiable, indeference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.








E. Garcia, et. Al vs HRET GR. No. 134792 12 August 1999
Facts:
Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd district of Manila. However, there has been a petition
for quo warranto filed before the HRET against Congress man Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the
eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives claiming that the latter was
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon the petitioners filing of
their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php filing fee. However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing
the petition for failure to pay 5,000 php as deposit. The petitioners then filed the cash deposit and filed for a
motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached. However, it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for quo warranto
of petitioners even after the payment of deposit fee
Ruling:
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has a judgment call and has
the authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual
and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. In view of the delicate
nature of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be
taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners are duty bound to know and are expected to
properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally ordered to
do so. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
and swift dispensation.












Lazatin vs. HET, GR NO. 84297, December 8, 1988
Facts:
Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the comelec to annual his proclamation after he had
taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharge the duties of congressman of the 1st district of
Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the comelec is the sole judge of all election contest. Buan Jr,
and Timbol ( Lazatin's opposition) alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the
assailed comelec resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October
6,1987. In the comment of the Sol- Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because
the proclamation was valid. The telex order issued by the comelec directing the canvassing board to proclaim
the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election code, " was in effect a grant of authority by
the comelec, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected
the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolution of the petitions of candidate's Timbol,
Buan Jr, and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
Issue :
Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET's jurisdiction.
Held :
The SC in a Resolution dated November 17,1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is
impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the congressional elections in the first
forest district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For
this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurf the functions of the house
electoral tribunal. The alleged in validity of the proclamation ( which had been previously ordered by the
comelect itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of
the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgement of the
electoral tribunal.











Section 18. Commission on Appointments
Raul daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
Facts:
The laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino ( LDP ) political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its
representation in the commission on appointments. They withdraw the seat occupied by the Daza ( LDP member
) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the COA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza question such
replacement.
Issues:
Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment valid changes the composition of the commission
an appointments.
Held:
As provided in the constitution; " there should be a commission on appointments consisting of twelve senators
and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of
proportional representation" of the political parties there in, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house
of Congress to see to it that the requirements is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measure,
not only upon the initial organization of the commission but also subsequently there to not the court.















COSETENG VS MITRA, 187 SCRA 377 (1990)
Facts:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner
Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As158 out of
202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner
Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commissionon Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On December 5,
1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on
Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis
C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House
minority. On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying
that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan,Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission
on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing
them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission
violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political.2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on
Appointments were chosen on thebasis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as
provided in Section 18,Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court
ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18.
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI,1987 Constitution.) The
composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House.There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership(which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap)as
the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on
Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no
merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should
have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on
Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.



















TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIANDEMOCRATS
(LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners,vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO
E.TAADA,
respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Facts:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPCsenators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirementthat each house must have 12
representatives in the Commission on Appointments, the partiesagreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of
Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No.of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would
produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN.Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP -PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the Commission
on Appointments. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen. Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the Commission on Appointments should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two
NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He
alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of
Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the
fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect
Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of
the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.
A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the Commission on
Appointments. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator
cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to
come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.



Drilon, et al v. Speaker GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation
of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent of the CA, hence, as prayed for, the
petition is withdrawn . As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. The second
petition filed by Senator Jamby Madrigal in a summary tackle about the reorganization of the
membership of the CA and that, in the meantime, all actions of CA be held in abeyance as
the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional. Senator Jamby Madrigal petitions
to Reorganize the membership of the CA is based upon the Observations that she herself
observe in the list of Commission on Appointments membership that there are certain
Political Parties acquire a seat of membership in CA held a position which supposedly are not
allowed in the provision of the constitution, moreover, she added to stopped intention of the
committee request that all actions of the Commission be held in ABEYANCE.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.
HELD:
Senator Madrigal contention has been dismissed due to the guidelines she ignored.
Petitioner has no standing to file the petition. Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort, Each House of Congress has the sole function of
reconstituting or changing the composition of its own contingent to the CA. The Extra ordinary
remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the
Petitioner.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Wherefore, the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No.180055 is
Granted. The Petition is Withdrawn. The Petition in G.R No. 183055 is Dismissed.










Section 21. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Bengson v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committe, 203 SCRA 767
FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa-Cory's brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. That
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. And claiming that the Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena
them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the committee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as " The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was
to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really " i aid of legislation" because it is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find
out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of
RA No. 3019, the " Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," a matter that appears more within
the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.






