Norms and Priorities in Love Ethics

207 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics
READING # 3

FROM: Louvain Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring, 1977, pp. 207-238,
by Louis Janssens.
Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics

Louis Janssens

Canon Louis Janssens is the senior Iaculty member oI the School oI Theology oI ,the Catholic University oI Louvain, where
he has been proIessor oI moral theology since 1939. He is most widely respected Ior the introduction oI a personalistic
approach to moral theology. ProIessor Janssens has not opted Ior a deontological approach, because oI the ambiguities
inherent in the term 'teleological (which already has a history behind it). He preIers to call his approach an 'ethics oI
responsibilitiy". This has earned him a high place among contemporary Catholic moral theologians. ProIessor, Janssens` last
contribution to Louvain Studies, 'Ontic Evil and Moral Evil, is generally considered one oI the principal moral reIlections
oI our times.

The problem oI morality relates to our inner attitude or disposition and to our actions.
With regard to both disposition and conduct, moral norms have existed since ancient times.
As a matter oI Iact, we distinguish two categories oI norms according as they reIer either to
our disposition or to our actions.

THE FORMAL NORMS

Norms oI this category assert what our disposition ought to be. We call them Iormal
norms, because our inner attitude or disposition is the Iormal, animating element oI our
conduct.
According to the synoptic Gospels, Jesus articulated our Iundamental attitude in the
double commandment oI love (agape) : 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your
heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and Iirst command-
ment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourselI. On these two
commandments depend all the law and the prophets (Mt 22:37-40; cI. Mk 12:29-34 and
Lk 10:27).
Loving God with all our heart, soul and mind is not entirely reducible to the love oI
neighbor, as iI the latter were the only content that love Ior God possesses. The love oI God
involves distinct attitudes and actions such as worship, prayer, contemplation, giving
ourselves to God and putting ourselves at his disposal. On the other hand, a true and direct
love oI God has an eIIect on the content oI the love oI neighbor, which in its turn is an
essential criterion oI love Ior God, a test and mark oI its genuineness. As Karl Barth says,
the commandment to love God is in Iact the basic and comprehensive circle which includes
in itselI the commandment oI love oI neighbor.
1

The connection between the love oI God and love oI neighbor is an important subject
matter Ior moral theology. But Ior the problem

1 Karl Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik. vol. I, 18 (dealing with the liIe oI the children oI God).
1*

we are concerned with, we may conIine ourselves to the claims oI love oI neighbor.
According to Scripture, the love oI neighbor is the Iundamental attitude which
has to inIorm and animate, to inspire and direct, all the moral demands which may
aIIect us in our temporal relationships and activities. St. Paul emphasizes that through
love we ought to be servants oI one another, because the whole law is IulIilled in one
word: 'You shall love your neighbor as yourselI (Gal 5.13-14). To explain how the
love oI neighbor is the basic principle oI our moral liIe, Paul reIers to the
commandments oI the second table, concerning our temporal relationships, and
concludes that all oI them are summed up in the precept oI the love oI neighbor,
because love, doing no wrong to a neighbor, is the IulIillment oI the law (Rom 13:8-
10). In the same way St. Matthew asserts that the golden rule oI love oI neighbor
summarizes the law and the prophets, the revelation oI God`s moral will: 'Whatever
you wish that men would do to you, do so to them: Ior this is the law and the
prophets (Mt 7:12; cI Lk 6:31).2
How can the Iundamental attitude oI love oI neighbor be the principle oI the
actualization oI our temporal relationships? Nobody denies that a great part oI the
moral liIe is appropriately governed by a -direct appeal to love, by a direct application
oI agape to the particular case. But since we have to Iunction in a multiplicity oI tasks,
roles and situations, and since to act means to deal in an active way with the intricate
reality in us and outside oI us, the Iundamental attitude oI love oI neighbor oIten
requires the mediation oI numerous moral attitudes or dispositions, which have
traditionally been called moral virtues. Hence there is a multitude oI Iormal norms:
you shall be just, sincere, grateIul, humble, chaste etc.; do not be vain, selIish,
envious, pitiless, stingy, rancorous, etc.
The Iormal norms constitute the absolute element oI morals. For instance, it will
remain true that, always and in all circumstances, we must be just: we ought to be so
disposed as to be concerned with the growth oI truly human social relationships and
structures as well as with the promotion oI the possibilities Ior that purpose. This
example also shows that a good moral disposition is the driving-Iorce oI a dynamic
ethics.
Formal norms do not determine the concrete content oI our actions. There is, Ior
example, the norm requiring us to be chaste we have to order our sexuality in such a
way that we respect ourselves as human subjects, our relationships to others, and the
demands oI social liIe, This Iormal norm, although describing our inner attitude, does
not tell us which concrete actions are able to embody a chaste

2 Concerning the golden rule. cI. B. Schuller, Die Begrundung sittlicher Urteile, Patmos-Verlag, DsseldorI,
1973, p. 56-71 and H. Reiner. Die Grundlagen der Siftlichkeit, Verlag Anton Ham, Meisenheim am Glan, 1974, pp.
348-379.
1*

disposition. Nevertheless, Iormal norms are oI paramount importance, Ior they relate to the
good disposition which, with its set oI moral virtues, holds sway in the domain oI morality.
Our good disposition maniIests its authenticity and its dynamism in urging us to its
realization. In other words, in our action our good disposition is the principle oI our
motives, oI our intention, and oI its eIIectiveness. Thus our intention already involves the
choice oI the action which, according to our prudent judgment oI conscience, is appropriate
Ior the actualization oI our good disposition or is able to realize in a truly human way the
end aimed at by our intention.
3
When our good disposition animates and directs us to such
an extent that it is the source oI our motivation, oI our intention and oI our willingness to
choose conscientiously the appropriate action, we say that our action is morally good,
because it is thereby the Iruit oI a morally good will or, rather, it is the action oI a subject
who is morally good by virtue oI his good disposition. On the contrary, we say that the
person, his will and his action are morally bad, when a morally bad disposition (vice) is the
cause oI motive, intention and choice. This shows that moral goodness and moral badness
are Iinally determined by the goodness or badness oI our disposition or attitude. No wonder
that moral theology, in close contact with the Gospel, has said over and over again that
moral goodness and badness proceed Irom the heart and that the good tree oI the
disposition cannot bear evil Iruit.
But the problem oI morality is more extensive than the question oI moral goodness
and badness. We said that a good disposition requires us to choose the actions which, in
accord with our well-considered judgment oI conscience, are apt to embody or realize our
good attitude. Whether or not our actions are objectively suited to actualize our good
disposition is thereIore a matter oI knowledge and judgment (judgment oI conscience) and
ipso facto oI truth or untruth, oI rightness or wrongness. That is the reason why we say that
an action, which is objectively (in truth) capable oI incarnating our good disposition, is
morally right, whereas we qualiIy as morally wrong an action which is inappropriate Ior
that purpose.
The distinction between moral goodness and badness on the one hand and moral
rightness and wrongness on the other hand is extremely important. It is, indeed, a Iact that
both do not always coincide in our conduct. When in good Iaith we Iollow an erroneous
conscience, we perIorm an action which objectively is not suitable Ior incarnating a
morally good disposition and, thereIore, is morally wrong; nevertheless, under such
circumstances we behave in a morally good way. It is even possible that an action as such
be morally right and never-.
St. Thomas emphasizes that a real intention (finis uoluntatis) already includes
the choice oI the Iitting action (ea quae sunt ad Iinem) and that the end oI the will is willed in the means (hoc ipsum quod in
eis vult, est finis). CI. I II, q. 8, art. 2 and 32; q. l2, art, 4 ad 3).
1*
theless the subject acts in a morally bad way. St. Thomas gives a clear example. He speaks
oI a man who, through the physical content oI his action, provides an indigent person with
what he really needs. His action is morally right (vult id quod de se est bonum), because
objectively it is able to incarnate the good disposition oI love oI neighbor. But iI he acts
only Ior the sake oI vainglory, so that his bad disposition is the cause oI what he wills and
does (si sit intentio mala causa volendi), his will is morally bad (voluntas eius mala est)
and his action, as willed by him, is morally bad (vult id quod de se est bonum sub ratione
mali et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso. est malum).
As Kant properly observed, an essential element oI the scope oI ethics consists in
helping us to Iind an answer to the question What ought we to do? In other words, the
problem oI morality reIers not only to the moral goodness or badness oI our disposition,
but also to the moral rightness or wrongness oI our actions. With respect to the latter, the
moral rightness and wrongness oI our actions, ethics has never omitted the development oI
a second category oI moral norms.