Standard Charter v. Senate GR No. 167173

FACTS:
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition (with Prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or injunction) dated and filed on March 11, 2005 by petitioners against respondent
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by
Edgardo Angara. Petitioner SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive
officers of said. Respondent is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the
Philippines. The petitioner seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate(P.S)
Resolution No.166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines
to attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly
that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting
the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered.

ISSUE:
Petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold
unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the court that took cognizance of the
foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in these courts

HELD:
Contention is untenable P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
inquiry to be and already being conducted by the respondent Committee. as found in the last
three
1) clauses thereof. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said
resolution, expose the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege
speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply, to denounce the illegal practice
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities, This fallacy is made
more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile
urged the Senate,
2) to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future
3) Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct.



Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 PHIL 29

FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government
of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime n 1949. Among the witnesses called to
be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During
the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the
same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate, the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent question in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the senate can impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to
answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing
said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness, right to due
process of law.









SABIO V. GORDON, 504 SCRA 704, OCTOBER 17, 2006

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:

No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact;
or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle
of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right
of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.




















CASE TITLE: SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. MAJADUCON,
GR No. 136760, JULY 29, 2003

FACTS:
Aug 28, 1998. Senator Blas Ople filed SRN 157.-directing National Defense and Security, to conduct inquiry,
in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of
active and retired military officers were organizing a coup detat to prevent the administration of then President
Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Aug 28, 1998. Senator Vicente Sotto III filed SRN 160.-directing appropriate Senate
Committee to conduct inquiry, in aid of legislation, into alleged mismanagement of funds and
investment portfolio of AFP-RSBS (Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System)
Senate President referred SRNs to: a) Committee on Accountabil ity of Publ ic officers and
Investigations [Blue Ribbon Committee] b)Committee on National Defense and Security
In public hearing of Blue Ribbon Committee, appeared that AFP-RSBS purchased lot in Gen San {LOT X MR-
1160} forPhp10,000/sqm. In Deed of Sale, Registry of Deeds, purchase price: Php 3000/sqm. Blue Ribbon
Committee services SUBPOENA to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify..
SUBPOENA-: a writ commanding person to attend court under penalty for failure to do so.

Atty. Flaviano refused. He filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23,{docketed as SP Civil Case
No. 496
On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the
Committee to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in
General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the
patenting/titling and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS, and from issuing subpoenas to
witnesses from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the
petition for prohibition and injunction.
[3]

On November 5, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of
(a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action. It further argued that the
issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order was invalid for violating the rule against ex-
parte issuance thereof; and that the same was not enforceable beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court.
On November 11, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss and granted the
writ of preliminary injunction


ISSUES:

(a) whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when
he dismissed petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction; and
(b) whether or not respondent Judge erred in convicting petitioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of
court.


HELD:
The Supreme Court finds that there is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the
assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification. In this case, the assailed resolution of
respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution.

The Court also finds that petitioner Pimentel is not guilty of improper conduct which obstructs or
degrades the administration of justice. The statement that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of
the rules of law and procedure does not constitute improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice. As correctly argued by petitioner, the phrase gross ignorance
of the rules of law and procedure is ordinarily found in administrative complaints and is a necessary
description to support a petition which seeks the annulment of an order of a judge wherein basic legal
principles are disregarded.












CASE TITLE: SENATE V. ERMITA, 488 SCRA 1, GR 169777, APRIL 30, 2006

FACTS:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise
sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent
belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related
with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Anault.



CASE TITLE: NERI V. SENATE, 549 SCRA 771

FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment
and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by
the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on
national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were
introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending
invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner
was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but
refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For
failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUES:
Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

HELD:
The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive
privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive
privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to
provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately. Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the
letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the
said information may impair the countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Republic of China.
The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public
information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly
confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind.
The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its
Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules
of procedure. Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.






















Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

FACTS: On September 26, 2007, Neri appeared before the respondent committees and
testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project - a
project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that we was
offered by Abalos a brie of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when he was further probed on PGMA's and petitioner's discussions relating to the
NBN project, peti ti oner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. The questions
that he refused to answer were: whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project; whether
ot not PGMA directed him to prioritize it; whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.
Hence, Subpoena Ad Testificandum to the petitioner was issued. The petitioner did not
appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec
privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He
was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
WON respondent committee committed a violation against Sec. 21 or Article VI in the
Constitution.

Held:
Respondents violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, requiring that the inquiry
be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. This requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate are
therefore procedurally infirm. The language of Sec. 21 Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that
the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It should
likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should
be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expresses in Sec.21 Art. 6 of the Constitution.



GARCILLANO V.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR NO. 170338, December 23, 2008

Facts:
This case involves the infamous Garci Tapes which allegedly contained the conversation of
PGMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano where the former instructed the latter to
manipulate theelection results in favor of PGMA. The speech of Cong. Escudero inthe House
of Reps jumpstarted the congressional investigation over these tapes. During the inquiry,
several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National
Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of
former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees
seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After
prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and
authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the
House. The HouseCommittee also decided to prepare committee reports based on the
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons in the hearings.
In the Senate, Senator Lacson also delivered a speech regarding the Garci Tapes. On motion
of Sen. Pangilinan, these tapes should be the subject of a legislative investigation by the
Senate. However, Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.
Sen. Defensor-Santiago also delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view
that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Because of these developments, Garcillano, and retired CA Justices Ranada and Agcaoili
filed separate petitions before the Supreme Court to for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Garcillano
prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape
recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto
be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. On the
other hand, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili prayed that the Senate be barred from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the House Committee hearings and the Senate legislative should be
prohibited for violation of RA No. 4200 (Anti-wiretapping Law) and sec. 3, Art. III of the
Constitution (privacy of communications)

Held:
The petition of Garcillano praying that the House Committee hearings on the Garci tapes be
stopped must be dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court noted that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.
However, the petition for prohibition of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili must be granted.
(However, the ponente did not touch upon the issue of the admissibility of the Garci Tapes.
The granting of the second petition was based on the non-compliance of the
legislativeinvestigation with sec. 21, art. VI of the Constitution which requires that inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance must be conducted in accordance with the Senates duly
published rules of procedure. Since the Senate did not publish its rules of procedure, then
noinquiry must be allowed lest violate the given constitutional requirement. The phrase "duly
published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half
of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each
term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation to be conducted by
the Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.













NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELEC. COOP., INC. vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF
DUMAGUETE, 155 SCRA 421 (1991)

FACTS: A subpoena was sent by the Ad Hoc Committee of Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete (respondent) to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of
the Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the
Committee's investigation. However, they failed to appear at said investigation and were sent
were ordered to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to
their failure to appear at said investigation. The investigation to be conducted by respondent
Committee was "in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public
utilities" in the City of Dumaguete and the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and
use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. Petitioners moved to
quash the subpoena but the motion to quash was denied. Petitioners contend that the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who
fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in
the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to
NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sangguniang Panglungsod have the power to punish a legislative
contempt for a partys disobedience of subpoena?

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the
power to punish non-members for contempt. There being no provision in the Local
Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is
devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc
Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these
powers. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such
issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena
power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the
investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. As admitted by the respondents
in their Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look
into the use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of pre-war vintage" which the latter had
acquired from the Visayan Electric Com. company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners". It
comes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of
NORECO II and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committees.
Section 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging
the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did
not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections
24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 of the Philippine Constitution.

HELD:
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law.
It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may
undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
Alvarez v. Guingona, GR No. 118303, January 31, 1996

In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR.
In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the
Senate.
In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a
public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its
recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817
became a law (RA 7720).
Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the
law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago was not able to comply with the income of
at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average
income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should not be.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate
held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
reading in the HOR.
The Senate only conducted its 1
st
hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the
Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was done in
the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need
of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a
special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the
Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-
owned-or-controlled corporations.



Guingona Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the
CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more
than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat.
In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.


Section 25. Limits on Power to Appropriate
Garcia vs. Mata 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive
status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him
to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which
prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has
no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item
therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails
to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law
for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental
governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of
reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION
MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general
appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to
the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be
expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.



Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)

Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister
of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of
1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency
of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings
within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.













DPWH vs Quirowa













[Sorry, walang ibang mahanap.]


Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the
General Appropriations Act of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in
the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme
is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt
policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred
that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of
the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found
that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as
a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is
valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations.
The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to
the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by
Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense.
The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original
intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the
AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the
CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The
SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it
would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I
am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court,
the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only
be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements
of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for
that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to
where funds should be allocated.



Sanchez vs. COA, 552 SCRA 471

Facts: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the
amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to
Implement Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to
constitute and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized under
the Local Government Code of 1991. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and
attested by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently issued a
memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the
operational expenses of the task force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. Upon post-
audit conducted by Department auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were disallowed.

Issue: What are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation may be allowed? Are those
present in this case?

Ruling: Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and
the heads of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before
transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the realignment (of
savings). However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1)
The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same
are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure
to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the
profligate spending thereof.
With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President
could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor proof that the amount transferred was
savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer was made.
Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was not in accordance with the purposes laid down by
the Special Provisions of R.A. 7180.
Section 26. Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings

Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962)

Cordero is the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Salazar who filed a case
against landlord Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a
motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of RA 1199 or The Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by counsel of tenants who
cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the Dept of Labor. Judge Cabatuando ruled
in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal RA 2263 AN ACT AMENDING
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-
NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES was
passed. This law, particularly Sec 19 & 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now allows trial lawyers
from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of creation of the Tenancy Mediation
Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment being the done the issue
has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando countered that the provision is not embraced in the
title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to
allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants.
HELD: The SC ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The constitutional
requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which
is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare
sections 19 & 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of representing
indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial attorneys in the Mediation
Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In other words, a
declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the
intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of
Justice.

Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives,
and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an
attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during
their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same
provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire
after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four
years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are
given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case,
cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act
No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within
the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not
constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said
Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore,
is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and
other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence
in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words,
under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the
salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the
retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other
emoluments.
Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for
services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs
counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared
unconstitutional by the SC.







PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC, 227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than
one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.




Insular Lumber Company v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981)

Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956,
RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in
the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years
from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to the CTA
and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence,
the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot
be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of
P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full
amount of P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those
paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was
credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR
averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide Means for
Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase
Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial
exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for
refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a
decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is
in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific
tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the
aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely
fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear
out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by
Congress which passed it.










Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 (1968)

Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in
NAPOCOR that in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder, receiving at least
50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder shall not
realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating
expenses. Also it could renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power
and energy,. This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and
PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They
aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . . This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It
is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers
along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title
of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it
suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise
nature of the amendment. Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of
the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.


Case Title: Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected
by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processedvideo-tape cassette,
ready for playback, regardless of length, anannual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation
of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses
and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical
attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals,
sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry.

Issue/s

1. Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

2. Whether or not the Decree is constitutional.

Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax
is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating
the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was
also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of
the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant
film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films
with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the dropin
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities ofvideo establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are
required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Case Title: Tolentino V. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
Facts
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Issue/s
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
Held
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue
law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill
which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
Case Title: Tobias V. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)
Nature of the case
Petition to render RA No. 7675 unconstitutional
Petitioner
Robert Tobias Ramon Guzman, Terry Lim, Gregorio Gabriel and Roberto R.Tobias, Jr.

Respondents
Hon City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, City Treasurer William Marcelino and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, all of the city of Mandaluyong

Facts
As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of
RA No.7675 otherwise known as An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong.
Prior to the enactment of the statute,
Ma n d a l u y o n g a n d S a n J u a n b e l o n g e d t o o n e l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t . H
o n C o n g r e s s i o n a l representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and
signed by pres. Fidel Ramos becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted
yes while 7,911 voted no. Thus, RA7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Issue
1. RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative
of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it
contravenes the one-subject-one bill rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of
the Constitution (every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this section embraces
two principal subjects 1) the conversion
of Mandal uyong i nt o a HUC and 2) t he di vi si on of t he congr essi onal
di st r i ct of SanJuan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

2. Second and third objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts has resulted in increase in the composition of the
House of Representatives and that it preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).


Held
Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.

Rationale
1 . T h e c r e a t i o n o f s e p a r a t e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i s t r i c t f o r Ma n d a l
u y o n g i s n o t a s u b j e c t separate and distinct from the subject of
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule, it
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement is the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions germane to that general subject

2. Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than
250thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative
proviso in the constitutionthe said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the
r egul ar congr essi onal pr ocesses i ncl udi ng due consi der at i on by t
he member s of t he House of Repr esent at i ve.