THE CONCRETE MATERIAL NORMS

This second category comprises the concrete, material norms. We call them concrete,
because they apply to a series oI deIinite actions; we qualiIy them as material, because they
indicate the material content (what is done, actus -externus) oI these actions. For instance,
the norm 'you shall not kill concerns the whole category oI actions, the material content
oI which consists in taking a person`s liIe.
In order to clariIy the signiIicance and import oI the concrete, material norms, we
must take into account a double ambiguity which unavoidably aIIects our actions.
The Iirst Iorm oI ambiguity consists in the presence and connection oI premoral
values and disvalues in reality, as well as in our actions insoIar as our actions deal actively
with reality.
There are realities in us and outside oI us which, because oI their properties, provoke
in our experience a positive reaction in the sense that we enjoy them and welcome them as
'valuable and hence 'worthy oI promotion (prosequenda). These realities are liIe, bodily
and psychic health, pleasure and joy, Iriendliness, the cultural values oI science, technique,
art, etc. We call them premoral values (classically: bona phvsica).5 They are premoral,
because in them-

~ III. q. 19, art, 7 ad 2.
Strictly speaking the distinction has to be made between valuable reality and value. A value is a qualitative relation
between a reality which is valuable because oI some properties or qualities and a subject able to appreciate that reality Ior its
qualities. In other terms, a value is the reason why a reality is a good (ratio boni) in the classical sense oI the word.
1*

selves they are neither moral nor immoral : subjects richly provided with them may Iall
short in their moral liIe and this is essential morality only reIers to our disposition or
attitude and to our actions. They are premoral, because we shall soon see that Irom a moral
viewpoint how we deal with these values in our actions is oI crucial importance. The more
so as ethics has given evidence that not all oI these values are 'equivalent. Ethics knows
the claims oI an ordo bonorum so that in our moral conduct it will be impossible to
evade the question oI priorities.
There are also realities in us and outside oI us which, on account oI their qualities, we
experience in a negative way as regrettable, harmIul, detrimental and thereIore as to be
avoided and shunned (vitanda). These realities are hunger and thirst, pain and suIIering,
illness and death, neuroses and psychoses, ignorance, error, violence, segregation, etc. We
qualiIy them as premoral disvalues (classically:
mala phvsica). As such they are neither moral nor immoral: people who are aIIlicted with
them can be oI high moral standing and as we shall soon see actions may even cause
premoral disvalues without being ipso facto incapable oI embodying a morally good dis-
position and thus incapable oI being morally right actions.
It is a Iact that, in as much as our actions actively deal with material realities and the
multiplicity oI their Iixed laws and properties, premoral values and disvalues may be
inseparably connected in our activity. ReIerring to Hegel, Marx wrote that necessity is only
blind as long as it remains unknown. For instance, as long as we were ignorant oI the laws
oI electricity, we could only Iear it as the blind and destructive Iorce oI thunderstorms.
Today we have suIIicient scientiIic knowledge oI the phenomenon to protect ourselves
with lightning-rods. We can use electricity as a source oI light, power and heat. The
knowledge oI the necessity inherent in things. the knowledge oI their natural laws and
Iixed properties, Irees us in as much as it widens and intensiIies the impact oI our liberty
on the material reality in us and outside oI us, But can scientiIic progress enable us to
subject necessity entirely to our Iree interventions? The increasing knowledge oI necessity
allows us to improve the productivity oI our activity with the help oI an ever improving
technology, but adverse eIIects on the environment can become so alarming that we speak
oI a moral problem to which legislators can no longer remain indiIIerent.
The present development oI heavy traIIic is an indication oI the democratization oI
transportation. It is subservient to a lot oI premoral values. At the same time, however,
modern transportation is accompanied by many accidents and the premoral disvalues
included in them. We have at our disposition more and more eIIective medicines, but how
many oI them are without detrimental side-eIIects ? These are only a Iew examples. But
they may suIIice to show that, in spite oI the
1*

progress oI our scientiIic knowledge, premoral values and disvalues remain inevitably
connected. Shall we not even go so Iar as to say that scientiIic and technological progress
involves ever new interrelationships between premoral values and disvalues? The
theologians oI the 16th century who started dealing with the moral implications oI actions
with several eIIects discerned a real problem.~ Perhaps we can pose the problem in a more
accurate way by stressing the inevitable connection between premoral values and disvalues
in our actions. At any rate, it is a Iact that we are continuously conIronted with conIlict
situations in which, by reason oI the connection between premoral values and disvalues, we
cannot realize a premoral value without admitting the inseparable premoral disvalue.
A second Iorm oI ambiguity results Irom the Iact that our actions cannot but Iollow
each other in the course oI successive moments oI time.
From the moment our actions demand our Iull attention and endeavor, we can do them
only successively. Hence there is a Iundamental ambiguity in our Ireedom oI choice. Our
ability to determine which action we want to perIorm at a certain moment is an expression
oI our autonomy, oI our selI-determination. This is the positive aspect oI our Ireedom. But
there is also a negative side. When here and now we choose a certain action, we must, at
the same time, and at least Ior the time being, omit and postpone all other possible actions.
This is the meaning oI Henri Bergson`s words: 'Every choice is a sacriIice. At every
moment a multiplicity oI premoral values awaits realization through our actions. Since we
can only actualize one oI them at a time, we are Iorced to make a choice in each case. But
to make a choice means that we give priority to a preIerred value. How do we justiIy our
preIerence (the classical problem oI the ordo bonorum) ? The premoral value or values we
realize through a particular action can be important Ior the well-being oI many persons or
social groups. But at every moment our particular action can only beneIit some. e.g.
ourselves, a neighbor, a certain group. Why do we act Ior the well-being oI this person or
this group rather than Ior the advantage oI others (the classical problem oI the ordo
caritatis) ? At Iirst sight these questions may seem to be Iutile. It is, indeed, a Iact that
most priorities have become a matter oI course Ior us. In the Iorm oI habits and practice,
priorities are the product oI our education, oI the established social patterns oI behavior
(institutions), and oI the settled ethos ruling our social roles and tasks. All this shows that,
because oI a rather unconscious process oI interiorization, many priorities are taken Ior
granted to such an extent that in our everyday liIe we conIorm to them in an uncritical way.
But ethics has

! CI. J, Ghoos, Lacte a double ef let. Etude de theologie positive in ETL. "# 28,
1951, pp. 30-33.
1*

to be critical. From oI old it has been asking when and why an omission is morally wrong
(peccatum omissionis). Since the preIerence Ior a certain action includes at the same time
the omission oI all other possible acts (omnis comissio est simul omissio), our choice~ is a
morally wrong omission iI it does not respect the priorities in accord with the ordo
bonorum and the ordo caritatis.
The consideration oI this twoIold ambiguity in our actions indicates the importance oI
the distinction between premoral values and disvalue on the one hand and morally right
and wrong actions on the other hand. However, there is not only a distinction between
them, but also a connection.
Ethics especially when dominated and directed by the Iundamental attitude oI love
(agape) serves the purpose oI improving as much as possible the well-being and the
development oI person: and social groups (according to the demands oI the ordo caritatis
and the ordo bonorum). Now, by its very nature every premoral value is promotive oI that
well-being and that development. ThereIore, we have a moral obligation to protect, to
preserve, and to realize the premoral values as much as possible. As soon as we have the
possibility oI realizing premoral values, means Ior which were previously lacking, this
realization becomes a moral duty. In other words, the Iact that increasing cultural
development continuously enlarges our possibilities requires us to espouse a dynamic
ethics. The same idea can be expressed in a negative way. By its own deIinition every
premoral disvalue is detrimental and harmIul to the development oI persons or to the
promotion oI social groups. Since ethics obliges us to enhance that development and
promotion to the best oI our ability it is clear that we have the moral duty to avoid and to
shun premoral disvalues as much as possible. In the light oI a dynamic ethics the moralists
emphasize more and more that, to give but one example by reason oI the abundance oI
their possibilities, the rich peoples are bound to do what they can in order to Iree the poor
part oI the world`s population Irom premoral disvalues, such as hunger, disease, inIant
mortality, ignorance, etc.
What Iollows Irom that Iundamental principle oI ethics, when we take into account
the twoIold ambiguity which qualiIies our conduct? Since our actions Iollow one another in
the course oI time and since in every situation we have thus to choose between several
possibilities. we ought to give priority to the actualization oI the premoral value which
according to the ordo bonorum is the better one (the better possible value), II we Iail to act
in that way, we do not realize the premoral values as much as possible. In the situations
where premoral values are unavoidably connected with premoral disvalues or where it is
impossible to avoid all oI the premoral disvalues which are inseparably blended, we ought
to choose the alternative which
214 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics 21.
1*

indicates our preIerence Ior the lesser premoral disvalue. Otherwise we do not exclude
premoral disvalues as much as possible.
Perhaps it can be helpIul to illustrate these rather abstract considerations with some
examples.
There are situations in which our preIerence Ior the lesser premoral disvalue has to
be ensured by a compromise. For instance, the heavy traIIic on our roads is
unavoidably connected with a number oI traIIic accidents, with the premoral disvalues
oI material damage, mutilation and loss oI human liIe. In this concrete instance we have
to take into account two premoral values and both are so important that we want to give
up neither oI them, viz., a convenient ride and a saIe trip. Both interests are opposite in
the sense that at the same time they can only be partly realized. The preIerence Ior the
lesser premoral disvalue as Iew accidents as possible and the Iewest possible traIIic
restrictions leads to a compromise, to a settlement in which the opposite values are
simultaneously but only partly realized and properly balanced. More generally
speaking, in situations where we have to protect two or more opposite values at the
same time, our preIerence Ior the lesser premoral disvalue has to be achieved in an
acceptable compromise.
7

There are other situations in which it is not possible to save, at least partly, the
diIIerent values through a compromise. In a declaration (April 1973) the Belgian
bishops, with one exception, certiIied the moral rightness oI a strictly therapeutic
abortion. There are inIrequent but not hypothetical cases, in which the liIe oI the Ietus
will be lost, whether an abortion is perIormed or not, and only the mother can be saved
through human intervention. II the doctor reIuses to interIere his Iree choice is a
preIerence Ior an omission in which two lives (premoral values) are lost. II he
intervenes, he chooses an action which expresses a preIerence Ior the lesser premoral
disvalue, namely, the loss oI only one liIe. The bishops used the correct argument: ~'
The moral norm which is applicable can be Iormulated as Iollows: when two lives are
in danger and one does all that is possible to preserve both, one will try to save one liIe
rather than to lose both. This concise argumentation deIines the methodology oI moral
reasoning very well. 1) Ethics requires us to preserve and to realize the premoral values
as much as possible : 'one does all that is possible to preserve both lives. 2) In conIlict
situations it is our moral obligation to choose the alternative which indicates our
preIerence Ior the lesser prernoral disvalue or Ior the higher premoral value: 'one will
try to save one liIe rather than to lose both.
3) Speaking oI the norm which applies to the case, the bishops explicitly talk oI a
moral duty.

CI. H.J. Wilting, Der Kompromiss als theologisches und als ethisches Problem, in Moraltheologische Studien
herausgegeben von Bruno Schller, Patmos-Verlag, DusseldorI, 1975.
1*

In a strictly therapeutic abortion priority is given to the lesser premoral disvalue which
cannot be avoided in any case. There are other situations in which one has even to take the
initiative to cause a lesser premoral disvalue in order to preserve or realize a higher
premoral value. Every mutilation is a premoral disvalue, experienced as harmIul to our
bodily integrity; nevertheless a surgeon can be obliged to eIIect a mutilation, when an
amputation is indicated to preserve the higher premoral values oI health or liIe. To isolate a
person out oI his social environment is to inIlict a premoral disvalue upon him : yet the
competent authority acts in a morally right way when, iI necessary, it quarantines a
contagious patient in order to protect the higher value oI public health. A Ialsehood is a
premoral disvalue and the error caused in the listener when one utters at untruth is a
premoral disvalue as -well, but when the recourse to these premoral disvalues is the only
means, Ior example, to keep a proIessional secret, the higher interest oI the community,
which demands secrecy within certain limits, has to be given priority.
In the mentioned cases we talked about a moral obligation. There can be situations in
which we would speak oI admirable actions rather than oI moral duties. In the war oI 1940-
1945 it was common knowledge that the Gestapo used some radical means, including the
administration oI truth serum, to rob prisoners oI war oI the military) secrets which they
were resolved to keep. Some prisoners preIerred to take their own lives in order to prevent
enemy Irom making then automatons so that they could be Iorced to give away their secrets
and endanger the lives oI their Iellow-combatants and the interests oI their country. They
loved their lives, but in conscience they chose to sacriIice them in order to preserve higher
values. Their action was morally good, because they Ielt conIident that it was the
incarnation oI a good disposition and the Christians among them remembered perhaps that
" greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his liIe Ior his Iriends (Jn 15:13).
Their action was also morally right, because they preIerred a lesser premoral disvalue (their
own death) in order to save higher premoral values (many lives, important military
interests). In this case we preIer not to speak oI a moral obligation. They perIormed a
heroic action which not everybody is able to achieve : one`s moral obligation (the ought ")
is conIined within the limits oI one`s possibilities (the "be able $% or ad impossibile nemo
tenetur.
The Ioregoing considerations, distinctions and examples enable us to examine the
characteristics oI concrete, material norms.
As we have already said, a concrete, material norm concerns a whole series oI actions
which are comparable in so Iar as they have a similar material content, For instance, the
norm " you shall not kill relates to a whole category oI actions which can be perIormed in
diIIerent ways, in various situations and with diverse motives and
216 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics 2l~
1*

intentions, but in all oI them the material content or what is done (actus externus) is the
same event, i.e., 'taking somebody`s liIe. A concrete material norm is expressed in both a
descriptive and a normative Iorm. In speciIying the material content oI a series oI actions it
uses only descriptive terms (e.g.. to kill) and does not have recourse to morally qualiIying
words or expressions (e.g., to murder), because in the latter case it would be a pleonastic
truism but not a concrete, material norm.
8
With respect to a series oI actions described in
this way, the concrete material norm sets Iorth a normative judgment according as the
material content (what is done) involves or causes premoral values or disvalues. The
concrete material norm prescribes actions realizing premoral values, it Iorbids those which
contain premoral disvalues. It is Iormulated in a positive way, when the actions include
premoral values, Ior instance, 'you shall render aid to a neighbor in need and in a negative
way, when the actions concerned imply premoral disvalues, Ior instance, 'you shall not kill
a human being, not take your own liIe, not mutilate a person, not utter a Ialsehood, not take
away what belongs to another, etc. In a general way, the concrete, material norms set Iorth
the material content (what is done) oI categories oI actions and prescribe or Iorbid these
actions as morally right or wrong according as they involve premoral values or disvalues.

1. CONCRETE MATERIAL NORMS ARE RELATIVE

Since ethics requires us to promote premoral values as much as possible and to avoid
and shun premoral disvalues to the best oI our ability, our Iirst attitude towards concrete,
material norms ought to be a willingness to Iollow them. But this Iirst reaction will not be
invariably our Iinal response to a concrete, material norm. -A norm which positively
prescribes an action which realizes a premoral value is only applicable iI that action can be
perIormed according

# In the Iormulation oI concrete, material norms only descriptive terms may be used to enunciate the
material content oI a series oI actions. Our languages have synthetic terms, which reIer to the material content
oI an action but at the same time Iormulate a moral Judgment. We call them morally qualiIying terms, e.g. lie is
a morally qualiIying noun aIIirming that a Ialsehood descriptive word reIerring to a premoral disvalue is
uttered in an immoral way (without proportionate reason). The same distinction has to be made between "
murder and 'killing, 'stealing and 'taking away what belongs to another, to 'commit adultery and to
'have sexual intercourse outside oI one`s marriage, etc. Moralists are oIten careless in using language. E.g., G.
Martelet, Lexistence humaine et larnour, Pour mieux comprendre lencvclique Humanae vitae, Desclee, Paris,
1969, compares the evil oI contraceptive intercourse with the use oI violence (p. 140), which is a premoral
disvalue, and with a lie (p. 149), which is a morally qualiIying term. Should the Iirst comparison be correct, the
encyclical would raise no problems. This cannot be said iI the second comparison is to be maintained. An
elementary Iamiliarization with analytical philosophy could prevent theologians Irom using slovenly language.
1*

to the ordo caritatis et bonorum, There is, Ior instance, the norm you shall render help to a
neighbor in need. Many people want aid and they need diIIerent types and degrees oI
help. With our limited possibilities we cannot personally help all oI them. We hay to
make a choice and the norm applies only to the concrete instance covered by the rules
oI priority (ordo caritatis et bonorum). Neither is a negative norm, prohibiting an action
which involves a premoral disvalue, always applicable: an action admitting or causing a
premoral disvalue is morally right, when it serves a higher premoral value o saIeguards
the priority given to a lesser premoral disvalue (cI. the Ioregoing examples). In other
words, we can have a proportionate reason to depart Irom the norm. Consequently,
concrete, material norms are relative in the sense oI conditional. They are not binding iI
there is a proportionate reason why the case at issue is not governed by them. AIter all,
this is a very traditional view,
9

All this does not prevent some concrete, material norms Irom being practically or
virtuously exceptionless. This will happen when; the material content oI an action is
described by the norm in such a way that practically always it will have priority (e.g., you
shall render help to a person in extreme distress) or when there is an inner contradiction
between the elements Iorming part oI the description oI what is done. A case in point is the
norm Iorbidding rape. As a descriptive term the noun rape means 'the use oI physical or
psychic violence in order to compel somebody to sexual intercourse against his or her
will. Violence is a premoral disvalue and its use can be justiIied by a proportionate reason
(e.g., in a case oI selI deIense). But truly human sexual intercourse is an expression oI

$ To describe the third level oI natural law, Thomas argues as Iollows: " man has a natural inclination to
values (bonum) according to the nature oI his reason which is proper to him " (I II, q. 94, art. 2). This is the
speciIic level oI natural law, since it is exclusively accessible to human beings. It is this speciIic natural law
which Thomas examines in his treatise De Iege naturali (I II, q. 94). Concerning the whole matter covered by
the speciIically human natural law, he makes an accurate distinction between universal principles (principia
generalia) which are absolute and the more concrete precepts (praecepta magis propria) which are relative in
the seas that they are not always applicable (valent ut in pluribus), In I II, q. 94, art. 3 and he considers as a
universal principle that our disposition has to be such that w have always the willingness to act in a reasonable
way (semper est agendum secundun rationem). As an example oI a concrete material norm he mentions:
deposita sun reddenda (art, 4). But, as Plato already did, he says that this norm is not applicable when, e.g.,
somebody entrusted a weapon to me and reclaims it in order to commit a murder or to Iight against his own
country, because in this case my action would not be reasonable and unabk to embody the good disposition
requiring me always to act according to reason. In his treatise on prudence, he reIers to the same example (II II,
q. 51. art. 4) and he emphasizes that the virtue oI prudence ought to govern and direct all our actions (ea quae
sunt ad finern) and that consideration (gnome) is a part oI that virtue, in as much as it requires us to examine the
case In the light oI higher principles (iudicare secundum aliqua altiora principia) and not only in the light oI
the concrete norm (regulae communes). (The example is taken Irom Plato, De re publica. I, 33k).
218 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics 21
1*

love and thus a Iree, mutual selI-giving which is radically opposed to the use oI
violence.
Concerning the requirements oI proportionate reason, ethics must cover an
immense Iield oI research. First, Ior more and more domains oI conduct the ethicist
must be advised by the human sciences (economy. sociology, medical sciences,
psychology, etc.) in order to gain insight into the signiIicance oI the elements oI an
action and oI its eIIects. Second, ethics must take into account the diIIerent sorts oI
actions: the instrumental actions producing a result (e.g., labor), the actions having
their meaning in themselves (e.g., play, scientiIic research, philosophical
investigation, contemplation etc.) and the &'pressive actions which in
communication with others signiIy an inner attitude (e.g., speaking, giving a
present, conIession oI Iaith in words or deeds, etc.). It happens that all three
meanings are present in the same action, For instance, a person who accomplishes a
creative task, achieves a result, can enjoy his work because oI its intrinsic meaning,
and express in it the love Ior his Iamily he supports by it. It is no easy matter to
deIine the priorities in connection with the diIIerent kinds oI action, especially
when diIIerent meanings are interwoven in the same action. Recently an interesting
study broached the question.` Third, in the deIinition oI priorities, the Ieatures oI
the diIIerent concrete, material norms have to be considered. There are, Ior
instance, the institutional norms which dictate us to act in accord with existing
institutions (e.g., promises, contracts, etc.) so that in the appreciation oI priorities
the importance oI institution Ior social liIe throws its weight into the scale A recent
study started examining this subject too in the light oI the problem oI priorities.
11
Fourth, in the Ioregoing pages we reIerred boringly to the ordo caritatis and the
ordo bonorum. This order oI charity and values is, indeed, a central point in the
delimitation oI preIerences or priorities. ThereIore, we will try to point out the main
lines oI the problem.`
2

For the sake oI clarity we will successively treat the ordo caritatis and the ordo
bonorun, The distinction between them may not be understood as a separation
because they are closely interrelated and amply intertwined.