Case Titile: Banat V. Comelec, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009
Facts:
This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369
(RA 9369)and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute.

RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7
December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less
than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for
prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also
assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these
provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution.
Petitioner argues the following:
The title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9369.

Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).According to petitioner, under the amended
provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice
President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en
banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the
President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation
cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government
concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.Section 34 which
fix the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon
election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right
to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds
that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.


Issue/s: Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

-Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution;

-Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution

-Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution


Held: The petition is denied. RA 9369 is constitutional.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing
Funds Therefore and for other purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and
other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and
accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to
specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26,
30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP
881.Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to
amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.

The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption
and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy,
incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section
37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation
cases for national elective posts.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.

The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only
applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore,
no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise
of police power and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just
an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The
role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise
of its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair
and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy
of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.


Case Title: Abas Kida V. Senate of the Philippines, GR. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Facts:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2
nd
Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Issue/s
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

Held:
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the
EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents
certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to
achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in
the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or
(3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1
st
option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office
of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through
a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also
create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is
viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results
3.2. 2
nd
option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own,
has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse
of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than
the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term
of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
3.3. 3
rd
option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed;
these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA
No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining
to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization,
it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.








Section 27. Passage of bills; Item Veto
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CIR v. CTA XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Title of the Case: BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION vs VALENCIA
Facts:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by
the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio
Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be filed two
month before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic
Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications(formerly
Commerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of
station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be disapproved
without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to
petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to
disapprove the applications for renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to
exist when the act of late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the
circular dated July24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e.,
late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and,
hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation.

Issues:
(1) Whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners'
applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis; (2) whether or not there was
abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9in favor of
PBS; and (3) whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is
entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.

Held:
In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation of
petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal
effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. There was
no express agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network
(CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was
such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the
construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued
to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between the radio
control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN from Channel
9 to Channel 10.As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state that it
having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the exchange of use
of Channel 9 and 10, no right belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to
give up its present operation of Channel 9. Based on the Appropriations Act the amount appropriated
for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the
same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are
already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President
may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. the
executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no
effect whatsoever, 4 and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any
expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station
in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express
condition for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see
that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been
entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.














Title of the Case: GONZALES V MACARAIG
FACTS:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following:
(1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has
to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.


HELD:

SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise
of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo
that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and
Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents
veto power.


Title of the Case: PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1,1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art
7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court. PhilCons A
prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the
GAA of 1994.16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National
Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items
of the GAA of 1994 and2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation
for debt services. Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU s, DPWH,
and National Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
HELD:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling
Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/ovetoing the entire appropriation for debt
service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/debt service. They are appropriate
provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation.
VETO VOID
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &creation
of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed
by Pres. Other SCU s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to
existing law.
VETO VALID
Special Provision on Road Maintenance

Congress specified 30% ratio for works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines
set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate
provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation.
VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip.
AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is
the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law.
VETOVALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions
allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the
Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.
VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs
use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an
appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws.
VETO VALID.










Title of the Case: BENGZON V. DRILON


FACTS:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by
the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill
provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the
Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.



HELD:

The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto
is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.



LORENZO M. TAADA vs. JUAN C. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

Section 28. Power of Taxation; Limitations; Exemptions
Title of the Case: COMMISSIONER VS. LINGAYEN GULF ELECTRICGR L-23771,
4 AUGUST 1988, EN BANC, SARMIENTO (J): 13 CONCUR
Facts:
Lingayen Gulf Electric Power operates an electric power plant serving the municipalities of Lingayen
and Binmaley, Pangasinan, pursuant to municipal franchise granted it by the respective municipal
councils. The franchises provided that the grantee shall pay quarterly to the Provincial Treasury of
Pangasinan 1% ofthe gross earnings obtained through the privilege for the first 20 years
(from 1946), and 2% during the remaining 15 years of the life of the franchise. In 1948, the
Philippine President approved the franchise
(RA3843) . I n 1955, t he BI R as s es s ed and demanded agai ns t t he company def i ci
enc y f r anchi s e t axes andsurcharges fro the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of
5% on gross receipts from 1948 to1954. The company asked for a reinvestigation, which was denied.
Issue: Whether the Court can inquire into the wisdom of the Act.
Held:
The Court does not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of the Act. Charters or
special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not
constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. They are usually adopted
after careful consideration of the private rights in relation with the resultant benefits of the State.
In passing a special charter, the attention of the Legislature is directed to the facts and
circumstances which the act or charter is intended to meet. The Legislature considers and
makes provision for all the circumstance of the particular case. The Court ought not to disturb the
ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals on the constitutionality of the law in question.