() R. Ginters, Die Ausdruckshandlung. Eine Lintersuchung ihrer sittlichen Bedeutsnmkeit in Moraltheologische
St udien herausgegeben von Bruno Schller. PatmosVerlag, DtisseldorI, 1976. -
*( R. Ginters, Jersprechen und Geloben. Begrundungsweisen ihrer sittlichen Jerbindl:chkeit in
Moraltheologische Studien herausgegeben von Bruno Schller. PatmosVerlag, DsseldorI, 1973.
(+ CI. B. Schuller, op. cit., pp. 46-101 H. Reiner, op. cit., pp. 166-178.
1*

,. -.& /01/ 2304"3"45
1. Eight times the New Testament repeats the commandment 'you shall love your
neighbor as yourselI (Mt 19:19; 22:39; Mk 12:31, 33. Lk 10:27, Rom 13:2, Gal
5:14, Jas 2:8) and twice the golden rule (Mt 7:12, Lk 6:3I).13 St. James (2:1-9)
interprets 'as yourselI as an appeal Ior impartial love oI neighbor. He denounces the
discrimination between poor and rich in the assembly. He emphasizes that partiality
sullies the honorable name by which Christians are called and concludes: 'II you
really IulIill the royal law, according to the scripture you shall love your neighbor as
yourselI,` you do well. But iI you show partiality, you commit sin and are convicted
by the law as transgressors (Jas 2:8-9).
Love oI neighbor is impartial. It is Iundamentally an equal regard Ior every
person, because it applies to each neighbor qua human existent. Every human being is,
or can normally become, a moral subject, i.e., a conscious, Iree and consequently
responsible agent. This is the human Ioundation oI equal consideration (la
reconnaissance de lhomme par lhomme). But in the perspective oI our Christian
Iaith the human dignity bestowed on man by God is given its ultimate meaning. Every
human being is created in God`s image. redeemed by Christ, called to be God`s child
and to participate in the eschatological kingdom. At this most basic level the
evaluation oI the other as oI irreducible worth and dignity extends to everyone alike.
There ought to be no partiality, no preIerence relative to idiosyncratic qualities and
attainments, no discrimination. Being impartial, agape is independent oI our personal
Ieelings oI sympathy (no Iavoritism) or aversion. It is unIailing, no matter what the
neighbor`s attitude or behavior with respect to us may be. It is universal in that
nobody is to be excluded since equal regard applies to each person qua human
existent.
14

In search oI the main elements oI the ordo caritatis, we should not lose sight oI
the impartial character oI agape.
This is already required in order to situate the love oI selI within that order.
Christian theology displays diverse and even conIlicting views on selI-love. Gene
Outka, identiIying certain characteristic issues oI greatest ethical importance, writes .
" These issues may be most conveniently grouped around Iour value judgments oI
selI-love: as wholly neIarious; as normal, reasonable and prudent; as justiIied
derivatively Irom other-regard; and as a deIinite obligation, independent oI other-
regard, though Ior some coincident with it. (6 Usually Catholic moralists regard love
oI selI as an obligation. The underlying thesis is evidently that love oI selI is not
necessarily

'Concerning the golden rule, cI. Iootnote 2,
(7 CI. G. Outka, Agape. An Ethical Analvsis, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1972, pp. 9-16.
$ G. Outka, op. cit., p. 56.

1*

selIishness or egocentric acquisitiveness (psychological egoism), but that we are
capable oI a genuine selI-regard and selI-respect. Speaking oI love oI selI in the
sense oI selI-consideration and selI-esteem, the classical manuals oI moral theology
generally aIIirm that 'other things being equal, one should love selI more than one`s
neighbor, Ior the Jove oI selI is the model Ior the love oI neighbor (Mt 22:39) and
nature itselI inclines to this in accordance with the saying: Charity begins at home.
(8 This thesis reIlects St. Thomas` view on the position oI the love oI selI within the
ordo caritatis. 'In ordine dilectionis oportet quod post Deum homo maxime diligat
seipsum.` 9*
In accord with the impartiality oI agape, we maintain that one is to have equal
regard Ior selI and Ior others, since the reasons Ior valuing the selI are identical with
those Ior valuing others, namely, that everyone is a human being, God`s image,
redeemed by Christ, called to be God`s child and to participate in the eschatological
kingdom. 'Valuing the selI as well as others remains a maniIest obligation. One
might adopt as a Iormal contention the utilitarian Iormula that each person ought to
count himselI as one but no more than one and ought never to accord himselI a
privileged position. . . Just as the neighbor ought to be regarded as a human being
prior to a particular human being, so the agent ought to value himselI in the same
way. The agent`s basic selI-regard, then, ought not to be simply dependent on the
number oI his achievements or the extent to which he is Iound likeable, but on his
being as well a man oI Ilesh and blood and a creature oI God, a person who is more
than a means to some other end 18
The impartiality oI agape prevents us Irom loving ourselves more than our
neighbor. It requires our loving attitude to be equally concerned with our own
irreducible dignity and that oI others. But equal consideration is not equivalent to
identical treatment. We are dynamic beings and we will never have Iinished
actualizing our potentialities. In other words, our subjective culture is a never
achieved liIe-task. Now, Ior the IulIilment oI that task we are irreplaceable. To
develop our cognitive Iaculty, we have to apply ourselves to study and reIlection, An
artistic bent cannot be cultivated without dealing actively with works oI art and
personal creative activity. We can only continue to develop and mature as moral
subjects by unIolding our good disposition through the promotion oI moral virtues
and through per-
sonally Iorming and Iollowing conscience. To Ioster our religious liIe we have to
practice our love Ior God with its implications. In the promotion oI the diIIerent
aspects oI our subjective culture, others

( J.A. Mc Hugh and Ch.J. Callan, Moral Theologv. A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the
Best Modern Authorities, Vol. 1, J. Wigner, New York and Herder, London, 1929, p. 462.
'III!, q. 26, art. 13 ad 3.
(: G. Outka, op. cit., pp. 290-291.
1*
can help us by oIIering Iavorable conditions (the values oI objective culture), by their
example and stimulation. They can IulIil a supplementary, but not a substitutional role,
since we are irreplaceable in the unIolding oI our subjective culture. Evidently, a person is
able to nurture his subjective culture out oI an attitude oI egocentric acquisitiveness so that
this selI-love is immoral selIishness, but he can do it also out oI a legitimate selI-regard and
thus develop his potentialities with the conviction that this is the only way to make his love
oI neighbor eIIicacious (nemo dat quod non habet).
The love oI selI as equal selI-regard involves selI-respect and selI-esteem. Every
person is a moral subject and, as such, has a dignity Iundamentally equal to that oI others.
ThereIore he would behave in an immoral way iI he allowed another subject to treat him as
an object. This also as we will soon see is important Ior establishing the ordo
caritatis.
The basic reason Ior the impartiality oI love is the equal dignity oI each and every
person qua human existent. But within the Iramework oI that Iundamental equality we
participate in the same human nature, the same human condition each one is an
originality. a unique personality and thus has his individual capacities, interests, needs, and
aspirations. To be eIIicient, love must take account oI everyone`s singularity. ThereIore,
equal regard must be distinguished Irom identical treatment. In other words, the
impartiality oI love requires that everyone be appropriately cared Ior~ This involves acting
in diverse ways suited to the individual`s needs and abilities. The appropriate expressions
oI a love-relationship are conditioned by the demands oI the neighbor`s uniqueness or
originality.
The importance oI the recognition oI each person`s originality emerges iI we do not
lose sight oI the primordial Iact that man is essentially a social being. To be really
operative, love as other-regard has to be concerned with the neighbor in his social relation-
ships. To all intents and purposes, the traditional proclamation oI the priority oI the
common good points in this direction. In order to understand the basic thrust oI the
classical view, we must consider societal liIe as co-existence, co-operation, and co-
participation.
First oI all, to be members oI a social group means co-existence, living together
(well-rendered by a pregnant Dutch word: samenleving).
There are many Iorms and degrees oI living together and their truly human
development constitutes a momentous aspect oI the common good.
The closest bonds are the I-thou relationships among Iriends, husband and wiIe,
parents and children, brothers and sisters, etc. They are especially enriching, because in
their reciprocity they recognize and promote the partners in their uniqueness. Although
these relation-
1*

ships are based on the irreplaceable originality oI the persons involved, agape as
equal-regard is a Iundamental condition Ior them, because it ensures that the partner is
cared Ior Ior his own sake and that intimacy does not degenerate into an egoistic
isolation, but remains open to the larger social context. On these terms, the I-thou
relationships deserve a special place in the ordo caritatis, because they improve the
development oI the persons involved in an unexcelled way and unIold the personal
originality which, as it will appear, is oI paramount importance Ior the richness and
Iecundity oI the larger social groups (social liIe as co-operation).
Besides the I-thou relationships oIten called primary relationships there
are many sorts oI so-called secondary relationships. Many oI them are so signiIicant
Ior social liIe as co-existence that they are sanctioned by institutions, namely, by
social patterns oI behavior. OIten they are even ratiIied by law, e.g. promises,
contracts, conventions between groups, treaties between states, international agree-
ments and accords, etc. The Iact that these relationships are institutionalized conIirms
their peculiar position in the ordo caritatis, We have already mentioned that in the
domain oI concrete, material norms institutional rules raise special questions, since
they prescribe actions in accord with institutions which are likely to protect the
common good, considered as the demands oI a truly human co-existence.
Second, social liIe means co-operation.
To describe the requirements oI collaboration, we must Iirst oI all consider the
distinction and interaction between objective and subjective culture. Objective culture
is realized by our human activity which transIorms the world Irom a - natural reality
into a cultural environment, inhabitable Ior human beings. In other words, it is the
patrimony oI already realized values such as science, technology, economic values,
language, works oI art, social institutions, civil societies, international organizations,
etc. By subjective culture we mean the development oI the person in his diIIerent
potentialities: improvement oI knowledge, reIinement oI aIIectivity and artistic taste,
moral progress, religious growth, etc. Between objective and subjective culture there
exists a dialectic relationship. Subjective culture cannot Ilourish without contact with
objective culture. There is no scientiIic liIe without books and laboratories, no esthetic
culture without works oI art, etc. In short, the resources oI objective culture are
indispensable Ior the improvement and cultivation oI human personality. On the other
hand, subjective culture is the source oI the development oI objective culture.AIter an
individual has come to a certain maturity oI subjective culture, he can in his turn
enrich objective culture through the exercise oI his personal giIts and capacities. II
man is to develop, he must transIorm the world into a universe oI objective culture,
which, in its turn, shapes man and helps him to attain a higher level oI sub-
1*

jective culture. As Jean Mouroux wrote, man perIects himselI by perIecting the world. -
The objective culture oI yesterday is the source oI the subjective culture oI today
which, in its turn, enhances the objective culture oI tomorrow. The mutual exchange
between objective and subjective culture in the course oI time makes culture a historical
reality.
But culture is also a social reality . it is the Iruit oI co-operation. Nobody acting on his
own, is able to realize the values oI objective culture which are required Ior his subjective
culture. This is due to our limitations. We have already said that we can only perIorm
particular, limited actions and that they must Iollow each other in the course oI successive
moments in time. This is a Iirst aspect oI our limitations: we do not have enough time to
achieve everything we need. But there is another, still more Iundamental aspect: everyone
possesses human potentialities in a limited way, so that he is not capable oI actualizing all
the values oI objective culture. This limitation oI our aptitudes and talents is reIlected in
our need to be helped and complemented by others. But everyone is also a unique
personality. This not only means that each person is limited in his own way. but also that
each person positively diIIers Irom each other person by reason oI his unique giIts and
capacities. Our diversity enables us to respond to and complete one another, to carry on
diIIerent tasks, proIessions and specialties. In other words, our diversity enables us to co-
operate in the elaboration oI the multiplicity oI values oI objective culture in order to make
a truly human subjective culture accessible to one and all. We are united in collaboration
not so much by what we have in common as by our originality. Evidently, our basic
equality is an indispensable condition Ior our co-operation it allows us to be interested in
the same cultural values but the real source oI our joint action is our diversity. Each
one`s uniqueness and the completest possible development oI everybody`s originality
provide the richness and Iecundity oI the co-operation.
From these Iacts a number oI conclusions concerning the ordo caritatis may be
drawn. -
Those who are able to work have the duty to contribute by their activity to the
collaboration which improves cultural values. Against the individualistic conception oI the
19th century which held that the duty oI labor exists only Ior those who do not possess the
means necessary Ior subsistence, we consider work -today as being primarily a social
service. Our Christian Iaith discloses the proIound meaning oI labor. We are created in
God`s image and as such we have to subdue the earth and everything in it, to transIorm the
natural milieu into a cultural milieu. When we realize our daily task Ior the beneIit oI
society, we are justiIied in thinking that by our own labor we advance the work oI the
Creator and beneIit our Iellow-men and that our personal industry contributes to the
carrying out oI the divine plan
224 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics 223
1*

in history. 9* Moreover, since our diversity is the source oI a creative co-operation.
everyone has to aim at a task corresponding to his originality in order to contribute to the
collaboration in accordance with his personal capacities. The Marxist maxim proves true :
Irom each according to his ability. All this goes to show that the IulIillment oI our
proIessional task is our normal and primordial contribution to the common good and as
such occupies a special place in the ordo caritatis.
To enhance co-operation in this way, authority has to assume special obligations. It
ought to develop a policy oI Iull employment and to aIIord as much as possible the
opportunity Ior everyone to perIorm a task according to his ability. To that end it has to
diversiIy the possibilities oI education in such a way that everyone can have the chance to
develop his individual capacities. For the same purpose it must apply the principle oI
subsidiarity: when the members oI society enjoy liberty to develop their original
possibilities, diversity Ilourishes Ior the beneIit oI a rich and IruitIul collaboration.
II it is true that our uniqueness and diversity Iorm the source oI the co-operation and oI
its Iecundity, the society that reIlects most adequately our social nature is the universal
community oI mankind. Only this universal society Iully encompasses all the diIIerent
kinds oI persons and all the diverse cultures oI the nations. Moreover, every country and
area possesses its special natural resources. It is only by world-wide co-operation that the
values oI objective culture can be Iully developed So many underdeveloped countries are
still incapable oI making use oI their valuable resources and thus oI taking their proper
place in world-wide co-operation. It is the duty oI the rich countries to help them to
become Iull partners in international collaboration, This must be one oI the most important
aspects oI their scientiIic, economic, Iinancial and technological assistance to the
developing countries. It is more than probable that, in the Iuture, judgment will be passed
on us according to the importance we attach to that historical task in the ordo caritatis.
A third aspect oI social liIe is co-participation.
Society as co-operation is not coextensive with society as coexistence, because at every
moment only a part oI its members is able to participate in the common eIIort. This
characterizes the very pattern oI our existence. Children begin liIe completely dependent
upon their parents. They could not attain the Iull development which is essential to their
participation in collaboration, unless during their early years their parents provided Ior their
needs. Once the children are grown up they can share with their parents in supporting the
Iamily. But they have hardly reached maturity, beIore their parents are on the threshold oI
old age and are in need oI more and more

help. This alternation between receiving and giving is a basic law oI every
society. Those who are Iit to work must provide Ior the needs oI all, including
those who are unable to contribute at the present time children, the sick, the
incapacitated, the old. In other words, the values oI objective culture which are
the Iruit oI co-operation must be oriented toward the subjective culture or
personal development oI every member oI society. And these values must be
shared in such a way that everyone has access to what he needs in order to
complete as Iully as possible his subjective culture according to the demands oI
his originality: to each according to his needs.
This leads us to a consideration oI distributive justice. which is oI primary
importance today. Formerly, ethical treatises gave little space to this. How
could there be much interest in distributive justice when there was so little to
distribute? Today a greater and greater development oI a world-wide
collaboration has become possible. It is possible to increase the multiplicity oI
the values oI objective culture to such an extent that through equitable
distribution access to cultural values and thereby the promotion oI subjective
culture may become the common good, the prerogative oI everyone. II we do
not seize these possibilities, we shall Iail to respect the intrinsic meaning oI
objective culture which exists in order to serve the subjective culture. We shall
Iail to recognize that, since society is composed oI human subjects. its ultimate
aim must be to see that their lives reach Iruition.
The increasing demands oI distributive justice according to the rhythm oI
the expanding possibilities constitute one oI the most urgent elements oI a
dynamic ethics Nowadays they are called the substance oI la grande politique.
In responding to them, responsible leaders on the national and international
levels must be loyal to the dynamism oI distributive justice and to the ideal oI
ensuring the widest possible participation in the values oI objective culture. In
this connection we have to agree with the utilitarian principle . the greatest
good Ior the greatest number.
2. Reminding us to love our neighbor as ourselves the New Testament`s letter
oI St. James emphasizes the impartiality oI love. But the New Testament
throws light upon other characteristics oI christian agape. In many diIIerent
contexts it teaches us that our love must emulate that oI the Father and oI Christ
or, rather, that it has to be modeled aIter the love the Father maniIests in and
through Christ. St. Matthew tells us that by loving our enemies and persecutors,
we may be children oI our Father who makes his sun rise on the evil and on the
good and sends his rain on the just and the unjust and he concludes that this
Iorms part oI our vocation to be perIect as our heavenly Father is perIect (Mt
5:43-48). A similar exhortation is given by St. Luke . " Be merciIul as your
Father is merciIul (Lk 6:36). Since our Father is a Iorgiving. God, we should
take the initiative in Iorgiving Irom our heart when our brother sins against us
(Mt 18:21-35

cI. Mt 5:23-24 and 6:14-15). In his letter to the Romans St. Paul aIIirms that nothing
is able to separate us Irom the love oI the Father
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8:39). God shows his love Ior us in that
Christ died Ior us while we were yet sinners (5:8) and enemies (5:10). It is in this love
that we share through the Holy Spirit who has been given us (5:5). In the light oI that
love, Paul
- explains in the paraenetic part oI the letter how Christians are to love one another,
and indeed all men, even enemies (12:9-21). The letter to the Ephesians. reIerring to
the model which is God`s and Christ`s love, describes how Christian love should
reIlect the properties oI divine love: 'Do not grieve the Holy Spirit oI God, in whom
you were sealed Ior the day oI redemption. Let all bitterness and wrath and anger and
clamor and slander be put away Irom you, with all malice, and be kind to one another,
tenderhearted, Iorgiving one another, as God in Christ Iorgave you. ThereIore be
imitators oI God, as beloved children. And walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave
himselI up Ior us, a Iragrant oIIering and sacriIice to God
(Eph 4:30; 5:2). St. John stresses that Christ loved us as the- Father loved him and
that our love Ior one another has to Iollow that pattern: 'As the Father - has loved
me, so I have loved you; abide in my love... This is my commandment, that you love
one another as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay
down his liIe Ior his Iriends (Jn 15:7-13). In the Iirst letter oI John we are told that
God is love, because he sent his only Son in the world so that we might live through
him, that, iI God so loved us, we also have to love one another (1 Jn 4:8-12) and that
we ought to lay down our lives Ior the brethren, as Christ laid down his liIe Ior us (1
Jn 3:16).
That our love is to be patterned aIter the Father`s love maniIested in and through
Christ points to signiIicant characteristics oI the ordo caritatis.
In his remarkable study oI the Beatitudes Jacques Dupont has shown that in
Israel God is represented as an ideal king, who is the protector and deIender oI those
who are poor and unIortunate, such as orphans, widows, reIugees, the Ieeble, and
oppressed. God has a predilection Ior them, because they are in a precarious
situation. The privilege oI the least ones does not owe to their merits, but only to the
attributes oI God as the ideal king and to the justice oI his kingdom. Jesus is above
all the herald who brings the good news oI the kingdom, not only by his preaching,
but by maniIesting it in his attitude towards the little ones, the poor, the sick, and
destitute persons oI all kinds, beginning with sinners. This is the sign oI his mission
which he gives to the disciples sent by John the Baptist: " Go and tell John what you
hear and see: the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and
the deaI hear, and the dead are raised up. and the poor have good