Issue [2]: Whether a rate below 5% on gross income violate the uniformity of tax clause in the
Constitution.
Held [2]: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed
alike. The legislature has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant
exemptions. Tax exemptions have never been deemed violateve of the equal protection clause. Herein,
the 5% franchise tax rate provided in Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have
a universal application. Section 259 expressly allows the payment of taxes at rates lower
than 5% when the charter granting the franchise precludes the imposition of a higher tax. RA
3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it in lieu of any
and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. The company, hence, is not liable for
deficiency taxes.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, (235 SCRA 630, 249 SCRA 628) August 25, 1994; October 30,
1995
Facts:
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. The value-added tax
(VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. Among the Petitioners was the Philippine Press Institute which claimed that
R.A.7716 violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay
Value Added Tax. It is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
non discriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI argued that the
VAT is in the nature of a license tax.
Issue:
Whether or not the purpose of the VAT is the same as that of a license tax.
Ruling:
A license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to
others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the
Jehovahs Witnesses, in connection with the latters sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional.
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is
quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a
license tax..It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the
sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its
right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.







GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219July 3, 1992
FACTS:
The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products,
additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to
the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which
levied a special duty of P0.95per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.

RULING:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bill is within the province of
the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure
are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides: The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix tariff rates and other
duties or imposts The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.











CIR vs SANTOS GR No. 119252, Aug 18, 1997
Facts:
Apolinario B. Santos, the Judge of RTC, Branch 67 Pasig- .Guild of Phil Jewe lers, Inc.: an association of Filipino
jewelers engaged in the manufacture of jewelries; among its members are Hans Brumann, Inc., Miladay
Jewels, Inc., Mercelles Inc., Solid Gold Intl. Traders, Inc., Diagem Trading Corp., & Jewelry by Marco & Co., Inc.
Respondent Marcos the President of the Guild. On Aug 5, 1988, BIR Director Viray issued Regional Mission
Order to conduct surveillance, monitoring and inventory of all imported articles of Hans Brumann Inc. After
said surveillance, BIR requested the establishment not to sell the articles until it can be proven that the
necessary taxes thereon have been paid. Mr. Hans Brumann agreed and signed said order. He never filed a
protest on the preventive embargo of the articles. Brumann was requested to prepare and make available the
documents indicated therein (the books of accounts and other accounting records); Brumann did not produce
the documents. Respondents Marco & Co. contended the constitutionality of Sec 150 (a) of NIR Code & prayed
that CIR and Customs be enjoined from issuing mission orders. Sec 150 (a) of NIR Code : Non-essential
goodsThere shall be levied, assessed and collected a tax equivalent to 20% based onthe wholesale price or
the value of importation used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff & custom duties; net of the
excise tax and value added tax. (Jewelry is considered non-essential good)
Issue: Whether or not Sec 150 (a) of the NIR code is unconstitutional.
Held: The petition is hereby granted Court is not in the position to question wisdom of Sec 150 (a) of NIR Code.
In imposing the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and executive
branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling
out or one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.


Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Phils., G.R. No. 158540, Aug. 3,
2005
Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this case have done their best to put up a
spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. At
present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),[1] who now
seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner
Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross).
This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents, it is about love of country and the
future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this Court, it is about elementary
statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar
measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds true with
this present Resolution.
POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFF RATES: Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has
no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming
that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the
ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional
provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional
grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
QUALIFIERS: This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority
attain primordial consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2) there must be specified limits; and (3) Congress
may impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority.
POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES: The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the
President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter
egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of
power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter
ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary
who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures.
Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and
imports.
TARIFF COMMISSION AND DTI SEC ARE AGENTS: Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the
SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its
inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In
that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within
their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which
significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may
be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the
President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization
through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because
taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated
conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act
that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act
beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short,
Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and
assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such
measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists
to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission
their respective functions in the legislatures scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by
Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of
the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the
Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides for
a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose
safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts.
POWER BELONGS TO CONGRESS: the cited passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, Since the Constitution
has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone
which can curtail such power. Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first
place which may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of redundancy, we quote Section
28(2), Article VI: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President.


ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS AQUINO

FACTS:
Petitioner filed complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and Notice of Sale of its lot
and building for the non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Said notice of Seizure was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the building is used exclusively for educational purpose.

HELD:
The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by laws nor by
jurisprudence. The lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
sketch by implication be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the constitution.


REV. FR.CASIMIRO LLADOC VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (CIR) AND THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS GR NO. L-19201 JUNE 16, 1965
FACTS:
Petitioner appealed to the CTA on November 2, 1960 that he is not supposed to pay the taxes imposed by the
respondent assessment for donees gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victoria claiming that at the time of
the donation, he was not the Parish Priest in Victoria, that there is no legal entity or juridical person known as
the Catholic Parish Priest of Victoria , and therefore he should be liable for the donees gift tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner have to pay the donees gift tax

HELD:

Yes, Petitioner is required to pay the donees gift tax. Gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the constitution. It is hereby affirmed
insofar as tax liability is concerned, in the sense that herein petitioner is not personally liable for the said gift
tax but he is presently the Parish Priest, thus ordered to pay the said gift tax without any pronouncement of
the cost.

Central Mindanao University vs DAR
Facts: The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate
located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. Primarily an agricultural university. Sometime in
1986, the CMU pres. launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-
IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide
socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income
of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement

among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated
Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would
provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would
provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor
and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and
P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year
would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired
laborers or members of their family to establish any house or live within the vicinity of the project area
and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-
landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose
contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate. The non-renewal of the contracts,
the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or
separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
Issue: W/N DARAB's has the jurisdiction to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar.
HELD: NO, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving
a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered
segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its
purposes.
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to
agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.


Commissioner vs Ca
Facts: Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various
programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its
religious, educational and charitable objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income from leasing out a portion of its
premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and 0 from parking fees
collected from non-members. Thus, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment to private respondent for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes
on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private respondent
formally protested the assessment saying that the leasing of their facilities to small shop owners, to
restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of parking lots are reasonably incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the private respondent and that the
income derived there from are tax exempt..
Issue: W/N the income of private respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees are exempt
from taxation.
Held: Yes, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last
paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations
(such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the imposed by the
same Code. Because the last paragraph of said section unequivocally subjects to tax the rent income
of the YMCA from its rental property, the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning
and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction.
FOR REFERENCE:
SEC. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. -- The following organizations shall not be taxed
under this Title in respect to income received by them as such x x x xx
(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other non-profitable
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
member;x x x xx x x x x
Notwithstanding the provision in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and
character of the foregoing organization from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of
their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject
to the tax imposed under this Code. (as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1457)




SYSTEM PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE VS. CALOOCAN CITY
FACTS: Petitioner requested respondent to extend tax exemption to the parcel of land claiming that
the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant
to Art. 5, Sec. 28 (3) of the 1987 Constitution and other applicable provisions of the Local
Government Code. The claim was denied for the said parcel of land was owned by its sister
company of which later on, donated it to the petitioner. The petitioner requested for tax
exemption but was still denied for the reason that the donation was a mere farce to evade the
payment of taxes. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lie against public respondent?
HELD: The court held that the petition for certiorari is dismissed after petitioners petition for
mandamus was twice denied siting that mandamus does not lie against the public respondent,
for it is defined as a judicial writ issued as a command to an inferior court to perform a public
or statutory duty, as such with the case at bar.

JOHN HAY VS. LIM
FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Fidel
V. Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone and creating a
regime of Tax exemption within.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner have legal standing to bring the petition?

HELD: Yes, the petitioner have legal standing as to which in assailing the legality of Proclamation No.
420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the government act being challenged.