news preached to them (Mt 11:4-6). Since our love has to Iollow and to mirror God`s
love, we should also give priority to those who are miserable and abandoned: 'The
obligation to help the poor and assist the weak is incumbent on everyone. The ultimate
Ioundation oI this obligation is essentially religious. It is grounded in the Iact that God
oIIers himselI as protector oI the weak and poor. The religious nature oI our duty to the
poor is thereIore independent oI the matter oI knowing whether these unIortunate persons
are also pious and IaithIul to God, iI they deserve God`s concern and the believer`s interest.
God does not surround them with care because they deserve it, but simply because he is
compassionate and merciIul, and because he loves justice and wants us to respect rights.
+) The Lord`s judgment on us will depend on what we did or Iailed to do on behalI oI
those whom he calls 'the least oI these my brethren (Mt 25:31-46). In order to pattern
their love aIter God`s love, Christians must give priority to those who are in need and
aIIliction, to stimulate at the national level the improvement oI social legislation in Iavor oI
Iorgotten persons and groups, to develop within the public opinion oI the rich nations a
sense oI responsibility Ior the poor countries.
God`s love Ior us is creative in the sense that it enables us to reciprocity. It aims at the
mutuality oI the covenant between God and us. In other words, " see what love the Father
has given us, that we should be called children oI God and so we are (1 Jn 3:1). The Father
overwhelms us with such a love that, through the Spirit who dwells in us, we are
empowered to give a response oI Iilial aIIection
When we cry Abba, Father` it is the Spirit himselI bearing witness with our spirit that we
are children oI God (Rom 8:16). - --
Modeled aIter God`s love, our love oI neighbor aspires to mutuality. This obtains in a
peculiar way among the members oI the Christian community in as much as they believe in
the covenant and conIess that all are one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:28). Is this, perhaps, the
reason why in the New Testament so many texts deal with the mutual love oI the believers
and brotherly aIIection, and that St. Paul issues the command: 'So then, as we have
opportunity, let us do good to all men and especially to those who are oI the household oI
Iaith (Gal 6:10) ? Love as equal regard is not dependent upon reciprocity
+) J. Dupont, Les Beatitudes. Tome II: La bonne nouvelle. J, Gabalda, Paris,
1969, p. 7 1-82. 'Lòbligation de secourir le pauvre et dàider le Iaible incombe a chacun; le Iondement dernier de cette
obligation est essentiellement religieux: il se trouve dans le Iait que Dieu Se donne comme le protecteur des Iaibles et des
pauvres. Le caractre religieux du devoir quòn a envers les pauvres est donc independant de Ia question de savoir si ces
malheureux sont aussi des gens pieux et Iideles a Dieu, sìls meritent que Dieu sòccupe dèux et que les croyants
sìnteressent a eux. Dieu ne les entoure pas de sa sollicitude parce quìls le meritent, mais simplement parce quìl est
compatissant et misericordieux et parce quìl aime Ia justice et veut quòIl respecte le droit.
+( CI. J. Ratzinger, Die christliche BrOderlichkeit. Kosel-Verlag, Munchen, 196Q

Ior its existence. Even an enemy should be loved. But mutuality is the Iinal ideal
Iruition oI neighbor-regard. It attains its perIection in I-thou-relationships. But in
relation to every one, genuine regard Ior the neighbor`s well-being involves concern
that he should regard his neighbor and, as a social being, Ioster cooperativeness and
community.
22

AIter the model oI God`s love in Christ who loved us and gave himselI up Ior us,
our love is to include selI-giving and selI-sacriIice, as long as we live in a world oI
conIlict and sin. We should love our enemies and persecutors. take the initiative in
Iorgiving, overcome evil with good, and even lay down our liIe Ior our Iriends. But the
sacriIicial aspect oI love has to be looked at more closely. First, the impartiality oI love
requires us to have equal respect Ior the irreducible dignity oI each person and thus to
put on a par, selI-regard and other-regard. Concerning selI-sacriIice this allows us to
diIIerentiate between attention to another`s needs and submission to his exploitation.
We should resist the latter, because it makes us objects (means) instead oI subjects.
'Not only have we no obligation to make ourselves, as it were, everybody`s doormat`;
we have something oI an obligation not to do so. 9* Second, we have to resist the
exploitation by the neighbor Ior his own sake. Love is concerned with the neighbor`s
well-being. He will be a better person iI he learns to respect interests not his own.
'Inseparable Irom this is the Iurther Iact that the realization oI a good community,
which is the moral concern oI us all, is impossible on any other terms. +7 Third, we
have to make a distinction between sacriIices concerning ourselves and those
concerning innocent third parties. There can be situations in which a Christian,
according to the Gospel. could preIer 'not to resist one who is evil (Mt 5:39), but
when in an unjust aggression the interests oI other innocent people are at stake, the
protection oI the most Iundamental interests oI societal liIe will habitually require us to
deIend the rights oI the innocent party. It may even happen that Ior the same reason we
ought to deIend our own interests, when they concern the well-being oI others. For
instance, the classical manuals oI moral theology tell us that in a case oI selI-deIense
one may preIer not to resist and to sacriIice his own liIe rather than to kill the assailant,
but they add that one has a duty to deIend himselI iI, Ior instance, as a husband and a
Iather he is responsible Ior the welIare oI his Iamily. In short, selI-sacriIice is not the
quintessence oI love, since it can only happen in a world in which conIlict and sin
occur. SelI-sacriIice is justiIied derivatively Irom other regard~ The restrictions we
mentioned show that selI-sacriIice is to be considered as an expression oI devotion to
others Ior their own sake when the interests at stake prove it right.
++ G. Outka, op. cit., p. 284-285,
+; W.G. Maclagan, Self and Others. A Defence of Altruism in Philosophical Quarterlv, t. 4, 1954, 118-119.
+7 W.G. Maclacian, art. cit.. p. 1 19.

<# -.& /01/ =/>/0?@

We have said that Iormal norms are absolute in that they reIer to the Iundamental
inner attitude oI love and to the moral dispositions or virtues, the mediation oI which is
indispensable Ior the practice oI love. We also said that the moral goodness oI the human
person is Iostered and Iurthered in as much as his morally good disposition aIIects the
motivation, the intention, and the conscientious choice oI his conduct. The moral goodness
oI the person is an absolute value. It has to be pursued in an unconditional way and takes
priority over all other values. The impartiality oI love requires us to recognize the absolute
demands oI morality equally in ourselves and in others. With regard to ourselves, this
means that we should always Iollow the maxim: non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona,
on the condition that mala reIers to morally wrong actions and not to premoral disvalues.
In our relationships with others, we may never impel them to act against their consciences,
whatever the consequences may be, although they may be prevented Irom perIorming
actions which inIringe the rights oI third parties or the requirements oI the common good.
Every person should be treated as a moral agent, namely, as a conscious, Iree, and
thereIore responsible subject. His intrinsic value oI moral subject must be respected in an
absolute way. Since it is becoming ever more possible to use technological and chemical
means to reduce a moral subject to the state oI an automaton, it is extremely important to
emphasize the irreducible value and dignity oI the human person as a moral agent.
Everyone has the inalienable right to be treated as a moral agent and his psychological
integrity must be respected in such a way that his ability to act and react in a conscious,
Iree, and responsible way in his relationships with others is preserved.
Recent studies +6 Iurnish very valuable inIormation with respect to priorities in the
domain oI premoral values. SuIIice it to mention the main points. First, the diIIerent
premoral values do not hold the same rank and position in the hierarchy oI values. With
respect to the distinction between lower and higher values " humanistic psychology " seems
to be very helpIul Ior moralists. All other things being equal, the higher value has to be
given priority. Second, the urgency oI a value has to be taken into account. Urgency can
mean that a value can only be saved by an immediate action (e.g., helping a person in
extreme distress, saving a drowning person). It can also mean that values are the
Ioundation or the condition oI possibility oI higher values (e.g., the realization oI the values
oI objective culture is the indispensable support oI subjective culture). A special urgency
relates to the premoral value oI human liIe, because liIe is the necessary condition Ior the
actualization oI all other values. Third. the degree

'CI. Iootnote 12.
+8 CI. especially the works oI Abraham H. Maslow.

oI probability is to be considered: when, in an alternative, the possibility oI realizing a
higher value is hardly likely, it may be preIerable to decide to actualize a lower but
certainly obtainable value. Fourth, our conduct has to be appropriate Ior preserving and
Iurthering a value in the long run: a person who is so wrapped up in his proIessional task
that he neglects sleep, recreation, etc. will in the long run jeopardize the value he intends to
serve. FiIth, special attention must be paid to the values protected by institutions which are
likely to aIIect social liIe. It is no wonder that, especially in this connection, moralists
stress that beIore perIorming an action which departs Irom institutional rules we must
answer particular questions : Would I or someone else make the same judgment about the
moral choice in any situation which is similar in the morally relevant aspects (the
requirement oI universalizability) ? What would happen iI everyone were to perIorm a
similar action in a similar situation (the generalization argument) ? What will happen iI
others are inIluenced by our action to do likewise (the wedge argument) ?
Evidently, no description oI the ordo caritatis and the ordo bonorum is able to clariIy
each concrete situation. Ethical rules are not recipes. This is the meaning oI the classical
teaching on the virtue oI prudence, which must govern our whole moral liIe. Prudence can
only lead to a practical certitude; but even practical certitude is not attainable in every
situation. Be this as it may, a morally good person, that is, a subject who cultivates the
Iundamental disposition oI love and the inner attitudes which are the moral virtues, with all
other things being equal, will have the greatest chance to comply with the demands oI
priorities (cognitio per connaturalitatem seu affinitatem).

2. CONCRETE MATERIAL NORMS ARE AFFECTED BY HISTORICITY

We have said that culture is a social and historical reality. By virtue oI the constant
interaction between objective and subjective culture, the cultural patrimony grows
continuously through the elaboration oI new values (although this development is not
necessarily a progress, since some values can be neglected and the hierarchy oI values
disturbed). Morals in the sense oI behavior patterns according to the social ethos are
part oI the culture attainment. Since ethics must be a critical reIlection on the existing ethos
and since it must prescribe the realization oI the premoral values made possible by
increasing cultural acquisitions, it should direct the cultural evolution and maniIest its own
dynamic development and disclosure. In this sense we say that ethics is aIIected by
historicity.
The historicity oI ethics does not mean that in the course oI time all material norms
will disappear and will have to be replaced with others. In all likelihood, Ior instance, it
would never be desirable

to cancel out the concrete, material norm 'you shall not kill. For every community it will
remain important to proclaim the high value oI human liIe as well as the grave premoral
disvalue involved in killing human beings. Yet even with respect to this norm there is
historicity. Traditionally many proportionate reasons were admitted Ior the justiIication oI
killing, not only in the case oI selI-deIense, but also with respect to capital punishment
(heresy, sorcery. etc.) and to holy wars (the crusades). Nowadays we are much more
nuanced with respect to the matter oI the death-penalty and war.
But historicity can also mean that a traditional concrete norm is abandoned and
replaced by another. For instance, Ior centuries our Western tradition maintained the norm
" marital intercourse only Ior procreation (concubitus propter solam procreationem). In
other words, conjugal chastity consisted in limiting sexual intercourse Ior the sake oI
procreation and spouses had to abstain Irom sexual relations during pregnancy and at old
age when there is no longer any prospect oI generation. The Iact that today we attribute a
much richer meaning to sexual intercourse shows how considerable historicity is, even in
such an important domain as that oI human sexuality. But such a substantial change does
not eliminate continuity with the past. Sexual intercourse retains its orientation to
procreation, but in the sense oI parenthood as the Iruit oI conjugal love.
In short, historicity is unavoidable with regard to the -concrete material norms oI a
dynamic ethics.

3. MORAL EVALUATION IS ONLY POSSIBLE CONCERNING THE WHOLE
ACTION

We have said that a concrete, material norm concerns a whole series oI actions which
are comparable in so Iar as they have a similar material content. Even when that material
content involves a premoral disvalue, the whole action can be morally right, when we have
a proportionate reason Ior admitting or causing the premoral disvalue. In other words, it is
impossible to make a moral judgment about the material content oI an action, without
considering the whole act: material content (actus externus, what is done), the situation, or,
classically, the circumstances and the Ioreseeable consequences. A judgment about moral
rightness or wrongness is only possible with respect to that totality, because only
concerning that whole is it possible to argue whether or not it expresses the priority oI the
lesser premoral disvalue or oI the higher premoral value. II, in addition, we evaluate the
moral goodness or badness oI the action, we must answer the question oI whether
motivation and intention result Irom a morally good disposition or not.

St. Thomas illustrates this view by considering a series oI actions, the material
content oI which is killing a man (occidere hominem). He emphasizes that homicide
involves a serious disorder (occidere hominem vel percutere in se deformitatem quandam
importat) but that this disorder can be outweighed by circumstances which make the whole
action a right one (aliae circumstantiae possunt supervenire ita honestantes actum, quod
praedictae inordinationes totaliter evacuantur). In a more general way he adds: 'There are
some actions which, absolutely considered involve a deIinite deIormity or disorder, but
which are made right by reason oI particular circumstances, as the killing oI a man.....
involves a serious disorder in itselI but, iI it be added that the man is an evildoer killed Ior
justice` sake... it is not sinIul, rather it is virtuous. +A It is obvious that in this text Thomas
speaks oI the material content oI an action (actiones absolute consideratae) independently
oI its real circumstances, that the disorder to which he points in that content (deformitatem
ve' inordinationem quandam) is not moral wrongness (which could never be counter-
balanced), but what we call a premoral disvalue, and that by the outweighing circumstances
(circumstantiae honestantes actum) he means that the whole action, considered in all its
elements, (circumstances) is morally right because there is a proportionate reason to justiIy
the causing oI a premoral disvalue. Thomas says that a one and the same material act,
killing a man (unus actus secundum speciem naturae), can be diIIerent acts Irom the
viewpoint oI morality (actus diversos secundum speciem moris) because oI the diIIerent
ends oI the will (ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis). The material event or what is done
to kill a man can be the material element oI a total action which according to the
concrete situation (circumstantiae), or to the intention (finem voluntatis) and the
Ioreseeable consequences, will be a morally wrong act (actus vitii) or a morally right act
(actus virtutis),
28
Ior example in a case oI selI-deIense. Moreover, Thomas emphasizes that
in the cases in which the act oI killing is morally right, behavior is morally good only iI the
intention and the motivation are the Iruit oI a morally good disposition. A soldier who kills
in a just war or an executioner who carries out a death-penalty perIorm a morally bad
action iI they act out oI immoral motives.
29
Only the whole action material content,
situation or circumstances, Ioreseeable consequences is subject to a moral judgment.
In connection with most domains oI human conduct, moral theology has always
recognized that we speak prematurely about morality, when

+A Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibet 9, q. 7, art, 15. 'Sunt quaedam actiones quae absolute consideratae
deIorn~itatem vel inordinationem quandam important, quae tamen aliquibus circumstantiis advenientibus bonae eIIicluntur,
sicut occidere hominem.., in se deIormitatem quandam importat, sed si addatur occidere maleIactorem propter iustitiarn,,. non
erit peccatum, sed virtuosum.
28111, q. 1, art. 3 ad 3.
291! II, q. 64, art. 7 in corpore and ad 1.

we make a moral judgment about the material content (actus externus) oI an action,
detached Irom the whole action.
Concerning some categories oI actions traditional morals has practiced yet another
approach. There are some domains in which it has immediately identiIied God`s moral will
with 'nature and its Iinality. On this assumption it is evident that a moral judgment can be
Iormed about the material content (actus externus) apart Irom the total action when what is
done is 'against nature (vitium contra naturam). Being against nature, which is the
expression oI God`s moral will, the external action is in itselI (de se) and intrinsically)
(intrinsece) morally wrong. The value oI this way oI reasoning evidently depends on the
truth oI the presupposition. Is it true that there are domains oI conduct in which nature is
equivalent to God`s moral will The answer to this question will determine whether or not a
duality oI methods or ways oI reasoning has to be admitted in our moral theology.
Mainly but not exclusively ;) traditional sexual ethics mentions 'sins against
nature. To examine the rationale oI this way oI thinking, we will consult St. Thomas. Up
to the present time oI oIIicial documents concerning sexuality reIer to him.
3
` Moreover
age-old tradition in which the role oI St. Augustine was decisive Ior many centuries has
been systematically elaborated in Thomas` treatise, De lege naturali. In a central text oI
this treatise on natural law ;+ Thomas aIIirms that the order oI the precepts oI natural law
depends on the order oI our natural inclinations (inclinationes naturales) and the value:
(bona) responding to them. In the order oI natural precepts he distinguishes three levels.
With respect to sexual sins 'against nature.` we are interested in the second level. " Second.
man has a natural inclination to some more special values according to the nature which he
has in common with the other animals and in this sense it is said that all that nature has
taught all animals belongs to natural law, such as sexual intercourse between male and
Iemale, care oI the oIIspring and the like. It is clear that Thomas reIers here to the Roman
jurist Ulpian who gives the same deIinition oI natural law (ius naturale est quod natura
omnia animalia docuit) and oIIered the same examples. Thomas talks in this text about
the generic or biological natural law. In this perspective sexual intercourse is a biological
act

:) There is, e.g.. the lie. Many theologians deIine the lie as the voluntary uttering oI a Ialsehood and argue that to say an
untruth goes against the nature oI language. But in every century some Iathers and theologians made a distinction between
falsiloquium (premoral disvalue) and mendacium (morally wrong action) and indicated diIIerent proportionate reasons
justiIying a falsiloquium. CI. G. Muller, Die Wahr haftigkeitspflicht und die Problematik der Luge, Verlag Herder,
Freiburg, 1962.
;( Humanae Jitae, n. 10.
;+ J II, q. 94, art. 2.
~ Digest, lib. I, tit. 1, n. I, 2-4.

(actus naturalis). as are eating and drinking.
3~
ReIerring to Augustine. Thomas asserts that
sexual intercourse is to the maintenance oI human race what eating and drinking are to the
subsistence oI the individual. He concludes: 'As the use oI Iood is not sinIul when it is
conIined within a proper measure and order (debito modo et ordine) in as much as it is
subservient to the health oI our body, so the use oI the sexual Iaculty is not sinIul iI it
happens in a right measure and order in as much as it is subservient to its end which is
procreation. According to a centuries-old tradition, especially advocated by the Stoics and
the Neo-Pythagoricians, which contended that intercourse is only justiIied Ior the sake oI
procreation (it is said that, among animals, the Iemale reIuses all sexual intercourse aIter
she has become pregnant. Thomas repeats the concrete, material norm . concubitus propter
solam procreationem. In his view, as well as that oI Augustine. this is the order written in
nature (ordo naturae inditus).
37
Now, this order comes Irom God himselI (ordo naturae est
ab ipso Deo), the Creator oI nature (natura cuius ille auctor est).
"#

According to Thomas, the order and requirement oI the biological nature is so evident,
that it is perceived immediately (secundum absolutam sui considerationem). This
immediate perception pertains not only to man but also to the animals, so that at that level
natural law is common to man and animaIs. The only diIIerence is that animals perceive
the order in an instinctive way (aestimatio naturalis) B 40 whereas man has an immediate
understanding oI the Iinality written by God in biological nature.
From this premise it is obvious in what sense Thomas speaks oI unchaste actions
against nature. Sexual activities excluding procreation (Thomas classiIies them in an order
oI ascendent gravity: masturbation, marital contraceptive, intercourse, homosexuality,
bestiality) are sins against biological nature (contra naturam omnis animalis).41 They are
graver than the sins which do not exclude procreation (in ascendent degree oI gravity:
Iornication, adultery, incest), because they go directly against God, the Creator who
expresses his will in