LUNG CENTER VS. QUEZON CITY
FACTS: The petitioner, a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 1823, filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution of which
60% of its hospital beds were exclusively used for charity patients.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution within the context
of the constitution, and therefore, exempt from the real property tax?
HELD: The court ruled that the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution for it possess
the elements required for it to be one. However, under the constitution, in order to be
entitled to exemption from real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof.
Thus, if the real property is used for one or more commercial purpose, it is not exclusively
used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.



PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. VS. FERTIPHIL CORP.

FACTS: The case stemmed from the issuance of LOI No. 1465, by then President Ferdinand Marcos
exercising his legislative powers, for the imposition of capital recovery component by the
Fertilizers Pesticides Authority on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the
Philippines. After the 1
st
EDSA revolution, the FPA stopped the imposition of P10 levy from
the PPI but was demanded for refund after the return of democracy. As such, it refused to
accede the demand of Fertiphil and questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI No. 1465 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The court ruled that LOI No. 1465 is unconstitutional for the mere fact that it was not for a
public purpose because it expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private
company. Thus, the purpose of the law is evident from its text that taxes are exacted only for
a public purpose.















Section 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 SCRA 331
Facts: Petitioner seeks to declare RA 920 as unconstitutional as as declaring the donation
by Sen. Zulueta as invalid. RA 920 contained an item appropriating 85,000 which the
petitioner alleged that it was for the construction of roads improving the private property
of Zulueta. He alleges that the said law was not for a public purpose.
Issue: Is R.A. 920 unconstitutional?
Ruling: Yes. R.A. 920 is an invalid imposition, since it results in promotion of a private
enterprise as it benefit the property of a private individual. The provision that the land
thereafter be donated to the government has not cure the defect. The rule is that if the
public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in promotion of a particular enterprise,
such defect shall render the law invalid. On the other hand, if what is incidental is the
promotion of a private enterprise the tax law shall be deemed for a public purpose.


VIRGILIO GASTON VS. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK GR L-77194 MARCH 15, 1988

Facts:

Petitioners are sugar cane producers, sugar cane planters and millers, who have come to this
court in their individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and
millers, said to be numerous that is impossible to bring them all to Court although the subject
matter of the present controversy is of common interest to all sugar producers, whether parties in
this action or not.
Respondent Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM), was formerly the government office
tasked with the function of regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it was superseded
by its co-respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) under Executive No. 18 on May 28,
1986. Although said Executive Order abolished the PHILSUCOM, its existence as a juridical entity
was mandated to continue the (3) more years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
suits by or against it and enables it to settle and close its affair, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets.
Respondent Republic Planters Bank, is a commercial banking corporation.
Angel H. Severino, Jr. et. Al., who are sugarcane planters planting and milling their sugarcane in
different mill districts of Negros Occidental, were allowed to intervene by the Court, since they
have common cause with petitioners and respondents having interposed no objection to their
prevention.
Petitioners and Intervenors have come to the Court praying for the Writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to implement and accomplish the privatization of Republic
Planters Bank by the transfer and distribution of the shares of the stocks of the said bank.

Issues:

1. Whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and planters pursuant to Section 7
of P.D. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public funds;
2. Whether shares of stocks in respondent bank paid for with said stabilization fees belong to the
PHILSUCOM or to the different sugar planters and millers from whom the fees were collected

Held:

The Writ of mandamus is denied and petition hereby DISMISSED.
The stabilization fees collected should be in the nature of tax, within the power of the State to
impose the promotion of the sugar industry. The Once the purpose has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general fund of the government. That
is the essence of the trust intended lifted from the 1935 Constitution.

Guingona vs. Carague
Facts:

That, the 1990 budget has a total of 98.4 billion for automatic appropriation (with 86.8 billion
for debt service) and 155.3 billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as General
Appropriations Act for 233.5 billion and on the other hand, appropriations to Department of
Education Culture and Sports (DECS) amounted to P27,017,813,000.00 only.
That, the said automatic appropriation is in coherence to the PD No. 18.

Issue:

W/N The automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional.

Held:

No, though it is clearly stated in Article XIV Section 5 (5) that to "assign the highest priority to
education", the Congress will not deprive its power to the call of demand for the national
interest and upholding other state policies and its objectives.
Congress is guided by its good judgment and it is only protecting our credit standing and its
response to our external debt.











PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS


FACTS:

In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal,
assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private
use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is
owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same
RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and
that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be
upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such
purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid?

HELD:

The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property
cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.