4
Summa contra Gentiles, lib. III, cap. 123.
% III!. q. 153, art. 2.
:* CI. L. Janssens, Manage et fecondite. De Casti Connubii a Gaudium et Spes, J. Duculot, Gembloux-Parjs,
1967.
$ St Augustine, Contra Faustum, XXII, c. 30 (PL, 42, 420) : 'Lex aeterna, id est, voluntas Dei creaturarum omnium
conditoris conservando naturali ordini consulens, non C" satiandae libidini serviatur, sed Ut saluti generis prospiciatur, ad
prolem tantummodo propagandam mortalis carnis delectationem dominatu rationis in concubitum relaxari sinit, Ibid., c. 61
(PL, 42, 438) : " Consulta quippe aeterna lex lIla, quae ordinem naturalem conservari iubet, perturbarl vetat, non njsi propaga-
tionis causa statuit hominis concubitum Iieri, et hoc non nisi socialiter ordinato connubio, quod non pervertat vinculum
pacis.
381111, q. 154, art. 12 ad I and 2.
~ III!, q. 57, art. 3.
7) II, q. 6, art. 2.
~IIII, q. 154, art, 11 and 12 ad 4; De Male,, q. 15, art. 1 ad 7.

the biological nature.
42
ThereIore, in a certain sense they are even graver than sacrilege.~
3

Why did Thomas, as well as the tradition beIore him, come to consider, Ior instance,
masturbation as graver than Iornication, adultery and incest? Why did he identiIy in the
domain oI sexuality God`s will with biological nature and its Iinality? The most important
reason which still has its inIluence on the vocabulary we use today in matters oI
sexuality and procreation is unquestionably the then prevailing view oI procreation. To
clariIy the process oI human procreation. many philosophers (Aristotle, Plutarch, Seneca,
etc.) and Fathers (Athenagoras, Augustine, etc.) drew a parallel with the sower who spreads
the seed on his Iield and then waits till the harvest is gathered beIore sowing again. The
seed already contains the plant in germ and the Iield, receiving it, must only supply the
proper environment Ior the development oI the plant. In the same way the male sperm was
considered as a seed (hence the expression : male seed, semen virile), in which a potential
human liIe is present. The womb was as a Iield in which the seed had to be received
(hence: conception) in order to have the conditions necessary Ior its development. Thomas
shares that view. He writes that the male seed contains a human liIe in potentiality (semen
humanum in quo est homo in potentia) and he adds that Ior that reason Aristotle asserted
that there is something divine in the male seed (in semine hominis esse quiddam divinum in
quantum scilicet est homo in potentia.
44
ThereIore the emission oI seed must be reserved to
the necessity oI procreation (quaeritur in semine... ut emittatur ad generationis utilitatem
ad quam coitus ordinatur) 45 This also explains why, according to Thomas, the sinIulness
oI masturbation consists in wasting male seed and that Ior the degree oI gravity it comes
immediately aIter murder: 'The unjustiIied emission oI seed conIlicts with the good oI
nature which intends the maintenance oI the human race; thereIore, aIter murder destroying
a human nature actually existing, this sin comes in the second place. since it prevents the
production oI a human nature. 46 This also explains why medieval tradition was not
concerned with Iemale masturbation.
As long as this view oI human generation was held, it was evident that in the domain
oI sexuality it was possible to make a moral judgment concerning an external action, apart
Irom the whole act, when it was perIormed against biological nature (vitium contra
naturam). Since, according to that view, wasting male seed was immediately connected
with a potential human liIe, it was no wonder that

7+ ~~~~, q. 154, art. 12.

*; III!. q. 154, art. 12 ad 2.
~ De Malo. q. 15, art. 2 in corpore.
~ Summa contra Gentiles, lib. III, cap. 122.
~ Summa contra Gentiles. lib. III, cap. 122.

biological nature and its Iinality were directly identiIied with God`s moral will.
Today this view is completely obsolete. Science has proved that only in a zygote or
through the Iusion oI a male and Iemale gamete can potential human liIe be present. On the
other hand, we no longer consider sexual intercourse as a biological action (actus naturae)
but as a personal act 'which signiIies and Iosters the selI-giving by which the couple gladly
and grateIully enrich each other. In that perspective it is no longer possible to identiIy
God`s moral will with the biological nature and its Iinality. Nature in us and outside oI us
is rather the material with which we have to deal in a truly human way. It is true that nature
has its Iixed properties and natural laws, so that there are limits in our dominion over it (cI.
what we said about ambiguity).
The question is how can we discover God`s moral will, since that will is not written
in biological processes and Iunctions or in nature outside oI us. To achieve that purpose,
God endowed us with reason enlightened by the revelation oI the Old and New Testament.
Now, revelation teaches us 1) that we are created in God`s image and that procreation and,
in general, nature in us and outside oI us have been committed to our responsibility and 2)
that we ought to accomplish our responsible task according to the demands oI a love-ethics
and oI its priorities. This means, as we have tried to explain in the Ioregoing
considerations, that in each action we must give priority to the lesser premoral evil or to the
higher premoral value. In other words, we must respect the ordo caritatis and the ordo
bonorum. In this way we overcome the duality in the methodological approach to moral
questions. In order to make a judgment about the moral rightness or wrongness oI our
conduct, in the domain oI sexuality as well as in the domains oI our actively dealing with
the other temporal realities, we have in each case to consider the whole action with all the
elements oI the concrete situation, because only with respect to the total action is it
possible to examine whether or not it respects the demands oI priorities.
The pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes is the Iirst document oI the magisterium
which deals with sexuality in the same manner as has been traditionally done Ior most
other domains oI human conduct. Overcoming the duality oI approach, it opens the way to
one and the same method oI reasoning in ethical problems. It does not call the marital act a
biological action (actus naturae), but an act oI the person. It explicitly rejects the merely
biological consideration oI human sexuality. With respect to the moral evaluation oI sexual
intercourse, it emphasizes that objective criteria should be Iollowed, criteria which are
Iounded on the nature and the dignity oI the

human person and oI his acts. Concerning sexual intercourse in marriage it proposes an
objective standard which 'has regard Ior the whole meaning oI mutual selI-giving and
human procreation in the context oI true love. 48 This standard summarizes what the
constitution previously said about sexual intercourse as uniquely expressing and perIecting
marital love (n. 49) and about responsible parenthood (n. 50). In this personalistic
perspective it becomes clear that one has to consider the whole action and the whole
context oI marital and Iamilial liIe in order to Iorm a moral judgment about the morality oI
sexual intercourse,
The encyclical Humanae Jitae did not reIer to the personalistic standard oI Gaudium
et Spes. Instead it reverts to the biological conception oI natural law, with an explicit
reIerence to the central text oI Thomas` treatise on natural law (n. 10). It is no wonder,
then, that it, puts Iorth a moral judgment about the material content oI sexual activity, apart
Irom the whole action and the whole context in the sense that what is done (actus
externus) is denounced as in itselI and intrinsically immoral (n. 14) iI it goes against the
biological processes and their Iunctions (n. 10, 12, 17). which God willed in his work oI
creation (n. 10, 13) so that no higher value is able to justiIy it (n. 14). The same
argumentation is used in the Documenturn circa sterili:ationem in noscomiis catholicis oI
the Congregation Ior the Doctrine oI the Faith (March 13. 1975) and the Declaration on
certain questions concerning sexual ethics (December 29, 1975" oI the same Congregation.
The diIIerence between Gaudium et Spes and Humanae Jitae with regard to the
methodological approach and the divergent views resulting Irom the diIIerent ways oI
reasoning has struck theologians.
49
Bernard Haring describes the dissonance with a
signiIicant comparison 'It is almost as diIIicult to reconcile Humanae Jitae with Gaudium
et Spes as it is to reconcile the Svllabus oI Pius IX with Vatican II`s Declaration on
Religious Libertv.`
50
The diIIiculty oI reconciliation has compelled the moralists to Iurther
and renewed reIlection. In our humble opinion, the most important result oI the combined
eIIorts in the Iield oI Iundamental moral theology consists in overcoming more and more
the duality (dualism) oI past eIIorts in moral discourse, in 1aying, the Ioundations Ior a one
and the same methodological approach to ethical problems concerning the temporal
realities and relationships and in evaluating them according to the demands oI a love-ethics
and its priorities. In this regard we cannot Iail to

7: Gaudium et Spes. n. 51.
~ Ph. Delhaye, Lencvclique Humanae vitae et lenseignement de Jatican le manage et Ia famille (Gaudium
et spes), in Bifdragen. t. 29, 1968, 35l-
;D B. Haring, New Hori:ons for the Church in the Modern World Indiana, 1968, p. 83.

mention the important contributions made Ior example, by Peter Knauer,
51
JoseI Fuchs,
52
Richard McCormick,
53
Bruno Schuller
54
and the signiIicant studies edited by the last
named which apply this manner oI reasoning to special Iields oI moral behavior,
55

+( P. Knauer, La determination du bien et du ma' par le pnincipe du double effet in NRT, "# 87, 1965. 356-376.
Id., tiberlegungen run moraltheologischen Pnin:ipienlehre den En:vklika Humanae vitae in Theologie und Philosophie, "#
45, 1970, 60-74.
~ J. Fuchs, The Absoluteness of Moral Terms in Gregorianum, "# 52, 1971, 4 15-458.
~ McCormick, Ambiguitv in Moral Choice. Kennedy Center Ior Bioethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.,
1973, and his important Notes on Moral Theologv in Theological Studies since 1971.
B. Schuller, Die Begniindung sittlicher Urteile. Tvpen ethischer Argumentation in den kat holisc hen
Moraltheologie, Patmos-Verlag, DsseldorI, 1973; idem, Neuere Beitrage :um Thema 'Begrundung sittlicher Normen` in
Theologische Benichte, Benziger, Einsiedeln, "# 7B (EA7B 109-181.
~ CI. Iootnotes 7, 10 and 11 and also R.D. PIahl, Haftung ohne Jerschulden als sittliche Pflicht in Moraltheologische
Studien herausgegeben von Bruno Sch:iller, Patmos-Verlag, DsseldorI, 1974.
1

Norms and Priorities in Love Ethics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Norms and Priorities in Love Ethics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Norms and Priorities in Love Ethics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

207 Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics

You might also like